

**CONTESTED IDENTITIES: TUAN GURU AND AHMADIYAH IN THE
REDRAWING OF POST-1998 SASAK-MUSLIM BOUNDARY LINES IN
LOMBOK**

BY

SITTI SANI NURHAYATI

**A thesis submitted to Victoria University of Wellington
in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy**

Victoria University of Wellington

2020

Abstract

This study examines what drives the increasing hostility towards Ahmadiyah in post-Suharto Lombok. Fieldwork was undertaken in three villages – Pemongkong, Pancor and Ketapang – where Ahmadiyah communities lived and experienced violent attacks from 1998 to 2010. The stories from these villages are analysed within the context of a revival of local religious authority and the redefinition of the paradigm of ethno-religious identity. Furthermore, this thesis contends that the redrawing of identity in Lombok generates a new interdependency of different religious authorities, as well as novel political possibilities following the regime change. Finally, the thesis concludes there is a need to understand intercommunal religious violence by reference to specific local realities. Concomitantly, there is a need for greater caution in offering sweeping universal Indonesia-wide explanations that need to be qualified in terms of local contexts.

Acknowledgements

Alhamdulillah.

I would especially like to express my sincere gratitude and heartfelt appreciation to my primary supervisor, Professor Paul Morris. As my supervisor and mentor, Paul has taught me more than I could ever give him credit for here. My immense gratitude also goes to my secondary supervisors, Drs Geoff Troughton and Eva Nisa, for their thoughtful guidance and endless support, which enabled me, from the initial to the final stages of my doctoral study, to meaningfully engage in the whole thesis writing process.

This work would not have been possible without the financial support of the New Zealand Aid Scholarships. I truly appreciate the support from the scholarship team, Lin, Clemmie, Ryan and Vivian – thank you. To Sally Jackman and Helen Greatrex, thank you for valuable comments and professional assistance in proofreading my thesis.

I would also like to thank Aliko Kalliabetsos who keeps reminding me to be grateful for having a sweet little family. Together with Hanlie, you both make me realise that “a home is not a place, home is with the person who shares in your grief and helps you carry the burden of loss”.

I would further like to thank Margaret Speirs and Brooklynne Mitchell of the Wellington Women House (WWH) for their enormous support during a critical period of my study. Also, to WWH alumnis, Donna and Inge, I will miss you all.

Nobody has been more important to me in the pursuit of this project than the members of my family. I would like to thank my parents, Aminah and Khalid Putraslam, whose love and guidance are with me in whatever I pursue. I am also grateful for the endless support of my in-laws, Lalu Marzuki and Muiyah. Most importantly, I wish to thank my loving and supportive hubby, Mmq, and my three wonderful children, Luqi, Dudi, Mukti, who came with laughter when there was none and brought joy to my life once more.

Table of Contents

Abstract	i
Acknowledgements	iii
Table of Contents	v
List of Abbreviations	viii
Glossary	ixx
Chapter 1. The Paradox of Democratic Indonesia	1
Introduction.....	1
Research Question.....	5
Research Design.....	6
Literature Review.....	9
(1) Inter-religious conflicts during 1998-2004	10
(2) Intra-religious conflicts from 2005 onwards.....	12
Significance of Study	24
Scope of Study	26
Analytical Rubric	27
1. Three sources of religious authority in Islam	27
2. Discourse	31
Organisation of the Thesis.....	31
Chapter 2. Tuan Guru and Religious Authority in Lombok	35
Introduction.....	35
Topography and Demography of Lombok.....	35
Islam and the Religion of the Sasak.....	38
Decentralisation and Local Identities.....	45
Nahdlatul Wathan (NW), Tuan Guru and Religious Authority.....	50
1. Tuan Guru.....	50
2. NW and The Seat of <i>Tuan Guru Belek</i>	55
Paramilitia in Post-1998 Lombok	59

Satgas Hamzanwadi, Amphibi and Hizbullah.....	61
Conclusion.....	63
Chapter 3. The National Context of Opposition Against Ahmadiyah	66
Introduction	66
Ahmadiyah in India.....	66
Ahmadiyah in Indonesia.....	68
1. Pre-Independence: Muhammadiyah and Persis Responses	72
2. Post-Independence.....	77
Government response and the “big tent”	90
Conclusion.....	95
Chapter 4. Contestation of Identity in Post-1998 Lombok.....	98
Introduction	98
Ahmadiyah in Lombok	98
Attacks in Post-1998 Lombok.....	99
Local Explanations.....	105
1. The Elites (MUI and Religious Leaders) on the Prophethood Issue.....	105
2. A Contrasting Identity: Villagers vs. Ahmadis.....	108
Sub-Local Explanations: Tuan Guru’s Revival.....	130
1. <i>Amphibi</i> : A Challenge from Tuan Guru Sibawaih Mutawalli.....	132
2. Attacks in Pancor, 2002: Killing Two Birds with One Stone.....	135
3. Ketapang Case: No-Proselytisation.....	138
Conclusion.....	140
Chapter 5. Conclusion	143
Sunni-Indonesian-Sasak-Muslims: Necessary Elements vs. Explanatory Variables	144
Bibliography.....	155
Appendix A	177

List of Abbreviations

Gafatar	Gerakan Fajar Nusantara (Fajar Nusantara Movement)
GAI	Gerakan Ahmadiyah Indonesia
JAI	Jemaah Ahmadiyah Indonesia
KTP	Kartu Tanda Penduduk or the national ID card
LPPI	Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengkajian Islam (Institute for Islamic Study and Research)
MKI	National Council for Islamic Religious Affairs of Malaysia
MUI	The Indonesian Ulama Council
MUNAS	National Deliberative Council
NASAKOM	Nasionalis Agama Komunis (Nationalism Religion and Communism)
NTB	Nusa Tenggara Barat
NU	Nahdlatul Ulama
NW	Nahdlatul Wathan
OIC	Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (previously Organisation of Islamic Conference)
Pancasila	Five principles of the official foundational philosophical theory of Indonesia
PBB	Partai Bulan Bintang (The Moon and Crescent Party)
Persis	Persatuan Islam (Islamic Union)
PKI	Partai Komunis Indonesia (the Indonesian Communist Party)
PPB	Pemuda Pancor Bersatu (The United People of Pancor)
PPP	Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (The United Development Party)
PSII	Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Union Islamic Party)
SARA	Suku, Ras, Agama (Ethnic, Race, Religion)
SBY	Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono

SIPILIS	Secularism, Pluralism, Liberalism
SKB	Surat Keputusan Bersama (Joint Ministerial Decree)
Tuan Guru	Religious leader(s) in Lombok
Tuan Guru Belek	Big Tuan Guru
Tuan Guru Kodek	Local Tuan Guru
Datu Tuan Guru Belek	The King of Tuan Gurus
Ustadz	Religious teacher
VOC	Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie (The Dutch East India Company)

Glossary

Adat	Local custom and social processes, akin to local rules.
Agama	The Indonesian government defined agama as an internationally recognised monotheistic creed with a holy scripture, a concept of prophethood and universal ethical teachings.
Amphibi	Name of the largest of Lombok's militia during the late 1990s and early 2000s.
Aqida or Aqidah	Literally means faith or basis of faith.
Chanda	Chanda is Ahmadiyah members' contribution towards the organisation – there is a compulsory and voluntary chanda.
Chanda aam	Annual chanda.
Da'wah or Dakwah	Islamic missionary activities.
Datu Tuan Guru Belek	The most supreme local religious leader in Lombok.
Fatwa	Religious edict.
Fiqh	Islamic jurisprudence.
Hadith	These are reports of the Prophet Muhammad's acts, words and practices. It acts a prophetic tradition for followers of the Islamic faith to emulate.
Hajj	Pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina by Muslims.
Hezbollah	A Lombok militia controlled by Nahdlatul Wathan Anjani.
Hisba	Inspection or control of observance of Islamic principles.
Huzur	Ahmadiyah Caliph.
imam	The leader of a communal prayer

Imam	Spiritual leaders of the Twelver Imam sect
Jihad	A struggle or fight against the enemies of Islam or the spiritual struggle within oneself against sin.
JKF-MKI	The National Fatwa Committee of Malaysia
Khatam al-nabiyyin	Within the Sunni-Muslim community translated as “the seal of the prophet”.
Khatib	The man who gives religious preaching during a Friday prayer.
Khuddam	Refers to young male Ahmadis.
Madrassah	Islamic school.
Mahdi	The promised Messiah.
Majelis Tarjih	The Council of Law-Making.
Majma’ al-Fiqh al-Islami	The council of Islamic jurisprudence.
Ma’shum	Free from sin.
Masyarakat Pancor Bersatu	Or known as PPB, it was one local organisation promoting Pancor as a model city for its modernity and religiosity (Islam).
Mazhab	School of Islamic jurisprudence – in Indonesia the majority of Muslims are followers of Syafi’i mazhab.
Mubahalah	Duel prayer.
Mubaligh	Preacher.
Mufti	Those in charge of issuing fatwa.
Muhaddath	A person spoken to by Allah.
Muhammadiyah	An Indonesian modernist, mass Muslim organisation in Indonesia.
MUI	Council of Indonesian Muslim Scholars, a quasi-state body that oversees religious matters and delivers fatwa.

Mujaddid	A reformer
Mushaf Fatimah	According to Shi'ah tradition, a book written by Imam Ali for Fatimah the daughter of Prophet Muhammad.
Nagari	Customary institutions in West Sumatra.
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)	A traditionalist mass Muslim organisation in Indonesia.
Nahdlatul Wathan (NW)	A local traditionalist mass Muslim organisation in Lombok. NW has rival branches in Anjani and Pancor.
Qur'an	The main religious text of the Islamic faith.
Rabithah Alam al Islamy	The World Muslim League.
Ristha Nata	The matchmaking department within Ahmadiyah.
Reformasi	Reformation/Reform Era: the political and legal reform process that brought democracy and decentralisation to Indonesia after the resignation of President Suharto in May 1998.
R1/Rauhun	The eldest daughter of NW's founder, the leading figure of NW Pancor branch.
R2/Raihanun	The youngest daughter of NW's founder, the leading figure of NW Anjani branch.
Sadaqa	Refers to voluntarily charity in Islam.
Salafi movements	A religious group which accepts only Qur'an and the prophet tradition as the source of law.
Sasak	Ethnic group indigenous to Lombok.
Satgas Hamzanwadi NW	The Lombok militia controlled by NW Pancor.
Shari'ah	Islamic Law.
Shi'ah	The branch of Islam that believes that Ali succeeded Muhammad as leader, and that places emphasis on the prophet's family.

Tabligh Akbar	Mass religious meeting or religious rally.
Tuan Guru	Local religious leader(s) in Lombok.
Tuan Guru Belek	Big Tuan Guru, religious leaders whose followers come from various regions.
Tuan Guru Kodek	Local religious leaders whose followers usually lived nearby or in close proximity to the clerics.
Ulama	The orthodox Sasak-Muslim majority in Lombok.
VOC	Religious leader in Islam
Waktu Lima	Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie (The Dutch East India Company)
Wetu Telu	Mainstream Muslim in Lombok
Wasiyyat	A local heterodox Muslim group in Lombok.
Zakat	Will of the deceased.

Chapter I

The Paradox of Democratic Indonesia

“It is a mixed and unsettled, fluctuating picture, without center and without edge – resistant to summary, hard to hold in place. As virtually everything has happened, it seems that virtually anything might; and it is impossible to tell whether all this stir and agitation – what the Indonesians, with their usual gift for verbal camouflage, have come to call reformasi – is the end of something or the beginning of something.”¹

(Clifford Geertz, 2012)

Introduction

With more than 200 million Muslims, Indonesia is the state with the largest Islamic population in the world. After more than three decades of military and one-party rule the regime change in 1998 opened the way to democratic change.² This transition to democracy has been widely hailed and regarded by many Indonesians, as well as others, as something of a success story. The transition saw attempts at military reform,³ increased political freedom for Indonesians,⁴ and campaigning by numerous civil society organisations seeking greater local and national government accountability.⁵ Free and mostly fair elections, freedom of the press,⁶ as well as a multi-party system seem to have helped the country move away from military rule.⁷ Since 1998, there has been considerable evidence that Muslim activists played an important role in ensuring a peaceful and far-reaching

¹ Clifford Geertz, *Life Among the Anthros and Other Essays* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 114.

² Felix Heiduk, “Between A Rock and A Hard Place: Radical Islam in Post-Suharto Indonesia,” *International Journal of Conflicts and Violence* 6, no 1 (2012): 27.

³ Douglas Webber, “A Consolidated Patrimonial Democracy? Democratization in Post-Suharto Indonesia,” *Paper to be presented at the 'Post Cold-War Democratization in the Muslim World: Domestic, Regional and Global Trends' Workshop* (2005): 1-29.

⁴ Luthfi Assyaukanie, *Islam and the Secular State in Indonesia* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2009), 178.

⁵ Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW), and Lingkar Madani untuk Indonesia (LIMA), are examples of these organisations.

⁶ Khrisna Sen and David T. Hill, *Media, Culture and Politics in Indonesia* (Jakarta: Equinox, 2007).

⁷ Heiduk, “Between a Rock and a Hard Place,” 27-28.

transition to greater democracy.⁸ Leading scholars characterise post-Suharto Muslim political activities as being in the spirit of “political moderation”, in which institutions and political opportunities provide incentives for previously excluded groups to enter the system, abandon more radical tactics, and “play by the rules”.⁹

The violent conflicts that took place following President Suharto’s downfall in 1998, however, raise questions concerning the correctness of the above interpretation of moderation. During 1998-2001, more than 10,000 people died during Muslim-Christian conflicts in the Moluccan islands, and pressure increased on ‘deviant’ Muslim groups, such as Ahmadiyah and Gafatar, who experienced violence across Indonesia amid calls for the government to ban them.¹⁰

I was born in Mataram, the capital of West Nusa Tenggara (NTB) province, and I was raised within a devoted Waktu Lima family.¹¹ As a native Sasak, I am fluent in local Lombok dialects. This has allowed me to comfortably interview my informants in the field, especially *Tuan Guru*, Ahmadis and the villagers, since they all are Sasak who speak local dialects. My first acquaintance with Ahmadiyah was in 1999 when I was studying for my BA in Semarang, Central Java, and one of my colleagues asked me how far my residence was from the village where the Ahmadiyah was attacked. I asked myself, an attack on a minority group in Lombok, is that really possible? What I read and heard seemed to be completely in contrast to the Lombok I knew. Despite the fact that it is known as the “island of a thousand mosques”, other religious groups have lived harmoniously side by side with the Muslim majority for centuries.

I became more interested once I found out that the scale of hostility towards the Ahmadiyah was more severe and more resolute than towards other minority religious groups in Indonesia, such as Darul Arqam (Al-Arqam) and Shi’a (Shi’a).¹² Violence towards Ahmadiyah involved the destruction of places of worship, as well as physical terror

⁸ Greg Barton, “Indonesia: Legitimacy, Secular Democracy, and Islam,” *Politics and Policy* 38, no. 3 (2010): 473.

⁹ Jillian Schwedler, “Islamists in Power? Inclusion, Moderation, and the Arab Uprisings,” *Middle East Development Journal* 5, no. 1 (2013): 1350006-3-1350006-5, Robert Hefner, “The Study of Religious Freedom in Indonesia,” *The Review of Faith & International Affairs* 11, no. 2 (2013): 18-27.

¹⁰ Erni Budiwanti, “Pluralism Collapse: A Study of the Jama’ah Ahmadiyah Indonesia and Its Persecution,” *Asia Research Institute Working Papers Series*, no. 117 (2009): 3.

¹¹ For more information about Waktu Lima, see Chapter 2 of this thesis under the sub-heading “Islam and the Religion of the Sasak” on page 37.

¹² Al Makin, “Homogenizing Indonesian Islam: Persecution of the Shi’a Group in Yogyakarta,” *Studia Islamika* 24, no. 1 (2017): 1-32.

and the relocation of Ahmadiyah members from their home towns. Besides that, some villages in different regions refused to issue the national ID card (KTP) to Ahmadiyah members, resulting in poor and restricted access to education and public health services.¹³

The Setara Institute reported that:

- In 2007, from 185 violations to freedom of religion occurrences across Indonesia, 15 were directed towards Ahmadiyah
- In 2008, from 367 violation acts, 238 targeted Ahmadiyah
- In 2009, from 291 violation cases, 33 were aimed at the Ahmadiyah community.

Despite the fluctuating figures, the numbers of attacks directed at Ahmadiyah are still striking.¹⁴

From July 1998 to February 2011, attacks on Ahmadiyah members took place in different places in Indonesia, including Pemongkong, East Lombok (October 1998), Pancor, East Lombok (September 2002), Tasikmalaya, West Java (December 2007), Sukabumi, West Java (April 2008), Bogor, West Java (April 2008), Makassar, South Sulawesi (June 2008) and Cikeusik, West Java (February 2011). The occurrences in Lombok, Java and Makassar alone reached 15 incidents in total with a death toll of six.¹⁵

Furthermore, national surveys conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in 23 provinces in 2016 show that 33% of respondents feel uncomfortable living in the same neighbourhood with the adherents of other religions. In addition, more than 68% are against the idea of having other religious places of worships being built in their residential areas. Previously, a national survey conducted by Lingkar Survey Indonesia (LSI) in October 2012 indicated that more than 50% of Indonesian Muslims preferred to have non-Ahmadiyah and non-Shi'a neighbours. In general, there was a growing hostility towards Ahmadiyah in the Reform Era. For example, a news report in 2007 highlighted the brutality of the Cikeusik incident, saying: "About 1,500 people stormed a house in Banten province on Sunday to stop 20 Ahmadiyah followers from

¹³ https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/berita_indonesia/2013/08/130802_ahmadiyah_lombok;
<https://tirto.id/penyerangan-ahmadiyah-di-ntb-kemunduran-proses-rekonsiliasi-cKQE>.

¹⁴ Human Rights Performance Index 2009-2010, Setara Institute (2010): 11.

¹⁵ <https://nasional.tempo.co/read/311528/setahun-15-kekerasan-terhadap-ahmadiyah>;
<https://nasional.tempo.co/read/384806/rentetan-kekerasan-terhadap-ahmadiyah-2011/full&view=ok>.

worshipping. They killed three men and badly wounded six others, while destroying the house and setting fire to several cars and motorbikes”.¹⁶

The more hostile attitudes towards Ahmadiyah also seem to be true in the case of Lombok, especially when comparing the scale and intensity of inter- and intra-faith conflicts on the island. On 17 January 2000, a religious rally (*Tabligh Akbar*) was held in Mataram in support of Muslims in the Moluccan islands during the period of inter-religious conflict there after 1998. This rally in Mataram was one of a number organised in several parts of Indonesia to demonstrate empathy and raise funds for the affected Muslims in the Moluccas. The organisers of this rally were the heads of local Islamic associations and a Dean from the local university in Mataram. Three activists from Jakarta attended the rally and gave speeches.¹⁷

As the perceived enemy of the Muslims in the Moluccan conflict were Christians, the main targets of the riots were originally Protestant and Catholic churches. Later, it turned out that houses and shops belonging to people of Chinese-Indonesian descent, as well as those of Christians, were attacked. The riots spread rapidly from the urban areas of the Mataram Municipality to the tourist area of Senggigi.

Despite the shockwaves these conflicts generated, Lombok’s January 2000 riots were limited to property damage and were spread only around the western part of Lombok.¹⁸ In addition, the January 2000 riots were brought under control within five days.¹⁹ By comparison, attacks on Ahmadiyah took place in all regencies (except the Mataram municipality) in Lombok. The violent attacks on the Ahmadiyah community in

¹⁶ “Indonesian President Condemns Mob Killing of Ahmadiyah Muslims,” *The Guardian*, 7 February 2011,

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/07/indonesia-inquiry-ahmadiyah-muslims-killed>, accessed 20 October 2016; <https://www.insideindonesia.org/one-year-after-the-cikeusik-tragedy>, accessed 27 February 2019.

¹⁷ They are Eggy Sudjana, an ICMI member; Taufik Hidayat, ex-convict of Komando Jihad; and Al-Chaidar, the coordinator of “Aksi Sejuta Ummat”. A similar rally held in Jakarta on 7 January 2000 sparked off the call for jihad to the Moluccas. All three men were arrested by the police for allegedly delivering a provocative speech during the rally that triggered the riots, although they were later released due to lack of evidence. The dominant role of Eggy Sudjana was also reported by MacDougall, see John MacDougall, “Keamanan di Lombok,” in *Politik Lokal di Indonesia*, (eds) Gerry van Klinken and Henk Schulte Nordholt (Yayasan Pustaka Obor Indonesia, 2007), 398.

¹⁸ 10,000 deaths in the Moluccan conflicts and the 1998 riots following Suharto’s downfall were a sad story for those of Chinese descent, especially Chinese women, see:

<http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2004/05/13/may-1998-riot-victims-still-waiting-justice-come.html>,
<http://www.nytimes.com/1998/06/10/world/in-jakarta-reports-of-numerous-rapes-of-chinese-in-riots.html>.

¹⁹ On the role of *Tuan Guru* in mediating the January riots and other local conflicts in Lombok, see Jeremy J. Kingsley, “Village Elections, Violence and Islamic Leadership in Lombok, Eastern Indonesia,” *Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia* 27, no. 2 (2012): 285-309.

Lombok started in 1998 in Pemongkong village, in the sub-district of Keruak in East Lombok. The most recent one took place in mid-2018 in Sakra, and also in the East Lombok regency. The attacks in Sakra village highlight that violence associated with anti-Ahmadiyah sentiment is still an ongoing reality on the island. From 1998-2018, at least 125 houses and four mosques were destroyed, and around 400 Ahmadihs have been relocated because of the serious threats made against their lives,²⁰ with one death recorded.

It is important to note that in a national context some opposition to Ahmadiyah has occurred since its early stages in Indonesia, although this was mostly in discursive forms.²¹ Similarly, Ahmadiyah arrived in Lombok in the late 1960s and its followers have lived side by side with mainstream-Muslims on the island ever since. However, hostility to this community from the mainstream residents has become more intense in recent years. The violence has been accompanied by increased pressure on Ahmadiyah to declare that they are no longer within the fold of Islam. This suggests that alongside the emergence of significant religious violence, there has also been the promotion of more exclusive definitions of Indonesian Muslim identity; a narrower more definitive religious identity that excludes non-Muslim and ‘deviant’ Muslim Indonesians. Taking these processes into account, political liberalisation has been a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it has fostered the emergence of moderate Islamic civil society organisations and Islamic parties. Yet on the other hand, unprecedented religious violence emerged post-1998.²² This thesis, therefore, tries to unveil the reasons why violence towards Ahmadiyah took place in Lombok and why it occurred when it did.

Research Question

The central question that this thesis addresses is: “What were the causes of the unprecedented intra-religious violence in post-1998 Lombok?” In order to address this question, a number of subsidiary questions have been investigated:

1. Why were Ahmadiyah communities targeted for violence in post-1998 Lombok?
2. What role did religious leaders play in these conflicts?

²⁰ Some are still living in the refugee barracks, while others chose to move outside the island.

²¹As noted by Burhani, the Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU – Awakening of Ulama), and *Persatuan Islam* (Persis-Muslim Union), the three largest Muslim associations in Indonesia, issued *fatwas* and other aggressive statements declaring that this religious movement was heretical and stood outside of Islam. Although they have consistently opposed the Ahmadiyah for decades, these three organisations have never transitioned from their discursive strategy of condemning Ahmadiyah for physical violence.

²² Heiduk, “Between A Rock and A Hard Place,” 26-40.

3. How significant was the discourse of the Muslim community regarding the policing of boundaries in the promotion and maintenance of violence against Lombok's religious minorities?
4. Did this exclusivist discourse successfully mobilise the masses, and if so, why?

This thesis postulates that the redrawing of the Sasak-Muslim (more than 70% of the total Lombok population) identity in Lombok after 1998 led to the violence against religious minorities, in particular Ahmadiyah communities. Therefore, this thesis will examine the immediate contexts or specific local conditions that have played significant roles in the violence against Ahmadiyah, and the nature of that violence, specifically, *Tuan Guru* politico-religious leadership competition. This thesis will also investigate the contribution of proselytising activities in breaking or maintaining peace between Sasak-Muslims and minority Islamic groups on the island.

The rationale for this thesis is that while post-Reformasi violence directed against ethnic and religious minorities took place across Indonesia, the reasons for the Lombok outbreaks (although sharing some broad nationwide factors) can only be adequately explained and understood in terms of very specific local conditions. This study of such violence in Lombok is the first to focus on the redrawing of the Sasak-Muslim identity boundaries after 1998, the exclusion of minorities, and the reasons for this.

Research Design

This thesis is primarily a description and analysis of the causes of violence toward Ahmadiyah in Lombok through the lens of identity redefinition and political dynamics after regime change both at the national and local levels. The focus is on the relationships between Ahmadiyah and Lombok's Muslim majority in the post-Suharto Era from 1998 to 2010. The reason for this limitation is based on the actual date of the first and the last attacks that took place in the three villages that were the focus of my fieldwork. Reference is made to other periods in the history of religious conflicts on Lombok and in other regions in Indonesia to shed light on the current situation by providing background and context.

The examination of the national drivers highlighted the significance of the redefinition of ethnic identity and the relationship to national identity across Indonesia. For the purpose of this thesis, I focused on the reinterpretation of religious identity, mainly from the National Ulama Council (MUI) and major mass Islamic organisations. How the

MUI's Sunni-Muslim identity guidelines are related to the surrounding political dynamic dimensions, especially the power vacuum after Suharto's departure, is the central theme of the national context of opposition towards Ahmadiyah detailed in Chapter 3.

The explication of the local factors is divided into two layers. The first one is local ethnic identity and political development in post-1998 Lombok. The second layer is the sub-local elements which specifically focused on peculiar factors originating from the three villages that were the focus of my fieldwork: Pemongkong in the East Lombok regency; Pancor in the East Lombok regency; and Ketapang in the West Lombok regency. There are several reasons for emphasising these areas. First, Pemongkong and Pancor share similarities in terms of the presence of a dominant religious institution in the villages, while Ketapang is a village where the presence of several religious leaders from outside the village is evident. This difference allows for the comparative analysis of the role of religious institutions in the perpetration of violence towards the Ahmadiyah community. Secondly, attacks in Pemongkong and Pancor took place in 1998 and 2002, respectively, but in Ketapang there were three occurrences (2005, 2006 and 2010). These variations may lead to new insights into the existence of specific local causal or contributory factors behind the persecution of Lombok's Ahmadiyah community. Additionally, limiting my research to West Lombok and East Lombok ensures a more focused and manageable sphere of research.

The research and analysis are based on both primary and secondary sources. The primary data has been acquired from a variety of sources, including interviews, archival material (government and Islamic organisations' documents), speeches, press releases, and media sources. The secondary sources are drawn from studies on religion, politics and the history of Ahmadiyah and other conflicts.

Some 30 interviews in total were conducted. Preparatory work for my fieldwork included interviews with other Ahmadi and officials, the results of which helped to develop my broader understanding of the context of the conflict and to refine and focus my questions for the main interviews. I conducted semi-structured interviews with two leaders of MUI from West Nusa Tenggara province (NTB) in its offices in Mataram. I interviewed several religious leaders (*Tuan Guru*) in different Lombok regions, and visited the NTB governor's office and interviewed the governor, Muhammad Zainul Majdi or TGB, who is also the leader of Nahdlatul Wathan (NW). I interviewed key figures of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Muhammadiyah and the Ahmadiyah leader's residence in Mataram. The main criterion for the selection of interviewees was based on the key positions they had in the

above organisations: leader of the MUI of Nusa Tenggara Barat (NTB) province; deputy leader of MUI; deputy leader of North Lombok MUI; and village leaders during the attacks on Ahmadiyah. I also assessed their association with the themes and issues to be discussed. I interviewed Ahmadiyah's members who were victims of the attacks and now live in refugee barracks in Mataram. I visited Ketapang, Pancor and Pemongkong to interview villagers to gain perspectives from them regarding the attacks. The selection of the interviewees from Ahmadiyah members and villagers was based on my judgement about who would best express their experiences of the events. I also conducted separate interviews with local government officials in four regions – Mataram Municipality, West Lombok, East Lombok regions, as well as NTB. The language I used for the interviews was my native language, Bahasa Indonesia, and local Sasak dialects. There is a schedule of interviews in Appendix A detailing dates, places, names, positions and other pertinent details.

As well as conducting interviews, I undertook field observations in the refugee barracks (Asrama Transito) in August and September 2015. I attended the sermons of the Ahmadiyah's preacher and Friday prayers in Asrama Transito. In August 2015, I also organised a group discussion with the female members of Ahmadiyah in Mataram.

In addition to interviews and field observation, I collected official documents from the government, the MUI and Ahmadiyah. Among them are the *fatwas*, speeches, sermons and press releases of NU, Muhammadiyah, MUI and Ahmadiyah that touch on the specific issues and themes I have focused on. I have used reports from non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and human right organisations, such as the Wahid Institute, CSIS and the Setara Institute, particularly on the nature and pattern of the violence.

I examined government reports as well as local laws about the specific issues and themes. I reviewed government decisions, communications and local by-laws on intra-faith issues. This was important in order to see how the government responded to Ahmadiyah issues in post-Suharto Lombok. Further, I investigated the possible relationships between these changes and the political influence of Islamic institutions, as well as the religious leaders in Lombok. I examined Ahmadiyah's official responses to the mainstream organisations and the MUI *fatwas*, as well as Ahmadiyah responses to the local by-laws directed at them, in order to examine how it responded to allegations that its teachings are deviant.

Print and electronic media were also sources of data collection. This is because the media gives considerable attention to the religious conflicts and the political transitions of

post-Suharto Lombok and it is conscious of the influence or place of these conflicts in the collective lives of the Sasak-Muslims. Media sources here include three national newspapers – *Kompas*, *Republika* and *The Jakarta Post* – and two of the biggest newspapers on the island – *Lombok Post* and *Suara NTB*. *Liputan6.com* of SCTV, a national television channel, is a complementary online audio-visual source that is used to give some idea about how Ahmadiyah issues have been framed nationally. Most of the information from the local print media was accessed from press archives and the NTB Library and *Lombok Post's* archive. These media sources provided me with some essential press publications on public discourses regarding ‘deviant’ groups post-1998, and how these have reported the ways religious leaders have understood the *Umma's* boundaries. I also looked at publications on how Islamic institutions perceived the Ahmadiyah conflicts. News on how the local governments reacted to Ahmadiyah issues reported by local media was another important subject of my study. These publications and documents provide leads that were subsequently followed up during my in-depth interviews.

As this research deals with individuals from various organisations and institutions, human ethics approval from the Human Ethics Committee of Victoria University was obtained prior to undertaking fieldwork.

Literature Review

In the following section, I examine numerous documents relevant to the central themes of this thesis: interfaith and intra-faith conflicts as a general introduction to religious conflicts in post-1998 Indonesia. Then, I investigate the literature on Ahmadiyah in Indonesia and the gap that this thesis tries to fill, which is the formation of identity after the regime change and its relation to the emergence of religious conflicts in Lombok from 1998-2010. Finally, I provide an overview of the approaches used in this thesis and their rationale.

According to Bagir there were two phases of religious conflicts after Suharto's downfall.²³

²³ Zainal Bagir, “Advocacy for Religious Freedom in Democratizing Indonesia,” *The Review of Faith and International Affairs* 12, no. 4 (2014): 29; Jamie Davidson, “Studies of Massive, Collective Violence in Post-Suharto Indonesia,” *Critical Asian Studies* 41, no. 2 (2009): 329-49.

(1) Inter-religious conflicts during 1998-2004

This phase was characterised by a number of sizeable inter-religious conflicts that involved the mobilisation of religious communities.²⁴ The clashes in the Moluccas islands and Poso regions were the largest in terms of scale and duration. In Ambon and the Moluccas, more than 10,000 died. In Poso, 200 Muslims and Christians were killed.

Scholars argue that these conflicts were triggered by rivalry between the civilian government and military leaders in the capital.²⁵ Military involvement in the Moluccas and Poso conflicts arose due to President Wahid's efforts to push for further military reform. Local political history also played a significant part in the conflicts. Access to political power has been linked to religious affiliations since the Colonial Era, whether it was the exceptional support for Christians by the Dutch, or the alliance of Muslims with the Japanese. Such concerns contributed to ill feeling, and may have been factors in the communal violence.²⁶ Recent studies by Qurtuby and Duncan suggest that religion must be factored into the analysis of the political aspects of the conflicts.²⁷ Both scholars examine the role of religion in the communal conflicts in the Moluccas area by paying attention to the central role of Muslim identity, religious networks and elites, as well as religious ideas, symbols and actions.²⁸ They conclude that religious associations (Islamic or Christian) became one of the contributing ideological influences on both Muslim jihadist and Christian fighters engaged in the violence.²⁹

²⁴ Laskar Jihad (founded on January 30, 2000) is the paramilitary wing of the FKAWJ (Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah wal Jama'ah or "Communication Forum of the Followers of Sunnah and the Community of the Prophet"). The goal of Laskar Jihad is explicitly to defend Muslims in Maluku from religious persecution, see Noorhaidi Hasan, "Between Transnational Interest and Domestic Politics: Understanding Middle Eastern Fatwas on Jihad in the Moluccas," *Islamic Law and Society* 12, no. 1 (2005): 73-92.

²⁵ Jon Goss, "Understanding the 'Maluku Wars': Overview of Sources of Communal Conflicts and Prospects for Peace," *Cakalele* 11(2000): 7-39; Damien Kingsbury, "The Reform of the Indonesian Armed Forces," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 22, no. 2 (2000): 302-21; and Jacques Bertrand, "Legacies of the Authoritarian Past: Religious Violence in Indonesia's Moluccan Islands," *Pacific Affairs* (2002): 57-85.

²⁶ Goss, "Understanding the 'Maluku Wars'," 15.

²⁷ Sumanto Al-Qurtuby, "Ambonese Muslim Jihadists, Islamic Identity, and the History of Christian-Muslim Rivalry in the Moluccas, Eastern Indonesia," *The International Journal of Asian Studies* 12, no. 1 (2015): 1-29; Christopher Duncan, *Violence and Vengeance: Religious Conflict and Its Aftermath in Eastern Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013).

²⁸ Al Qurtuby, "Ambonese Muslim Jihadists," 4.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 25.

The inter-religious conflicts in the Moluccas were generally resolved once the Malino Agreement II was signed by both parties on 11-12 February 2002.³⁰ The Malino Agreement is the result of the Indonesian government, led by Coordinating Minister for People's Welfare Mr Jusuf Kalla, and mediation through convening a meeting between the opposing Christian and Muslim factions from Indonesia's Moluccas province (known as the 'Spice islands' during Dutch colonial rule) in Malino, South Sulawesi. After two days of intense heart-to-heart talks, the two parties in the conflict reached an agreement to end the three-year bloodshed, and to work together to maintain peace in the Moluccas. The Agreement was signed by the two sides comprising 35 Christian and 35 Muslim delegates. When announcing the peace treaty that was signed on Tuesday 12 February 2002, Yusuf Kalla, who hosted the talks, said, "both sides have agreed to end all conflicts and hostilities". The treaty is a resolution encapsulated in a joint declaration known as the 11 points of "The Moluccas Agreement in Malino".³¹

³⁰ Zainal Bagir, "Advocacy for Religious Freedom in Democratizing Indonesia," *The Review of Faith and International Affairs* 12, no. 4 (2014): 29.

³¹ Both sides agreed:

1. to end all conflicts and disputes
2. to abide by due process of law enforcement fairly, faithfully, honestly and impartially, supported by the communities. Therefore, the existing security officers are obliged to be professional in exercising their mission
3. to reject and oppose all kinds of separatist movements, among others the Republic of South Moluccas (RMS), that threaten the unity and sovereignty of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia
4. that as part of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, the people of the Moluccas have the rights to stay and work legally and fairly in the Republic of Indonesia nationwide and vice versa, by respecting the local culture, law and order
5. to ban and disarm illegal armed organisations, groups, or militias, in accordance with the existing law. Outside parties that disturb the peace in the Moluccas will be expelled from the Moluccas
6. to establish a national independent investigation team to investigate among others, the tragic incident on January 19, 1999, the Moluccas Sovereign Front (Front Kedaulatan Maluku-FKM), Republic of South Moluccas (Republik Maluku Selatan-RMS), Christian Republic of South Moluccas (Kristen Republik Maluku Selatan-Kristen RMS), Jihad Warrior (Laskar Jihad), Christ Warrior (Laskar Kristus), coercive conversion, and human rights violations
7. to call for the voluntary return of refugees to their homes, and the return of properties
8. to rehabilitate mental, social, economic and public infrastructures, particularly educational, health, religious, and housing facilities, supported by the Indonesian government
9. to preserve law and order for the people in the area, it is absolutely necessary for the military and the police to maintain coordination and firmness in executing their function and mission. In line with this, a number of military and police facilities must be rebuilt and re-equipped to enable them to function properly
10. to uphold good relations and harmony among all elements of believers in the Moluccas, all efforts of evangelism must highly honour the diversity and acknowledge local culture
11. to support the rehabilitation of Pattimura University for common progress, as such, the recruitment system and other policies will be transparently implemented based on the principle of fairness while upholding the necessary standard.

For a different view see Bagir (2014) who argues that several potential conflicts that threatened to escalate were managed and were controlled – mostly by the community itself. Bagir, "Advocacy for Religious

(2) Intra-religious conflicts from 2005 onwards

From 2005, a sequence of smaller but more frequent conflicts emerged in several regions related to two main issues: (1) attempts to block the building of houses of worship by religious minorities,³² and (2) attacks on minority religious groups by those who ostensibly embrace the same religion.³³ The first set of issues mostly related to the building of churches; the second concerned the so-called intra-religious conflicts, which are the main focus of this thesis.

Intra-faith conflicts in post-Suharto Indonesia have largely involved the majority Muslim and minority Ahmadiyah groups. Attacks on Ahmadiyah spread across the country and mostly started in 2005.³⁴ Studies on Ahmadiyah have become one of central themes in publications on Indonesian Islam ever since. There were limited numbers of scholarly works on Indonesian Ahmadiyah before the regime change in 1998. They are only a minor part of the general discussions of belief and religious movements in Indonesia.³⁵ Starting in 2000, scholarly works on the Ahmadiyah in Indonesia began increasing proportionally with the growing number of attacks on the Ahmadiyah in the post-Suharto Era.

Inspired by Burhani,³⁶ I divide the post-2000 literature on Ahmadiyah into three categories: (1) Historical descriptive studies; (2) Human rights and the freedom of religion; and (3) Theological issues and the role of *fatwas*. Included in the first category are Iskandar Zulkarnain's *Gerakan Ahmadiyah di Indonesia (Ahmadiyah's Movement in Indonesia)* (2001), and Herman Beck's *The Rupture Between the Muhammadiyah and the Ahmadiyah*

Freedom," 29, see also Zulfan Tadjoeddin. *Explaining Collective Violence in Contemporary Indonesia: From Conflict to Cooperation*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.

³² Mainly churches, see Denny Hamdani, "Radical Muslim Groups and Confrontation to Church," paper presented at the *International Symposium on the Strategic Role of Religious Education in the Development of Culture of Peace Education* (Bogor: 2012): 1-2.

³³ Bagir, "Advocacy for Religious Freedom," 29.

³⁴ In 2006, the Ahmadi in Gegerung Village, Lombok, were attacked and their houses, mosques and shops were destroyed and burned down by the attackers, and even now around 20 Ahmadiyah families are living in a shelter. In December 2007, an Ahmadiyah community in Kuningan, West Java was ransacked and eight mosques were closed by the local administration. On 28 April 2008 in Sukabumi, West Java a mob of more than 100 people burned down an Ahmadiyah mosque and vandalised a nearby Ahmadiyah school. These attacks continued in Manis Lor (2010), Cisalada (2010), Cikeusik (2011), Makasar (2011), and Singaparna (2012). Melissa Crouch, "Indonesia, Militant Islam and Ahmadiyah: Origins and Implications," (ed) Syari'ah and Governance ARC Federation Fellowship Islam the University of Melbourne (2009): 1-20.

³⁵ Among them are Howard Federspiel's *Persatuan Islam* (1970), Harry Benda's *The Crescent and the Rising Sun* (1958), Alfian's *Islamic Modernism in Indonesian Politics* (1969), and Deliar Noer's *The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942* (1973).

³⁶ Burhani's thesis *When Muslims are not Muslims: The Ahmadiyah Community and the Discourse on Heresy in Indonesia*, PhD Thesis (University of California Santa Barbara, 2013), 22-35.

(2005).³⁷ They focus on historical data on the Ahmadiyah community in Indonesia: its first arrival; Ahmadiyah's mission; and the history of Ahmadiyah's relations with some Islamic organisations, such as Muhammadiyah.

The second category makes up the largest portion of the literature on Ahmadiyah in post-1998 Indonesia. This includes the work of Al-Fitri "Religious Liberty in Indonesia and the Right of Deviant's Sects" (2008); Reni Susanti's MA thesis *When Human Rights Become so Political* (2008); Soemawidjaja's LL.M thesis *Freedom of Religion and Religious Minorities: The Ahmadiyah in Indonesia* (2009); Nina Mariani Noor, et al. "Ahmadiyah, Conflicts, and Violence in Contemporary Indonesia." (2013) and Crouch's *Indonesia, Militant Islam and Ahmadiyah: Origins and Implications* (2009).³⁸ Other studies by Asad (2009) and Rofiqoh (2010) look at the conflicts from legal perspectives. Both note that Indonesia has ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which guarantees the freedom of religion. In addition, the 1945 constitution warrants freedom of religion for all Indonesians. However, a Joint Ministerial Decree (SKB) issued in 2008 annihilated these legal foundations.³⁹ Max Regus's doctoral thesis (2017), *Understanding Human Rights Culture in Indonesia: A Case Study of the Ahmadiyya Minority Group*, is the latest work on Ahmadiyah in Indonesia from a human rights point of view.⁴⁰ Aleah Connley's "Understanding the Oppressed: A Study of the Ahmadiyah and their Strategies for Overcoming Adversaries in Contemporary Indonesia" (2017) looks into how Ahmadis perceived the increasing hostility from the mainstream in positive ways.⁴¹

³⁷ Iskandar Zulkarnain, *Gerakan Ahmadiyah di Indonesia*, 1st ed. (Yogyakarta: LKiS Yogyakarta, 2005). Herman L. Beck, "The Rupture Between the Muhammadiyah and the Ahmadiyya," *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 161, no. 2/3 (2005).

³⁸ Al-Fitri, "Religious Liberty in Indonesia and the Right of Deviant's Sects," (2008); Reni Susanti's MA thesis *When Human Rights become so Political* (2008), Soemawidjaja's LL.M thesis *Freedom of Religion and Religious Minorities: The Ahmadiyah in Indonesia* (2009), Nina Mariani Noor, et al. "Ahmadiyah, Conflicts, and Violence in Contemporary Indonesia." *Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies* 3, no. 1 (2013): 1-30; and Crouch's *Indonesia, Militant Islam and Ahmadiyah: Origins and Implications* (2009).

³⁹ The Joint Decision of the Minister of Religion, the Minister of Home Affairs and the Attorney General, dated 9 June 2008, is a warning and an order to the followers, members and/or leaders of Ahmadiyah Qadiani (JAI) and to the general public, known as "SKB Tiga Menteri". The decree, while giving a warning to the public not to violate the law in relation to Ahmadiyah members, also "[...] warns and orders followers, members, and/or board members of Ahmadiyah Indonesia, for as long as they refer to themselves as Muslims, to stop spreading interpretations and activities that deviate from the central teachings of Islam, that is, acknowledging there is a prophet fully versed in all teachings after the Prophet Muhammad," <http://sultra.kemenag.go.id/file/dokumen/SKBtentangAhmadiyah.pdf>.

⁴⁰ Max Regus, "Understanding Human Rights Culture in Indonesia: A Case Study of the Ahmadiyya Minority Group," Doctor of Philosophy, Tilburg University, 2017.

⁴¹ Aleah Connley, "Understanding the Oppressed: A Study of the Ahmadiyah and their Strategies for Overcoming Adversaries in Contemporary Indonesia," *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs* 1(2016): 29-58.

The third category mainly focuses on the role of government and the MUI *fatwa* in perpetuating public opposition and sentiment towards Ahmadiyah. The works of Erni Budiwanti, “Pluralism Collapse: A Study of the Jema’ah Ahmadiyah Indonesia and its Persecution” (2009), John Olle’s “The Majelis Ulama Indonesia Versus ‘Heresy’: The Resurgence of Authoritative Islam” (2009), Jessica Soedirgo, “Informal Networks and Religious Intolerance: How Clientelism Incentivizes the Discrimination of the Ahmadiyah in Indonesia.” (2018) and Fatima Zainab Rahman’s “State Restriction on the Ahmadiyah Sect in Indonesia and Pakistan: Islam or Political Survival?” (2014) are some that fit into this category.⁴² Burhani’s thesis *When Muslims are not Muslims: The Ahmadiyya Community and the Discourse on Heresy in Indonesia* (2013), Abdurrahman Mas’ud’s “Menyikapi Keberadaan Aliran Sempalan” (2009), and Khoiruddin Nasution’s “Fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) on Ahmadiyah” (2008) are some examples of the literature that focuses on the theological differences between Ahmadiyah and mainstream-Islam in Indonesia.⁴³ In addition to these, most foreign think-tank organisations and NGOs in Indonesia discuss the role of hard-line activists with Middle-Eastern links as the main proponents of the anti-Ahmadiyah campaigns and religious intolerance in general in the post-Suharto Era.⁴⁴

Despite the existing literature, Burhani claims that Ahmadiyah in Indonesia is still under-studied, especially in terms of the research focus on this in the previous academic literature.⁴⁵ Most publications on the post-1998 Ahmadiyah-mainstream conflicts overlook, for example, the study of Ahmadiyah’s messianic teachings, and its comparative study with other messianic groups in Indonesia such as Darul Arqam (Rufaqa’) and Gerakan Fajar

⁴² Erni Budiwanti, “Pluralism Collapse: A Study of the Jama’ah Ahmadiyah Indonesia and its Persecution,” (2009); John Olle, “The Majelis Ulama Indonesia Versus ‘Heresy’: The Resurgence of Authoritative Islam,” in (eds) van Klinken, Geert Arend, Barker, Joshua, *State of Authority: The State in Society in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 2009), 95-116; Jessica Soedirgo. “Informal Networks and Religious Intolerance: How Clientelism Incentivizes the Discrimination of the Ahmadiyah in Indonesia.” *Citizenship Studies* 22, no. 2 (2018): 191-207; Fatima Zainab Rahman, “State Restriction on the Ahmadiyah Sect in Indonesia and Pakistan,” (2014).

⁴³ Burhani’s thesis *When Muslims are not Muslims: The Ahmadiyya Community and the Discourse on Heresy in Indonesia*, PhD Thesis (University of California Santa Barbara, 2013); Abdurrahman Mas’ud “Menyikapi Keberadaan Aliran Sempalan” (2009), and Khoiruddin Nasution, “Fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) on Ahmadiyah” (2008).

⁴⁴ For example, see ICG, “Indonesia: Implications of the Ahmadiyah Decree,” in *Asia Briefing*, Jakarta/Brussels: ICG, 2008. A Cross-country Report on Trends of Extremism in South and South-East Asia, Working Paper, International NGO for Indonesian development (INFID), 22 January 2019.

⁴⁵ Ahmad Najib Burhani, “The Ahmadiyya and the Study of Comparative Religion in Indonesia: Controversies and Influences,” *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations* 25, no. 2 (2014): 141.

Nusantara (Gafatar) are still lacking.⁴⁶ In addition, Ahmadiyah's *chanda*⁴⁷ system, which seems to contribute significantly to the group's survival, is also still neglected in academic studies of Ahmadiyah in Indonesia.

Burhani's *The Ahmadiyya and the Study of Comparative Religion in Indonesia: Controversies and Influences* seems to be the first study on the Ahmadiyah intellectual contribution in modern Indonesia.⁴⁸ It highlights the significant influence of Ahmadiyah literature during the late Colonial Era and the first two decades after the declaration of independence in 1945 among Dutch and indigenous intelligentsias. It also discusses the influence of Ahmadiyah literature on Christianity as resources in dealing with missionary activities, especially for Islamic organisations that were dedicated to countering Christian missions like Muhammadiyah.⁴⁹ Therefore, Ahmadiyah literature and philanthropic traditions, as well as comparative studies between Ahmadiyah and other minority groups, are themes that highlight topics for further research in the future.

In order to answer the main research question of this thesis, "What were the causes of the unprecedented intra-religious violence in post-1998 Lombok?", I specifically placed high importance on previous academic literature on the rationale of the growing hostility towards the Ahmadiyah community. Hicks argues that previous studies on Ahmadiyah-mainstream conflicts in Indonesia tend to use one particular approach, either "religious essentialism" or "political instrumentalism", in analysing intra-faith conflicts.⁵⁰

The first approach, religious essentialism, puts theology at the centre of the analysis by highlighting particular verses of the holy books that arguably provide justification for

⁴⁶ Melissa Crouch, "Law and Religion in Indonesia: The Constitutional Court and the Blasphemy Law," *Asian Journal of Comparative Law* 7, no. 1 (2012): 1-46; Budiwanti, "Pluralism Collapse," 1-26; Robin Bush and Budhy Munawar-Rachman, "Majority Views on Minorities in Indonesia," in *Religious Diversity in Muslim-Majority States in Southeast Asia*, (eds) Bernhard Platzdasch and Johan Saravanamuttu (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2014), 16-50.

⁴⁷ Chanda is Ahmadiyah members' contribution towards the organisation, and there is a compulsory and voluntary chanda, <https://www.ahmadiyya.us/documents/chapters/ma-boston/1184-chandasummaryjuly2016/file>, accessed 17 April 2019.

⁴⁸ Ahmad Najib Burhani, "The Ahmadiyya and the Study of Comparative Religion in Indonesia: Controversies and Influences," *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations* 25, no. 2 (2013): 141-58.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Jacqueline Hicks, "Heresy and Authority: Understanding the Turn Against Ahmadiyah in Indonesia," *South East Asia Research* 22, no. 3 (2014): 321-39.

the perpetrators' acts.⁵¹ The second approach, political instrumentalism, sees the conflict as driven by elites via the manipulation of religious texts for their own personal gain.⁵²

Besides religious and political reasons, the past legacies and state-building history is one explanation of the motive of religious violence in modern Indonesia. In his book *Islam and Democracy in Indonesia, Tolerance Without Liberalism*, Jeremy Menchik argues that Indonesia's political elites and leaders of the leading mass Islam organisations embrace "godly nationalism".⁵³ Godly nationalism tolerates other beliefs with some preconditions which Menchik refers to as "tolerance without liberalism". Menchik supports his argument with a historical account looking back to the 1945 constitution which requires belief in one god and the 1965 blasphemy law prohibiting "deviant interpretations" of religious teachings. These legal powers gave the state the power to limit pluralism by excluding non-believers and heterodox groups like Ahmadiyah. Therefore, according to Menchik, intolerance has been institutionalised since the early days of the Indonesian Republic, and thus violence towards Ahmadiyah has deep roots and is likely to occur.

What all these three approaches share in common is that they tend to provide a large-national scale explanation on the rationale of religious and communal violence in Indonesia. Those who propose the first approach frame the conflict as a clash of religions, raising the danger of the simplification that the conflict is a recurrence of past history and there is not much we can do about it. The Ahmadiyah conflict is a repeated event from the past, events that already took place in many parts of the world between Muslims and the 'evil' deviants.

In parallel, the second approach, political instrumentalism, also adopts a generalisation of the conflicts in which Ahmadiyah-mainstream tense relationships are seen as an expected result of political struggle among political leaders. Fatima Zainab Rahman, for example, disregards the role of sacred texts. Rather, she contends that the Ahmadiyah exclusion policy adopted in Indonesia and Pakistan is mainly related to the regimes in power needing to bolster their popularity and secure their legitimacy by giving consensus to the supporter of anti-Ahmadiyah movements in both countries.⁵⁴ While somewhat

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Jeremy Menchik, *Islam and Democracy in Indonesia, Tolerance Without Liberalism*, Cambridge University Press, 2016; Menchik, "Productive Intolerance: Godly Nationalism in Indonesia," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 56, no. 3 (2014): 591-621.

⁵⁴ Fatima Zainab Rahman, "State Restriction on the Ahmadiyya Sect in Indonesia and Pakistan: Islam or Political Survival?" *Australian Political Studies Association* 49, no. 3 (2014): 408-22. See also Humeira

useful, simply relying on the political instrumentalism approach is problematic. Looking at intra-faith conflicts from the perspective of power play among elites undermines the importance of various streams within every religion and their potential contribution, directly or indirectly, to trigger disagreement among the adherents of a particular religion. Mainstream-Muslim opposition to the Ahmadiyah community would hardly exist if different interpretations of the Qur'an between Sunni-Muslims and Mirza Ghulam Ahmad teachings did not exist. Similarly, the claim that Ahmadiyah is outside Islam, according to the majority Sunni-Muslims, would be unlikely to arise if understanding of the meaning of "prophet" didn't differ. Furthermore, relying on the political approach alone would give the impression that the acknowledged beliefs of some leaders or their followers were somewhat counterfeit.⁵⁵ This thesis demonstrates that causation is more complex. Hicks notes that, "If it is really all about the personal ambitions of particular leaders, then the religious component is relegated to serve as nothing more than a marker for the real concern, which is usually political or economic".⁵⁶

A similar argument goes against Menchik who claims that persecution of minorities in Indonesia has more to do with the processes of state-building entailing the institutionalisation of orthodoxy and less to do with beliefs. Menchik's "godly nationalism" overlooks the rise of local religious identity that took place in many regions after the regime change, as well as the role of local religious leaders when explaining the rationale of communal and religious violence in post-1998 Indonesia.

These three approaches frame the conflict within Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations*. Huntington contends that there are eight possible "civilisations" in this world that can be used as ways in which people see themselves: "Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and possibly African civilization".⁵⁷ He suggests that present and future conflicts after the Cold War are the result of our inability to overcome barriers based on civilisation because of the very long histories that produced them. In part, because of this history, civilisational identities act as fundamental filters that affect all aspects of how people perceive and experience social reality.

Iqtidar, "State Management of Religion in Pakistan and Dilemmas of Citizenship," *Citizenship Studies* 16, no. 8 (2012): 1013-28.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 322-23.

⁵⁶ Jacqueline Hicks, "Heresy and Authority," 322.

⁵⁷ Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (1993): 25.

The people of different civilizations have different views on the relation between God and man, the individual and group, the citizen and the state, parents and children, husband and wife, as well as differing views on the relative importance of rights and responsibilities, liberty and authority, equality and hierarchy. These differences are the product of centuries. They will not soon disappear. They are far more fundamental than differences among political ideologies and political regimes.⁵⁸

Such differences make harmony and mutual relations across civilisations next to impossible, because identity is a given and cannot be changed.⁵⁹ The differences become more striking because individuals cannot change their civilisational identity, and thus it is hard to dismiss their potential for creating misunderstandings, disagreements and conflicts.

Olivier Roy eloquently argues how the ‘clash of civilizations’ theory would potentially mislead Al-Qaeda counter-efforts in Europe:

“The 9/11 debate was cantered on a single issue: Islam. Osama Bin Laden was taken at his own words by the West: Al-Qaeda, even if its methods were supposedly not approved by most Muslims, was seen as the vanguard or at least a symptom of “Muslim wrath” against the West ... This vertical genealogy obscured all the transversal connections (the fact, for instance, that Al-Qaeda systematized a concept of terrorism that was first developed by the Western European ultra-left of the seventies or the fact that most Al-Qaeda terrorists do not come from traditional Muslim societies but are recruited from among global uprooted youth with a huge proportion of converts). The consequence was that the struggle against terrorism was systematically associated with a religious perspective based on the theory of a clash of civilizations: Islam was at the core of Middle East politics, culture, and identity. This led to two possibilities: either acknowledge the “clash of civilizations” and head toward a global confrontation between the West and Islam or try to mend fences through a “dialogue of civilizations,” enhancing multiculturalism and religious pluralism. Both attitudes shared the same premises: Islam is both a religion and a culture and is at the core of the Arab identity. They differed on one essential point: for the “classists,” there is no “moderate” Islam; for the “dialogists,” one should favour and support “moderate” Islam, with the recurring question, what is a good Muslim?”⁶⁰

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ <https://tif.ssrc.org/2011/09/08/the-paradoxes-of-the-re-islamization-of-muslim-societies/>.

The simple recipe offered by Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations* is also criticised by Guy Elcheroth and Stephen Reicher:

“So to claim that civilizations inevitably clash is simply untrue – or at least it is a dramatic over-generalization. Moreover, to make such a claim doesn't help us understand when such conflicts break out and when they don't. After all, even where there is a history of antagonism between groups such as Jews, Muslims and Christians, it remains true that most of the time people live together peacefully.”⁶¹

The three approaches in the extant studies on Ahmadiyah in Indonesia are, undoubtedly, beneficial in unfolding the causes of the Ahmadiyah-mainstream tensions in post-Suharto Indonesia. Yet, they recognise the conflict mainly comes from one form of identity, either religious, political, or the institutionalisation of particular ideologies and the neglect of other types of identities that exist and may also have played a role in the perpetuation of conflict. Scholars like Cohen and Sen argue that the failure to recognise multiple forms of identity could be misleading and is detrimental to the success of counter-violence efforts:

“We have concentrated on these collective structures and categories and by and large have taken the individual for granted. We have thereby created fictions. My argument is that we should now set out to qualify these, if not from the bottom upwards, then by recognising that the relationship of individual and society is far more complex and infinitely more variable that can be encompassed by a simple, unidimensional deductive model.”⁶²

“The confusion generated by an implicit belief in the solitarist understanding of identity poses serious barriers to overcoming global terrorism and creating a world without ideologically organized large-scale violence. The recognition of multiple identities and of the world beyond religious affiliations, even for very religious people, can possibly make some difference in the troubled world in which we live.”⁶³

Using a one-size-fits-all approach in the study of mainstream Muslim-Ahmadiyah tensions means acknowledging the difference in teachings between Ahmadiyah and the Islamic mainstream is nearly impossible to reconcile. Moreover, generalisation neglects the

⁶¹ Guy Elcheroth, Stephen Reicher. *Identity, Violence and Power Mobilising Hatred, Demobilising Dissent* (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2017), 17.

⁶² Stanley Cohen, “Moral Panics and Folk Concepts,” *Paedagogica Historica: International Journal of the History of Education* 35, no. 3 (1999): 6.

⁶³ Amartya Sen, *Identity and Violence*, 79.

existence of multiple expressions of religious devotion that Muslims could possibly choose. It also overlooks the fact that there are some sections of non-Ahmadiyah-Muslims, and some elements of mainstream-Muslims, who not only condemn the violence but also believe that that Ahmadiyah is within the fold of Islam.

In this vein, this thesis looks specifically at how the Sasak-Muslim identity boundaries are represented and conceived in the ‘deviant’ discourses against the Ahmadiyah community. The rationale for this thesis is that while post-Reformasi violence directed against ethnic and religious minorities took place across Indonesia, the reasons for the Lombok outbreaks can only be explained and understood in terms of very specific local conditions. This study of such violence in Lombok is the first to focus on the redrawing of the Sasak-Muslim identity boundaries, the exclusion of minorities, and the reasons for this.

I place high importance on discourses representing collective identity and I use the “articulation” of Stuart Hall, which he defines as the process of rendering a collective identity, position or set of interests explicit distinct, and accessible to definite political audiences.⁶⁴ The term articulation is initially used to explain why ideology and the formation of ideological fights are incidental, but not forever inevitable, determined, absolute or essential.⁶⁵ Therefore, it is a useful term to help explain the sudden outbursts of violence towards the Ahmadiyah community in post-Suharto Indonesia.

“An articulation is thus the form of the connection that can make a unity of two different elements, under certain conditions. It is a linkage which is not necessary, determined, absolute and essential for all time. You have to ask under what circumstances can a connection be forged or made? So, the so-called ‘unity’ of a discourse is really the articulation of different, distinct elements which can be rearticulated in different ways because they have no necessary ‘belongingness’. The ‘unity’ which matters is a linkage between that articulated discourse and the social forces with which it can, under certain historical conditions, but need not necessarily, be connected. Thus, a theory of articulation is both a way of understanding how ideological elements come, under certain conditions, to cohere together within a discourse, and a way of asking how they do or do not become articulated, at specific conjunctures, to certain political subjects ... [It] asks how an ideology discovers its subject rather than how the subject thinks the

⁶⁴ Lawrence Grossberg, “On Postmodernism and Articulation: An Interview with Stuart Hall,” *Journal of Communication Inquiry* 10 (1986).

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 53.

necessary and inevitable thoughts which belong to it; it enables us to think how an ideology empowers people, enabling them to begin to make some sense or intelligibility of their historical situation, without reducing those forms of intelligibility to their socio-economic or class location or social position.”⁶⁶

Hall’s design offers a framework for addressing the approaches of this thesis. The moment in between shifting (from articulation to re-articulation), or what Hall called “positioning”, is what makes meaning possible. Meaning is an idea when, at any given time, a sign or image becomes part of a conflictual discourse. It happens when we are deliberately taking a critical standpoint to a sign or image that was previously taken for granted, thus making them seem naturally real. This standpoint becomes challenging when conflict over the meaning of a sign or a discourse is problematised through unexpected events that break the social setting, when powerful interests are involved, or when a striking ideological conflict becomes apparent. Therefore, this approach would help to explain why ‘positioning’ on deviant discourses is taking place in post-1998 Lombok. For example, it enables the identification of views about what key characteristics define ‘us’ (Sasak-Muslim) in contrast to those considered ‘others’ (the deviant). Why did the critical overview of Sasak-Muslim identity, which excludes Ahmadiyah, take place after the regime change? Therefore, this method will be valuable to investigate the central question of this thesis: “Why did unprecedented and violent attacks against an allegedly deviant group occur after decades of non-aggression?”

For the purpose of this thesis, I employ two approaches to study conflict that were proposed by Guy Elcheroth and Stephen Reicher:⁶⁷

- (1) First, this thesis does not treat conflict as predestined, nor does it treat the framing of conflict in terms of particular group memberships as inevitable. Rather, it sees such categories as resources, which are actively invoked for the purposes of mobilising support.
- (2) Secondly, this thesis looks into the importance of leadership. It also points to the importance of the contemporary context (and not only events of the past) in determining which categories are employed and, more to the point, which categories are successfully employed. Thus, it opens up an investigation into why and when the leaders’ appeals succeeded in mobilising the masses.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 53.

⁶⁷ Guy Elcheroth, Stephen Reicher, *Identity, Violence and Power*, 8.

In explaining the redefinition of Sasak-Muslim boundaries in the Reformasi Era, I treat Islamic identity as a frame of reference that religious or political actors use to recruit members, generate collective action and preserve their existence. Hence, for the wide range of a group's members' personality traits, skills and capabilities to become productive and achieve the movement's objectives, they must move away from self-identity and take on the group's social identity. Erikson highlights that the discourse of collective identities must always be seen as temporary, and identities are always about becoming, an ongoing negotiation, not a once and for all achievement. He says, "[The boundary lines] are never a fixed property ... They are always shifting as the people of the group find new ways to define the outer limits of their universe".⁶⁸

Consistent with Erikson, Hall argues identity is an unfixed history that is rewritten every time and the past becomes ever-shifting. According to Hall:

"Identity emerges as a kind of unsettled space, or an unresolved question in that space, between a number of intersecting discourses. ... [Until recently, we have incorrectly thought that identity is] a kind of fixed point of thought and being, a ground of action ... the logic of something like a 'true self.' ... [But] Identity is a process, identity is split. Identity is not a fixed point but an ambivalent point. Identity is also the relationship of the Other to oneself."⁶⁹

"(Cultural identities) come from somewhere, have histories. But far from being eternally fixed in some essentialized past, they are subject to the continuous 'play' of history, culture and power."⁷⁰

Hall's theory stresses the importance of immediate contexts surrounding the construction of identity, and acknowledging the critical contribution of local articulation. To be precise, despite the origin of identity as a concept that can be established in different aspects of human behaviour, its construction is defined by the agency of individual actors and the social context in which they operate.⁷¹ This enables analysis of both conscious decisions by political and religious actors, and random occurrences and settings. It does not provide simple formulae for determining degrees of devotion or certain preconditions in

⁶⁸ Erik H. Erikson, *Insight and Responsibility: Lectures on the Ethical Implications of Psychoanalytic Insight* (Faber, 1966), 12.

⁶⁹ Stuart Hall, "Ethnicity: Identity and Difference," *Radical America* 23, no. 4 (1989): 10.

⁷⁰ Stuart Hall, ed. *Cultural Identity and Diaspora, Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory: A Reader* (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994), 225.

⁷¹ Khalil al-Anani, *Inside the Muslim Brotherhood: Religion, Identity, and Politics* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016), 34.

which particular strategies are carefully chosen, because “Violence is always sporadic and requires close attention to the immediate context in order to understand how, why and when tolerance turns to violence and *vice versa*”.⁷²

The importance of immediate context has been discussed by a great number of authors in literature on religious and communal violence in Indonesia. In his book, *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia*, Jacques Bertrand notes that the communal and religious conflicts that took place in the first decade of Reformasi should be treated as direct consequences of the re-interpretation of Indonesian nationalism.⁷³ The end of New Order Era marked the end of an authoritarian regime and a starting point to re-evaluate Suharto’s concept of Indonesian nationalism, which mainly prohibited Indonesians to publicly express their ethnic and religious identities.

“At the end of the juncture a national model is reconfirmed or a new one adopted, and a different structure of political institutions reflects newly achieved gain/losses for ethnic group inclusion or terms of inclusion.”⁷⁴

During the transition period, scholars like Sidel argued that religious violence in the early years of Reformasi was closely related to the reassertion of the authority of religious institutions. In analysing the roots of the communal violence in the Moluccas and series of terrorist bombing attacks after 1998, Sidel notes:

“... the successive phases of violence emanating from under the broad umbrella of these religious hierarchies worked – structurally, if not instrumentally – not only to effect an extrusion of internal problems onto religious “Others”, but also to reassert the structures of boundaries of religious authority upon those claimed as the followers of their faith.”⁷⁵

These indicate that religious violence in post-1998 Indonesia is intertwined with the re-evaluation of national and ethnic identity in which religious institutions play a significant role. This thesis aims to go beyond Bertrand and Sidel. While Bertrand focuses mainly on the reinterpretation of identity at the national level, this thesis looks into the redefinition of local identity and the role of local religious institutions in Lombok. In contrast to Sidel’s emphasis on inter-religious conflicts and regional terrorist network in post-1998 Indonesia,

⁷² Guy Elcheroth and Stephen Reicher, *Identity, Violence and Power Mobilising Hatred, Demobilising Dissent* (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2017), 17.

⁷³ Jacques Bertrand, *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia* (Cambridge University Press, 2004).

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 5.

⁷⁵ John Sidel, *Riots, Pogroms, Jihad: Religious Violence in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), xii.

this thesis will look into intra-faith conflicts involving Ahmadiyah in post-Suharto Lombok.

The history of mainstream Muslim-Ahmadiyah relations in Lombok and Indonesia in this thesis will be analysed under this framework. Immediate contexts in this thesis include the socio-political changes at the national and local levels that took place after Suharto's downfall. In Lombok, I will also look specifically at the role of *Tuan Guru* as a religious authorities on the island because identities “do produce social power, those who wish to wield such power (politicians, leaders and other activists) will actively seek to construct versions of identity that sustain their practical projects”.⁷⁶ *Tuan Guru* are neither dutiful nor rigid agents; they are human and lively actors. Therefore, the durability of collective identity is contingent upon the ability and creativity of the collective agent to link “intersecting discourses”: solidarity, action and its organisational layers in the participants' sense of self.⁷⁷

Therefore, the goal of this thesis is to study the conflicts between Ahmadiyah and mainstream-Muslims, not simply as theological debates within Islam or merely as the result of power plays among the ruling elites. This thesis will account for the tension between mainstream-Muslims and the Ahmadiyah community as an anomaly in the normal pattern of social relations in Lombok, which are characteristically fluid and based on many different social categories. This thesis therefore aims to show what makes Lombok's Muslims accept such categories as ‘real’ in the pragmatic sense that they provide a grid for interpreting social experience and for giving and accepting the direction to attack Ahmadiyah members. The question is not whether religion (Islam) provides justification where a deviant evil is set against righteous Muslims. The question is rather why and when these ideas of what is sacred are taken up, who weaves these ideas into a political discourse, and why they momentarily work in mobilising the masses.

Significance of Study

This thesis acknowledges the importance of Ahmadiyah among other minority groups, since the public and scholarly debates on whether its position is within or outside

⁷⁶ Guy Elcherth and Stephen Reicher, *Identity, Violence and Power Mobilising Hatred*, 95.

⁷⁷ William A. Gamson, Commitment and Agency in Social Movements, *Sociological Forum* 6, no. 1 (March 1991): 41.

of Islam are found not only at local and national spheres, but also in other countries like Malaysia and Pakistan.⁷⁸

Moreover, most of the research on religious conflicts in post-Suharto Indonesia concentrates on the inter-religious patterns, since these conflicts represent the worst examples of tragic mass violence.⁷⁹ These studies are not only greater in number than those on the intra-faith conflicts, but also draw on a wider range of themes in analysing the conflicts – from political economy at the national and local levels to religious factors and elites' power struggles surrounding the conflicts. This study attempts to address this lacuna by focusing on intra-religious hostilities in three different locations on Lombok island.

There are a number of studies on Islam in post-1998 Lombok. One of the most noteworthy is Jeremy Kingsley's PhD thesis, *Tuan Guru, Community and Conflict in Lombok, Indonesia*.⁸⁰ Kingsley identifies the central role of *Tuan Guru* (local religious leaders) as a peace broker in the conflict management agendas on the island.⁸¹ Whereas research at more aggregate levels has been important in advancing our understanding of the national patterns that may drive or trigger intra-faith violent conflict, there has been no previous study that has focused specifically on Lombok's Ahmadiyah-mainstream tensions. The Ahmadiyah-Lombok cases are only a small part of a bigger story of Ahmadiyah at the national level, and a minor part of the scholarly literature on the study of religious conflicts and religious institutions in Lombok.⁸² In addition, while looking into the Ahmadiyah community from different angles, there was no study that specifically focused on the role of identity in analysing Ahmadiyah and mainstream-Islam relations in

⁷⁸ Fatima Zainab Rahman, "State Restriction on the Ahmadiyya Sect in Indonesia and Pakistan," 408-422; Ajay Raina, "Democrats and Minority Marginalization: The Case of Pakistan," *Asian Journal of Political Science* 22, no. 2 (2014), <https://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2018/07/06/jais-has-no-right-to-stop-ahmadiyah-muslims-court-rules/>.

⁷⁹ Jeremy J. Kingsley, *Tuan Guru, Community and Conflict in Lombok, Indonesia*, PhD Thesis The (University of Melbourne, 2010), 5.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Ibid., see also Kingsley, "Peacemakers or Peace-Breakers? Provincial Elections and Religious Leadership in Lombok, Indonesia," *Indonesia* (2012): 53-82; Kingsley, "Redrawing Lines of Religious Authority in Lombok, Indonesia," *Asian Journal of Social Science* 42 (2014): 657-77; Kingsley, "Village Elections, Violence and Islamic Leadership in Lombok, Eastern Indonesia," *Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia* 27, no. 2 (2012): 285-309; and Kingsley's latest book, *Religious Authority and Local Governance in Eastern Indonesia* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2018).

⁸²The only exception is the recent work of Koerner and Putro, Catherine Koerner and Widodo Dwi Putro, "The Socio-Legal Construction of Ahmadiyah as A Religious Minority by Local and National Government Policy: Restriction before the Law, A Challenge for Religious Freedom in Nusa Tenggara Barat, Indonesia," *International Journal of Indonesian Studies*, no. 4 (2017).

post-1998 Indonesia. Yet, scholars argue that the search for identity is one of the main characteristics of the Reformasi Era.⁸³

This thesis aims to fill the gap through an in-depth study of the mainstream Muslim-Ahmadiyah encounter in post-1998 Lombok from the point of view of the redefinition of identity. This is important because more than 70% of Lombok's total population are Muslims. In addition, there is one religious group in Lombok, *Islam Wetu Telu*, that like Ahmadiyah meets the deviancy criteria of MUI in 2007, but mostly lives peacefully with Sasak-Muslims. Furthermore, besides treating religious teaching differences as resources, this thesis acknowledges the importance of local contexts in the perpetuation of conflicts. These aspects have received limited attention in the previous studies of Ahmadiyah in Indonesia.

In the context of religious studies, the contribution of this research is in expanding the academic analysis of the role of religious leaders in perpetuating and/or preventing conflicts. In addition, the thesis will assist in gaining a better understanding of the possible relationship between the formation of local identity and the religious violence after the departure of an authoritarian regime.

Scope of Study

Unless otherwise specifically stated, the Ahmadiyah community described in this thesis is limited to the Ahmadiyah Qadian group or Jemaah Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI) as this is the only existing branch of Ahmadiyah in Lombok.

The case study on Ahmadiyah in Lombok focuses on Lombok three villages: Pemongkong, Pancor and Ketapang. The three villages fit the category of the Islam Waktu Lima region that I examine further in Chapter 2. Therefore, attacks on the Ahmadiyah community outside the Waktu Lima region – for example, attacks on Ahmadiyah in Bayan, North Lombok regency, which fit the category of the Wetu Telu region – are not the core attention of this thesis.

⁸³ Ahmad Najib Burhani, "Defining Indonesian Islam, An Examination of the Construction of the National Islamic Identity of Traditionalist and Modernist Muslims," in *Islam in Indonesia: Contrasting Images and Interpretations*, (eds) Jajat Burhanudin and Kees van Dijk (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2013); Arie Setyaningrum Pamunkas, *The Dakwah Media in Post Suharto Indonesia: From Politics of Identity to Popular Culture (The Case of Ummi)* (Berlin: Humboldt University, 2015); Martin Ramstedt and Fajar Ibnu Thufail, eds. *Kegalauan Identitas: Agama, Etnisitas, dan Kewarganegaraan Pada Masa Pasca-Orde Baru* (Jakarta: Grasindo, 2011).

Analytical Rubric

In order to interpret the basis and significance of intra-religious violence in Lombok, it is important to have some background understanding of Islamic boundaries in Indonesia. In the next section, I will explore three patterns of religious authority in Islam. Then I will look into the three main forms of Islam in Indonesia. For the purpose of this thesis, the three forms aim to explain the different sources of religious authority that Indonesian Muslims use to express their religious piety. In my attempt to explain the mainstream-Islam opposition towards Ahmadiyah's teachings, I will elaborate on the model of religious authority adopted by each form of Islam in Indonesia. Understanding these differences is crucial to appreciating the conflicts between different groups who all identify as Muslim.

1. Three sources of religious authority in Islam

Mir-Kasimov notes that “the survival of a religious community is closely related to the issue of religious authority”.⁸⁴ Mir-Kasimov defines religious authority as what “initiates a religion and maintains the link with its original impulse throughout history”.⁸⁵ The original impulse in Islam is the Qur'an, the revelation received by the Prophet Muhammad. Consequently, any claim of religious authority in Islam has to prove its link to the sacred texts.⁸⁶

Mir-Kasimov further suggests three construction patterns in the religious authority in Islam based on their approach to the Qur'an.⁸⁷ The first is *rationalist* in character, which “favoured reason as the trustworthy instrument for the adequate understanding and application of the revelation, and even, in some cases, as a means of independent access to its source”.⁸⁸ The second approach is *Islamic-mysticism*, which basically argues that God's revelation continued after the Prophet Muhammad died. This category encompasses large number of groups, including some forms of Sufism and messianic-based movements. The last one is the *traditionist* approach, which essentially believes that the Qur'an is a final revelation, and therefore after the death of the Prophet the only perfect guide to the salvation

⁸⁴ Orkhan Mir-Kasimov, *Unity in Diversity: Mysticism, Messianism and the Construction of Religious Authority in Islam* (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 2.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 1.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 2.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

of the Muslim community is the Qur'an and the Hadith (the accounts of the words and deeds of the Prophet). The authorities who derived concrete principles and application of the law from the Qur'an and the Hadith, and then took on the role of the bearer of religious authority and were known as *jurists* or *ulama*.⁸⁹ Mir-Kasimov adds that these three models are the basic jurisprudential patterns that are still relevant in analysing the religious authority construction in the contemporary Islamic world, likely with some variations.⁹⁰

For the purpose of this thesis, I propose three forms of Islam in Indonesia and explain which model of religious authority each form adopted. The first form, 'mainstream-Islam', generally refers to the two biggest Islamic organisations in Indonesia, NU and Muhammadiyah, which together represent this. The terms 'modernist' (*modernis*) and 'traditionalist' (*tradisionalis*) are widely used to describe Muhammadiyah and NU, respectively, as the two main groupings within Islam in Indonesia.⁹¹ In December 2016, based on a survey in 34 provinces in Indonesia, the Alvara Research Center estimated that more than 79 million Indonesian Muslims aged 17 years and older were affiliated with NU and more than 22 million were affiliated with Muhammadiyah, which makes these two the largest religious (Islamic) organisations in the country.⁹²

The second form, which I call 'official Islam', is represented by the government-sanctioned Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI).⁹³ The MUI was founded in 1975. Although it was established at Suharto's behest, and continues to be funded by the government, the MUI is a non-governmental institution. Its leader is appointed periodically by MUI's members who consist of Muslim scholars from various Islamic organisations, including NU and Muhammadiyah.⁹⁴ Since Suharto's downfall, membership has widened to include activists from the Salafi movements.⁹⁵

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 3.

⁹¹ Deliar Noer, *The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), 29-30.

⁹² CEO Alvara Research Center, Hasanuddin Ali, <https://hasanuddinali.com/2017/01/19/menakar-jumlah-jamaah-nu-dan-muhammadiyah/>, accessed 17 April 2019.

⁹³ For more details on Islam and democratisation in Indonesia, see Robert Hefner, *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000).

⁹⁴ MUI, however, is not a supervisory body for these Islamic organisations and MUI's *fatwas* are not binding upon them, see Much Nur Ichwan, "'Ulama' State and Politics: Majelis Ulama Indonesia after Suharto," *Islamic Law and Society* 12, no. 1 (2005): 49.

⁹⁵ Wiktorowicz describes Salafi as "a common religious creed, which accepts only one legitimate religious interpretation: "Islamic pluralism does not exist". Quintan Wicktorowicz, "Anatomy of the Salafy Movement," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 29, no. 3 (2006): 207-39.

The MUI is organised at national level and there are also provincial MUI committees.⁹⁶ In the statutes of the MUI, the Council's role is defined as providing *fatwas* and advice, both to the government and to the Muslim community, on issues related to religion in particular and to all problems facing the nation in general.⁹⁷ Hence, the Council's function is authoritative but advisory in nature.

The third and last form of Indonesian Islam, in my schema, comprises 'minority Islam' groups, including various 'deviant' groups. For the purpose of this research, deviant groups are those groups that disagree with one or more of the 10 guidelines of the 2007 MUI's *fatwa*. The 2007 MUI *fatwa* states that a group is considered deviant if it:

1. Disagrees with the six principles of *Rukun Iman* (six pillars of faith);
2. Believes and acts outside the teaching of the Qur'an and Hadith (the Prophet's tradition);
3. Believes in a decree that comes after the Qur'an;
4. Disputes the authenticity of the Qur'an;
5. Interprets the Qur'an differently from Qur'an principles;
6. Disagrees with Hadith as a source of Islamic teaching;
7. Humiliates, despises or looks down on the Prophets and the Messengers;
8. Disagrees that the Prophet Muhammad is the last Prophet and Messenger;
9. Changes, adds or deletes principles concerning religious rituals that have been set down by Shariah, such as "The Hajj (pilgrimage) is not to Mecca", and prayers which do not have to be performed five times a day; or
10. Claims other Muslims are infidels without justification by syari'ah, for instance, they are infidels because they do not come from the same Islamic group.

⁹⁶ M.B. Hooker, *Indonesian Islam: Social Change through Contemporary Fatawâa* (Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 2003), 61.

⁹⁷ Nadirshah Hosen, "Behind the Scene: Fatwas of Majelis Ulama Indonesia (1975-1988)," *Journal of Islamic Studies* 15, no. 2 (2004): 147-79.

This minority category includes the Ahmadiyah, Shi'a and Gafatar.⁹⁸ Shi'a is the oldest group among the others.⁹⁹ Gafatar is a group established in 2012 and headquartered in Jakarta. Gafatar promised the renewal of Islamic religious tradition in Indonesia through Ahmad Mushaddeq, its founder, who claimed to be a prophet and Messiah who would save Indonesia and Muslims from destruction.¹⁰⁰ Ahmadiyah, established in India in 1889, arrived in Indonesia during the Dutch colonial period. The Indonesian Muslim Council issued a *fatwa* in 2005 that judged the movement to be deviant. Three years later, in 2008, a government Joint Ministerial Decree banned Ahmadiyah from proselytising.¹⁰¹

I argue that Mir-Kasimov's three modes of religious authority are useful in understanding the presence of the necessary element behind mainstream-Islam opposition towards Ahmadiyah in Indonesia. For mainstream-Islam, no matter what combination of jurisprudential patterns NU and Muhammadiyah may have adopted, there is a significant proportion of the *traditionist* element in it. For example, there may be a stronger *rationalist* element within Muhammadiyah than NU concerning re-interpretation of religious scriptures to fit modernity.¹⁰² On the other hand, there are Sufi elements within NU that Muhammadiyah lacks, for example, regarding how *nahdliyyin* (NU's members) respect and venerate *kyais* (religious leaders). Regardless of these, the *traditionist* approach is the main character of both NU and Muhammadiyah. A central point in analysing mainstream-Islam in Indonesia particularly lies on the specific rule that applies within the *traditionist* category, namely that "the revelation ends with Prophet Muhammad". A similar view is also shared by official Islam or the MUI. By and large, minority Islam in Indonesia has a contrasting view through the adoption of *Islamic-mysticism* as their source of religious

⁹⁸The previous Minister of Religious Affairs stated that Ahmadiyah followers in Indonesia number around 50,000, while the Ahmadiyah estimate they have 40,000 followers, <http://www.republika.co.id/berita/breaking-news/nasional/11/02/10/163354-menteri-agama-bantah-jumlah-anggota-ahmadiyah-capai-400-ribu>. For Shia, the leader of the Association of Jemaah of Ahlul Bait Indonesia (IJABI), Jalaluddin Rakhmat, stated that the members of Shi'a in Indonesia are around two-and-a-half million, <http://www.syahindonesia.com/2014/04/habib-ahmad-zein-klaim-jalaludin-rahmat.html>. For Sufi and Salafi, there are no real data on their members.

⁹⁹ Shi'a is a name given to those who supported Ali ra (son-in-law of Prophet Muhammad and the fourth Caliph) after the war of Shiffin. However, there was also a claim that Shi'ah is the group that supported Hussein (the grandson of Muhammad) who was killed in Karbala.

¹⁰⁰ Al Makin, "Returning to the Religion of Abraham: Controversies Over the Gafatar Movement in Contemporary Indonesia," *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations* 30, no. 1 (2019): 88.

¹⁰¹ Ahmad Najib Burhani, "Hating the Ahmadiyya: The Place of 'Heretics' in Contemporary Indonesian Muslim Society," *Contemporary Islam* 8 (2014): 143.

¹⁰² Charles Kurzman, "Achmad Dachlan," in *Modernist Islam*, (ed) Charles Kurzman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 344-48.

authority. Many, not all, groups within the minority Islam hold the view that revelation continues after the departure of Prophet Muhammad, some of them even declared their founder as a ‘prophet’ and a ‘promised Messiah’.

2. Discourse

For the purpose of this research, discourse refers to speeches, words and symbols that are used by *Tuan Guru* to define and describe the boundaries of the Muslim community.

I define discourse as a set of related representations. In this thesis, the notion of representation (or sign) is considered a four-way relationship between a signifying element (signifier), a signified element, an interpretant who relates the signifier to the signified element and interpreter(s).¹⁰³ Max Boholm gives an example of this structure: smoke (signifier) being a sign of fire (signified element) to a cognitive agent, for example, a forest ranger (interpreter), given the knowledge that fire causes smoke (interpretant).¹⁰⁴ This model is mostly beneficial in analysing the sociological differences between Ahmadiyah and Sasak-Muslims, for example, how Sasak-Muslims perceived the notions of ‘Ahmadiyah’s donations’ and their relevancy to ‘conversion threat’.

Organisation of the Thesis

The study is organised into five chapters. Chapter 2 will be dedicated to introducing the reader to the geography, demography and history of Lombok. This chapter will also examine the mainstream-Islamic organisations in Lombok, the history of these organisations and local politics on the island, as well as the history of conflicts in post-Suharto Lombok. I argue that the construction of Islamic collective identity is contingent upon the Islamic leaders and/or Islamic organisation aims and objectives, its internal structure, and the political environment within which it operates. The history of *Tuan Guru* and its emergence into a dominant religious authority in Lombok is therefore central in this chapter. The background issues of political transition in the post-Suharto Era, the development of democratisation in the country, and debates about the role political Islam has played during this period will be explored here. How far these trends of moderation,

¹⁰³ For more details on identity representation, see Max Boholm, “Towards a Semiotic Definition of Discourse and a Basis for a Typology of Discourses,” *Semiotica* 208 (2016): 177-201.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 180-83.

vis à vis the growing Islamic conservatism and religious violence across the archipelago, provide a context for the direction of Indonesian politics in the post-Suharto Era will then be discussed.

Chapter 3 is an account of the attitude towards Ahmadiyah at the national level, especially reflected in the MUI's *fatwas*. I emphasise the relationship between the harsher *fatwas* on Ahmadiyah in Reformasi Indonesia and the socio-political developments after Suharto's resignation. This chapter aims to demonstrate that defining the boundary lines of Indonesian Muslims was the channel the MUI used to establish its authority in post-1998 Indonesia.

Chapter 4 looks at the impact of changing religious authority dynamics on the boundaries of identity at the local and sub-local levels in Lombok. Without theological concerns surrounding the prophethood issue, the majority opposition towards Ahmadiyah could not have risen to its current and recent levels and could not have escalated to the point of excluding Ahmadiyah from the *Umma*. However, there are several sociological issues that also need to be taken into account in analysing the growing opposition to Ahmadiyah in post-New Order Lombok. I will focus on how the discussion of contested Muslim identity at the national, local and sub-local levels, together with the fragmented religious authority in Lombok, contributed to the rise of violence towards the Ahmadiyah community on the island.

Chapter 5 is the conclusion. It will deal with the major findings and attempt to prove the extent to which set objectives have been met. Recommendations for possible further research will also be given in this chapter.

Chapter 2

Tuan Guru and Religious Authority in Lombok

Introduction

In this chapter I begin with background information on Lombok, such as the demographics and the proportion of the various ethnicities and religious adherents living on the island, in order to reveal the significance of Sasak ethnicity among Lombok's Muslim population. Then I examine the socio-political changes that have taken place in Lombok since Suharto's downfall, which sheds light on the immediate contexts surrounding the rising concerns about ethnic identity. Next, I continue with a depiction of Lombok's mainstream-Islam as well as the religious authorities on the island. These will be given prominence in this chapter since I contend that religious leaders (*Tuan Guru*) and religious institutions (NW) are two foundational dimensions of Sasak-Sunni-Muslim identity in post-1998 Lombok. *Tuan Guru* and NW have significantly shaped Islam in Lombok and play a critical role in the post-1998 intra-religious conflict on the island. *Islam Wetu Telu* (*Wetu* literally means time and *Telu* literally means three) or Sasak people who, although professing to be Muslims, continue propitiating the ancestors and various divine spirits of their locality, largely defined the majority or mainstream-Islam in pre-1998 Lombok.¹⁰⁵ These backdrops are essential for the discussion in the next two chapters on the role and responsibilities of religious authority, the shifting 'others' from *Wetu Telu* to Ahmadiyah, and the prevailing discourses during the reconstruction of Sasak-Muslim identities in post-Reformasi Lombok.

Topography and Demography of Lombok

Lombok is an island located to the east of Bali island and to the west of Sumbawa island, and both Lombok and Sumbawa make up the West Nusa Tenggara province (NTB) with Mataram as its capital. In the early days of Independence, Lombok was part of the Sunda Kecil province with its capital in Singaraja Bali. Later, on 14 August 1958, Lombok

¹⁰⁵ 'Wetu Telu' introduced for the first time by Jan van Baal in his book *Pesta Alip Di Bayan* in 1976, and Erni Budiwanti sharpens this division in her "Religion of Sasak" in 1997. *Tuan Guru* Abdul Karim from Bayan said that Bayanese people have never used this term, and as a Sasak-Muslim from the northern region, he further stressed that "we (northern people) do not accept to be called a Wetu Telu Muslims, we are Muslims. Wetu Telu is a term that attributed to us by the outsiders". Interview with TG Abdul Karim, August 2015.

and Sumbawa islands merged into NTB with Mataram as the capital. The provincial capital of Mataram is located in the western part of Lombok, in the province's one urban area that has a population of about 441,064 (2017). The province as a whole has a total area of nearly 20,000 squares kilometres and a population of 4,773,795 (2017). Lombok has only about 25% of this land area (approximately 5,435 squares kilometres), but 70% of the total population or 3,352,988 (2017). H.M. Saud, a member of Lombok's Regional Government Council, 1948-1949, said, "Lombok is like a small pond. If you want to catch a fish you have to make sure that there is no excessive water splash, so no harm to the lotus and no damage to the dyke".¹⁰⁶ I assume that the meaning is because of the density of the population of this tiny island, which is also home to the provincial capital, it makes Lombok the centre stage of NTB's political competition and, it is said, only skilful politicians will survive and gain control over the island.

Figure 2.1

Map of Lombok



¹⁰⁶ Personal communication with H.M. Saud (1916-1996) in Mei 1996.

Lombok consists of four regencies (*Kabupaten*): West Lombok, Central Lombok, East Lombok and North Lombok, and one municipality, Mataram. Each regency is led by a Bupati (regent) while the municipality is led by a Walikota (mayor). The heavily forested volcano Mt. Rinjani (3,726 metres) and a few smaller peaks dominate the northern part of Lombok. Mt. Baru (2,576 metres), a smaller cone within the Mt. Rinjani crater, is still active. The big earthquakes and series of aftershocks that hit Lombok during August 2018 were mainly centered in the regions surrounding Mt. Rinjani.

NTB, in contrast with the western part (Bali, Java, Sumatra and Kalimantan), was considered to be less developed. Lombok, like other regions in the eastern part of Indonesia, has long suffered from under-development, resulting in poor infrastructure, an under-educated population, and high rates of child and maternal mortality.¹⁰⁷ For those among the economically marginalised population, migration is a frequent option. The island is one region in Indonesia that has a higher rate of migrant workers to other islands, such as Bali and Sulawesi, to support their families through remittances.¹⁰⁸

Lombok has an ethnically and religiously diverse population of some three-and-a-half million inhabitants, of which over 70% of the population are Sasak, Lombok's indigenous ethnic group.¹⁰⁹ Besides longstanding Chinese and Arab communities,¹¹⁰ there are sizeable Balinese, Sumbawanese and Javanese communities. Balinese Hindus, numbering approximately 155,000 people, form the largest ethnic and religious minority,¹¹¹ and mainly live in Western and Central Lombok and own their land. Their land ownership

¹⁰⁷ For a more thorough study on the development in West Nusa Tenggara province and Lombok in particular, see Kathryn Monk and Yance De Fretes, *The Ecology of Nusa Tenggara and Maluku is a Comprehensive Ecological Survey of a Series of Ecologically Diverse Islands in the Pacific* (Hong Kong: Periplus Editions, 2002); Rusman and Roosmalawati, "Infant and Children Mortality in Lombok, Indonesia" (Jakarta: Collaboration Between the Center for Population and Manpower Studies, Indonesian Institute of Sciences (PPT-LIPI) and the Demography Program, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1998).

¹⁰⁸ In January to April 2018, there were around 9,000 migrant workers from West Lombok and East Lombok regencies alone, BNP2TKI, 2018. See also Leslie Butt and Jessica Ball's "Strategic Actions of Transnational Migrant Parents Regarding Birth Registration for Stay-behind Children in Lombok, Indonesia," *Population, Space and Place* 25, no. 3 (2019): 1-9.

¹⁰⁹ Biro Pusat Statistik NTB, 2011.

¹¹⁰ Frode F. Jacobsen, "Marriage Patterns and Social Stratification in Present Hadrami Arab Societies in Central and Eastern Indonesia," *Asian Journal of Social Science* 35, no. 4/5 (2007): 472-87.

¹¹¹ Nuhri M. Nuh, "Kelompok Salafi Di Kabupaten Lombok Barat," in *Kasus-Kasus Aliran/Faham Kagamaan Aktual Di Indonesia*, (ed) Ahmad Syafi'i Mufid (Jakarta: Departemen Agama Republik Indonesia 2009), 1-42.

goes back to the time when the Balinese kingdom annexed Lombok in the 17th century.¹¹² The Sumbawanese have primarily settled in the eastern region and the Arabs in the western part of Lombok, near the old harbour of Ampenan. The Chinese, who are predominantly traders, live in trading centres such as the Ampenan and Cakranegara sub-districts. The Bugis from Makassar (South Sulawesi) live in the coastal areas of Eastern Lombok. Each ethnic group speaks its own language. Muslims, who make up 94% of the island's total population, predominantly consist of the Sasak, the Bugis and the Arabs. The Balinese are overwhelmingly Hindu, whereas the Chinese are generally either Christian or Confucian. In 2015, there were 1898 mosques and *mushallas*, 17 churches, 307 *puras* (Hindu temples), 10 Buddhist temples and one Confucian temple in West Lombok regency alone.¹¹³ In 2017, there were more than 5,000 mosques across Lombok.¹¹⁴ The outstanding number of mosques in the island makes Lombok known as “the island of a thousand mosques”. This clearly outlines the importance of Islam in Lombok. As one *Tuan Guru* (one of the local Lombok religious leaders) in West Lombok suggests, “Islam is at the core of life for the Sasak”.¹¹⁵ Edward Aspinall supports this statement and proposes Lombok as the only island/region in Indonesia that is equal to Aceh in regard to their deep association with religion (Islam).¹¹⁶ Even though there is no demand to strictly implement Islamic law in Lombok, it is clear that Sasaks are closely associated with Islam. This relationship between ethnicity and religion is important when analysing the form of identity redefinition that took place on the island after 1998.

Islam and the Religion of the Sasak

This section introduces the history of Islam and pre-Islamic religions in Lombok. This includes when Islam arrived in Lombok, how it has survived, and the gradual process of the conversion of the Sasak people to Islam. It is worth noting that one peculiarity of the Indonesian government's stance on (freedom of) religion is that it recognises six official

¹¹² Erni Budiwanti, “Religion of the Sasak: An Ethnographic Study of the Impact of Islamisation on the Wetu Telu in Lombok” (Melbourne: Monash University, 1997), 6.

¹¹³ Nuhri M. Nuh, “Kelompok Salafi Di Kabupaten Lombok Barat,” 2.

¹¹⁴ Bureau Statistic NTB, 2018.

¹¹⁵ Jeremy Kingsley, *Tuan Guru, Community and Conflicts in Lombok, Indonesia* (Melbourne: The University of Melbourne, 2010), 99.

¹¹⁶ While Lombok is known as “the island of thousand mosques”, Aceh is popular as the “Veranda of Mecca”, see Edward Aspinall, *Islam and Nation Separatist Rebellion on Aceh, Indonesia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 10.

religions only (Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism). Following the anti-communist massacres in 1966-1967, every citizen is required to embrace one of these religions, as it is compulsory personal data that is mentioned on identification cards such as the national ID (KTP), and in passports.¹¹⁷ It should be emphasised, however, that the Indonesian followers of the above-mentioned religions do not form coherent groups. For example, there is mainstream-minority Islam in Indonesia, and within the mainstream-Islam alone there are numerous groups with different stances regarding some issues.¹¹⁸

Prior to the arrival of foreign influences in Lombok, the Boda was the original belief of the Sasak. The worship of the ancestral spirits and various other local deities was the central focus of these Boda practices. This religion initially had nothing to do with Buddhism, as it was mainly characterised by animism and pantheism.¹¹⁹ A later development in the seventh century, the Hindu-Majapahit Kingdom of East Java that occupied Lombok, brought Hindu and Buddhist teachings and practices to the Sasak.¹²⁰ Therefore, up until Islam 600 years later, Lombok had been under the influence of Buddhism and Hinduism from Java.¹²¹ After 1966, the Boda community eventually declared themselves Buddhists and therefore became one of the six official religions in Indonesia.¹²²

Islam was introduced for the first time by Javanese preachers, the most prominent being Sunan Prapen (1510-1605), a descendent of Sunan Giri,¹²³ who landed in the northern part of Lombok in the 16th century after the demise of the Majapahit Kingdom.¹²⁴ These preachers used the ancient Javanese language for instruction.

¹¹⁷ Yuksel Sezgin and Mirjam Kunkler, "Regulation of 'Religion' and the 'Religious': The Politics of Judicialization and Bureaucratization in India and Indonesia," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 56, no. 2 (2014): 448-78.

¹¹⁸ One example is the NU and Muhammadiyah's different views on accommodation to local tradition.

¹¹⁹ Budiwanti, "Religion of the Sasak: An Ethnographic Study of the Impact of Islamisation on the Wetu Telu Lombok," 3-7.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 8.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 3-4.

¹²² Ever since, the Boda community has put Buddhism in the religion column of their national ID cards. A study on Lombok's Boda community, see MacDougall, "Buddhist Buda or Buda Buddhists?"

¹²³ Sunan Giri, one of the Walisongo, the famous nine Islamic preachers in Java, lived around the 14th century. Sunan Giri spread Islam to Lombok, Sulawesi and the Moluccas.

¹²⁴ According to Tuan Guru Abdul Karim, the Bayanese named West Lombok and its surrounding as "Teben" from the Arabic word "Tabi'in" which means "followers", since the Bayanese and the northern people were the first Sasak to accept Islam.

This introduction of Islam by Sunan Prapen was through Sufi approaches that were strongly mixed with mysticism and that welcomed local customary beliefs characterised by animism.¹²⁵ During their mission, the preachers did not immediately abolish the old traditions, using the local tradition as a bridge to introduce Islam. The syncretism of Boda-Hinduism and Sufi Islam resulted in what came to be known as *Islam Wetu Telu*.¹²⁶

The presence of *Islam Wetu Telu* confirms that the early stage of Islamisation in Lombok, like other places in Indonesia, is not marked with a clear division between Islam and pre-existing Islamic beliefs. Van Dijk argues, “When Islam spread over Indonesia it was confronted with elaborate social structures and deeply rooted beliefs. Islam became the official religion of these societies, but it did not prove easy to replace the old beliefs and customs”.¹²⁷

The central role of the ancestor is one of the most noticeable common elements within *Wetu Telu*. The *Islam Wetu Telu* mosque in Bayan is surrounded by a complex of ancestor graves (*makam*). These ancestors are the founders of the Bayanese (the residents of the Bayan region in the northern part of the island). *Islam Wetu Telu* highly regards Mt. Rinjani as an important spiritual centre.¹²⁸ In their daily lives, *Islam Wetu Telu* tend to disregard the routine practices of Islam such as prayer five times a day and fasting for the whole month during Ramadhan, which the majority of the Muslim community consider obligatory, and valuing local customs and practices (*adat*).¹²⁹

The arrival of the Bugis (from Makassar, South Sulawesi) in the eastern part of Lombok in the 17th century introduced Islam in a different form to the one that had been introduced earlier by the Javanese preachers.¹³⁰ Tuan Guru Abdul Karim explains that, unlike *Wetu Telu*, the dominant character of Islam in the eastern part of Lombok is the

¹²⁵ Budiwanti, “The Purification Movement in Bayan, North Lombok Orthodox Islam Vis-À-Vis Religious Syncretism,” in *Between Harmony and Discrimination: Negotiating Religious Identities Within Majority-Minority Relationships in Bali and Lombok*, (eds) C. Philipp E. Nothhaft and David Harnish (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 147.

¹²⁶ Budiwanti, “The Purification Movement in Bayan,” 147.

¹²⁷ Kees van Dijk, “Comparing Different Streams of Islam Wrestling with Words and Definitions,” in *Islam in Indonesia: Contrasting Images and Interpretations*, (eds) Jajat Burhanudin and Kees van Dijk (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2013), 15-24.

¹²⁸ “Among the Bayanese, it has been a commonly accepted belief that their village is the navel of the world, its absolute centre”. Sven Cederroth, “Return of the Birds: Images of a Remarkable Mosque in Lombok,” *Nytt NIAS*, no. 4 (2004): 21.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ In 1623, Sultan Alauddin King of Gowa (who had embraced Islam in 1603) started an expansion for a food reserve for his people in Sumbawa island and Lombok.

strong *syari'ah* approach.¹³¹ This means that Islam in the eastern part of Lombok, at least its core teachings, is not contaminated with local customary beliefs characterised by animism. To distance this teaching from *Wetu Telu*, which was present before, scholars refer to this as *Islam Waktu Lima*.¹³² In this vein, it seems that the differences between *Islam Waktu Lima* (literally means Five-Times-Islam and in this thesis refers to Sasak-Muslim or Lombok's mainstream-Muslim) and *Islam Wetu Telu* (literally means Three-Times-Islam) concur with the extant literature on Islam in Java that suggests the existence of multiple forms of Islam. This is from Geertz's abangan-santri separation,¹³³ via Beatty (*wong Jawa* vs. *wong Islam*)¹³⁴ and Hefner (*Javanist Islam*, or *Kejawen* vs. *Santri*),¹³⁵ and Woodward (*Kejawen, Islam Jawa* and *Normative Islam*),¹³⁶ to Koentjaraningrat (*Agami Jawi* and *Agami Islam santri*).¹³⁷ In parallel, the past tensions between *Kaum Muda* (Young Generation) and *Kaum Tua* (Old Generation), *Kaum Paderi* and *Kaum Adat* in West Sumatera, all indicated that the keyword in analysing various 'streams' of Islam in Indonesia lies in whether Islam is surpassing the previous local tradition and practices, or whether it is accommodating local tradition and practices.

In addition to a more accommodating stance towards local tradition, the current size of *Islam Wetu Telu* compared to *Islam Waktu Lima* is like that of minority Islam to mainstream, respectively.¹³⁸ Nonetheless, there are differences in religious practices between *Islam Wetu Telu* and the majority of Sasak-Muslims. The most noticeable and most significant differences between *Wetu Telu* and *Waktu Lima* are the way they practice religious duties, which are part of the Five Pillars of Islam, like prayer five times a day and fasting during the month of Ramadhan. While the majority of the Muslim community pray five times daily and observe a full month of fasting during Ramadhan,

¹³¹ Interview with Tuan Guru Abdul Karim, August 2015.

¹³² For example, Sven Cederroth, "Return of the Birds," 20.

¹³³ Clifford Geertz, *The Religion of Java* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1960).

¹³⁴ Andrew Beatty, *Varieties of Javanese Religion: An Anthropological Account* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

¹³⁵ Robert Hefner, *Hindu Javanese: Tengger Tradition and Islam* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985).

¹³⁶ Woodward, Mark R. *Islam in Java: Normative Piety and Mysticism in the Sultanate of Yogyakarta* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1989).

¹³⁷ Koentjaraningrat, *Javanese Culture* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985).

¹³⁸ There is no official record of *Islam Wetu Telu* followers, but since the community now lives mostly in Bayan (North Lombok), with smaller numbers in Rembitan (Central Lombok), the number is approximately less than 1,000.

Wetu Telu adherents perform prayer three times ('three times' in Sasak dialect is literally '*Wetu Telu*') a day and fast only for the first three, middle three and last three days of Ramadhan.¹³⁹ The execution of religious duties mainly rests on appointed religious leaders or *pemangku*.¹⁴⁰ Besides that, Tuan Guru Abdul Karim, a 55-year-old *Tuan Guru* from Bayan, says that up until now it would be very hard to separate alcohol from the life of *Islam Wetu Telu*, especially during festive or communal gatherings.¹⁴¹

Referring to the 10 guidelines of the 2007 MUI's *fatwa* point no. 9,¹⁴² *Islam Wetu Telu* is a deviant group. However, this community has always been regarded as part of the Muslim community in Lombok that needs further guidance.¹⁴³ *Wetu Telu* has been the subject of *Tuan Guru* preaching for at least five decades. Erni Budiwanti describes *Wetu Telu* as a community that accepted Islam verbally through verbal declaration of faith or *syahadah*. She says, "the majority of nominal Muslims, especially in Bayan and perhaps in other places too, conceive of Islam narrowly as the *syahadah* profession of the faith by declaring that there is no other god except Allah alone, and that Muhammad is His messenger".¹⁴⁴

What Budiwanti calls narrow Islam, according to Sven Cederroth, is the similarity that *Islam Wetu Telu* shares with Javanese Islamic syncretism or what Koentjoroningrat called *Agami Jawi*.¹⁴⁵ The *Agami Jawi* belief system, according to Koentjoroningrat, includes:

"An extensive range of concepts, views, and values, many of which are Muslim in origin: the belief in God Almighty (*Gusti Allah*), the belief in the prophet

¹³⁹ *Islam Wetu Telu*'s three times prayer is a product of the assimilation of Islam to Hindu practices. The way *Islam Wetu Telu* pray is like other Muslims, but the frequency of their daily prayer represents how many time Hindus pray daily. It means that *Islam Wetu Telu* is violating point no. 9 of the MUI Fatwa 2007: "Changes, adds to, or reduces principles concerning religious rituals that have been set down by Shariah, such as 'The *hajj* (pilgrimage) is not to Mecca', and prayers which do not have to be performed five times a day".

¹⁴⁰ Rasmianto, "Interrelasi Kiai, Penghulu dan Pemangku Adat dalam Tradisi Islam Wetu Telu di Lombok," *Jurnal el Harakah* 11, no. 2 (2009): 138.

¹⁴¹ Interview with Tuan Guru Abdul Karim, August 2015.

¹⁴² "A group is considered deviant if it changes, adds to, or reduces principles concerning religious rituals that have been set down by *syari'ah*, such as 'The Hajj (pilgrimage) is not to Mecca', and prayers that do not have to be performed five times a day," see Chapter 1, page 29.

¹⁴³ Interview with the MUI NTB leader, Saiful Muslim, July 2015; interview with Tuan Guru Abdul Karim, August 2015.

¹⁴⁴ Budiwanti, "The Purification Movement in Bayan," 158.

¹⁴⁵ There is an interesting discussion of religion and syncretism in Charles Stewart, "Syncretism and Its Synonyms: Reflections on Cultural Mixture," *Diacritics* 29, no. 3 (1999): 40-62.

Muhammad (*kanjeng nabi Muhammad*), and the belief in other prophets (*para ambiya*). The Javanese consider God Almighty to be the creator and ultimate cause of life and the entire universe. They believe that there is but one God (“gusti Allah ingkang maha esa”). All human actions as well as important decisions are done “in the name of God” (*bismillah*), a formula pronounced many times per day to inaugurate any small or large endeavor.”¹⁴⁶

Tuan Guru Abdul Karim from Bayan labels *Wetu Telu* as a community that “has a strong will to hold *aqidah* (Islamic faith) but poor knowledge in *syari’ah* (canon law) matters”.¹⁴⁷ Nevertheless, the admittance of *Islam Wetu Telu* as part of the Muslim community by the mainstream in Lombok makes it fair to argue that there are some values that united the two.¹⁴⁸ Even though *Islam Waktu Lima* and *Islam Wetu Telu* have different attitudes in accommodating local tradition and performing religious rituals, both hold *traditionist* approaches and believe that revelation ends with the Prophet Muhammad.¹⁴⁹ Similar to *Islam Waktu Lima*, there is no prophet after Prophet Muhammad within *Islam Wetu Telu* teaching.

After 1966, many *Islam Wetu Telu* followers quickly converted to Islam to register their religious affiliation for a national ID card.¹⁵⁰ In addition to this, the significant decrease in the numbers of *Islam Wetu Telu* followers these days has been due to the intense preaching and conversionary efforts of *Tuan Guru* to the *Islam Wetu Telu* community. As a result, the numbers of the *Islam Wetu Telu* community have been eroded significantly, although they still exist in the Northern Lombok region (Bayan) and to a smaller extent in the Central Lombok region (Rembitan).

Lombok’s Sasak people, in general, live in either the *Wetu Telu* or the *Waktu Lima* region.¹⁵¹ *Islam Wetu Telu* was therefore essential in defining the *Waktu Lima* community. In other words, *Islam Wetu Telu* was the contrasting image of the Lombok’s mainstream-

¹⁴⁶ R.M. Koentjaraningrat, “Javanese Religion,” in *Encyclopedia of Religion*, (ed) Lindsay Jones, 2nd ed., vol. 7 (Macmillan Reference USA, 2005): 4816.

¹⁴⁷ Interview with Tuan Guru Abdul Karim, August 2015.

¹⁴⁸ Interview with Dr. Fahrurrozi Dahlan, a lecturer at UIN Mataram, who explains that “Islam Wetu Telu is not deviant, they just need further guidance, the differences (with Waktu Lima) are not *on-aqidah*’s domain ...”. Interview with Fahrurrozi Dahlan, July 2015.

¹⁴⁹ Interview with Tuan Guru Abdul Karim, August 2015; interview with Saiful Muslim, July 2015.

¹⁵⁰ Yuksel Sezgin and Mirjam Kunkler, “Regulation of ‘Religion’ and the ‘Religious’: The Politics of Judicialization and Bureaucratization in India and Indonesia,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 5, no. 2 (2014): 448-78.

¹⁵¹ Outside these two regions of Islam, one community with significant presence in Lombok is the Balinese-Hindu community.

Muslim. However, the significance of *Wetu Telu* in defining what *Islam Waktu Lima* is seems to be replaced by the presence of the ‘deviant’, exhibited in numerous attacks on Ahmadiyah community in post-1998 Lombok. I mentioned earlier in this chapter¹⁵² that both *Wetu Telu* and Ahmadiyah meet the deviant criteria of the 2007 MUI deviant guidelines. However, the mainstream-Muslim behaviour toward Ahmadiyah members differs to their attitude towards *Islam Wetu Telu* followers. In Lombok, Ahmadiyah has always been a deviant group, but the group has mostly been subject to violence attacks since 1998. *Islam Wetu Telu* has always been regarded as the ‘almost-accepted-members’ of the Sasak-Muslim community, in need of guidance but never perceived as a deviant and never totally excluded from the Muslim community. Indeed, *Islam Wetu Telu* has a relatively harmonious relationship with the Sasak-Muslim compared to Ahmadiyah. Therefore, these contrasting experiences of *Islam Wetu Telu* and Ahmadiyah are vital in defining Sasak-Muslim identity inclusively and exclusively. I will return to this in more detail in Chapter 3.

My fieldwork in 2015 concentrated on the *Islam Waktu Lima* region, which characterised the majority of the island. In order to reveal the role of religious institutions and *Tuan Guru*, I divided the *Waktu Lima* region into two categories: (1) *Waktu Lima Plus Tuan Guru*; and (2) *Waktu Lima Neutral*. This sub-regional division is intended to reveal particular patterns of religious conflict in post-1998 Lombok and the different rationale behind the violence toward Ahmadiyah. The division helps to show that most of the religious violence against Ahmadiyah in post-1998 Lombok took place in a more persistent way in the regions that do not have a single dominant religious authority.

Waktu Lima regions

(1) *Waktu Lima Plus Tuan Guru*

It is the region where orthodox power is prevalent and a single dominant religious group/organisation or *Tuan Guru* is present. In addition, these regions are the birthplace of either the leading religious organisations or religious leaders, or both. Pancor (East Lombok) Kediri (West Lombok), Pagutan (West Lombok), and Jerowaru (East Lombok) are some places that fit in this category.

(2) *Waktu Lima Neutral*

Islam Waktu Lima followers live in this region. However, there is no dominant religious organisation or religious leader. Alternatively, several *Tuan Guru* from outside the village

¹⁵² See footnote 35.

regularly attend to give religious sermons. One area that fits this category is Ketapang (West Lombok).

Decentralisation and Local Identities

Suharto's departure in May 1998 was accompanied by massive development across Indonesia. In Lombok, one change from the economic perspective was the high inflation at the peak of the economic crisis in 1998-1999 that led to the severely devalued rupiah. It made the remittance payments sent from overseas worth more than three times their former value.¹⁵³ The number of Lombok's migrant labourers working abroad increased two-fold during 1998. The Departemen Tenaga Kerja (Department of Labour) of NTB noted that in 1997-1998 there were around 10,000 workers abroad, whereas in 1998-1999 there were nearly 20,000 workers sent abroad.¹⁵⁴ This resulted in the dramatic increase of remittance payments sent home by these workers from Rp. 37,122,960,000 in 1997-1998 to Rp. 243,586,395,107 for the period 1998-1999.¹⁵⁵ The weakened rupiah made remittance payments the most favoured shortcut for turning around family finances.

According to MacDougall, this feature significantly contributed to the increase in crime rate amid the popular public perception of police incompetency.¹⁵⁶ In 1999, the police achieved autonomy from the military, but the high level of public distrust toward their professionalism and ability to act effectively when needed was inevitable during the early days of Reformasi.¹⁵⁷ During the January riots in 2000, for example, witnesses reported that the police arrived when the riots were over.¹⁵⁸ A local journalist also reported that Ahmadiyah leaders visited the police station weekly for about a month following the 2002 attack in Ketapang, West Lombok, but received a minimum response.¹⁵⁹ Lack of resources is one factor that explains this situation, and the former provincial police chief of NTB, Farouk Muhammad, pointed out that corruption within the police was partly due to the basic necessity of having to perform duties such as buying gas and petrol.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵³ MacDougall, "Buddhist Buda or Buda Buddhists?" 2-4.

¹⁵⁴ Dinas Ketenagakerjaan Provinsi Nusa Tenggara Barat, 2000.

¹⁵⁵ MacDougall, "Buddhist Buda or Buda Buddhists?" 1-3.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 3.

¹⁵⁷ Kingsley, "Tuan Guru, Community and Conflict," 38.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁹ Interview with Adi, November 2015.

¹⁶⁰ Kingsley, "Tuan Guru, Community and Conflict," 38.

The government hierarchy during the Suharto Era started with the governors (Gubernur) and descends down to district heads (Bupati) to sub-district heads (Camat). None of these were elected by the people and hence, unsurprisingly, have little to do with those in their supposed constituencies. Instead, these officials were obligated to those who appointed them, and the governor position during the New Order was always held by a Javanese military officer.¹⁶¹ In addition, in every Indonesian province, the central government was not only represented by the provincial governor and those under his command, but also through the various institutions that administered the central government's policy in the provinces. The heads of these institutions, the Regional Offices (Kantor Wilayah), report not only to governors but also to the relevant Jakarta-based secretaries of the programmes being applied in the provinces. In short, the central government's presence in the province is both recognisable and, most of all, prevailing.¹⁶²

However, the Reform Era brought positive changes as one of the top priorities of the first administration under Habibie was to replace the former centralised government with a decentralised one. Against this background, law no. 22/1999, known as *Undang-Undang Otonomi daerah* (the Law of Regional Autonomy), was issued in 1999.¹⁶³ It was aimed at regulating the right of the local government to control their own internal affairs by fostering good governance and empowering the growth of civic society.¹⁶⁴ As a consequence, one major change that took place was the shift of power balance between the provinces and central government, as well as between the provinces and regencies or municipalities.¹⁶⁵ The shift in power relations mainly meant a substantial share of power was transferred from central to provincial level, and from provincial to district level. The

¹⁶¹ Lombok governor prior to 1998: Raden Aryo Muhammad Ruslan Tjakraningrat (1958-1966), a Javanese civil servant; Wasita Kusumah (1966-1977) a military Sundanese, Javanese General Gatot Suherman (1977-1988); and special forces, Kopassus (Komando Pasukan Khusus) Javanese General Warsito (1988-1998).

¹⁶² For more on decentralisation, Vedi Hadiz, *Localising Power in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia a Southeast Asia Perspective* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2011); (eds) Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy, *Local Power and Politics in Indonesia Decentralisation & Democratisation* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003); (eds) Michele Ford and Thomas B. Pepinsky, *Beyond Oligarchy: Wealth, Power, and Contemporary Indonesian Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University, 2014).

¹⁶³ Undang-Undang Otonomi Daerah, http://www.dpr.go.id/dokjdi/document/uu/UU_1999_22.pdf.

¹⁶⁴ More on the decentralisation era and its impact to power distribution locally, see Vedi Hadiz, *Localising Power in Post-Authoritarian*.

¹⁶⁵ David Harnish and Brigitta Hauser-Schaublin, "Introduction Negotiating Religious Identities Within Majority-Minority Relationships in Bali and Lombok," in *Between Harmony and Discrimination: Negotiating Religious Identities within Majority-Minority Relationships in Bali and Lombok*, (eds) C. Philipp E. Nothaft (Brill, 2014), 4.

new path to assume power locally also initiated the movement of creating smaller divisions by splitting up existing units (*pemekaran*) – village, district or provinces – and creating new sub-units.

This provided locals with opportunities to compete for increased social and political status in the Decentralisation Era, something that was impossible during the previous administration.¹⁶⁶

An effort to put in a local candidate as a governor in the 1980s, for example, resulted in serious punishment to those parliamentary members who challenged the right of the central government to choose the right (military officer) candidate.¹⁶⁷ Sandra M. Hamid's doctoral thesis on land dispute among the locals against a private company backed by Jakarta in Rowok, Central Lombok regency, provides an example of how the centralised system during the New Order administration often occupied and monopolised local natural resources while sacrificing the rights of the locals.¹⁶⁸

The departure of Suharto consequently brought significant changes in Lombok. The most noticeable one was the euphoria at having indigenous Sasak to rule and govern their own island. Scholars like Nordholt and van Klinken note the departure of Suharto and the concern of identity politics, as follows:

“The sudden demise of the strong New Order state in 1998 came as a surprise to many professional Indonesia watchers. What seemed to be a solid and invincible regime turned out to be a fragile state, in which regional, religious, and ethnic identity politics became more dominant.”¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁶ Kari Telle, “Vigilante Citizenship: Sovereign Practices,” 184.

¹⁶⁷ Kingsley, *Tuan Guru, Community and Conflict*, 47-48.

¹⁶⁸ In his annual speech in the House of Representatives in 1991, Suharto mentioned that the East is a huge region “lacking” and “in need” of development. Basically, this was an invitation for developers to begin large-scale investment in the eastern parts of the archipelago where Lombok resides. This includes high-end tourism which previously, in the 1980's and early 1990's, was concentrated mainly in Bali. Lombok, Bali's closest eastern neighbour, was a natural site for local and foreign investors and land speculators as land in Bali had become a rare and comparatively expensive commodity. From their experiences in Bali, investors had learnt that their first priority should be to target the seemingly endless beaches stretching around Lombok. Those with access to information, such as which beaches were going to be declared as “tourism designated areas” would be able to take advantage of the unfolding situation by securing the land in advance. Their strategy was to provide the lowest possible compensation to the local landowners, and then resell the land for a substantial profit to other investors who would come later with their plans to build hotels and other similar forms of tourist infrastructure. This incited protests from local landowners in Rowok in 1997. For a fuller account, see Sandra Hamid, *Engaging the Center: On Being Indonesian Citizens in Lombok, Eastern Indonesia* (Illinois: University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2005).

¹⁶⁹ Henk Schulte Nordholt and Gerry van Klinken, “Introduction,” in *Renegotiating Boundaries Local politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia*, (eds) Henk Schulte Nordholt and Gerry van Klinken (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2007), 3.

While acknowledging these processes were noticeable in the early years of the Reformasi, Edward Aspinall contends that ethnic political identity has declined significantly in recent years. The democratisation process after Suharto and patronage distribution are two important factors that prevented ethnic politics to flourish and play a leading role in the reconstruction of identities after the resignation of Suharto.¹⁷⁰ The democratisation process provides space for ethnic politicians to participate on the political stage in their own autonomous regions. These chances weaken ethnicity-based political identity since the room to channel their aspiration is now available, particularly through the decentralisation programme. One perfect example is NTB. Here, candidates for local government governor and deputy governor positions are nominated together as pairs, but it cannot be a Sasak pair. Rather, it is either Sasak-Sumbawa or Sasak-Bima pairs. In other words, ethnic affiliations are only one part of the options that are available in building political support.

The second is what Vedi Hadiz calls “oligarchy”, or what Aspinall notes as “predatory distribution” where a small group of elites have control of a region.¹⁷¹ This system binds together the elites and their supporters as well their political opponents in deal-making and compromise circles.¹⁷² Ruling elites changing their political affiliation to different parties is one example of the deal-making and compromised nature of a Lombok local religious institution. Consequently, the circles tend to slacken ethnic boundaries rather than intensify them.

Therefore, if ethnicity is marginal in determining the identity redefinition, how are we to explain the Lombok post-1998 identities' construction? Chapter 4 will discuss this topic in more detail. However, first we need to identify what kind of identity is taking place in a decentralised Lombok and who has the right to define the boundaries.

¹⁷⁰ Edward Aspinall, “Democratization and Ethnic Politics in Indonesia: Nine Theses,” *Journal of East Asian Studies* 11, no. 2 (2011): 289-319.

¹⁷¹ Vedi Hadiz, *Localising Power in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia: A Southeast Asia Perspective* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2011), 11; Edward Aspinall, “Democratization and Ethnic Politics in Indonesia,” 289-319. For more on oligarchy, see also (eds) Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy, *Local Power and Politics in Indonesia: Decentralisation & Democratisation* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003); (eds) Michele Ford and Thomas B. Pepinsky, *Beyond Oligarchy: Wealth, Power, and Contemporary Indonesian Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University, 2014).

¹⁷² Edward Aspinall, “Democratization and Ethnic Politics in Indonesia: Nine Theses,” *Journal of East Asian Studies* 11, no. 2 (2011): 289-319.

In the Indonesian context, religion has a greater legitimacy as a source of political authority than ethnicity.¹⁷³ Religion is a factor that can act as a cohesive binding agent for various nations that lack alternative uniting elements in Indonesia.¹⁷⁴ For example, during the post-Reformasi national elections, all the presidential and vice-presidential candidates who stood were Muslims. The support of *ulamas* (Muslim scholars) for one candidate and the appointment of a MUI leader as the vice-president of the other running candidate in the recent 2019 election confirm that in Indonesia's electoral system, religion is still one of the most important marketing strengths in candidates' campaigns.

In Lombok, where more than 90% of the population is Muslim, it is expected that religion is a prominent driver of identity, although without dismissing completely the ethnicity element. Further, Lombok's close association to Islam is reflected by the number of mosques scattered on the island ("the island of a thousand mosques").¹⁷⁵ Together with Sumbawa island, Lombok is marketing the island's vacation industry with the slogan "halal tourism designation".¹⁷⁶ This shows the resilience of ethno-religion as a vehicle of collective identity in Lombok's post-authoritarian regime.

I have mentioned in the previous chapter that mainstream-Islam in Indonesia is represented by NU and Muhammadiyah, and the MUI symbolises official Islam. These three bodies have the most authoritative capacity in defining what constitutes an Indonesian Muslim, considering the number of their followers (NU and Muhammadiyah) and the MUI's productivity in issuing *fatwas* or religious edicts. In the case of Lombok, NW and *Tuan Guru* are two religious institutions that significantly shaped Islam in Lombok and played a critical role in the post-1998 identity redefinitions on the island.

¹⁷³ Edward Aspinall, Sebastian Dettman, and Eve Warburton, "When Religion Trumps Ethnicity: A Regional Election Case Study from Indonesia," *South East Asia Research* 19, no. 1 (2011): 27-58.

¹⁷⁴ Joseph Chinyong Liow, "Indonesia: Contesting Principles of Nationhood," in *Religion and Nationalism in Southeast Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 179.

¹⁷⁵ The actual numbers of mosques are much more than this, because in 2017 the total number on the island is more than 5,000 (Statistic Bureau NTB, 2017).

¹⁷⁶ In 2016, Lombok won World's Best Halal Beach Resort and World's Best Halal Honeymoon Destination, <https://www.indonesia.travel/gb/en/news/indonesia-dominates-world-halal-tourism-awards-2016-winning-12-top-categories>, accessed 1 August 2018; <https://en.antaraneews.com/news/115855/ntb-islamic-center-becomes-halal-tourism-icon>, accessed 1 January 2019; <https://www.thejakartapost.com/travel/2017/09/15/west-nusa-tenggara-halal-destinations-promoted-at-annual-event.html>, accessed 1 January 2019; <https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2018/07/02/house-praises-west-nusa-tenggara-for-halal-cuisine.html>, accessed 1 January 2019.

Nahdlatul Wathan (NW), Tuan Guru and Religious Authority

Religious authority is a vague concept and challenging to define. Here, I will recount who Lombok's religious authority is, as the understanding of this matter is central to appreciating the critical role that *Tuan Guru* play in defining the Sasak-Muslim identity boundaries in post-Reformasi Lombok. I will return to further analysis of religious authority and its workable definition in Chapter 4.

1. Tuan Guru

Tuan Guru refers to Lombok's local religious leaders. Fahrurrozi explains that *Tuan Guru*, while synonymous with religious leaders in other part of Indonesia, has a distinctive nature:

“In Sasak society, the terms *kyai* and *tuan guru* function slightly differently than in other parts of Indonesia. Indeed, the term *tuan guru* is in some way equivalent to the term *kyai* on Java, while the term *kyai* for the Sasak carries a different, distinct meaning. On Lombok, *kyai* ranges from those who are marriage officiants to those who are invited to religious ceremonies such as marriages, burials, or memorial services for the dead to offer Islamic invocations, such as repetitions of the Islamic profession of faith (*tahlilan*) or prayers of thanksgiving to God (*syukuran*); these occasions are known in Sasak society as *roah*.”¹⁷⁷

Fahrurrozi and Kingsley noted that there are no clear rules about what preconditions need to be fulfilled in order to gain status as a Lombok *Tuan Guru*.¹⁷⁸ However, there are several characteristics that *Tuan Guru* share: returning from *hajj* (pilgrimage); religiously knowledgeable; and followers who reflect a social acceptance of their religious teaching capacity.

For the first condition, we are referring to the fifth pillar of Islam, pilgrimage to Mecca. It is common in Sasak society, before having attained the title of *Tuan Guru*, to be required to complete the *hajj*. Unlike the other four pillars (*syahada* or the profession of faith; *shalat* or daily prayers; *zakat* or almsgiving, and *shaum* or fasting during Ramadhan), *hajj* requires sufficient provision of physical and material wellbeing. Nonetheless, until the 1950s travelling to Mecca was only possible by sea and the journey took at least three

¹⁷⁷ Fahrurrozi, “Tuan Guru and Social Change in Lombok, Indonesia,” *Indonesia and the Malay World* 46, no. 135 (2018): 119.

¹⁷⁸ Fahrurrozi, “Tuan Guru and Social Change in Lombok,” 119-120; Jeremy Kingsley, “Redrawing Lines of Religious Authority in Lombok, Indonesia,” *Asian Journal of Social Science* 42, no. 5 (2014): 662.

months one way, so pilgrimage in the past meant living at sea for around six months and enduring various hardships during the voyage.¹⁷⁹ The returning pilgrim then added the honorific title *tuan* before their name. It is important to note that all who have performed pilgrimage are *tuan* but not all *tuan* are *Tuan Guru*. The word *tuan* literally means “master” or “a high position noble” in Sasak dialect. The word *guru* that comes after *tuan* means “teacher”, so *Tuan Guru* literally means honourable teacher or grand master. *Tuan Guru* refers to Lombok’s religious leaders and their importance is similar to *kyais* for Muslims in Java.¹⁸⁰ Fahrurrozi notes that regardless of how knowledgeable a religious leader he is, how fluent his Qur’an recitation, and how respectable his leadership in the community is, those who have not yet completed the *hajj* are seen as a lower-level religious authority, usually called *ustadz* compared to *Tuan Guru*.¹⁸¹

The second characteristic of *Tuan Guru* is that as well as being perceived as knowledgeable individuals, they have experienced living outside Lombok, mainly overseas. I argue that this relates to two things; the *hajj* ritual and, to a certain extent, educational training. Many pilgrims did not return immediately to Lombok, but stayed on for a few years to study Islam in Mecca.¹⁸² Tuan Guru Pancor, for example, went to Mecca with his parents when he was 15 years old to perform *hajj*. Yet, after the pilgrimage season ended, he was staying for further religious education and only came back to Lombok 13 years later when he established a school and NW. The returning pilgrim had therefore not only completed the pillars of Islam, but they were regarded by Sasak as those who have gained more understanding of religion.

The respect and appreciation given to these perceived to be well-trained and knowledgeable returning pilgrims is natural because the Qur’an underlines that God will exalt those who believe and those who have knowledge to high ranks.¹⁸³ Fahrurrozi highlights that in the Sasak-Muslim community there is a high expectation that a *Tuan*

¹⁷⁹ My parents used to tell us that before departing to Mecca, our great grandfather greeted all the family members as if he would never see them again. For an account on the hardships of pilgrimage in the past, see <https://www.republika.co.id/berita/jurnal-haji/haji-tempo-doeloe/17/06/13/org3rr313-di-masa-lalu-pergi-haji-bukan-perkara-mudah>.

¹⁸⁰ Zamachsari Dhofier, *Tradisi Pesantren: Studi Tentang Pandangan Hidup Kyai* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1982).

¹⁸¹ Fahrurrozi, “Tuan Guru and Social Change in Lombok,” 122.

¹⁸² Budiwanti, *Religion of the Sasak*, 10.

¹⁸³ Qur’an 58: 11.

Guru has the ability to respond to the concerns of Muslims in the field of Islamic law (*syari'ah*) and jurisprudence (*fiqh*).¹⁸⁴ The leader of NW, Tuan Guru Haji M. Zainul Majdi, MA – also known in society as Tuan Guru Bajang – believes that a *Tuan Guru* “is a prominent figure who is central to the religious affairs of society, therefore the *Tuan Guru*’s (religious) capability must be high, especially in terms of understanding Arabic books and the classical texts of Islam”.¹⁸⁵

The third requirement is mainly derived from their religious teaching activities. When the *hajj* finally returned home, they realised that there were gaps between the Islam they learned and the Islam practised by the Sasak. This has mainly inspired the returning pilgrims to seriously focus on spreading the knowledge they gained in Mecca to the rest of the Sasak-Muslims, mainly through sermons and educational institutions. The *Tuan Guru* built up pupil networks, and made an impact on wider segments of the Sasak-Muslim community, often far from their original residences. A Lombok *Tuan Guru* also therefore means a knowledgeable person delivering religious messages who has students or followers. A consequence of these teaching activities is what Fahrurrozi calls “devoutness”. A *Tuan Guru* is expected to be a role model, someone who, before anything else, practises what he teaches. The corroboration of knowledge and action is the other criteria to be a *Tuan Guru* in Lombok, mainly because this is in the vein of Prophet Muhammad’s teaching.¹⁸⁶ Failing to do so may result in declining charisma and numbers of followers.

The last criterion is lineage. Religious actors are effectively and convincingly authoritative only when others willingly respect and obey them.¹⁸⁷ Therefore, any person can be a *Tuan Guru* if society acknowledges him as such, and anybody can open an Islamic boarding school if students want to study in it, “still the ideal type of a *tuan guru* has either

¹⁸⁴ Fahrurrozi, “Tuan Guru and Social Change in Lombok,” 120.

¹⁸⁵ In contrast to Kingsley, Fahrurrozi underlines that in addition to the Qur’an and Hadith, the *Tuan Guru* must have a good understanding of Islamic literature, like *kitab kuning* (“Yellow Book”, the traditional collections of Islamic texts used in the pesantrens and madrasahs of Indonesia). Fahrurrozi, “Tuan Guru and Social Change in Lombok,” 120.

¹⁸⁶ Interview with Tuan Guru Anwar, June 2015 regarding Prophet Muhammad as the best role mode, see Qur’an 33: 21.

¹⁸⁷ Gudrun Kramer and Sabine Schmidtke, eds. 2006. *Speaking for Islam: Religious Authorities in Muslim Societies* (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 1-2. For a fuller account on religious authority see also, Daphna Ephrat and Meir Hatina (eds), *Religious Knowledge, Authority, and Charisma: Islamic and Jewish Perspectives* (Utah: University of Utah Press, 2014); Liyakatali Takim, *The Heirs of the Prophet: Charisma and Religious Authority in Shi’ite Islam* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006).

an ancestral or personal link with another leading *tuan guru*".¹⁸⁸ It is therefore very common that strong and respected families have led to organisational continuity.¹⁸⁹

Lineage is not limited to direct descent, but also includes links by marriage. Fahrurrozi explains:

"The most obvious ways are through marrying into an appropriate bloodline (by marrying the daughter of a respected *tuan guru*) or by being a beloved student of a respected *tuan guru* – and these two methods usually go hand-in-hand as the teacher's daughters are very likely to be married off to his students. It is also very common for a *tuan guru* to seek out someone to continue teaching in his religious school if he does not have any sons to carry on the work, and taking on the mantle of a venerable *pesantren* leader is an acceptable way to establish a pedigree."¹⁹⁰

This has allowed some of the most prominent *Tuan Guru* to build upon the success of previous generations. For example, Tuan Guru Mutawalli al-Kalimi's mission in Jerowaru was transferred to his son Tuan Guru Sibawaih Mutawalli, and Tuan Guru Zainuddin Majdi inherited NW's top leadership in Pancor from his grandfather,¹⁹¹ Tuan Guru Pancor is also the son of Tuan Guru Abdul Majid. The descendants of *Tuan Guru* are treated with special veneration in Sasak society, implying they have a high chance of acceding their father's honor and charisma.

These four characteristics explain the initial logic of the advent of *Tuan Guru* within the Sasak-Muslim community. These characteristics also allow *Tuan Guru* to play significant roles within the community. The active involvement of *Tuan Guru* in teaching and *da'wah* (proselytising) is a channel that allows two-way communications between *Tuan Guru* and the Muslim community, which subsequently builds public recognition of the *Tuan Guru* as teacher and preacher.

Additionally, in the post-Independence Era, the expanding networks of *Tuan Guru* pupils across the island not only enabled *Tuan Guru* teachings to be spread to the areas in post-Independence Lombok, but also increased the 'economic' power of the *Tuan Guru*

¹⁸⁸ Fahrurrozi, "Tuan Guru and Social Change in Lombok," 122.

¹⁸⁹ Karel Steenbrink, *Pesantren, Madrasah, Sekolah: Pendidikan Islam Dalam Kurun Modern* (Jakarta: LP3iS, 1994): 110-14.

¹⁹⁰ Fahrurrozi, "Tuan Guru and Social Change in Lombok," 122.

¹⁹¹ Tuan Guru Bajang was also married to Rabiatal Adawiyah, the daughter of Kyai Abdul Rasyid Abdullah Syafi'i, the leading figure in Pesantren As-Syafiyah, Jakarta in 1997 before becoming divorced in 2014.

whose *pesantren* (Islamic boarding school) growth extended to these productive areas.¹⁹² Cederroth argues that this was the rationale behind the ability of the *Tuan Guru* to provide relief during the period of a great famine in Lombok in 1966 which, in turn, marked the unchallenged popularity of *Tuan Guru* among the Lombok people.¹⁹³ While teaching and giving sermons explains the root of their religious power, their economic networks and involvement in the struggle against the colonial government also validate *Tuan Guru*'s political authority which, according to Kingsley, led *Tuan Guru* to become peace brokers in post-1998,¹⁹⁴ especially when conflict emerged in local communities. This ability is mainly supported by well-established *Tuan Guru* outreach networks. Kingsley says, "in Lombok, *Tuan Guru* and their religious organization fulfil this role of creating a web (network) of relationships between different levels of society and parts of Lombok".¹⁹⁵

Kingsley notes *Tuan Guru* do not possess a single religious tradition and have a variety of political affiliations.¹⁹⁶ He contends that:

"*Tuan Guru* are not a homogenous group, but rather hold a diverse range of religious positions. This multiplicity of perspectives among *Tuan Guru* reflects the Indonesian context, which is marked by a plurality of Islamic traditions, interpretations and practices."¹⁹⁷

Therefore, there are *Tuan Guru* who are affiliated with NW, some others are with NU and some are not affiliated to any of the three biggest Islamic mass organisations.¹⁹⁸ Nevertheless, there is one thing that most *Tuan Guru* share with regard to their mission; it is to protect orthodoxy. This became much clearer after Indonesian independence, when the focus of Lombok *Tuan Guru* missionary activities was mainly defined by the division of *Islam Wetu Telu* and *Islam Wetu Lima*.

Protecting orthodoxy in pre-1998 was mostly reflected in *Tuan Guru*'s *da'wah* to the *Islam Wetu Telu* community. NW mainly carried out its *da'wah* through

¹⁹² Budiwanti, *Religion of the Sasak*, 10-11.

¹⁹³ Sven Cederroth, *The Spell of the Ancestors*, 8.

¹⁹⁴ Peace broker here refers to conflict mediator, see Jeremy Kingsley, "Peacemakers or Peace-Breakers? Provincial Elections and Religious Leadership in Lombok, Indonesia," *Indonesia* (April 2012): 75.

¹⁹⁵ Jeremy Kingsley, "Peacemakers or Peace-Breakers? Provincial Elections and Religious Leadership in Lombok, Indonesia," *Indonesia* (April 2012): 75.

¹⁹⁶ Jeremy Kingsley, *Tuan Guru, Community and Conflict*, 89.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁸ So far there is no *Tuan Guru* associated with Muhammadiyah, and this may be because of the so-called modernist character of Muhammadiyah.

schools as well as its pupils who became migrants in North Lombok. Non-NW *Tuan Guru*, such as Tuan Guru Safwan Hakim from Kediri West Lombok and Tuan Guru Abdul Karim from Bayan, are also two of the most persistent *Tuan Guru* conducting purification programmes.¹⁹⁹ Tuan Guru Abdul Karim established *pesantren* (an Islamic boarding school) Nurul Bayan in Bayan North Lombok. Tuan Guru Safwan Hakim built mosques and *madrassah* (religious schools), two basic institutions for fostering orthodox Islam.²⁰⁰ In general, the missionary activities of *Tuan Guru* have gradually superseded *Islam Wetu Telu* influence, therefore *Tuan Guru* are the religiously knowledgeable whose mission is to complete the Islamisation of Lombok and to refine Lombok's Muslim community. Actively preaching to *Wetu Telu* communities shows that the *Tuan Guru* title also entails the duty to maintain conformity in religious practices.

2. NW and The Seat of *Tuan Guru Belek*

Ibrahim Abu-Rabt divides the elites in contemporary Muslim societies into four types: (1) political elite; (2) business elite; (3) military elite; and (4) intellectual elite.²⁰¹ Being a Muslim intellectual in contemporary Indonesia is a difficult undertaking. Some historical studies show that the Muslim intellectuals have mostly been active in the anti-colonialist struggle and have had a vision about the construction of the nation-state after independence.²⁰² However, a good number of contemporary Islamic intellectuals felt betrayed by the political elite once Indonesia reached its independence.²⁰³ Indeed, the power elite has manipulated and co-opted religious intelligentsia in order to promote the status quo in the eyes of the masses.²⁰⁴ While rejecting the idea that the religious intelligentsia have always been submissive to the state, the above statement seems to

¹⁹⁹ Interview with Tuan Guru Abdul Karim, August 2015.

²⁰⁰ Budiwanti, "The Purification Movement in Bayan," 154-57.

²⁰¹ Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabt, "Contemporary Islamic Intellectual History: A Theoretical Perspective," *Islamic Studies* 44, no. 4 (2005): 507.

²⁰² Syafi'i Maarif, "Indonesian Islam and Democracy," *Sydney Papers* 16, no. 1 (2004): 18-21; Syafi'i Maarif, *Islam, Humanity, and Indonesian Identity: Reflection on History* (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2018).

²⁰³ Bahtiar Effendy, *Islam and the State in Indonesia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003); Edward Aspinall, *Opposing Suharto: Compromise, Resistance and Regime Change in Indonesia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005).

²⁰⁴ Felix Heiduk, "Between A Rock and A Hard Place: Radical Islam in Post-Suharto Indonesia," *International Journal of Conflict and Violence* 6, no. 1 (2012): 26-40.

contain some element of truth in explaining the relationship between religious leaders and the pre-Reformasi Indonesian state in general.

However, the historical account of religious leaders and the state is not the main focus of the following section. Rather, I would like to focus more on Lombok's *Tuan Guru*, the varying levels of *Tuan Guru* authority, and what impact these have had on the Sasak-Muslim redefinition of identity in post-1998 Lombok. My intention is to show that the highest rank of *Tuan Guru*, Lombok's most influential religious leaders, is closely associated with the biggest Muslim mass organisation on the island, NW.

While NU and Muhammadiyah are two of the biggest mass organisations in Indonesia, NW is the biggest Muslim mass organisation in Lombok. NW was established in 1953 by Tuan Guru Kiai Haji Zainuddin Abdul Madjid or Tuan Guru Pancor or Maulana Syekh (d. 1997). The teaching adherence of NW is closer to NU than to Muhammadiyah. In fact, Zainuddin Abdul Madjid was NU's chancellor for Sunda Kecil province (consisted of Bali Lombok, Sumbawa, Flores, Sumba and Rote) in the 1950s.²⁰⁵ NU's decision to leave Masyumi prior to the 1955 election seemed to be the main reason for Zainuddin Abdul Madjid's separation from NU as he continued to pledge his loyalty to Masyumi until the party was disbanded in 1960.²⁰⁶

During the New Order, NW and the majority of Lombok's *Tuan Guru* joined the ruling party, Golkar, until Suharto's downfall.²⁰⁷ The government received benefit from NW and *Tuan Guru* support during elections, as well as the latter's endorsement of several government programmes such as family planning. In return, NW and other *Tuan Guru* received government assistance for their proselytising activities, as well as building networks through Islamic schools across the island.²⁰⁸ NW also encouraged all graduated santri or alumni to found their own schools, and this strategy has proved to be effective in the expansion of the NW network for several decades.²⁰⁹

In the early decade of its establishment, there were 66 NW schools across Lombok. Today, over 800 NW-associated schools are run in the province, with some 200,000

²⁰⁵ Budiwanti, "Religion of the Sasak," 4.

²⁰⁶ Saipul Hamdi, *Nahdlatul Wathan Di Era Reformasi: Agama, Konflik Komunal Dan Peta Rekonsiliasi*. (Yogyakarta: Kurnia Kalam Semesta, 2014): 24.

²⁰⁷ Adam Tyson, "Vigilantism and Violence in Decentralized Indonesia: The Case of Lombok," *Critical Asian Studies* 45, no. 2 (2013): 207.

²⁰⁸ Interview with Tuan Guru Anwar, July 2015.

²⁰⁹ Tyson "Vigilantism and Violence in Decentralized Indonesia," 211; Budiwanti, "The Purification Movement in Bayan," 154-55.

students throughout the entire system.²¹⁰ The network's coverage is wide, and NW's schools exist even in peripheral regions like Bayan in North Lombok regency. In addition, the University of NW is established in the capital, Mataram, and offers a wide range of subjects in religious and non-religious fields of study.

There are some detailed studies on NW.²¹¹ The intention here, however, is to highlight the extensive network of NW, which allow this organisation to provide sufficient support for NW-affiliated *Tuan Guru*. This feature makes the dynamics within NW impact on Lombok's *Tuan Guru*, as Kingsley notes there are varying levels of *Tuan Guru* influence over Sasak-Muslims.

Kingsley divides Lombok's *Tuan Guru* into *Tuan Guru Belek* (big) and *Tuan Guru Lokal* (local). This division indicates that *Tuan Guru* hold varying level of influence.²¹² Yet, he also argues that there are no standardised variables to determine this, but the main point is "social acceptance" from the Sasak-Muslim community. The social acceptance level is related closely with the criteria of *Tuan Guru* discussed earlier in this chapter. Therefore, *Tuan Guru Belek* is the supreme *Tuan Guru* whose charisma and influence are widely recognised by the Muslim community and *Tuan Guru Lokal* is an example of those *Tuan Guru* concentrating their mission around their residence.²¹³

Considering, the size of NW's educational institution (*pesantren* or *madrassah*) as well as the numbers of pupils and followers, naturally, *Tuan Guru* associated with NW have a larger chance of wider social acceptance. One example of the varying status of Lombok's *Tuan Guru* based on their organisational affiliation is the comparison between Tuan Guru Izzy, who lives in Praya, Central Lombok, and Tuan Guru Ulil from Perampuan, West Lombok. Besides teaching locally, the former regularly travels to West Lombok regions for religious teachings and is known publicly as a *Tuan Guru* of NW. On the other

²¹⁰ Interview with Dr. Fahrurrozi, August 2015.

²¹¹ For example, Saipul Hamdi, *Nahdlatul Wathan Di Era Reformasi: Agama, Konflik Komunal, Dan Peta Rekonsiliasi* (Yogyakarta: Kurnia Kalam Semesta, 2014); Saipul Hamdi and Bianca Smith, "Sisters, Militias and Islam in Conflict: Questioning 'Reconciliation' in Nahdlatul Wathan, Lombok, Indonesia," *Contemporary Islam* 6, no. 1 (2012): 29-43.

²¹¹ Jeremy Kingsley, "Peacemakers or Peace-Breakers?" 62.

²¹² Jeremy Kingsley, "Peacemakers or Peace-Breakers?" 62.

²¹³ Fahrurrozi argues that the limitation of *Tuan Guru Lokal* influence can be verified by the fact that they were often just known by the name of their village, such as Tuan Guru Bengkel (TGH M. Saleh Hambali) or Tuan Guru Sakre (TGH L. Zainal Abidin Sakra). The founder of NW is an exception, as he is known as Tuan Guru Pancor, reflecting that his home town is in Pancor. However, his fame and influence cover Lombok and beyond. See Fahrurrozi, "Tuan Guru and Social Change in Lombok," 128.

hand, Tuan Guru Ulil, who lives in Perampuan village in the West Lombok region, does not have associations with NW and his influence hardly reaches outside Perampuan. Therefore, association with NW and could easily pump up the size of *jema'ah* (audiences) who attend *Tuan Guru* sermons. It is important to highlight that the relationship between *Tuan Guru* and these mass organisations are mutual in nature. *Tuan Guru* are the backbone of NW teaching dissemination efforts, and at the same time NW's size and networks embedded in many places provide its *Tuan Guru* with abundant mass and material support. The supreme position – the highest rank of *Tuan Guru* – in the *Tuan Guru Belek* group is what I call *Datu Tuan Guru Belek*.²¹⁴ He is the one with superior influence within the Sasak-Muslim community in almost all Lombok regions. This is a *Tuan Guru* that people, even those who live far outside his residence, will spontaneously recognise when you mention his name without any need for further explanation. There is one *Tuan Guru* who met this criterion in pre-Reformasi Lombok, NW's top leader, Tuan Guru Pancor. His superiority in religious knowledge, devoutness, size of schools and pupils, as well as his lineage, is even well acknowledged by other prominent *Tuan Guru* such as West Lombok's previous MUI leader, as well as the founder of the Nurul Hakim school (Western Lombok's largest Islamic boarding school), the late Tuan Guru Shafwan Hakim.

Tuan Guru Zainudin Abdul Madjid passed away aged 93 in October 1997, and he had only two daughters and left no will regarding his spiritual heir. His departure not only caused a power struggle within NW, but he also left the seat of *Datu Tuan Guru Belek* empty. The organisational congress in July 1998 elected his younger daughter, Siti Raehanun, as General Head of Nahdlatul Wathan. Fairly soon, a group around the older daughter, Siti Rauhun, denied Raehanun leadership on the grounds that no female leaders are admitted in Syafi'i mazhab (one of Sunni Islam's four schools of Islamic law).²¹⁵ Subsequently, this group held a contending congress in December 1998, in which Tuan Guru Bajang, the son of Siti Rauhun, was elected General Head of Nahdlatul Wathan. Raehanun's decision to move to Anjani on 28 December 1998 marked the official split of NW into the R1 faction in Pancor and R2 faction based in Anjani.²¹⁶

²¹⁴ Datu means “king” in Sasak dialect.

²¹⁵ Saipul Hamdi, “Politik Islah: Re-Negoisasi Islah, Konflik, dan Kekuasaan Dalam Nahdlatul Wathan di Lombok Timur,” *Kawistara* 1, no. 1 (2011): 2.

²¹⁶ Anjani is around 12 kilometres from Pancor.

Consequently, the logic that follows is that if *Tuan Guru* are so central to the life of Sasak-Muslims, and *Datu Tuan Guru Belek* is the most respectable *Tuan Guru* among the best *Tuan Guru*, it is an appealing position worth fighting for. Even without an internal rift between NW's founder's two daughters, or even one of Tuan Guru Pancor's daughters peacefully ascending to the NW top leadership, she will never be a *Tuan Guru* owing to her sex. While both daughters have sons, they are still a 'junior' compared to the leaders of big *pasantren* like Tuan Guru Safwan Hakim or Tuan Guru Jerowaru. Hence, the death of Tuan Guru Pancor and the subsequent internal quarrel within NW regarding the legal heir has shattered the initial idea that the next *Datu Tuan Guru Belek* would be NW's top leader. The loophole in the *Datu Tuan Guru Belek* selection criteria also added to the complications in determining who Lombok's most influential *Tuan Guru* was. The death of Tuan Guru Pancor, therefore, opened up the arena for competition for non-NW *Tuan Guru* to fight for the 'throne'. The most obvious indicators of this competition, I argue, were the formation of paramilitia associated with *Tuan Guru Belek*'s candidates and, as will be discussed in the next two chapters, the expulsion and relocation of Ahmadiyah from the candidates' hometown.

Paramilitia in Post-1998 Lombok

The story of *Tuan Guru* having command over paramilitary groups has a long history related to them not only being religious leaders, but also leaders of the 'oppressed native' when the Balinese Karangasem Kingdom occupied the West Lombok region from the 17th century. Under the Karangasem ruler, Sasak nobles and *Tuan Guru* felt politically beleaguered and led many ineffective local rebellions against the Balinese.²¹⁷ These repeated setbacks later moved the rebellion leaders to ask for Dutch military invention to overthrow the Balinese.²¹⁸ When the Dutch were finally able to overthrow the Balinese, instead of reviving the Sasak aristocratic authority and control over Lombok, they became the new conquerors of the Sasak and imposed heavy land taxation on them.²¹⁹ Van der Kraan argues that one of the most notable impacts of Dutch colonialism in Lombok was the worsening condition of the peasantry, which comprised around 90% of the Lombok

²¹⁷ Budiwanti, "Religion of the Sasak," 9.

²¹⁸ Sven Cederroth, *The Spell of the Ancestors*, 34; MacDougall, "Buddhist Buda or Buda Buddhists?" 4.

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 34.

population.²²⁰ Kraan contends that, “In their half-century rule the Dutch had succeeded in transforming the island described by F.A. Liefrinck in 1887 as ‘a rich land blessed by nature’ into a region of endemic famine”.²²¹

Therefore, Van der Kraan points out that the number of Dutch personnel was never more than 250 men, and that with this small force they controlled more than half a million people.²²² Against this background, the religious leaders then turned their mission into local rebellions opposing the Dutch colonial regime. This lasted until the early 1940s.²²³

Adrianus Meliala explains that community policing became increasingly significant in post-1998 Indonesia in general because greater resources and responsibilities were received by the local operational units, especially during the Decentralisation Era and mainly because of the lack of staff and funding.²²⁴ Within this framework, the formation of vigilante groups was aiming to share these considerable responsibilities through the command posts in the villages under their control.²²⁵

For the purpose of this research, there are two large paramilitary groups relevant to this study. The three groups here are defined as an army-like organised group that are not official, and often not legal. They have either established themselves in those areas that experienced religious violence in post-1998 Lombok or are under the leadership of prominent *Tuan Guru* in their respective regions. They are: *Amphibi*, *Satgas Hamzanwadi* and *Hizbullah*. *Amphibi* was founded by *Tuan Guru* Sibawaih, the son of *Tuan Guru* Mutawalli in Jerowaru, East Lombok. Besides *Amphibi*, there are two other paramilitary groups that actually came from the same mother organisation, NW. After NW’s split in

²²⁰ Alfons Van der Kraan, *Selaparang Under Balinese and Dutch Rule: A History of Lombok 1870-1940*

(Canberra: Australian National University, 1976), 260.

²²¹ As noted by Van der Kraan, under the Dutch, the Sasak suffered more severe control and oppression than before mainly because the Sasak elites (noble families) betrayed their own people in order to maintain some degree of privilege and power. Ibid.

²²² Ibid., 184; personal communication with Nigel Connell, Wellington, May 2019.

²²³ Tyson, “Vigilantism and Violence in Decentralized Indonesia,” 205; Budiwanti, “Religion of the Sasak,” 9; MacDougall, “Buddhist Buda or Buda Buddhists?” 4.

²²⁴ The local operational unit (Kesatuan Operasional Dasar) consists of three layers: the Polres (district-level) police station, followed by the Polsek (sector) police station, and the last one is Pospol (police post) at the bottom level. Pemekaran wilayah (split of the region) that took place during the decentralisation era means there are newly established districts and municipalities in need of a local police unit, see Tyson, “Vigilantism and Violence in Decentralized Indonesia,” 11.

²²⁵ Ibid.

1998, *Satgas Hamzanwadi* belonged to NW Pancor and *Hizbullah* was established by the NW Anjani faction two years later.²²⁶

Satgas Hamzanwadi, Amphibi and Hizbullah

Three months prior to the congress, on 1 April 1998, *Satgas Hamzanwadi*, a paramilitary wing of NW, was established, leading to the impression that the need for a paramilitary had never seemed an important issue during the NW's founder's life. After the official split of NW and the relocation of the R2 faction to Anjani on 13 January 2000, *Hizbullah* was formally established as NW Anjani's official paramilitary. Each of these paramilitia is associated with NW. Secondly, all of these paramilitary groups were established after the death of NW's founder. The establishment of paramilitia therefore seems closely linked to NW's internal disputes. However, I argue that the vacant seat of *Datu Tuan Guru Belek* is one of the important factors in explaining the formation of *Amphibi* in 1999, one year after the establishment of *Satgas Hamzanwadi* of NW Pancor. As for *Hizbullah*, the rationale of its establishment was mainly due to the dispute within NW.

Amphibi (the acronym for "Amankan Masyarakat Pemerintah Hukum Indonesia Berdasarkan Iman" or Secure the Indonesian People, Government and Law Based on Faith) is the largest of Lombok's paramilitaries. It was founded by Tuan Guru Sibawaih (d. 2015) and his brother guru Ukit, both Muslim clerics in Jerowaru, East Lombok.²²⁷ Tuan Guru Sibawaih headed his own pesantren, and together with his brother had a reputation for successfully attracting 'misbehaving' youth and getting them to engage with Islam.²²⁸ Tuan Guru Sibawaih distanced himself from political parties and rejected government aid for his pesantren, arguing that accepting money from the government or politicians would only restrict his independence in managing his pesantren.²²⁹ Kingsley, however, notes that

²²⁶ Tuan Guru Sibawaih Mutawalli or the *Amphibi*'s founder is the son of Tuan Guru Mutawalli al Kalimi.

²²⁷ Jerowaru was the headquarters of the rebellion against the Dutch colonial regime in Lombok under the leadership of Tuan Guru Alim in 1891. Their late father, Tuan Guru Mutawalli, is the descendant of Tuan Guru Alkalimin, who together with Tuan Guru Alim was captured by the Dutch colonial regime in the late 1890s. The colonial government feared their influence among the people would lead to another rebellion against the colonial regime, which is why Tuan Guru Mutawalli is also known as Tuan Guru Mutawalli Alkalimi (named after his father).

²²⁸ MacDougall, "Buddhist Buda or Buda Buddhists?" 256-7; for another group with similar characteristics is Bujak, see Tyson, "Vigilantism and Violence in Decentralized Indonesia," 14.

²²⁹ <http://lomboktoday.co.id/20150521/tgh-sibawaihi-haramkan-proposal-masjid.html>.

Amphibi had harmonious relations with the previous NTB governor (2003-2008), Lalu Serinata, while he was still in office.²³⁰ On 11 October 2004, around 200 members of *Amphibi* and another paramilitary group, Elang Merah, delivered their speech supporting the then governor, H.L. Serinata, in establishing an international airport in Praya, Central Lombok regency, amidst protests from local farmers and landowners affected by this policy.²³¹ The airport was officially inaugurated by the President of the Republic of Indonesia, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, on 20 October 2011.

Amphibi was officially active in April 1999 and claimed to have recruited more than 100,000 members within five months, and rapidly became the most feared vigilante force in Lombok.²³² *Amphibi* attributes its formation to the moral weakness and the impotence of state apparatus to maintain security.²³³ In July 1999, *Amphibi* members began to register men who had to pay Rp. 150,000 (equal to \$NZD15) to become active patrol guards to protect East Lombok's communities.²³⁴ It also ordered the construction of *Amphibi* security posts (*pos keamanan Amphibi*) in communities under its patronage.²³⁵ The members wear bright orange vests that have previously been blessed by Tuan Guru Sibawaih with a mystical mantra.²³⁶ It was not mentioned, however, whether they were armed or not, but the active members confessed that the vest itself is considered the best weaponry they have ever had because of the blessed mantra.²³⁷ Kingsley argues that their estimated size, regardless of the exact figure, makes this group capable of directly challenging the security apparatus on the island.²³⁸

In December 1999, *Amphibi* members were tracking two alleged middlemen who fenced goods for thieves in Sengkongo village. A Hindu listed in the target operation was

²³⁰ Kingsley, *Tuan Guru, Community and Conflict*, 51.

²³¹ <https://nasional.tempo.co/read/49220/ribuan-anggota-pamswakarsa-datangi-kantor-gubernur-ntb>, accessed 27 February 2018.

²³² Telle, "Vigilante Citizenship: Sovereign Practices," 89; Tyson, "Vigilantism and Violence in Decentralized Indonesia," 13.

²³³ Telle, "Vigilante Citizenship: Sovereign Practices," 89.

²³⁴ Verena Beittinger-Lee, *(Un)Civil Society and Political Change in Indonesia: A Contested Arena* (London: Routledge, 2009), 178-79.

²³⁵ MacDougall, "Buddhist Buda or Buda Buddhists?" 257.

²³⁶ Ibid.

²³⁷ Verena Beittinger-Lee, *(Un)Civil Society and Political Change in Indonesia*, 179.

²³⁸ Kingsley, *Tuan Guru, Community and Conflict*, 51. By 2000, *Amphibi*'s members had reached 200,000, and in 2001 the police reported the group had 480,000 members, see Verena Beittinger-Lee, *(Un)Civil Society and Political Change*, 179.

found and his hand was cut off that night. This was the first time the *Amphibi* patrolled a Lombok-Hindu area and punished a Hindu-Lombok nobleman ('Gusti' is the second highest rank in the Hindu-Indonesia 'kasta' system). Previous studies, however, failed to mention that the same punishment also applied to Muslim thieves. *Amphibi* punished both Muslim and non-Muslim criminals. For example, in Jempong, Sekarbela district of Mataram, a thief named Mahrip was murdered by the *Amphibi* as a punishment for his action a week earlier of robbing a couple and then raping the wife before the eyes of her husband. Similar raids also took place in Jenggik, East Lombok, in early 2000 and, as the Puri Agung Rinjani case showed in 2007, this was not the last time *Amphibi* gave a 'reminder' to Lombok's Hindu-Balinese community of their presence on the island.²³⁹ It is also in Pemongkong, *Amphibi*'s headquarters, that one of the earliest attacks on Lombok's Ahmadiyah took place in 1998, six months before the official establishment of this paramilitary group.

The recorded history of the *Tuan Guru* active leadership in a physical war against the Dutch colonial force in Lombok confirms that the charisma of Lombok's *Tuan Guru* is supplementary to their control over 'militia' forces. Furthermore, the presence of paramilitaries in Pancor and Pemongkong (*Waktu Lima Plus Tuan Guru* region) is important in analysing the different patterns of violent attacks in these villages with Ketapang (*Waktu Lima* Neutral region) where paramilitaries were absent. I will return to this issue in Chapter 4.

Conclusion

This chapter provides the necessary social, political, economic, geographic and demographic background to Lombok. It has also highlighted the nature of mainstream-Islam, and Lombok's religious authorities. The importance of Islam to the Sasak and the centrality of Islam in Lombok, described by *Tuan Guru* Safwan Hakim from Kediri West Lombok, is equal only to Aceh.²⁴⁰ Further, the distinctiveness of Lombok is also marked by the ways Islam was introduced to the Sasak through a Sufi and then a strong *syari'ah* approach.

This allows for a clearer understanding of the patterns of violence in post-1998 Lombok, and the basis for understanding how the boundaries of the Muslim community

²³⁹ Telle, "Vigilante Citizenship: Sovereign Practices," 183-84.

²⁴⁰ Ibid., 99.

have been redrawn on the island, which will be discussed further in Chapter 3. The background and regional divisions also provide a more comprehensive review of the social and religious mechanisms that are involved in perpetuating or preventing religious conflicts, which is the major theme of Chapter 4.

Decentralisation is definitely a positive development that provides equity, especially for locals to participate in the political arena. It has enabled Sasak to resume top government positions and develop capacity-building programmes with a focus on infrastructure, health and education.²⁴¹ However, Kingsley notes that this development might also be problematic, as the quality and skills of local politicians has been questioned owing to the lack of space and support for them to develop their leadership capacities during the New Order Era.²⁴² The continuity of “governed by outsiders” for a large part resulted in a lack of opportunities for the Sasak to master political leadership skills.²⁴³ I argue that *Tuan Guru* is an institution that not only consists of individuals committed to spreading Islamic teachings, but is also a religious institution that has a long vivacious history and has been heavily involved in the political dynamics concerning the life of Lombok’s Muslims. This included their involvement in the movements against the Dutch, to their choice of association with particular political parties, either because of ideological reasons or simply contextual pragmatism. These factors gave *Tuan Guru* the potential to fill the absence of skilled politicians in the Reform Era Lombok.²⁴⁴

In the next chapter, I will focus on the prominent anti-Ahmadiyah discourses at both the elite and the grassroots levels. I will present the different status among *Tuan Guru* and its impact on the redefinition of post-1998 Sasak-Muslim identity, as well as the emergence of violence towards Ahmadiyah. Therefore, my interviews and analysis in subsequent chapters go beyond that of Kingsley’s work on the *Tuan Guru*.

²⁴¹ Interview with an official from NTB Planning Bureau Department, August 2015.

²⁴² Kingsley, *Tuan Guru, Community and Conflict*, 47-48; Tjok Suhendra, “Paradigma Memilih Pemimpin,” *Lombok Post*, 29 July 1999.

²⁴³ MacDougall, “Buddhist Buda or Buda Buddhists?” 3.

²⁴⁴ In 2017, at least three held a top-ranked position in Lombok: Tuan Guru Bajang (the governor), Tuan Guru Ahyar Abduh (mayor of Mataram Municipality) and Tuan Guru Suhaili (regent of Central Lombok regency).

Chapter 3

The National Context of Opposition Against Ahmadiyah

Introduction

In this chapter I focus on attitudes towards Ahmadiyah at the national level, especially as reflected through the deviancy *fatwas* of the MUI (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Indonesian Ulama Council). I begin with the description of the establishment of Ahmadiyah in India in order to give an insight into the political background of the early years of Ahmadiyah's formation and the later split of Ahmadiyah into Ahmadiyah Qadian and Ahmadiyah Lahore. Then, I will examine Ahmadiyah's history in Indonesia prior to Indonesian independence and its early interactions with mainstream-Muslims. This reinforces the claim that theological differences – as essential as these have been in articulating Ahmadiyah's deviancy – had never been expressed in the form of hostility and violence until after 1998. I then shift to a discussion of the development of Ahmadiyah-mainstream Muslim relations through the lens of the evolution of the MUI *fatwas* on Ahmadiyah from the Suharto period to the Reformasi Era. MUI is an official Islamic body established by the state in 1975. One of its main duties is to produce *fatwas* aimed at guiding the Indonesian Muslim community. This is an important foundation for the discussion of the alleged attempt by the MUI to secure more power in post-1998 Indonesia through producing *fatwas*. I argue that these post-1998 MUI *fatwas* were mainly aimed at providing guidelines for the redefinition of the Indonesian Muslim identity.

Ahmadiyah in India

Ahmadiyah was established in Qadian, a city in the Gurdaspur district of Punjab province in 1889 in pre-partition India, then a British colony. The Punjab consists of diverse cultures and religious communities of Sikhs, Hindus, Christians and Muslims. The widespread Christian missionary activities affected Muslim intellectuals in India. In analysing the causes of the 1857 Mutiny, Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817-1898), the founder of Aligarh University, heavily criticised colonial rule. He suggested that the revolt was the end product of accumulated wrongs and frustrations built up over decades. He argued that the most powerful source of dissatisfaction was the proselytising activities of Christian

missionaries.²⁴⁵ The response from Muslim intellectuals in India at that time was of two kinds: (1) modernisation along Western lines; or (2) return to what was understood as fundamental purity.²⁴⁶ Against this background, the creation of Ahmadiyah can be understood as part of the then considerable efforts to provide alternative reform movements and interpretations of Islam. The establishment of several Islamic educational institutions marked this trend. Adil Khan notes:

“This period saw the opening of some of the most recognisable educational institutions in contemporary South Asian Islam, including the Dar al-‘Ulum at Deoband, Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan’s Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh, and the Nadwat al-‘Ulamā in Lucknow.”²⁴⁷

The movement’s founder was Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835-1908). After Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s death, his companion, Hakim Nuruddin, became the leader of Ahmadiyah. In 1914, Ahmadiyah split into two groups: Ahmadiyah Qadian led by Basheeruddin Mahmud Ahmad (the eldest son of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad); and Ahmadiyah Lahore led by Muhammad Ali. The main cause of the split, as Lavan notes, was due to Muhammad Ali’s intention “to direct Ahmadiyah closer to mainstream-Islam and the middle class”.²⁴⁸ Lavan notes that Ahmadiyah Lahore rejected the idea of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s prophethood, instead naming him as a *mujaddid* or reformer.²⁴⁹ In addition to this, the educational and scholarly background of the leaders also seemed to contribute to the split between Ahmadiyah Qadian and Ahmadiyah Lahore.²⁵⁰ Adil Hussain Khan argues

²⁴⁵ “Muslims believed that the government would slowly convert everyone to Christianity ... The missionary schools, awarded government grants in 1854, flourished. Their curricula included instruction in Christian doctrine. Government officials awarded prizes to pupils who were knowledgeable in the study of the Bible. Many parents thought that the government meant their children to leave their own faith. In 1850, an Act made it criminal to withhold inheritance from a member of the family renouncing his religion. This was seen as an attempt to benefit converts to Christianity.” R.A. Geaves, “India 1857: A Mutiny or a War of Independence?” *Islamic Studies* 35, no. 1 (1996): 25-26.

²⁴⁶ R.A. Geaves, “India 1857: A Mutiny or a War of Independence?” *Islamic Studies* 35, no. 1 (1996): 25-28; Adil Khan, “Introduction,” in *From Sufism to Ahmadiyya: A Muslim Minority Movement in South Asia* (Indiana University Press, 2015), 5-6.

²⁴⁷ Adil Khan, “Introduction,” 5-6.

²⁴⁸ Spencer Lavan, *The Ahmadiyah Movement: A History and Perspective* (Delhi: Manohar Book Service, 1974), 92.

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

that the causes of the split are both theological and political, particularly regarding who would be the future leader of the Ahmadiyah community.²⁵¹ Adil Hussain Khan says:

“The issue of Ghulam Ahmad’s prophethood is certainly a critical aspect of the conflict between Ahmadiyah and orthodox Islam. Muhammad Ali’s (Ahmadiyah Lahore’s leader) criticisms of the Qadianis, however, were often presented in a way that highlighted Basheeruddin Mahmud Ahmad’s (Ahmadiyah Qadian’s leader) character flaws or expressed Muhammad Ali’s disapproval of the Jema’at’s [Ahmadiyah community] leadership, rather than expounding the numerous theological issues at hand.”²⁵²

Both groups exist in Indonesia: the Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI) known as the Ahmadiyah Qadian; and Gerakan Ahmadiyah Indonesia (GAI) or Ahmadiyah Lahore. This thesis focuses only on JAI or Ahmadiyah Qadian, because the JAI in Lombok were subject to the post-1998 violence attacks and there are no GAI on the island.²⁵³

Ahmadiyah in Indonesia

The Ahmadiyah (Qadian and Lahore) arrived in Indonesia during the Dutch colonial period. The first JAI *mubaligh* (missionary preacher) was Maulana Rahmat Ali who arrived in October 1925 in Tapaktuan, Aceh. The JAI places strong emphasis on organisation and membership and is less concerned with intellectual issues than the GAI.²⁵⁴ Ahmadiyah Qadian’s recruitment includes periodically sending missionaries all over the world. JAI’s progressive moves in recruiting members are reflected in its policy, which states that a new branch would immediately be established anywhere the minimum requirement (three people) had been fulfilled.²⁵⁵ All the branches of the JAI in Indonesia come under the authority of the international Ahmadiyah Qadian organisation based in London.²⁵⁶ The Indonesian government acknowledged JAI as a legal organisation based on a decree by the

²⁵¹ Adil Hussain Khan, “Authority, Khilāfat, and the Lahori-Qadiani Split,” in *From Sufism to Ahmadiyah: A Muslim Minority Movement in South Asia* (Indiana University Press, 2015), 64-90.

²⁵² *Ibid.*, 79.

²⁵³ Soleh Ahmadi, Ahmadiyah’s *mubaligh* (leader) for NTB, confirms that there is no GAI in Lombok. Interview with Soleh Ahmadi, July 2016.

²⁵⁴ Ahmad Najib Burhani, “Hating the Ahmadiyah: The Place of ‘Heretics’,” *Contemporary Islam* 8 (2014): 143.

²⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 43.

²⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

Minister of Justice (number J.A/5/23/13) on 13 March 1953 and this was reported in the *Official Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia* no. 26 on 31 March 1953.

The GAI *mubalighs*, Maulana Ahmad and Mirza Wali Ahmad Baig, arrived one year earlier than the JAI's *mubaligh*. In 1924, they reached Yogyakarta, the city where Muhammadiyah was established in 1918. In contrast to JAI, GAI is known as an intellectual and reformist movement that had more appeal to the Dutch-educated intelligentsia.²⁵⁷ The GAI applied for the right of association on 28 September 1929.²⁵⁸ It was described by Dawam Raharjo during the early period of independence as a reform movement that promoted a rational approach and it attracted the attention of Muslim intellectuals including the President, Sukarno.²⁵⁹ Since the GAI is less concerned with recruiting more members, the JAI outnumbered the GAI with 330 branches across Indonesia.²⁶⁰

Despite the differences between JAI and GAI, it is important to note that Ahmadiyah is a messianic movement whose founder claimed to be a promised Messiah who communicated with, and received revelation from, God. Lavan notes:

“Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was sincerely convinced that God was speaking to him, calling on him to be the promised Messiah and Mahdi of the Muslims. While through this revelation, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad claimed to be communicating a corrected version of Islam, he was, at the same time, developing a consciously sectarian movement within Islam.”²⁶¹

Therefore, based on the three modes of religious authority model (Chapter 1), the Islamic authority in Indonesia is predominantly *traditionist*, believing that revelation ends with the death of Prophet Muhammad. Whereas, Ahmadiyah fits in the religious authority category of *Islamic-mysticism* by contending that the departure of the Prophet does not interrupt God's revelation.

²⁵⁷ Herman L. Beck, “The Rupture Between the Muhammadiyah and the Ahmadiyya,” *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land-en Volkenkunde* 161, no. 2/3 (2005): 210-46; Zulkarnain, Iskandar, *Gerakan Ahmadiyah Di Indonesia* (Yogyakarta: LKiS Yogyakarta, 2005).

²⁵⁸ Iskandar Zulkarnain, *Gerakan Ahmadiyah di Indonesia* (Yogyakarta: LKiS Yogyakarta, 2005), 4.

²⁵⁹ Dawam Raharjo, in M.A. Suryawan, *Bukan Sekedar Hitam Putih: Kontroversi Pemahaman Ahmadiyah* (Tangerang: Azzahra Publishing, 2016), iii-v.

²⁶⁰ <https://www.jpnn.com/news/mengunjungi-kampung-ahmadiyah-di-cisalada-bogor> accessed 27 January 2019.

²⁶¹ Spencer Lavan, *The Ahmadiyah Movement*, 4.

It is worth noting that while the core of Ahmadiyah's teaching offers a distinctive approach to the whole theological foundations of Islam, for example, on the *jihad* doctrine and the death of Jesus,²⁶² this thesis will mainly focus on the prophethood status of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad. This reflects the emphasis in my fieldwork on both mainstream leaders and Ahmadis. Friedman notes the importance of this matter:

“None of Ghulam Ahmad's ideas caused greater controversy than his claim to have been entrusted with a crucial role in the spiritual history of mankind. He claimed, among other things, to be *mujaddid*, renewer (of religion) at the beginning of the fourteenth century of Islam; *muhaddath*, a person frequently spoken to by Allah or one of His angels; and *mahdi*, “the rightly guided one, the messiah,” expected by the Islamic tradition to appear at the end of days. These are, in the Islamic context, bold religious claims, but even they fade into moderation when compared with the manner in which Ghulam Ahmad interpreted the Islamic idea of the prophethood and its finality.”²⁶³

The words “*khataman nabiyyin*” (Qur'an 33:40) are usually translated as the “Seal of the Prophets” and refer to Muhammad. For Ahmadiyah Qadian, this term is understood to mean that the Prophet Muhammad is the best prophet and that there would be no prophet after him who would bring a new law (*shari'ah*).²⁶⁴ According to Soleh Ahmadi, the word “nabi” in Arabic is an appropriate term to describe these subordinates, and Ahmadiyah believes that prophets can come into the world after Prophet Muhammad, but that they are at a lower level than he is. Mirza Ghulam Ahmad is one of Prophet Muhammad's subordinates; he is *nabi non-shari'ati* (non-bearing law prophet). The revelation that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad received does not contradict the law that Prophet Muhammad had established. Therefore, the word “*khatam*” is indicative of the highest degree or rank.²⁶⁵ Soleh Ahmadi says, “The word “nabi” means those who deliver messages. Therefore, a

²⁶² There is an alternative view from Adil Khan regarding the interconnection of the death of Jesus and prophethood of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad. In claiming to be the second coming of Jesus, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was making an intrinsic claim to prophethood. The logic is since Jesus was a prophet in his first appearance, he would be a prophet in his second appearance. As Mirza Ghulam Ahmad claimed that Jesus had already died and Mirza Ghulam Ahmad himself is the promised messiah, he implicitly raised himself equal to Jesus, a prophet. His lack of subtlety in this claim may have been the result of the incompatibility of such a claim with orthodox Islam, see Adil Khan, *From Sufism to Ahmadiyah*, 48.

²⁶³ Yohanan Friedmann, *Prophecy Continuous: Aspects of Ahmadi religious Thought and Its Medieval Background* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 49.

²⁶⁴ Interview with Soleh Ahmadi, July 2016, see also <https://www.alislam.org/book/true-insights-concept-khatm-e-nubuwwat/profound-interpretation-khataman-nabiyyin/>.

²⁶⁵ Ibid.

mail carrier also could be called ‘nabi’ ... Why has the MUI accused us of being deviant without taking into consideration what the word ‘prophet’ means to us?”²⁶⁶

These views on the finality of prophethood are understood to be the most serious deviation from orthodox belief for Indonesia’s mainstream-Islam and, more generally speaking, the Sunni world. The exclusion of Ahmadiyah from Pakistan’s Islam, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Brunei, and other countries, including Indonesia, shows the importance of the belief on the finality of prophethood in defining who is in and who is out of the Muslim community. This is the main rationale behind the resentment from Indonesia’s mainstream Muslims towards Ahmadiyah, already charged as a deviant group long before the MUI issued the deviance guidelines.²⁶⁷ Muhammadiyah became Indonesia’s first Islamic institution to issue a *fatwa* on the deviance of Ahmadiyah through its *Majlis Tarjih* (the Council of Law-Making) during the 18th *Muktamar* (Congress) in Solo in 1929. The *fatwa* was entitled “Hukum orang jang mengimankan pada Nabi sesudah Nabi Muhammad saw” (the law regarding those who have faith in the existence of a prophet after the Prophet Muhammad). It was mainly a statement of the prophethood status of Muhammad who was seen as the last prophet (*khatam al-nabiyyin*) and thus there is no prophet after him based on the Qur’an (33:40). Hence, the word “*khatam*” for Muhammadiyah means “the last”. Those who do not accept this doctrine are unbelievers.²⁶⁸

Therefore, the Ahmadiyah interpretation that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s rank as a non-law bearing prophet is held to not be acceptable, as no other interpretation on *khataman nabiyyin* (Qur’an, 33:40) is allowed.²⁶⁹ Consequently, Jemaah Ahmadiyah Indonesia’s official response to the MUI *fatwa* on Ahmadiyah’s deviancy received an unsympathetic response because for the MUI’s leaders not a single point from JAI’s 12-point response revoked Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s prophethood status.²⁷⁰ In the other words, the way in

²⁶⁶ Soleh Ahmadi, July 2016.

²⁶⁷ Muhammadiyah issued a deviant *fatwa* to those claiming to have a prophet after Prophet Muhammad in 1929, the Islamic World League issued a deviant *fatwa* on Ahmadiyah in 1973, and a year later a similar *fatwa* was issued by the Islamic Organisation Conference (IOC).

²⁶⁸ Interview with Subhan Acim, August 2015.

²⁶⁹ Ibid.

²⁷⁰ The essential responses to the MUI *fatwas* were on the first six points and the remaining points are basically a statement of how Ahmadiyah will obey the laws and act as good citizens: “(1) we recite the declaration of faith that there is no God but Allah, and Mohammed is his Prophet; (2) we believe that Mohammed was the final prophet; (3) we believe Mirza Ghulam Ahmad to be a teacher and mentor, who inspired his followers to strengthen the teachings of Islam as brought by the Prophet Mohammed; (4) in the induction Oath of Ahmadiyah we use the word “Mohammed” before “Prophet of God”; (5) we do not believe that divine revelation of Islamic law took place after the Holy Koran was revealed to Mohammed; and we follow the teachings of the Koran and the Prophet Mohammed; and (6) the Tadzkirah is not the holy book of

which the JAI and the MUI understood the phrase “*khatam an-nabiyyin*” was different, with the emphasis on the implication of whether there is, or is not, new revelation.

MUI also charges Ahmadiyah with deviancy on several grounds, most notably for violating point no. 8 (Disagrees that the Prophet Muhammad is the last Prophet and Messenger). MUI also explains that the Qur’an and the prophet’s tradition absolutely confirms the finality of prophethood in the Prophet Muhammad SAW. Therefore, whoever claims to be a prophet after Prophet Muhammad is no longer a Muslim.²⁷¹ For the same reason, in September 2005, NU also identified Ahmadiyah as deviant.²⁷² While Indonesia’s majority Islam and official Islam both shared the same stance in regard to Ahmadiyah’s deviant status, the mainstream Muslim’s attitude towards Ahmadiyah is not static. I will illustrate this by looking at the pre-Independence period and then after MUI was established.

1. Pre-Independence: Muhammadiyah and Persis Responses

It is important to note that the violence against the Ahmadiyah community started in the late 1990s. The Ahmadis lived relatively peacefully with their Muslim counterparts in Indonesia from their arrival in the 1920s.²⁷³ The Muslim leaders’ disagreements over Ahmadiyah teachings began in the late 1920s. However, the clash during this period took the form of a ‘war of ideas’ between the leaders of both camps, notably in some large cities in Java, like Bandung (the capital of West Java) and Yogyakarta, where in open discursive sessions both leaders criticised each other via publications as well as in debates. The debate was between Ahmadiyah Qadian leaders represented by Maulana Rahmat Ali and Abu

the Ahmadiyah but a series of notes on the spiritual experience of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad that were compiled in 1935, 27 years after his death”. ICG, *Implication of the Ahmadiyah Decree* (International Crisis Group, 2008: 5); Max Regus, *Understanding Human Right Culture in Indonesia: A Case Study of the Ahmadiyya Minority Group* (Tilburg: Tilburg University, 2017), 139.

²⁷¹ <http://konawe.kemenag.go.id/file/dokumen/PenjelasanTentangFatwaAliranAhmadiyah.pdf>, accessed 12 March 2016.

²⁷² <http://www.nu.or.id/post/read/12315/sikap-pbnu-tentang-ahmadiyah>, accessed 11 March 2019.

²⁷³ This by no means dismisses the fact that there were debates and opposition to the published Qur’anic translation by Muhammad Ali of Lahore between Tjokroaminoto, the leader of Sarekat Islam and Muhammadiyah leaders. For a fuller account, see Much Nur Ichwan, “Differing Responses to an Ahmadi Translation and Exegesis,” *Archipel* 62 (2001): 143-61.

Bakar Ayyub against Ahmad Hassan, the leader of Persatuan Islam or *Persis* (Islamic Union).²⁷⁴

The debates took place in two of the largest cities in Java, Batavia (Jakarta) and Bandung, from 1933-1934. The first debate took place: in Bandung on 14-16 April 1933; in Jakarta, 28-30 September 1933; and the last one, as well as the lengthiest, took place over four days in Jakarta on 3-6 November 1934 and was titled *Openbare Debate Vergadering (Assembly of Open Debate) Between Defender of Islam vs. Ahmadiyah Qadian*.²⁷⁵ The April 1933, September 1933 and November 1934 debates were attended by more than 1,000 people, more than 2,000, and around 1,500 participants, respectively.²⁷⁶ In addition, numerous Islamic organisations joined the debates and many newspaper journalists covered these events. Among them were Muhammadiyah, PSII (Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia or Indonesian Union Islamic Party) and Jong Islamieten Bond Betawi.²⁷⁷ The newspapers included *Bintang Timoer* (leftist affiliated), *Sinar Islam* (belongs to Ahmadiyah), *Het Licht* (belongs to Jong Islamieten Bond), *Pembela Islam* (Persis magazine) and *Pers Bureau Hindia Timoer*. There were no consensuses or agreements achieved between Ahmadiyah and the Persis leaders through the debates, which mainly focused on the prophethood claim of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad and the second coming of Jesus. Nevertheless, instead of violence, the intellectual debates and publications were two channels used by both Ahmadiyah and Muslim intellectuals to express their disagreements. Moreover, the fact that three debates were held in two consecutive years and were covered by various newspapers is evidence that the Islamic leaders, as well as the public, particularly in Jakarta and the West Java region, were generally aware of Ahmadiyah's different teachings. This awareness, however, never descended into physical violence. In contrast, decades later, reports from some non-governmental organisations suggest that West Java is the region where Ahmadiyah received the worst physical violence in post-Reformasi Indonesia.²⁷⁸

²⁷⁴ Persatuan Islam is an Islamic organisation that was established in September 1923 in Bandung, West Java province. Under Ahmad Hassan's leadership, Persis emphasised its commitment to opposing heresy, myth and superstition, which are considered Islamic.

²⁷⁵ Catur Wahyudi, *Marginalisasi dan Keberadaban Masyarakat* (Jakarta: Pustaka Obor Indonesia, 2015), 63.

²⁷⁶ Ibid.

²⁷⁷ Muhammadiyah's representatives came from the organisation's branches in Garut (a regency in West Java) and Pekalongan (a regency in Central Java), and PSII representatives from Bandung.

²⁷⁸ The Setara Institute, for example, reported that for six consecutive years (2010-2017), West Java was the province with the highest number of intolerance and violation of freedom of religion cases, and that

How are we to explain these contrasting phenomena? The reasons behind this discursive ‘war of ideas’ were mainly due to the Ahmadiyah literature on Christianity, which proved to be a good resource for the Muslim counter-attack against the Dutch Christian missionaries²⁷⁹— as it had been against the British missionaries in early 20th century India.²⁸⁰ Beck points out that the origins of the initial welcoming attitude of Muslims in Indonesia, particularly Muhammadiyah in the mid-1920s towards Ahmadiyah (GIA) preachers. This was because Ahmadiyah was seen by Muhammadiyah to be a potential partner in the struggle against Christianity and colonialism.²⁸¹ In addition, Burhani argues that the Ahmadiyah literature on Christianity supported a sense of the superiority of Islam and its compatibility with modernity.²⁸² Mirza Wali Ahmad Baig, an Ahmadiyah Lahore preacher, insisted that his mission in Central Java was to guide the Muslims and to arm their hearts against the dangers threatening Islam, such as materialism and Christianity.²⁸³ Hendrik Kremer (1888-1965), a Dutch missionary with the *Nederlandsch Bijbelgenootschap* (Dutch Bible Association), held the view that the Ahmadiyah was one of the important factors for the change in the Muhammadiyah’s tolerant attitude towards Christianity to a hostile one.²⁸⁴ It was in both parties’ perceived interests (Muhammadiyah and GIA) to undermine efforts by Christians to convert Indonesians.

In its attempts to halt the Christian mission in Java, it seems that Muhammadiyah welcomed those who supported their goals. This extended to JAI (Qadian) or GIA (Lahore).²⁸⁵ Both Ahmadiyah Lahore and Qadian have a strong anti-Christian missionary

Ahmadiyah had been one of the most targeted groups, see Setara Institute Executive Summary, Mid-Year Report, Jakarta, 20 August 2018.

²⁷⁹ Especially in Yogyakarta (Muhammadiyah’s headquarters) and Central Java.

²⁸⁰ Beck, “The Rupture between the Muhammadiyah and the Ahmadiyya,” 210-46; Burhani, “Hating the Ahmadiyya,” 133-152; Spencer Lavan, *The Ahmadiyah Movement*, 12.

²⁸¹ “[...] Muhammadiyah was convinced that it and the Ahmadiyya shared the same aim of purifying the faith and modernising Islam. The aim was to be aligned with activities in the religious, social, and educational fields. As the Ahmadiyya was generally known at that time both for developing an Islamic educational system that was compatible with modern Western education, and its zealous, anti-Christian mission all over the world and in Western Europe in particular, the Muhammadiyah considered it the ideal partner to co-operate with in Central Java with its underdeveloped Muslim educational system and its Christian colonial government”; Beck, “The Rupture Between the Muhammadiyah and the Ahmadiyya,” 240.

²⁸² Burhani, “The Ahmadiyya and the Study of Comparative Religion in Indonesia,” 141.

²⁸³ Beck, “The Rupture Between the Muhammadiyah and the Ahmadiyya,” 231.

²⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 222.

²⁸⁵ Coincidentally, Ahmadiyah Lahore’s (GAI) preachers were the ones who made the first contact with Muhammadiyah.

element in their teachings.²⁸⁶ The basis of Ahmadiyah's anti-Christian literature had existed during the life of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad or prior to the Qadian-Lahore split. Indeed, the special attention to Christianity in the development of Ahmadiyah teaching by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad in late 19th century India corresponds with the works of scholars like Steven Lavan and Adil Khan. Lavan notes:

“The work of the Batala (a city in Gurdaspur district, Punjab) Church Mission and the Church Missionary Society, which established a high school in that town in 1878, has resulted in significant conversion of the Indian population to Christianity ... with a potential for religious and communal tension already written into more than three hundred years of Punjab history, the added dimension of British rule and Christian missionary presence in both the province and the district, was to have an important role in the development of (Mirza Ghulam) Ahmad's programme.”²⁸⁷

Similarly, Adil Khan says, “It is important to appreciate this rationale within the context of the rivalry between Islam and Christianity in 19th century India”.²⁸⁸

Little information on the development of the JAI during the Sukarno era can be obtained.²⁸⁹ The dearth of publications on the JAI during this period was, perhaps, a significant factor in the low levels of public attention. Additionally, Herman Beck argues that the tolerant attitude of Muhammadiyah to Ahmadiyah Lahore preachers in 1920s was owing to Muhammadiyah's lack of literature on Ahmadiyah (both Lahore and Qadian).²⁹⁰ For example, it was only after a warning from Haji Rasul in 1925,²⁹¹ an Islamic scholar

²⁸⁶ During our conversation, Soleh Ahmadi explained at length the superiority of Ahmadiyah teaching regarding Jesus' tomb in Kashmir, and concluded his talk with the truth of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad's claim that he is the promised Messiah.

²⁸⁷ Spencer Lavan, *The Ahmadiyah Movement*, 12.

²⁸⁸ Adil Khan, *From Sufism to Ahmadiyah* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015), 43.

²⁸⁹ On the other hand, there were considerable publications by the GAI during this period, but most of them are in English, which made them accessible only to the very small literate segment of Indonesians, around 5% of the young Republic's total population. See Peter Lowenberg, “Writing and Literacy in Indonesia,” *Studies in the Linguistic Sciences* 30, no. 1 (Spring 2000): 135. Nonetheless, the impact of GAI's publications to this marginal section of literate Indonesian should not be taken lightly. One of the most influential leaders of the GAI was Djojosoegito, the former chairman of the central schooling council of Muhammadiyah, a close friend of Ahmad Dahlan (the founder of Muhammadiyah), and also a second cousin to K.H. Hasyim Asy'ari (the founder of Nahdatul Ulama). As Steven Lavan notes, Ahmadiyah Lahore's founders, Muhammad Ali and Khawajah Kamal-ud-Din, “while impressed and supportive of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad's leadership, were thinkers, reformers, writers and leaders in their own right”. See Spencer Lavan, *The Ahmadiyah Movement*, 99.

²⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 241.

²⁹¹ Haji Rasul was a prominent Islamic cleric, as well the father of Hamka, the first appointed leader of MUI, the Indonesian Ulama Council, in 1975. In addition, Much Nur Ichwan notes that around that time

from Sumatera Island, that Muhammadiyah started to distance themselves from Ahmadiyah Lahore preachers.²⁹² Muhammadiyah, despite being claimed as a modern reformist organisation, concentrates more on the observation of rituals and less on theological concerns.²⁹³ Therefore, just like Muhammadiyah, it is possible that the Indonesian people at that time lacked information on Ahmadiyah teachings.²⁹⁴ It is also important to note that the majority of Indonesians at that time were uneducated and illiterate, which made access to information regarding Ahmadiyah's theological differences only possible for the educated Muslim elite.

Hence, the non-violent reaction in the early period of mainstream Muslims to the Ahmadiyah Qadian and Lahore preachers' arrival in Indonesia was related to several factors. First, because of a less informed and illiterate society at that time and a dearth of information about Ahmadiyah Qadian's teachings. Secondly, there was a pragmatic goal that drove Muslim mass organisations like Muhammadiyah to join hands with Ahmadiyah Lahore preachers in their efforts to counter Christian missionary activities in Indonesia.²⁹⁵ To a certain extent, the 'war of ideas' also highlighted Ahmadiyah's life during the period of British rule in India. Only after the foundation of the Islamic State of Pakistan in 1947 did Ahmadiyah and Sunni-Muslim theological differences become part of the major constitutional problem. Therefore, further study on the relationship between the mainstream-Muslim preference for a 'war of ideas' rather than violence within the context of colonial rule, which is closely associated and supportive of Christian missionaries, is needed.

After recounting the mainstream Muslim-Ahmadiyah tensions in the early days and the possible explanation of the past non-aggressive period, in the next section I examine the *fatwas* and recommendations issued by MUI on Ahmadiyah, especially during Suharto's administration and after the New Order's downfall. The rationale for this is because a closer look at the *fatwas* before and after the regime change clearly reveals the

Muhammadiyah was also seeking Haji Rasul's support to expand to Sumatra, see Much Nur Ichwan, "Differing Responses to an Ahmadi Translation and Exegesis," 148.

²⁹² Beck, "The Rupture Between the Muhammadiyah and the Ahmadiyya," 220-230; Haji Rasul's first acquaintance was with Ahmadiyah Qadian when it reached Padang, West Sumatera province through Tapaktuan, Aceh. He was one of West Sumatera *ulama* who actively fought against Ahmadiyah influence, see Iskandar Zulkarnain, 2005: 179.

²⁹³ Ibid.

²⁹⁴ Ibid., 220-30.

²⁹⁵ Ibid., 240.

growing opposition towards Ahmadiyah. There was a discernible change in the way mainstream-Muslims responded to the so-called deviant teachings of Ahmadiyah and Ahmadis in post-Reformasi Indonesia. This change is important background for the discussion on the relationship between a power vacuum, religious authority and identity redefinition at the national level.

2. Post-Independence

i) MUI and the State

Theological issues are central in analysing the inclusivity and exclusivity of the *Umma*. The exclusion of Ahmadiyah from the global Muslim community was primarily based on its different interpretation on the finality of prophethood. In the following section, I focus on the role of official Islam (MUI) in issuing religious edicts (*fatwas*) against Ahmadiyah.

The dynamics of the relationship between political Islam and the state prior to the Reform Era could be summarised by Snouck Hurgronje's recommendation to the Dutch Colonial Government in the 1920s. He says, "... I never had any objections to the religious elements of this institute [Islam]. Only its political influence is, in my opinion, deplorable. And as a Dutchman especially, I feel a strong need to warn against this".²⁹⁶

Hurgronje's claim is not groundless. From the Padri wars in West Sumatra (1803-1837) to the Diponegoro War in Central Java (1825-1830), the struggle against colonialism always involved (Islamic) religious leaders. The religious leaders also played important roles during the struggle for independence and the formation of the new Indonesian Republic, as well as working closely with non-Islamic leaders during the formulation of the national constitution. Looking at the Islamic leaders' pivotal role, and the fact that Muslims comprise more than 80% of Indonesia's population, one may argue that the constitution of the new republic would be likely to favour the views of Islamic leaders but this did not become the case. The Islamic leaders, despite their numbers, realised that Indonesia consisted of several nations before it became a state.²⁹⁷ The idea of subjugating ethnic and religious identities into one single, larger Indonesian Republic entity united the

²⁹⁶ <http://www.eurasiareview.com/14092011-christiaan-snouck-hurgronje-history-of-orientalist-manipulation-of-islam-analysis/>.

²⁹⁷ For more detail, see Benedict Anderson, "Indonesian Nationalism Today, and in the Future," *Indonesia* 67 (April 1999).

founding fathers of Indonesia, both Muslim and non-Muslims, in their struggle against colonial governments.²⁹⁸ The idea of subjugation made the Islamists (those who support an Islamic theocracy) sacrifice their idea of including the seven words (the obligation to carry out Shari'a Islam for its adherents) from the first verse of the Pancasila in 1945.²⁹⁹

In the 1960s, Sukarno announced that there were three combinations of core ideology that tied Indonesia's political organisations together. Those three ideologies were Nationalism, Islam (representing Religion) and Marxism (Communism) or NASAKOM. Sukarno initially designed it as a binding ideology for the nation. The President's harmonious relationship with the Indonesian Communist party (PKI) also further marginalised the Islamists from the centre of power. The failed September coup by the PKI in 1965 ended their existence and therefore gave hope to Islamists that they might achieve more influence in the political arena.

There were no preliminary warnings that the worst was yet to come. During the New Order, Suharto's consolidation of power started after the 1965 coup.³⁰⁰ He used these events to confirm that Indonesia was a region prone to the threat of the latent enemy, communists, who were often associated with atheism.³⁰¹ He therefore saw an urgent need

²⁹⁸ Ibid., 3.

²⁹⁹ The Jakarta Charter is the draft constitution. The drafting committee of the constitution, which is mainly divided into non-Muslim and Muslim secular leaders, found itself deadlocked over the role religion would play in the state. Sukarno inserted himself into the debate by including seven words into the first verse to indicate a special relationship between Muslims and the state. Sukarno declared on 10 July 1945:

... national independence is hereby expressed in a Constitution of the Indonesian state which is moulded in the form of the Republic of Indonesia, resting upon the people's sovereignty and founded on (the following principles): The Belief in God, with the obligation to carry out Shari'a Islam for its adherents in accordance with the principle of 11 righteous and moral humanitarianism; the unity of Indonesia, and a democracy led by wise policy of mutual deliberation of a representative body and ensuring social justice for the whole Indonesian people (Yamin, 1959: 154)

Sukarno's declaration of agreement was premature. The Christian-dominated eastern part of the archipelago still would not accept the inclusion of shari'a and considered the inclusion threatening to the Christians in light of their status as a minority. On 17 August, one day after the Japanese surrendered Indonesia to the allied forces, Sukarno declared Independence. The opening meeting of the Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence on 18 August 1945 was opened and the Preamble of the Jakarta Charter was amended to remove the stipulation that Muslims must adhere to shari'a. Sukarno ultimately eliminated the seven words from the Preamble in order to achieve his goal of territorial integrity, see Michael, Densmoor, *The Control and Management of Religion in Post-Independence, Pancasila Indonesia*, Master Thesis (Washington DC: Georgetown University), 2013.

³⁰⁰ Mary E. McCoy, "Purifying Islam in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia: Corporatist Metaphors and the Rise of Religious Intolerance," *Rhetoric and Public Affairs* 16, no. 2 (2013): 280.

³⁰¹ For fuller detail, see Vanessa Hearman, "The 1965-1966 Violence, Religious Conversions and the Changing Relationship Between the Left and Indonesia's Churches," in *The Indonesian Genocide of 1965 Causes, Dynamics and Legacies*, (eds) Katharine McGregor, Jess Melvin and Annie Pohlman (Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 179-95; Mujiburrahman, *Feeling Threatened: Muslim-Christian Relations in Indonesia's New Order* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006).

to form an authoritative ideology to uphold the unity of the state. The president transformed Pancasila as the sole ideology, which meant that Pancasila became the only legal ideological foundation for every Indonesian and all the mass organisations in the country. It was superior to other forms of ideologies, including religion. Suharto saw this as a way of establishing a stable state through eliminating the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). At the same time, discussions of SARA (Ethnic, Religious, Racial and Tribal) identities were prohibited in the public sphere.

However, in practice, the sole ideology policy was not exclusively targeted at communists, but also at any potential political power that might challenge Suharto, which included political Islam.³⁰² Suharto controlled Islam's agenda and its room for movement in the political arena. He endorsed Islam to function as a cultural and spiritual entity, but at the same time denied Islam the right to become a political force.³⁰³ In 1973, Suharto merged Islamic parties into one Muslim political party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan – PPP, or Unity and Development Party), and made it clear that the party did not have a reference to Islam in its title, and that the party had to accept Pancasila as its core ideology.³⁰⁴ In short, Suharto suppressed religion as secondary to the need for stability and security, therefore Islam was secondary to the Pancasila. Once again, the claim that “a good number of contemporary Islamic intellectuals felt betrayed by the political elite once Indonesia reached its independence” finds supporting evidence.³⁰⁵

In this vein, the importance of a state-delegated religious authority was established. Yuksel Sezgin and Mirjam Kunkler highlight that the post-colonial Indonesian approached religious policy with a bureaucratic outlook,³⁰⁶ which meant that the Indonesian

³⁰² Mary E. McCoy, “Purifying Islam in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia” (2013): 275-315; Felix Heiduk, “State Disintegration and Power Politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia,” *Third World Quarterly* 35, no. 2 (2014): 300-15.

³⁰³ Douglas Ramage, *Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance* (London: Routledge, 1995), 191-92.

³⁰⁴ For a fuller study on the controversy of Pancasila as a sole ideology, see Robert Pringle, *Understanding Islam in Indonesia: Politics and Diversity* (Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 2010), 90; Michael Densmoor, *The Control and Management of Religion in Post-Independence, Pancasila Indonesia*, Masters Thesis (Washington DC: Georgetown University, 2013).

³⁰⁵ The first betrayal after the declaration of independence took place in 1945 where the seven words “obligation to observe Islamic law for Muslims” were omitted during the formation of the state's ideology. For fuller detail on political Islam and the state, see Bahtiar Effendy, *Islam and the State in Indonesia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003); Edward Aspinall, *Opposing Suharto: Compromise, Resistance and Regime Change in Indonesia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005).

³⁰⁶ Yuksel Sezgin and Mirjam Kunkler, “Regulation of ‘Religion’ and the ‘Religious’: The Politics of Judicialization and Bureaucratization in India and Indonesia,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 56, no. 2 (2014): 451.

government, most remarkably during Suharto, delegated vertically to a subordinate agency managing religion for its own political purposes. In this way, the state successfully forestalled it from formulating policies that would go against the central government's policy preferences. Indeed, scholars have argued that the New Order's power elite has manipulated and co-opted religious institutions in order to promote the status quo in the eyes of the masses.³⁰⁷

After the implementation of the decentralisation programme in 1999, the central government kept its previous authority over the administration of religion. There are two leading institutions on which the Indonesian government relies for the administration of religion: (1) the Ministry of Religious Affairs; and (2) the MUI.³⁰⁸ The Ministry of Religious Affairs administers various aspects of the practical Islamic legal traditions, including pilgrimages, marriage and religious school administration. MUI handles more of the formation policy on of Islamic legal tradition issues, including religious edicts or *fatwa*. The religious institution that is the main focus here is MUI.

MUI can be seen as an institution of religious authority (the highest national religious authority) that issues *fatwas* in Indonesia. In this thesis, I will specifically be focusing on the deviant *fatwas* of the MUI.

Suharto's New Order established the MUI in 1975. The MUI is not a state-endorsed Office of the *mufti* (those in charge of issuing *fatwa*), for example, as in Brunei and Malaysia.³⁰⁹ In theory, it is not a state agency at all, but a non-governmental organisation. However, it receives substantial funding from the government and is often as seen as part of the government by the public. The main goal of the MUI *fatwas* was to "translate" Suharto's local and national development policy.³¹⁰ When requested, the Council was to provide "input" to the government in the form of "information about religious life in Indonesia".³¹¹ The body was allowed to produce *fatwas* as long as they did not go against

³⁰⁷ Felix Heiduk, "Between A Rock and A Hard Place: Radical Islam in Post-Suharto Indonesia," *International Journal of Conflict and Violence* 6, no. 1 (2012): 26-40.

³⁰⁸ Tim Lindsey, "Monopolising Islam: The Indonesian Ulama Council and State Regulation of the 'Islamic Economy'," *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* 48, no. 2 (2012): 255.

³⁰⁹ "Regardless of the historical background of its establishment, the MUI is an ordinary institution, like many others in Indonesia. The MUI's proclamations are not legally enforceable upon the Muslim people of Indonesia"; Syafiq Hasyim, "The Council of Indonesian Ulama (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI) and Religious Freedom," *Irasec's Discussion Papers*, 12 December 2011, 25.

³¹⁰ Tim Lindsey, "Monopolising Islam." 257.

³¹¹ *Ibid.*

the interests of the regime. MUI has often been described as a puppet of the government. For example, Atho Mudzhar says:

“The relationship of the MUI with the government is a complicated one. On the one hand it is characterized by the fact that the government constantly demonstrates its high regard for the MUI and extends its financial support, but on the other the MUI is under constant pressure to justify government policies from the religious point of view.”³¹²

Although Mudzhar’s statement explains the relationship between religious leaders and the pre-Reformasi Indonesia state in general, a closer analysis, however, of the MUI and its *fatwas* in post-1998 Indonesia indicates that the MUI has not always been submissive to the state. Indeed, Norshahril Saat argues that there is a mutual relationship between the state and the authority responsible for issuing *fatwas* in Indonesia and Malaysia.³¹³ When comparing the MUI Fatwa Commission and JKF-MKI (National Fatwa Committee) of the MKI (National Council for Islamic Religious Affairs Malaysia), Norshahril Saat says:

“Both institutions contain units actively involved in state capture, and they include units responsible for issuing *fatwas*, overseeing *shar’iah* economics, managing halal certification and determining public morality. Moreover, these two institutions have similar origins and functions: they were formed or enlarged under authoritarian conditions – under the rule of Suharto and Mahathir – as national *ulama* institutions to issue *fatwas* and religious advisories. Their membership is made up of individuals with similar objectives. *Ulama* from both countries agreed to participate in these bodies in order to increase their influence within their respective states. The politicians in these states, in return, sought to advance their political and economic objectives through co-opting the *ulama*.”³¹⁴

In this vein, the following section will look closely at the 1980 and 2005 MUI *fatwas* as well as its recommendation on Ahmadiyah in 1984. I argue that there has been an evolution in the MUI’s statements on Ahmadiyah as well as a modification of its position

³¹² M. Atho Mudzhar, “Fatwas of the Council of Indonesian Ulama: A Study of Islamic Legal Thought in Indonesia 1975-1988,” Jakarta: INIS, 1993, 120.

³¹³ Norshahril Saat, *The State, Ulama and Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2018), 56; Ibrahim Abu Rabi also claims that, “To a large extent, the power elite has also put to use some religious intelligentsia in order to promote the status quo in the eyes of the masses”. Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi, “Contemporary Islamic Intellectual History: A Theoretical Perspective,” *Islamic Studies* 44, no. 4 (2005): 507.

³¹⁴ Norshahril Saat, *The State, Ulama and Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia*, 56.

vis à vis the Indonesian government.³¹⁵ This is important background to better understand the relationships between the state and *ulama* in pre- and post-Suharto Indonesia. The discussion on the *fatwa* modifications is vital in supporting the claim that the MUI's official response to a deviant group in post-1998 Indonesia was mainly intended to define the Muslim community boundary lines. This, however, is heavily determined by how solid the government's command of the religious sector was when the *fatwa* was issued.

ii). MUI Fatwas: Pre- and Post-1998

The 2005 *fatwa* was the second MUI *fatwa* on Ahmadiyah. The first *fatwa* was issued by the MUI in 1980. Four years later, in 1984, the MUI also issued a recommendation through its national working meeting (Rakernas) advocating the banning of the dissemination of Ahmadiyah teachings in Indonesia.

ii) 1980 fatwa

1. In line with data and facts found in nine books on the Ahmadiyah, the MUI issues a *fatwa* that the Ahmadiyah is a non-Islamic group, heretical and deviant.
2. Regarding the Ahmadiyah case, the MUI should always be in contact with the government.³¹⁶

iii) 1984 recommendations

1. That Jamaah Ahmadiyah, in the territory of the Republic of Indonesia, which is a corporation³¹⁷ based on the decree of the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Indonesia No. JA/23/13 on 13 March 1953 (appendix to the State Gazette on 31 March 1953 No. 26) for the Muslim community has evoked:
 - a. social unrest since its doctrines are in contrast to Islamic doctrines.
 - b. disintegration, especially in devotional matters (prayer), on marriage and so on.
 - c. a threat to social stability and national security. Based on these reasons, it is hoped that the authority reviews the decree of the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of

³¹⁵ For a discussion on the MUI's Fatwa on Ahmadiyah, also refer to John Olle, "The Majelis Ulama Indonesia Versus 'Heresy': The Resurgence of Authoritarian Islam," in *State of Authority: The State in Society in Indonesia*, Garry van Klinken and Joshua Barker (eds), 95-111.

³¹⁶ Tim Penyunting, *Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Himpunan Fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia* (Jakarta: MUI, 1997), 71.

³¹⁷ Corporation here refers to mass organisation.

Indonesia No. JA/23/13 on 31 March 1953 (appendix to the State Gazette No. 26, on 31 March 1953).

2. Recommend:

- a. That the MUI, the provincial MUI and the local MUI, all *ulama*, and preachers throughout Indonesia should explain the heretical doctrines of the Ahmadiyah Qadian which is outside of Islam.
- b. Those who have already joined the Jemaat Ahmadiyah Qadian return to the Islamic doctrine.
- c. The Muslim community increase its alertness in order to not be influenced by this heretical doctrine.³¹⁸

There is one important point from the *fatwas* and recommendations in the Suharto Era. The first *fatwa* in 1980 was only a statement of Ahmadiyah's deviancy, but no ban or limitation on Ahmadiyah's activities was included. The 1984 recommendation specifically mentions that the deviant group is Ahmadiyah Qadian (JAI, or Jemaah Ahmadiyah Indonesia) and requests the government review Jemaah Ahmadiyah Indonesia's legal status as an organisation since the JAI "has evoked social unrest since its doctrines are in contrast to Islamic doctrines". Ahmadiyah Lahore (GAI, Gerakan Ahmadiyah Indonesia) was not mentioned in the 1980 *fatwa* or 1984 recommendations.

A clear statement of the 1980 *fatwa*, that the MUI's further actions towards Ahmadiyah will be in line with government policy, was a clear admission of the absolute control of the Suharto government over the MUI. The reluctance of the Suharto government to act made the recommendation meaningless, and the fact that there was no extra effort from the MUI to persuade the government to act further based on the 1980 *fatwa* and 1984 recommendations underscores the inferior position the Council had in relation to the government.

iv) 2005 *fatwa*

After considering:

³¹⁸ Sekretariat MUI, *Himpunan Keputusan dan Fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia* (Jakarta: Sekretariat MUI, t.t.), 147. The MUI recommendation on the Ahmadiyah community issued in the national working meeting on 4-7 March 1984.

- a. That up until now the Ahmadiyah denominations continued to disseminate their doctrines in Indonesia, even though the MUI had issued a *fatwa* and banned them.
- b. That the effort to disseminate the Ahmadiyah doctrines had evoked social unrest.
- c. That some members of the society urged the affirmation of the MUI's *fatwa* on the Ahmadiyah doctrines in relation to the emergence of various opinions and reactions within society.
- d. That in order to comply with the demand of the society and to maintain the purity of Islamic belief, the Council of Indonesian Ulama needed to affirm the *fatwa* on the Ahmadiyah doctrines.

Bearing in mind:

- (1) The Qur'an 33: 40,³¹⁹ "Muhammad is not the father of any of your men, but (he is) the apostle of God, and the seal of the prophets. And God has full knowledge of all things". The Qur'an 6: 158, "Verily, this is My way, leading straight: follow it: follow not (other) paths: they will scatter you about from His (great) path: This has He commanded you that ye may be righteous". The Qur'an 5:105, "O ye who believe! Guard your own souls: if ye follow (right) guidance, no hurt can come to you from those who stray. The goal of you all is to God: it is He that will show you the truth of all that ye do".
- (2) The prophet Tradition transmitted by Al Bukhari "there will no Prophet after me" and another tradition of the Prophet transmitted by Tirmidzi "Messengership and prophethood have been ended: for this reason, there will not be a Messenger nor a Prophet after me".

Observing:

1. The Decision of the *Majma' al-Fiqh al-Islami* Organisasi Kerja Sama Islam (The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, which previously was called the Organisation of Islamic Conference, OIC), No. 4 (4/2), in its second conference in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on 10-16 Rabi' al- Tsani 1406 AH/22-28 December 1985 on the Ahmadiyah Qadiyan doctrines in which, among other things, states that the Ahmadiyah doctrines, which acknowledge Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as a Prophet after the Prophet Muhammad and that he has received divine revelation is apostasy and deviating from Islam since it disavows the definite Islamic doctrines, which are acknowledged by all *ulama* that

³¹⁹ In this thesis, all citations from the Qur'an will be taken from al-Qur'an and translations from the Ministry of Religious Affairs of Indonesia.

the Prophet Muhammad is the last Prophet and Messenger. The text of the decree is as follows: “Truthfully, what is claimed by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad on his prophecy, the doctrines he carried and revelations descended on him are strict deviancy against the definite Islamic doctrines that the Prophet Muhammad is the last Messenger and Prophet; and that there would be no more revelations descended on anyone after this. The belief disseminated by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad has made him and his followers apostates, deviating from Islam. The Ahmadiyah Qadian and the Ahmadiyah Lahore are the same, although the latter believes that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad is the shadow and continuation of the Prophet Muhammad”.

2. The decree of the *fatwa* on the Council of Indonesian Ulama in the Second MUNAS in 1980 on the Ahmadiyah Qadiyan.
3. The opinion of the *fatwa* Commission assembly in the seventh MUNAS of the Council of Indonesian Ulama in 2005.

With submission to Allah

Decide that and determine: *fatwa* on the Ahmadiyah doctrines

1. To affirm the decree of the *fatwa* of the MUI in the second conference in 1980 which decided that the Ahmadiyah doctrines are outside the path of Islam, heretical and deviating; and a Muslim who has joined these doctrines is an apostate.
2. For those who joined the Ahmadiyah doctrines to return immediately to the true Islam, which is in line with the Qur’an and the traditions of the Prophet.
3. To oblige the government to ban the dissemination of Ahmadiyah doctrines throughout Indonesia and to annul the organisation as well as to close all its offices.

The 2005 *fatwa* above highlights three key issues. First, the content of the *fatwa* in 2005 is an affirmation and combination of the *fatwa* issued in 1980 and the recommendations of 1984 which, principally, have the same substance, viz. that the Ahmadiyah community is outside of Islam, “heretical and deviated”.³²⁰ Therefore, Ahmadiyah’s deviant status has not changed.

Secondly, the MUI *fatwa* in 2005 stated that “Ahmadiyah Qadian and Ahmadiyah Lahore are the same”, and therefore underlines that both (JAI) and (GAI) are deviant. In addition, “evoking social unrest” is the main consideration of the 1984 recommendation

³²⁰ Humeira Iqtidar, “State Management of Religion in Pakistan and Dilemmas of Citizenship,” *Citizenship Studies* 16, no. 8 (2012): 1013-28.

and the 2005 *fatwa* issuance. However, the 2005 *fatwa* specifically identifies dissemination efforts as the source of the so-called “social unrest”. The latest *fatwa* goes further by including GAI in the deviant category and signalling that their dissemination is a potent threat for the wider community.

Lastly, the *fatwas* and recommendations during the Suharto Era highlighted that the government had the dominant role in determining how the MUI presented their *fatwas* on Ahmadiyah, as well as to the extent that the MUI asserts its position in relation to the government. I will elaborate the last issue further below.

In response to the 2005 MUI *fatwa* and the growing hostilities against Ahmadiyah, the government issued a joint ministerial decree in 2008 SKB (Joint Ministerial Decree). It basically says:

- (1) Members of the public are warned and ordered not to declare, suggest or attempt to gain public support for an interpretation of a religion that is held in Indonesia or to conduct religious activities that resemble the religious activities of that religion which are deviant from the principal teachings of that religion.
- (2) The followers, members, and/or leading members of the Indonesian Ahmadiyya Jama'at (JAI) are warned and ordered, as long as they consider themselves to hold to Islam, to discontinue the promulgation of interpretations and activities that are deviant from the principal teachings of Islam, that is to say the promulgation of beliefs that recognise a prophet with all his teachings who comes after the Prophet Muhammad SAW.³²¹

The first point clearly states that the government is limiting Ahmadiyah’s activities by not allowing preaching beyond the immediate Ahmadiyah’s community. The second point explicitly states that to be accepted as part of the Muslim community, Ahmadiyah must not recognise any prophet after Prophet Muhammad. Therefore, the SKB has an accommodative attitude towards the MUI’s *fatwa*.³²² The SKB is mainly restating the MUI’s objection to the prophethood status of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad. It also endorses the

³²¹ For an alternative argument on SKB and human rights, see Yusril Ihza Mahendra’s (the former Human Rights Minister and the former leader of Moon and Crescent Party or PBB) argument in <http://www.thepersecution.org/world/indonesia/docs/skb.html>.

³²² Deputy General of Human Rights at the Human Rights and Justice Ministry, Harkristuti Harkrisnowo, criticised the issuance of SKB and claims it was related to the big protest of mass and Islamic organisations in front of the National Palace asking the government to disband Ahmadiyah, see <http://www.thepersecution.org/world/indonesia/docs/skb.html>.

Council's demand to contain the dissemination of Ahmadiyah teaching in a positive manner.³²³ This also expressed earlier in the president's speech at the National Congress of the MUI in 2005. SBY says:

“We open our hearts and minds to receiving the thoughts, recommendations and *fatwas* from the MUI and *ulama* (Islamic scholars) at any time, either directly to me or the minister of religious affairs or to other branches of government. We want to place MUI in a central role in matters regarding the Islamic faith, so that it becomes clear what the difference is between areas that are the preserve of the state and areas where the government or state should heed the *fatwa* from the MUI and *ulama*.”³²⁴

At the MUI meeting two years later, SBY states:

“In accordance with its regulations, the MUI issues *fatwas*. The president cannot issue a *fatwa*. But after a *fatwa* issued, the tools of the state can do their duty. Hopefully our cooperation will deepen in the future ... We must all take strict measures against deviant beliefs.”³²⁵

The response of the SBY government to the *fatwas*, therefore, can be interpreted as the government's inclination to strengthen ties with MUI or the president's personal religious view, or possibly combination of both.³²⁶ The Ministry of Religious Affairs also issued a document explaining the MUI *fatwa*, explicitly referring to the history of false prophets in the early period of Islam.³²⁷ This document further confirmed the government's full support of the MUI's deviant *fatwa* against Ahmadiyah.³²⁸

The effect of the government's support of the MUI *fatwas* is displayed when we compare the Suharto and SBY's responses to the Council's edicts on Ahmadiyah. The Suharto administration did not respond to the 1980 *fatwa* and the 1984 recommendation of the MUI. This meant that the *fatwa* and recommendation had no significant social or

³²³ For the 2005 MUI *fatwa* on Ahmadiyah see Chapter 3 of this thesis.

³²⁴ ICG, *Indonesia: Implications of the Ahmadiyah Decree*, 2008, 8.

³²⁵ *Ibid.*, 9.

³²⁶ Burhani, “Hating the Ahmadiyya,” 142; see also Sofian Asgart, “The Phenomenon of Paramilitary Organizations: Case Study of Six Organizations,” in *Indonesia's Post-Suharto Democracy Movement*, (eds) A.E. Priyono Stanley, Adi Prasetyo, and Olle Tornquist (Jakarta: Demos, 2003).

³²⁷ See Chapter 3.

³²⁸ Correspondingly, MUI *fatwas* on deviant guidelines were in line with the Ministry's definition of religion that it must have a connection with a prophet and a holy book. According to the 1952 regulation issued by the Minister of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, the Indonesian government defined *agama* as an internationally recognised monotheistic creed with a holy scripture, a concept of prophethood and universal ethical teachings.

political impact. In contrast, the 2005 *fatwa* seems to correspond with the SBY presidential pledge to secure support from Islamic groups and to consolidate power after Suharto's downfall.³²⁹ It seems that the changed nature of the MUI's 2005 *fatwa* on Ahmadiyah compared with its earlier efforts is largely related to how solid the government's command of the religious sector was when the *fatwa* was issued.

A positive response to the MUI's *fatwa* also came from some sections of the Muslim community which are neither NU nor Muhammadiyah. Yuzril Ihza Mahendra, the former leader of the Moon and Crescent party (PBB) on one occasion called for Ahmadiyah to declare their clear separation from Islam. In a similar vein to Mahendra, Amin Djamaluddin, the leader of LPPI (*Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengkajian Islam*, or Institute of Islamic Research and Assessment), an organisation well known for their anti-Ahmadiyah campaigning, describes Ahmadiyah as one of the "deviant sects that pretends to be Muslim".³³⁰ Both Mahendra and Djamaludin indicate that the ideal solution in dealing with Ahmadiyah is for Muslims to cut all ties with Ahmadiyah.

The next section seeks to explain the consequence of a supportive stance from the government and some sections of the Muslim community to the deviance *fatwas* of the MUI in relation to socio-political developments after the regime change, especially the reconstruction of Indonesian Muslim identity.

Government response and the "big tent"

Hasyim summarises the positive responses from mainstream-Islam and the government to the post-1998 MUI's *fatwas* on deviant groups, he argues that the responses led the MUI to become a single authoritative institution policing deviancy issues. Hasyim notes:

³²⁹ One lesson that SBY learnt from Wahid is that the latter's pluralist (as evident in his welcoming of the Ahmadiyah leader) and liberal attitudes did not save him from impeachment. It is also important to note that with the president's party – the Democrat Party – securing only 10% of the total parliamentary seats in 2004, the SBY cabinet was left officially supported by only a small coalition between the Democrat Party and several small Islamic parties, while the opposition consisted of the two biggest parties, Golkar and the Megawati Nasionalist Party (PDI-P). Therefore, many scholars argue that SBY highly valued the support from conservative Islam, see Melissa Crouch, "Law and Religion in Indonesia: The Constitutional Court and the Blasphemy Law," *Asian Journal of Comparative Law* 7, no. 1 (2012): 1-46; Martin van Bruinessen (ed), *Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam, Explaining the "Conservative Turn"* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2013).

³³⁰ Ahmad Najib Burhani, "Fundamentalism and Religious Dissent: The LPPI's Mission to Eradicate the Ahmadiyah in Indonesia," *Indonesia and the Malay World* (2016), 44 (129, 148).

“The support to MUI as the police of morality and *aqida* (faith) came not only from SBY, but also from NU and Muhammadiyah too. Both NU and Muhammadiyah seem to agree to granting a single authority to MUI for doing *hisba* (inspection) for the deviance of *aqida*. Their reason: that Indonesian Muslims should share one opinion regarding *aqida* and MUI can become an organization offering shelter for this matter. Indonesian Islam might and could have different understandings on *fiqh* issues (Islamic jurisprudence), but not in *aqida*. The concept on *aqida* should be in one voice that refers to MUI because the matter of *aqida* is the highest symbol of Islam.”³³¹

Joseph Chinyong Liow argues that the early formation of Indonesian nationalism was narrow and lacking in universal binding agents.³³² Due to the uneven proportion of the vast number of ethnicities across Indonesia,³³³ it is likely that many peripheral regions, the home for the minority ethnicities, were not well represented during the formation of the foundation of the young republic in the mid-1940s. Similarly, Bertrand notes that Suharto’s concept of nation contributed to the “marginalisation and exclusion of particular groups”.³³⁴ The departure of Suharto and the trend of identity redefinition that followed was the opportunity to fill this gap.

During the early years of the democratic transition, the view that the Pancasila was the sole binding ideology for the citizens and mass organisations was challenged. Scholars like Henk Schulte Nordholt predicted that Indonesia might experience a breakdown of “a shared sense of Indonesian citizenship”.³³⁵ Schulte Nordholt noted that “a paradoxical development is that Balinese middle class intellectuals tend to stress their regional

³³¹ Syafiq Hasyim, “Majelis Ulama Indonesia and Pluralism in Indonesia,” *Philosophy and Social Criticism* (2015), 41 (4-5): 491.

³³² Joseph Chinyong Liow, “Indonesia: Contesting Principles of Nationhood,” in *Religion and Nationalism in Southeast Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 179.

³³³ The Indonesian population census of 2010 reveals the map of ethnicities in Indonesia. The largest group is the Javanese, comprises of more than 40% (84 million people) of Indonesia’s then total population of 200 million. The second place goes to the Sundanese, natives of West Java, with 31 million people or around 15% of the total population. The Sundanese make up 74% of the West Java population. Together, the Javanese and the Sundanese make up more than 50% of the country’s total population. Outside Java island, the ethnic record is much more complex. The proportion of the ethnicities outside Javanese and Sundanese are varied, but none of the 1329 ethnicities reaches 5% in total, <https://www.bps.go.id/news/2015/11/18/127/mengulik-data-suku-di-indonesia.html>, accessed 1 March 2019. Based on the census there were 1,331 ethnicities in Indonesia. The census on ethnicity was the third after the first one in 1930 by the Dutch Colonial Government and in 2000 by the Statistics Bureau.

³³⁴ Jacques Bertrand, *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflicts in Indonesia*, xiv.

³³⁵ Henk Schulte Nordholt and Gerry van Klinken, “Introduction,” in Henk Schulte Nordholt and Gerry van Klinken (eds), *Renegotiating Boundaries Local Politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia* (Brill, 2007), 2.

authenticity and deny their Indonesian identity, but they do both in a very Indonesian way because throughout the archipelago, differences are increasingly expressed in similar terms".³³⁶ In parallel, Franz and Keebet von Benda-Beckmann's work shows that the *nagari* is considered the basis of Minangkabau culture.³³⁷ Nordholt and Benda-Beckmann reflect on the fragility of Indonesian national identity after the authoritarian leader had departed and the expression of concern about regional identities immediately followed right across the archipelago.

The identity quest did not always end in peace and was often mixed with religious elements. The Moluccas' violence is one of the best-known examples of atrocious interfaith conflicts where the mixture of ethno-religious factors played an important role.³³⁸ In 2007, the proposal to regulate 'Perda Injil', or *the Local Bible Law*, came up in Manokwari Papua. This proposal aimed to foster Christian values among the local community and was mainly a response to what the local Christians perceived as the growing threat of Islamisation and the growing influence of immigrants in Papua.³³⁹ Similar cases also reportedly took place in Minahasa.³⁴⁰

Some scholars argue that the MUI has been effectively influencing state policy on Islamic legal traditions in the post-Suharto Indonesia.³⁴¹ This has been achieved through the introduction of what has been called the "big tent". The big tent concept is basically a

³³⁶ Schulte Nordholt points to some "Indonesian" phenomena in present-day Bali: ethnic tensions, "sweeping" of immigrants, the connections between gangs of *preman* (thugs) and politicians, recent election politics, and the role of urban middle class intellectuals in articulating exclusive cultural identities, see Henk Schulte Nordholt, "Bali an Open Fortress," in Henk Schulte Nordholt and Gerry van Klinken (eds), *Renegotiating Boundaries Local Politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia* (Brill, 2007), 416.

³³⁷ Franz and Keebet von Benda-Beckmann, "Ambivalent Identities: Decentralization and Minangkabau Political Communities," in Henk Schulte Nordholt and Gerry van Klinken (eds), *Renegotiating Boundaries: Local Politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia* (Brill, 2007), 417-42.

³³⁸ Jon Goss, "Understanding the 'Maluku Wars': Overview of Sources of Communal Conflicts and Prospects for Peace," *Cakalele* 11 (2000): 7-39; see also Sumanto, Al Qurtuby, "Ambonese Muslim Jihadists, Islamic Identity, and the History of Christian-Muslim Rivalry in the Moluccas, Eastern Indonesia," *The International Journal of Asian Studies* 12, no. 01 (2015): 1-29. For Ahmadiyah, see Ahmad Najib and Burhani, "Hating the Ahmadiyya: The Place of 'Heretics' in Contemporary Indonesian Muslim Society," *Contemporary Islam* 8 (2014): 133-52.

³³⁹ <https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1147430/daerah-dengan-perda-syariah-dan-injil-dari-aceh-hingga-papua/full&view=ok>, accessed 5 February 2019.

³⁴⁰ The Minahasa (Christian) elite ruled the provincial political arena under the New Order, despite the fact that the province included similar numbers of Minahasa (Christians) and Gorontalo (Muslims), see David Henley, Maria Schouten, and Alex J. Ulaen, "Preserving the Peace in Post-New Order Minahasa," in Henk Schulte Nordholt and Gerry van Klinken (eds), *Renegotiating Boundaries: Local Politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia* (Brill, 2007), 307-26.

³⁴¹ Tim Lindsey, "Monopolising Islam." 256; Syafiq Hasyim, "The Council of Indonesian Ulama (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI) and Religious Freedom," 7.

re-articulation of Suharto's policy on managing Indonesia's diverse Muslim organisations.³⁴² This concept was aimed at accommodating all Muslim organisations in Indonesia and acquiring a broader reception among Indonesian Muslims. For the big tent to work, a collective identity movement was needed.³⁴³ The collective identity becomes more significant considering these developments in the early years of Reformasi. In the other words, it seems that from the MUI's perspective, religious guidance is deemed necessary during a period where "the idea of the nation is damaged, the legitimacy of the state questioned, the nature and future of regional identities contested, and the boundaries between 'state', 'nation' and 'region' have become zones of conflict".³⁴⁴

Having said that, the *traditionalist* view is the primary Muslim identity boundary marker in Indonesia. Consequently, any claim of religious authority in Islam in Indonesia had to prove its link to the belief that the revelation and prophethood ended with the death of the Prophet Muhammad. This applied to the big tent collective identity too, as reflected in the MUI *fatwas* on those groups believing that revelations were ongoing. The continuity of prophecies and prophets after the death of the Prophet Muhammad is the main articulated reason for opposition towards the Ahmadiyah community. Muhammadiyah issued the first *fatwa* on Ahmadiyah deviancy in Indonesia in the late 1920s. After more than eight decades, neither the majority of Islamic organisations (NU and Muhammadiyah) nor the MUI in Indonesia have changed their stance on Ahmadiyah's deviancy.

Ahmadiyah was not alone. In post-Suharto Indonesia, there has been ongoing hostility and increasingly violent attacks on Ahmadiyah and other groups claiming the revelation and prophecies continue in various places across the country. These groups include Shi'ah and Gafatar. Gafatar calls for the "Abraham pathway", combining the teachings of Islam, Christianity and Judaism. Gafatar promised the renewal of the Islamic religious tradition in Indonesia through the claim by Ahmad Mushaddeq, its founder, to be a "prophet and Messiah" who would save Indonesia and Muslims from destruction.³⁴⁵

³⁴² Suharto intended that the MUI would be a sort of representative consultative forum for all Muslim organisations in Indonesia. Suharto needed a representative body in which he could easily address and discuss many things concerning Islam, the nation state, and the development of the country, see Syafiq Hasyim, "The Council of Indonesian Ulama (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI) and Religious Freedom," 7.

³⁴³ Ibid.

³⁴⁴ Syafiq Hasyim, "The Council of Indonesian Ulama (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI) and Religious Freedom," 6.

³⁴⁵ Al Makin, "Returning to the Religion of Abraham: Controversies Over the Gafatar Movement in Contemporary Indonesia," *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations* 30, no. 1 (2019), 88.

Gafatar was established in 2012 and headquartered in Jakarta. According to the group's spokesperson, it has more than 50,000 members across Indonesia. On 18 January 2016, hundreds of ethnic Malay and Dayak attacked two Gafatar communities in Kampung Pasir and Antibar villages in Mempawah-Pontianak, West Kalimantan province.³⁴⁶ Eight communal houses were burned down. Then the military and police evacuated about 1,600 Gafatar members by truck to an army base in Pontianak. The extent of the persecutions is reflected in the fact that Gafatar members returned to their home towns, most of which were in Java, and abandoned their farms worth Rp. 30.4 billion (US\$2.3 million).³⁴⁷ Their number gradually grew as more exiled Gafatar members were evacuated from other regencies in the West Kalimantan provinces, including Kubu Raya, Melawi, Landak and Bengkayang. Similar protests against other Gafatar communities in other regencies in both West and East Kalimantan followed within days.³⁴⁸ While the majority of Gafatar members are not natives of Kalimantan, they reportedly had good relationships with Dayak people, the native tribe on the island.³⁴⁹ For the purpose of this thesis, I will limit the discussion on Gafatar to MUI's response to this group's teachings. In February 2016, the MUI issued a *fatwa* against Gafatar for deviating from Islamic teachings,³⁵⁰ the main reason being the declaration that Ahmad Mussadeq was a prophet.³⁵¹

The MUI East Java branch issued a *fatwa* on Shi'ah in January 2012 through *fatwa* number Kep-01/SKF-MUI/JTM/I/2012.³⁵² The *fatwa* based its decision on one of the Twelver Shi'ah teachings that the *Imams*³⁵³ are *ma'shum* (free from sin). *Ma'shum* is an

³⁴⁶ West Kalimantan province located in Kalimantan, the third biggest island in the world.

³⁴⁷ Human Rights Watch news, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/03/29/indonesia-persecution-gafatar-religious-group>, accessed 5 February 2019.

³⁴⁸ Ibid.

³⁴⁹ <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-3125453/cerita-eks-gafatar-soal-perjalanan-sampai-ke-kalimantan>, accessed 5 February 2019.

³⁵⁰ Fatwa MUI No. 6 Tahun 2016 Tentang Aliran Gerakan Fajar Nusantara (Gafatar).

³⁵¹

<https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2016/02/02/15145621/MUI.Temukan.Ada.Paham.Sesat.di.Gafatar>, accessed 1 January 2019; see also Al Makin, "Returning to the Religion of Abraham," 88.

³⁵² <http://ashadisasonko.staff.ipb.ac.id/files/2012/04/FATWA-MUI-JATIM-SYIAH-SESAT.pdf>, accessed 5 February 2019, <https://www.kompasiana.com/syamsu-l/552e00556ea834b4178b4586/benarkah-syiah-sesat-ini-dia-fatwa-mui-tentang-syiah>, accessed 27 April 2019.

³⁵³ The Twelve Imams, together with Prophet Mohammed and his daughter Fatimah al-Zahra, make up the 14 infallible according to the Shi'a Muslim. They are seen as divinely guided leaders and are the holiest people in the Islamic religion. They are known as *ahlul bayt*, meaning the people of the household and the first five of the Twelve Imams are particularly significant – Prophet Muhammad, Imam Ali, Fatima al-Zahra, Imam Hassan and Imam Husayn.

attribute that belongs only to the prophets (point b).³⁵⁴ Assuming the Twelver Shi'ah *Imams* are free of sin is to simply imply that the *Imams* are equal to the prophets. Another important point in the *fatwa* is the Twelver Shi'ah's belief in the presence of other revelations besides the Qur'an named *mushaf Fatimah* (point e).³⁵⁵ The main objective of this *fatwa* was to stop the Twelver Shi'ah teachings being disseminated through donations targeting poor Muslims living in the East Java region (point no. 3).³⁵⁶ This activity was seen as a method of conversion. Conversion via donations potentially leads to social unrest (point no. 4).³⁵⁷ Seven months later, on 26 August 2012, there were attacks on the Shi'ah community in Sampang Madura, East Java province. Fifty houses were burned down, one death recorded and more than 150 Shi'ah members were evacuated to Sidoarjo by the security forces.³⁵⁸

In considering the attacks on the Shi'ah community in Sampang and Gafatar in Kalimantan, it is fair to argue that the finality of prophethood and revelation are the most essential stated elements behind the exclusion of Ahmadiyah from the Muslim community in Indonesia. The more explicit the claim of prophethood, the more opposition that can be expected. Comparing MUI's attitude towards Twelver Shi'ah and Gafatar, the latter has more in common with Ahmadiyah. For example, Gafatar is subject to MUI's *fatwa*. There is a ministerial joint decree banning dissemination of the group's activities and teachings similar to the joint decree against Ahmadiyah. In contrast, while supporting the 2012 MUI East Java *fatwa*, the central MUI in Jakarta has never issued any *fatwa* on Twelver Shi'ah's deviancy and there has been no joint ministerial decree officially banning their activities and proselytization in Indonesia. This most likely relates to the fact that Gafatar clearly declares that Ahmad Mushaddeq is a prophet, while Twelver Shi'ah only claims that the Twelve Imams are free from sin but not explicitly that they are prophets.³⁵⁹

In addition, the opinion of an international Islamic organisation like the Islamic Organisation Conference (IOC) needs to be taken into account when analysing the

³⁵⁴ <http://ashadisasonko.staff.ipb.ac.id/files/2012/04/FATWA-MUI-JATIM-SYIAH-SESAT.pdf>, accessed 5 February 2019, <https://www.kompasiana.com/syamsu-l/552e00556ea834b4178b4586/benarkah-syiah-sesat-ini-dia-fatwa-mui-tentang-syiah>, accessed 27 April 2019.

³⁵⁵ Ibid.

³⁵⁶ Ibid.

³⁵⁷ Ibid.

³⁵⁸ Al Makin, "Returning to the Religion of Abraham," 88, https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/berita_indonesia/2013/07/130726_syiah_sampang_tolak_sda, accessed 21 January 2019.

³⁵⁹ <https://www.kompasiana.com/syamsu-l/552e00556ea834b4178b4586/benarkah-syiah-sesat-ini-dia-fatwa-mui-tentang-syiah>, accessed 27 April 2019.

government and mainstream-Islam rejection of the claim that Shi'ah is deviant. Muhammadiyah and NU see Shi'ah as part of the *Umma*.³⁶⁰ The government's response seems to be in line with the more lenient attitude of the MUI, NU and Muhammadiyah towards Shi'ah. Suryadharma Ali, the Minister of Religious Affairs stated in August 2012 that Shi'ah is not deviant and Sunni-Shi'ah rivalries should be halted.³⁶¹ The minister also refers to the IOC's acceptance of Shi'ah.³⁶²

Gafatar was not as fortunate as Shi'ah. On 24 March 2016, Attorney General Muhammad Prasetyo announced a joint decree (SKB) banning Gafatar activities including propagation of the group's teaching, signed by the Minister of Religious Affairs, Lukman Saifuddin, and the Minister of Home, Affairs Tjahjo Kumolo. When explaining the motive behind the SKB on Gafatar, Attorney General Muhammad Prasetyo said, "If we let it go on, Gafatar could potentially cause public unrest and trigger various other sensitive issues. So, I hope all parties understand that this (is) for the sake of maintaining religious harmony".³⁶³ Prasetyo's statement implies that Gafatar's teaching, mainly the prophethood status of its founder, is a serious and sensitive matter in Indonesia. The elites appear to believe that the presence of these groups has potential to disturb social order, which further justifies the significance of the MUI's deviance *fatwas*.

For the MUI, it is imperative to set a proper regulation managing the group whose teachings are against the core beliefs of the *traditionists* in Indonesia. The deviance *fatwas* issuance seems to function as the MUI's main channel to construct the Indonesian Muslim community's identity boundaries. Besides the *fatwa* on Ahmadiyah, MUI issued several *fatwas* in 2005. These include *fatwas* against pluralism, secularism, liberalism, interfaith prayer, interfaith marriage and all alternative interpretations of religious texts.³⁶⁴ These *fatwas* highlight that the Council set several guidelines, not just about 'threats' existing within the Muslim community, like Ahmadiyah. The *fatwas* also alluded to the enemies who originally resided outside the Indonesian Muslim community who may have infiltrated the Muslim community, especially in the so-called Democratic Era.

³⁶⁰For the NU stance, see <https://nasional.tempo.co/read/426145/nu-syiah-tidak-sesat-hanya-berbeda>, accessed 5 February 2019. As for Muhammadiyah, see <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2012/09/07/09330267/Din.Muhammadiyah.Keberatan.Fatwa.Sesat.Syiah>, accessed 5 February 2019.

³⁶¹ <https://www.jpnn.com/news/pemerintah-tolak-syiah-dianggap-sesat>, accessed 5 February 2019.

³⁶² Ibid.

³⁶³ Ibid.

³⁶⁴ <https://mui.or.id/fatwa/>, accessed 1 December 2017.

The outer enemies include what are perceived as western values. These are clearly expressed, for example, in the *fatwa* disapproval of secularism, pluralism and liberalism.³⁶⁵ MUI used the abbreviation SIPILIS to denote the dangers of these three ideas for the Indonesian Muslims. The issuance of the Ahmadiyah deviant and SIPILIS *fatwas* by the MUI in 2005 are examples of developments arising from new political opportunities opening up after the regime change. Within this framework, the power vacuum and the competition of ideologies after Suharto's departure played an important part behind the formulation of the MUI *fatwas*.

Conclusion

The violent attacks on Ahmadiyah in post-1998 Indonesia shows that the Muslim community's common identity can indeed be seen clearly at the level of *aqida* (essentials of their faith). The main objection of the MUI *fatwa* was the issue of the finality of the prophethood, which is the primary element separating Ahmadiyah from mainstream Islam.

Policing the Indonesian Muslim community boundaries through the lens of a *traditionist* approach is the strategy used by the MUI to define their role and articulate their position in modern Indonesian society.³⁶⁶ According to Guy Elcheroth and Stephen Reicher, identities “do produce social power, those who wish to wield such power (politicians, leaders and other activists) will actively seek to construct versions of identity that sustain their practical projects”.³⁶⁷ Regardless of critiques of the big tent concept, which “... inclines to the embodiment of primordialism rather than the politics of tolerance”,³⁶⁸ this strategy successfully made the MUI “the most authoritative Muslim institution in Indonesia in the field of *fatwa* production”.³⁶⁹ This finds its momentum in the

³⁶⁵ Keputusan Fatwa MUI No: 7/MUNAS VII/MUI/11/2005 Tentang Pluralisme, Liberalisme dan Sekularisme Agama.

³⁶⁶ For a detailed study on MUI's struggle for more power post-1998, see Pier Gillespie, “Current Issues in Indonesian Islam: Analysing the 2005 Council of Indonesian Ulama Fatwa No. 7 Opposing Pluralism, Liberalism, and Secularism,” *Journal of Islamic Studies* 18 (2007): 202-40.

³⁶⁷ Guy Elcheroth and Stephen Reicher, *Identity, Violence and Power Mobilising Hatred, Demobilising Dissent* (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2017), 95.

³⁶⁸ Syafiq Hasyim, “The Council of Indonesian Ulama (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI) and Religious Freedom,” 7.

³⁶⁹ Through the 2005 *fatwa* on Ahmadiyah, the Council put itself above the government as the *fatwas* states that the latter has to obey the former; “to oblige the government to ban Ahmadiyah and seal off all of Ahmadiyah's buildings across Indonesia,” <https://e-dokumen.kemenag.go.id/files/fmpbnNCJ1286170246.pdf>, see also Syafiq Hasyim, “The Council of Indonesian Ulama (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI) and Religious Freedom,” 8.

aftermath of the regime change, when there was no social force strong enough to replace the authoritarian regime's capacity to maintain and guard the Pancasila-based national identities.³⁷⁰ A very specific power vacuum, and the competition of ideologies after the regime change in 1998, played vital roles in explaining the more antagonistic MUI *fatwa* on Ahmadiyah in the Reformasi Era.

In the post-Suharto Era, Ahmadiyah is not the only group that suffered opposition and violence. Other groups like Gafatar and Shi'ah also faced hostility and were forced to relocate and leave their property. Looking closely at the MUI *fatwas* against Gafatar and Shi'ah, it is clear that different views on the finality of the prophethood and revelations are the main motives behind the MUI deviant *fatwas*.

Concurring with Elcheroth and Reicher,³⁷¹ Bates argues that the functionality of social identities and the role of communal groups as “coalitions have been formed as part of rational efforts to secure benefits”.³⁷² Posner and Anani add that the political value of identity symbols is principally determined by local contexts.³⁷³ The regime change is an important cause that determined to what extent the MUI pursued groups held to be deviant, particularly Ahmadiyah. The absence of a strong government in the early years of Reformasi is crucial in discerning how the MUI positioned itself *vis à vis* the state. In addition, scholars note that the power vacuum after the departure of an authoritarian regime in 1998 was soon followed by the search for identities across Indonesia, which opened a path for the competition of ideologies. Within this framework, MUI chose *fatwa* production as the main channel to claim more power. The *fatwas*' goals are to deliver a set of guidelines on what constitutes an ‘Indonesian Muslim’ against the ‘deviant’, as well as the threat of the so-called western values (secularism, liberalism and pluralism). In this vein, one way used by the MUI to establish its authority in post-1998 Indonesia was through defining and redefining the boundary lines of Indonesian Muslims. In the next chapter, I will examine

³⁷⁰ A senior journalist in Indonesia, Goenawan Muhammad, wrote, “When Suharto goes, everything will have to be reinvented,” <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/1997-07-01/indonesia-after-suharto>, accessed 5 February 2019.

³⁷¹ Guy Elcheroth, Stephen Reicher, Guy Elcheroth, Stephen Reicher, *Identity, Violence and Power Mobilising Hatred, Demobilising Dissent* (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2017), 17.

³⁷² Robert Bates, “Modernization, Ethnic Competition and the Rationality of Politics in Contemporary Africa,” in *State Versus Ethnic Claims*, (eds) Donald Rothchild and Victor A. Olorunsola (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1983) 152.

³⁷³ Daniel N. Posner, “When and Why Do Some Social Cleavages Become Politically Salient Rather Than Others?” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 40, no. 2 (2017): 2004. Khalil al-Anani, *Inside the Muslim Brotherhood*, 34.

Lombok's Ahmadiyah, its history, and the main reasons for its exclusion by the Muslim-mainstream at the local and sub-local levels.

Chapter 4

Contestation of Identity in Post-1998 Lombok

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to focus on the impact of changing religious authority dynamics on the boundaries of identity at the local and sub-local levels in Lombok. The discussion on the MUI's deviancy *fatwas* against heterodox groups in Chapter 3 demonstrates that all groups and sects claiming that revelations are ongoing and/or that prophethood continues fall foul of the mainstream religious authorities in Indonesia. My fieldwork findings demonstrate that such theological matters are a necessary element that define identity boundary lines. Without these theological concerns, the majority opposition towards Ahmadiyah could not have risen to its current and recent levels and could not have escalated to the point of excluding Ahmadiyah from the *Umma*. However, there are several sociological issues that also need to be taken into account in analysing the growing opposition to Ahmadiyah in post-New Order Lombok.

I will start with a brief history of Ahmadiyah in Lombok, followed by the MUI and local religious leaders' (or *Tuan Guru*'s) explanation on Ahmadiyah's perceived deviancy. Then, I examine the contrasting identity boundaries from both from the Sasak-Muslims and Ahmadi's perspectives, as well as the local media report on attacks against Ahmadiyah. I will then provide a contextual background of the post-1998 attacks on Ahmadiyah community in three villages. A thorough explanation of the motives for the violence will make up the last part of this thesis.

Ahmadiyah in Lombok

As mentioned above, the form that exists in Lombok today is the JAI or Ahmadiyah Qadian. JAI became the target of violent attacks in numerous regions in post-1998 Lombok and is the primary focus of this thesis.

A local student studying in Yogyakarta, around the mid-1960s, purchased Ahmadiyah's teachings. He returned to Lombok and converted several Sasak to Ahmadiyah.³⁷⁴ Initially, they formed a small group in Mataram before moving to Pancor, East Lombok. The group successfully recruited comparatively substantial numbers with

³⁷⁴ Soleh Ahmadi, July 2016.

membership in the low hundreds in East Lombok. The city of Pancor, located only two kilometres from East Lombok's capital, Selong, was chosen as Lombok's Ahmadiyah headquarters and remained so until the 2002 attacks. The pre-2002 Pancor Ahmadiyah community was the largest Ahmadiyah community in Lombok and NTB. The group claims that there are now only around 400 Ahmadi across Lombok, a small minority of the island's total population of approximately 3.5 million, of which 90% are Muslim.³⁷⁵

From the city of Pancor, Ahmadiyah spread to other Lombok regions, including the southern part in Pemongkong, and the northern part in Bayan. The group's presence in Pancor since the early 1970s is unique, given that Pancor is NW's headquarters. However, there had been no recorded physical attack on Ahmadiyah in Pancor prior to 2002. In the southern part of East Lombok regency in Pemongkong, a smaller number of Ahmadiyah members arrived from Pancor in the 1980s and continued to live there until the 1998 attacks, when around 10 Ahmadi families were forcibly relocated to Pancor. The Ahmadiyah community moved to Ketapang only in 2004, and most of them were the victims of previous attacks in other regions like Pancor, Pemongkong, Bayan and Praya.

Attacks in Post-1998 Lombok

The intra-faith conflicts in post-1998 Lombok between the mainstream-Muslim and Ahmadiyah broke out almost 30 years after Ahmadiyah first arrived on the island. Before my discussion on why Ahmadiyah is a vital boundary marker in the post-1998 Sasak-Muslim identity construction, I will first present a brief narration describing the attacks on Ahmadiyah communities in three different villages: Pemongkong, Pancor and Ketapang. The sequence of the conflicts is based on the region category of *Islam Waktu Lima* mentioned in Chapter 2.³⁷⁶

1. *Waktu Lima Plus Tuan Guru*

i) *Attacks on Ahmadiyah Pemongkong, East Lombok, October 1998*

The attacks on Ahmadiyah post-Suharto started in Pemongkong village, a sub-district of Keruak, East Lombok district, on 1 October 1998. Fifty men burned and destroyed Ahmadi's houses and the Ahmadiyah mosque in Kuranji hamlet (*dusun*), Pemongkong village. The attackers were led by Badar bin Amaq Setur from Ujung Serumbung hamlet. When I tried to confirm the attackers' identity to Ahmadiyah leaders, they promised that

³⁷⁵ Soleh Ahmadi, July 2016.

³⁷⁶ For more details on the region division see Chapter 2 of this thesis.

they would respond to my email very soon, but I have received no reply as yet. However, in one document of Ahmadiyah NTB regarding the “tragedy Ahmadiyah Lombok”, Ahmadiyah leaders report that their members were saved after leaving the territory of *Tuan Guru Sibawaih* of Jerowaru, the founder of *Amphibi*.³⁷⁷ The document also mentioned that starting in late 1996, *Tuan Guru Mutawalli Sibawaih*, in some of his sermons, said that “Ahmadiyah is heretical, an apostasy and deviancy that destroys *aqidah* Islam. Converting to Christianity is better than becoming Ahmadiyah members”,³⁷⁸ and “People joined Ahmadiyah for financial benefits”.³⁷⁹ Corresponding with Ahmadiyah’s documentation, the villagers in Pemongkong also state that Ahmadiyah was trying to convert more non-Ahmadis through donations.³⁸⁰

Six families, 24 Ahmadis in total, left their village to go to Pancor. Three days later, the same mob with the same mob leader attacked Ahmadis in Tompok-Ompok hamlet not far away from Kuranji (Tompok-Ompok and Kuranji are part of Pemongkong village) where four houses were burned, one person died and 17 Ahmadis were relocated to Pancor.

ii) *Attacks on Ahmadiyah Pancor, East Lombok, 2002*

Pancor is the second biggest city in East Lombok after Selong, the capital. It is the place where NW was founded and continues to be the headquarters of the biggest Islamic organisation in Lombok. The city, interestingly, was also the place where Ahmadiyah was first introduced in Lombok in the early 1970s. The most noted duel prayer (*mubahalalah*) in Indonesia between an Ahmadiyya missionary (Ahmad Hariadi) and a Muslim opponent (Ustadz Irfan) also took place in the city of Pancor in August 1983.³⁸¹ *Mubahalalah* is a mechanism for resolving disputes in which both sides pray to God to bless the one telling the truth and curse the side in error.

³⁷⁷ Interview with Jauzi Zaedar, October 2015.

³⁷⁸ Ahmadiyah report, “Tragedi Jemaah Ahmadiyah Lombok,” 4.

³⁷⁹ Tragedy Ahmadiyah Lombok, JAI NTB.

³⁸⁰ Interview with Mahrup, October 2015.

³⁸¹ Ghulam Ahmad to a number of his opponents. Muslims and non-Muslims have used this method alike. Among the targets of Ghulam Ahmad’s challenges were Pandit Lekh Rah from the Arya Samaj, Muhammad Husayn of Batala, the American John Alexander Dowie and Abd Allah Atham, a Muslim convert to Christianity. Ahmadiyah uses this method mainly to end public debates. It seems that *mubahalalah* is a peacemaking/conflict resolution when people keep on talking and criticising the opponent’s belief on a certain issue and the former has no intention of changing their belief, see Burhani, “The Ahmadiyya and the Study of Comparative Religion in Indonesia: Controversies and Influences,” *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations* 25, no. 2 (2013): 141-58.

This *mubahalalah* between Ahmad Hariadi and Ustadz Irfan became known outside NTB, mostly because Hariadi published an account of his experiences after his re-conversion to Islam.³⁸² Three months later, on 21 November 1983, there was a Surat Keputusan (decree) from Kejaksaan Negeri (State of Attorney Office) of East Lombok no. Kep.11/IPK.32.2/L-2.III.3/11/1983 that prohibited Ahmadiyah activities in the East Lombok region. The issuance of the prohibition letter saw conflict between Ahmadis and the majority Sasak in Pancor cease until early September 2002 when graffiti on some houses belonging to Ahmadis appeared saying, “Ahmadiyah is deviant, repent before ...!”, followed by a pamphlet on behalf of *Masyarakat Pancor Bersatu* (the United People of Pancor) through the gates of Ahmadiyah members’ residences in a similar tone.

On Tuesday 10 September at 8 pm, in the midst of a monthly meeting among Ahmadiyah leaders at the Ahmadi mosque in Pancor, out of the blue stones were thrown at the mosque. The offender came by and told the Ahmadis attending the meeting that “all of your deeds are *maksiat* (immoral), so your *ibadah* (worship) is useless ... you are non-Muslim”. The meeting stopped and Ahmadiyah leaders reported the incident to the police immediately. The police responded by sending two patrol cars to the mosque.

By 10 pm, around 1,000 people had destroyed the mosque. Because of the imbalance in numbers, there was nothing the police could do to stop the attack. The masses then moved to destroy the Ahmadiyah members’ houses surrounding the mosque, and continued with similar acts in the neighbouring areas in Beremi. Reportedly, 81 houses, eight shops, one mosque and one *mushalla* (smaller mosque) were burned down. Five hundred and eighty-three Ahmadis were evacuated to the East Lombok police station that night.

During their stay at the police station, Ahmadis were told by the officer, “If Ahmadiyah members want to be safe, they have to leave this group”,³⁸³ which confirms the Ahmadiyah leaders’ statement that “the attackers, the government and the security officer were one voice (against Ahmadiyah)”.³⁸⁴ Ahmadiyah leaders told me that their members were put in different places, separated from the leaders. “They (the police and

³⁸² Ahmad Hariadi’s invitations to the *mubahala* were distributed to people in Lombok, particularly *ulama*, in the form of a pamphlet entitled *Khabar Suka* (Good News). After the distribution of thousands of pamphlets, a local cleric in Pancor, Haji Irfan, finally answered Hariadi’s challenge to hold a *mubahalalah*. However, after a three-month waiting period had elapsed following the event nothing happened to either party, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TCFDTUkyiPY>, accessed 12 June 2016.

³⁸³ Interview with Soleh Ahmadi, July 2015; interview with Awar, August 2015.

³⁸⁴ Interview with Soleh Amadi and Jauzi Zaedar, July 2015.

government officers) told our members that we (the leaders) were converted already, on the other hand they (the police and government officers) told us (the leaders) that our members were already converted”.³⁸⁵ This dishonesty implies that this tactic was deliberate.

After a week, they were relocated to Asrama Transito in Mataram and two weeks later Ahmadiyah leaders organised houses to rent for their members.³⁸⁶ Ahmadi stayed in these houses for about one year before deciding to buy land and houses in Bumi Asri Ketapang, a housing complex in Ketapang, Gegerung village, Lingsar district West Lombok.

There is no satisfactory answer to who the attackers were. The Ahmadiyah’s report mentioned that people who identified themselves as the United People of Pancor (PPB) were noted among the mob.³⁸⁷ I have not found any news mentioning PPB within the extensive coverage of attacks on Ahmadiyah by the local newspapers during September 2002. When I tried to confirm whether local paramilitary members, like *Satgas Hamzanwadi* of NW, were involved in the attacks, an Ahmadiyah leader replied, “due to the number of the attackers it was hard to say but that does not mean it was impossible”.³⁸⁸

In February 2013, an online website named “Media Nahdlatul Wathan” reported a meeting in which the presence of NW Pancor’s leaders was prominent.³⁸⁹ This meeting attempted to reactivate PPB as the guardians of people of Pancor. The goal of the PPB’s revival is to protect the people of Pancor’s identity from threatening ideologies. According to the then NW Deputy Leader who attended the meeting, Dr. H. Mawardy Hamry, the image of Pancor intertwined with NW represents Sasak’s identity. He says, “... Pancor is the icon of Sasak. The *madrassah* (of NW) established by *Al Magfurullah* (*Tuan Guru Pancor*) has brought Pancor’s name up to the national level ...”³⁹⁰

³⁸⁵ Ibid.

³⁸⁶ The Ahmadiyah leaders did not reveal the exact amount, but one of the Ahmadi in the barracks said that the houses rent in total was around Rp. 100 million Indonesian.

³⁸⁷ Tragedi JAI Lombok.

³⁸⁸ Interview with Soleh Ahmadi, July 2015.

³⁸⁹ <http://medianahdlatulwathan.blogspot.co.nz/2013/03/pancor-bersatu-kembali-digagas.html>, accessed 11 July 2016. This website clearly shows its support for NW Pancor, for example, one of the articles expressed positive support for TGB’s candidacy in 2013, http://medianahdlatulwathan.blogspot.com/2013/03/bani-abdul-majid-siap-menangkan-tgb-dan_8140.html, accessed 11 July 2016.

³⁹⁰ The coordinator of the United People of Pancor, Syamsul Rijal, explained that the meeting aimed to improve the role of the younger generation in maintaining social order. Ibid.

While there is not sufficient evidence to reveal the role of NW's paramilitia during the 2002 attacks, there is also no concrete proof to claim otherwise. There was no record of their involvement in preventing the attacks or protecting Ahmadiyah members during the riots.

2. *Waktu Lima* Neutral attacks on Ahmadiyah Ketapang, West Lombok (2005, 2006, 2010)

Waktu Lima Neutral is a region where the residents are adherents of *Islam Waktu Lima*, but the region does not have a prominent religious cleric. The absence of a prominent religious leader or institution is central in analysing the different pattern of attacks in the *Waktu Lima* Neutral villages. I argue that the attacks in this region were more persistent compared to the *Waktu Lima* Plus regions.

Ketapang is known to be a village where the *Islam Wetu Telu* community used to reside. The village leader told me that Ketapang was used as the place for *bertapa* (meditation) in order to gain spiritual power, but the practices gradually eroded as Islam penetrated the area. Due to *da'wah* missionaries, *Wetu Telu* influence is scarce in this village today. In contrast, pesantren and NW Islamic schools have been established in the village centre since the 1990s. There are at least four *Tuan Guru* who regularly visit Ketapang to provide religious teachings: Tuan Guru Izzy, Tuan Guru Pagutan, Tuan Guru Pejeruk and Tuan Guru Gunung Sari. According to the village leader, the number of participants attending each of the *Tuan Guru's* sermons is almost equal. He also told me that in the past he was a "bad" guy who drank alcohol and had not performed daily prayers. In recent years, however, after attending *Tuan Guru's* sermons he had gradually become more religious.

Ahmadis enjoyed a peaceful life in their new place, managing to buy land of 1,000 square metres. The land is not only productive, but also located literally opposite their residential area, with access to the main road. For Ahmadis, during the first two years of their stay it seemed that Ketapang would be a perfect place to restart and rebuild their dreams of having a normal life. However, in 2005, those dreams appeared to be too good to be true.

The rumours of the upcoming attacks on Ahmadiyah had circulated several months prior to the attacks. By the end of July 2005, the district head of Lingsar held a meeting with the village leaders and Ahmadiyah leaders, the police and the military to discuss the current situation. It was not clear what the recommendation as a result of the meeting was.

The village leaders expressed their concern about what they perceived as Ahmadiyah's proselytization activities.

On 19 October 2005, the first attack on the Ahmadiyah took place in Ketapang, Gegerung village, West Lombok district, in which three houses of Ahmadiyah followers were destroyed.³⁹¹ Two days later, a meeting, which included village leaders, Ahmadiyah leaders, religious leaders as well as the police was held in the village mosque. The meeting recommended that the Ahmadiyah leave Ketapang as soon as possible. If the Ahmadiyah failed to relocate all of their members within three months, then Ketapang residents would carry out the relocation by force.³⁹² The Ahmadis chose to stay in Ketapang, and for three months they kept waiting with full vigilance. On 4 February 2006, when the three months had passed, the biggest attack on the Ahmadiyah in West Lombok occurred and 38 families were evacuated to Asrama Transito in Mataram.

A month prior to the attacks, it was reported that one of the Tuan Guru Izzy from Central Lombok, who was preaching in Ketapang, asked the audience in one of his sermons, "if Muslims in this village (Ketapang) were powerless to relocate Ahmadiyah (from Ketapang), I will bring my men (to undertake the task of relocating)".³⁹³ Those who attended the sermon immediately responded, "there is no need for that, we (people of Ketapang) can do it by ourselves".³⁹⁴

Four years later, when Ahmadiyah's members tried to rebuild their houses in Ketapang, another attack took place on 26 November 2010.³⁹⁵ As a result, Ahmadiyah's members returned to Asrama Transito (the refugee barracks) and are still confined there. Asrama Transito consists of several rooms around three metres by four metres in size. When I visited in 2015, Awar and her family (a husband and two teenagers) lived in one room. Awar explains that in the past, the situation was worse, as several families had to share one room with blankets as partitions. However, they still have to share the communal kitchen, toilets and bathrooms. Nonetheless, there is one big room around eight metres by eight metres in the barracks that Ahmadis use to perform communal prayer. In time, more Ahmadis moved out and live away from the barracks, and now the numbers of Ahmadis

³⁹¹ Jauzi Zaedar, August 2015.

³⁹² Ibid.

³⁹³ Interview with Johar, September 2015.

³⁹⁴ Ibid.

³⁹⁵ <http://sorot.news.viva.co.id/news/read/204268-ahmadiyah--darah-dan-ibadah>.

staying there has declined. The children go to nearby schools but the communal prayer of the community continues to be mostly held in the barracks. Up until now, Ahmadis have had full access to work and harvest the crops on their land in Ketapang.

For the villagers in all three villages, the relocation of Ahmadiyah out of the villages was a priority for their opponents. This indicates that there is a clear identity separation between the villagers and Ahmadiyah, to the extent that the latter are viewed as unacceptable ‘others’ and are no longer accepted as village residents. How do we explain this identity separation and violence in post-1998 Lombok? The intra-faith conflicts in post-1998 Lombok indicate that there was a reconstruction of the identity boundaries of the Muslim community on the island heavily drawn by theological and non-theological factors. Findings in the field also show that the theological motive is predominantly raised by the elites, while sociological issues are mostly found at the grassroots level. I divide the discussion into local and sub-local levels. At the local level, the prophethood matter, as well as discourses on exclusivity and the conversion threat, are what the three villages shared in common throughout the advent of post-1998 Sasak-Muslim ethnic identity redefinition. The sub-local factors, a specific pattern related to the presence and/or the absence of *Tuan Guru* in particular villages and the power competition among religious authority, seem to be significant factors behind the outbreak of religious violence towards Ahmadiyah in Pancor, Pemongkong and Ketapang.

Local Explanations

1. The Elites (MUI and Religious Leaders) on the Prophethood Issue

Numerous religious elites in Lombok such as Fahrurrozi Dahlan, the Secretary General of Nahdlatul Wathan Anjani and Subhan Acim, the head of *Majlis Tarjih Muhammadiyah NTB*, as well as Tuan Guru Anwar from NU also support Saiful Muslim’s view. Further, they consider the different concept on the finality of prophethood as a basic doctrine. Tuan Guru Anwar says:

“This is because Ahmadiyah contains the *aqidah* dispute. If they are not claiming themselves as Muslims, no one will do any harm to Ahmadis. You cannot force someone to share your belief, but it is your duty to defend your religion if someone humiliates it.

You see, Hindus, Buddhists, and Christians have been living in harmony with the mainstream in Lombok for so long.”³⁹⁶

Subhan Acim, the Dean of Dakwah Faculty at the Islamic University of Mataram contends, “We cannot accept Ahmadiyah, or any group, who believe in the presence of a prophet after Muhammad SAW, as part of the Muslim community because for us, Prophet Muhammad is the last prophet”.³⁹⁷

This is also a view upheld by all the villagers in the three different regions as the main rationale for excluding Ahmadiyah from the Sasak-Muslim community. Almost all of my interviewees in all three regions clearly stated their objections to the prophethood status of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad. Fajrin, a 50-year-old farmer from Ketapang, says, “How can you say you are a Muslim if you believe that there is a prophet after Prophet Muhammad?”³⁹⁸ Adi, a taxi driver in his mid-40s from Pemongkong, says, “There is no doubt that they are not Muslim because they have another prophet.”³⁹⁹ Similarly, Ainun from Pancor confirms that, “The prophethood issue of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad is the main rationale behind the Ahmadiyah conflict in Pancor”.⁴⁰⁰

For the mainstream leaders, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s ‘excellence’ can only be described with other titles (i.e. reformer or great teacher) but not ‘prophet’. Interestingly, when I asked Saiful Muslim (since GAI refers to Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as a reformer) if GAI would be accepted in Lombok, the MUI leader NTB said, “no, they are the same”.⁴⁰¹ Saiful Muslim adds that GAI is a back-up in case JAI experiences a setback.⁴⁰² Saiful Muslim’s argument concurs with the 2005 MUI *fatwa*, which does not differentiate between JAI and GAI. The fact that 400 *Tuan Gurus* later in 2008 pledged agreement to the governor’s decree to ban Ahmadiyah in NTB is evidence that a consensus among the local religious leaders in the province of Ahmadiyah’s deviancy was final.⁴⁰³

In a document titled “The Explanation of the *Fatwa* on Ahmadiyah’s Stream”, the Indonesian Ministry of Religious Affairs refers to the history of a false prophet in the

³⁹⁶ Interview with Tuan Guru Anwar, June 2015.

³⁹⁷ Interview with Subhan Acim, July 2015.

³⁹⁸ Interview with Fajrin, Ketapang, September 2015.

³⁹⁹ Interview with Adi, Pemongkong, August 2015.

⁴⁰⁰ Interview with Ainun, Mataram, September 2015.

⁴⁰¹ Interview with Saiful Muslim, July 2015.

⁴⁰² Interview with Saiful Muslim, July 2015.

⁴⁰³ Interview with Saiful Muslim, July 2015.

past.⁴⁰⁴ In history, all false prophets in the early time of Islam received no mercy from the Islamic ruler (i.e. Musailamah) unless they repented (i.e. Tulayhah bin Khuwailid).⁴⁰⁵ Musailamah al-Kadzab was a popular example of such a false prophet.⁴⁰⁶ The document mentions that this view is also shared by *ulamas* from the Islamic Organisation Conference (IOC) countries as well as Islamic organisations, including the Rabithah *Alam al Islami* (Islamic World League).⁴⁰⁷

The historical events of how the first Caliph of the Four Righteous Caliphs (Abu Bakr) dealt with false prophets becomes a reference point and guide for defining the duties of a religious authority. Part of the duties is policing the conformity of the interpretation of the core religious doctrine, such as the interpretation of the finality of prophethood verse. Consequently, the religious authority has the right to take preventive action against similar deviancy happening in the future. Waging war against the false prophet until they die or repent aims to close the door for false prophets in the future.⁴⁰⁸ In post-1998 Indonesia and Lombok, MUI *fatwa* and *Tuan Guru's* discourses do not explicitly initiate attacks on Ahmadiyah. Nonetheless, the MUI's *fatwa* on Ahmadiyah in 2005 and *Tuan Guru's* speeches on Ahmadiyah were two important events ratifying MUI and *Tuan Guru* status as religious authorities. Together, the *fatwa* and speeches indicate MUI and *Tuan Guru* responsibilities to protect the Muslim community. This was done through excluding Ahmadiyah from the Muslim community and limiting Ahmadiyah's chance to disseminate their teaching to mainstream-Islam.

To sum up, the finality of the prophethood has been the basic rationale for the uneasy relationship between Ahmadiyah and the mainstream of Sunni Islam.⁴⁰⁹ This issue is the turning point when the *traditionist* could not tolerate the *Islamic-mysticism* stream.⁴¹⁰

⁴⁰⁴ <http://konawe.kemenag.go.id/file/dokumen/PenjelasanTentangFatwaAliranAhmadiyah.pdf>, accessed 12 March 2016.

⁴⁰⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁶ Musailamah was a false prophet during the Prophet Muhammad's time and he was killed in the Yamamah battle in 632 AD, <http://konawe.kemenag.go.id/file/dokumen/PenjelasanTentangFatwaAliranAhmadiyah.pdf>, accessed 12 March 2016.

⁴⁰⁷ The Islamic World League issued a deviant *fatwa* on Ahmadiyah in 1973 and a year later a similar *fatwa* was issued by IOC. Ibid, accessed 12 March 2016.

⁴⁰⁸ Interview with Saiful Muslim, July 2015.

⁴⁰⁹ Yohanan Friedmann, *Prophecy Continuous*, 165.

⁴¹⁰ MUI's deviant guidelines point no 8, see also MUI's explanation on Ahmadiyah: 115, <http://konawe.kemenag.go.id/file/dokumen/PenjelasanTentangFatwaAliranAhmadiyah.pdf>, accessed 12 March 2016. Yohanan Friedmann, *Prophecy Continuous*, 165.

However, as I will examine below, other additional factors also contributed to the continuously disintegrating relationship between Ahmadiyah and Lombok's mainstream-Muslims, such as Friday prayers, residential areas, marriage arrangements and donations. These 'local' factors go beyond the national discourse but are consistent with it. They confirm that "the relationship of individual and society is far more complex and infinitely more variable that can be encompassed by a simple, unidimensional deductive model."⁴¹¹ The prominence of these factors in three villages indicates their central role as resources, which according to Guy Elcheroth and Stephen Reicher, were actively invoked for the purposes of mobilising support.⁴¹² They clearly distinguish the theological prophet issues pre- and post-1998 from the sociological concerns focused on grassroots realities of identity and difference.

2. A Contrasting Identity: Villagers vs. Ahmadis

i) *Exclusiveness*

a. *Communal Prayers and Friday Prayers*

Prayer is the second pillar of Islam, and performing prayer as a communal act is highly preferable because of the multiple rewards given by Allah to those who perform prayer together with their Muslim brothers and sisters.⁴¹³ On the island of Lombok, where mosques are abundant, it is common to have more than one mosque in one village. Due to the number of mosques and other reasons such as different affiliations to a political party or different Islamic groups, it is not rare for people from one neighbourhood to perform prayers, communal prayers and Friday prayers (a weekly prayer performed every Friday at midday) in different mosques. Whether in Pancor, Pemongkong or Ketapang, it is the same and has been for decades; it is simply a reality. However, when it comes to Ahmadiyah performing prayers in different places and their choosing to live in separate areas, these aspects became serious matters in the three selected villages.

While the villagers in Ketapang say that they have never seen Ahmadis performing both daily prayers and Friday prayers, villagers in Pancor explain that Ahmadiyah always

⁴¹¹ Stanley Cohen, "Moral Panics and Folk Concepts," *Paedagogica Historica: International Journal of the History of Education* 35, no. 3 (1999): 6.

⁴¹² Guy Elcheroth, Stephen Reicher, *Identity, Violence and Power*, 8.

⁴¹³ One Hadith of the Prophet (peace be upon him) said: "Prayer in congregation is twenty-seven times better than prayer individually" (Sahih al-Bukhari, no. 645, Sahih Muslim, no. 650).

perform Friday prayers in a different mosque.⁴¹⁴ Johar, a 50-year-old farmer (villager) from Ketapang, says, “We never saw them at *shalat berjamaah* (communal prayer) with other villagers”.⁴¹⁵

I experienced this while visiting the refugee barracks (Asrama Transito Mataram) in 2015. All Ahmadiyah members living in or outside the refugee barracks would come together for Friday prayers at the refugee camp, rather than joining the Friday prayers in the mosque closest to their own residence.⁴¹⁶ This routine of Ahmadiyah performing communal prayers separately from non-Ahmadiyah Muslims also took place in other places like Pancor, Sambielen and Praya, leaving the villagers with the impression that Ahmadis “did not want to join a congregation with them”.⁴¹⁷

Nonetheless, the reality in post-1998 Lombok is that performing communal prayers separately, especially Friday prayers, becomes an important consideration when defining who is within or outside Muslim community boundaries. Performing Friday prayers in different locations is observed by most of the villagers and this is what principally differentiates them from Ahmadiyah, and even led to a Ketapang village leader being convinced that Ahmadis did not pray at all.⁴¹⁸ This Friday prayer separation, combined with separate residential areas, further confirmed Ahmadiyah’s social separation and this was understood as deviancy. For some, it also raised suspicions that Ahmadiyah was planning something to destroy the Muslim community. Mahmud from Ketapang says, “It is because they have a different prophet, if they have nothing to hide from us, why live and pray separately?”⁴¹⁹

The rationale for this is explained by the governor, Tuan Guru Bajang, saying that, “Friday prayers is an important communal prayer for Muslims all over the world when all Muslims (especially men) gather together in a *jama’ah* prayer, a congregation; it represents the unity of Muslims as faithful believers”.⁴²⁰ He also says:

⁴¹⁴ Interview with Mahmud and Awan (Ketapang, September 2015); interview with Agus and Johar (Sambielan, 2015); interview with Ainun and Syahrul (Pancor, 2015).

⁴¹⁵ Interview with Johar, August 2015.

⁴¹⁶ A big mosque also located about one kilometre from the barracks.

⁴¹⁷ Interview with Mahmud, Ketapang 2015; interview with Ainun and Syahrul, Mataram, 2015.

⁴¹⁸ Interview with Maksum, Ketapang, 2015.

⁴¹⁹ Interview with Mahmud, September 2015.

⁴²⁰ Interview with TGB, September 2015.

“In Indonesia where the majority of Muslims follow Syafi’i *mazhab* (school of Islamic jurisprudence), there are some strict criteria of how Friday prayers should be performed; the prayers must be attended by at least forty persons and it needs to be done in a single place or mosque within a particular residency or village unless the size of the village is too big and it is too difficult to gather all Muslims in the village in one place.”⁴²¹

Tuan Guru Bajang’s statement implies that there is a particular jurisprudence (Syafi’i *mazhab*) applicable to Sasak-Muslims, which regulates religious practices, including Friday prayers. Therefore, for the villagers, what Ahmadiyah does is against this tradition. Differences in performing Friday prayers, not the essential rituals but just the location, entails serious consequences, to the extent Ahmadiyah has been pushed outside the boundary of Islam. Put simply, performing the congregational Friday prayers in a mosque with the rest of the villagers is an observance that defines a Sasak-Muslim. The non-participation of Ahmadis makes the villagers in the three villages question the Ahmadis’ religious identity.

In response, the Ahmadiyah leader said to Tuan Guru Anwar in 2006 that it was inconvenient to perform prayer together with the mainstream, especially Friday prayers, because the *khatib* (the one who gives the sermon during Friday prayer) will point at “Ahmadiyah and say something bad about our group or our members”.⁴²² However, several *Tuan Guru* and religious leaders deny this. They say that the reason is because Ahmadis are not allowed to pray behind a non-Ahmadi *imam* (prayer leader).⁴²³

Soleh Ahmadi, the Ahmadiyah NTB leader, confirms this, saying that Ahmadis are only allowed to pray behind an *imam* who is also an Ahmadiyah member.⁴²⁴ The reason for this is that the *imam* in a communal prayer is, ideally, the best individual – the most knowledgeable in religious matters and the most fluent in Qur’anic recitation – among those joining the prayers. For Ahmadis, Ahmadiyah teaching is the best path among other available streams within Islam. Hence, Ahmadiyah is the chosen community and its followers are the chosen among Muslims. This, in turn, implies that the Ahmadis perceived themselves as better Muslims compared with non-Ahmadi Muslims. Simply put, from the Ahmadiyah perspective, communal prayer draws vivid identity boundaries for the

⁴²¹ Interview with TGB, September 2015.

⁴²² Interview with Tuan Guru Anwar, September 2015.

⁴²³ Interview with Tuan Guru Anwar, September 2015; interview with Saiful Muslim, July 2015.

⁴²⁴ Interview with Soleh Ahmadi, July 2016.

Ahmadiyah community, restricting them to performing communal prayer only behind an *imam* from their own community.

The communal prayer matter confirms the importance of religious conformity and an agency responsible for protecting the tradition. It is revealed through the existence of a specific set of religious practices that defines the Lombok Muslim community, for example, the critique of Ahmadis who perform Friday prayers in a separate mosque from the mainstream-Muslims. The Ahmadiyah members' commitment to pray only behind an Ahmadi imam means Ahmadiyah perform collective prayer only in their own mosques.

The collaborative work by Ronald Fischer, Rohan Callander, Paul Reddish and Joseph Bulbulia shows that “ritual synchrony increases perceptions of oneness with others, which increases sacred values to intensify prosocial behaviours”.⁴²⁵ The research findings also show that rituals with synchronous body movements were more likely to enhance prosocial attitudes.⁴²⁶ It is worth noting that prayer five times a day is one of the five pillars of Islam, in fact, it is the second pillar after the verbal confession of faith. Communal prayer itself is a set of synchronous body movements, meaning that those behind the *imam* (prayer leader) will together follow and imitate the *imam's* movement during prayers. Prayer is also believed to cause a higher reward from God when it is performed communally. While it is common for Lombok Muslims to perform prayer in particular mosques of their choice in a village, they also would likely not oppose the idea of praying in a different mosque occasionally. The research of Fischer, Callander, Reddish and Bulbulia does not conclude that having rituals with synchronous body movements exclusively leads to violence.⁴²⁷ However, considering the importance of prayer within Islam, it is fair to argue that consistently performing prayer in a separate house of worship allows Lombok's mainstream-Muslims to question Ahmadiyah identity as Muslims.

These arrangements were interestingly brought up frequently during my fieldwork, by either the villagers or *Tuan Guru*. It is one of the most significant determining factors in excluding Ahmadiyah from the Sasak-Muslim community.⁴²⁸ Approval to adhere to this specific set of religious practices (prayer) is an important Lombok Muslim identity

⁴²⁵ An example of prosocial behaviour is someone helping a neighbour to fill out an insurance form. Since this person helped without any professional obligation to do so, the behaviour would be considered prosocial, even if the helper expected their neighbour to reciprocate with a comparable favour in the future.

⁴²⁶ Ronald Fischer, Rohan Callander, Paul Reddish and Joseph Bulbulia, “How do Rituals Affect Cooperation? An Experimental Field of Study Comparing Nine Ritual Types” (Springer, 2013).

⁴²⁷ Ibid.

⁴²⁸ Interview with TGB, September 2015.

marker.⁴²⁹ The NW Pancor leader, TGB, claims that a close interaction with the society and joining the mainstream in Friday prayers would make a great difference to Lombok Ahmadiyah-mainstream relations.⁴³⁰ TGB's statement indicates that, as a religious leader, he expects Ahmadiyah to conform to the religious practices of the mainstream. At the same time, the statement may also be interpreted as him fulfilling his duty as a *Tuan Guru*.

b. Separate Residence and Restricted Marriage

Living in an exclusive residential area is typical of the Lombok's Ahmadiyah community. Both the current regent of West Lombok regency, Fauzan Khalid, and the previous governor, Tuan Guru Bajang, stress the importance of these issues of their perceived exclusivity. Fauzan Khalid explains, "We want (to treat) Ahmadiyah the same way (we treat) Hindus and Christians in Lombok, but they do not (live) exclusively".⁴³¹ TGB expressed his concern on Ahmadiyah's exclusivity, he says, "The number of Ahmadiyah in the refugee barracks has steadily decreased, I hope they stop staying in their group, instead I wish they would blend in with the rest of society ...".⁴³²

However, according to Soleh Ahmadi, a concentrated residential location allows a smooth and easy coordination among Ahmadiyah members to take place. Those Ahmadiyah members who live outside the refugee barracks seem to be gathering with other members in a particular neighbourhood. Some scholars like Burhani and Connley highlight that Ahmadiyah is a close-knit community, and this character seems to have become more intense due to the increasing opposition they have experienced in recent years.⁴³³ Connley adds that these separate residential areas are a way to guarantee safety for Ahmadiyah's members. She contends, "... from an internal perspective, this strong cohesion makes Ahmadiyah ready to sacrifice for their fellow Ahmadiyah ...".⁴³⁴ This willingness to sacrifice

⁴²⁹ Ibid.

⁴³⁰ Ibid.

⁴³¹ "Apa yang membuat Jemaah Ahmadiyah Sembahyang di Masjid Sendiri, Tidak Bersama Muslim Lain?" Rohmatin Bonasir, BBC Indonesia, 21 February 2018, <https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/dunia-42791329>, accessed 1 January 2019.

⁴³² Interview with TGB, September 2015.

⁴³³ Ahmad Najib Burhani, "Conversion to Ahmadiyah in Indonesia: Winning Hearts through Ethical and Spiritual Appeals," Sojourn, *Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia* 39, no. 3 (November 2014); Aleah Connley, "Understanding the Oppressed: A Study of the Ahmadiyah and their Strategies for Overcoming Adversaries in Contemporary Indonesia," *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs* 1(2016): 51-52.

⁴³⁴ Ahmad Najib Burhani, "Conversion to Ahmadiyah in Indonesia," 672.

makes Ahmadis feel safe living within their own community. According to Connley, “Many participants feel that the Ahmadiyah community is a ‘safe’ place, and cherish the extreme closeness they share with other members of the community, who they regard as family or ‘relatives’ (*saudara*) in a strikingly real sense”.⁴³⁵

During my field observation on Friday prayers in the refugee barracks, I could feel the close-knit nature of the Ahmadiyah community. Each member welcomed the other members who joined the Friday prayers. It was more than a simple “hi” or “how are you?”, it was a warm and sincere gesture holding hands and hugs combined with a genuine concern asking how the other members were doing.

In a group discussion with Ahmadiyah female members, most participants expressed their contentment to be part of the community, because “wherever we go we can always rely on other members’ assistance, we are like family”.⁴³⁶ Various departments within Ahmadiyah also ensure that the specific needs of their members are fulfilled. This is from the *khuddam* department for Ahmadi male youth, and the *lajnah imailiah* department for female youth, to *Ristha Nata*, an agency responsible for facilitating prospective marriages, as well as a communal infirmary where every member can receive free treatment and free homeopathic medicine.⁴³⁷ When asked about their view on the government assistance programme to Ahmadiyah members in the refugee barracks, Wiwin, a female member, replied, “no matter how much money you offer us, it is almost nothing compared to what we received (from the organisation)”.⁴³⁸ Wiwin’s statement underlines that the provincial government programmes to provide entrepreneurship trainings and soft loans are not as good as various types of support that Ahmadiyah provides for its members.

Marriage arrangements are also another important consequence of the close-knit nature of Ahmadiyah community. This is typical in a small minority group like Ahmadiyah as it is in other groups such as Jamaah Tabligh and the Salafi movement.⁴³⁹ Homogamy, that is, marriage arrangements whereby it is recommended that all members (male and

⁴³⁵ Aleah Connley, “Understanding the Oppressed,” 51-52.

⁴³⁶ Interview with Awar, August 2015.

⁴³⁷ During a group discussion, Awar explained that the chosen members (mostly female) received some kind of pharmacy training in Singapore before holding responsibility for organising the infirmary; interview with Awar, August, 2015.

⁴³⁸ Interview with Wiwin (pseudonym), August 2015.

⁴³⁹ For fuller detail on homogamy practises in minority groups like Jamaah Tabligh, for example, see Eva Nisa, “Marriage and Divorce for the Sake of Religion: The Marital Life of Cadari in Indonesia,” *Asian Journal of Social Science*, 39 (2011): 797-820.

female) marry another Ahmadi,⁴⁴⁰ is an essential aspect of life of every Ahmadiyah member, especially because it is commanded by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad. This is highlighted in the official website of Ahmadiyah in the Islamic marriage section:

“Furthermore, you should be aware that the Promised Messiah ... also prohibited Ahmadi women from marrying non-Ahmadi men. The reasoning behind this is very sound. A woman is not permitted to marry outside her faith because when she is in her husband’s home and environment, she and her children are exposed to non-Muslim and non-Ahmadi culture and practices. This makes it very difficult for her to remain steadfast in her own faith and bring up her children as Muslims. A man, on the other hand can more easily influence his wife and bring her into the Islamic way of life.”⁴⁴¹

Marriage arrangements are essential for the Ahmadiyah as they create clear-cut boundaries about who an Ahmadi should/can marry. To make sure that homogamy or endogamy traditions continue, there is a strict punishment for those members who violate this rule. Abang explains:

“In the past, punishment to women was more severe compared to men; women who chose to marry non-Ahmadi men were ousted from our community. As for men, because he’s the leader of the family, it was okay so long as he provided sustainable guidance for his wife and children. Now the disqualification from community applies to both men and women.”⁴⁴²

Marriage is a “required duty” by the Ahmadis.⁴⁴³ The marriage arrangement is the result of a direct order from Mirza Ghulam Ahmad himself. Ahmad says:

“... our *jemaat* (community) is increasing in number ... Hence, it was deemed imperative that, in order to foster mutual bonds of relationship and to save them from the ill effects and bad outcomes, a suitable arrangement should be made for the marriage of the boys and girls ...”⁴⁴⁴

The fourth Caliph Hazrat Mirza Tahir Ahmad played a crucial role in the establishment of a matchmaking bureau to ensure that Ahmadis married those within the

⁴⁴⁰ Soleh Ahmadi, July 2016.

⁴⁴¹ <https://www.alislam.org/books/pathwaytoparadise/LAJ-chp3.htm>, accessed 6 January 2017.

⁴⁴² Interview with Abang, July 2016.

⁴⁴³ Huma Ahmed Gosh, “Portraits of Believers: Ahmadi Women Performing Faith in the Diaspora,” *Journal of International Women's Studies*, 6(1): 85.

⁴⁴⁴ <https://www.rishtanata.us/index.php/content/index/about-us>, accessed 6 January 2017.

community.⁴⁴⁵ The specific bureau, called *Ristha Nata*, which acts as matchmaker for its members, is used by Ahmadiyah leaders to keep records of eligible men and women. Based on the record, when consulted, *Ristha Nata* tries to set up suitable matches according to the family's preferences. *Ristha Nata* has its own website in each country around the world. Soleh Ahmadi explains that in Indonesia, *Ristha Nata* is still in the form of a bulletin. Awar, a female Ahmadi, in her early 40s who I met in the refugee barracks, says the group has a special "dating" bulletin where you will find photos as well as brief CVs and contact details of single Ahmadiyah males and females across Indonesia.⁴⁴⁶ Through this bulletin she met her husband, Abang, who is from Sumatera. The process was quite simple. Abang visited Awar parent's house and met her father and made a proposal of marriage. Awar's father told her about the proposal and asked her opinion. On Awar's agreement, it was mainly the local Ahmadiyah leader who represented Abang in discussing the rest of the marriage process and fees with Awar's family, especially because Abang had no family members in Lombok. Abang said that initially he was worried that his proposal might get rejected because at that time he had no permanent job. However, the local Ahmadiyah leader convinced him that for an active and pious member like him everything would be all right. This highlights that piety comes before anything else, such as age gaps and financial and educational background, in considering the right partner in the Ahmadiyah marriage tradition. Abang adds that if a man just joined Ahmadiyah and his parents are not Ahmadis, he will need to have an Ahmadi guardian if he wishes to be married. The guardian is responsible for educating him in the noble teaching of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad.⁴⁴⁷

Ahmadiyah believes that to transmit core teachings to the younger generation, both parents need to hold these beliefs in common.⁴⁴⁸ Therefore, a successful marriage is key to the survival of Ahmadiyah as a community and, for a marriage to be successful, male and female need to share the same vision.⁴⁴⁹ This is becoming more crucial considering the minority status of JAI in Indonesia.⁴⁵⁰ Every branch seems to be very well informed about each of their members' details. When I came across a file of a deceased Ahmadiyah

⁴⁴⁵ Huma Ahmed-Gosh, "Portraits of Believers," 86.

⁴⁴⁶ Interview with Awar, August 2015.

⁴⁴⁷ Interview with Abang, September 2015.

⁴⁴⁸ Interview with Soleh Ahmadi, July 2016.

⁴⁴⁹ Interview with Soleh Ahmadi, July 2016.

⁴⁵⁰ Interview with Soleh Ahmadi, July 2016.

member, I found it contained basically everything about the family of the deceased. This included his assets, how many of his children were school age, and whether or not he left any children who meet the category of “*layak menikah*” (reached a sufficient age for matrimony).⁴⁵¹ The detailed information is then sent to the appropriate department, for example, the data on those who have reached a sufficient age for matrimony will be delivered to the *Ristha Nata* department. When asked, *Ristha Nata* will arrange a marriage for their members. Often, this arrangement involves Ahmadiyah leaders from other regions and possibly across countries.⁴⁵²

Similar practices, which entail deep trust of their leaders and the matchmaking bureau, also take place within Ahmadiyah communities in other countries. As Huma Ahmad-Gosh notes, many Ahmadi women from South Asia came to the United States through arranged marriages.

“They consented readily to arranged marriages, even in instances where they had never seen their partners and marriages were solemnised over international telephone calls. Since marrying within the order is recognised as a virtue, these women conformed to such marriages with full faith and trust in the matchmakers.”⁴⁵³

From the mainstream’s perspective, homogamy is another problematic Ahmadiyah tradition, after communal prayers. This tradition creates a sense of exclusivity and maintains a gap between the group and its surrounding communities, no matter how hard they tried to be actively engaged with the rest of the villagers. Mahmud, a 40-year-old farmer from Ketapang, says, “It (the marriage prohibition) is too bad, you know what, most of the Ahmadi girls are very pretty and they seem to know how to behave”.⁴⁵⁴

ii) *Conversion*

Besides communal prayer, one similar issue the three villages shared is the mainstream’s concern about conversion threat via marriage and donation. Besides exclusivity, another objection regarding homogamy practised by Ahmadiyah in three villages is mainly about its potential to convert non-Ahmadis to join the group through

⁴⁵¹ Lampiran, Tragedi JAI Lombok, JAI provinsi NTB.

⁴⁵² Abang explains that one of Ahmadi male from Indonesia married a female Ahmadi from Pakistan.

⁴⁵³ Huma Ahmed-Gosh, “Portraits of Believers,” 85.

⁴⁵⁴ Interview with Mahmud, October 2015.

matrimony. Mahmud, a farmer in his late 50s from Ketapang, says that several Ahmadiis told them that if they are marrying Ahmadi women, they do not have to worry about the wedding fees and all the groom-to-be's needs, they just need to join the group.⁴⁵⁵ This is in contrast to the local tradition of the Sasak where the biggest portion, if not all, of the wedding costs is the groom's responsibility. This leaves an impression that waiving 'the wedding fees' in exchange for the groom's membership is an effort to attract male villagers to join Ahmadiyah.⁴⁵⁶ Because if you want to marry an Ahmadi girl, you do not need money, you just join the group. In response to this, the villagers like Mahmud says, "I will never trade my faith (to join Ahmadiyah) just because of a girl".⁴⁵⁷

Conversion through donation seems to be closely associated with allegations that Ahmadiyah is receiving overseas funding. The potential to receive funding from London headquarters was mentioned by Lombok's religious leaders. Tuan Guru Anwar of NU, for example, pointed to the possibility of Ahmadiyah leaders in Indonesia politicising the attacks on Ahmadiyah intentionally so as to receive more funding from London. He suggested that the more Ahmadiyah reportedly suffered, the more funding they would receive.⁴⁵⁸ Tuan Guru Anwar explained that during his visits to Ahmadiyah members at night in the barracks, he often saw them having dinner and nice meals. He says, "If they were really financially devastated, where did the goat meat come from?"⁴⁵⁹ He adds, "We all could wear a mask, couldn't we?"⁴⁶⁰

The MUI NTB leader, Saiful Muslim, also endorses Tuan Guru Anwar's suspicions. He asked me to compare the situation in the refugee barracks and the official residence of the Ahmadiyah *mubaligh*.⁴⁶¹ In contrast to the situation in the barracks, the Ahmadiyah *mubaligh* lives in a well-designed official residence located literally behind the governor's official residence in Mataram. The house has a good front yard, a convenient living room, a small library, bedrooms for the *mubaligh* and his family, plus non-stop access to the

⁴⁵⁵ Interview with Mahmud, August 2015.

⁴⁵⁶ Interview with Anang, August 2015.

⁴⁵⁷ Interview with Mahmud, August 2015. Moreover, some scholars like Burhani argue that this tradition is detrimental to the group's inclusivity claim. He argues that the marriage restriction works to limit Ahmadiyah members' relations with non-Ahmadiis, see Burhani, "Conversion to Ahmadiyya in Indonesia," 674.

⁴⁵⁸ Interview with Tuan Guru Anwar, July 2015.

⁴⁵⁹ Interview with Tuan Guru Anwar, July 2015.

⁴⁶⁰ Interview with Tuan Guru Anwar, July 2015.

⁴⁶¹ Interview with Saiful Muslim, July 2015.

globally broadcasting MTA channel (Muslim Television Ahmadiyya International).⁴⁶² Saiful Muslim compares Ahmadiyah *mubaligh* with mainstream Muslim preachers. Saiful Muslim says, “Ahmadiyah *mubaligh* is not like our (mainstream) preachers. Wherever they go, they receive salary and incentive, including house and car”.⁴⁶³

Merchants and Chanda

Apart from the international funding allegation, I observed that many Ahmadiyah members who lived in Pancor were successful retail and wholesale merchants. Most of them were selling basic foods like rice and sugar. One of my family members in Pancor said that prior to Ahmadiyah’s relocation in 2002, she used to buy a good quality rice from an Ahmadi at Pancor’s market. In general, Ahmadiyah members had a better economic status than their neighbours then. Prior to the 2002 attacks, it is known in Pancor that the most successful furniture supplier in town was Ahmadiyah’s member H. Ma’arif. The Ahmadis’ financial advantage compared with the mainstream population in Pancor was also reflected in the size and decoration of the Ahmadiyah mosque in this city. The biggest renovation took place in early 2000 when the general economy was shaken due to the financial crisis. Perhaps the entrepreneur skills of Ahmadis also contributed to the fact that while living in the refugee barracks with limited facilities, many Ahmadiyah members easily and quickly familiarised themselves with the economic opportunities around the barracks. Most Ahmadis who I met said that once they arrived in the barracks, they immediately observed the local markets. Most Ahmadis living here earn their income as retailers.

In addition to the business culture among Ahmadis, one important channel of the financial support of the organisation is through *chanda*, which is a contribution to the organisation from Ahmadiyah members. There are several types of *chanda*, from a compulsory (for example, almsgiving or *zakat* and *chanda aam*) to donations (for example, *wassiyat* and *sadaqa*).⁴⁶⁴ The amount of *zakat* to be paid is similar to that of the majority

⁴⁶² The television is located in the library room and when I visited MTA was broadcasting an al-Qur’an tafsir programme in English.

⁴⁶³ Interview with Saiful Muslim, July 2015.

⁴⁶⁴ <https://www.alislam.org>, accessed 12 May 2016. There are several *chanda* types:

a. *Zakat*

Zakat is one of the five pillars of Islam. In the Holy Qur’an, God has repeatedly urged the believers to pay *Zakat* for the purification of their souls. Those who have capital in the form of cash, jewellery, bullion not used for one full year are required to pay at the rate of one-fortieth (1/40th) of the value of the goods.

of Muslims, which is 1/40th of one's annual income. However, outside *zakat*, there are other obligatory *chandas* with significant amounts that have to be paid by Ahmadiyah members. For example, the obligatory regular *chanda* or *chanda aam* is 1/16th of each member's annual earnings. This amount is two-and-a-half times higher than the compulsory almsgiving in Islam, which is only 1/40th of Muslims' annual incomes.⁴⁶⁵ It is an obligation for every member to pay *chanda*, even for a new born baby. The higher the earnings the more they have to pay.

Awar explains that the *chanda* from the local branches will be sent to the central organisation in Jakarta. Then some is distributed back to the members across the country

b. *Fitrana*

Fitrana is a compulsory donation made at the end of the Holy month of Ramadhan to be distributed to the poor. This donation is based on the *Sunnah* of the Holy Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be on him). This *chanda* should be paid before *Eid*.

c. *Chanda Aam* (Regular Subscription)

This basic donation was established by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad and is compulsory for every earning member of the Ahmadiyah community. The payment ratio is 1/16th of one's income from all sources after taxes and compulsory insurance. The *Chanda Aam* year is from 1 July to 30 June.

d. *Wassiyat* (Will)

Wassiyat is the making of a will in the favour of the community, pledging 1/10th to 1/3rd of one's total assets to the Jamaat at the time of one's death. A person who has pledged *Wassiyat* is known as a *Moosi* and must also donate 1/10th to 1/3rd of his earnings yearly instead of *chanda aam*. This scheme was also set up by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad. This is a voluntary pledge and carries other conditions with it.

e. *Jalsa Salana* (Annual Gathering)

This donation is also compulsory and is used exclusively for the expenses of the Annual Convention held at the national level. The prescribed rate is 1/120th of one's annual income from all sources.

f. *Tahrike Jadid*

This scheme is responsible for the opening of new missions and construction of mosques throughout the world. It was launched by the second *Khalifatul* of Ahmadiyah in 1932, who urged members to lead a simple life, cut down even on their meals, and donate as much as possible for the propagation of Islam in countries outside of India and Pakistan. A little as a cent may be donated but the donor must resolve not only to pay it regularly, but to try and increase it even by a cent every year. The suggested rate is 1/5th of one's monthly income once a year, which is from 1 November to 31 October.

g. *Sadaqa*

Sadaqa is voluntary donation given by believers for the poor and needy. God has commanded Muslims to ward off calamities and privations by helping those who are less fortunate and require assistance. It can be made at any time and in any amount.

h. *Eid Fund*

This voluntary donation was started by the Promised Messiah and is to ensure that the poor and needy are able to have a joyful Eidi. Publications [missing words?]

This funding scheme is not new for a small minority group with distinctive utopian model of community like Ahmadiyah. There is a need to support the group's activities by asking funding from its loyal members.

⁴⁶⁵ <https://www.ahmadiyya.us/documents/chapters/ma-boston/1184-chandasummaryjuly2016/file>, accessed 17 April 2019.

and some is sent to the Ahmadiyah headquarters in London.⁴⁶⁶ Awar adds that the *Huzur* (the Ahmadiyah central leader) in London decides whether or not a branch will get financial support, and if yes, how much.⁴⁶⁷ The decision is made based on reports that are sent by Ahmadiyah leaders in every country.⁴⁶⁸

Internally, *chanda* supports Ahmadiyah to have the capabilities to help its members who are experiencing difficulties, as well as to give rewards to those for achievements. Soleh Ahmadi, for example, explains the role of London in the survival of Lombok's Ahmadiyah community. He explains, "If not because London (HQ), then how could we manage to rent houses for hundreds of our members after the 2002 attacks in Pancor, and we rented the houses for roughly a full year".⁴⁶⁹

Chanda has enabled Ahmadiyah to become a well-resourced organisation.⁴⁷⁰ Soleh Ahmadi also adds that the organisation's resources play an important role when Ahmadi in the refugee barracks bought several houses and some pieces of land in Ketapang in 2003. The financial power of the organisation is put in plain words by Dyah, a school teacher. She says that every family in the refugee barrack receives around Rp. 2 million Indonesian per month from the central organisation in Jakarta.⁴⁷¹ Awar explains that some children receive a monthly stipend but that is because of their outstanding achievements at school.⁴⁷²

In Pancor's case, one of the main reasons behind the attacks on Ahmadiyah was the announcement of their triumph as a successful survivor of the economic crisis. The announcement came from Ahmadiyah's mosque using a speaker around a month prior to the attack on them in 2002.⁴⁷³ It briefly reported that the economic crisis hit Indonesia badly, but Ahmadiyah had not been affected by this situation. Ainun expresses his disappointment at this and calls it a "pride humiliation" to the people of Pancor. According to Ainun, it is explicitly highlighting the financial advantage of being an Ahmadiyah

⁴⁶⁶ Interview with Awar, August 2015.

⁴⁶⁷ Interview with Awar, August 2015.

⁴⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁹ Interview with Soleh Ahmadi, July 2016.

⁴⁷⁰ Ahmadiyah in Surabaya, for example, claimed that its branch has funding of Rp. 100 billion Indonesian per year, "We have international auditors to check where the money was spent, we have 100 billion/year, the record of our donators is also transparent, not like political parties, you make donation one million but there is no record ...". Abdul Gaffar, "Ahmadiyah dalam Perspektif kekerasan Negara," *Jurnal Sosiologi Islam* 3, no. 2 (October 2013): 43.

⁴⁷¹ Interview with Dyah, August 2015.

⁴⁷² Interview with Awar, August 2015.

⁴⁷³ Interview with Ainun, September 2015; interview with a police officer in Mataram, October 2015.

member. The announcement took place at the same time as the ongoing massive renovation of Ahmadiyah's mosque in Pancor amidst a severe economic crisis across Indonesia.⁴⁷⁴ The announcement from the Ahmadiyah's mosque was interpreted by the mainstream as saying that a solution for the general people's financial difficulties was to join.⁴⁷⁵

Externally, Ahmadiyah also has the potential to participate in numerous social activities. In three villages, people confirmed that Ahmadiyah members often donate money and basic foods to their neighbours.⁴⁷⁶ Their involvement in charity and helping those in need are additional activities that were mentioned by Ahmadiyah female members during our conversations. "Regardless of how they (the mainstream) treated us, we were often helping them".⁴⁷⁷

Donating is obviously noble in character. However, there are critiques of the fact that Ahmadiyah is providing help to those who are in need. Syahrul from Pancor, and Johar from Ketapang, say that Ahmadiyah was giving parcels of noodles, rice and sugar to those who attended their sermons. Both agree that this is how Ahmadiyah attracts people to come.⁴⁷⁸ The village leader of Ketapang explains that Ahmadiyah will lend them money and they have to return the money in the next 10 to 12 months without any interest. This seems dubious for the villagers in Ketapang, and the village leader contends, "They (Ahmadis) say we can pay back later in a lesser amount ... nothing comes for free ma'am and we do not want to be those who sell their religion for money".⁴⁷⁹

Both acts of giving away food as well as lending money (and asking to return the money in a lesser amount) seem to have raised questions regarding the motives behind these unusual economic behaviours. These behaviours, which in many ways have helped the poor, are easily suspected by the villagers to be part of an effort to convert them to join Ahmadiyah. From Ahmadiyah's perspective, food donations aim to provide services to those in need. Likewise, the soft loan also has similar purposes. However, for the villagers, the relationship between Ahmadis and the villagers-in-need is not a simple donator-

⁴⁷⁴ Atun, a female Ahmadiyah member told me that Ahmadis invested heavily to build the mosque and that even after severe attacks to the building, the foundation of the building was still as sturdy as it used to be. Interview with Atun, August 2015.

⁴⁷⁵ Interview with Ainun, September 2015.

⁴⁷⁶ *Lombok Post*, "Ahmadiyah Sumbang 10 Ton Beras," 3 November 2004.

⁴⁷⁷ Interview with Awar, August 2015.

⁴⁷⁸ Interview with Syahrul September 2015; interview with Johar, August 2015.

⁴⁷⁹ Interview with Mahmud, Ketapang, August 2015.

recipient connection. My findings in the field show that donation schemes, on some occasions, were counter-productive for Ahmadiyah themselves. Ideally, the villagers would return the money on time. However, Ahmadis have said that if the villagers need more time, then forcing them to pay back immediately is simply corrupting the initial goal to help those in need. These services may be interpreted as an evidence of the existing Ahmadiyah ‘conversion threats’, which means that for the villagers the donations were aimed at attracting the impoverished villagers to join Ahmadiyah. Therefore, the giver and the villagers had different perspectives on the purposes of the loan scheme.

The economic issues related to giving donations and receiving overseas funding are important matters that serve as a predominant marker of identities for both Sasak-Muslim and Ahmadiyah. The suspicion of conversion motives behind Ahmadiyah’s donations mainly comes from the grassroots level, whereas the overseas funding allegation is mainly delivered by Lombok’s religious elites. The prophethood issue has been there continually, but it is not enough to trigger hostility and relocation. The donation and funding issues, together with marriage as well as separate mosques for performing Friday prayers, reveal the differences between Lombok’s Sasak-Muslims and Ahmadiyah. These elements explain, in large part, the identity separations behind Ahmadiyah and Sasak-Muslims in three villages.

iii) Why Conversion Discourses?

Having set out the theological and non-theological issues that draw a clear line of identity separation of Sasak-Muslim from Ahmadis in three villages, in this section I discuss the most prominent discourse in constructing the anti-Ahmadiyah sentiment or worse, and mobilising the masses to commit violence. It is the funding discourse. It is appealing to me because of the contrasting facts I found in the field between *Tuan Guru’s* statements and the observed conditions of Ahmadis, especially in the refugee barracks. In his analysis on Edward Gibbon’s quote concerning the politicisation of religion by the ruling elites,⁴⁸⁰ Joseph Chinyong Liow says:

“While it explains why political leaders might want to play up religious issues (and many are certainly culpable), it does little to illuminate the source of the fears and

⁴⁸⁰ “... the various modes of worship which prevailed in the Roman world were all considered by the people as equally true; by the philosophers as equally false; and by the magistrate as equally useful,” see footnote no. 428.

preconceptions that a religious discourse triggers – why, to turn Gibbon’s logic on its head, do “the people” consider the veracity of religion to be “equally true” such that they can be influenced so easily by the magistrate? This surely speaks to the salience of the content of the message itself, and not just the creative and opportunistic use of it for other more self-serving ends.”⁴⁸¹

Therefore, the discussion of discourse is important to reveal what strategy has been chosen by the religious authority to convey their identity approach and why this is effective in mobilising the mass to commit violent attacks.

Crouch argues that “any attempt to understand modern state approaches to the regulation of religion must be considered in historical context”.⁴⁸² In the Indonesian context, state regulation of religion is mainly around two issues: Muslim-Christian tensions; and disputes within Islam.⁴⁸³ The Muslim-Christian tensions mostly focus on conversion via incentive-donations, whereas disputes within Islam are essentially about the Muslim community's conflicting identity boundaries. The latter has been explained above through the role of the MUI and *Tuan Guru* as the religious authority guarding the *traditionist* approach to religious doctrine. Below I argue that the essence of the Muslim-Christian tensions indeed was also found in the anti-Ahmadiyah’s discourses in Lombok.

As mentioned in above, there are several sociological issues besides communal prayer that are also crucial in defining the Sasak-Muslim identity boundaries. These include Ahmadiyah’s marriage arrangements, donations and separate residential areas. I argue that these three topics have one thing in common. They triggered the mainstream’s objection to the apparent potential for converting more Sasak-Muslim members to Ahmadis. The mainstream’s objection reveals that conversion via donation seems to be a very sensitive issue. This was the main theme of the anti-Ahmadiyah discourses within the Sasak-Muslim communities concerned. I will explain this from the perspective of the state approach to the regulation of religious propagation.

Tensions between Muslims and Christians due to conversions is reflected in the word ‘Kristenisasi’ or ‘Christianisation’. Karel Steenbrink notes that financial aid for those who converted to Christianity in regions under the Dutch East India Company’s

⁴⁸¹ Joseph Chinyong Liow, “Introduction,” in *Religion and Nationalism in Southeast Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 4.

⁴⁸² Melissa Crouch, “Shifting Conceptions of State Regulation of Religion: The Indonesian Draft Law on Inter-religious Harmony,” *Global Change, Peace & Security* 25, no. 3 (2013): 265.

⁴⁸³ Ibid.

(*Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie* or VOC) control (like Jakarta) were common during the Dutch occupation.⁴⁸⁴ During the largest conversions to Christianity in 1966–1969 (after the 1965 coup) there were at least 35 missionary bodies from the United States operating in Indonesia and reportedly two million conversions to Christianity.⁴⁸⁵ In 1967, many Islamic religious leaders began to petition the government to issue guidelines on the boundaries of proselytization. During Suharto’s rule, Muslim-Christian relationships in Indonesia were best described as “distrustful” of each other.⁴⁸⁶

One of the clear manifestations of the uneasy relationship between Muslims and Christians was the regulation of proselytization and financial aid through the issuance of the 1978 joint decrees between the Religious Affairs and Home Affairs ministries. The debate over guidelines on proselytization was concerned with who was the target of these activities, and the acceptable methods of proselytization. The concern received a positive response from the government in 1978, with the issuance of a Ministerial Decree No. 70/1978, stating that religious propagation should not:

1. Target people who already embrace a religion among the five state-recognised religions;
2. Use material inducements, money, clothes, food, medicine, etc, to convert people who already embrace a religion;
3. Entail the distribution of pamphlets, bulletins, magazines, books etc, in areas where people already embrace a religion;
4. Permit door-to-door visits to private residences of people who already embrace a religion.⁴⁸⁷

Regarding overseas financial aid, another Ministerial Decree No. 77/1978 was issued, which entails that all domestic religious institutions must obtain an agreement or a recommendation from the Ministry of Religious Affairs when they receive any form of aid

⁴⁸⁴ Karel, Steenbrink. “Christianity and Islam: Civilization or Religions?” *Contemporary Indonesian Discussions* (2004): 227.

⁴⁸⁵ Melissa Crouch, “Shifting Conceptions of State Regulation of Religion,” 273. Crouch also mentions “the rumour that a large number of conversions to Christianity had taken place in 1965 after the attempted Communist coup” can be found in many scholarly works such as Avery T. Willis, *Indonesian Revival* (South Pasadena, CA: William Carey Library, 1978); Frank Cooley, *The Growing Seed* (New York: Division of Overseas Ministries, 1981); and Kurt Koch, *The Revival in Indonesia* (Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel Publications, 1972).

⁴⁸⁶ For a fuller account see Mujiburrahman, “Feeling Threatened: Muslim-Christian Relations in Indonesia’s New Order” (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006).

⁴⁸⁷ Myengkyo Seo, *State Management of Religion in Indonesia* (New York: Routledge, 2013), 72.

from foreign governments, organisations or individuals. This stipulates that any institution receiving aid must carry out a training programme for the local populations so that they can replace foreign staff in these areas. The programme must start within six months following enactment of the decree and finish no more than two years after that.⁴⁸⁸ In general, Muslims were supportive of these decrees while the Christians claimed that the government was using them to solely serve Muslim interests.⁴⁸⁹

In this vein, the idea of financial aid or overseas funding as conversion tools are issues that quickly linked the Ahmadiyah to the ‘conversion threat’ definition already known to Indonesian Muslims in general. Hence, the perception that Ahmadiyah was receiving funding from its headquarters in London, and that Ahmadis give soft loans, food parcels or waived wedding fees, are all seen as potential conversion methods in a financial disguise.

Conversion via donations were dominant in Lombok’s *Tuan Guru* discourses. According to Max Boholm’s theory, discourse consists of four elements: a signifying element (signifier); a signified element; an interpretant that relates the signifier to the signified element; and interpreter(s).⁴⁹⁰ One of the most prominent anti-Ahmadiyah discourses was conversion via donation. The ‘financial aid’ here is a signifier, being a sign of a signified element named ‘conversion’ to the ‘villagers’ as the interpreters. The knowledge that ‘financial aid causes conversion’ is a familiar interpretant for the interpreter or the Indonesian Muslim community.

This interpretation is very likely to have been influenced by the history of the Muslim-Christian relationship in modern Indonesia. As noted by Hall, “(Cultural identities) come from somewhere, have histories”.⁴⁹¹ This suggests that in introducing Ahmadiyah as the ‘other’, *Tuan Guru* began not with a blank sheet, but rather with available materials that easily resonated with the common knowledge of the people. Soon after the large earthquake hit Lombok in 2018, numerous donations arrived on the island. There was also a presence of technicians and health practitioners to help Lombok recover after the disaster. I met several religious leaders and volunteers from Islamic foundations like the *Bulan Sabit*

⁴⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁰ For more details on identity as a set of representation, see Max Boholm, “Towards a Semiotic Definition of Discourse and a Basis for a Typology of Discourses,” *Semiotica* 208 (2016): 177-201.

⁴⁹¹ Stuart Hall, ed. *Cultural Identity and Diaspora, Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory: A Reader* (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994), 225.

(Moon and Crescent) organisation, which expressed their concern over the potential massive missionary activities in Lombok mixed in with the disaster relief efforts.⁴⁹²

iv) *The Trend in Local Media*

The role of religion in shaping the identity of journalists is also paramount at the national and local levels in Lombok. The role of religion reached such prominence that even the media could not escape from the influence of the sacred. The work of Brauchler offers the most extensive research on the role of the media during the Moluccan conflicts. Brauchler's research focuses on cyber-actors and unveils their specific cyber-strategies during the Moluccan conflicts. These strategies were of a communicative nature and included: (1) "flame wars" (online fighting with words); (2) "cross-posting" of messages to promote solidarity among group members and to defame others; (3) the inclusion and linking of reliable sources to lift the local conflict to a global level; and (4) the manipulation of websites and online identities. All three of the analysed cyber-actors – the Masariku Mailing List, the CCDA Newsletter, and the online presence of the FKAWJ and Laskar Jihad – utilised these strategies to engage each other, thus using "the medium of the internet strategically for their goals and purposes".⁴⁹³ It seems that during the Moluccan conflicts, each party (Muslims and Christians) had their own media representatives. These channels seem to relatively equal in numbers. This may reflect the virtually equal proportion of Muslims and Christians in the Maluku province.⁴⁹⁴

The power of religion in reshaping identity also influenced those journalists expected to present the story of the Ahmadiyah conflict objectively to the public. A nationwide survey of 600 journalists representing a cross-section of news organisations and ethnicities from across the country revealed that Indonesian media workers perceive themselves as "Indonesian", "Muslims" and "journalists" by 40.3%, 39.7% and 12%,

⁴⁹² Personal communications with one of the Moon and Crescent's volunteers and a local religious leader in Gunungsari, West Lombok regency, August-September 2018. As a comparison of how a natural disaster triggers the redefinition of identity can be found in the post-tsunami Aceh. Michael Feener argues that the "re-making" of Aceh during its recovery from disaster and conflict helped to re-energise the work of state shari'a institutions which had only a minimal impact on society during the first years of the 21st century, see Michael R. Feener, *Shari'a and Social Engineering: The Implementation of Islamic Law in Contemporary Aceh, Indonesia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 2.

⁴⁹³ Birgit Brauchler, *Cyber Identities at War: The Moluccan Conflict on the Internet* (Berghahn Books, 2013), 314.

⁴⁹⁴ Based on the data from the Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Maluku province in 2017, the proportions of Muslims and Christians among the population of the Moluccans are 55% and 44%, respectively.

respectively.⁴⁹⁵ More than 60% of them supported the banning of Ahmadiyah in Indonesia.⁴⁹⁶ Inevitably, numerous narratives against Ahmadiyah were articulated and dispersed for public consumption through the mass media after Suharto's downfall.⁴⁹⁷ The word "clashing" (*bentrok*), not "attack" was used by *Jawa Pos*, *Kompas*, *Republika*, *Suara Merdeka*, *Pikiran Rakyat* in describing the Cikeusik tragedy.⁴⁹⁸ Furthermore, videos broadcast on national television channels captured the attacks but not the "killing sessions".⁴⁹⁹ The main theme of these media reports was the difference between Ahmadiyah teachings and Islam and why the group deserved the label 'deviant'.⁵⁰⁰ The Centre for Innovation Policy and Governance Media's report concluded that most of the news material concerning Ahmadiyah in Indonesia was a representation of the mainstream's agenda and interests.⁵⁰¹ For example, *Liputan 6* reported that in March 2011, five Ahmadis from Garut, West Java, repented.⁵⁰² *Republika* reported in May 2013 that those ex-Ahmadis formed a group called Ikamasa (Ikatan Masyarakat Mantan Aliran Sesat Ahmadiyah or the association of ex-deviant-Ahmadiyah's members). One of the group's members said that they need spiritual guidance as well as economic and education support.⁵⁰³ Saskia Schäfer also noted this trend and explains:

"A *Kompas* reporter quoted Dadang Romansyah, the head of the local branch of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, as saying, "Today twenty people have uttered the shahada ... I honestly saw [people] cry and shed tears the moment dozens of Ahmadis officially

⁴⁹⁵ Budi Setiyono and Lawrence Pintak, "The Mission of Indonesian Journalism: Balancing Democracy, Development, and Islamic Values," *International Journal of Press Politics* XX, no. X (2011): 192

⁴⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 193.

⁴⁹⁷ For more details on challenges in revealing the story of minority groups in Indonesia, see Imam Shofwan, "Beratnya Meliput Minoritas," *Jurnal Ma'arif Institute* 7(1) 2012; see also Andreas Harsono, "Indonesia's Religious Violence."

⁴⁹⁸ Newspapers observed are *Jawa Pos*, *Kompas*, *Republika*, *Suara Merdeka* and *Pikiran Rakyat*. For a fuller report see <http://cipg.or.id/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/MEDIA-3-Kelompok-Rentan-2012.pdf>. *Ibid.*

⁴⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰⁰ R. Alexander, Mallian, *Objektivitas pemberitaan kasus konflik Ahmadiyah dengan FPI di surat kabar Nasional: analisis objektivitas pemberitaan kasus konflik antara Ahmadiyah dengan FPI di surat kabar Kompas, Jawa Pos, Republika, dan Suara Pembaruan*, Bachelors thesis (Petra: Christian University, 2009), <http://cipg.or.id/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/MEDIA-3-Kelompok-Rentan-2012.pdf>.

⁵⁰¹ <http://cipg.or.id/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/MEDIA-3-Kelompok-Rentan-2012.pdf>.

⁵⁰² https://www.liputan6.com/news/read/326954/lima-jemaat-ahmadiyah-garut-bertobat?related=dable&utm_expid=.9Z4i5ypGQeGiS7w9arwTvQ.I&utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.co.nz%2F.

⁵⁰³ <https://www.republika.co.id/berita/dunia-islam/islam-nusantara/13/05/21/mn4m38-kisah-jemaah-ahmadiyah-yang-kembali-ke-pangkuan-islam>.

entered Islam”. *Suara Islam* quoted the Minister as saying, “I cried the moment they uttered the *shahada*”. *Republika* reported that a group of Ahmadis had “repented” (*bertobat*), “returned to pledging the two sentences of the *shahada*,” and “return(ed) to the lap of Islam.”⁵⁰⁴

On the island of Lombok, the local newspapers extensively covered the Ahmadiyah attacks happening in many regions of the island and, in particular, dominated the front pages of the *Lombok Post*. The news coverage focused on the mainstream’s objection to having Ahmadiyah neighbours.⁵⁰⁵ The villagers put the blame on Ahmadiyah exclusivity and that they were trying to convert them and disseminate their teachings. Another prominent topic was narrating the local leaders’ demand for Ahmadiyah to stop being exclusive to prevent future chaos from happening.

While trying to keep the sources balanced, the news coverage on Ahmadiyah leaders and their response to the attacks was minimal compared to the space given to local leaders and villagers. The responses from Ahmadiyah leaders or lawyers were never on the front page and appeared rarely anywhere else. For example, after the attacks in Ketapang in 2005, there was a news item in the *Lombok Post* regarding Ahmadiyah leaders asking for a dialogue with the villagers and the religious leaders.⁵⁰⁶ Besides this, the rest of Ahmadiyah news was about the Ahmadiyah refugees and their daily life after being relocated from the villages.⁵⁰⁷ This situation was described by JAI spokesperson Firdaus Mubarik as a “trapped media”:

“I think those media are trapped ... The groups spreading the hate speech directed Ahmadiyah issues onto the deviant matter. This community is deviant, Ahmadiyah is heretical, (Ahmadiyah) is affiliated to different institutions, and the teachings are like that and so on. The media just go with the flow. They fail to see the other side of the coin; the victim’s perspective ... In practice, they assigned the wrong reporters. The reporters fail to build good access (with the victims). After the coverage, the reporters

⁵⁰⁴ Saskia Schäfer, “Ahmadis or Indonesians? The Polarization of Post-reform Public Debates on Islam and Orthodoxy,” *Critical Asian Studies* 50, no. 1 (2018): 22.

⁵⁰⁵ “Bupati Lotim Larang Ahmadiyah,” *Lombok Post*, 13 September 2002; “Perkampungan Ahmadiyah Diduga Diserang Massa,” *Lombok Post*, 11 October 2005; “BTN Ketapang Belum Kondusif,” *Lombok Post*, 22 October 2005; “Lombok Barat Bebas dari Ahmadiyah,” *Lombok Post*, 25 September 2002; “Rumah Ahmadiyah Masih Dijaga,” *Lombok Post*, 20 March 2006.

⁵⁰⁶ “Penasihat Hukum Ahmadiyah Ingin Dialog,” *Lombok Post*, 26 October 2005.

⁵⁰⁷ “Menengok Jamaah Ahmadiyah di Pengungsian,” *Lombok Post*, 14 September 2002; “Sebagian Jamaah Ahmadiyah Pilih Keluar Lombok,” *Lombok Post*, 19 September 2002; “Pendidikan AUS Keluarga Ahmadiyah Difikirkan,” *Lombok Post*, 29 September 2002.

return to the editor, the editor does not have a good perspective as well. The cycle continues. So long as this perspective is maintained, Ahmadiyah will always be reported as deviant.”⁵⁰⁸

In response to this, Ahmadiyah members see it as evidence that there is a bigger agenda behind their relocation. The acts of intolerance are not purely the initiative of the villagers, because “the villagers acted based on what they have been told”⁵⁰⁹ and “they do not have the control over media”.⁵¹⁰ In addition, the news putting Ahmadiyah in a disadvantaged situation in some ways builds Ahmadiyah’s strength, making them believe that things in the media are not always accurate.⁵¹¹ One of my informants confirmed their disappointment from Ahmadiyah’s point of view at the media reports, and she says, “In the past, we were shocked every time we watched the (TV) news, but now we get used to it”.⁵¹²

Most of the news coverage on the Ahmadiyah-mainstream tension post-1998 portrayed Ahmadiyah as the source of the attacks. This tendency is noticeable at the national and Lombok levels. Ahmadiyah is, reportedly, the deviant that is exclusive and tries to convert the villagers. Therefore, the news portrays Ahmadiyah as a sharply different entity from the majority Sasak-Muslim community. On the other hand, Ahmadiyah sees the news imbalance as proof of a systematic attempt to force them to compromise their faith.⁵¹³ This belief allows them to build strength, especially in overcoming antagonisms and opposition. For the majority of Ahmadis who I met, what the media presented regarding Ahmadiyah was very far from their understanding of reality. From the Ahmadis’ perspective, they are pious Muslims and not a deviant group.

⁵⁰⁸ “Menurutku media-media ini terjebak... Kelompok-kelompok syiar kebencian ini kan mendrive isu Ahmadiyah sebagai isu sesat. Agama ini sesat, Ahmadiyah kafir, memiliki insititusi yang berbeda, ajarannya seperti ini, dan seterusnya. Dan ternyata, media terdorong untuk mengikuti saja. Mereka gagal melihat sisi lain, dari perspektif korban. Itu dia masalahnya. Jadi, pertama perspektif media sudah salah ketika memandang persoalan itu secara global. Lantas, dalam praktiknya mereka juga salah menugaskan reporter. Nah, reporternya sendiri tidak membangun akses yang cukup baik [dengan pihak korban]. Kemudian setelah selesai liputan, [reporter] balik ke meja redaksi dan redaksinya juga tidak punya perspektif yang baik. Siklusnya terus begitu. Selama perspektifnya tetap semacam ini, Ahmadiyah akan terus dibilang melulu sesat” (Firdaus Mubarik, 6211, Juru Bicara JAI, Wawancara, 02/02/2012), in <http://cipg.or.id/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/MEDIA-3-Kelompok-Rentan-2012.pdf>, accessed 1 January 2018.

⁵⁰⁹ Interview with Soleh Ahmadi, July 2015.

⁵¹⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹¹ Aleah Connley argues that Ahmadiyah turns the tables by perceiving their advantageous situation as a strengthening factor for the community. The oppression and hostilities directed against them are proof of the right path they are following and they believe that the source of opposition is not originally from Indonesia, see Aleah Connley, “Understanding the Oppressed,” 29-58.

⁵¹² Interview with Awar, August 2015.

⁵¹³ Interview with Soleh Ahmadi, July 2015.

There was no Lombok media covering the Ahmadiyah story prior to Reformasi. This highlights that Ahmadiyah predominantly catches the media attention only after violent attacks took place. At the national and Lombok levels, it seems that what the media did not do was to ensure that the perspectives of Ahmadiyah were reflected in reporting as much as *Tuan Guru* and the Sasak-Muslim opinion did, so that Ahmadiyah's perspectives were given space in the media that allowed their voice to be heard. Nevertheless, most of the media reports, which appeared siding with the mainstream, have contributed to circulating the idea of Ahmadiyah's 'deviant' identity in contrast to the ideal Sasak-Muslim identity.

Sub-Local Explanations: Tuan Guru's Revival

The specific timing of the outbreak of violent conflict indicates that different sources of religious authority alone are not sufficient to explain the harsher attitude of the mainstream towards Ahmadiyah after the regime change in 1998. The tension between the majority Muslims and Ahmadiyah in Indonesia is not solely due to the different interpretations of the scriptural verses on the finality of the prophethood. Indeed, we must anticipate the presence of triggering factors behind the emergence of hostility and violence towards Ahmadiyah in post-1998 Indonesia. While registering the similar background to that of the national level, this thesis underlines that for the Lombok case there is a peculiar local context behind the emergence of post-1998 intra-faith conflicts involving Ahmadiyah. The mainstream perception on Ahmadiyah's exclusivity and the alleged conversion threat of Ahmadiyah's teaching are two prominent local contextual factors behind the emergence of violence against the Ahmadiyah community. I will deliberate on the details of these specific sub-local factors in each of the three villages, to further stress the importance of paying close attention to local factors behind communal and religious violence.

As noted by Guy Elcheroth and Stephen Reicher, "Violence is always sporadic and requires close attention to the immediate context in order to understand how, why and when tolerance turns to violence and *vice versa*".⁵¹⁴ Khalil Anani argues that identity construction is defined by the agency of individual actors and the social context in which they operate.⁵¹⁵ I contextualise these deliberations through the dynamics of Ahmadiyah and Sasak-Muslim

⁵¹⁴ Guy Elcheroth and Stephen Reicher, *Identity, Violence and Power Mobilising Hatred, Demobilising Dissent* (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2017), 17.

⁵¹⁵ Khalil al-Anani, *Inside the Muslim Brotherhood: Religion, Identity, and Politics* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016), 34.

relations in post-1998 in Lombok. Understanding the sub-local context surrounding the hostility towards Ahmadiyah in Lombok requires close attention to the dynamic of Lombok's local religious institutions: *Tuan Guru* and NW.

Focusing on religious authority is useful for my analysis because it is a shorthand to explain some very fundamental differences between mainstream-Muslims and Ahmadiyah on the island. For the purpose of this thesis, I concur with Krämer and Schmidtke's definition of religious authority. They say, "Like any kind of authority, religious authority does not denote a fixed attribute, but is premised on recognition and acquiescence. Put differently, it is relational and contingent,⁵¹⁶ which is exactly the phenomenon that we can see in Lombok and the way Muslims there position *Tuan Guru*."

Following Weber's concept, Gudrun Krämer and Sabine Schmidtke propose that authority is linked to the notion of legitimacy and the concept of trust.⁵¹⁷ Religious authority can be attributed to individuals, groups of people, or institutions.⁵¹⁸ This authority poses certain criteria and it may pass through generations or be personally achieved.⁵¹⁹ Nonetheless, religious actors are effectively and convincingly authoritative only when others willingly respect and obey them.⁵²⁰ Within this framework, religious authority is intertwined with charisma.⁵²¹ Therefore, *Tuan Guru's* charisma relies heavily on recognition and acceptance. Charisma is also contingent and subject to modification, especially if there is an adjustment in precondition or criteria that previously generated acceptance.

Kingsley (2012) mentions that there are two types of *Tuan Guru*: *Tuan Guru Belek* (Big) and *Tuan Guru Lokal* (Local). There has not been any study on the impact of the *Tuan Guru Belek* and *Tuan Guru Lokal* division on the relationship of mainstream-

⁵¹⁶ Gudrun Krämer and Sabine Schmidtke, *Speaking for Islam: Religious Authorities in Muslim Societies*, 2.

⁵¹⁷ Gudrun Krämer and Sabine Schmidtke, *Speaking for Islam*, 1. For a fuller account on religious authority and charisma see also, Daphna Ephrat and Meir Hatina (eds), *Religious Knowledge, Authority, and Charisma: Islamic and Jewish Perspectives* (Utah: University of Utah Press, 2014); Liyakatali Takim, *The Heirs of the Prophet: Charisma and Religious Authority in Shi'ite Islam* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006).

⁵¹⁸ Gudrun Krämer and Sabine Schmidtke, *Speaking for Islam*, 2.

⁵¹⁹ Ibid.

⁵²⁰ Ibid.

⁵²¹ Ibid.

Ahmadiyah in post-1998 Lombok. For the purpose of this thesis, the highest-ranking *Tuan Guru* among the *Tuan Guru Belek* group is called *Datu Tuan Guru Belek*.⁵²²

I also mentioned in Chapter 2 that association with NW, Lombok's biggest mass Islamic organisation, enables *Tuan Guru* to have a wider public acceptance because of the NW's broad student and school networks.⁵²³ Indeed, *Datu Tuan Guru Belek* in post-Independence Lombok was the founder of NW. The death of the NW founder in late 1997 marked the competition among *Tuan Guru* for a *Datu Tuan Guru Belek* seat on the island. I argue that the competition among *Tuan Guru* is crucial in explaining the motives behind the outburst of religious violence in Lombok after the departure of Suharto. I will explicate this through the description of attacks on Ahmadiyah in Pemongkong and Ketapang. I frame the attacks in Pemongkong in 1998 and the attacks on the Ahmadiyah community in 2002 in Pancor as part of *Tuan Guru's* struggle to resume the highest position of religious authority on the island.

1. *Amphibi*: A Challenge from Tuan Guru Sibawaih Mutawalli

Pemongkong fits the category of *Waktu Lima Plus* region. The most influential *Tuan Guru* who lives in this area is Tuan Guru Sibawaih Mutawalli. He is the son of Tuan Guru Mutawalli al-Kalimi, one of Lombok's most charismatic *Tuan Gurus* after the founder of NW.⁵²⁴ After Tuan Guru Mutawalli al-Kalimi's death (1984), Tuan Guru Sibawaih Mutawalli (d. 2015) continued preaching in Jerowaru and in 1999, and established a paramilitary group named *Amphibi*. Although having some schools around Jerowaru, it seems that NW cannot surpass Tuan Guru Sibawaih Mutawalli's charisma and authority in this region.⁵²⁵ Tuan Guru Sibawaih Mutawalli's charisma was demonstrated by the rocketing number of *Amphibi* members only months after its establishment.⁵²⁶ This increasing number of *Amphibi* members signaled Tuan Guru Mutawalli's change of status from a *Tuan Guru Lokal* in Jerowaru to a *Tuan Guru Belek*.

The 1998 attacks in Pemongkong-Keruak, where the late Tuan Guru Sibawaih Mutawalli resided, was one of the earliest attacks on Lombok's Ahmadiyah community.

⁵²² See pages 53-54 of this thesis.

⁵²³ For more detail, refer to Chapter 2 of this thesis.

⁵²⁴ Interview with Salim, October 2015.

⁵²⁵ Interview with Kahar, October 2015.

⁵²⁶ MacDougall, "Buddhist Buda or Buda Buddhist?," 62.

The attacks on Ahmadiyah post-Suharto started in Pemongkong village in the sub-district of Keruak, East Lombok on 1 October 1998. In one Ahmadiyah NTB document titled “Tragedy Ahmadiyah Lombok”, it is reported that Ahmadiyah members were saved after leaving the area “under the influence” of Tuan Guru Sibawaih Mutawalli, the founder of *Amphibi*.⁵²⁷ Furthermore, the Ahmadiyah document mentions that in late 1996, Tuan Guru Sibawaih Mutawalli in some of his sermons said that Ahmadiyah was a deviant group that destroyed Islam and was more dangerous than Christianity.⁵²⁸ This indicates two things. First, the report specifically describes the character of Tuan Guru Sibawaih Mutawalli’s residential area as a ‘non-Ahmadiyah friendly’ region. Secondly, it points to the substance of Tuan Guru Sibawaih Mutawalli’s sermons cornering Ahmadiyah. These sermons encourage an examination of the importance of the Ahmadiyah’s conflict for Tuan Guru Sibawaih Mutawalli.

My findings in the field confirm that the NW founder is a *Datu Tuan Guru Belek*. The balance of power among *Tuan Guru* seemed like it was shaken once the NW founder (Tuan Guru Pancor) passed away in 1997 aged 93. The death of Tuan Guru Pancor was a shock for NW, mainly because he left no will regarding his spiritual heir. At the same time, his departure left the *Datu Tuan Guru Belek* seat empty. The power struggle within NW after the death of Tuan Guru Pancor weakened the organisation. This also opened the door for those who wanted to challenge NW’s dominance in Lombok as well as gain the status of *Datu Tuan Guru Belek*. I argue that these processes are closely related to the emergence of the intra-faith conflicts involving Ahmadiyah on the island starting in 1998.

Tuan Guru Sibawaih Mutawalli’s antagonistic speeches against Ahmadiyah and the establishment of *Amphibi* need to be analysed against this background. The speeches and the establishment of *Amphibi* indicate three important points. First, *Amphibi*’s success in recruiting substantial numbers of members in a relatively short time indicates that Tuan Guru Sibawaih Mutawalli had successfully established his authority as a prominent religious leader and security guarantor far beyond his residence.⁵²⁹ This was vital for Tuan Guru Sibawaih Mutawalli because wider public acceptance is the main prerequisite for achieving the status of a *Tuan Guru Belek*. Furthermore, *Amphibi* is a group that

⁵²⁷ Interview with Jauzi Zaedar, July 2015.

⁵²⁸ Interview with Karim (pseudonym), September 2015; see also Ahmadiyah Report, “Tragedi JAI Lombok.”

⁵²⁹ To get the vest, a new member had to pay around \$NZD15, but this did not stop people from joining *Amphibi*; interview, Soleh, October 2015.

successfully transformed the identity of most of its members from their dark past, such as thugs, into Sasak heroes. Under the leadership of a *Tuan Guru*, *Amphibi*'s image is not just a mere paramilitia but more like a righteous-religious-paramilitia group. This shows in the members' pride in their special vest uniforms. This vest, for some *Amphibi* members, makes them feel psychologically protected or strengthened after the vest has received a special prayer from Tuan Guru Sibawaih Mutawalli.⁵³⁰ Other members literally believed that a vest that had been blessed by Tuan Guru Sibawaih Mutawalli would make the vest impenetrable by a person or weapon.⁵³¹ The charisma of Tuan Guru Sibawaih Mutawalli is therefore clearly demonstrated through the strong faith *Amphibi* members had regarding the protective power of the vest.

Secondly, the anti-Ahmadiyah discourses, the attacks and the subsequent relocation of six Ahmadiyah families from Pemongkong to Pancor were crucial events that elevated Tuan Guru Sibawaih Mutawalli's popularity.⁵³² The establishment of *Amphibi* and its accomplishment in punishing criminals in many Lombok regions may have sent a clear signal that Tuan Guru Sibawaih Mutawalli cared for the safety of Lombok's residents. Previous studies note the rise of criminals, thieves and thugs in Lombok during the early years of the Reform Era. *Amphibi* was established when the public trust of the security apparatus was at its lowest point. The formation of *Amphibi* appeared to be an effective answer to safety, one of the most basic human needs. Even though NW's paramilitia *Satgas Hamzanwadi* was established one year earlier than *Amphibi*, NW at that time was mostly preoccupied by its internal conflicts. It is noteworthy that conflict within NW started to reach its peak in 1999, which coincidentally was *Amphibi*'s formation year. This opens the possibility of linking the 1998 attacks on Ahmadiyah in Pemongkong with the internal clashes within NW.

Tuan Guru Sibawaih Mutawalli's speeches, which positioned Ahmadiyah instead of *Islam Wetu Telu* as the 'other' against Sasak-Muslims, may be interpreted as directly attacking NW. There is no *Islam Wetu Telu* community in Pancor. The most noticeable heterodox group in Pancor was Ahmadiyah which, growing in numbers and a presence in NW headquarters for more than three decades, positioned Ahmadiyah as the threatening deviant meaning to undermine NW's commitment to protect Sasak-Muslims from different

⁵³⁰ Interview with Kendi (pseudonym), October 2015.

⁵³¹ Interview with Jago (pseudonym), October 2015.

⁵³² MacDougall, "Buddhist Buda or Buda Buddhist?," 62.

religious doctrines and practices. As reflected in the post-1998 MUI's *fatwas*, policing conformity of religious doctrine of the *traditionist* is part of the MUI's strategy in reviving and maintaining their religious authority. In this vein, *Tuan Guru* share similar policing duties with the MUI. Failing to do so may have resulted in declining public acceptance. The public's acceptance is the main source of the *Tuan Guru's* authority in Lombok.

Having said that, Tuan Guru Sibawaih Mutawalli's father was an influential *Tuan Guru* in Jerowaru, which means that he was also of virtuous lineage descent.⁵³³ Furthermore, his rising popularity after the establishment of *Amphibi* is an essential factor to consider in weighing the prospect of the *Amphibi's* founder's actions in influencing Sasak-Muslims back then. I argue that the raids on the Pancor Ahmadiyah community in 2002 may equivalently be interpreted as NW's response to those who would like to challenge its supremacy in Lombok and discuss this in detail below.

2. Attacks in Pancor, 2002: Killing Two Birds with One Stone

Pancor is the second largest city in East Lombok after Selong, the capital. It is where NW was founded and continues as the headquarters of the biggest Islamic organisation in Lombok. The city is also where Ahmadiyah was first introduced in Lombok in the early 1970s. Almost two decades later, in early September 2002, there were around 1,000 people destroying the Ahmadiyah mosque.

Tuan Guru is the backbone of NW. After the split within NW in 1998, many new figures of *Tuan Guru* immediately came out in public. Before that, people of Pancor knew only one *Tuan Guru*, the founder of NW, Tuan Guru Pancor. The other elites within NW were the only ones to receive the title of *ustadz* (religious teacher).⁵³⁴ It was reported that there had been an escalating number of new *Tuan Guru* within NW during the internal turmoil in 1998-2000.⁵³⁵ This shows that both R1 and R2 needed more *Tuan Guru* to support their claims as the legitimate heirs of NW. As the conflicts intensified between R1 and R2 supporters, R2 reported several attempts to challenge her authority over NW by R1. However, over time R1 overpowered R2, verified by the relocation of the latter's headquarters from Pancor to the village of Anjani. A journalist from *Suara NTB* said that

⁵³³ Pemongkong is only 35 kilometres from Pancor.

⁵³⁴ Interview with Ainun, September 2015.

⁵³⁵ Saipul Hamdi and Bianca J. Smith, "Sisters, Militias and Islam in Conflict: Questioning 'Reconciliation' in Nahdlatul Wathan, Lombok, Indonesia," *Contemporary Islam* 6 (2012): 33.

prior to the relocation in 2000-2001, there was a “systematic cleansing” of R2’s supporters from Pancor city, which frequently involved violence.⁵³⁶

Similarly, from the Ahmadiyah’s perspective, the 2002 attacks were well organised because the perpetrators successfully attacked different locations from 10-12 September.⁵³⁷ It is worth noting that in September 2002, when attacks on Ahmadiyah took place, Pancor was a city whose populous were loyal to R1. I mentioned in Chapter 3 that United Youth of Pancor (PPB) is a mass organisation that actively promoted the exclusion of Ahmadiyah from Pancor in 2002. It would be hard to dismiss the R1 faction’s involvement during the conflicts, especially when some of its members are those who initiated the revival of PPB in recent years.⁵³⁸

The connection between PPB and R1 is an important clue in explaining the motive of the 2002 attacks. Ahmadiyah conflicts in Pancor had more likely helped NW Pancor (R1) to address its three main issues. First, to validate R1’s position as the legal heir of NW. Reportedly, none of the activists of PPB was arrested. Furthermore, coordinated responses from the police and local government asking Ahmadiis to “leave Ahmadiyah” was a clear signal that besides support from the populous, the government and the police in Pancor were also not against the relocation of Ahmadiyah from the village. Hence, the attacks could act as a public declaration that R1 had full control over Pancor. Thus, it would be pointless for R2 to continue to challenge R1’s authority in NW’s birthplace.

Secondly, to show NW’s commitment (under R1’s faction leadership) to guard the Muslim community from the ‘non-standard’ religious teaching. This was evident in NW Pancor’s commitment to remove Ahmadiyah from NW’s headquarters. Ensuring Ahmadiyah no longer exists in Pancor is a signal to cleanse the city and maintain Pancor’s status as a ‘pious’ area. The relocation of Ahmadiyah may have acted as a powerful mark of distinction between the ‘new’ and the ‘old’ Pancor once R1 took over Pancor completely. It was the transformation of Pancor from a city that had been home and headquarters to Ahmadiyah for more than three decades to an Ahmadiyah-free city, which marked R1’s victory. It also dismisses any doubt of NW’s commitment and ability to protect Lombok’s

⁵³⁶ Interview with a local journalist of *Suara NTB*, September 2015.

⁵³⁷ Interview with Awar, Nur and Soleh Ahmadi, August 2015.

⁵³⁸ <http://medianahdlatulwathan.blogspot.co.nz/2013/03/pancor-bersatu-kembali-digagas.html>, accessed 17 May 2017. PPB is one mass organisation that actively showed its support for Zulkiflimansyah-Siti Rahmi Djalilah, one of the NTB province governor candidates in 2018. Siti Rahmi Djalilah is the granddaughter of the NW’s founder, see <http://lombokita.com/pemuda-pancor-bersatu-komit-menangkan-fiddin-dan-zul-rohmi/>, accessed 1 April 2018.

Muslim community from the ‘deviants’. Therefore, the Ahmadiyah relocation from Pancor was meant to counter the challenge from Tuan Guru Sibawaih Mutawalli of Pemongkong. This could only be done properly once NW’s domestic disputes were settled. This may help explain the four-year gap between attacks in Pemongkong (1998) and Pancor (2002).

Thirdly, commanding a wide network of students and schools across Lombok that were connected to headquarters in Pancor acted as an announcement of status as the legal heir of NW. R1 and R2 both know that they will never be a true NW leader because of their sex. However, attaining the status of a legitimate heir was imperative for both. Being a legitimate heir would subsequently entail the right to transfer the NW leadership to their sons; Muhammad Zainul Majdi (R1’s son) or Lalu Gede Muhammad Zainuddin Ats-Tsani (R2’s son). The heir then reserves the right to be called “Tuan Guru Bajang” (TGB). The legal heir could then expect to lead NW and carry on their grandfather’s supreme authority. If these motives were involved, the attacks on the Ahmadiyah community in 2002 were like “killing two birds with one stone”. It established R1’s and then her son’s authority in Pancor by defeating R2. This was also a declaration of the presence of another strong candidate (TGB) for the *Datu Tuan Guru Belek’s* throne besides Tuan Guru Sibawaih Mutawalli.

The intercorrelation between the attacks in Pemongkong and Pancor strongly indicates that there was a power vacuum at the local level after the death of Tuan Guru Pancor in late 1997. This acted as a fertile ground for competition among religious leaders. The death of Tuan Guru Pancor, which coincidentally came only six months before the downfall of Suharto, was a local occurrence that provided the setting for the battle between Tuan Guru Sibawaih Mutawalli and the future leader of NW to be Lombok’s most prominent *Tuan Guru*. Within this power struggle framework, a redefinition of Sasak-Muslim identities was a project that was central to both sides (Tuan Guru Sibawaih Mutawalli and the legal heir of NW) to establish and strengthen their authority as the most influential religious leader in post-Reformasi Lombok. Within this project, Ahmadiyah is central in defining the ‘other’ *vis à vis* the Sasak-Muslim community. The presence of Ahmadiyah allows the *Datu Tuan Guru Belek* candidates to deliver their vision of an ideal Lombok Muslim community. This, in turn, has strengthened Tuan Guru Sibawaih Mutawalli and TGB’s authority over Muslims on the island.

Next, I will look into the attacks on Ahmadiyah in Ketapang. The Ketapang case shows two important things. First, the absence of a prominent *Tuan Guru* in Ketapang led to an agreement of ‘no-Ahmadiyah proselytization’ between the village leaders and

Ahmadiyah leaders prior to Ahmadis moving to the village in 2004. Secondly, the anti-Ahmadiyah discourses in Ketapang shared a similar spirit to those in Pancor and Pemongkong. I will elaborate on this further from the viewpoint of the *Waktu Lima Plus Tuan Guru* and *Waktu Lima* Neutral regional division.

3. Ketapang Case: No-Proselytization

This village fits the category of *Waktu Lima* Neutral and most of its residents are *Waktu Lima* followers. There is no single dominant religious authority here, instead there are several *Tuan Guru* regularly visiting and giving their sermons. Similarly, there is no dominant Islamic mass organisation. There is a NW school and a non-NW Islamic boarding school in the village, and most of the teachers in the boarding school are affiliated with a boarding school in Kediri, West Lombok. There was very little evidence to show that the attacks on Ahmadiyah in Ketapang were related to competition for a *Datu Tuan Guru Belek* seat.

Unlike Pancor and Pemongkong, in Ketapang there were three attacks on the Ahmadiyah community. The first one took place in 2005, two years after Ahmadiyah's arrival in the village. Then, there were subsequent attacks in 2006 and 2010. These make the pattern of attacks on Ahmadiyah in Ketapang different from those in Pancor and Pemongkong. I understand this variation in the rate of recurrence to relate to the existence or absence of a dominant religious authority in a particular village.

The second and the third attacks (2005, 2006) were due to Ahmadiyah's resolution to stay in Ketapang. Ahmadis refused to obey the villagers' demand to leave Ketapang in 2006 before they were forcefully relocated to the refugee barracks in Mataram. In 2010, Ahmadis made an attempt to return to, and rebuild, their houses in Ketapang, which then caused the third attack. However, there is no record of Ahmadiyah members' effort to return to Pancor and Ketapang. Ketapang may have appeared to be the last chance for Ahmadiyah's members to have a proper place to live after the series of previous attacks in other places in Lombok. It is also noteworthy that there is no organised and trained paramilitia like *Amphibi* or *Satgas Hamzanwadi* of NW in this village.

In Ketapang, there was an agreement between the village leaders and Ahmadiyah leaders approving Ahmadiyah staying in the village as long as they did not preach to the rest of the villagers. Interestingly, my findings show that the mainstream's concern over the issue of conversion also materialised in Pancor, mainly regarding the Ahmadiyah

distributed pamphlet promoting their teaching across town. This is perceived by mainstream Muslims as Ahmadiyah's attempt to convert more members. One of the Muhammadiyah members in Pancor explained that in the late 1980s he often found pamphlets outlining the glory of Ahmadiyah teachings but had no idea who delivered them. The objection here is not limited to the content, rather it is to whom the pamphlets were sent. According to Syahrul, delivering the pamphlets to someone who clearly belongs to another religious organisation is not acceptable: "I felt annoyed that they tried to convert me to become an Ahmadi".⁵³⁹ In Pancor, you cannot proselytise to someone who has already made his or her choice of a particular religion. However, in contrast to Ketapang, there was no such 'no-proselytising agreement' upon Ahmadiyah's arrival in *Waktu Lima Plus* region, like Pancor and Pemongkong.

This indicates that in a *Waktu Lima Plus* region, the presence of a religious authority seems to preclude the need for a 'no-proselytising agreement'. The presence of *Tuan Guru* contributed to building the village's confidence that there is a religious institution responsible for guarding the village from any misguided teachings. Correspondingly, the absence of a dominant religious authority also meant the absence of a genuine religious guardian in a *Waktu Lima Neutral* place like Ketapang. This led to the Muslims in the village feeling insecure, preventing them from wholeheartedly and unconditionally welcoming a minority heterodox group like Ahmadiyah. This then led to requesting an agreement prior to accepting Ahmadiyah in the village.

The agreement meant that the Sasak-Muslims expected the *Tuan Guru* to act as an agent ensuring the preservation of the *traditionist* core teachings. In their absence, a precaution like an agreement prohibiting proselytization of Ahmadiyah's doctrine needs to be undertaken. In addition, the recurrent attacks on Ahmadiyah in Ketapang also provide evidence of another important role of *Tuan Guru* for Sasak. This relates to the absence of a dominant *Tuan Guru* acting as peacemaker in the village. A study from Kingsley suggests that due to their authority, *Tuan Guru* may act as a peacemaker whenever conflicts arise.⁵⁴⁰ The absence of a religious authority makes it harder to control the recurrence of attacks. Together, the agreement and the repeated attacks confirm how significant the presence of a religious authority is in managing conflicts among Sasak-Muslims both in *Waktu Lima*

⁵³⁹ Interview with Syahrul, December 2015.

⁵⁴⁰ Jeremy Kingsley, "Peacemakers or Peace-Breakers? Provincial Elections and Religious Leadership in Lombok, Indonesia," *Indonesia* (April 2012): 75.

Neutral and *Waktu Lima Plus Tuan Guru* regions. Last, but not least, the agreement found in Ketapang's case also demonstrates that *Tuan Guru*'s significance as the guardians of Sasak-Muslims, within the context of opposition towards Ahmadiyah, is manifested in multiple forms at the sub-local levels.

Conclusion

In Lombok, both Islam *Waktu Lima* and *Islam Wetu Telu* hold the *traditionist* approach, which explains greatly why Sasak-Muslims consider *Islam Wetu Telu* part of Lombok's Muslim community. A different approach to the source of religious authority is the key element separating Ahmadiyah from the mainstream. The different interpretations of the verses on the finality of prophethood is also an issue that the conflict at the national level and Lombok have in common.

On the island of Lombok, the regime change followed by the Decentralisation Era provided the perfect timing to reinterpret local identity. Some scholars note that the revival of traditional ethnic political institutions and mobilisation of ethnic discourse in contests for political power are dominant in the aftermath of Suharto's departure,⁵⁴¹ which is also what the national and local factors share in common.

In Lombok, this is mainly about *Tuan Guru*'s revival as a religious institution which started after the death of the NW founder in late 1997. This revival was marked by strengthening the role of *Tuan Guru* as the guardian that ensures conformity of religious doctrine and practices on the island. *Tuan Guru* are the local yet powerful *jurists* in defining the Sasak-Muslim community identity boundaries.

Nevertheless, how these local Lombok factors are manifested at the sub-local levels may vary. In Pancor and Ketapang, Ahmadiyah became a hot topic among the mainstream only when the religious authority had the intention to make it so. Hasyim notes that series of *fatwas* set the "big tent" identities when MUI reasserted its political position and power

⁵⁴¹ Leena Avonius, "Reforming Adat: Indonesian Indigenous People in the Era of Reformasi," *Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology* 4, No. 1 (2003): 123-42; Christopher R. Duncan, "Reconciliation and Revitalization: The Resurgence of Tradition in Post-conflict Tobelo, North Maluku, Eastern Indonesia," *Journal of Asian Studies* 68, No. 4 (2009): 1077-1104; David Henley and Jamie S. Davidson, "Introduction: Radical Conservatism – the Protean Politics of Adat," in *The Revival of Tradition in Indonesian Politics: The Deployment of Adat from Colonialism to Indigenism*, (eds) Jamie S. Davidson and David Henley (New York: Routledge, 2007), 1-49; Tania Li, "Adat in Central Sulawesi: Contemporary Deployments," in *The Revival of Tradition in Indonesian Politics: The Deployment of Adat from Colonialism to Indigenism*, (eds) Jamie S. Davidson and David Henley (New York: Routledge, 2007), 337-70.

in post-1998 Indonesia.⁵⁴² Equally, defining the presence of ‘others’ and reformulating the Sasak-Muslim boundaries in Pemongkong and Pancor seemed to start taking place after the death of Tuan Guru Pancor or precisely when the *Datu Tuan Guru Belek* seat was vacant. This confirms that religious authorities’ existence is constantly contested.⁵⁴³ When there are specific circumstances entailing political opportunities to assume more power or to raise challenges to their authority, then the redefinition of identity and the articulation of ‘us’ and ‘other’ are equally essential in preserving and attaining more power.

In Ketapang, the case was slightly different. The presence of a regulation prohibiting Ahmadiyah to proselytise indicates that the absence of *Tuan Guru* in Ketapang led the villagers to equip themselves with a preventive measure against heterodox religious teachings. Nonetheless, this further confirms the significance role of *Tuan Guru* within the Sasak-Muslim community as local leaders guarding their boundary lines remain intact. This also confirms that local factors need to be taken into account in analysing the root of religious violence in post-1998 Lombok.

⁵⁴² Syafiq Hasyim, “The Council of Indonesian Ulama (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI) and Religious Freedom,” 7.

⁵⁴³ Erik H. Erikson, *Insight and Responsibility*, 12; Stuart Hall, Ethnicity,” 10; Stuart Hall, *Cultural Identity and Diaspora*, 225; Frederic Volpi and Bryan S. Turner, “Introduction: Making Islamic Authority Matter,” *Theory Culture Society* 24, no. 2 (2007):1-19.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter is to weave together the arguments of the earlier chapters into a cogent overall thesis argument that addresses the research questions posed and offers convincing and original explanations based on the evidence of my research. At this point, we return to the main thesis question, viz, how are we to account for the violence against Ahmadiyah and other religious communities on the island of Lombok and why did these attacks take place when they did? What were the causes? Why were communities that had lived peacefully alongside each other for decades the target of violence, enforced eviction and ongoing displacement? How are the conflicts related to similar acts across Indonesia in the years after the 1998 ‘democratic revolution’? Why would greater democracy bring inter-communal violence? How significant were local Lombok political, ethnic and religious realities to the outbreaks of violence? To answer this, I analysed three case studies of post-1998 violence attacks against Ahmadiyah in the Lombok villages: Pancor, Pemongkong and Ketapang.

I drew heavily on Kingsley’s works on *Tuan Guru*. His research has insightfully shed light on *Tuan Guru*’s political role during conflict management and the institution they run (*pesantren*). My work is equally interested in the religious dimension of *Tuan Guru* in their responsibility as religious authorities and their role in the identity redefinition of Sasak-Muslims in post-1998 Lombok.

My in-depth primary fieldwork has led me to a series of key conclusions about the reasons for the growing anti-Ahmadiyah opposition in post-Suharto Lombok. At the centre of these findings are the relationships between the sources of religious authority, a contingent local power vacuum, and the processes of regional and religious identity redefinition after the departure of Suharto. The connections between these factors shed light and generated a new interpretation of the intra-faith conflicts involving Ahmadiyah in Lombok and elsewhere. It is not simply about a power vacuum after the regime changed, but also a very specific local yet significant event that led to the revival of *Tuan Guru* as a religious authority. And again, it is not just a matter of agency but of radically different perceptions of identity that de-mark Ahmadiyah from mainstream-Muslims.

Sunni-Indonesian-Sasak-Muslims: Necessary Elements vs. Explanatory Variables

My study of the extant academic literature and field research demonstrate that theological motives are the necessary element that separate Ahmadiyah from mainstream Sunni-Muslims in Lombok, Indonesia, and across the Sunni-Muslim world more generally, and that behind those elements are radically different approaches to the sources of religious authority. In Chapter 1, this thesis adopted the model of three sources of religious authorities: *traditionist*, *rationalist* and *Islamic-mystical*. The *traditionist* approach is prominent across Sunni Islam and dominant within mainstream Indonesia, while Ahmadiyah fits within the *Islamic-mystical* approach. The fundamental difference between these two approaches is the belief that revelation and prophethood ended with the death of Prophet Muhammad.

A similar approach to the sources of religious authorities is a cause that the anti-Ahmadiyah in Lombok, nationally, and the wider-Sunni world share. For example, the anti-Ahmadiyah sentiment in other countries like Malaysia is focused on different interpretations of the finality of the prophethood of Muhammad. During its 1973 annual conference in Mecca, *Rabithah Alam al Islami* (The Muslim World League), an international non-governmental Islamic organisation based in Mecca, issued a *fatwa* declaring that Ahmadiyah was outside the Islamic fold. In essence the MUI's (*the Indonesian Ulama Council*) *fatwas* in 1980 and 2005, as well as the MUI's recommendation in 1984, confirmed that Ahmadiyah was outside the Muslim community. The official response from both NU and Muhammadiyah principally agreed that Ahmadiyah stood outside the Muslim community. Indeed, in 1929, Muhammadiyah was the first mass Islamic organisation in Indonesia to issue a *fatwa* declaring that those who believed prophethood continued were deviants.

The dominance of *traditionists* in Indonesia relates to the history of *ulama* and their close ties to the Middle East, especially Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Both places are centres of Sunni teachings and development. The work of Laffan, for example, highlights the importance of “intellectual links” between Cairo Islamic leaders during the colonial period.⁵⁴⁴ The close link of LPPI (Institute of Islamic Research and Assessment), which actively promotes an anti-heterodox group's campaign in Indonesia and Saudi Arabia, has

⁵⁴⁴ Michael Laffan, *The Makings of Indonesian Islam: Orientalism and the Narration of a Sufi Past* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011).

been reported in previous scholarly research.⁵⁴⁵ Similar patterns of linkages and relationships can be found in the background of numerous elites within the MUI in post-1998 Indonesia.

A parallel link is also found in Lombok. These global connections can be traced back to the history of *Tuan Guru*. In Chapter 2, I detailed an acknowledged precondition of gaining the title of *Tuan Guru* was to have resided for a period of time in regions outside Lombok in order to acquire religious knowledge. These ‘other regions’ have largely been understood as the Middle East. For instance, NW’s founder lived in Mecca for more than a decade before returning to Lombok to establish NW in 1953. His grandson, TGB, achieved his doctoral degree in Al Azhar University in Cairo. In July 2018, there was an International Ulama Conference in Mataram, Lombok attended by around 500 *ulamas* from around the world. One of the key speakers during the conference was Professor Dr. Ibrahim Al-Hudhud, Acting Rector of Al-Azhar University Cairo.⁵⁴⁶ The prevalence of the *traditionist* approach in Indonesia and Lombok is rooted in the Sunni stream, which most Indonesian Muslims adhere to. It is also historically linked to the places and networks where these prominent religious leaders received their education, therefore reinforcing and generationally renewing these connections and influences.

Nevertheless, my findings and analysis in Chapters 3 and 4 indicate that the theological motive alone is not sufficient to account for the dynamics of the mainstream-Muslims and Ahmadiyah relationships in Indonesia and Lombok. This thesis goes further and argues that the shift from non-violent aggression to the growing physical hostility against Ahmadiyah demonstrates that the motives for anti-Ahmadiyah sentiment are entangled in various contextual background realities. Therefore, the conflicts cannot be fully explained without taking into account the immediate local political context when and where the violent attacks actually occurred.

At the national level, close ties between the MUI’s elite and the Middle East was an important background to appreciate the essence of MUI’s *fatwas*, which are essentially maintaining the mainstream Sunni adherence to the *traditionist* approach. However, this needs to be considered and analysed concurrently with the power vacuum after Suharto’s

⁵⁴⁵ ICG Report, “Indonesia: Implikasi SKB (Surat Keputusan Bersama) Tentang Ahmadiyah,” Asia Briefing, Jakarta/Brussels, 2008; Ahmad Najib Burhani, “Fundamentalism and Religious Dissent: The LPPPI’s Mission to Eradicate the Ahmadiyah in Indonesia,” *Indonesia and the Malay World* 44, no. 129 (2016): 145-64.

⁵⁴⁶ <https://www.republika.co.id/berita/dunia-islam/islam-nusantara/18/07/27/pcih7j313-konferensi-ulama-internasional-di-ntb-bahas-moderasi-islam>, accessed 5 February 2019.

resignation and the absence of an alternative dominant politico-social force to replace his authority. The regime change is widely claimed as the main cause of identity fragmentation across the country. At the same time, the new democratic freedoms opened opportunities for various ideologies to participate in the pursuit of what it means to be an Indonesian after the departure of Suharto.

In Chapter 3, I discussed the pursuit of identity as a significant factor in the revival of MUI as a religious institution with the authority to draw the Indonesian Muslim identity boundaries lines. I expanded the argument through the exploration of how the state approached religious policy. The Indonesian state approached religious policy with a bureaucratic outlook that imitated the politics of the colonial administration, which was always suspicious of political Islam.⁵⁴⁷ Meaning that after independence, the Indonesian government delegated vertically to a lower agency, which managed religion for its own political purposes. In this way, the state, particularly during the Suharto period, successfully thwarted the formulation of policies that would go against the central government's policy guidelines and ensured religious quiescence or agreement. Scholars like Felix Heiduk have argued that the New Order's power elite successfully promoted the status quo through co-optation of religious institutions.⁵⁴⁸ The pre-1998 relationship between MUI and the state is an example that supports this co-optation theory. Suharto established the MUI in 1975. During Suharto's regime, the MUI, by and large, was the government's de facto agent.⁵⁴⁹

The nature of the MUI's relationship with the state changed after Suharto's resignation.⁵⁵⁰ The political opportunity offered by Reformasi was utilised by the MUI to promote the agenda of formulating national guidelines for the Indonesian Muslim community. This was mainly reflected in the post-1998 MUI's *fatwas*. The *fatwas* were the main driver of the collective identity project for Indonesian Muslims, or what MUI called

⁵⁴⁷ Yuksel Sezgin and Mirjam Kunkler, "Regulation of 'Religion' and the 'Religious'," 463.

⁵⁴⁸ Felix Heiduk, "Between A Rock and A Hard Place: Radical Islam in Post-Suharto Indonesia," *International Journal of Conflict and Violence* 6, no. 1 (2012): 26-40.

⁵⁴⁹ Syafiq Hasyim, "The Council of Indonesian Ulama (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI) and Religious Freedom," Irasec's Discussion Papers, 12 December 2011, 25.

⁵⁵⁰ Norshahril Saat, *The State, Ulama and Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2018), 56; Ibrahim Abu Rabi' also claims that, "To a large extent, the power elite has also put to use some religious intelligentsia in order to promote the status quo in the eyes of the masses"; see also Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi', "Contemporary Islamic Intellectual History: A Theoretical Perspective," *Islamic Studies*, 44, no. 4 (2005): 507.

the “big tent” concept.⁵⁵¹ The big tent was a pathway to increased MUI political power.⁵⁵² It meant altering the old image of the Council, from government helper to the definitive national guide for the national Muslim community.⁵⁵³

The formulation of the guidelines for the Muslim community generates two demarcation lines. It is not merely about the pious and the deviant, but also about external ideologies that potentially challenge the Muslim community's ‘purity’. These were confirmed by the issuance of the MUI *fatwa* on what constitutes deviancy in 2007 and the *fatwa* of SIPILIS (secularism, pluralism and liberalism) in 2005.⁵⁵⁴

In the post-Suharto Era, the MUI’s manoeuvre seemed to correspond with the administration’s wish to secure support from the Council.⁵⁵⁵ This indicates that the extent of an agent like the MUI in exerting its authority to define religion and maintain the *traditionist* approach and its core beliefs in Indonesia mainly depends on how firm the government control over the MUI is. For example, the SKB on Ahmadiyah in 2008 seems to be a middle ground for accommodating the mainstream demand, as well as protecting their right to live in Indonesia. SKB prohibits violence towards Ahmadiyah, but at the same time contains a ban on Ahmadiyah propagating its teaching to non-Ahmadis. The prohibition of Ahmadiyah’s proselytization activities reflects the government’s assurance to the Sunni-mainstream that Ahmadiyah has, technically, minimal capacity to attract additional members. Further, SBY’s support of the MUI’s *fatwa* on Ahmadiyah was extended to similar groups who were against the *traditionist* core beliefs, like Gafatar.

Another noticeable implication of the possible cooperation between the state and the religious authority in post-1998 Indonesia is the renewal of Suharto’s legacy of ‘corporatist metaphors. Mary McCoy defines corporatism as “a political ideology that casts government and society as a harmonious whole wherein all divisions disappear and all

⁵⁵¹ Syafiq Hasyim, “The Council of Indonesian Ulama (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI) and Religious Freedom,” 25.

⁵⁵² Norshahril Saat, *The State, Ulama and Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia*, 56.

⁵⁵³ Tim Lindsey, “Monopolising Islam,” 256; Syafiq Hasyim, “The Council of Indonesian Ulama (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI) and Religious Freedom,” 7.

⁵⁵⁴ “... that makes the nation synonymous with the Islamic *ummat* (community of believers) and thus needing purification from Western values and internal heretical elements”. Mary E. McCoy, “Purifying Islam in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia: Corporatist Metaphors and the Rise of Religious Intolerance,” *Rhetoric and Public Affairs* 16, no. 2 (Summer 2013): 276.

⁵⁵⁵ The government under SBY who then occupied minority seats in the parliament wanted to advance their political and economic objectives through cooperating with, and supporting, MUI. Ibid.

interests converge”.⁵⁵⁶ The consequence of corporatism is the perception that “such unity was necessary to maintain stability in a nation of extraordinary ethnic, religious, and cultural diversity that made it inherently prone”, she argued, “to the outbreak of civil conflict”.⁵⁵⁷ Within this context, conformity is the main character of religious policies in Indonesia. The prominence of the phrase “to prevent social unrest” from the MUI and government officials when explaining the rationale of *fatwas* and joint decrees against the so-called deviant groups also needs to be understood against this background.

The complex background of post-1998 anti-Ahmadiyah sentiments in Lombok has been detailed in Chapter 4. After the departure of Suharto, Sasak-Muslims were concurrently pressured by a prolonged global, but nationally influenced, ideal of the *Umma* and a desire to strengthen local identity. In Lombok, this identity was partially defined by the rejection of Ahmadiyah beliefs. On the island, there is no further negotiation or discussion regarding the prophethood matter and thus no doubt of Ahmadiyah’s stance *vis á vis* the global *Umma*. Similar to the national pattern, theological issues are the key to the tensions between Lombok’s mainstream-Muslims and Ahmadiyah.

However, besides theological motives, we must examine and explore explanatory variables. That is, while there is evidence that these deep-rooted theological differences have led to discomfort and alienation between mainstream-Muslims and Ahmadiyah, they do not sufficiently account for the transition from religious dispute to religiously directed exclusion and violence. In parallel, theological motives do not provide adequate reason behind the shifting Sasak-Muslims’ perception of ‘other’ from *Wetu Telu* to Ahmadiyah.

Strengthening the ethno-religious character of local identities has been a trend in post-1998 Indonesia. Joseph Chinyong Liow argues that it is likely that many peripheral regions where the minority ethnicities reside were not represented during the formation of the foundation of the young republic in the mid-1940s,⁵⁵⁸ which was mainly owing to the uneven proportion of the vast number of ethnicities across Indonesia.⁵⁵⁹ Suharto’s departure and the identity redefinition trend that followed was an opportunity to fill this gap. The

⁵⁵⁶ Mary E. McCoy, “Purifying Islam in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia,” 277.

⁵⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁵⁸ Joseph Chinyong Liow, “Indonesia: Contesting Principles of Nationhood,” in *Religion and Nationalism in Southeast Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 179; see also Bertrand, *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia*, 5.

⁵⁵⁹ Ibid.

Reformasi and the implementation of the decentralisation policy opened opportunities for indigenous people to express themselves as such and rule in their own home.

The democratic freedom and decentralisation revived and re-envisaged Sasak identity. The absence of shared local customs between Sasak-Muslims and Ahmadiis was an important observation made during my research in the field. Both Ahmadiis and *Islam Wetu Telu* are deviant, according to MUI's 2007 deviancy guideline. However, Ahmadiyah's teachings have not been mixed with local culture the way *Islam Wetu Telu* teachings have. Unlike Ahmadiyah's teachings, *Islam Wetu Telu* teachings and origins contain strong elements of local cultures. For example, there are numerous festivals celebrated by *Islam Wetu Telu* that are also celebrated by *Islam Waktu Lima* such as *maulid nabi* (celebration of the birth of the prophet). The central role of local culture in securing the mainstream's positive response was further highlighted by the local government and *Tuan Guru's* perspective of *Islam Wetu Telu*. For the local government, *Islam Wetu Telu* is Lombok's cultural legacy that needs to be preserved. For *Tuan Guru*, *Islam Wetu Telu* are Muslims who need more religious enlightenment.

Intense signs of ethnicity were prominent in the emergence of anti-Ahmadiyah sentiments and actions in Reformasi Lombok. Nonetheless, like many regions in Indonesia, separation from the Indonesian Republic was not the goal of the redefinition of ethnic identity in post-1998 Lombok. Opposition to Ahmadiyah in post-Suharto Lombok is a primary boundary marker confirming that the Sasak-Muslim community shares a common perceived enemy with their Muslim counterparts in other regions. This explains the shift of Sasak-Muslim identity boundaries from *Waktu Lima* vs. *Waktu Telu* to become *Waktu Lima* vs. Ahmadiyah. *Islam Wetu Telu* trespasses some of the 10 guidelines of the deviancy by MUI (2007). However, the scope of *Islam Wetu Telu* is only in a few regions in Lombok and not throughout Indonesia. In contrast, Ahmadiyah's deviant status has been generally accepted in Indonesia. In post-1998 Lombok, positioning Ahmadiyah as 'others' makes Sasak-Muslims believe and understand that they are fit to be part of the larger national and global Sunni-Muslim community.

My fieldwork findings reveal there were issues related to two contrasting perceptions of identity between Ahmadiyah and Sasak-Muslims expressed mostly at the grassroots level. They range from differences in: Friday prayers; residential areas; marriage arrangements; and financial activities. My interviews show that together with the theological disputes, these grassroots issues mark two contrasting identity boundaries between Ahmadiis and Sasak-Muslims. They support the claim that the Ahmadiyah vs.

mainstream tensions are not just a matter of power play but of different identity perceptions. For example, for Ahmadis, donations are simply a good cause and endogamy is a fundamental step for creating pious future generations. On the other hand, donations and endogamous marriage are perceived by the mainstream as the manifestation of conversion intentions. In Chapter 4, I expounded the history of the perceived conversion threat through the financial guise of gifts and financial rewards that was associated with Christian missionaries. Indeed, the discourse portraying Ahmadiyah disseminating their teachings via financial gifts was prominent in post-1998 Lombok. This discourse was supported by the fact that Ahmadis had financial advantages compared to many mainstream villagers. The *chanda* contribution and support from Ahmadiyah's London headquarters at the same time helped to build the image of Ahmadiyah as a well-resourced organisation receiving overseas funding. The connection between 'donations' as a sign of 'conversion' is historically embedded in the Indonesian Muslim community. Therefore, this discourse was effective and convincing in linking Ahmadiyah presence as a living threat to the Muslim community. Another example is communal prayers. For the mainstream, performing prayers with the rest of the non-Ahmadis villagers is an essential element confirming the identity of a Muslim in Lombok. At the other end of the spectrum, performing communal prayers behind an Ahmadi *imam* only is the result of believing Ahmadiyah is the true *Umma*.

These contrasting interpretations of identity boundaries suggest that there should be a limit to our expectation of the inclusion of Ahmadiyah within the mainstream. Both grassroots and theological issues are identity markers for Ahmadiyah. Belief in the prophethood of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, prayer only behind an Ahmadi *imam*, and marriage to another Ahmadi are all integral to the identity of an Ahmadi. Consequently, the mainstream position that they should just join the majority to end the violence is not only unlikely but impossible for almost all Ahmadis. These explanatory variables have received little attention in the previous academic literature.

The new space of this mixed local, national and global Muslim-identity vision reinforces power structures, most notably the revival of *Tuan Guru*, on the island in a new way. Chapter 4 evidences that the violence against Ahmadis in Pemongkong, Pancor and Ketapang took place with each village displaying distinctive characteristics, thus confirming the presence of sub-local factors. The sub-local factors endorse three important points. First, *Tuan Guru* is the local agent ensuring that the post-1998 Sasak-Muslims' identity follows the national pattern of mainstream identity redefinition by opposing and

labelling Ahmadiyah as ‘other’. This, however, does not mean *Tuan Guru* are under the command of either one of the mainstream mass Islamic organisations or MUI. Most of *Tuan Guru* are neither Muhammadiyah nor NU. Indeed, association to NW, Lombok’s largest Muslim organisation, provides *Tuan Guru* with wide resources and public acceptance across the island.

Likewise, the revival of *Tuan Guru* is not just simply following the pattern of the revival of the MUI as a religious authority at the national level. The plausible connection between attacks on Ahmadiyah in Pemongkong and Pancor, elaborated on in Chapter 4, underlined that initially the revival of *Tuan Guru* in Lombok was not primarily about *Tuan Guru*’s position vs. the local government, but mainly a competition for the position of the most influential *Tuan Guru*. This was prompted by the contingent event of Tuan Guru Pancor’s death. The departure of Tuan Guru Pancor six months prior to the removal of Suharto reinforced the dispute within NW and the struggle to attain the *Datu Tuan Guru Belek* seat. The freedom Reformasi offered provided an opportunity for religious authorities to ensure that the conformity of doctrine and ritual was maintained. This, together with the vacant seats of NW’s top leader and *Datu Tuan Guru Belek*, made the revival of *Tuan Guru* as a religious authority more significant and noticeable.

In parallel, the Ketapang case demonstrates that a Memorandum of Understanding prohibiting proselytization acted as preventive measure to protect Sasak-Muslim boundary lines from heterodox teachings in the absence of *Tuan Guru*. Additionally, the absence of teaching dissemination efforts is an important factor for determining how two deviant groups received different treatment from Lombok’s mainstream-Muslims. In Chapter 3, I mentioned that proselytization activities are central for JAI. In contrast, within *Islam Wetu Telu* there are no proselytization activities to recruit new members. In Chapter 4, I argued that Sasak-Muslims live in *Waktu Lima Plus Tuan Guru* and *Waktu Lima Neutral* regions are equally against Ahmadiyah’s proselytization. In addition to theological differences and local religious leaders’ power competition, teaching dissemination and shared local culture are two factors that also influenced the mainstream perception of the so-called deviant groups. This combination makes the Lombok’s anti-Ahmadiyah cases unique.

Secondly, the revival of *Tuan Guru* contributed to the continuity of oligarchy practises evident during the Suharto Era. Within this patronage network, *Tuan Guru*’s influence increased after the removal of Suharto. In Chapter 4, I illustrated a strong indication of oligarchy, which Kingsley describes in his book as “a fabric of governance”,

in the attacks against Ahmadiyah in Pancor.⁵⁶⁰ The plausible benefits of the conflicts for NW, as well as the responses of the local elites and the police during the relocation of Ahmadis, seemed to concur with what the Ahmadis called an agreement between the bureaucrats, the police and NW leaders to relocate them from Pancor. Another example was the issuance of local laws banning Ahmadiyah activities by all regents and Mataram's mayor. The Pancor attacks and the local laws prohibiting Ahmadiyah activities indicate that the local bureaucrats were inclined toward building a harmonious relationship with *Tuan Guru*.

Finally, the later developments in Lombok show the rising influence of *Tuan Guru*, both as religious and political leaders, especially when the opportunity to rule in their own regions arrived after decentralisation. *Tuan Guru* became leading potential candidates to fill the top positions, mainly owing to their existing public profile arising from their mass networks. Besides this, *Tuan Guru* were also skilful indigenous actors among very few skilled Sasak politicians. *Tuan Guru* played a leading role during the rebellion against Dutch colonial rule and were subsequently involved in the patronage networks with the local elites pre- and post-1998. Besides the success of TGB in securing the gubernatorial seat for two consecutive periods (2008-2018), numerous *Tuan Guru* now serve as top Lombok bureaucratic leaders, such as regents and mayors, as well as parliamentary representatives. This demonstrates that the later development of *Tuan Guru's* revival in post-1998 Lombok was extended through both religious and political channels.

All this leads to my new explanation of how the national is inflected locally and can only be understood by reference to changes in local religious, ethnic and political identity. Violence is not always political or religious in nature. It is not so-called *traditionist* vs. *Islamic-mysticism* identities alone that prompts conflict. In Lombok, this identity formation was manifest in an extension and revival of the *Tuan Guru* as the prevailing politico-religious authority over the Sasak-Muslim community and guardian of the identity boundaries.

However, the central role of *Tuan Guru* does not mean that they always get what they want. The declining popularity of TGB after declaring his support for one presidential candidate in the 2019 election is a recent example. The Lombok's Ahmadiyah case shows that *Tuan Guru's* appeals to *traditionist* values are not likely to gain power on the ground

⁵⁶⁰Jeremy Kingsley, *Religious Authority and Local Governance in Eastern Indonesia* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2018).

if they are not informed by local knowledge. Even the most brilliant *Tuan Guru* creativities need to speak to villagers if they are to gain real acceptance. The strategy must resonate with local life if they are to be effective, which means taking ordinary people's fears and ethical values seriously. Within this framework, we can witness the effectiveness of linking Ahmadiyah's threat through proselytization activities and its relationship to donations, generating momentum and ongoing power.

This thesis reveals the importance of the predominance of local context as seen in my analytical categorisation of the different politico-religious contexts in Lombok and the impact this had on the violence. A previous study by Menchik focuses on "local genealogies" of tolerance culture within the prominent national mass Islamic organisations like Muhammadiyah, NU and Persis.⁵⁶¹ The Lombok Ahmadiyah case highlights the presence of the influential local mass Islamic organisation of NW which enriches the national-scale explanation of Menchik. Without undermining the significant contribution of Menchik's "path dependent" and "Godly nationalism" characteristics of Indonesian nationalism/democracy, which also partially makes up his explanation about hostility towards Ahmadiyah, this thesis reminds us that Menchik's national-scale explanation misses local variants.⁵⁶² Zainal Bagir's pioneering work on stages of communal conflicts in post-1998 Indonesia has proved to be valuable in my work. My case study in Lombok shows that Bagir's inter- and intra-faith conflicts divisions need to be further qualified in terms of local contexts.

The Lombok case is one of many Ahmadiyah local stories across Indonesia. To be accurate, the national picture needs the full stories from all regions. For example, the study of Ihsan Ali-Fauzi and Rizal Panggabean indicates that different tactical responses from the local police prior and during the attacks on Ahmadiyah would greatly impact the causalities level in different areas in West Java province.⁵⁶³ Another example is the anti-Ahmadiyah discourses in Ketapang, Lombok compared to those in Cikeusik, West Java. While mainstream-Muslims in both places are highly concerned by the proselytization

⁵⁶¹ Jeremy Menchik, *Islam and Democracy in Indonesia, Tolerance Without Liberalism* (Cambridge University Press, 2016); Menchik, "Productive Intolerance: Godly Nationalism in Indonesia," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 56, no. 3 (2014): 591-621.

⁵⁶² Ibid.

⁵⁶³ Ihsan Ali-Fauzi and Rizal Panggabean, *Pemolisian Konflik Keagamaan di Indonesia* (Jakarta: PUSAD Paramadina, 2014).

activities of Ahmadis,⁵⁶⁴ it is yet to be revealed whether conversion through marriage and financial rewards are also prevalent in Cikeusik. To prevent future violence, a deeper understanding of the local causes of conflict is needed. This deeper understanding of local circumstances provides a rich background for the analysis of the influence of national and international factors. Therefore, greater caution is needed to ensure that specific study of the unique characteristics of local communities is not neglected as a result of sweeping universal assumptions across many cultures and geographies.

⁵⁶⁴ For Cikeusik see, for example, <http://www.voaindonesia.com/read/indonesiana/2011/02/07/13159/bentrokan-cikeusik-terjadi-karena-jemaat-ahmadiyah-menantang-dan-bacok-warga/#sthash.LcTRvOQb.dpbs>. For Ketapang, see Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis.

Bibliography

- Abalahin, Andrew. "A Sixth Religion? Confucianism and the Negotiation of Indonesian Chinese Identity under the Pancasila State." In *Spirited Politics: Religion and Public Life in Contemporary Southeast Asia*, edited by Andrew Wilford and Ken George, 119-42. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publications, 2005.
- Abu-Rabt, Ibrahim M. "Contemporary Islamic Intellectual History: A Theoretical Perspective." *Islamic Studies* 44, no. 4 (2005): 503-26.
- Abuza, Zachary. *Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia* (Routledge, 2007).
- Ahmed, Manzooruddin. "Umma: The Idea of a Universal Community." *Islamic Studies* 14, no. 1 (1975): 27-54.
- Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat International. "Head of Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat Responds to Brutal Killings of Ahmadi Muslims in Indonesia: Hadhrat Mirza Masroor Ahmad Says That Perpetrators Will Be Answerable to God Almighty," 7 February 2011.
- Ahyar, Muzayyin. "Ahmadiyah Dalam Labirin Syariah Dan Nasionalisme Ketuhanan Di Indonesia." *Mazahib* XIV, no. 2 (December 2015).
- Amnesty International. "Re: Open Letter on the Displaced Ahmadiyya Community in Mataram, Lombok." London, 5 July 2010.
- Akkoyunlu, Karabekir. "Chapter One: Setting the Theoretical Framework." *The Adelphi Papers* 47, no. 392 (2007): 11-20.
- . "Chapter Three: Indonesia." *The Adelphi Papers* 47, no. 392 (2007): 45-64.
- Al Qurtuby, Sumanto. "Ambonese Muslim Jihadists, Islamic Identity, and the History of Christian-Muslim Rivalry in the Mollucas, Eastern Indonesia." *The International Journal of Asian Studies* 12, no. 01 (2015): 1-29.
- Al-Fitri. "Expanding a Formal Role for Islamic Law in the Indonesian Legal System: The Case of Mu'amalat." *Journal of Law and Religion* 23 (2007/2008): 249-70.
- Al Makin, "Returning to the Religion of Abraham: Controversies Over the Gafatar Movement in Contemporary Indonesia," *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations* 30, no. 1 (2019): 87-104.
- Al-Anani, Khalil. *Inside the Muslim Brotherhood: Religion, Identity, and Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.
- Ali-Fauzi, Ihsan and Rizal Panggabean. *Pemolisian Konflik Keagamaan Di Indonesia*. Jakarta: Pusat Studi Agama & Demokrasi (PUSAD) Paramadina, 2014.
- Anderson, Benedict. "Indonesian Nationalism Today, and in the Future." *Indonesia* 67 (April 1999).
- Anderson, John W. "Electronic Media and New Muslim Publics." In *The New Cambridge History of Islam*, edited by Robert Hefner, 648-60. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.

- Antlov, Hans. "Village Government and Rural Development in Indonesia: The New Democratic Framework." *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* 39, no. 2 (2003): 193-214.
- Anwar, Syamsul. "Fatwā, Purification and Dynamization: A Study of Tarjih in Muhammadiyah." *Islamic Law and Society* 12, no. 1 (2005): 27-44.
- Appleby, R. S. *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation*. Rowman and Littlefield, 2000.
- As'ad, Muhammad. "Ahmadiyah and the Freedom of Religion in Indonesia." *Journal of Indonesian Islam* 3, no. 2 (2009).
- Asgart, Sofian. "The Phenomenon of Paramilitary Organizations: Case Study of Six Organizations." In *Indonesia's Post-Suharto Democracy Movement*, edited by A.E. Priyono Stanley Adi Prasetyo, and Olle Tornquist. Jakarta: Demos, 2003.
- Aspinal, Edward. *Opposing Suharto*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005.
- . "When Religion Trumps Ethnicity, a Regional Election Case Study from Indonesia." *Southeast Asian Research* 19, no. 1 (March 2011).
- . *Islam and Nation Separatist Rebellion in Aceh, Indonesia*. Studies in Asian Security, 2009.
- . "Democratization and Ethnic Politics in Indonesia: Nine Theses." *Journal of East Asian Studies* 11, no. 2 (2011): 289-319.
- Assyaukanie, Luthfi. *Islam and the Secular State in Indonesia*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009.
- Baal, Jan van. *Pesta Alip Di Bayan*. Bhratara, 1976.
- Bagir, Zainal. "Advocacy for Religious Freedom in Democratizing Indonesia." *The Review of Faith and International Affairs* 12, no. 4 (2014): 27-39.
- Balzani, Marzia. "Dreaming, Islam and the Ahmadiyya Muslims in the UK." *History and Anthropology* 21, no. 2 (2010): 293-305.
- Barton, Greg. "Indonesia: Legitimacy, Secular Democracy, and Islam." *Politics and Policy* 38, no. 3 (2010): 471-96.
- . "Indonesia's Nurcholishmadjid and Abdurrahman Wahid as Intellectual Ulama: The Meeting of Islamic Traditionalism and Modernism in Neo-Modernist Thought." *Studia Islamika* 41 (January 1997).
- . "Neo Modernism: A Vital Synthesis of Traditionalist and Modernist Islamic Thought in Indonesia." *Studia Islamika* 2, no. 3 (March 1995).
- Bayat, Asef. "Islamism and Social Movement Theory." *Third World Quarterly* 26, no. 6 (2005): 891-908.
- Bates, Robert. "Modernization, Ethnic Competition and the Rationality of Politics in Contemporary Africa." In *State Versus Ethnic Claims*, edited by Donald Rothchild and Victor A. Olorunsola. Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1983.
- Beck, Herman L. "The Rupture Between the Muhammadiyah and the Ahmadiyya." *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 161, no. 2/3 (2005): 210-46.
- Beitinger-Lee, Verena. *(Un)Civil Society and Political Change in Indonesia: A Contested Arena*. Routledge, 2009.

- Bertrand, Jacques. "Legacies of the Authoritarian Past: Religious Violence in Indonesia's Mollucan Islands." *Pacific Affairs, University of British Columbia* (2002): 57-85.
- . *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia*. Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- Boland, B. J. *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia*. The Hague: Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal, Land- en Volkenkunde, 1982.
- Bondan, Molly. *In Love with a Nation*. C. Warner, 1995.
- Booth, Anne. "Economic Development, National Security and Political Accommodation in Indonesia in the New Order Era." In *ESRC Pacific Asia Programme Project on Security, Development and Political Accommodation in Pacific Asia Institute of Commonwealth Study*. London, July 1998.
- Bottomley, Daniel C. "The KTP Quandary: Islam, the Ahmadiyya, and the Reproduction of Indonesian Nationalism." *Contemporary Islam* (2014): 1-16.
- Bourchier, David. "Skeletons, Vigilantes and the Armed Forces: Fall from Grace." In *Reformasi: Crisis and Change in Indonesia*, edited by David Bourchier, 149-71. Melbourne: Monash Asia Institute, 1999.
- Bousfield, John. "Adventures and Misadventures of the New Sufis: Islamic Spiritual Groups in Contemporary Malaysia." *Sojourn: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia* 8, no. 2 (1993): 328-44.
- Bowen, John. *Islam, Law, and Equality in Indonesia: An Anthropology of Public Reasoning*. Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- Brauchler, Birgit. "Islamic Radicalism Online: The Mollucan Mission of the Laskar Jihad in Cyberspace." *The Australian Journal of Anthropology* 15, no. 3 (2004): 267-85.
- . *Cyber Identities at War: The Moluccan Conflict on the Internet*. Berghahn Books, 2013.
- Breidlid, Torhild. "The Legitimization of Violence Against Ahmadiyya Community in Indonesia." *Kawistara* 3, no. 2 (2013): 117-226.
- Bruinessen, Martin van, ed. *Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam, Explaining the "Conservative Turn"*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2013.
- . "Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia." *South East Asia Research* (2002): 117-54.
- . "Introduction: Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam and the 'Conservative Turn' of the Early Twenty-First Century." In *Contemporary Development in Indonesian Islam, Explaining the "Conservative Turn"*, edited by Martin van Bruinessen, 1-20. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2013.
- . "Overview of Muslim Organizations, Associations and Movements in Indonesia." In *Contemporary Development in Indonesian Islam, Explaining the "Conservative Turn"*, edited by Martin van Bruinessen, 21-59. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2013.
- Bubalo, Anthony and Greg Fealy. *Joining the Caravan? The Middle East, Islamism and Indonesia*. Lowry Institute Paper. Double Bay, New South Wales: Longueville Media, 2005.
- Bubandt, Nils. "Rumors, Pamphlets, and the Politics of Paranoia in Indonesia." *The Journal of Asian Studies* 67, no. 3 (2008): 789-817.

- Budiwanti, Erni. "Pluralism Collapses: A Study of the Jama'ah Ahmadiyah Indonesia and Its Persecution." *Asia Research Institute Working Paper Series No. 117* (2009): 1-26.
- . "The Purification Movement in Bayan, North Lombok Orthodox Islam Vis-À-Vis Religious Syncretism." In *Between Harmony and Discrimination: Negotiating Religious Identities within Majority-Minority Relationships in Bali and Lombok*, edited by C. Philipp E. Nothaft. Brill, 2014.
- . "Religion of the Sasak: An Ethnographic Study of the Impact of Islamisation on the Wetu Telu of Lombok." Monash University, 1997.
- Bufacchi, Vittorio. "Rethinking Violence." *Global Crime* 10, no. 4 (2009): 293-97.
- . "Two Concepts of Violence." *Political Studies Review* 3 (2005): 193-204.
- Burhani, Ahmad Najib. "The Ahmadiyya and the Study of Comparative Religion in Indonesia: Controversies and Influences." *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations* 25, no. 2 (2013): 141-58.
- . "Conversion to Ahmadiyya in Indonesia: Winning Hearts Through Ethical and Spiritual Appeals." *Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia* 29, no. 3 (2014): 657-90.
- . "Defining Indonesian Islam an Examination of the Construction of the National Islamic Identity of Traditionalist and Modernist Muslims." In *Islam in Indonesia: Contrasting Images and Interpretations*, edited by Jajat and Kees Van Dijk Burhanudin, 25-48. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2013.
- . "Fundamentalism and Religious Dissent: The LPPI's Mission to Eradicate the Ahmadiyya in Indonesia." *Indonesia and the Malay World* 44, no. 129 (2016): 145-64.
- . "Hating the Ahmadiyya: The Place of 'Heretics' in Contemporary Indonesian Muslim Society." *Contemporary Islam* 8 (2014): 133-52.
- . "Liberal and Conservative Discourses in the Muhammadiyah: The Struggle for the Face of Reformist Islam in Indonesia." In *Contemporary Development in Indonesian Islam, Explaining the "Conservative Turn"*, edited by Martin van Bruinessen, 105-44. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Nation, 2013.
- . "Transmission of Islamic Reform from the United States to Indonesia." *Indonesia and the Malay World* 41, no. 119 (2013): 29-47.
- . "Treating Minorities with Fatwas: A Study of the Ahmadiyya Community in Indonesia." *Contemporary Islam* 8 (2013): 285-301.
- . *When Muslims are not Muslims: The Ahmadiyya Community and the Discourse on Heresy in Indonesia*, PhD Thesis, University of California Santa Barbara, 2013.
- Burhanudin, Jajat and Kees van Dijk, eds. *Islam in Indonesia Contrasting Images and Interpretations*. Amsterdam University Press, 2013.
- Bush, Robin. *Nadhlatul Ulama and the Struggle for Power within Islam and Politics in Indonesia*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009.
- Butt, Leslie and Jessica Ball. "Strategic Actions of Transnational Migrant Parents Regarding Birth Registration for Stay-behind Children in Lombok, Indonesia." *Population, Space and Place* 25, no. 3 (2019): 1-9.

- Carmaz, Kathy. *Constructing Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide Through Qualitative Analysis (Introducing Qualitative Methods Series)*. Sage Publications, 2006.
- Castells, Manuel. *The Power of Identity*, 2nd ed. Blackwell, 2003.
- Cavanaugh, William T. *The Myth of Religious Violence: Secular Ideology and the Roots of Modern Conflicts*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
- Cederoth, Sven. *The Wetu Telu Religion of the Sasak on Lombok*. Gothenburg: Institutionen for globala studier, asien studier & Institutionen for globala studier, social antropologi, 2007.
- . "Return of the Birds: Images of a Remarkable Mosque in Lombok." *NIAS Nytt*, no. 4 (2004): 21.
- . *The Spell of the Ancestors and the Power of Mekkah*. Sweden: Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis, 1981.
- Choi, Nankyung. "Democracy and Patrimonial Politics in Local Indonesia." *Indonesia* 88 (2009): 131-64.
- Cohen, Stanley. "Moral Panics and Folk Concepts." *Paedagogica Historica: International Journal of the History of Education* 35, no. 3 (1999): 585-91.
- Colbran, Nicola. "Realities and Challenges in Realising Freedom of Religion or Belief in Indonesia." *The International Journal of Human Rights* 14, no. 5 (2010): 678-704.
- Connley, Aleah. "Understanding the Oppressed: A Study of the Ahmadiyah and Their Strategies for Overcoming Adversaries in Contemporary Indonesia." *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs* 1(2016): 29-58.
- Cribb, Robert. "Problems in the Historiography of the Killings in Indonesia." In *The Indonesian Killings of 1965-1966: Studies from Java and Bali*, edited by Robert Cribb, 25, 1990.
- Crouch, Melissa. "Indonesia, Militant Islam and Ahmadiyah: Origins and Implications." edited by Syari'ah and Governance ARC Federation Fellowship Islam, 1-20. The University of Melbourne, 2009.
- . "Judicial Review and Religious Freedom: The Case of Indonesian Ahmadis." *Sydney Law Review* 34, no. 3 (2012): 545-72.
- . *Law and Religion in Indonesia Conflict and the Courts in West Java*. London: Routledge, 2014.
- . "Law and Religion in Indonesia: The Constitutional Court and the Blasphemy Law." *Asian Journal of Comparative Law* 7, no. 1 (2012): 1-46.
- . "Regulating Places of Worship in Indonesia: Upholding Freedom of Religion for Religious Minorities?" *Singapore Journal of Legal Studies* (July 2007): 96-116.
- . "Shifting Conceptions of State and Religion: The Indonesian Draft Law on Interreligious Harmony." *Global Change, Peace and Security [Special Ed: State, Society and Religion in the Asia-Pacific]* 25, no. 2 (2013): 265-83.
- Davidson, S. Jamie. "Studies of Massive, Collective Violence in Post-Suharto Indonesia." *Critical Asian Studies* 41, no. 2 (2009): 329-49.
- Day, Tony, ed. *Identifying with Freedom, Indonesia after Suharto*. United States: Berghahn Books, 2007.

- Denoeux, Guilain. "The Forgotten Swamp: Navigating Political Islam." *Middle East Policy* (2002): 61.
- Departemen Penerangan R. I. "10 Tahun Majelis Ulama Indonesia." 1985.
- Dhofier, Zamachsjari. *Tradisi Pesantren: Studi Tentang Pandangan Hidup Kyai*. Jakarta: LP3ES, 1982.
- Dijk, Kees van. "Comparing Different Streams of Islam Wrestling with Words and Definitions." In *Islam in Indonesia: Contrasting Images and Interpretations*, edited by Jajat Burhanudin, and Kees van Dijk, 15-24. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2013.
- . "Islam and Socio-Political Conflict in Indonesian History." *Social Compass* 30, no. 1 (1984): 5-25.
- Duncan, Christopher. *Violence and Vengeance: Religious Conflict and Its Aftermath in Eastern Indonesia*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013.
- Dusche, Michael. "Muslim Identity vs. Political Liberalism." *International Journal on Humanistic Ideology* 5, no. 1 (2012): 37-54.
- Ecklund, Judith. "Tradition or Non-Tradition: Adat, Islam and Local Control on Lombok." Paper presented at the Annual Conference on Indonesia, Wisconsin, 1976.
- . "Marriage Seaworms, and Song: Ritualized Responses to Cultural Change in Sasak Life." Cornell University, 1977.
- Effendy, Bahtiar. *Islam and the State in Indonesia*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003.
- Elcheroth, Guy and Stephen Reicher. *Identity, Violence and Power Mobilising Hatred, Demobilising Dissent*. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2017.
- Elson, R. E. "Another Look at the Jakarta Charter Controversy of 1945." *Indonesia* (2009): 105-30.
- Emmerson, Donald K. "What Is Indonesia?" In *Indonesia the Great Transition*, edited by John Bresnan. United States: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2005.
- Erb, Maribeth, Priyambudi Sulistiyanto, Carol Faucher, eds. *Regionalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia*: Taylor and Francis, 2009.
- Erikson, Erik H. *Insight and Responsibility: Lectures on the Ethical Implications of Psychoanalytic Insight*. Faber, 1966.
- Escobar, Arturo. *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World*. Woodstock New York: Princeton University Press, 2011.
- Fahrurrozi, "Tuan Guru and Social Change in Lombok, Indonesia." *Indonesia and the Malay World* 46, no. 135 (2018): 119.
- Faizah. "Pergulatan Teologi Salafi Dalam Mainstream Keberagamaan Masyarakat Sasak." *Ulumuna* 16, no. 2 (2012): 375-402.
- Fealy, Greg and Greg Barton, eds. *Nahdlatul Ulama: Traditionalist Islam and Modernity in Indonesia*. Clayton: Monash University Asia Institute, 1996.
- Federspiel, Howard. "Modernist Islam in Southeast Asia." *The Muslim World* 92 (2002).
- . *A Dictionary of Indonesian Islam*. Ohio: Ohio University Center for International Study, 1995.

- . *Islam and Ideology in the Emerging Indonesian State: The Persatuan Islam (Persis), 1923 to 1957*. Netherlands: Brill, 2001.
- Feener, R. Michael. "New Networks and New Knowledge: Migrations, Communications and the Refiguration of the Muslim Community in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries." In *The New Cambridge History of Islam*, edited by Robert Hefner, 37-68. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.
- . *Shari'a and Social Engineering: The Implementation of Islamic Law in Contemporary Aceh, Indonesia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
- Fionna, Kathleen Azali and Ulla. "Research on Contemporary Indonesia: Complexities and Intricacies to Explore." *Sojourn, Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia* 30, no. 1 (2015): 227-55.
- Forrester, Geoff, ed. *Post-Soeharto Indonesia: Renewal or Chaos?* Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1999.
- Foucault, Michael. "The Order of Discourse." In *Untying Texts: A Post-Structuralist Reader*, edited by Robert Young, 52-61. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981.
- Friedmann, Yohanan. *Prophecy Continuous: Aspects of Ahmadi Religious Thought and Its Medieval Background* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989).
- Gardin, Ingela. *The Unknown Balinese. Land, Labour and Inequality in Lombok*. Goteborg, Sweden: Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis, 1982.
- Geertz, Clifford. *Life Among the Anthros and Other Essays*. Princeton University Press, 2012.
- . *The Religion of Java*. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1960.
- Gillespie, Piers. "Current Issues in Indonesian Islam: Analysing the 2005 Council of Indonesian Ulama Fatwa No. 7 Opposing Pluralism, Liberalism, and Secularism." *Journal of Islamic Studies* 18, no. 2 (2007): 202-40. Published electronically 20 February 2007.
- Goss, Jon. "Understanding the 'Maluku Wars': Overview of Sources of Communal Conflicts and Prospects for Peace." *Cakalele* 11 (2000): 7-39.
- Grossberg, Lawrence. "On Postmodernism and Articulation: An Interview with Stuart Hall." *Journal of Communication Inquiry* 10 (1986): 45-60.
- Gurses, Mehmet. "Islamists, Democracy and Turkey: A Test of the Inclusion-Moderation Hypothesis." *Party Politics* 20, no. 4 (2012): 646-53.
- Haan, Willem de. "Violence as an Essentially Contested Concept." In *Violence in Europe: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives*, edited by Sophie Body-Gendrot and Pieter Spierenburg, 27-40. New York: Springer, 2008.
- Hadiz, Vedi. *Localising Power in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia: A Southeast Asia Perspective*. Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2011.
- Hall, C. Michael, Dallen J. Timothy, David Timothy Duval. *Safety and Security in Tourism: Relationships, Management, and Marketing*. Routledge, 2012.
- Hall, Stuart, ed. *Cultural Identity and Diaspora*, edited by Patrick and Laura Chrisman, *Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory: A Reader*. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994.
- . "Ethnicity: Identity and Difference." *Radical America* 23 no. 4 (1989): 9-20.

- Hamayotsu, Kikue. "The Limits of Civil Society in Democratic Indonesia: Media Freedom and Religious Intolerance." *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 43, no. 4 (25 Mar 2013): 658-77.
- Hamdani, Denny. "Radical Muslim Groups and Confrontation to Church." In *International Symposium the Strategic Role of Religious Education in the Development of Culture of Peace Education*. Bogor, 2012.
- Hamdi, Saipul. "Ahmadiyah Di Era Reformasi." *Jurnal al-Ulum* 11, no. 1 (2011): 27-46.
- . *Nahdlatul Wathan Di Era Reformasi: Agama, Konflik Komunal Dan Peta Rekonsiliasi*. Yogyakarta: Kurnia Kalam Semesta (KKS), 2014.
- . "Politik Islah: Re-Negosiasi Islah, Konflik, Dan Kekuasaan Dalam Nahdlatul Wathan Di Lombok Timur." *Kawistara* 1, no. 1 (21 April 2011): 1-102.
- Hamid, Ahmad Fauzi Abdul. "The Aurad Muhammadiyah Congregation: Modern Transnational Sufism in Southeast Asia." In *Encountering Islam: The Politics of Religious Identities in Southeast Asia*, edited by Yew-Foong Hui, 66-100. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2013.
- Hamid, Sandra. "Engaging the Center: On Being Indonesian Citizens in Lombok, Eastern Indonesia." University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2005.
- Harnish, David D. and Brigitta Hauser-Schaublin. "Introduction Negotiating Religious Identities Within Majority-Minority Relationships in Bali and Lombok." In *Between Harmony and Discrimination: Negotiating Religious Identities Within Majority Minority Relationships in Bali and Lombok*, edited by C. Philipp E. Nothaft. Brill, 2014.
- Harnish, David. "Tensions between Adat (Custom) and Agama (Religion) in the Music of Lombok." In *Divine Inspirations: Music and Islam in Indonesia*, edited by David Harnish and Anne Rasmussen, 80-108. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Harsono, Andreas. "Indonesia's Religious Violence: The Reluctance of Reporters to Tell the Story," edited by Nieman Harvard. Harvard, 2012.
- Hasan, Noorhaidi. "Between Transnational Interest and Domestic Politics: Understanding Middle Eastern Fatwas on Jihad in the Moluccas." *Islamic Law and Society* 12, no. 1 (2005): 73-92.
- . "The Salafi Movement in Indonesia: Transnational Dynamics and Local Development." *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 27, no. 1 (2007): 83-94.
- Hasyim, Syafiq. "The Council of Indonesian Ulama (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI) and Religious Freedom." *Irasec's Discussion Papers* (December 2011).
- Hefner, Robert. *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000.
- . "Introduction: Muslims and Modernity: Culture and Society in an Age of Contest and Plurality." In *The New Cambridge History of Islam*, edited by Robert Hefner, 1-36. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.
- . "Public Islam and the Problem of Democratization." *Sociology of Religion* 62, no. 4 (2001): 491.

- . “The Study of Religious Freedom in Indonesia.” *The Review of Faith & International Affairs* 11, no. 2 (2013): 18-27.
- Heiduk, Felix. “Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Radical Islam in Post-Suharto Indonesia.” *International Journal of Conflict and Violence* 6, no. 1 (2012): 26-40.
- . “State Disintegration and Power Politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia.” *Third World Quarterly* 35, no. 2 (2014): 300-15.
- Hicks, Jacqueline. “Heresy and Authority: Understanding the Turn Against Ahmadiyah in Indonesia.” *South East Asia Research* 22, no. 3 (2014): 321-39.
- Hooker, M. B. *Indonesian Islam: Social Change through Contemporary Fatawaa*. Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 2003.
- . “Islam and Medical Science: Evidence from Malaysian and Indonesian Fatwas.” *Studia Islamika* 4, no. 4 (1997).
- Hosen, Nadirsyah. “Behind the Scenes: Fatwas of Majelis Ulama Indonesia (1975-1988).” *Journal of Islamic Studies* 15, no. 2 (2004): 147-79.
- . “Religion and the Indonesian Constitution: A Recent Debate.” *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 36(October 2005): 429-40.
- Howell, Julia Day. “Indonesia’s Salafist Sufis.” *Modern Asian Studies* 44 (2010): 1029-51.
- Hunter, Cynthia L. “Local Issues and Changes: The Post-New Order Situation in Rural Lombok.” *Sojourn* 19, no. 1 (2004): 100-22.
- Huntington, Samuel. “The Clash of Civilizations?” *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (1993): 22-49.
- ICG. “Indonesia: Implications of the Ahmadiyah Decree.” In *Asia Briefing*. Jakarta/Brussels: ICG, 2008.
- . “Indonesia: Implikasi SKB (Surat Keputusan Bersama) Tentang Ahmadiyah.” edited by Asia Briefing. Jakarta/Brussels, 2008.
- Ichwan, Moch. Nur. “Towards a Puritanical Moderate Islam: The Majelis Ulama Indonesia and the Politics of Religious Orthodoxy.” In *Contemporary Development in Indonesian Islam, Explaining the “Conservative Turn”*, edited by Martin van Bruinessen, 60-104. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2013.
- . “Ulama State and Politics: Majelis Ulama Indonesia after Suharto.” *Islamic Law and Society* 12, no. 1 (2005): 45-72.
- Ihsan Ali-Fauzi, Rudy Harisyah Alam, and Samsu Rizal Panggabean. *Pola-Pola Konflik Keagamaan Di Indonesia (1990-2008)*. Yayasan Wakaf Paramadina (Ywp), Universitas Gadjah Mada (MPRK-UGM). The Asia Foundation (TAF), 2009.
- Iqtidar, Humeira, “State Management of Religion in Pakistan and Dilemmas of Citizenship.” *Citizenship Studies* 16, no. 8 (2012): 1013-28.
- Jenkins, David. *Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics 1975-1983*. Ithaca: Cornell University.
- Justino, Patricia, Tilman Brück and Philip Verwimp. *A Micro-Level Perspective on the Dynamics of Conflict, Violence, and Development*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

- Kaptein, Nico J. G. "The Voice of the *Ulama*: Fatwas and Religious Authority in Indonesia." *Archives de sciences sociales des religions*, 49e Année, no. 125, *Autorités Religieuses en Islam* (Jan. - Mar., 2004), 115-130.
- Kelman, Herbert C. "The Place of Ethnic Identity in the Development of Personal Identity: A Challenge for the Jewish Family." In *Coping with Life and Death: Jewish Families in the Twentieth Century*, edited by Peter Y. Medding, 3-26. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.
- Kenney, Jeff. "The Politics of Sects and Typologies." *Nova Religio: The Journal of Alternative and Emergent Religions* 6(2002): 137-46.
- Kersten, Carool. *Islam in Indonesia*. London: Hurst & Company, 2015.
- . "Islam, Cultural Hybridity and Cosmopolitanism: New Muslim Intellectuals on Globalization." *Journal of International and Global Studies* 1, no. 1 (2009).
- Khan, Adil Hussain. *From Sufism to Ahmadiyya a Muslim Minority Movement in South Asia*. Indiana University Press, 2015.
- Khatab, Sayed. "Hakimiyyah and Jahiliyyah in the Thought of Sayyid Qutb." *Middle Eastern Studies* 38, no. 3 (July 2002): 145-70.
- Kingsbury, Damien. *The Politics of Indonesia*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.
- . "The Reform of the Indonesian Armed Forces." *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 22, no. 2 (2000): 302-21.
- Kingsley, Jeremy J. "Peacemakers or Peace-Breakers? Provincial Elections and Religious Leadership in Lombok, Indonesia." *Indonesia* (2012): 53-82.
- . "Redrawing Lines of Religious Authority in Lombok, Indonesia." *Asian Journal of Social Science* 42 (2014): 657-77.
- . "Tuan Guru, Community and Conflict in Lombok, Indonesia." PhD thesis, The University of Melbourne, 2010.
- . "Village Elections, Violence and Islamic Leadership in Lombok, Eastern Indonesia." *Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia* 27, no. 2 (2012): 285-309.
- . *Religious Authority and Local Governance in Eastern Indonesia*. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2018.
- Kingsley, Jeremy and Tim Lindsey. "Talking in Code: Legal Islamisation in Indonesia and the MMI Shari'a Code." In *The Law Applied: Contextualizing the Islamic Shari'a*, edited by P. Bearman, B.G. Weiss and W. Heinrichs, 295-320: I. B. Tauris, 2008.
- Klinken, Gerry van. *Communal Violence and Democratization in Indonesia: Small Town Wars*. London: Routledge, 2007.
- . "Indonesian Politics in 2008: The Ambiguities of Democratic Change." *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* 44, no. 4 (2008): 365-81.
- Kostic, Miomira. "Victimology: A Contemporary Theoretical Approach to Crime and Its Victim." *Law and Politics* 8, no. 1 (2010): 65-78.
- Kraan, Alfons van der. *Lombok: Conquest, Colonization and Underdevelopment, 1870-1940*. Singapore: Heinemann Educational Books (Asia), 1980.
- . "Selaparang Under Balinese and Dutch Rule: A History of Lombok 1870-1940." Australian National University, 1976.

- Kramer, Gudrun and Sabine Schmidtke, eds. *Speaking for Islam: Religious Authorities in Muslim Societies*. Leiden: Brill, 2006.
- Krause, Keith. "Beyond Definition: Violence in a Global Perspective." *Global Crime* 10, no. 4 (2009): 337-55.
- Laffan, Michael. "The Fatwa Debated? Shura in One Indonesian Context." *Islamic Law and Society* 12, no. 1 (2005): 93-121.
- . *The Makings of Indonesian Islam: Orientalism and the Narration of a Sufi Past*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011.
- Laffan, Michael and Nico J. G. Kaptein. "Theme Issue: Fatwa in Indonesia." *Islamic Law and Society* 12, no. 1 (2005): 1-8.
- Lane, Max. *Unfinished Nation: Indonesia before and After Suharto*. Verso, 2008.
- Lathan, Andrea. "The Relativity of Categorizing in the Context of the Ahmadiyah." *Die Welt des Islams* 48 (2008): 372-93.
- Lavan, Spencer. *The Ahmadiyah Movement: A History and Perspective*. Delhi: Manohar Book Service, 1974.
- Leebaw, Bronwyn. *Judging State-Sponsored Violence, Imagining Political Change*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
- Leena, Avonius. *Reforming Wetu Telu: Islam Adat, and the Promises of Regionalism in PostNew Order Lombok*. Helsinki, 2004.
- Lim, Merlyna. "Radical Islamism in Indonesia and Its Middle Eastern Connections." *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 15, no. 2 (2011): 31-41.
- Lincoln, Bruce. *Holy Terrors, Second Edition: Thinking About Religion After September 11*. University of Chicago Press, 2010.
- Lindsey, Tim. "Islam, Law and the State in Southeast Asia," edited by Kerstin Steiner: I.B. Tauris, 2012.
- . "The Criminal State: Premanisme and the New Order". In *Indonesia Today: Challenges of History*, edited by Grayson Lloyd and Shannon Smith. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001.
- . "Monopolising Islam: The Indonesian Ulama Council and State Regulation of the 'Islamic Economy'." *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* 48, no. 2 (2012): 253-74.
- Liow, Joseph Chinyong. *Religion and Nationalism in Southeast Asia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016.
- Lukito, Ratno. *Legal Pluralism in Indonesia: Bridging the Unbridgeable*. New York: Routledge, 2013.
- Woodward, Mark and Chris Lundry. "Getting Culture: A New Path for Indonesia's Islamist Justice and Prosperity Party?" *Contemporary Islam* 7 (2013): 173-89.
- M. Atho Mudzhar. *Fatwas of the Council of Indonesian Ulama: A Study of Islamic Legal Thought in Indonesia 1975-1988*. Jakarta: INIS, 1993, 120.
- Maarif, Syafi'i. "Indonesian Islam and Democracy." *Sydney Papers* 16, no. 1 (2004): 18-21.
- . *Islam, Humanity, and Indonesian Identity: Reflection on History*. Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2018.

- MacAndrews, Colin, ed. *Central Government and Local Development in Indonesia*. Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1986.
- MacDougall, John. "Buddhist Buda or Buda Buddhists? Conversion, Religious Modernism and Conflict in the Minority Buda Sasak Communities of New Order and PostSoeharto Lombok." Princeton University, 2005.
- . "The Political Dimensions of Emasculation." In *Post-Colonial Disorders: Fantasy, Conspiracy and Estrangement Among Populist Leaders in Post-New Order Lombok Indonesia*, edited by Mary-Jo DelVecchio Good, 109-24: University of California, 2008.
- Madkur, Ibrahim. *Fi Al-Falsafat Al-Islamiyyat Manhajuhu Wa Thatbiquhu*. Kairo: Dar al-Ma'arif.
- Malik, Atif M. "Denial of Flood Aid to Members of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community in Pakistan." *Health and Human Rights* 13, no. 1 (2011): 70-77.
- Makin, Al. "Homogenizing Indonesian Islam: Persecution of the Shi'a Group in Yogyakarta." *Studia Islamika* 24, no. 1 (2017): 1-32.
- . "Returning to the Religion of Abraham: Controversies Over the Gafatar Movement in Contemporary Indonesia." *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations* 30, no. 1 (2019): 87-104.
- Mandaville, Peter. *Transnational Muslim Politics, Reimagining the Umma*. London: Routledge, 2001.
- Marranci, Gabrielle. *Understanding Muslim Identity: Rethinking Fundamentalism*. Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.
- May, Samantha. "Political Piety: The Politicization of Zakat." *Middle East Critique* 22, no. 2 (2013): 149-64.
- McCoy, Mary E. "Purifying Islam in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia: Corporatist Metaphors and the Rise of Religious Intolerance." *Rhetoric and Public Affairs* 16, no. 2 (2013): 275-315.
- McGregor, Katherine E. *History in Uniform: Military Ideology and the Construction of Indonesia's Past*. Leiden: KITLV Press, 2007.
- Mehden, Fred R. von der. "Religion in Asia as a Vehicle for Technological Change." *Bulletin of Science Technology & Society* 7 (1987): 638.
- Melton, J. Gordon. "Perspective: Toward a Definition of 'New Religion'." *Nova Religio: The Journal of Alternative and Emergent Religions* 8, no. 1 (July 2004): 73.
- Menchik, Jeremy. "Productive Intolerance: Godly Nationalism in Indonesia." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 56, no. 3 (2014): 591-621.
- . *Islam and Democracy in Indonesia, Tolerance Without Liberalism*. Cambridge University Press, 2016.
- Menon, Jisha and Patrick Anderson, *Violence Performed: Local Roots and Global Routes of Conflict*, edited by Janelle Reinelt and Brian Singleton. Palgrave MacMillan, 2011.
- Merkel, Wolfgang. "Embedded and Defective Democracies." *Democratization* 11, no. 5 (2007): 33-58.

- Meuleman, Johan. "Dakwah, Competition for Authority, and Development." *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land-en Volkenkunde* 167, no. 2-3 (2011): 236-69.
- Mietzner, Marcus. *Military Politics, Islam and the State in Indonesia: From Turbulent Transition to Democratic Consolidation*. ISEAS, 2008.
- . "Reinventing Asian Populism; Jokowi's Rise, Democracy, and Political Contestation in Indonesia." *Policy Studies* 72 (2015).
- Mudzakir, Amin. "Minoritisasi Ahmadiyah Di Indonesia." *Masyarakat Indonesia* XXXVII, no. 2 (2011): 1-25.
- Mufrodi, Ali. "Peranan Ulama Dalam Masa Orde Baru: Studi Tentang Perkembangan Majelis Ulama Indonesia." IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah, 1994.
- Muhsin, Anto. "Wiring the New Order: Indonesian Village Electrification and Patrimonial Technopolitics (1966-1998)." *Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia* 29, no. 1 (2014): 63-95.
- MUI. "Fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia Nomor: 7/Munas Vii/Mui/11/2005 Tentang Pluralisme, Liberalisme Dan Sekularisme Agama." Jakarta: MUI, 2005.
- Mujiburrahman. "Feeling Threatened: Muslim-Christian Relations in Indonesia's New Order." Amsterdam University Press, 2006.
- Nasir, Mohamad Abdun. "The Ulama, Fatawa, and Challenges to Democracy in Contemporary Indonesia." In *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations*. London: Routledge, 12 June 2014.
- Nay, Olivier. "Fragile and Failed States: Critical Perspectives on Conceptual Hybrids." *International Political Science Review* 34, no. 3 (2013): 326-41.
- Nisa, Eva. "Marriage and Divorce for the Sake of Religion: The Marital Life of Cadari in Indonesia." *Asian Journal of Social Science*, 39 (2011): 797-820.
- Noer, Deliar. *The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942*. Oxford University Press, 1973.
- Noor, Nina Mariani, et al. "Ahmadiyah, Conflicts, and Violence in Contemporary Indonesia." *Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies* 3, no. 1 (2013): 1-30.
- Nu'man, H. *Maulana Syaikh TGKH. Muhammad Zainuddin Abdul Madjid: Riwayat Hidup Dan Perjuangannya*. Pengurus Besar Nahdlatul Wathan, 1999.
- Nuh, Nuhri M. "Kelompok Salafi Di Kabupaten Lombok Barat." In *Kasus-Kasus Aliran/Faham Kagamaan Aktual Di Indonesia*, edited by Ahmad Syafi'i Mufid. Jakarta: Departemen Agama Republik Indonesia, 2009: 1-42.
- Pamungkas, Arie Setyaningrum. "The Dakwah Media in Post Suharto Indonesia: From Politics of Identity to Popular Culture (the Case of Ummi)." Humboldt University, 2015.
- Partow, Negar. "Divine Sovereignty and State Authority in Israel and Iran." Unpublished PhD Thesis, Victoria University of Wellington, 2011.
- Pepinsky, Thomas B. *Beyond Oligarchy: Wealth, Power, and Contemporary Indonesian Politics*. Ithaca: Cornell University, 2014.
- Perwita, Anak Agung Banyu. *Indonesia and the Muslim World: Islam and Secularism in the Foreign Policy of Soeharto and Beyond*. Nordic Asian Institute, 2007.

- Peterson, Daniel C. "Identity, Muslim." In *Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World*, edited by Richard C. Martin, 339-44. New York: MacMillan Reference USA, 2004.
- Pfaff, Steven and Paul Froese. "Explaining a Religious Anomaly: A Historical Analysis of Secularization in Eastern Germany." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 44, no. 4 (2005): 397-422.
- Platzdasch, Bernard. "Religious Freedom in Indonesia: The Case of the Ahmadiyah." *ISEAS Working Paper: Politics and Security Series* 2 (2011).
- Porter, Donald. *Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia*. New York: Routledge Curzon, 2002.
- Posner, Daniel N. "When and Why Do Some Social Cleavages Become Politically Salient Rather Than Others?" *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 40, no. 2 (2017): 2001-2019.
- Puhle, Hans-Jürgen. "Democratic Consolidation and 'Defective Democracies.'" J. W. Goethe Universität Frankfurt am Main, 2005.
- Putro, Dwi Widodo and Catherine Koerner. "The Socio-Legal Construction of Ahmadiyah as a Religious Minority by Local and National Government Policy: Restrictions Before the Law, a Challenge for Religious Freedom in Nusa Tenggara Barat, Indonesia." *International Journal of Indonesian Studies*, no. 4 (2017).
- Rachman, Budhy M. and Robin Bush. "Majority Views on Minorities in Indonesia." In *Religious Diversity in Muslim-Majority States in Southeast Asia*, edited by Bernhard Platzdasch and Johan Saravanamuttu, 16-50. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2014.
- Rahman, Fatima Zainab. "State Restriction on the Ahmadiyya Sect in Indonesia and Pakistan: Islam or Political Survival?" *Australian Political Studies Association* 49, no. 3 (2014): 408-22.
- Raina, Ajay. "Democrats and Minority Marginalization: The Case of Pakistan." *Asian Journal of Political Science* 22, no. 2 (2014): 206-26.
- . *Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam, and the Ideology of Tolerance*. New York: Routledge, 1996.
- Ramakrishna, Kumar. "Delegitimizing Global Jihad Ideology in SE Asia." *Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs* 27, no. 3: 343-69.
- Regus, Max. "Understanding Human Rights Culture in Indonesia: A Case Study of the Ahmadiyya Minority Group." PhD Thesis, Tilburg University, 2017.
- Rizal Sukma, Jamhari Makruf, and Kamarulnizam Abdullah. "The Attitude of Indonesian Muslims towards Terrorism." *Journal of Human Security* 7, no. 1 (2011): 21-36.
- Robison, Richard and Vedi R. Hadiz. *Reorganising Power in Indonesia: The Politics of Oligarchy in an Age of Markets*. Psychology Press, 2004.
- Rofiqoh, Lilik. *The Fatwas of the Majelis Ulama Indonesia on the Ahmadiyah Doctrines: The Problems of Religious Authority and Tolerance*. 2008.
- . "The MUI's View on Ahmadiyah and the Controversy Surrounding It." *De Jure, Jurnal Syariah dan Hukum* 2, no. 1 (2010): 55-70.
- Rountree, Jennifer Achod and Marck Pilisuk. "Who Benefits from Global; Violence and War." In *The Hidden Structure of Violence*. NYU Press, 2015.

- Rusman, Roosmalawati. "Infant and Children Mortality in Lombok, Indonesia." Jakarta: Collaboration Between the Center for Population and Manpower Studies, Indonesian Institute of Sciences (PPT-LIPI) and the Demography Program, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1998.
- Ryan, Stephen. *The Transformation of Violence Intercommunal Conflict*. Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2007.
- Saat, Norshahril. *The State, Ulama and Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2018.
- Saeed, Abdullah. *Interpreting the Qur'an; Towards a Contemporary Approach*. Routledge, 2006.
- Salim, Arskal. "Muslim Politics in Indonesia's Democratisation: The Religious Majority and the Rights of Minorities in the Post-New Order Era." In *Indonesia: Democracy and the Promise of Good Governance*. ISEAS, 2007.
- . *Challenging the Secular State: The Islamization of Law in Modern Indonesia*. University of Hawaii Press, 2008.
- Salim, Arskal and Azyumardi Azra. *Shari'a and Politics in Modern Indonesia*. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003.
- Schafer, Saskia. "Renegotiating Indonesian Secularism Through Debates on Ahmadiyya and Shia." *Philosophy and Social Criticism*, no. 1-12 (2015).
- . "Ahmadis or Indonesians? The Polarization of Post-reform Public Debates on Islam and Orthodoxy." *Critical Asian Studies* 50, no. 1 (2018): 16-36.
- Schulte-Bockholt, Alfred. "A Neo-Marxist Explanation of Organized Crime." *Critical Criminology* 10 (2001): 225-42.
- Schwarz, Adam. *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia's Search for Stability*. United States: Westview Press, 2000.
- Schwedler, Jillian. "Can Islamists Become Moderates? Rethinking the Inclusion-Moderation Hypothesis." *World Politics* 63, no. 2 (2011): 347-76.
- Sedgwick, Mark. "Sect in the Islamic World 1." *Nova Religio: The Journal of Alternative and Emergent Religions* 3, no. 2 (2000): 195-240.
- . "Sects and Politics." *Nova Religio: The Journal of Alternative and Emergent Religions* 6(2002): 165-73.
- Selengut, C. *Sacred Fury: Understanding Religious Violence*. Altamira Press, 2003.
- Sen, Amartya. *Identity and Violence; the Illusion of Destiny*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company 2006.
- Seo, Myengkyo. *State Management of Religion in Indonesia*. New York: Routledge, 2013.
- Setiyono, Lawrence Pintak and Budi. "The Mission of Indonesian Journalism: Balancing Democracy, Development, and Islamic Values." *International Journal of Press Politics* XX, no. X (2010): 1-25.
- Sezgin, Yuksel and Mirjam Kunkler, "Regulation of 'Religion' and the 'Religious': The Politics of Judicialization and Bureaucratization in India and Indonesia." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 56, no. 2 (2014): 448-78.
- Shea, Nina and Paul Marshall. *Silenced: How Apostasy and Blasphemy Codes Are Choking Freedom Worldwide*. Oxford Scholarship Online, 2011.

- Shepard, William E. "‘Denomination’ as a Label for Some Islamic Phenomena?" *Nova Religio: The Journal of Alternative and Emergent Religions* 6(2002): 155-64.
- Sidel, John T. *Studies of Massive, Collective Violence in Post-Soeharto Indonesia*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006.
- . *Riots, Pogroms, Jihad: Religious Violence in Indonesia*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006.
- Sirry, Mun'im. "Fatwas and Their Controversy: The Case of the Council of Indonesian Ulama (MUI)." In *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, 100-17: The National University of Singapore, 2013.
- . "The Public Expression of Traditional Islam: The Pesantren and Civil Society in PostSuharto Indonesia." *The Muslim World* 100, no. 1 (2010).
- . "Religious Freedom and Places of Worship in Contemporary Indonesia." *Religious Freedom Institute, Georgetown's Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs* (19 July 2016).
- Sisk, Timothy D. "Introduction: Religious Leaders, Conflict, and Peacemaking." In *Between Terror and Tolerance: Religion, Conflict, and Peacemaking*, edited by Timothy D Sisk, 1-8: Georgetown University Press, 2011.
- Smith, Bianca J. "Re-Orienting Female Spiritual Power in Islam." *Indonesia and the Malay World* 40, no. 118 (2012): 249-71.
- Smith, Bianca J and Saipul Hamdi. "Sisters, Militias and Islam in Conflict: Questioning ‘Reconciliation’." In Nahdlatul Wathan, Lombok, Indonesia." *Contemporary Islam* 6, no. 29-43 (2012).
- Soedirgo, Jessica. "Informal Networks and Religious Intolerance: How Clientelism Incentivizes the Discrimination of the Ahmadiyah in Indonesia." *Citizenship Studies* 22, no. 2 (2018): 191-207.
- Spierenburg, Pieter. "Violence: Reflections About a Word." In *Violence in Europe: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives*, edited by Sophie Body-Gendrot and Pieter Spierenburg, 13-25. New York: Springer, 2008.
- Steenbrink, Karel. "Christianity and Islam: Civilization or Religions?" *Contemporary Indonesian Discussions* (2004).
- Stewart, Charles. "Syncretism and Its Synonyms: Reflections on Cultural Mixture." *Diacritics* 29, no. 3 (1999): 40-62.
- Sukamto. *Kepemimpinan Kyai Dalam Pesantren*. Jakarta: LP3S, 1999.
- Suryana, A'an. "Indonesian Presidents and Communal Violence Against Non-Mainstream Faiths." *South East Asia Research* 26, No. 2 (June 2018): 147-60.
- Suryawan, M. A. *Bukan Sekedar Hitam Putih: Kontroversi Pemahaman Ahmadiyah*. 1st ed. Tangerang: Azzahra Publishing, 2006.
- Susanti, Reni. "When Human Rights Become So Political: State-Islam Relations and Its Impact on the Ahmadiyya Community in Indonesia." Institute of Social Studies, 2008.
- Tadjoeddin, Zulfan. *Explaining Collective Violence in Contemporary Indonesia: From Conflict to Cooperation*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.

- Telle, Kari. "Vigilante Citizenship: Sovereign Practices and the Politics of Insult in Indonesia." *Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences of Southeast Asia and Oceania* 169, no. 2-3 (April 2013): 183.
- Tezcur, Gunes Murat. *Muslim Reformers in Iran and Turkey: The Paradox of Moderation*. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2010.
- The Wahid Institute. "Doktrin Salafi Terlalu Tekstual." In *Focus Group Discussion di Lombok*, 1-3. The Wahid Institute, 2009.
- Thompson, John B., ed. *Language and Symbolic Power*. Harvard University Press, 1991.
- Thoriquttyas, Titis. "Discovering the Scholarship Dimension of Ahmadiyya: Ahmadiyya's School on Indonesian Islam's Views." *Attarbiyah: Journal of Islamic Culture and Education* 2, no. 1 (2017): 55-78.
- Thufail, Fajar Ibnu and Martin Ramstedt, eds. *Kegalauan Identitas: Agama, Etnisitas, Dan Kewarganegaraan Pada Masa Pasca-Orde Baru, Grasindo*. Jakarta: Grasindo, 2011.
- Tibi, Bassam. *Islam Between Culture and Politics*, 2nd ed. New York, Basingstoke [England]: Palgrave Macmillan in association with the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 2005.
- Tilly, Charles. *The Politics of Collective Violence*. Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- Turvey, B. E. *Criminal Profiling: An Introduction to Behavioral Analysis*. London: Academic Press, 1999.
- Tyson, Adam. "Vigilantism and Violence in Decentralized Indonesia: The Case of Lombok." *Critical Asian Studies* 45, no. 2 (2013): 201-30.
- Uddin, Asma T. "Blasphemy Laws in Muslim-Majority Countries." *The Review of Faith & International Affairs* 9, no. 2 (2011): 47-55.
- Varshney, Ashutosh. "Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Rationality." *Perspectives on Politics* 1, no. 1 (2003): 85-99.
- Vatikiotis, Michael R. J., ed. *Indonesian Politics under Suharto: The Rise and the Fall of the New Order*, 3rd ed. Routledge, 1998.
- Volpi, Frederic and Bryan S. Turner. "Introduction: Making Islamic Authority Matter." *Theory Culture Society* 24, no. 2 (2007): 1-19.
- Wahyudi, Catur. *Marginalisasi Dan Keberadaban Masyarakat*. Jakarta: Yayasan Pustaka Obor Indonesia, 2015.
- Webber, Douglas. "A Consolidated Patrimonial Democracy? Democratization in Post-Suharto Indonesia." *Paper to be presented at the 'Post-Cold War Democratization in the Muslim World: Domestic, Regional and Global Trends' Workshop* (2005): 1-29.
- Webster, Jennifer. "French Identity, Muslim Identity: Universalism, Laïcité, and the Islamic Challenge." University of North Carolina, 2008.
- Wellman, James K. "Is Religious Violence Inevitable?" *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 43, no. 3 (2004): 291-96.
- Wiktorowicz, Quintan. "Anatomy of the Salafi Movement." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 29, no. 3 (2006): 207-39.

- Wilcox, P. *Theories of Victimization*, edited by S. Lab and B. Fisher, Encyclopaedia of Victimology and Crime Prevention. Thousand Oaks, 2010.
- Wilson, Ian Douglas. "Continuity and Change: The Changing Contours of Organized Violence in Post-New Order Indonesia." *Critical Asian Studies* 38, no. 2 (2006): 265-97.
- Woodward, Mark. *Java, Indonesia and Islam*. Springer, 2011.
- . ed. *Towards a New Paradigm: Recent Developments in Indonesian Islamic Thought*. Tempe: Arizona State University, 1996.
- . et al. "Getting Culture: A New Path for Indonesia's Islamist Justice and Prosperity Party?" [In English]. *Contemporary Islam* 7, no. 2 (Jul 2013 2013): 173-89.
- . et al. "The Islamic Defender Front: Demonization, Violence and the State in Indonesia." *Contemporary Islam* 8 (2013): 153-71.
- Yudhistira, A. Zaky. "Islam Sasak: Wetu Telu Versus *Waktu Lima*." Jakarta: STAINU Jakarta, 2013.
- Zaman, Muhammad Qasim. "The 'Ulama': Scholarly Tradition and New Public Commentary." In *The New Cambridge History of Islam*, edited by Robert Hefner, 335-54. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.
- Zito, George V. "Toward a Sociology of Heresy." *Sociological Analysis* 44, no. 2 (1983): 123-30.
- Žižek, Slavoj. *Violence*. London: Profile Books Limited, 2008.
- Zulkarnain, Iskandar. *Gerakan Ahmadiyah Di Indonesia*, 1st ed. Yogyakarta: LKiS Yogyakarta, 2005.
- "245 Kasus Intoleransi Di Indonesia Dalam Setahun."
<http://warta-ahmadiyah.org/245-kasus-intoleransi-di-indonesia-dalam-setahun/>
- "Dari Ronda Kampung Menjadi Pam Swakarsa."
<https://www.library.ohio.edu/indopubs/2001/03/11/0063.html>
- "Fatwa MUI Tahun 1980 Tentang Aliran Sesat Ahmadiyah."
<http://santri.web.id/index.php/categoryblog/571-fatwa-mui-thn-1980-tentang-aliran-sesatahmadiyah>.
- "Mengungsi Tujuh Tahun, Warga Ahmadiyah Akan Diberi KTP."
<http://warta-ahmadiyah.org/mengungsi-tujuh-tahun-warga-ahmadiyah-akan-diberi-ktp/>.
- "Tak Ada Alasan Pengungsi Syi'ah Dan Ahmadiyah Bertahan Di Pengungsian."
<http://ahlulbaitindonesia.org/berita/4999/tak-ada-alasan-pengungsi-syiah-dan-ahmadiyahuntuk-tidak-pulang/>
- "Saya (Tarno) Ingin Pulang."
<http://indoprogress.com/2011/10/saya-ingin-pulang/>
- "Sebagian Warga Syiah Bertahan Di Pengungsian."
http://m.bbc.co.uk/indonesia/berita_indonesia/2012/01/120113_sampangsyiah.shtm
- "Pemerintah Harus Sediakan "Rumah Layak Huni Bagi Pengungsi Ahmadiyah."
<http://news.detik.com/read/2011/02/15/061039/1571361/10/pemerintah-harus-sediakanrumah-layak-bagi-pengungsi-ahmadiyah-di-lombok>.

“Kronologis Serangan Di Kuningan.”

<http://turunkebumi.wordpress.com/2007/12/19/kronologi-ahmadiyah-kuningan-prapenyerbuan/>.

“Komnas Ham Tagih Janji Jokowi.”

<http://warta-ahmadiyah.org/komnas-ham-tagih-janji-jokowi-soal-ahmadiyah/>.

“Warga Ahmadiyah Manislor.”

<http://warta-ahmadiyah.org/tag/jawa-barat/>.

"Ahmadis Di Lombok, Terasing Di Negeri Sendiri." *ceramah pemuka agama mempengaruhi opini masyarakat.*

http://www.bbc.co.uk/indonesia/berita_indonesia/2013/08/130802_ahmadiyah_lombok.

"Banyak Janji Yudhoyono Tentang Ham Yang Tidak Dipenuhi."

<http://www.republika.co.id/berita/breaking-news/nasional/11/02/10/163381-as-prihatininsiden-ahmadiyah-temanggung-terjadi>.

"AS Prihatin Insiden Cikeusik, Pandeglang Dan Gereja Di Temanggung Terjadi."

<http://www.republika.co.id/berita/breaking-news/nusantara/11/02/10/163473-8-kiaditangkap-ratusan-ulama-banten-demo-polres-pandeglang>.

"8 Kiai Di Tangkap Dalam Insiden Cikeusik, Ulama Protes."

<https://orangmiskin.wordpress.com/tag/ahmad-hariadi-tobat/>.

<https://www.hrw.org/news/2008/06/10/indonesia-reverse-ban-ahmadiyah-sect>.

"Ahmad Najib Burhani: "Peran Kerajaan Saudi Dalam Kekerasan Keagamaan Bersifat Tidak Langsung." 22 July 2015.

<https://www.madinaonline.id/sosok/wawancara/ahmad-najib-burhani-peran-kerajaan-saudi-dalam-kekerasan-keagamaan-bersifat-tak-langsung/3/>.

"Lombok Berduka." 30 November 2015.

<http://tribratanews.ntb.polri.go.id/2015/11/30/lombok-timur-berduka/>

http://www.bbc.co.uk/indonesia/berita_indonesia/2014/08/140828_ham_indonesia_unao

<https://Nasional.Tempo.Co/Read/16924/Pam-Swakarsa-Amphibi-Diminta-Mundur>.

[http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/11/11/No-Sympathy-Bombers-Say-](http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/11/11/No-Sympathy-Bombers-Say-MuslimGroups.html)

[MuslimGroups.html](http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/11/11/No-Sympathy-Bombers-Say-MuslimGroups.html).

[https://www.republika.co.id/Berita/Jurnal-Haji/Haji-Tempo-Doeloe/17/06/13/Org3rr313-](https://www.republika.co.id/Berita/Jurnal-Haji/Haji-Tempo-Doeloe/17/06/13/Org3rr313-DiMasa-Lalu-Pergi-Haji-Bukan-Perkara-Mudah)

[DiMasa-Lalu-Pergi-Haji-Bukan-Perkara-Mudah](https://www.republika.co.id/Berita/Jurnal-Haji/Haji-Tempo-Doeloe/17/06/13/Org3rr313-DiMasa-Lalu-Pergi-Haji-Bukan-Perkara-Mudah).

[http://theahmadiyya.blogspot.co.nz/2012/09/ahmad-hariadi-tugas-saya-](http://theahmadiyya.blogspot.co.nz/2012/09/ahmad-hariadi-tugas-saya-menyadarkan.html)

[menyadarkan.html](http://theahmadiyya.blogspot.co.nz/2012/09/ahmad-hariadi-tugas-saya-menyadarkan.html).

Rai, Tjok Suhendra. "Paradigma Memilih Pemimpin." *Lombok Post*, 29 July 1999.

"Di Tolak Warga Sekitar Ponpes Tahfiz Ditutup." *Lombok Post*, 13 November 2015.

"Rumah Warga Salafi Diamuk Massa." *Radar Lombok*, 10 June 2015.

"Subki Sasaki Tak Takut Bela Ahmadiyah." *Lombok Post*, 20 August 2013.

"Tidak Tahlilan Dan Maulidan, Rumah Komunitas Salafi Di Lombok Dirusak." *Lombok Post*, 11 June 2015.

"Tangani Ahmadiyah, Pemprov Tunggu Regulasi Pusat." *Lombok Post* (Mataram, Lombok), 30 April 2008.

- “Tak ada Pengamanan Khusus Untuk Jemaat Ahmadiya.”, *Lombok Post* (Mataram, Lombok), 30 April 2008.
- “Merasa terancam Ngungsi di Mapolres Lotim.” *Lombok Post*, 14 September 2002.
- “Sebagian Jemaah Ahmadiyah Pilih Keluar Lombok.” *Lombok Post*, 19 September 2002.
- “Lotim Mulai Kondusif.” *Lombok Post*, 17 September 2002.
- “Ahmadiyah Dilarang.” *Lombok Post*, 20 September 2002.
- “296 Jemaah Ahmadiyah Ngungsi di Mapolres Lotim.” *Lombok Post*, 21 September 2002.
- “Lombok Barat Bersih dari Ahmadiyah.” *Lombok Post*, 25 September 2002.
- “Jemaah Ahmadiyah Ditampung di Mataram.” *Lombok Post*, 26 September 2002.
- “Pendidikan AUS Ahmadiyah dipikirkan.” *Lombok Post*, 29 September 2002.
- “Lotim kembali Ribut, Aset LDII Diserang.” *Lombok Post*, 30 September 2002.
- “Perkampungan Ahmadiyah Diduga Diserang Massa.” *Lombok Post*, 1 October 2005.
- “BTN dan Dusun Ketapang Belum Kondusif?” *Lombok Post*, 22 October 2005.
- “BTN Ketapang Masih Dijaga, *Lombok Post*.” *Lombok Post*, 24 October 2005.
- “Penanganan Ahmadiyah Mengacu SK Bupati.” *Lombok Post*, 27 October 2005.
- “Penasihat Hukum Ahmadiyah Ingin Dialog.” *Lombok Post*, 26 October 2005.
- “SK Pelarangan Ahmadiyah Tidak Berdasar.” *Lombok Post*, 28 October 2005.
- “Rumah Pengikut Ahmadiyah Gegerung Diserbu Massa.” *Lombok Post*, 5 February 2006.
- “Ketapang Kondusif, Polisi Masih Berjaga.” *Lombok Post*, 6 February 2006.
- “Tuntut Hak Sebagai Warga Negara.” *Lombok Post*, 7 February 2006.
- “Menag: Ahmadiyah Sesat, Tapi Tak Boleh Diserang.” *Lombok Post*, 7 February 2006.
- “Pemkab Lobar Larang Ahmadiyah.” *Lombok Post*, 7 February 2006.
- “Ahmadiyah Masih Percaya Pemerintah.” *Lombok Post*, 8 February 2006.
- “Lobar dan Muspida Plus Juga Bahas Kasus Ahmadiyah.” *Lombok Post*, 8 February 2006.

Appendix A

List of Interviewees

Name	Position	Location	Date
Tuan Guru Anwar	Tuan Guru (NU)	Duman, West Lombok	15 June 2015
Tuan Guru Bajang (TGB)	Governor of NTB province	Mataram	17 September 2015
Tuan Guru Abdul Karim	The leader of Pesantren Nurul Hakim	Bayan, North Lombok	17 August 2015
Tuan Guru Muhktar	Former leader of MUI Mataram	Mataram	1 July 2016
Fahrurozi Dahlan	Deputy Leader of NW Anjani	Mataram	4 June 2015
Subhan Acim	The Head of Majlis Tarjih Muhammadiyah NTB		6 July 2015
Saiful Muslim	The leader of MUI NTB province		7 July 2015
R. Sri Bintoro H.	Muslim cleric	Mataram	17 December 2015
Haji Mutawalli Hasan	Pesantren Nurul Hakim Kediri	Mataram	5 October 2015
Soleh Ahmadi	The leader of Ahmadiyah NTB	Mataram	5 July 2005; 13 July 2016
Jauzi Zaedar	Deputy Leader of Ahmadiyah NTB	Mataram	5 July 2015
Dyah	Ahmadi	Mataram	16 August 2015
Abang	Ahmadi	Mataram	3 July 2016

Awar	Ahmadi	Mataram	3 July 2016
Karim	Ahmadi	Mataram	2 September 2016
Fajrin	Ketapang resident	Ketapang	1 September 2015
Munir	Ketapang resident	Ketapang	1 September 2015
Maksum	Ketapang resident	Ketapang	15 September 2015
Maman	Ketapang resident	Ketapang	3 September 2015
Johar	Ketapang resident	Ketapang	15 September 2015
Mahmud	Ketapang resident	Ketapang	15 September 2015
Makruf	Pancor resident	Pancor	3 September 2015
Kahar	Pancor resident	Pancor	1 October 2015
Ainun	Pancor resident	Mataram	16 September 2015
Kendi (pseudonym)	<i>ex Amphibi</i> member	Pemongkong	1 October 2015
Jago (pseudonym)	<i>ex Amphibi</i> member	Pemongkong	1 October 2015
Zulkarnain	Mataram resident	Mataram	15 September 2015
Ninik Uqi	Mataram resident	Mataram	1 December 2015
Niniq Iyah	Mataram resident	Mataram	27 September 2015

Sylvi	Mataram resident	Mataram	27 September 2015
Warman	Mataram resident	Mataram	7 October 2015
Official 1	Government official of the NTB province	Mataram	1 December 2015
Official 2	Government official of the NTB province	Mataram	27 September 2015
Official 3	Government official of the NTB province	Mataram	27 September 2015
Officer 1	Police Officer	Mataram	1 September 2015
Officer 2	Police Officer	Mataram	1 October 2015
Mr X (pseudonym)	A journalist of <i>Suara NTB</i>	Mataram	1 October 2015
