

The Social Representational Theory of Symbolic Politics

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I know this looks like an Oscar acceptance...

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## Abstract

While there have been repeated exhortations that the study of political behaviour be accorded greater status in social psychological research, such calls have gone relatively unheeded. This thesis is intended to address to some small extent this problem.

Specifically, an argument is presented to address the flaws of a little-heralded theory of political behaviour, symbolic politics theory (Sears, 1993), by re-articulating that theory within a broader theory of social behaviour, social representations theory (Moscovici, 1973; 1988). At its heart symbolic politics contends that political behaviour is based on the evocation of 'symbolic predispositions' in response to symbolic content of political objects. Following Verkuyten (1985) political symbols and symbolic predispositions are re-interpreted from the perspective of social representations theory.

The result is a shift in emphasis onto the role of values, discourse, and social interaction in political preference and opinion. These concepts are investigated using data derived from a four-phase panel survey of the Wellington, New Zealand, electorates, as well as transcripts of parliamentary debates, and a laboratory experiment to provide support for the re-articulation of symbolic politics within this framework.

The first two studies present qualitative and quantitative analyses of open-ended questions designed to probe the subjective meanings of ideological labels, and the concepts, ideas, and values associated with the major political parties of the time. The results indicate that the boundaries of group membership are defined by differences in representational content between groups, as well as within-group consensus.

The second set of studies investigate the role of social values in political perception and preference. Firstly, political parties were differentiated by the frequency of rhetorical use by their members of the two values of freedom and equality, consistent with the predictions of Rokeach (1973). Secondly, survey respondents used a value-attribution instrument to indicate the values which they perceived parties to oppose or endorse. Again, the values associated with these parties were shown to be predictive of preference. Thirdly, respondents completed the Schwartz (1992) values inventory, which was used to produce a value profile of supporters of different

parties' supporters. Weak support was found for Rokeach's (1973) two-value model of politics, with the parties differentiable on two discriminant functions defined by self-reliance values and equality values. The final study in this section presents the results of a laboratory manipulation in which groups of participants viewed different party political advertisements before rating the major parties for favourability and value attributions. This study indicates that exposure to political media may influence the values parties are seen to represent, and that this may impact positively or negatively on perceptions of the favourability of those parties.

The final empirical chapter utilises a social network measure to investigate the role, if any, that one's interpersonal environment may play in political preference and representations. A clear relationship was found between the political composition of the environment and primary respondent preference and ideological self-identification. These findings are interpreted as supporting the social representational theory of symbolic politics.

Qualifications and limitations of a representational theory of symbolic politics are discussed, as are the implications for such a conceptualisation of political and social behaviour.

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## CHAPTER ONE

# AIMS OF THE RESEARCH PROGRAMME AND SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS

“Oh, what a tangled web we weave  
when first we practice to deceive!  
And when the practice is perfected  
we’re just the boys to get elected.”  
(Fairburn, 1967, p.148)

The first two lines of the quotation above are familiar to most people. Less well known are the closing lines which indicate that the verse pertains to politics. Even less well known is the fact that the author, Arthur Fairburn, is a New Zealander. This leads in a roundabout way to the focus of this thesis: political behaviour in New Zealand.

This is a thesis about how we make decisions about the shape of our political future, and why sometimes we choose not to make a decision at all. Unlike much of the research into human decision making the voting decision comes about infrequently, in most Western democracies most likely only once every three or four years. We head in literally millions to the nearest polling booths driven by a variety of motivations, to place our ticks and set the scene for the next three years, before we next get the opportunity to vote for those who will structure the social and political environment in our country. I intend to illustrate in the course of this work a view of voting behaviour more clearly situated in the context in which it occurs- culture, society, neighbourhood, and ultimately individual social networks while retaining the role of the individual as the ultimate arbiter in the act of voting.

The second chapter describes the advantages and disadvantages of the historically important perspectives on voting and political behaviour, giving particular emphasis to the Michigan or party identification approach (eg. Campbell, Converse, Miller & Stokes, 1964), sociological approaches (eg. Lazarsfeld, Berelson & Gaudet, 1944; Dunleavy & Husbands, 1985), rational choice or rational actor approaches (eg. Downs, 1957; Himmelweit, Humphreys & Jaeger, 1987) and the symbolic politics perspective (eg. Sears, 1992). This chapter highlights the problems associated

with adopting each of these perspectives in addressing the question of how people decide for whom to vote, placing particular emphasis on the debate between proponents of rational choice and symbolic politics. As well as describing the general approaches to political behaviour, chapter one also describes the research that has been carried out in New Zealand using these approaches.

Chapter three presents the historical and political background against which this research was conducted. This is particularly important given the aim of this thesis in locating political behaviour in inter-psyche as well as intra-psyche processes. In the course of a brief summary of 20<sup>th</sup> century New Zealand politics attention is focussed on the development of the two major parties (National and Labour) and the changes in the number and nature of parties following a change of electoral system. Following this summary of New Zealand's political history is a brief summary of voting behaviour research in New Zealand.

Chapter four presents an attempt at resolution of some of the major problems affecting the symbolic politics approach to political behaviour, concluding that many of the weaknesses of symbolic politics may be addressed by reformulating symbolic politics using social representations theory. Social representations are conceptualised as knowledge structures (akin to social schemas) with emphasis placed on both the content of the representation and communication as the mode of generation and transmission of the representational content. This re-conceptualisation places greater importance on the context in which political behaviour occurs- the social impact on the individual. In so doing, symbolic politics becomes a process which occurs not only within the individual but also through communication between people.

Using the framework of social representations theory the remainder of the thesis reports studies investigating the role in political perception of social and personal values, the strategies used by voters and parties to position themselves discursively in relation to each other (and the way in which this is mirrored in the representations held of those parties), and the transmission of representational content through individual's social networks.

Chapter five opens with a summary of this attempt at theoretical integration, and reviews previous studies on social representation and politics. The data collection strategy for the research

programme is described - primarily a four-phase survey using the same sub-sample of the Wellington area electorates from a year out from the 1996 election until the month after. Two studies are presented: The first study describes the respondents' understanding of what it means to be politically liberal or politically conservative (liberal-conservative self-identification being one of the primary symbolic predispositions central to the operation of symbolic politics). This study shows that liberal-conservative self-identification reflects certain ways of viewing the world which are not only relevant to the domain of political behaviour. There follows an analysis of first phase open-ended responses which illustrates the use of values, social groups, and representational content to justify the respondents' own preferences. It is argued that there are a number of 'legitimising myths' or repertoires which people draw upon which are intimately related to social and personal values.

Chapter six takes up the theme of human values in a series of studies. The first study looks at the rhetorical use of the theoretically important values of freedom and equality (building on the work of Rokeach, 1973) in parliamentary speeches. The second study presents analyses of value-based political representations of the major parties in the lead-up to the election, illustrating possible relationships between the representations held of parties and preference for those parties. Thirdly, analyses of the personal and social values of the Wellington sample are presented that suggest the importance placed on the value of freedom may be largely rhetorical. That is to say there is a level of incongruence between the public endorsement of the values of freedom and equality by political parties and the personal endorsement of those values by the people who affiliate with those parties. Finally, an experiment is reported which examines the impact of political party advertisements (screened on national television prior to the election) on the value-based political representations of the major parties, and preference for those parties.

Chapter seven presents results of several investigations into the impact of the social environment on respondents' political views and preferences. The emphasis on communication as the mode for transmission of representational content is tested by surveying respondents about the political views of the people making up their social networks, and relating the political composition of the network to primary respondent preference and ideological self-identification.

Finally, chapter eight summarises the findings of the research programme and presents conclusions about the role of social representations in political perception, preference, and behaviour.

## CHAPTER TWO

### Theories of Electoral Behaviour

It will first be appropriate to describe the more current approaches to electoral behaviour as well as recounting the historical antecedents of these contemporary approaches, and in the process illustrate how the research conducted has come full circle.

It is appropriate to start with a survey of the separate threads of research which different disciplines have woven about the topic of political preference. The greater volume of research on political preference and behaviour occupies three camps deriving out of sociology, psychology, and economics. The following section reviews the broad perspectives these three disciplines adopt in addressing the question of why people choose to vote for one of a range of parties, starting with the seminal political sociology work of the Columbia school with its primary focus on objective group membership, followed (chronologically) by the major psychological contribution of the Michigan school focusing on socialised subjective party identification. This survey of the major approaches is completed with the rational choice perspective, the culmination of centuries of economic theory and viewing political preference as being based on the desire of the voter to maximise the benefits associated with political choice.

Each of these perspectives is illustrated with reference to classic and contemporary examples of the research conducted under the umbrella of that tradition. Each perspective can be shown to be conceptually flawed, or alternatively fails to take into account important elements of competing perspectives. Finally I shall introduce a contemporary socio-political theory, symbolic politics, upon which this thesis is initially based, attempting to illustrate how the theory may be conceptualised to counter the common criticisms made about it. Ultimately this re-conceptualisation, based on social representations theory, highlights the role of inter-individual as well as intra-individual influences on political behaviour.

## CONTEMPORARY VOTING RESEARCH

The question of how people vote has been the subject of many questions (and numerous answers) since the early days of social scientific inquiry, with explanatory approaches differentiated into two main camps. Harrop and Miller ask the question "Is voting an act of affirmation or of choice?" (1987, p.130). When a tick is placed in a particular box is it the result of an extended process of deliberation in which the relative advantages of the parties are weighed against the desires of the voter and each other, or is it an expressive act confirming one's identification with that party above others? This opposition of instrumental versus expressive has become the standard framework for considering the basis upon which political choices are made, though a simple dichotomy ignores the richness of the theoretical resources available.

The topic of voting behaviour itself cuts across disciplinary divides, spawning research interests in sociology, psychology, economics, and of course political science. While some researchers (for example political psychologists) have proven receptive to the different perspectives offered by these different disciplines the majority have denied, or at least failed to take advantage of, the utility of the cross-disciplinary nature of the topic at hand. Though these approaches differ in their overt endorsement of the degree to which individual versus social factors affect vote choice there is certainly grounds for synthesis (for example see Rose & McAllister, 1986). I shall outline the distinctive approaches to explaining voting behaviour below, including their shortcomings, before presenting the synthetic conceptual framework in which this research programme is framed.

### **SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES:**

While there might be a little disagreement as to the exact date at which the contemporary era in voting behaviour research began the event in question remains the same. Whether it is the date of publication (1944: eg. Carmines & Huckfeldt, 1996) or when the research was actually conducted (1940: eg. Visser, 1994) the seminal work is that of Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet (1944). Only a short time after the New Zealand National and Labour parties embarked on a seventy year domination of New Zealand politics the Vienna-trained Lazarsfeld set out what is considered to be one of the earliest examples of survey research in order to investigate the processes of voting (Visser, 1994). Lazarsfeld considered the action of voting to be essentially



the same as consumer decisions or selection of occupations, with the final act of voting being the culmination of a process extending back in time. The aim of the research programme was to follow a voter sample in the seven months leading up to the 1940 US presidential election using a seven wave panel methodology, as well as evaluating potential effects of the repeat interview schedule on the respondents. Lazarsfeld expected that mass media would play an important role in the voting decision, and the study was restricted to a sample of 600 respondents in Erie County, Ohio, in an attempt to control for any variations in media coverage that would occur across a larger sample area. Media content was examined in minute detail to determine the impact of events coinciding with the seven waves of interviews.

As far as elaborating on the original theoretical background the study was a failure. It appeared that voting might not be comparable to consumer behaviour after all with only one out of every ten respondents showing any variability in preference across the seven month period. The other ninety percent had made up their minds before the study had even begun. The size of the sub-sample (only fifty four) who made their decisions during the study period was too small to draw any reliable conclusions about the impact of media related campaign events.

Disheartened by the result, Lazarsfeld and his colleagues let the study rest for a year before attempting any further analysis of the material they had so painstakingly obtained. Subsequent elaboration of the background information on respondents led to the publication of 'The people's choice' in 1944 and made no mention of the original action model. In its place was essentially a theory of primary group influence, in which it was shown that voting intentions congruent with the preferences of primary groups (eg. family, religious groups, ethnic groups, etc) of which the respondent was a member were more likely to be consummated in the voting booth than intentions which were not supported by objective group memberships. Where intentions were found to be unstable they were attributed to social cross pressure arising from memberships of groups with different affiliations. Mass media were hypothesised to influence partisanship through opinion leaders within those social groups, who disseminated the information with a selective spin agreeable to the established views of the group. In an important shift, the psychological impact of cross pressure was further elaborated in a follow up study (the 1948 presidential election) such that conflicting messages from mis-aligned groups resulted in psychological pressure on the individual. This psychological pressure might only be accommodated through

selective perception of the political environment, for example increased emphasis on congruent social groups (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, & McPhee, 1954). The specific focus switched from objective group membership to the role of interpersonal influence in membership groups on the individual vote. Lazarsfeld et al summed it up best in saying "a person thinks, politically, as he is, socially" (1944, p.27).

The work of Lazarsfeld and others laid the foundation for sociologically oriented approaches to electoral behaviour, emphasising the role of social structure and social groups, frequently accompanied by a rejection of the individualist emphasis presented by other disciplines' investigations of the subject (eg. Dunleavy & Husbands, 1985). As a result electoral sociology has come to be primarily concerned with the relative rates at which particular groups (occupying different positions in society) vote for particular parties. Thus the explanation of group related patterns of voting is derived from the societal position of those groups, with reference to the historical relationship between those groups and the available political parties. Such explanations attribute little importance to the values or characteristics of the individual members of these groups, with the unit of analysis being parties and social groups as opposed to individual voters.

From the view of this thesis, one of the most important contributions of the Columbia program has been the emphasis on cross-level inference (Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1993). That is to say, while individual voters were the source of information the issue of voting was considered at a broader social level. The emphasis has shifted from group memberships to an ongoing interest in context or environment effects on voting, in which it is the role of salient contexts (for example, work, neighbourhood, etc) in determining the groups to which one is exposed that is important. Typically, investigation of contextual effects attempts to make links between census level information (from electorates, counties or smaller precincts) and aggregate voting data for those same areas.

### **DUNLEAVY AND HUSBANDS (1985): THE RADICAL MODEL**

The rejection of individualist assumptions is typified by the one of the more recent contributions to electoral sociology in the work of British political sociologist Patrick Dunleavy and his colleagues (Dunleavy & Husbands, 1985). Admittedly Dunleavy also rejects a number of sociological

assumptions as well, for example the concept of opinion 'contagion' as a mechanism for the transmission of partisanship proposed by followers of the Lazarsfeld tradition. The 'radical' model proposed rejects the received wisdom of the importance of party identification, as well as implying strongly that the Western voting process is not as much of an exercise of free will as we would prefer to believe.

According to the radical model the vote of the individual mirrors their position in the hierarchy of society, with different groups interpreting their societal positions through the portrayal of their group interests in mass media. The portrayal of group interests is in turn influenced by the political parties themselves, and is more often biased against parties of the left. Social class is redefined such that upper, middle, and lower classes are replaced by social cleavages based on occupational location, primarily public versus private sector. This primary cleavage is then cross-cut by other cleavages deriving from consumption pressures (how many cars, whether accommodation is owned or rented). In this way the radical model presents individual votes as an instrumental reflection of the political system's ideological interpretation of social cleavages, based on a broadly dominant ideology transmitted through mass media.

In accordance with the heavy emphasis on the media as purveyors of the dominant ideology Dunleavy and Husbands (1985) see no place for such concepts as attitudes or everyday social interaction in the political opinion formation process. Interpersonal communication is unimportant as Dunleavy argues (on the basis of his survey work) that as the content of social contact is rarely political, there is no need to consider the role of contagion in the transmission and formation of political opinion. Fluctuations in group based support relate not to stability of membership but rather to the ongoing interests of the group determined by their societal position as presented by the media. For example unemployed inhabitants of a council flat vote for Labour because Labour has historically been portrayed as representing the interests of unemployed council estate occupants, not because of explicitly political discussion down at the pub. This contrasts with earlier contributors to the field for whom secondary (ie. non-family) group memberships were the contexts for primary (fact-to-face) contact in which one could discuss political matters with people of a similar background. For Dunleavy it is social position itself, and not any persuasive interpersonal contact, that is important.

## PROBLEMS WITH THE SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

The strengths and weaknesses of the radical model are more fully detailed in chapter eight but a brief discussion is appropriate. The rigorous rejection of attitudes as contributory to preference formation (Dunleavy argues that they are causally consequent of preference) condemns Dunleavy to the "realm of metaphysical speculation" (Harrop & Miller, 1987) in that he speaks of the 'collective perceptions' held by individuals about group interests, which replaces the explanatory mechanism of contagion of other models. The vagueness of definition of this idea has led to criticism that Dunleavy has neglected the role of interpersonal contact without a satisfactory alternative. Moreover, the radical model is not suited to explain aspects of voting unrelated to social group membership growing out of an almost deterministic emphasis on social cleavages and relative neglect of the role of political party performance. While the emphasis on the role of media is laudable, the assumption that societal position is the paramount (and only) influence on political preference appears too narrow.

## THE MICHIGAN / PARTY IDENTIFICATION MODEL

While Lazarsfeld and his colleagues were following up the work begun in 'The voter decides' with another county-wide survey for the 1952 presidential election other researchers were about to accidentally change the face of voting research. A group of Michigan-based researchers, students and colleagues of the influential social psychologist Kurt Lewin, were preparing a survey to be carried out prior to the 1948 presidential election. As it happened they chose to include in the survey a question on political affiliation which has since become a familiar part of opinion surveys to this day. After the election it became clear that only the Michigan group had come close to predicting the upset victory of Truman, based on a question included effectively at the last minute.

The most pervasive (and enduring) concept in contemporary electoral behaviour research is that of 'party identification'. Party identification refers to the long-standing attachment that a majority of voters develop towards a political party. The predictive success of their 1948 research placed the Michigan group as the new leaders of voting research and generated momentum that would lead to the establishment of the survey research centre in Michigan that, to this day, provides much of the impetus behind the nationwide survey programme into political behaviour in the United States.

In their endorsement of the party identification model Harrop and Miller (1987) argue that just as people can consider themselves as Church of England without actually being regular church-goers or possessing any tangible link to the Church itself, so too can people see themselves as Labour or Conservative without any formal link to the party itself. A considerable amount of ink has been devoted to making a link between socialisation experiences and the development of party identification. To a large extent party identification is inherited from parents and assumes greater importance as the individual draws upon their partisanship to make sense of the cacophony of political information that bombards them as they make their way again and again to the polling booth. Developing as it does at the same time as the other aspects of identity for the individual it is argued that this political attachment forms part of the individual's self-knowledge and is therefore extremely durable.

According to the party identification model, then, individuals do not identify with a particular party because of what that party apparently stands for but the other way around- they accept that party because they identify with it. In this the party identification model stands in direct opposition to other models of voting behaviour falling under the blanket of rational choice.

The origins of the Party identification model derive from the mid 1950's (Campbell et al, 1960). The model was conceived to some extent as a rejection of the theory and conclusions of the Columbia school. Though both schools share an emphasis on social groups the Michigan theorists place considerable emphasis on political party candidates and party policy, focussing on the link between the parties and social groups. Electoral choice is seen to be affected by attitudes towards the candidates, policy, and the party-social group linkage. Attitudes to each of these elements will to varying degrees reflect one's party identification. For example voters will support a party they believe represents their interests as members of different groups on the basis of their prior identification even in the absence of any corroborating information. Thus party identification exerts a pervasive influence on preference through biased perception of political policy, candidates, issues etc.

More recent developments (from US) have developed three main assumptions upon which the party identification model rests (Aimer & McAllister, 1992):

- Party identification is not only a conduit for the act of voting, but also acts as a framework for understanding the political world- it is a cognitive miser-type process. Party identification will influence evaluation of other political stimuli- unfamiliar candidates will be dismissed because they represent a different party, new splinter parties may be evaluated unfavourably if they splinter from the identification party ('betrayal').
- Identification with a party is separate (in theory and aetiology) from actual vote. In practical terms this means that a disparity between party identification and actual vote may not be inconsistent with the model, *provided* that the vote and party identification do re-align in the near future. This is referred to as the 'homing tendency' (Campbell et al, 1960). This in turn leads to the idea of the 'normal vote' in which partisanship and the actual vote are congruent. Lamare (1992) reports that in the 1990 New Zealand election approximately 70% of Labour

identifiers and 85% of National identifiers cast 'normal' votes in the same direction as their party identification.

- Party identification is relatively stable over time. While particularly charismatic opposition candidates might convince some people to switch their vote for an election or two, these effects are weaker and less enduring than identification with the identification party, as with other group affiliations. Changes to identification are developed over a long period and consequently require a weight of 'evidence' to change. For example, even if a party affects policy that contradicts the historical background of the party (as with the fourth Labour government) then it is more likely that the *strength* of identification will decrease rather than the direction. An alternative mechanism might occur when an individual radically changes their group memberships such that they are no longer represented by their identification party. This explanation is one that has been invoked to explain the traditionally 'soft' constituency of left-wing parties in the West- the unemployed vote Labour until they achieve a high-paying job, then they vote National.

While the measurement of party identification has proven an area of recent contention (Miller, 1992) most research on electoral behaviour, regardless of philosophical orientation, includes the now standard question: 'Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent or what?', followed by an indication of the strength of that identification.

### **PROBLEMS WITH THE MICHIGAN PERSPECTIVE**

The party identification perspective has proven remarkably resilient in the face of firstly, increasingly sophisticated alternative formulations, and secondly the reality of increasing electoral volatility. To a greater or lesser extent most western democracies have undergone some degree of dealignment with a decrease in the number of people professing such an affiliation, leading in turn to a greater electoral population capable of swinging dramatically from election to election. The increasing popularity of proportional representation-style electoral systems and the resulting increase in electoral choice (greater number of parties) may contribute to this trend, though it is also found in some of the strongest two-party systems in the world. It

may be that the Michigan model was a product of a particularly stable period in American history. Even so the concept of party identification is still a must in any survey of electoral preference.

The longevity of the party identification concept is attributable in part to its flexibility - that is to say that it has been adapted and incorporated in more complex theories. For an example see the discussion on party identity as analogous to brand loyalty in Himmelweit, Humphreys, and Jaeger's (1985) Consumer model of voting behaviour.

The next section summarises some of the theory and research that has been conducted within the rational choice framework that has overtaken both the sociological and psychological approaches in popularity.



## THE RATIONAL CHOICE PERSPECTIVE:

"the theory assumes that the voter recognises his own self-interest, evaluates alternative candidates on the basis of which will best serve this self-interest, and casts his vote for the candidate most favourably evaluated".

(Enelow and Hinich, 1984, p. 3)

More recently (though once again the inspiration dates back to the 50's) the 'fashion' in political behaviour research revolves around the conceptualisation of the voter as a rational agent (Aimer & McAllister, 1992). Indeed by 1992 nearly 40% of the articles published in *American Political Science Review* focused on Rational choice theories (Green & Shapiro, 1994).

In its simplest form, rational voting involves supporting the party perceived as most likely to act in a manner that will lead to outcomes to the benefit of the voter. While the party identification model conceives the act of voting as one of affirming one's loyalty to the party, the rational choice perspective views the vote as the outcome of an agenda-driven deliberative process. For this reason the two perspectives are frequently contrasted. According to Harrop and Miller (1986) there are three main characteristics of rational choice models:

- The act of voting is an instrumental one intended to maximise benefits to the voter.
- Social aspects and uses of the vote are effectively ignored- we don't vote to please our friends or family.
- As a rational process it is expected that voters will be rational in their acquisition of information. Thus the voter actively seeks relevant (and sufficient) information which serves as the basis for calculated deliberation

While the Columbia and Michigan schools were thrashing out their differences Anthony Downs (1957) was preparing the way for the currently ascendant approach to voting behaviour. Downs is commonly cited as the patriarch of the rational choice perspective (Aimer & McAllister, 1992; Green & Shapiro, 1994; Harrop & Miller, 1986). For example, in a rare example of reflexivity (Goodin & Klingemann, 1996) it is revealed that the most commonly cited work in the 'New handbook of political science' (1996) is Downs' 'An economic theory of democracy'. According to

Downs (assuming a costless information environment) voters weigh up the 'utility income' or benefits they have garnered under the current administration. These benefits include increases to personal income, government services etc, which they can assume they will continue to receive should the administration continue. This is then contrasted with the hypothetical utility that would have been obtained under an opposition administration, producing a 'party differential' between the different outcomes. The party with the greatest expected utility is the party that will receive the vote.

In reality, Downs acknowledges that information is neither costless or entirely accurate and for that reason voters may utilise strategies other than paradigmatic information seeking to avoid the costs of information acquisition:

- People may internalise the political judgements of other sources (people and media) perceived to hold similar values to their own.
- Rather than evaluation of the party platforms per se the voter may base preference judgements on the ideologies of the parties available (assuming that government action is ideologically based).
- Rather than seeking out specific information (such as party manifestoes) people may base preference judgements on incidental (and free) information gleaned from conversation or media.
- Ultimately, Downsian voters develop a standing party commitment as a shortcut to optimal and systematic information gathering.

Another strength of the rational choice perspective is the role given to political parties. If voters are rational then it is in the interests of the parties to maximise their apparent utility to encourage people to support them. This has proven universally difficult- given the range of interest groups in existence it is practically impossible to satisfy everybody even some of the time.

### **HIMMELWEIT, HUMPHREYS, AND JAEGER (1985): THE VOTER AS CONSUMER**

While Lazarsfeld et al (1948) were forced to dispense with the idea, the metaphor of voter as consumer has continued to be popular in contemporary approaches. This metaphor serves as

the basis for the work of Himmelweit, Humphreys and Jaeger (1985) in the book 'How voters decide', summarising the results of a fifteen year panel of interviews. Central to their view of the voter as active, responsive, and informed is the contention that voting preference reflects policy preferences of the voter. The voter actively deliberates over which party offers a policy mix that reflects the voter's own preferences. The voter chooses one party over the alternatives just as the consumer selects one make of washing powder over other competing brands.

While down-playing the importance of party identification Himmelweit et al (1985) acknowledge the construct plays a limited role - the perception of political parties should also take into account the likelihood of each party successfully introducing the preferred policy (how reliable is the washing powder?). Thus just as consumers develop brand loyalty, the voter develops some relatively enduring loyalty to a particular party. However, in the quest for political novelty (a new brand of washing powder, a new make of underpants) the voter is likely to be swayed as much by new brands as old favourites.

### **PROBLEMS WITH RATIONAL CHOICE**

Though the most common criticism leveled at rational choice research has been focused on the "impoverished" view it presents of the human species as fundamentally self-interested (Mansbridge, 1990) the more telling substantive criticisms rely on the theoretical and practical shortcomings of the approach.

Unfortunately, while Downs' (1957) focus on rational choice has proven extremely influential, many of his caveats have not received as much attention. Even allowing for the lack of pure information, the strategies Downs suggests to reduce the cost of information clearly reduce the rational voter from the computational automaton to a fallible information miser not dissimilar to that presented by the Michigan model.

As a model of human behaviour, expected to explain phenomena other than voting and consumer behaviour, the rational choice approach is more seriously flawed in that it has proven difficult to explain other more fundamental behaviours. For example, assuming that the rational choice formulation of Downs (1957), Himmelweit et al (1985), and others is a reasonable

description of the process that precedes placing of the tick in the ballot box, there is still the problem of explaining why people vote AT ALL. Given the minuscule odds that any individual vote will actually determine the outcome of an election the costs of footing it down to the polling station vastly outweigh the potential benefits. For example, while research has shown that as the costs of registering to vote and voting increase there is a decline in turnout (Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980) in line with the predictions of rational choice, there has been little success identifying the benefits necessary to increase turnout.

Empirical tests of rational choice models may be divided into three families: analysis of aggregate data, analysis of individual-level survey data, and experimental studies.

Both aggregate and individual level analyses of the turnout paradox are based on the same rationale: If voters perceive that the election outcome will be close then they will be motivated to protect their potential benefits by ensuring they cast a potentially decisive vote. One method of testing the rational basis of turnout uses aggregate-level data and compares the closeness of election outcomes and the benefits of different elections. It is hypothesised that turnout for elections with close outcomes and high benefits will be higher than for decisive elections with low benefits. The closeness of the actual election result is used a proxy for perceived closeness. This may or may not be an accurate measure, and the effects of closeness of result on turnout may be moderated by factors unrelated to perceptions and strategy of individual voters (campaign strategy may differ for close as opposed to decisive elections). Additionally, this method risks the usual problem associated with drawing inferences about individual-level choices from aggregate level data.

Alternatively, survey data may be used to compare individuals with different electoral stakes and perceptions of the closeness of an election. While this method avoids the pitfall of the ecological fallacy, and allows more accurate measurement of perceptions of closeness, results have not offered consistent support for rational choice formulations. For example, even where positive benefits are associated with greater turnout, there is little evidence that turnout will increase regardless of whether or not those surveyed considered the electoral race close or not (Riker & Ordeshook, 1968; Ferejohn & Fiorina, 1975). Though a number of researchers have purported to have found a strong relationship between personal economic status and political preference (eg.

Lewis-Beck, 1985) this position has been argued by Sears and Lau (1983; Lau, Sears & Jessor, 1990) to be an artefact of question order in the NES surveys.

Similarly, experimental studies have not resulted in a wealth of support for rational choice formulations. A typical experimental result may be found where experimental participants are assigned monetary rewards dependant on which candidate is successful, most participants choose to vote even where the monetary costs (for example a poll tax) outweigh the stake they have in the outcome (Plott, 1991).

Even those findings that superficially support the rational choice thesis may be interpreted in a number of ways. For example, the studies carried out by Lazarsfeld and his collaborators (Lazarsfeld et al, 1948; Berelson et al, 1954) that demographic characteristics (particularly socioeconomic status) are to some degree predictive of voting preference was interpreted by these early theorists as indicating that individuals are motivated by obvious self-interest - the voters' class reflects their financial as much as social positions and their party preference reflects the belief that particular parties will improve their social as well as financial position. An alternative interpretation is that voting in this circumstance is a symbolic act tied to the context of class conflict.

In response to the paradox of voter turnout Downs (1957) suggested that voters go to the polls because they fear the collapse of democracy in the event of widespread abstention. Surely such maintenance of democratic institutions is itself a public good to which any one voter's contribution is negligible, in effect substituting the turnout paradox for paradox of civic-minded participation. Why not stay at home and let others save democracy?

While the paradox of voter turnout is a clear problem for rational choice style theories, there have been innovative attempts to bridge the gap. Dunleavy (1992) provides support from a potentially unexpected quarter (he acknowledges that the original intention of the work was to roundly criticise rational choice models). Dunleavy (1992) takes the perspective that voter turnout may be modelled on a theory of group membership using the following argument:

Parties present themselves as offering utility for different people, and are perceived as such. The

more an individual voters considers this to be the case, the more they come to recognise that particular parties offer platforms that promote (or oppose) the interests that voter shares with others. The recognition that this is the case is referred to as 'party identity' and serves as a yardstick by which the voter can judge competing parties, their performance and their platforms. The acquisition of such a party identity may be accompanied by the internalisation of a particular ideological shorthand derived from the identified party and which may serve as a more efficient route to acquiring political information.

This process makes salient the difference between the costs of voting for or against different parties. At the same time one's perception of the electoral viability of the party increases. After all, even marginal increases in the popularity of political parties can disproportionately increase the apparent favourability of the parties concerned (under MMP, a party that increases their party vote to 5% can hold the balance of power in government) - "In almost all cases people see their vote as more efficacious if their preferred party is going to win or perform strongly, even if it wins handsomely" (p.86). Thus the individual's likelihood of voting is influenced by the perceived viability of a party, and that perception is inflated by one's own positive attachment to the party.

These sorts of problems have lead to rational choice theorists limiting their empirical investigation to clearly defined areas that are more amenable to the rational choice formulation, and avoiding areas where it is less likely to prove successful (Green & Shapiro, 1995).

While the formulation presented by Himmelweit et al (1985) has been criticised on similar grounds it has also been criticised for down-playing the role of party identification. While the analogy of party identification as similar to brand loyalty in choosing (for example) a brand of detergent seems plausible, it obscures the fact that beyond the superficial level the consequences associated with choosing a political party are qualitatively and quantitatively different. Buying detergent does not usually arouse the same level of sentiment as the choice of political party - One rarely worries about expressing a preference for Persil in a pro-Surf environment. Choosing a charismatic but incompetent president will cause long term local and global anomalies that are more enduring than a slightly soiled load of washing! To some extent the question as formulated in a rational choice framework is misleading- rather than asking how

we decide who to vote for it is more appropriate to ask whether the vast majority actually 'choose' at all.

The problems faced by a rational choice approach are summarised as follows:

- The rational choice perspective offers an unsatisfactory view of human motivation.
- While rational choice formulations have proven successful in the area of economic theory they have been less successful in other endeavours with a practical inability to demonstrate that a range of behaviours are adequately explained (if at all).
- Problems operationalising rational behaviour that have lead to the common adoption of individual self-interest for empirical purposes.

## SYMBOLIC POLITICS

While the party identification model is popularly referred to as *the* social psychological model of voting behaviour it is certainly not the only approach to political behaviour that has grown out of social psychology (Himmelweit et al (1985) for example). One of the most intriguing (but less famous) frameworks for understanding political behaviour is the symbolic politics perspective offered by Sears (Sears, 1993; Sears, Huddy & Schaffer, 1986).

Sears (1993) starts by saying:

“Human beings are intensely concerned about remote and abstract political symbols, even though the emotional costs they pay and benefits they receive from such involvement are modest. These intense emotions have energised many of history’s most devastating social, political, and religious conflicts.” (p.113)

It is immediately clear that (like the party identification model) symbolic politics rejects the assumptions of rational choice approaches, with greater emphasis on emotional commitment to politics and political life. Indeed much of the empirical work on symbolic politics has sought to undermine the view of the voter as a calculated rational maximiser, particularly where rational utility is defined as self-interest.

The theory of Symbolic politics in its simplest form holds that people’s attitudes and behaviours relating to aspects of the political world, for example issues, elections, parliamentary candidates, are heavily influenced by longstanding affective predispositions. These predispositions are a conditioned response to some stimulus in the political world.

Like the party identification model these long-standing dispositions develop through childhood socialisation, with a particular emphasis on family. The most important and frequently used symbolic predispositions include racial prejudice, ideological identification and party identification. Symbolic predispositions mediate behaviour when the context includes some object that is associated with that disposition. Contrary to the rational choice emphasis on utility as the motivation behind political action, symbolic politics maintains that if there is utility in political behaviour it is coincidental.



In practice, the symbolic politics approach is explicitly contrasted with self-interest based rational choice theory. Over a twenty year period Sears has attempted to show that 'activation' of symbolic predispositions have greater explanatory power than self-interest in motivating political behaviour. For example, Sears, Hensler and Speer (1979) measured people's attitudes towards forced busing to see if those people living in an area subject to (or potentially subject to) busing were less positive about busing than those for whom there was no objective utility. They found that while the symbolic predispositions of racial intolerance and political conservatism were predictive of opposition towards busing as well as presidential preference in the 1972 election, there was no apparent effect of self-interest. More recently Sears and Huddy (1995) contrasted racial prejudice and realistic interests as potential explanations for white opposition to bilingual education programs. The results were less conclusive in that both explanations had some explanatory power when the participants lived in an ethnically mixed area and the researchers were forced to admit that the two were more difficult to separate than originally expected.

In the body of work conducted in a symbolic politics framework the most common and fruitful stimulus issues have been related to race. The illustrations in the previous paragraph involve attitudes towards policy relating to black and Hispanic Americans, responses to which are hypothesised to be based on a combination of anti-minority affect and traditional values. To expand, from a symbolic politics perspective white opposition to (pro-black) affirmative action is based not on resource conflict but rather a combination of anti-black sentiment and appeal to traditional values such as Protestant work ethic (success is the reward for effort) and equality (nobody should be advantaged over others). Thus in an early exposition of the theory (Sears et al, 1986) it was argued that at the level of greatest abstraction political symbols appeal to core values such as equality or freedom. I shall return to the relationship between values and symbols at a later point.

The symbolic politics theory subsumes the concept of party identification (as a symbolic predisposition) into a theory that in its application has at the very least shown that there is more to political decision making than rational choice theorists suggest. However the symbolic politics approach has not propagated beyond Sears and his collaborators and has been subject to almost as much criticism as the rational choice approach.

One major problem is that while these studies have shown that people make similar political decisions whether there is objective utility or not, they have failed to provide much support for the argument that it is symbolic politics that theoretically accounts for the results. The standard symbolic politics study compares political attitudes of groups for whom there is, or is not, objective utility in certain attitudes. The assumption is that if people in the no-utility condition behave similarly to the utility condition then the effect is not based on simple self-interest.

At the heart of the symbolic politics- rational choice debate is the definition of rationality (and political symbolism). On the one hand rational choice theory may present a plausible account of the processes involved in placing a ballot box tick, but it has tremendous difficulty explaining why the voter goes to the trouble of being there. Secondly, what constitutes a utilitarian outcome? There is a large body of research that shows that when defined in narrow self interest terms rational voting does not satisfactorily explain a range of political behaviours. While the studies executed by Sears to undermine rational choice they only go a short way to supporting the alternative symbolic politics alternative. For example, voters in areas unaffected by forced busing policy exhibit the same opposition as those directly affected but how true is it that this is due to affective reactions to the symbolic content of the forced busing message? A number of alternatives may be offered. Bobo (1983) has contended that the evidence cited by Sears does in fact support a realistic group conflict view of anti-busing sentiment - whites may not be directly affected by the policy but such policy does potentially affect them at the level of group interest. This view receives some support in the form of the work of Kinder and Kiewiet (1981) who argue that political behaviour is driven not by individual self-interest but instead by group-based or even national-level self interest.

The problem then, is how we determine whether opposition to, or support for a party or policy is rational (utilitarian) or symbolic (expressive)? Many political acts and objects can be convincingly deconstructed in such a way that the underlying motivators can be framed symbolically OR rationally. If this is the case it would seem more plausible that political behaviour need not be conceived simplistically as either rational, or symbolic, but rather more flexibly - political behaviour can be rational and/or symbolic depending on the stimulus and the individual. For example recent research on the social value basis of consumer decisions has drawn together a

number of oppositions such as symbolic-rational, expressive-utilitarian, etc, to show that the social values of different people contribute to their consumer choices through symbolic *and* rational routes (Allen, 1997).

## **PROBLEMS WITH SYMBOLIC POLITICS**

In practice, Sears has ignored the definitional problems associated with political symbolism by using a broad definition "The term "political symbol" refers to any affectively charged element in a political attitude object... all that is intended is that the symbol convey some meaning to the individual." (Sears, 1993, p.147). It should be clear that such a definition does not automatically rule out the possibility that apparently rational stimulus content may be construed symbolically, or vice versa. For example, white opposition to market rental for rural Maori owned property can be framed either in terms of financially damaging to white farmers or alternatively as symbolic of a change in the longstanding Maori-Pakeha power status quo. In practical terms Sears ignores the problem of defining symbolic content in favour of the assumption that policy issues such as forced busing do involve symbolic meaning, and focuses instead on the symbolic predispositions he argues are 'activated' by the presence of such political symbols.

As well as the limitations illustrated above the symbolic politics thesis may be flawed in a number of more potentially fatal ways. Firstly, Sears has justified his formulation of symbolic politics by arguing that the political world is too complex for the ordinary individual to understand or to operate successfully in, in short politics and private life are divorced in terms of both content and immediacy. Therefore people use affective associative shortcuts (affect based evaluation of symbolic content) to operate politically in a process that Sears contends separates the political from the private. From a social psychological standpoint this view argument is problematic in the specification of a process unique to political behaviour - what reason is there to believe that such a privileged process relating only to political stimuli occurs. It would seem preferable to apply what we know about social knowledge to the question of politics as a part of the broader social world and account for political behaviour in terms of more general and generalisable mechanisms.

Secondly, the practical evaluation of the symbolic politics thesis is at odds with the 'level' of theoretical articulation at which symbolic politics is assumed to operate (Doise, 1986). Doise has suggested that to a great extent the way in which we as social psychologists would approach empirically the questions that concern us is in turn determined by the content of those questions. Doise describes four levels of theoretical articulation at which psychological research operates: Individual, interpersonal, social, and ideological. As relates to symbolic politics (or indeed any theory of political behaviour) it is imperative to consider the context in which such behaviour originates and to account for this methodologically in our investigation.

To summarise, the problems with the symbolic politics perspective are as follows:

- The definition and empirical investigation of political symbols, including the specification of what constitutes rational versus symbolic content. Research in this tradition has successfully shown rational self interest to be limited in explanation of a range of political attitudes while failing to offer convincing support for symbolic politics as an alternative explanation.
- The assumption that rational and symbolic motivation are exclusive, both as refers to political stimuli, and as applied by voters themselves.
- The level of theoretical articulation at which the theory operates: Symbolic politics assumes process of symbol generation and communication that can only be social but ignores this assumption in empirical execution. This in part grows out of the presentation of the theory as effectively specific to political behaviour.

## CHAPTER THREE

### A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEW ZEALAND POLITICS

New Zealand historians usually locate the origins of the modern two party system in the 1890's during which time the Liberal party began a 21 year (1891-1912) tenure as government, coinciding with full adult suffrage in 1893. During this period the conservative opposition coalesced under the banner of the Reform Party, before embarking on their own parliamentary dynasty from 1912 to 1935 (with a brief hiccup from 1928 to 1930). During the 1931-1935 period the Labour party grew in stature, leading the United and Reform Parties (governing during this period) to coalesce further with other anti-Labour parties to produce the National Party in 1936. Since this time New Zealand has experienced an extended period in which the political environment has been characterised by swings between the Labour and National Parties which even after a period of political instability still dominate the two sides of the political divide in New Zealand.

Since the inception of National and Labour as distinct unified parties, the two party system has been cemented in place by the electoral system under which the government is determined. Prior to 1996 the New Zealand electoral system was a single-member simple-plurality (commonly called first-past-the-post or FPP). Under this system the number of electorates has grown from 80 to 99 (at the time of the change of electoral system) with parliamentary seats being allocated to candidates who win more votes (not necessarily a majority) than any other single candidate in the same electoral region. Generally speaking the party whose candidates hold more than 50% of the electorates wins the right to form the Government.

Under this system minor parties, while preferred by a significant proportion of the voters country wide, have traditionally found it difficult to win even a single electorate, with the consequence that the parliamentary seats held by the major parties do not reflect their actual percentage of the vote. Thus minor parties such as Social Credit have been able to gain more than ten percent of the valid nationwide vote (as Social Credit did in 1954, 1966, 1978, peaking in 1981 with 20.7 percent), but have at best managed less than 3% of the parliamentary seats. Thus of the 1284

parliamentary seats available from 1946 to 1990 only seven have been held by parties other than National and Labour (Mulgan, 1994).

Though the electoral system wasn't changed till 1993 the seeds of electoral change were sown much earlier in the 1970's, culminating under the 1984-1990 Labour Government. While the vision of 1984 predicted by Orwell may not have been accurate in its specifics that year certainly did herald a turning point in New Zealand politics, and society in general, the aftermath of which is still being felt today. The 1984 Labour administration inherited a New Zealand suffering from a period of National rule under the dictatorial figure of Sir Robert Muldoon. Muldoon had ridden a conservative ticket to the Prime ministership, proceeding to make an isolationist New Zealand so tight that such anecdotes as individuals needing permission from the Government to subscribe to a magazine if it was published overseas became folklore. With the incoming Labour Government New Zealand experienced a short-term financial crisis (to some extent due to Roger Douglas, the incoming finance minister, claiming that the Labour government should devalue the dollar). The new Labour Prime Minister, David Lange, and his finance minister Roger Douglas embarked on a programme of economic reforms so sweeping that they have changed the face of New Zealand politics and society beyond measure. Though winning the 1987 election the Labour administration was rocked by a series of set backs- Lange appeared to recant his belief in rightist reform and removed Douglas from the finance position before abdicating the prime ministership on health grounds, Labour's party president Jim Anderton deserted the party in 1989 to form NewLabour in the image of pre-1984 Labour before uniting with a number of other minor parties to form the Alliance, Lange's replacement Geoffrey Palmer was unable to revitalise the popular fortunes of the Labour party and was deposed by his deputy Mike Moore only weeks before the election. The election was a disaster for Labour with a record swing to National who tightened the already creaking screws on Government spending even further while Labour ejected the tragic Moore in favour of his deputy Helen Clark (New Zealand's first female political leader).

Under National a raft of legislative changes led not to the 'decent society' for which they had campaigned but instead a New Zealand in which the unemployment and crime rates had skyrocketed. The health reforms initiated by Labour lead to the closure of more and more hospitals. University students used to paying less than \$250 a year for their education were suddenly faced with a 500% increase and the loss of universal student allowances. Nationals' popularity

plunged. Nevertheless they were able to retain their hold on Government in the 1993 election with a one-seat majority.

## THE RISE OF THE 'MINOR' PARTY PLAYERS

The 1993 election also saw the appearance as potential forces in parliament of the Alliance and New Zealand First. As mentioned previously the core of the Alliance was NewLabour, established by former Labour MP Jim Anderton. The other parties forming the Alliance were Mana Motuhake (a Labour splinter party established in 1979 by former Labour Maori affairs minister Matiu Rata to primarily contest the Maori electorates), the Greens (who had managed approximately 10% in their first outing in 1990), the Democratic Party (formerly Social Credit), and subsequently the Liberal Party (formed in 1992 by disillusioned National backbenchers Hamish McIntyre and Gilbert Myles). Anderton was the only minor party MP to survive the 1990 election process but was joined in 1993 by Mana Motuhake leader Sandra Lee, and two representatives of New Zealand First, Winston Peters and Tau Henare.

New Zealand First has been called the "most influential party to have emerged since the formation of National in 1936" (Miller, 1997), and as such is worthy of some attention. New Zealand First was born in a climate of growing discontent with the ongoing process of change in New Zealand under National, and indeed it was the then National MP, Winston Peters, who gave voice to that discontent and in so doing was ejected from the National caucus in 1992 (an action unprecedented in the then 56 year history of the National Party). At the time Peters was the most popular politician in New Zealand and happy to take advantage of that popularity to criticise the National Party programme, likening the unfulfilled election promises made by National to the atrocities committed by the Nazi Party in the 1930's (Miller, 1997). Peters finally split from National in March 1993 under a cloud of speculation that he would join, in fact lead, the Alliance (the way having been prepared by Myles and McIntyre). His resignation forced a by-election in his electorate of Tauranga, ultimately a meaningless exercise as National and Labour united in refusing to put up any candidates in opposition. Needless to say, Peters won (with a record majority) forming New Zealand First in July of 1993 after several months of suspense and with the encouragement of opinion polls suggesting that 31% of the electorate would support a Peters-led party (even in the absence of any substantive policy). This compared favourably with 34%, 22% and 11% for Labour, National and the Alliance respectively. In their first electoral outing a matter of months later New Zealand First failed to live up to this hypothetical promise and gleaned 8.4% of the nationwide vote in the 1993 general election. On the positive side



Peters was joined after the 1993 election by Tau Henare, who managed to pry one of the traditionally Labour strong-hold Maori seats. With charismatic leadership and a platform skirting populism and pragmatic conservatism New Zealand First were vying with the Alliance for the balance of power third-place vote in the first MMP election.

## **ELECTORAL REFORM**

The idea of electoral reform gained favour over a period of years, due in no small part to some bizarre electoral outcomes. For example, on five occasions starting in 1954 minor parties achieved more than 10 percent of the nationwide vote but received little more than two percent of the seats in parliament. In 1978 and 1981 Social Credit gained 16.1 percent and 20.7 percent of the vote which translated into 1.1 and 2.2 percent of the available parliamentary seats. A Royal Commission on the Electoral System was established, reporting in 1986, with the recommendation that consideration be given to a change of electoral system. While the concept of electoral change in favour of a proportional representation system (under which parliamentary seats would be allocated in proportion to the percentage of valid nationwide vote) had been bandied about for a number of years, David Lange as Prime Minister set the ball rolling during a speech in which he accidentally agreed to hold a referendum on electoral change. The initiative was accidental in that he has since claimed that he misread the speech in which it was intended that he would dismiss the chance of a referendum, but indicates the amount of pressure on elites to carry out the recommendations of the Royal Commission (Levine & Roberts, 1997). The spirit of change had been liberated...

A game of political one-upmanship followed. Labour introduced legislation hinting at electoral reform though little eventuated. The successful 1990 National party accused Labour of reneging on their election promise of a binding referendum on the future of the electoral system, usurping that promise as one of their own electoral platforms. Under National the promised binding referendum was once more watered down, but still resulting in a non-binding, indicative referendum held in 1992. The referendum asked the question of whether the electoral system should be changed, and what would be the preferred alternative system. Held as it was in a non-election year the turnout was low at around 55% but the verdict was resounding - 84% indicated a preference for electoral change leading ex-prime minister Mike Moore to observe that the

people hadn't spoken- they had screamed (Levine & Roberts, 1997). As well as the clear endorsement of change the referendum cemented the Mixed Member Proportional system (MMP) as the favoured alternative to FPP. In the face of such apparent determination a final referendum was scheduled to be held at the next election to decide once and for all the shape of New Zealand's political landscape for the foreseeable future. Thus, New Zealand held in 1993 a national referendum which saw the acceptance of a proportional representation electoral system to be used for the first time in the October 1996 national election. The Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) system gives electors two votes- a party vote which they cast for their preferred party, and an electorate vote that may be cast for their preferred local candidate. Voters may or may choose to cast their electorate vote for a candidate from their preferred party allowing the possibility of split-ticket voting, in which they may cast an electorate vote for a candidate from a party other than the one for which they have cast their party vote. Effectively New Zealanders can cast two votes under different local and national electoral systems- their local candidate is decided as before using simple plurality (the local candidate with the greater percentage of the electorate vote becomes MP for that electorate), while each party wins a proportion of parliamentary seats commensurate with their proportion of the national party vote. Depending on their slice of the party vote each party has their number of seats topped up to ensure they meet the national vote. Under MMP the number of electorates was cut from 100 to 65, with a further 55 list-seats allocated to parties to bring their proportion of parliamentary seats into line with their proportion of the national vote. Importantly, MMP offers any party that achieves a minimum of five percent of the national vote, or wins one electorate seat, a level of parliamentary representation reflecting their share of the nation wide vote. Though the role of government has traditionally been held by either the National party (conservative) or the New Zealand Labour party (socialist/liberal), no party currently has more than 40% of the popular vote. MMP was designed to usher in a new era of coalition government.

## **THE RUN-UP TO THE 1996 ELECTION**

With the adoption of MMP promising to present minor parties with a greater slice of the political pie the incentives for new parties were great. The mood of change was seized upon by a number of MPs who for various reasons were unsatisfied with their membership in established parties. As a result of the re-drafting of electorate boundaries (to reduce the nationwide number from 99 to

60) a number of sitting MPs found themselves in a selection battle with other members of their own party. For example, the affable Clive Matthewson found his electorate subsumed by the neighbouring electorate of Labour party finance spokesman Michael Cullen. What ever other motivation there may have been, seven politicians from both sides of the house (including Matthewson as leader) came together and established the centrist party United New Zealand. From absolute obscurity United became the third largest party in Parliament. United and National entered into formal coalition and gave New Zealand an indication of what political life under MMP might look like.

At the same time a number of other MPs established the National splinter party Right-of-Centre (ROC) which was as tragically short-lived as its name, changing to the Conservative Party before disappearing off the political map after the election. National MP Graeme Lee formed the Christian Democrats and formed an alliance with Christian Heritage, which had already competed in a number of elections.

New parties need not spring up from within Parliament alone. A number of other interest groups threw their hats into the ring, including a Lazarus-like return by Roger Douglas in the guise of the Association of Consumers and Taxpayers (ACT, though the party was denounced by David Lange as the Association of consumers and tax avoiders). Originally presented as a business-oriented lobby group ACT quickly concluded that political influence would only be gained if they became a formal political party. With a thin veneer of social justice rhetoric over right wing economics (presented as the logical conclusion of the 1984 Labour 'Rogernomics' agenda) ACT proved immediately popular with Business Roundtable types. It was decided that as the architect of Rogernomics (the title given to the programme of privatisation initiated by the 1984 Labour government), Roger Douglas was not the best leader for the fledgling party. Instead the baton was handed to head-Rogernome, Richard Prebble, who had been the Minister for State Owned Enterprise under Labour prime ministers Lange, Palmer, and Moore. With the arrival of ACT, National finally had a potential ally to balance the presence of the Alliance on the other side of the political divide.

## THE PRE-ELECTION BIG PICTURE

This period of political instability saw a flurry of activity, marked by the birth of six splinter parties whose members defected from the established parties, as well as a rapid increase in parties based on interest groups. At the time of the 1996 election New Zealand had 27 registered political parties, only six of which by pre-election polls would satisfy the criteria for parliamentary representation. This contrasts with the long period of electoral stability prior to recent changes, when the role of long-term identification with the two major parties occupied a pivotal role in explanations of New Zealand voting behaviour (see Lamare, 1992).

As the number of parties has increased, so too has the overlap between their political platforms and intended constituencies. The result is a divided left-wing in which the traditional Labour party vies for the same slice of the vote as the six-year old Alliance, while the centre-right continues to be dominated by the National party and its allies, specifically United New Zealand. While United was formally co-allied with National, the Conservative Party, the Christian Coalition, and ACT were all preparing to join the party.

New Zealand First claimed a centrist position but this appeared to be an over-simplification. Winston Peters campaigned on generalities, not specifics, meaning no in-depth analysis of policy was possible. Their support was clearer however, split between a sizeable contingent of elderly (traditional National voters, but now Peters' most enduring supporters) and Maori (traditionally a stronger Labour constituency). For this reason New Zealand First probably was not a true centre party (unlike United, drawing as it did MPs from both sides of the house) but the traditional ideological positioning of their support averaged out to somewhere near the centre.

At the time of the first survey in this project, National was the most preferred party, followed by the Alliance who appeared on track to usurp the position of Labour as THE party of the left. Labour had plunged to an all-time low with less than 20% support, followed by New Zealand First at less than 10%. The implications of this period of change for the study of political behaviour have both positive and negative sides: While giving an unparalleled opportunity to make a psychological study at a time of tremendous change it also makes it difficult to anticipate changes during the course of a programme of research. The need to accommodate to rapid changes in

the electoral climate necessitated considerable flexibility in the course of the research programme, sometimes dictating that survey items be redesigned to address changes in topicality and popularity.

Perhaps the greatest anticipated change was expected to result from the increase in choices at the ballot box. By the time of the election the names of 27 parties appeared on the ballot paper, with the majority having sprung up within the last couple of years. New Zealanders, used to at most three realistic alternatives were suddenly spoiled for choice. This increase was reflected by a dramatic increase in the amount of electioneering material being thrust at the public. Not least of these were newspaper and television campaigns aimed at facilitating the public understanding of the new electoral system. There was great concern leading into the election with some polls suggesting that as few as thirty percent of the voting population actually understood the intricacies of the two vote system.

#### **THE 1996 NEW ZEALAND GENERAL ELECTION**

At the time this project began National was the polling consistently as the most popular party, followed by the Alliance, Labour and finally New Zealand First. Had the election results mirrored these early opinion poll results (a year before the election) it was unclear whether the new electoral term would see National governing alone or a coalition of Alliance-Labour-New Zealand First.

If a week is a long time in politics, then in the volatile situation that was New Zealand approaching the first MMP election, a year can be a yawning chasm for the aspirations of political hopefuls. One of the most significant events of this period occurred with little advance attention when Winston Peters, leader of New Zealand First, gave a speech in the Elim Christian Hall to an elderly audience, in the centre of the Asian population in Auckland. In the speech Peters was critical of the National Government immigration policy, claiming that it was too easy for economic predators to enter New Zealand, placing pressure on the New Zealand economy and generally leading to the end of New Zealand as we know it. Peters decried National policy that "sees rows of ostentatious homes in this very suburb, occupied in some cases by children whose parents have no ties to this country other than the price they paid for the house, and who prefer to remain

outside its shores.” (quoted in Miller, 1997b, p.170). Miller (1997b) comments that Peters’ Maori ethnicity made him a difficult target for accusations of racism (though he was roundly attacked by other politicians).

The effect was dramatic. By the end of April 1996, two months after the speech, New Zealand First leapfrogged both Labour and the Alliance to be second only to National in the polls. The rise of New Zealand First came primarily at the expense of the Alliance who found themselves at the rear of the electoral field, at one point sinking to 6% in one poll. National’s lead was eroded and Labour sunk to their lowest mark in history.

By the time of the election it was clear that things had changed once more. New Zealand First had fallen from 28% at the end of April to around 15% (attributed to their equivocation over whether they would negotiate with National after the election), Labour had survived a leadership challenge and emerged strongly to trail National, while National and the Alliance continued to suffer as parts of their constituencies (the elderly from National, Maori and low income from Alliance) continued to flirt with New Zealand First. National continued to maintain they could govern alone, particularly in the face of popular disapproval at the prospect of a National-Act-Christian Coalition merger (Dubbed the ‘Toxic Trio’ by United). Act had benefited from an apparent betrayal of their electorate candidate, Mark Thomas, by Prime Minister Jim Bolger declaring on television that Act would probably win the seat of Wellington Central, thus ensuring their presence in Parliament (See Gustaffson, 1997; Jesson, 1997; Miller, 1997; and Street, 1997 for more detailed accounts of the progress of each party into the election).

Whatever the exact percentages, by the time of the first MMP election it was widely expected that the next New Zealand Government would be dominated by the political left...

## THE ELECTION RESULT

Table 3.1

Results of the 1996 New Zealand MMP Election

Party	% Electorate Votes	Electorate Seats	% Party Votes	List Seats	Total Seats	% Total Seats
<b>National</b>	33.9	30	33.8	14	44	36.7
<b>Labour</b>	31.1	26	28.2	11	37	30.8
<b>NZ First</b>	13.5	6	13.4	11	17	14.2
<b>Alliance</b>	11.3	1	10.1	12	13	10.8
<b>ACT</b>	3.8	1	6.1	7	8	6.7
<b>United</b>	2.1	1	0.9	0	1	0.8
<b>Chr. Coalition</b>	1.6	0	4.3	0	0	0.0
<b>ALCP</b>	0.2	0	1.7	0	0	0.0
<b>Others</b>	2.5	0	1.5	0	0	0.0

(Figures taken from Levine & Roberts (1997), table 1, p.228)

Table 3.1 above reports the results of New Zealand's first MMP election. Of the 27 parties contesting the election only six won parliamentary seats. Of the 120 seat parliament, National won 44, Labour 37, New Zealand First 17, the Alliance 13, Act 8, and United 1. No party had sufficient numbers to govern alone and it came down to New Zealand First as power broker to decide with whom to ally. Either combination of National - New Zealand First or Labour - New Zealand First would hold a majority of seats and form a Government.

There ensued almost two months of uncertainty as New Zealand First conducted coalition negotiations with both Labour and National before deciding which party to side with either in formal coalition or in a minority government capacity.

We expected that one of the results of this widening panorama of political choice would be a public experiencing increasing difficulty in understanding the political sphere (and their place in it) in traditional terms. For example, consider those models of voting behaviour stressing the

strength of long term political affiliations- how would such approaches accommodate those voters intending to vote for a party that didn't even exist before the previous election? Before presenting the research programme there follows a summary of those investigations carried out in New Zealand to date.

## **VOTING BEHAVIOUR RESEARCH IN NEW ZEALAND POLITICAL SCIENCE**

For a number of reasons New Zealand represents an ideal place in which to consider the processes underlying political behaviour. Firstly the people of New Zealand have undergone a period of electoral and social change that presents the opportunity to examine the dynamics of such change. Secondly, compared to the United States and Britain, New Zealand is a small country in terms of population. This is reflected in the smaller number of electorates meaning that a sample that in the US might be representative of only a single electorate can be the same size as a sample that is representative of New Zealand as a whole - if the funding can be found. Herein lies the problem - the resources have been (until relatively recently) unattainable. This is, in part, due to the small size of the academic community interested in politics and political change. As a result of the chronic lack of resources investigators have been (till recently) unable to develop an ongoing research program allowing the sorts of over-time comparisons that can be made in the US or Europe.

“No overall model of New Zealand voting behaviour has been proffered, let alone competing models. Rather than pursue a concern for theorising or modelling, most researchers have focused on the more immediate objective of seeking to explain an election outcome, with reference to the partisanship of respondents and the current salient short-term issue and leadership effects. Beyond this general psephological purpose, the particular interests of individual researchers, even where they overlap, tend to be complementary rather than competing or conflictual. This again reflects above all the relative theoretical innocence of research into New Zealand electoral behaviour, theory being the purveyor of debate.” (Aimer & McAllister, 1992, p.178-179).



“unfortunately, the cost of getting substantive results usually leaves little or no money for methodological experimentation.” (Aimer & McAllister, 1992, p.179). The paucity of systematic theory-based research and debate has meant that New Zealand political science has come to be characterised by pragmatism, with an enthusiastic but relatively small research community.

The NZES is the greatest attempt to provide New Zealand political researchers with large-sample data on politically important variables. Each election year since 1987 more than 1000 voters have provided their responses standard, as well as topical, political questions. Since 1993 the NZES has added an extra dimension through surveying of ‘elites’ directly involved in politics. The 1993 sample consisted of 693 parliamentary candidates and political party delegates, who received a slightly reduced version of the main-sample survey. This has allowed extensive comparison to be drawn between the views of voters and elites. While a number of theoretically important issues have continued to receive attention throughout the survey span, there has also been attention devoted to topically important issues. For example, *Voter’s Vengeance* (Vowles & Aimer, 1993) summarises findings from 1984 to 1990 and pays particular attention to the rise of new parties (the Greens and NewLabour). The rise in popularity of the Greens has been linked to the growing (worldwide) endorsement of postmaterial values (those values that transcend immediate physical concerns like economic viability and security), and the 1990 NZES tapped this important construct. The results indicate that there is something of a cohort effect in the endorsement of postmaterialism with those born between 1945 and 1955 containing the highest proportion of postmaterialists, with those born subsequently almost as high. Regression analysis of a measure of commitment to the environmentalist position onto demographic and attitudinal variables, postmaterialism was the single strongest predictor of a pro-environmental position. Additionally there was a clear association between postmaterialism and support for the Greens, with almost one third of those voting for them being classified as postmaterialist (twice as high a proportion than supporters of the other parties).

One of the themes running through the NZES reports concerns the investigation of possible dimensions of political perception. Postmaterialism figures as one possible dimension in a number of analyses over time, with authoritarianism suggested as a second (Vowles et al, 1995). These findings are particularly relevant to the studies in chapter six, and are presented in more

detail where appropriate.

### **The New Zealand Election Study (NZES)**

The three volumes summarising the findings of this research programme have built up a rich database of information based on responses from more than 2000 electors, and more than 1000 'elite' party members (eg. party delegates from the major parties). In these surveys particular attention has been paid to the structural factors influencing political behaviour, issues and voting, electoral participation and volatility, in fact there is now evidence comparable to pretty much any mainstream political science endeavour overseas. At the same time the programme has retained a focus on the particular issues that are of particular interest in a New Zealand context; for example environmental politics and the impact of new parties and the new electoral system.

Of particular relevance to this thesis has been the investigation of values and dimensions of public opinion in New Zealand. Both the 1990 and 1993 NZES survey included inventories allowing classification of the respondents as possessing a materialist or postmaterialist value orientation (Inglehart, 1990). The postmaterialism construct has been most strongly championed by Inglehart (1990) and is intended as an indication of the extent to which people's value priorities reflect a desire for transcendence of materialist concerns. For example, postmaterialists are expected to value freedom of speech and attachment to the democratic ideal, while in contrast materialists are expected to value economic improvement and the maintenance of social order. Inglehart's own research has focussed on the finding that over the last 20 years endorsement of postmaterialist ideals have become increasingly popular, arguably reflecting increasing industrialisation and the progress that has accompanied it. Put simply, people whose immediate concern for satisfaction of physical needs has been met are turning their attention to things that transcend these more immediate physical concerns.

## VOTING BEHAVIOUR RESEARCH IN NEW ZEALAND PSYCHOLOGY

Forgas' (Forgas, Kagan, & Frey, 1977; Forgas, Laszlo, Siklaki, & Moylan, 1995) repeated exhortation that the 'study of the causes and processes underlying political behaviour is one of the fundamental issues in social psychology' (Forgas et al, 1995, p.19) has been largely unaddressed by psychologists in New Zealand. A recent review of political psychology in New Zealand illustrated similar problems to those facing political scientists. That is, the lack of resourcing is reflected in the unsystematic body of research that has accrued. Ironically the greater part of this work has been conducted by political scientists interested in psychology rather than psychologists interested in politics (with some notable exceptions). Indeed, there have to date been few forays into the fundamental area of voting behaviour from the psychological quarter with the majority of studies focusing on attitude structures (Chignell & Stacey, 1980), specific issues (for example attitudes towards the New Zealand nuclear position, eg. Taylor, 1988), or alternatively reporting psychometric evaluations of politically relevant personality constructs (eg. Jamieson (1978) on conservatism). In short there has been little attention paid to the psychological study of political behaviour.

While New Zealand politics research has made use of the theoretical traditions detailed previously there has been, to date, no explorations of the symbolic politics thesis. To rectify this oversight it is one of the aims of this work to examine New Zealand political behaviour within a social psychological framework that is intended to accommodate the current shortcomings of the theory of symbolic politics while synthesising pertinent aspects of the other traditional approaches.

It is no surprise that this shift towards postmaterialism has been argued as one explanation for the increasing popularity of environmental politics, an issue that has been relevant to New Zealand.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### SYMBOLIC POLITICS AND SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS THEORY: TOWARDS A RESOLUTION AND SYNTHESIS

The various contradictions and inconsistencies presented by the different approaches to voting behaviour amounts to a sizeable problem- rational choice theories can account for a range of narrowly defined phenomena but not others, party identification theses are decreasing in predictive power as the electorate becomes more volatile, while symbolic politics presents a plausible, and to me, intuitively satisfactory alternative which in practice is difficult to decisively separate from a rationality-based process. How then can this impasse be prevented?

Clearly the different approaches outlined, while purporting to offer explanatory frameworks for the totality of political behaviour, in reality are most successful when applied to limited instances or behaviours. For example, while the Michigan perspective allows the prediction of voting behaviour for a majority of the electorate it does not satisfactorily account for those voters whose vote is incongruent with their party identification, or more importantly that part of the electorate whose party identification is volatile. The behaviour of these individuals may be better described from a rational choice perspective in which preference at time A compared to time B might vary according to changes in rational utility associated with the parties concerned. Of course this perspective needs to be able to accommodate voter stability reflecting a long standing party commitment without negating the assumptions upon which the framework rests. Alternatively a symbolic politics approach, as something of an extension of the Michigan model, holds that political behaviour reflects core values the origins of which are located in the social context in which the voter exists. As a perspective that has developed as a reaction to the growing popularity of rational choice theories the symbolic politics thesis has proven successful at highlighting the flaws of the rational choice approach while failing to establish the symbolic politics model itself as a distinct or superior alternative. Some of the strengths of the Michigan model are shared with the sociologically derived approaches exemplified by the Columbia school. For example, any explanation of voting behaviour based on objective group memberships (for example; gender, age, social class, organisational affiliation, etc) has the advantage of simplifying the causal relationships involved. That is to say, while age may conceivably influence vote

preference, there is no way that the reverse can be true (Harrop & Miller, 1987). Unfortunately some of the same criticisms may be applied as well, with voter volatility occurring at a greater rate than can be attributed to changes in group memberships. Taken to an extreme the sociological reliance on aggregate analysis exemplified by Dunleavy and Husbands (1985) comes at the expense of the role of the individual as illustrated by their dismissal of attitudes, and social influence (however defined) as unimportant parts of the voting process.

### **SUMMARY: DOING POLITICS...**

It should be clear from the perspectives detailed previously that there is considerable variation in the way in which political behaviour is conceptualised. Firstly, the sociological perspective places emphasis on the social and group context in which political behaviour occurs. In its strongest form this argument is open to the criticism of determinism at the expense of the individual's role. Secondly, the Michigan perspective focuses on the individual voter and the long term affiliation with political parties leading to a view of the voter as an impoverished cognitive miser. Thirdly, rational choice theorises the role of individual level utility maximisation as the determinant of votership while being unable to account for the fact that people vote at all. Finally, the symbolic politics perspective presents a picture of people cast afloat on the tide of emotion, reacting at a gut level to the abstract elements of the issue at hand. Clearly there are both commonalities and contradictions in these different approaches to explaining why we vote the way we do...

The problem then, is to articulate a framework for explaining voting behaviour which takes into account the important aspects of the more traditional models already detailed. The framework presented in this thesis is therefore something of a synthesis of these major approaches but conceived from a strongly social psychological perspective in which the interdependence of the individual and their social context is considered.

The picture I wish to develop is one in which the ultimate voting decision falls to the individual voter, but which is an ongoing part of a multi-determined process in which people 'do politics' as it were. Far from being divorced from the business of everyday life the stuff of politics is intertwined irreducibly with the stuff of working, talking, leisure, etc in such a way that our social actions and environments construct and constrain the ways we think about politics. This differs from the view

held by Lazarsfeld et al (1948), and McPhee(with Smith & Ferguson, 1963) which assumes active persuasion in interpersonal dealings directly concerning politics influences the preferences of the persuaded by the persuader. Rather, the process of social communication be it face to face or via media such as newspapers, TV, radio, organisational communication etc serve to provide (as well as restrict) one's access to information that relates directly and indirectly to political goings-on. In this way what is not said is of equal importance to what is said in contributing to the information upon which political preference ultimately rests.

For example, one can conceive of any number of highly homogeneous environments (for example union meetings, shop floors, affluent and not so affluent neighbourhoods, etc) in which views are presented which are congruent with, and serve to reinforce, those of others in the same environment. In such an instance one need not explicitly state ones political preference- it is either assumed or alternatively inferred from other peripheral cues (preference for Dan Rather or Peter Jennings, views on race and other social issues, state television, tax rates, pay equity, etc). These tidbits form the cognitive structures from which social and political behaviour arise.

### **SYMBOLS and SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS:**

A link has been drawn between political symbols and social cognition by Verkuyten (1995). Drawing upon Social Representations theory<sup>1</sup> (SRT; Moscovici, 1972) Verkuyten argues that political symbols may form part of, or are themselves social representations, which are knowledge structures the genesis and communication of which occurs through social interaction. Social representations have been compared to the concept of social schemata more typically associated with the North American social psychological tradition but with the primary emphasis falling on the social and communicative nature of the knowledge structures concerned (Augoustinos & Innes, 1990). Before elaborating on the argument presented by Verkuyten there follows a brief explanation of SRT.

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NOTE 1: The majority of the research on social representations theory is published in the French and German languages. The interpretation presented here is based primarily on the available English language literature, supplemented where possible with French language material available in New Zealand.

## **SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS THEORY:**

McGuire (1986) has referred to Social Representation Theory (SRT) as an example of a "distinctively European social psychology" (p.97). The particular aim of SRT (Augoustinos & Walker, 1995) is to return to pre-eminence the role of collective level concepts such as ideology and culture in individual level cognition. Psychological functioning is conceived as being mediated and influenced by the membership or belongingness of the individual to various collectivities. Belongingness brings with it communication, experiences and epistemologies which are shared by the members of the collective. For this reason individual psychological processes can only be considered in the context of their social and cultural location.

Researchers in the SRT tradition have argued for a dialectical relationship between individual and society, such that the individual is at turns the product of society through societal norms, conventions, and values, as well as a dynamic participant in creating societal change. While the intellectual ancestry of SRT includes such influential thinkers as Levy-Bruhl and Piaget (Augoustinos & Walker, 1995) the concept of social representations can be seen as the contemporary offspring of the Durkheimian notion of 'representations collective'. For the theory's original proponent, Serge Moscovici, social representations are:

"Systems of values, ideas, and practices with a two-fold function: first to establish an order which will enable individuals to orient themselves in and master their material world, and second, to facilitate communication among members of a community by providing them with a code for naming and classifying the various aspects of their world and their individual and group history." (Moscovici, 1973, p. xiii)

In terms of content then, social representations form the common stock of knowledge that we as members of different groups share. "consensual universes" (Augoustinos & Walker, 1995) which are social in origin and propagation. It is thanks to these shared theories about how things work that we are able to communicate with one another (with varying degrees of success).

Representations vary in terms of how widespread they are, from hegemonic representations common to the majority of members of whole societies or cultures, to representations shared only by certain sub-groups. For example the Western democratic ideal might be a hegemonic

representation while the belief in creationism is a polemical representation held consensually by (large) subgroups of the population (one need only experience the creationism-Darwin debate briefly to appreciate the importance of contrasting polemical representations for defining different groups!).

While the common content of group wide social representations facilitates successful communication, it also serves to set the boundaries of social identity (Verkuyten, 1995). Social groups become established through common experience, and come to differentiate themselves from other groups within society through the commonalities or otherwise in that experience.

### **SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS AS BOTH CONTENT AND PROCESS**

While the term 'social representation' refers to the content of social life, it also refers to the process of creation and transmission of social knowledge. The confusion over this dualism has proven a point of contention for detractors of SRT, as well as widespread misunderstanding. The problem arises in part as a problem of translation. An accurate translation of the process involved from the French into English would be the solecism 'social representing', so the term 'social representation' has come to be used to refer to both the content and process aspects of the theory (Lloyd & Duveen, 1989).

Moscovici (1972) explicitly rejects the distinction between content and process that is central to mainstream social cognition research. This distinction is rejected according to the argument that content of any knowledge structure constrains the process of encryption and retrieval. Semin (1995) explains this point by asking the question "Think about a person born on October 25!" (Semin, 1995, p.603). Semin claims that no content-free process can specify the complex representational process involved when someone familiar with astrology is able, with their lay-knowledge of Taureans to provide a list of descriptors, while the astrologically-challenged will be unable to answer the request in meaningful way. While this is a contrived example (and unrepresentative of the diverse cognitive tasks confronting us at all times) it does provide an illustration at the very least of one example in which it is difficult to disentangle process and content.



From an analytic perspective, the social representation literature has made use of a great variety of different data collection strategies and statistical techniques. While a number of researchers have made use of laboratory and experimental data collection the greater part of the literature has focused on field studies of socially occurring phenomena, commonly comparing the social representational process across different groups. The request might just as easily be "Think about a person who votes Republican!"- the cognitive processes evoked will be directly dependent on the possession of representational content.

For example, the original work by Moscovici (1961/1976) examined the way in which the narrow concepts of psychoanalysis came into common usage through their use in popular and targeted media. Moscovici argued that psychoanalytic concepts were first interpreted in terms of other already available concepts before themselves being subsumed into the body of common sense knowledge before in turn coming to be used explain other novel ideas. Moscovici identified two processes in operation in this transition: Anchoring and objectification. Anchoring refers to the process by which novel (and potentially threatening) ideas are classified and assimilated through comparison with current cultural knowledge. Objectification occurs when novel concepts have been completely assimilated, existing independent of the original assimilation process, and are themselves available for anchoring future new ideas.

In one of the few applications of SRT to political phenomena, Di Giacomo (1980) compared the social representations of a protest movement held by movement activists and students (who the movement had sought to mobilise). Di Giacomo derived the representations held by the groups by asking participants to make word associations with target words that were central to the protest debate. The responses were analysed via cluster analysis and multidimensional scaling and compared across the groups. Di Giacomo found that the representations differed in terms of the inter-relationships between the elements comprising them. For example, the central concept of 'workers' was judged by student participants to be self-referentially incongruent. Conversely, 'executives' (the scapegoat of the protest organisation) was judged as more congruent with 'students'. Di Giacomo argued that these sorts of incongruencies were the reason that the protest movement had been unable to mobilise the student body in their favour.

### **Criticisms of Social Representations Theory**

While researchers have endorsed the flexibility and broad scope of Social Representations Theory it has not been without its detractors. The theory and its application have been criticised on a number of grounds, notably on the potentially circular nature of group definitions, appropriate definitions of consensus, and the extent to which the theory is open to mis-use. I shall address each in turn (see Parker, 1987; Potter & Litton, 1985; Potter & Wetherell, 1987).

A central theme of Social Representations Theory focuses on the role of representations in defining the boundaries and content of groups. This has encouraged investigation of different groups' representations to determine the role of those representations in group differentiation. While this is apparently straight forward Potter and colleagues (Potter & Litton, 1985; Potter & Wetherell, 1987) have pointed out that there are a number of assumptions that need to be acknowledged. For example, group membership has frequently been determined independently of the salience of those group memberships to the actual members. In reality group members may not identify themselves in the same group as researchers would, and may not subscribe to the sorts of labels that researchers may identify them with. For example, Di Giacamo (1980) investigated differences in the representations of a protest movement held by students and student radicals. Potter and colleagues argue that this may be a mis-representation of the way in which members of the investigated groups view themselves, in effect, the 'group' is not just a topic for analysis but also an analytic resource. Secondly, the way in which groups are used may lead to circularity. That is to say it is problematic for the researcher to identify different people as members of different groups, identify the differences and similarities in representations across groups, and then determine that any differences found are the reason for different group memberships. In effect we are claiming that the representations found give rise to the groups we selected at the start. While this sort of criticism might apply to some of the research conducted under the umbrella of Social Representations Theory it is simple to avoid. For example, Scarbrough (1984) presents an investigation of the role of ideology in political preference. Rather than looking at groups (eg. Labour versus Conservative voters) she first identifies clusters of attitudinal similarity in the sample (categorising people in terms of similar attitudes on important issues) and only then cross-tabulates these groups by attitudinal similarity against political preference to show that there are indeed important relationships. In the case of this thesis the main group identities are well constituted in everyday discourse, and all participants are self-

identified members of the target groups.

Secondly, it is argued that there should be general consensus in representational content within groups. The problem arises in defining an a level of 'consensus' necessary for something to be satisfactorily considered a group representation. In practice Potter and Litton (1985) criticise several studies for their use of statistical aggregation which may homogenise possible intra-group differences. In the analyses presented in this thesis efforts are made to avoid the over-use of aggregational methods that ignore diversity within and between groups. For example, a number of studies utilise descriptive analyses that show simply that certain representational content is more common to one group than another (eg. correspondence analysis). Similarly, the thesis uses Multiple Discriminant Analysis to determine what characteristics distinguish between members of different groups. While this statistic is based on computation of linear combinations of variables that maximally differentiate between groups it also allows for estimation of the extent to which group members are correctly classified into their groups. This is important because it means that some estimate of the extent to which not only linear combinations of variables differentiate between groups, but also how well the functions obtained may be used to successfully categorise participants. Similarly, where appropriate use is made not only of analyses that test the level of agreement or disagreement between groups but also the extent of variance within group responses (for example, two groups may have exactly the same mean on an attitudinal variable but one group may have much greater within-group variance, indicating that the other group holds a more consensual position on the variable).

Finally (for the purposes of this overview) while proponents of the theory argue it is the best attempt at reintroducing the 'social' to social psychology, there have been concerns voiced that this is not in fact the case, and even if it is the theory is open to mis-use (eg. Parker, 1987). Parker (1987) identifies a trend in social psychology of the use of sociological theory to paper over the cracks caused by positivism and individualism that have characterised psychology from its inception as an experimental science. Parker (1987) argues that while Moscovici is to be lauded for utilising Durkheim's dualism of collective and individual representations, the theory that is based on this dualism is rendered ultimately individualistic in nature by the conceptualisation of representations as cognitive structures residing in the mind of the individual. I shall not attempt to present a resolution of this possibility but rather refer back to the position assumed by Hewstone

et al (1982) that social representations are distributed systems of belief that represent "bridges" (p.242) between the realities of the social and the individual.

### **VERKUYTEN (1995): POLITICAL SYMBOLS AS SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS**

According to Verkuyten the majority of political symbols may be part of the family of representations described by Moscovici (1988) as 'polemical' representations. Polemical representations are those representations which hold social relevant (and therefore potentially divisive) content. Social identity develops out of these polemical representations (Wagner, 1994; Verkuyten, 1995). In the context of political life it is differences in political representations that distinguishes a Republican from a democrat (representational differences underlie identification). In this way, starting with representational content that develops through early social interaction potential voters develop social representations of the political world (which is a sub-representation of all social knowledge). Subsequent information is interpreted in relation to these representations from which political preference ultimately arises. The relationship must be reciprocal such that preference influences the development of these representations as well as being shaped by them.

Verkuyten uses the American flag as an example of a political symbol, referring to the US supreme court decision that the burning of the flag should not be legally punishable because to do so would be a violation of the values for which the American flag is symbolic- freedom of speech and action. For Verkuyten the complex social representation of the flag and the broader representations of which it is itself a part have at their core fundamental social and traditional values. Therefore to experience the symbolic form is to participate psychologically in the symbolic content, in this case the flag and the many value that it entails.

Clearly the American flag is a potent symbol with a long and value-laden history but any number of indigenous examples may come to mind. When the New Zealand syndicate Black Magic won the America's Cup from the San Diego yacht club in 1996 the cup was described as representing the triumph of the small South Pacific nation over an American giant, an embodiment of the Kiwi spirit. In short, the cup symbolised aspects of the national identity. Similarly, when the Cup was attacked and damaged in March 1997 the assailant was reported as saying (through his lawyer) that the Cup symbolised everything he despised. A sporting trophy had become a political

symbol. It is clear that the behaviour of the assailant towards this particular symbol was immediately related to the content that symbol held for him, content that was not manifestly obvious to a great number of people.

One can hypothesise that for this individual the Cup is part of a broader representation (in this case concerning social/racial relations in New Zealand). While it is unlikely that the Cup symbolises the same things for everyone, it has been widely reported in press coverage of this case that the individual concerned is a member of an organisation that has dedicated itself to the liberation of their people, and has chosen as their method the destruction of similar cultural icons. In fact, it is the very fact that this representation is *not* shared that gives the act its power.

Though the above examples are a good illustration of this central thesis it is not just physical objects (like the flag or the America's Cup) that can hold symbolic meaning. According to Sears social groups can evoke symbolic predispositions (for example national pride) in a similar manner to more concrete political objects (Sears, 1993). Group symbols like "whites", "the poor", or "tories" are evoke emotion in just the same way as more tangible symbols such as the Union Flag, or the America's Cup. In this way the symbols associated with political parties themselves should play a significant (and hitherto uninvestigated) role in the favourability of those parties. It is these more general objects that will be the analytic focus of this work for the simple reason that it is these political parties that are endorsed in the voting process. This does not mean that, for example, attitudes on political issues are not important antecedents of the voting act, rather stands on political issues are an important part of the representations of political parties and political matters in general.

### **POLITICAL SYMBOLS AS SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS: ADVANTAGES**

Interpretation of political symbols in terms of social representations facilitates the symbolic politics thesis in a number of ways. On the one hand, according to Sears different symbols may hold different meanings for different people evoking different reactions. For the symbolic politics thesis this presents a problem at the empirical and theoretical level- Sears has avoided direct investigation of symbolic content while assuming there is such content that relates to individual pre-dispositions. On the other hand SRT takes this sort of problem to be a group level

phenomenon- with individual differences in representational content reflecting and defining group memberships. From this perspective Polemical representations are representations which differ across subgroups of a population such that there will be a general intra-group consensus as to the content of group-defining representations, while there will be inter-group differences in representational content. Thus political symbols as social representations would be expected to be differentially relevant to individuals as members of different groups.

A related advantage concerns the problem of the level of theoretical articulation of symbolic politics. Doise (1984) has argued that SRT presents a framework in which the different levels of theoretical articulation may be bridged. Citing Moscovici's desire that the study of social representations would serve to "define an object of social psychology which is pertinent both to the individual level and to the collective level and of which the content has a clear social value." (Moscovici, 1979, p.4, cited in Doise, 1984). SRT has been enthusiastically adopted by European social scientists as an alternative to the North American social psychological tradition because of the greater emphasis on the social context in which social thought and behaviour occur. For example, the work of Hewstone, Jaspars, and Lalljee (1982) has been lauded as an example of cross level influence in illustrating the relationship between social representations, intergroup attribution, and social identity processes in pupils from different schools with different social status. Hewstone et al (1982) elicited cross-group and intra-group representations using an open ended story format, connecting the representational content with patterns of intergroup attribution.

Unlike the symbolic politics thesis as outlined by Sears (1986; 1993) the adoption of SRT as an explanatory framework allows us to move 'doing politics' into the realm of general social behaviour. While Sears has presented symbolic politics as a process specific to political behaviour, political life is simply another part of social life according to SRT. Thus doing politics becomes part of everyday thought even for those who disavow interest in political matters. Billig (1991) has sought to highlight the rhetorical nature of everyday thought, and has extended that to the study of social representations. Billig (1989, 1991) has argued that the investigation of social representations needs to acknowledge the rhetorical and argumentative nature of thinking. From this perspective the giving of opinions (as mediated by the appropriate social representations) is not a neutral retelling of an individual position, rather opinion giving mirrors the process of

thinking itself which Billig argues is rhetorical in nature. That is, individual positions are arrived at through a process of self-argumentation which is reflected in their exposition. Opinions are constructed in the context of argument so that they pre-empt unspoken criticisms. This stand has important implications for the empirical investigation of political representations which will be discussed at a later juncture.

## POLITICAL SYMBOLS AS SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS: IMPLICATIONS

What does the adoption of a social representational approach mean for the practical study of political behaviour? The application of social representations theory allows us to hypothesise the relationship between a number of key literatures and political behaviour. Firstly, political symbols do not exist in a vacuum, they are not context free. That is to say that political symbols are created, propagated, and manipulated socially. Politicians manipulate symbolic content through discourse (primarily through the media) while it is propagated throughout the electorate in everyday conversation. The implications of this are twofold: it is necessary to investigate the usage of symbolic material in political discourse by both political elites and the electorate at large. At the elite level this means examining natural political discourse. At the electorate level attention needs to be paid not just to individual-level political preference but also to the interactional context in which it occurs.

Secondly, the power of political symbolism rests in the connection between their use and the core values they invoke. The reason flag-burning arouses such emotion lies in the values which the flag symbolises - the symbolic act of flag-burning represents a denial of those values. This necessitates examination of the values linked to particular political symbols and the value based differences between different social and political groups. For example, endorsement of which values distinguishes between supporters of different political camps?.




Figure 4.1. Reconceptualisation of symbolic politics



In this way symbolic politics becomes a product of political discourse, social interaction between political participants, and the values held by participants and endorsed (or otherwise) by society in general. All of which occur within the representational environment in which political behaviour occurs. This is represented in the schematic above, Figure 4.1.

The intention then is to evaluate symbolic politics theory using the insights gained from applying social representations theory to political preference and behaviour, focussing on the concepts illustrated in figure 4.1. This required a number of data sources: data from a four phase panel survey was used to gain and analyse information about values and political preference, as well as social interaction effects on political preference; archival parliamentary speeches were analysed as examples of elite political discourse; and a laboratory experiment was used to examine the impact of media (via party political advertisements) on the values which parties are perceived as representing. The following section outlines the methodology used to collect the surveys.

## **SURVEY GRAND METHOD**

Given the problems highlighted by Sears (1986) regarding narrow inferences drawn from attitude research based on the use of student samples it is of course desirable to attempt access to a more representative population. Given the context of electoral change surrounding the first MMP election it was particularly important to tap the vein of broader public response to this change leading up to the casting of the vote.

For these reasons the largest body of data came from four waves of survey questionnaires. The surveys were sent out between November 1995 (just under a year before the election) and November 1996 (within a month after the election). Table 4.1. below summarises the return rates for each phase.

The broad aim was to obtain data from the sample four times over the period leading up to and immediately following the general election. Sampling over this time period allowed considerable flexibility in responding to topical political issues as well as obtaining a greater deal of information from individual subjects than would be practicable in a single survey. The first MMP election has

been received with enthusiasm by the political science community as an unparalleled opportunity to study political change in action. The primary advantage of mail as opposed to telephone-sampling are that it is easier to reach members of lower socio-economic groups (many of whom cannot afford a telephone). This must be weighed against the likelihood that some proportion of higher-social economic group households will also be excluded having unlisted phone numbers.

A panel survey was planned with the intention that it would allow variables to be tracked over time. For example a social network measure was included (the focus of chapter seven) in the first and fourth phases with the intention of determining the impact from time 1 to time 2 of social network characteristics on political preference. Ultimately, though the fourth phase social network data are the focus of ongoing research it was not included in the thesis for reasons of economy. Though the 'panel' nature of the surveys was not capitalised upon for tracking change over time it did allow a vast amount of information to be gathered about a small number of people, at the expense of the size of the sample.

Rather than attempt a nationwide probability sample (wide coverage but little depth) it was considered wiser to use a sampling frame comprising the 11 pre-MMP electorates in and surrounding the Wellington area. The electorates sampled were Eastern Hutt, Kapiti, Karori, Heretaunga, Island Bay, Miramar, Onslow, Pencarrow, Porirua, Southern Maori (Wellington area only), and Western Hutt. Together, these represent more than 10% of the electoral area of New Zealand.

These represented considerable diversity in terms of ethnic composition and socio-economic grouping. Given the traditionally low response rate of Maori population the attempt was made to over-sample this particular population. Ultimately 300 Maori registered electors were randomly selected from the local Maori electoral roll falling within the geographical parameters of the remainder of the sample, with an additional 685 electors chosen from the general rolls for the other 10 electorates.

A number of points should be noted regarding the New Zealand electoral system. Firstly it should be noted that that membership of the Maori roll is voluntary (but only available to self-identified Maori) meaning that a number of Maori were also included in the sample from the general roll.

Secondly, while it is not illegal to decide not to vote in the general election it is illegal (and punishable) not to register on the local roll. Despite the possible consequences an increasing number of eligible candidates have failed to register to vote. For example, from comparison of the national census of 1990 with the electoral roll for the same period it is estimated that approximately 8 per cent of eligible voters had failed to enrol or re-enrol (Mulgan, 1994). This suggests the existence of a growing class of people outside of the political system. Having said that the use of the electoral roll meant a sampling frame including 90 percent or more of the desired sample population. Additionally, though there has been a decline in electoral turn-out (from over 90 per cent in the 1940's to just over 80 per cent in 1993) New Zealand has one of the highest levels of electoral participation in the world. This decline in registration and turn-out was one of the primary motivations behind a change of electoral system.

986 survey questionnaires (with postage-paid return envelopes) were sent out in November 1995 to the randomly selected sample. A reminder two weeks after the initial mail out was followed two weeks later by a repeat mail out of the questionnaire to those who had not responded. The same pattern of reminders and repeat surveys was followed for all subsequent survey waves. Of the 986 originally sent, 151 were returned with address out of date, while 247 were satisfactorily returned, giving a response rate of 30%. Subsequent surveys were sent only to those who responded to the first survey.

While a response rate of 30% represents an average response rate when compared to similar social psychological research for the same area (for example, Allen (1997) reports return rates of 20% and 39% for two shorter surveys) it is important to consider the issue of non-response bias, and for this reason a comparison was made of local area census results. Comparison of the sample's demographic characteristics with the 1996 national census indicated that other than intentional over-sampling of non-European ethnic groups, the sample matches the profile of the region as a whole remarkably well. A comparison of gender, age, ethnicity, and education for the sample and the sample area is included in appendix one, on page 238.

The second wave of the programme was mailed out in March 1996, approximately six months before the national election was held. Surveys were only sent to the 247 who had satisfactorily completed the first survey. Of the 247 surveys sent out 20 were returned as no longer

contactable, with 2 further deceased. 163 surveys (or 20% of the original mail-out) were received as satisfactory.

The third wave was mailed in mid-September 1996 (four weeks before the election). Attempts were made to obtain current addresses for respondents for whom contact details were out of date, but with only one success. 19% (or 155) of the first wave sample completed and returned the third survey.

The final survey was mailed out in early November 1996, three weeks after the election. As well as the survey itself, respondents were also given the option of receiving a short (two page) or a longer (four page) summary of the results. 18% (or 142) of the first mail-out sample replied, or 67% of the first sample survey.

A useable-return window of two months was allowed for each of the first, second and fourth phases. Surveys from the third return were accepted up till the day immediately before the election. One month after the close of the final survey, summaries of the most accessible research findings were sent out to all first phase respondents. Only 30 of the final phase respondents indicated a preference for the long summary, so the other 223 respondents for whom a current address was available were sent the short summary. All respondents were thanked (profusely) for their participation.

It should be noted that it is not automatically the responsibility of the New Zealand Postal Service to identify and return mail for which the address is either incorrect or out of date. The responsibility of returning incorrectly addressed mail falls to the occupier of the marked address, meaning that in the majority of cases out of date mail was returned too late to be re-sent and included in the current phase. In one case a first-wave survey was returned out of date only after the closure of the fourth phase. A further implication of this procedure is that the number of out of date addresses for all phases is likely to be higher than reported.

A number of strategies were used to increase survey returns, for example, customised cover letters for each survey recipient. In addition each survey return put the respondent into a draw for \$400, \$100, and ten \$20 prizes. This was repeated for each survey wave.

Table 4.1  
Summary of return rates for each survey phase

	Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 3	Phase 4
<b>Mailed</b>	985	247	227	222
<b>Out of date</b>	151	18	5	0
<b>Deceased</b>	-	1	0	1
<b>No longer interested</b>	-	1	0	7
<b>Returned</b>	247	163	155	142
	30%	20% (72%)	19% (70%)	18% (67%)

At the completion of the fourth survey wave 113 respondents had completed all four survey phases representing 14% of the original sample (or 53% of those receiving all four surveys).

**Note:** Where survey data are used in the course of this work it should be assumed that all measures used in any particular study are obtained from the same survey phase unless specified otherwise.

## **PART ONE**

### **Discourse and Political Representations**

“When the political columnists say ‘Every thinking man’ they mean themselves, and when candidates appeal to ‘Every intelligent voter’ they mean everybody who is going to vote for them.” (Franklin P. Adams, from *Nods and Becks* (1944) cited in Jay, 1996).

## CHAPTER FIVE

### POLITICAL SYMBOLISM AND SYMBOLIC PREDISPOSITIONS

The premise that the symbolic meaning of stimulus objects influences perception and behaviour lies at the heart of this chapter. The aim is to illustrate with reference to a number of theoretical and methodological traditions that this symbolic meaning is central to behaviours in the domain of political preference.

The thesis that political behaviour is influenced by the symbolic meanings associated with different attitude objects has a long and distinguished history, though it has more recently been relegated to a minor role in favour of theories more amenable to statistical analysis. The dominant models in political science have been economic theories typically espousing rational self-interest as the basis of political preference, the testing of which involves equation building incorporating various private and public economic variables.

This family of theories include the arguments that preference is determined by the issue proximity of the voter and the political parties (Downs, 1957), individual self-interest (Riker, 1995), pocket-book politics (Lewis-Beck, 1985) and sociotropic self-interest (Kinder & Kiewiet, 1981). Though the dominant theories of political behaviour have tended to assume some form of rationality, a brief survey of the material produced by political parties in the run up to the election suggests that at the very least political elites are aware that there is more to it than a simple weighing up of the pros and cons.

The explanatory power of such self-interest based models has been the subject of increasing challenges since the early 80's from a number of directions. The Symbolic Politics theories of Sears (Sears, et al, 1986; Sears, 1993) argues that political choice is influenced not by self-interest but by the evocation of long-standing, stable predispositions by the symbolic meaning of political objects. These affective predispositions develop through socialisation – stimuli are paired with emotion during social interaction (primarily with family members). For example, support for forced busing might be dictated by affective reactions to the symbols associated with the issue; blacks, force, segregation, etc, which have developed over a period of time. It has been argued

that the activation of such symbolic predispositions plays a significant role in attitudes on a diverse range of issues, for example drug education programs (Wysong, Aniskiewicz, and Wright, 1994), funding for private schools (Tedin, 1994), tax evasion (Sears & Citrin, 1985), gender inequality (Sears & Huddy, 1992), support for the death penalty (Tyler & Weber, 1982), and bi-lingual education (Sears & Huddy, 1991).

Clearly the direction of these affective predispositions will vary for different people for different objects. Indeed the specific symbols evoked by a particular object will vary from person to person. In this, symbols may be likened to social representations (Verkuyten, 1995) in that we would expect that popular objects would hold broadly consensual meanings within groups but might hold different meanings between groups. Thus there will be differences between different party's supporters as to what different parties stand for, but there should be general consensus within groups as to what their own party, as well as other parties, stand for. Even though a Labour party supporters still have a representation of what other parties stand for even if it is inaccurate (from the perspective of those other parties) and they disagree with it. It is the differences in symbolic meaning that serve to differentiate and mobilise groups towards different alternatives. Symbols define (as well as appeal to) the identities and values of peoples and nations (Verkuyten, 1995; Sears, Huddy, & Schaffer, 1986).

In practice Symbolic Politics Theory research has generally focused not on the symbolic meaning of political objects or the content of symbolic predispositions but rather on the quantitative effects of the symbolic predispositions presumed to be activated by the symbols contained in them. Sears (1993) has argued that most attitude objects comprise multiple symbols and overall evaluation of the object will be an additive function of evaluations associated with the symbols present. In practice the exact 'formula' remains unsupported. A number of studies have shown the attitudes of white Americans towards racial policies are a function of their race-neutral predispositions (eg. party identification) as well as racial attitudes (Sears et al, 1979; Sears et al, 1986), these in turn are activated by the symbols associated with the policies. It can be argued that at no point is the symbolic content of the attitude object actually established other than by intuition. There are numerous reasons for this shortcoming, but the major issue is a definitional one- what form does a symbol or symbolic meaning take such that we can recognise it? Similarly, the symbolic content of an issue such as bilingual education is supposed to evoke a symbolic



predisposition such as ideological identification though no attempt has been made to investigate the qualitative nature of this symbol-symbolic predispositional relationship.

Symbols express defining values, beliefs and ideals (Verkuyten, 1995) which are capable of engendering strong feelings- one need only consider the reaction to the US flag burning to appreciate this. Symbols represent ideal states of being, the experience of which may only be possible through psychological participation through particular symbols. As Verkuyten (1995, p.268) points out the "symbolic form of the flag is used to experience the symbolic content (eg. Freedom, equality, and sovereignty)", and the symbolic contents are ideals and values central to the identity of the perceiver. Experience of a symbol allows the viewer experiential access to its symbolic content, it allows the viewer to psychologically experience that content.

As symbolic attributes vary across and within populations it follows that they will also be sources of contention in disputes where the meaning of symbols (not just political symbols) are central to a dispute. In the political arena the manipulation of symbolic objects by political elites is a source of powerful social control, and for that reason the symbolic attributes of political parties are of tremendous significance to elites whose electoral aim must be to distinguish themselves from other political groupings in such a way that they are preferred over those alternatives.

Just as the boundaries of consensus of social representations mark members of different groups so too do the symbolic meanings associated with political stimuli. As symbolic meaning develops over time it is possible that the meanings traditionally associated with an object may be entirely contradictory to the manifest associations at any particular time. For example, the fourth New Zealand Labour Government under David Lange embraced free market reform and dramatically overhauled the welfare system that had been a foundation stone of the New Zealand social system. More than that, the foundation of the welfare state was a reflection of the dominant ideal of social equality which has historically characterised New Zealand society. Though this ultimately led to the demise of that administration, many New Zealanders still associate the pursuit of equality through a welfare state with the Labour Party. This is an image that the Labour party is actively seeking to encourage today. Theoretically then, if a political object (in this case a political party) loses or becomes divorced from, its traditional meaning it will lose the ability to effectively mobilise viewers.

Sears and his collaborators have found a consistent predictive relationship between variables which have been labelled "symbolic predispositions", particularly party identification and ideological identification, and voting preference. It is assumed that these relationships reflect "activation" of the predispositions by the symbolic content of the relevant political stimuli (issue, party, or candidate) without any attention paid to the content of the relationship between predisposition and symbol. For example, what is the symbolic content associated with one's ideological predisposition?. It is the aim of these two studies to address this question. What do people associate with the party with which they identify, or with their ideological self-identification.

The two studies presented in this chapter use open-ended, as well as rating scales, to investigate the content of political symbols and symbolic predispositions. The first study reports an analysis of the meanings that people hold of one of the central symbolic predispositions identified by Sears (1993)- ideological self-identification, while the second investigates the perceived content of the symbols that are perhaps most central to political preference- the parties themselves.

### **STUDY ONE:**

#### **SYMBOLIC PREDISPOSITION CONTENT: IDEOLOGICAL SELF-IDENTIFICATION**

Depending on the discipline, the term ideology may have any one of a number of different meanings. In most empirical research on political behaviour it has come to possess a fairly narrow meaning. In one of the most famous papers on political ideology, Converse (1964) interpreted political ideology as meaning a belief system about politics, or a "configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence" (p.207). Research in this vein may involve the elicitation of positions on a range of issues which can then be analysed to determine the extent to which positions on different issues are systematically related. For example, if one's position on one issue is consistent with their position on other issues (eg. opposing tighter defence spending as well as nuclear weapons testing) then one may be considered to view politics ideologically. It is assumed that if one displays this consistency it is a reflection of an underlying ideological construct.

Commonly, ideological self-identification is measured by asking participants to indicate whether they consider themselves to be politically conservative or politically liberal. For example, the 1980 NES included the question:

“We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Here is a seven-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about it?” (Luttbeg & Gant, 1985, p. 81).

The symbolic politics studies into ideological identification frame ideology in terms of liberal versus conservative, using the same NES construction presented above (Sears & Citrin, 1985; Sears et al, 1986).

A number of approaches have been taken to the investigation of ideology, and this section summarises those approaches using the taxonomy provided by Scarbrough (1984).

In addition to the contribution of the party identification concept, Campbell et al (1960) also presented their views as to what constitutes an ideological approach to politics. According to Campbell et al, an individual may be considered as thinking ideologically if they evidence systematic patterns of inter-relationship between their attitudes. Converse (1964) repeats this proposition, stating that an ideology consists of attitudes (specifically attitudes on issues of public policy) that are “bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence” (p.207). Attitudes may be considered functionally interdependent if positions on the issues they represent vary systematically. The same authors go further- not only does an ideology comprise of systematically organised attitudes on issues of public policy, but the specific attitudinal inter-relationships are those that reflect the way that political elites think about politics. Research based on these assumptions has typically found that the general public rarely display the sorts of attitudinal structure that satisfy these criteria (eg. Lane, 1962). Scarbrough (1984) describes research in this tradition under the title of attitudinal approaches to ideology.

An alternative literature that taps the componentry of political ideology grows out of research that seeks to identify the dimensions of political perception and comparison held by voters. According to Scarbrough (1984) research in this vein makes use of analyses of data concerning the way in which people perceive parties, and through dimension reduction techniques seeks to identify the

important dimensions of political perception. A number of studies using this method have concluded that a significant proportion of voters do have an ideological approach to perception and comparison of political targets because the dimensions derived from their responses closely match the sort of theoretical and intuitive ordering of political parties in the countries sampled. That is to say, a number of studies have reported that the first dimension of comparison reflects the relative ideological position of political parties in the political environment. For example, Inglehart and Klingemann (1976) reporting on results from samples from nine European countries, indicate that with one exception (Ireland) voters in these countries perceive parties relative to each other in a dimensional space that neatly matches their stereotypical left-right position.

The final approach to be considered revolves around the idea of ideology as a facilitatory tool which people use to make sense of politics (eg. Sears & Citrin, 1985). The most obvious and frequently used ideological tool is the right-left or liberal-conservative continuum, upon which one can place and compare parties, policies, political leaders and other political objects. Studies in this vein may typically involve evaluating the extent to which people use ideological terms like liberal-conservative to represent political matters (eg. Nie, Verba, & Petrocik, 1976).

Scarborough (1984) presents an innovative investigation of ideology using data from the 1979 British 'Opinion Survey'. Scarborough is critical of the three broad approaches to ideology outlined above and avoids them in favour of a combination of a priori theorising and statistical analyses to show that British voters display a combination of ideological attitudinal 'patterns'. Scarborough (1984) argues that the attitudinal approach typified by Converse and colleagues is problematic on a number of levels. Firstly, it entails a potentially circular argument - that attitudes constitute an ideology if those attitudes are organised according to some cognitive structure, and the evidence for cognitive structure is found in covariation of the attitudes that constitute an ideology. Secondly, the assumption that the particular pattern of attitudinal covariation needed to constitute an ideology reflects that expressed by political elites, when it is obvious that even elites from the same groups disagree as well as agree with each other on the same as well as different issues.

The dimensional approach is criticised on the grounds that, while the statistical methods employed frequently produce results that suggest that voters perceive and differentiate political

objects in theoretically and intuitively recognisable ways, these findings say nothing about the organising principles upon which voters base their observations.

Finally, the idea that political ideology is a tool by which voters make sense of political matters may be criticised on the grounds that, firstly, the reduction of ideology to something as simple as left-right or liberal-conservative ignores the richness and use of ideology in everyday terms, and secondly, that such a conceptualisation is problematic because the level of everyday usage (reflecting important goals and values) is incompatible with the level of analysis employed in this tradition of research. That is to say, Scarbrough (1984) argues that the level of analysis, focussing on whether or not people use abstract concepts to make sense of politics, is not the same as what those ideological positions mean- the endorsement of different goals and how they should be achieved. This is an important point - as Scarbrough (1984) points out, the endorsement of different goals and how they should be achieved is the stuff of contention and division.

Briefly, Scarbrough (1985) derives four basic ideological 'types' based on subjective content analyses of the writings of political figures identified with the British Labour and Conservative parties. These consist of two rightist 'types' in Tory and Neo-liberal ideologies, and two leftist 'types' in Labour and Socialist ideologies. Scarbrough (1984) theorises that these four ideal type ideologies should be present in some combination in the members of the 1979 sample. Data analysis consisted of cluster-analysing responses to 134 survey items requiring participants to indicate degree of endorsement of groups of 'action' and 'belief' items (issue positions and social/political goals). The analysis yielded six attitudinal profiles - a Tory profile (stereotypically Tory principles), a centrists of the right profile (mixture of neo-liberal and Tory principles), a radicals of the right profile (some neo-liberal principles and strongly Tory principles), a radicals of the left profile (characterised by a mix of Labour and socialist attitudes), a tough-on-crime Labour profile (a mixture of basic Labour principles as well as conservative attitudes on law and order), and a noisy profile (a mixture of attitudes inconsistent with the four ideal types). The most important question, whether British voters think ideologically when it comes to politics, is addressed by evaluating the strength of the relationship between membership of a particular attitudinal cluster and political preference. Scarbrough (1984) concludes that this is indeed the case with members of the different clusters possessing preferences that vary systematically in

relation to the particular combination of ideological types.

### **Meaning of liberal-conservative**

The research conducted by Sears as well as others not in the symbolic politics tradition has found conservatism to be consistently predictive of opposition to (and liberalism predictive of support for) a range of policy initiatives, for example, school busing, affirmative action, decreased public funding of private schools, and bilingual education (Sears & Citrin, 1985; Sears & Huddy, 1991; Sears & Huddy, 1992; Tedin, 1994; Tyler & Weber, 1982; Wysong, Aniskiewicz, and Wright, 1994). The question remains- what does identifying oneself ideologically mean? Though a number of surveys have asked respondents to define terms such as liberal and conservative (eg. the 1980 NES) few studies have resulted from the material available (for an exception see Luttbeg & Gant, 1985). Instead of asking people what these terms mean for them the social meanings of ideological labels have instead been analysed by comparing the opinions of liberals and conservatives on socio-political issues (eg. Neapolitan, 1991). In this manner, personal political ideology is viewed very much as a framework around which political decision making, opinion, and preference are constructed. It is this construction as a belief system about a certain topic that falls within the umbrella of social representation theory.

### **POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AS A SOCIAL REPRESENTATION**

According to Moscovici (1988) there are at least three ways that representational knowledge becomes social knowledge. Firstly, representations may be shared by members of "highly structured" groups such as parties, cities, or nations (p.221) without having been originally produced by those. These *hegemonic* representations are rooted in history and tend to endure independently of the successes of the groups holding them. Examples might be the pre-eminence of the democratic principle typified by the United States, or the dominance of liberal individualism in the West.

Alternatively representations may become social through contact and circulation of knowledge among related subgroups. Representational knowledge is added to and transmuted and shared once more with other groups. Moscovici suggests that representations about mental illness are examples of these *emancipated* representations, as would be the representations of

psychoanalysis documented by Moscovici (1961) himself. In these examples the knowledge and experiences of medical professionals, mental health professionals, and lay people are shared among the general population and integrated into the social knowledge of all the groups involved.

Finally, Moscovici identifies a family of representations that are generated through social conflict and controversy, and as a result the content of these representations will differ across groups. "These *polemical* representations must be viewed in the context of an opposition or struggle between groups and are often expressed in terms of a dialogue with an imaginary interlocutor" (Moscovici, 1988, p. 222). Moscovici gives as an example of polemical representations the different versions of Marxism circulating in France. It is into this family of representations that political representations (such as ideological beliefs) may be classified.

Interpreting the symbolic politics association between ideological position and political issue position in terms of social representations theory requires that we identify ideology as a social representation as held by the individual and social groups. For example, self-identified liberals would be expected to hold a generally consensual representation about what it is to be liberal or conservative, and what position liberals and conservatives would be expected to assume in relation to a range of social and political issues (as supported by Neapolitan, 1991). Just as Sears (1993) argues that issues have symbolic content that activates one's symbolic predispositions (in this case ideological identification) this translates into the representational content of the issue being a part of one's ideological representation and one's issue position is based on this. What then is the content of a political ideological representation?

## CONSERVATIVE / LIBERAL SELF-IDENTIFICATION

If there is one widely accepted finding in the study of political behaviour it is that a majority of the electorate do not view politics in ideological terms (Converse, 1964; Lane, 1962). It would seem that the majority of the voting public pay little attention to political matters. As a result their lack of knowledge about politics is reflected in the lack of consistency between attitudes on different issues (One can disagree with tighter defence spending but agree with an anti-nuclear policy) and superficial appreciation of abstract political concepts. The majority are unable to agree on a definition of what a liberal or conservative position might entail. Definitions of ideological positions are not consistent in their opposition. That is to say that the term "Liberal" is not consistently defined by concepts which are the opposite of those that define "Conservative".

Why is it then that the same ideologically innocent voters are capable of identifying strongly and consistently with an ideological label, which is in turn predictive of their political preferences (eg. Sears & Citrin, 1985; Sears et al, 1986). Conover and Feldman (1981) have argued that the conceptualisation of ideological identification as a continuum running from liberal to conservative is inaccurate. The reason we may hold stands on different issues that appear to be ideologically consistent if one views liberal and conservative as polar opposites is because they are in fact dimensionally distinct. The concepts and issues that come to mind when one considers ideological conservatism ARE different concepts and issues to those that comprise ideological liberalism. In this way, liberal support for anti-nuclear policy is not as inconsistent with a conservative opposition to tightening defence spending as would first appear. This does not mean however, that because that conservative and liberal are dimensionally different they cannot be perceived as opposites. Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock (1991) give the example that while the policy platforms of the Liberal and Democratic parties are not perfect opposites the parties themselves are still perceived as such.

Reporting on a study investigating the accuracy of ideological definitions among the electorate, Luttbeg and Gant (1985) present table 5.1 below. The table shows the frequency of mention of meanings of ideological labels in response to the following question in the 1980 NES:

"People have different things in mind when they say that someone's political views are liberal or conservative. We'd like to know more about this. Let's start with liberal. What sort of thing do you have in mind when you say that someone's political views



are liberal (conservative)?" (Luttbeg & Gant, 1985, p.81).

Table 5.1.  
Distribution of first definitions of Liberal and Conservative (N=1400)

Definitions	%
<b>Liberal</b>	
Acceptance of change and new ideas	10.6
Spend more freely; favour government spending	7.4
Social welfare; "give-away programs"	4.9
Socialistic; for welfare state:	
less to private enterprise	4.7
Quick (rash) response to problems	2.4
Other responses	30.0
Haven't thought about it	31.5
No answer or don't know	8.5
<b>Conservative</b>	
Resistant to change and new ideas	10.3
For free enterprise, capitalism	4.6
Slow (cautious)	4.3
Spend little; less wasteful	3.7
For states' rights	2.4
Other responses	31.5
Haven't thought about it	31.5
No answer or don't know	7.4

From Luttbeg and Gant (1985): Table 1, p.82.

Based on table 5.1 Luttbeg and Gant (1985) concluded that the (American) public is not nearly as innocent of ideology as previous researchers have claimed, with around 60% able to articulate consistent meanings for one, other, or both of these ideological labels.. Luttbeg and Gant went on to classify the accuracy of respondent's definitions of the ideological labels. Correct definitions were those that were "consistent with enduring understandings of these terms in the context of American politics" (p.83). Though approximately 40 percent of the sample was unable or unwilling to define either concept, eight out of ten of those who did were classified as correct in their definitions of both labels. There were no statistically significant differences found in people's ability to define the concepts according to level of education, gender, or ethnicity.

The aims of this study then are two-fold. The primary aim is to determine the representational content of ideological labels and investigate the relationship between that content and

respondent's self-professed ideological identification. Secondly, as this is the first study of the research programme it is desirable that we get some idea of where the parties stand in relation to one another. For example, there had been considerable media debate going into the election as to where New Zealand First stood in the political spectrum - United New Zealand claimed that they were the one true center party, claiming that a potential coalition of National, Christian Coalition, and ACT was a "toxic trio" (appropriated from Winston Peters) even though they themselves had been in formal coalition with National going into the year of the election. At the same time the National party lumped New Zealand First with Labour and the Alliance (a triumvirate that they dubbed "the gloom gang"). Though Labour might not have accused Peters of being a National lap-dog they were eager to distance themselves from New Zealand First and Peters' message.

The consistent relationships found between issue attitudes and liberal-conservative identification may be extended beyond endorsement of different issues. Specifically, if ideological affiliation differentiates opposition from endorsement of particular issue positions then by extension we expect that ideological affiliation will differentiate opposition from endorsement of different parties (which themselves have different positions on these same issues). We expect then to distinguish supporters of different parties by their ideological self-identification. The first part of this study reports the results of several measures commonly used in political psychology - ideological identification, social dominance orientation, and right-wing authoritarianism with the aim of profiling the support for each political party. While these three measures have distinct theoretical backgrounds there have been high intercorrelations reported in research using them, those scoring highly on RWA and SDO have typically identified as conservative, while the reverse is true for self-identified liberals (Altemeyer, 1996; Pratto et al, 1994).

Social Dominance Orientation measures the degree to which individuals endorse anti-egalitarian values, and support and perpetuate hierarchical group-based systems of inequality (see Sidanius, 1993; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth & Malle, 1994). Social Dominance Orientation plays a central role in Social Dominance Theory in which human societies are viewed as group-oriented social hierarchies, with the hierarchical function maintaining human survival over the evolutionary period. On this basis it is argued that most forms of inter-group oppression and conflict serve the function of establishing and maintaining particular group-based, hierarchical

social systems. The items comprising the Social Dominance Orientation scale tap the beliefs that some people are inherently inferior or superior to others, and the approval of inequality in group relationships.

The SDO measure has been used both within the framework of Social Dominance Theory and as a general index of anti-egalitarianism and it is primarily for this reason that it was used in this study. Firstly, Sears has argued that endorsement of egalitarian values is the bedrock upon which many symbols and political attitudes are based (Sears et al, 1986). Indeed much of the symbolic politics literature has illustrated the point that old-fashioned (or overt) racism has been replaced by a more subtle symbolic racism that blends anti-black affect with traditional values, chief among which is equality. For example, anti-affirmative action attitudes may be based around the argument that affirmative action gives preferential treatment to blacks at the expense of other groups. The endorsement of equality is an important social value in our New Zealand sample (Allen, 1994) so the inclusion of SDO may allow us to investigate the role of egalitarianism in political preference.

The authoritarianism concept was initially developed by Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson and Sanford (1950), who suggested that authoritarianism comprises authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, and conformity. More recently, however, argument has focused on the role of power in the authoritarian concept (eg., Altemeyer, 1981; Ray, 1989). For example, Ray (1989) has argued that a primary aspect of authoritarianism is the submission-domination relationship with authoritarians displaying submission to recognised authority and dominance and aggression to lower status others.

Some of the more robust findings have related AP to political attitudes and preferences. Hansen (1978) found that subjects scoring highly on the F-scale generally prefer more conservative candidates. For example Byrne and Przybyla (1980) found that supporters of Ronald Reagan scored significantly higher than did supporters of Jimmy Carter or John Anderson. Similarly, Richard Nixon was the most preferred candidate of highly authoritarian subjects in 1968 (Byrne & Kelley, 1981).

Historically we expect that conservative identifiers will support National, while liberal identifiers

will express support for Labour and the Alliance. The Alliance in turn should be preferred by those scoring more highly on liberal identification. The same pattern of results is expected for SDO and authoritarianism, with National supporters scoring higher on both measures than Labour and finally, Alliance supporters.

#### **METHOD: Measures**

The open-ended data and ideological self-identification measure upon which these first two studies are based were obtained from the first of four surveys carried out over a period of a year. The first survey is replicated in appendix two. The SDO and RWA measures were included from the second survey, replicated in appendix three. Details of other data sources and specific survey questions will be more comprehensively described in the relevant studies.

The first survey included a number of scales and open-ended measures designed to obtain baseline information as part of an ongoing longitudinal research program.

A common (ie. Sears & Citrin, 1985; Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1996) single-item measure of political liberal/conservative self-identification asked the respondents to indicate on a seven point scale (1 indicating liberal, 7 indicating conservative) how they might characterise their political views. There has been considerable debate in the approach to the election as to how to characterise the different parties, particularly New Zealand First with its mixture of themes and supporters, so this item was intended to clarify the liberal-conservative position of the parties by how their supporters view themselves. Respondents also completed a demographic section including age, gender, income, and level of education (appendix two, page 247).

The exact phrasing of the ideological identification item was:

“Frequently people use the terms “liberal” and “conservative” to describe their political beliefs. How would you rate yourself in these terms? (circle a number from 1 to 7)” where ‘1’ was anchored with the label “liberal” and ‘7’ with “conservative”

This was followed by the ideological meaning probe:

“Different people have different ideas about what “liberal” and “conservative” mean. What do these terms mean to you?”

Appendix two replicates the survey in which these items were presented.

As well as the ideological identification and open-ended meanings questions the analysis below makes use of two measures presented in the second survey phase: Both authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) are personality variables found to relate to political behaviour, and correlate strongly with ideological identification. SDO is particularly relevant given that it is a construct theoretically based on endorsement of egalitarian values.

Right Wing Authoritarianism: Authoritarianism was measured with Altemeyer's (1981) Right Wing Authoritarianism scale. In the interest of parsimony, 9 items from the Right-wing Authoritarianism scale were selected that reflected a variety of issue domains, as well as reflected the three primary dimensions of authoritarianism: conventionalism, authoritarian submission, and authoritarian aggression. The item numbers selected were 2, 4, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 24. Reliability analyses indicated that the 9-item Authoritarian Personality scale to be internally consistent, with a satisfactory Cronbach's alpha of .73 and an average item-total correlation of .41. Respondents rated the items on a scale from 1 "Strongly Disagree" to 7 "Strongly Agree". This measure is replicated on page 256 of appendix three.

Social Dominance Orientation: Sidanius' 16-item balanced Social Dominance Orientation scale was used (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallwoth & Malle, 1994). Analysis of the 16-item Social Dominance Orientation scale showed it to be internally consistent, with a Cronbach's alpha of .84, and an average item-total correlation of .48. The items were rated on a 1 "Strongly Disagree" to 6 "Strongly Agree" scale. This measure is replicated on page 255 of appendix three.

## RESULTS: Measures

Does the liberal-conservative construct have validity in the New Zealand context? After all - while the concept of liberal-conservative political positions is a common inclusion in North American political research is it appropriate in the New Zealand context? A number of studies, most notably the NZES studies outlined in an earlier chapter, have used left-right placement as a measure of political ideology. Similarly, a number of studies have used traditional liberal-conservative measures (eg. Ng & Allen, under review; Wilson & Patterson, 1974).

To evaluate the appropriateness of the liberal-conservative construct for the investigation of political perception in these studies a number of statistical analyses may be carried out. Firstly, does the liberal-conservative self-identification measure relate systematically and intuitively to political preference? To address this question liberal-conservative self-identification scores were correlated with feeling thermometer ratings of the salient parties, with the correlations plotted for each party in Figure 1 below. The figure shows the parties organised in order of decreasing correlation; National, United New Zealand, New Zealand First, Alliance and Labour. With the exception of the Alliance and Labour all parties are positioned relative to each other in the order that reflects the common perception of their ideological positions.




Figure 5.1. Correlation between feeling thermometer ratings and liberal-conservative self-identification.

Next, comparisons were made between supporters of the major parties on their scores on the LIBCON variable. Liberal/conservative self-identification varied significantly across supporters of the three major parties. Not surprisingly National party supporters (mean=4.67, SD=1.52) rated themselves as more conservative than either Alliance (mean=3.24, SD=1.45) or Labour (mean=3.28, SD=1.43) supporters ( $F(2,168)=20.76, p<.001$ ). There was no difference in self-rating between Labour and Alliance supporters using Tukey post-hoc tests.

A second method that may be used to evaluate the appropriateness of liberal-conservative identification is to determine the dimension(s) of comparison used to evaluate and differentiate political parties, and calculate the degree of correspondence between the dimension(s) of comparison and liberal-conservative self-identification. This may be done two ways: using multidimensional scaling or factor analysis of feeling thermometer ratings to derive dimensions of political comparison. Both methods were used, producing very similar results.

Multidimensional scaling of feeling thermometer ratings for National, Alliance, Labour, New Zealand First, and United New Zealand produced a single dimension, producing a RSQ index of .97, indicating that the dimension derived accounted for the majority of variance in feeling thermometer ratings. The weightings of each target party were as follows: National, -1.90, United New Zealand, -.07, New Zealand First, .39, Labour, .74, and Alliance, .84. The feeling thermometer ratings were converted to z-scores and a score calculated for each respondent on the dimension. This was done by multiplying each standardised feeling thermometer rating by the corresponding weighting for that target party and aggregating them for each respondent. This was then correlated with the participant's liberal-conservative self-identification rating, producing a correlation of  $r(219)=-.48$ .

Factor analysis produced a similar result. The feeling thermometer ratings for National, Alliance, Labour, New Zealand First, and United New Zealand (same as above) were analysed using principal components analysis and produced a single factor accounting for 48% of the variance in scores (the factor had an eigenvalue of 1.91). The loadings for each party were: National, -.77, United New Zealand, -.25, New Zealand First, .60, Labour, .61, and Alliance, .75. Factor scores were calculated for each respondent and correlated with liberal-conservative self-identification

ratings, producing a correlation of  $r(219)=-.45$ .

These two analyses suggest that (while there may be more appropriate variables for measuring ideological self-identification in New Zealand) the use of liberal-conservative self-identification possesses a reasonable degree of discriminant validity for the sample obtained.

Figure 5.2 below shows the mean scores on the three measures used, for respondents indicating they intended to vote for National, Labour or the Alliance.




Figure 5.2. Graph of National, Labour, and Alliance intending voters' scores on ideological identification, SDO, and right-wing authoritarianism (RWA).

Liberal/conservative self-identification varied significantly across supporters of the three major parties. Not surprisingly National party supporters (mean=4.67, SD=1.52) rated themselves as more conservative than either Alliance (mean=3.24, SD=1.45) or Labour (mean=3.28, SD=1.43) supporters ( $F(2,168)=20.76, p<.001$ ). There was no difference in self-rating between Labour and Alliance supporters using Tukey post-hoc tests.



Similarly, supporters of the parties differed in their Social Dominance Orientation scores. National party supporters (mean=2.81, SD=.81) rated higher than either Alliance or Labour (both mean=2.24, Labour SD=.77, Alliance SD=.88,  $F(2,96)=5.99$ ,  $p<.005$ ). Again, Tukey post-hoc tests showed no difference between Labour and Alliance supporters. It should also be noted that relative to ideological identification and RWA the SDO scores are much lower on average. This may reflect the content of the questions in the SDO measure, requiring as they do endorsement of politically incorrect attitudes.

National supporters scored more highly on authoritarianism (mean=4.64, SD=.96) than did supporters of Labour (mean=3.76, SD=1.14) and the Alliance (mean=3.66, SD=1.09,  $F(2,105)=10.58$ ,  $p<.001$ ). Again, Tukey post-hoc tests showed no difference in scores between Labour and Alliance supporters. This indicates that Labour and Alliance supporters favour egalitarianism more highly than National supporters.

The three measures were all significantly inter-correlated. Liberal/conservative self-identification correlated positively with both SDO ( $r=.34$ ,  $df=132$ ,  $p<.001$ ) and authoritarianism ( $r=.48$ ,  $df=142$ ,  $p<.001$ ), while SDO correlated positively with authoritarianism ( $r=.33$ ,  $df=140$ ,  $p<.001$ ).

### **DISCUSSION: Measures**

As predicted, National party supporters identified more closely with the conservative end of the liberal/conservative identification measure than did Labour and Alliance supporters, but there was no way to differentiate between the two groups of liberal supporters. The same pattern was repeated for the other two measures. While this was not unexpected for the SDO and RWA constructs, it was expected that ideological identification would better differentiate supporters of the Alliance and Labour.

Though Labour and Alliance share the same origins they should be identified as ideologically distinct. The 1984-1990 fourth Labour government became known as the "new right" and initiated a raft of reforms that National perpetuated on their rise to power. The Alliance was born as a rejection of those events and one would therefore expect Alliance supporters to be more liberal than their Labour counterparts. Why then are Labour and Alliance supporters effectively

indistinguishable on the three measures used (and particularly ideological identification)? Taking political ideology as a social representation we must expect that there are differences in the ideological representations held by the two parties' supporters. The second part of this study looking at the meanings of ideological labels is therefore expected to illustrate differences in the representational content held by Labour and Alliance supporters, that might account for this inability to separate the two using a simple measure of ideological identification.

#### **METHOD: Content analysis**

The question used to probe for subjective meanings of the two ideological labels of conservative and liberal is as follows:

“Different people have different ideas about what “liberal” and “conservative” mean.

What do these terms mean to you?”

This question followed immediately after the liberal/conservative identification question detailed in the first part of this study.

#### **RESULTS: Content Analysis**

The general method of analysis employed in this exercise is thematic content analysis. Put simply, content analysis may consist of documenting the number of occurrences of key words or phrases. For example, Billig (1978) enumerated the frequency with which key values were presented in samples of two National Front (fascist) affiliated publications, Spearhead and Britain First. Comparison of these frequency counts for the two publications illuminated important differences in value orientations that could be grounded in the context of a split within the organisation itself. Thematic content analysis goes some way beyond this gross categorisation. The inter-relations between key words and phrases become the unit of analysis, and are combined according to the themes they illustrate. Thus, the analytic categories are the themes derived from the discourse.

To this end each response was broken down into individual concepts, which were then grouped together into categories. Categories reflected commonality between the concepts in those categories. This categorisation process is a reflexive process that may involve exploding one class into two or more, as well as aggregating classes. At the end of the process one has the minimum number of discrete classes

This process yielded 277 separable concepts, which were divided into 45 categories of concepts. Of the 277 concepts identified, all but 31 (or 11%) of these were satisfactorily. These uncategorised concepts were those that displayed no commonality with the concepts comprising the 45 categories. A number were impossible to classify on grounds of ambiguity (eg. "cruising" used to describe liberal, "opting out" used to describe conservative), while others simply did not share any commonality with any other concepts (eg. "hypocritical" used to describe liberal).

Coding reliability was checked by having a second person code a sample of 100 respondents' responses. After coding was completed by both raters the categorisation was compared showing that the two coders had independently agreed on 92% of the sub-sample classification. The discrepant responses were discussed, resulting in 100% agreement. Where discrepancy required a change in the classification scheme the remaining responses were re-checked so as to be consistent.

Table 5.2.  
Taxonomy of liberal/conservative descriptors

Category:	Concept examples:	%LIB	%CON
Pro-change	"favour reform" "open to change" "accept change"	16	2
Anti-change	"static" "rigid" allergic to change" "suspicious of change"	0	14
Narrow minded	"narrow minded" "tunnel vision" "fixed ideas" "one-eyed"	0	8
Broadminded	"flexibility" "broadminded" "Consider alternatives"	23	0
Redress status quo	"redress balance between rich and poor" "back to basics"	1	0
Support status quo	"maintain power structures" "preserving social distinctions"	0	13
Prejudiced	"Stuck up" "intolerant of others"	0	1
Tolerant	"tolerant" "welcome diversity" "unprejudiced"	6	0
Traditional	"old fashioned" "conventional" "sticking to tradition"	0	14
Modern	"trendsetting" "modern" "contemporary"	3	0
Progressive	"favouring progress" "forward thinking" "progressive"	6	0
Left wing	"left wing" "to the left" "centre left"	4	0
Right wing	"right wing" "right of centre" "favouring extreme right"	0	4
Reserved	"reserved" "keep to oneself" "hold back"	0	9
Expressive	"speak your mind" "outgoing" "confiding"	4	0
Rash	"not considered" "taking risks" "less thought before acting"	8	0
Considered	"careful decision making" "think before acting"	2	12
Frugal	"mindful of money" "mean" "fiscally prudent" "frugal"	0	1
Security	"security" "stable" "safer"	0	6
Pro-people	"concern for others" "for the people" "compassion"	8	2
Pro-money	"money oriented" "emphasise fiscal matters"	0	6
Socialist/communist	"socialist following" "communist" "commies"	2	0
Pro-private enterprise	"belief in private enterprise" "private ownership" "user pays"	1	3
Pro-intervention	"govt has role in economy" "enforcing greater regulation"	1	0
Social welfare	"welfare state" "emphasising social welfare"	2	0
Moral viewpoint	"moral stand" "moral" "not sacrificing morals"	1	3
Freedom	"political freedom" "free to decide" "freedom"	10	1
Social conscience	"social conscience" "socially aware" "social justice"	3	0
Individualistic	"individual values" "individual freedom"	3	2
Pro-minority	"preferential treatment for Maoris" "concern for minorities"	3	0
Working class	"supporting working class" "up with the workers"	3	0
Extremist	"more extreme actions" "radical" "over the top"	5	1
Rural NZ	"farmers" "rural NZ" "farming"	0	1
Pro-environment	"environment issues" "greenies" "recycling"	1	0
Equality	"equality" "equal access for all"	2	0
Weak	"wishy washy" "wimps"	1	0
Alliance	"Alliance" "pro-Alliance"	1	0
Anti-money	"anti-economy" "down with business"	1	0
Upper class	"upper class"	0	3
Pakeha	"white" "pakeha"	0	1

Table 5.2 above shows the 40 major categories. The remaining two were for "other" responses (those which were unclassified) and "Nothing/Don't know" (where respondents wrote nothing or indicated they could not). Additionally, table 5.2 shows the percentage of the sample attributing each meaning category to the two targets, liberal and conservative (note that this does not sum to 100% as most respondents gave more than one meaning for each target).

Each category was assigned a new variable, and frequency of descriptors was calculated. 22% of the sample were unable to define liberal (and 3% gave at least one uncategorisable descriptor). Similarly, 29% of the sample were unable to define conservative (with 4% giving at least one uncategorisable descriptor).

The first point to notice from table 5.2 is that for many of the meaning categories there is an opposite meaning category. In many cases one category is attributed to liberal and it's opposite to conservative (or vice-versa). For example, 16% of the sample indicated that liberal means supporting change, while 14% of the sample said the reverse was true of conservative (that conservative means opposition to change). Additionally, though there are more than 30 meaning categories, several are clearly more important than others. For example, pro-change and anti-change, or narrow-minded and broad-minded. In some cases even though a category has an opposite, that opposite is not mentioned as frequently. For example, conservative is described by 13% as meaning support of the status quo, though only 1% indicate that the opposite applied to liberal. This indicates that though many of the ideas associated with these ideological labels have opposites, this does not automatically mean that endorsement of one meaning for conservative is accompanied by the endorsement of the opposite concept for liberal.

The frequency with which each descriptor was used was cross-tabulated against which of National, Labour, the Alliance, and New Zealand First each respondent indicated they were most likely to vote for. These contingency tables (one for liberal, one for conservative) were used as input for the correspondence analysis. This was then subject to multiple correspondence analysis using the ANACOR algorithm used by SPSS 6.1.3.

Though it is only really since the early 1980's that multiple correspondence analysis has received attention from American researchers (primarily in the area of advertising and marketing) the

technique has a much longer history in Europe, and particularly France, where it has been used by social representation theorists to graphically illustrate the content and variation between populations of social representations. It can be considered as belonging to the family of multidimensional scaling techniques. Taking as input data in the form of a contingency table consisting of rows (objects) and columns (attributes) multiple correspondence analysis can be used to determine the appropriate dimensionality of evaluation of the objects based on the attributes, both of which can in turn be represented in euclidean space on the same perceptual map.

Important statistical considerations for multiple correspondence analysis relate to the objects and attributes being rated. It is important that the attributes upon which the objects are rated are a good approximation of the attributes which would be expected to fully describe all of the objects. Given that data for this analysis was obtained by eliciting meanings of the target terms using an open-ended method, this requirement should be satisfied.

Conservative descriptors:

As with discriminant analysis, correspondence analysis produces dimensions of similarity up to a maximum of one less than the number of targets entered. In this case the maximum number of dimensions is three (four target parties minus one). Examination of the proportion of between groups variance showed that a two-dimensional solution was most appropriate (the third dimension of the three dimensional solution accounted for only 2% of variance). The two dimensions produced accounted for 80% and 20% of variance respectively, indicating that the first dimension was much more important in differentiating supporters of different parties. Figure 5.3 below shows a perceptual map of the results. Each target party and target descriptor have a value on each dimension, and the scores on each dimension are plotted against each other.




Figure 5.3. Two dimensional perceptual map showing results of correspondence analysis results for descriptors of the conservative label (descriptors indicated by circles and parties by triangles).

When interpreting the map derived from correspondence analysis it is important to note that the further points are situated from the origin, the less "inertia" they possess. This means that points located on or near the origin represent attributes about which there is effectively consensual endorsement across the descriptors used by the three groups. Similarly, the further from the origin a point is the greater the role that point will play in defining the dimension, and the greater the variation across objects. The centre of the map is marked with a solid circle. Only descriptors that do not fall in the centre have been labelled. For example, the descriptor category "extremist" was used almost exclusively by intended Labour voters to describe conservative, while the category "traditional" was used by all groups.

Dimension one (accounting for the majority of variance) differentiated Labour and the Alliance from National intending voters. Alliance and Labour intending voters were more likely to describe "conservative" as extremist, favouring money and the upper class, opposing change, narrow-minded, individualistic and reserved, while for National intending voters conservative represented the descriptors of modern, favouring people, right-wing, security, and freedom. Clearly National supporters hold a more positive view of what it means to be politically conservative than do Labour and Alliance supporters.

The second dimension differentiates primarily between Labour and the Alliance, though National falls half way between the two. Labour supporters use the descriptor categories of extremist, middle NZ, right wing, pro-upper class, while Alliance supporters were more likely to indicate that being politically conservative meant being reserved, individualistic, favouring free-market reform, and endorsing security.

#### Liberal descriptors:

The two dimensions of the solution accounted for 72% and 28% respectively. Again, this indicates that the first dimension is more important in differentiating the parties. Figure 5.4 shows a plot of the attribute and target scores on these two dimensions. This also indicates that the second dimension of liberal meaning is more important in differentiating the parties than the second conservative dimension, though it is not possible to make any statistical comparison.






Figure 5.4. Two dimensional perceptual map showing results of correspondence analysis results for descriptors of the liberal label (descriptors indicated by circles and parties by triangles).

Dimension one (accounting for the majority of variance) once again differentiated National supporters from Labour and the Alliance intending voters. Alliance and Labour supporters were more likely to describe being "liberal" as favouring collective responsibility, pro-people and minorities, tolerant and broadminded, progressive and modern, and favouring Labour. To National intending voters being liberal meant favouring a free-market position, retaining the status-quo, being extremist and left-wing, favouring individualism, represented the middle-class, and to a lesser degree security and freedom. Unlike the representation of conservative, Alliance and Labour supporters clearly view being politically liberal as a positive. Having said that, National supporters represent liberalism in a mixed fashion. On the one hand being liberal has negative connotations: being rash, and extremely left-wing, but it also possesses positive

meanings as well: freedom and security, as well as a number of potentially ambiguous meanings: favouring a free-market position (a corner stone National position), supporting individuals, and middle New Zealand.

As with the representation of conservatism, the second dimension differentiates primarily between Labour and the Alliance, with National again in the middle. Labour supporters use the descriptor categories of favouring minorities, people, middle New Zealand, and the working class, but also extremist, left-wing, and modern. Alliance supporters on the other hand, name as attributes of liberalism possessing a moral standpoint, supporting individuals, being progressive, tolerant and expressive, endorsing freedom and social justice, and too a much smaller extent, being rash.

#### **DISCUSSION: Content Analysis**

The meanings given by respondents for the two ideological labels may fit broadly into the three categories of personal and group identity found by Bettencourt and Hume (1999). Bettencourt and Hume used open-ended questions to elicit characteristics of personal and group identity and found that the responses could be categorised into affiliations, values, and affective responses. This suggests that respondents are investing the meanings given with identity-related meanings, rather than an objective response to the probe question.

Both sets of results indicate that there is one primary dimension of meanings for both conservatism and liberalism that differentiates strongly between National (conservative), and Alliance and Labour (liberal) voters. Clearly then, this primary dimension is the one that distinguishes the broad classes of liberal and conservative. In both cases there is a secondary dimension that differentiates between different liberal viewpoints - which it should be added is not possible to do on the basis of comparing ideological self-identification ratings.

Consideration of the results above indicates that self-identified liberal (Labour and Alliance) and conservative (National) voters have a black and white view of what it means to be politically conservative. Conservative voters view their position as favourable, while liberal voters do not. In certain areas the meanings are contradictory- being modern but narrow-minded and opposing change, favouring people while at the same time favouring money over people. There is clearly

evidence of a self-serving bias (perceptual distortions that serve to protect or enhance the self-concept: Snyder, Stephan & Rosenfield, 1978). Alternatively this may be evidence of a group-serving bias (Islam & Hewstone, 1993). Given the context of the study- respondents were at least implicitly contrasting conservative and liberal- it may be more likely that a group-based explanation is a better explanation.

Such a statement is less applicable to perceptions of liberalism- both liberal and conservative voters identify positive, negative, and ambiguous attributes. This may in part be attributable to the relative differences between the three groups of voters self-ratings. National supporters were significantly more conservative than Labour and Alliance voters, but only in relative terms. With a rating of "4" being the mid-point of the scale National supporters (4.66) were less conservative than their Alliance (3.24) and Labour (3.15) counterparts were liberal. Indeed of the National supporters, 47% gave a response of four or less compared to 88% of Alliance and 79% of Labour supporters. Even supporters of conservative parties may consider themselves to be liberal.

This in turn suggests that the meaning of being liberal is more murky than the meanings associated with being conservative. This is not surprising given the post-1984 reforms, initiated by a traditionally liberal party. Liberalism has become the battle ground on which subsequent elections have been fought - all sides battling for ownership of a label that is clearly viewed more positively than the alternative. From the symbolic politics perspective this is clearly important - Labour has become divorced from it's symbolic roots and is battling to recover credibility. In 1990, Mike Moore attempted to do this by harking back to the days of Labour-party (and New Zealand) icon Michael Joseph Savage but it clearly didn't ring true in the ears of those who had borne the brunt of the 1984 reforms.

The finding of a second dimension is significant. It has already been shown that one cannot differentiate between Labour and Alliance supporters base on their own self-reported ideological affiliation. Given the parties' platforms, and history we would expect to be able to distinguish the two parties - Alliance has styled itself as more liberal than Labour so why is it that if anything Labour party supporters are marginally more liberal than Alliance? The second dimensions found in the meanings attached to liberal/conservative may hold the answer - these ideological labels

mean different things to the two parties' supporters. According to the correspondence analyses reported above there are significant dimensions of difference between the two groups' perceptions of ideological meaning.

Unfortunately, correspondence analysis is a highly descriptive statistical method. It is not possible (other than with the eye) to determine whether or not one attribute is statistically more descriptive of a target than another. For example, rash and pro-Labour are both closer to Alliance than Labour but both are close to the origin- indicating they possess little inertia. For this reason an alternative analysis was conducted using multiple discriminant analysis, a multivariate statistical tool that may be used to predict categorical group membership based on scores on predictor (independent) variables. The result is a number of discriminant functions which are linear combinations of the predictor variables. The maximum number of possible functions is the number of groups predicted minus one, or equal to the number of variables, whichever is the smaller. Not all functions derived may discriminate at a statistically significant level, and should this occur the analysis may be performed a second time specifying the use of only the significant function(s). A particularly useful statistic is the overall classification rate, that is, the number of cases for which the group membership can be accurately predicted on the basis of the discriminant functions obtained. Thus, for a three group discriminant analysis with two variables the maximum possible number of functions is two.

### **RESULTS and DISCUSSION: Discriminant analysis**

The aim of the analysis is to attempt to identify which of the meanings associated with these two labels distinguishes between the three parties (and particularly between Labour and Alliance supporters). To do this the data needs to be recalculated. Discriminant analysis takes as input continuous rather than categorical variables so for each respondent an index variable was created for each descriptor category to indicate whether a descriptor was perceived to apply to one or both ideological labels. The rationale for this is that the analysis is being conducted to differentiate which attributes distinguish different parties' supporters. Thus, if an attribute is applied to both liberal and conservative labels it does not discriminate between the two. If an attribute applies to one and not the other, then it does differentiate. Therefore, for each respondent an index was created by subtracting the frequency of occurrence of each attribute applied to the label conservative was subtracted from the frequency of occurrence of that same

attribute to the label liberal. If the attribute was applied once to conservative but not liberal then the variable was scored “-1”, if applied once to liberal but not conservative it was scored “+1”, and finally if applied equally to both (or as in the majority of cases, neither) then the variable had a value of “0”.

Due to the high number of variables, stepwise discriminant analysis was conducted. This reduced the number of variables by excluding those that (across the sample) did not differentiate groups. To avoid the exclusion of important variables a liberal variable entry criteria was applied. As suggested in Hair, Anderson, Tatham and Black (1995) and Tabachnick and Fidell (1997) all values with a significance level of less than .30 were included in the analysis. Additionally, as the sample is sufficiently large 73 respondents (or 30% of the sample) were held back from the discriminant analysis to act as a hold-out sample, upon which to test the accuracy of the discriminant functions obtained.

Table 5.3.  
Pooled within-group correlations between meaning variables and discriminant functions

Left-wing	-.40*	-.11
Open-minded	.39*	.12
Considered	.38*	.06
Reserved	-.30*	-.15
National party	.28	-.01
Favouring change	-.24	.05
Extremist	-.22	-.07
Anti-money	.17	.05
Support status quo	.15	.02
Anti-change	-.13	.02
Free Market	.12	-.05
Narrow-minded	-.08	-.35*
For people	.32	.33*
Expressive	-.00	.32*
Equality	.25	-.30*
Against status quo	.08	.30*
Tolerant	.05	.23
Social justice	.21	.22
Freedom	-.01	.21
Labour party	-.06	.17
Progressive	.05	.15

The discriminant analysis produced two significant discriminant functions, the first accounting for 72% ( $\chi^2(42)=95.47$ ,  $p<.001$ ) and 28% ( $\chi^2(20)=35.90$ ,  $p<.05$ ) of the between-groups variance respectively. Table 5.3 below shows the pooled within-group correlations between the variables

included in the analysis and the two canonical discriminant functions. Shaded areas indicate the function with which each variable has the highest correlation.

The primary discriminant function is defined most strongly at the positive pole by the meanings open-minded and considered (by convention only values greater in magnitude than .30 are used for interpretation), and at the negative pole by left-wing and reserved. Additionally, the category pro-people also loads on this function though it loads most strongly on the second function. The second function is defined primarily by pro-people, expressive, and anti-status quo on one end and narrow minded and equality at the other.

Figure 5.5 below shows a plot of the group centroid scores for each discriminant function. The first function differentiates most strongly between Labour and the Alliance, and National, while the second differentiates most strongly between the Alliance and Labour.




Figure 5.5: Discriminant map derived from MDA analysis of liberal/conservative meanings index

Together, table 5.3 and figure 5.5 allow us to interpret the meaning of the two functions. National supporters score lower on function one than Labour and the Alliance. This means that they are more likely to distinguish between liberal and conservative in terms of the values loading negatively on that function. The reverse is true for Labour and Alliance supporters. Of particular relevance to this study is the second dimension, which discriminates between Labour and the

Alliance. Labour supporters differentiate between liberal and conservative in terms of expressive, pro-people, and opposition to the status quo, while Alliance supporters distinguish between these ideological labels using the concepts of narrow-minded and equality.

Finally, the two functions obtained correctly predicted 69% of the voting preference of respondents in the computation sample (Press's  $Q=70.83$ ,  $p<.001$ ) and 48% of the hold-out sample (Press's  $Q=7.07$ ,  $p<.01$ ), both significantly better than chance. This is important - it is possible to obtain significant discriminant functions that are practically useless in differentiating between group memberships. Hair et al (1995) recommend that significant discriminant functions should be able to accurately predict group membership at 50% better than chance (eg. chance level multiplied by one and a half) before interpretation of the functions. This recommendation is satisfied by the results obtained

## DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY

As expected, examination of the ideological identification, SDO, and RWA scores shows that National supporters are quite distinct from Labour and Alliance supporters. National supporters are more conservative, express more authoritarian attitudes, and endorse egalitarianism less than supporters of the other two parties.

Unfortunately it is not possible to differentiate between Labour and Alliance supporters on the basis of any of these measures. It is only when one looks at the subjective meanings of the two ideological labels with which people are being asked to identify that it becomes possible to distinguish between those favouring these two parties in terms of ideology. Self-confessed liberal supporters of these two parties see different things when they look at the political environment.

Relating these findings back to social representations theory it is apparent that supporters of different parties do perceive the political world in terms of different criteria. Even though Labour and Alliance supporters appear indistinguishable on the same one-to-seven-point scale that they necessarily share the same political ideology, indeed, it is these ideological differences that may explain why a liberal voter supports Labour rather than Alliance, and vice-versa. Where does this difference in viewing the political world come from? Social representation theorists argue that it comes from the social world by way of interaction and communication, whether face-to-face or through the media (Moscovici, 1973).

The lesser consensus over the liberal label is important in terms of symbolic politics. Not only is the ideologically conservative position viewed less positively by the sample (the greater part of the sample rated themselves as liberal) but all parties represented being liberal with some positive elements, even self-identified conservatives. This suggests that the symbol "liberal" is not clearly owned by any one group. Even National party supporters claim the liberal position as their own. This is in no small part likely to be due to the political upheaval in the wake of the fourth Labour government who, it would appear, have become divorced from their traditional symbolic ground. The election campaign itself reflected this with the National party attempting to style themselves as leaning towards the liberal side of the political spectrum, occupying the ideological middle ground. This is consistent with the finding that the majority of the sample fall to the liberal side of ideological identification. There is more to be gained by identifying one's party as more



liberal, than more conservative.

The other point to be made concerning the valence of the attributed meanings of liberal and conservative is that they do not function independently. The questions merely asked for respondents to attribute meaning to the two labels, but the results clearly argue that in the eyes of the respondents one position is preferable to the other. In effect, responses indicate that participants are conceiving the two labels in an inter-group context. This relates back to Moscovici's (1988) contention that ideological (polemical) representations, growing out of social division, play an important role in establishing inter-group boundaries and identity.

This point is borne out by the results of the psychological measures administered to the sample. Investigation of the relationship between SDO and ideological meanings are suggestive as to why it is that those scoring high on SDO may be more likely to identify as conservative. One of the core meanings associated with the conservative label was support for the status quo, opposition to change, lack of consideration of other ideas. Research using the SDO construct has shown that those scoring higher on SDO are more likely to seek out hierarchy enhancing roles- that is to say roles that allow opportunity to perpetuate or enhance social hierarchy. For example Sidanius, Liu, Shaw and Pratto (1994) found that legal students wishing to become prosecutors (a system enhancing role) scored more highly on SDO than those wishing to become public defenders (a system attenuating role).

The two components of this study have illustrated a number of important aspects of a social representational approach to political preference, as well as profiling supporters of the major parties in preparation for the remainder of this thesis. Firstly, Moscovici (1988) contends that identification grows out of differences in the content of polemical representations, such as political ideology. In the realm of politics this would mean that ideological identification is based on differences in perception of the political world. This study has shown that supporters of the major political parties in New Zealand may be distinguished by their ideological self-identifications, and that these in turn may reflect differences in the content of one's ideological representations. While Labour and Alliance supporters have a common ideological position there are marked differences in the way they interpret that position.

Importantly, a large proportion of the sample identified concepts relating to change (pro-change, broadminded, redress status quo, modern, progressive, and freedom) versus stability (anti-change, narrowminded, support status quo, traditional, considered decisions, and security). In turn the change-related concepts were applied overwhelmingly to the liberal position, while those concepts relating to stability or lack of change were attributed to the conservative position. This was reflected by the results of the discriminant analysis in which the meaning categories of broadminded, considered decisions, favouring change, support for the status quo, and opposition to change were some of the concepts defining the primary discriminant dimension distinguishing liberal from conservative. This dimension in turn distinguished strongly between Labour and Alliance supporters on the one hand, and National supporters on the other.

Having said this, the analyses presented in this study do not allow us to determine the direction of causality. The relative endorsement of these ideological meanings distinguishes between supporters of different parties but does not allow us to state whether (as is theoretically consistent) differences in ideological representation are the basis of political preference, or whether one's ideological position merely reflects political preference. This is a problem that may be addressed in a later chapter.

The approach adopted for this investigation may be considered to be broadly typological in nature. That is to say, the data comprises of respondent's lay-definitions of what it means to be politically liberal or conservative. To what extent do Scarbrough's (1984) criticisms of the typological approach generalise to this study?

In the studies reviewed by Scarbrough (1984) that use this typological approach a number of different criteria are used to determine whether or not people evidence ideological thought. One criterion is that in order to attribute ideological thought to an individual, that individual should display a 'deeper' level of abstraction in their perception of politics. That is to say that if a person shows that they make sense of politics by using ideological concepts, such as liberal and conservative, then they may be assumed to think ideologically. A second criterion is that one's ability to articulate political concepts abstractly follows directly from their holding an ideology. While the second criterion may appear to be simply the inverse of the first, Scarbrough (1984) argues that there are different implications for the two.

Firstly (and as indicated in the earlier summary of the argument) to say that one thinks ideologically simply because they are able to appropriately use terms like 'liberal' or 'left' surely ignores the richness of political dialogue? As Scarbrough (1984) points out, politicians do not present political matters in such simplified terms. In fact it is frequently the case that politicians attempt to avoid such gross characterisations, given the polarised emotional responses such terms may elicit. This is not surprising - after all, the typological approach revolves around a construction of political ideology as a tool, a means of simplifying the diversity of what politicians do for the voters themselves. Indeed it is accepted by researchers in this tradition that ideologies encompass domains such as the values and ideals to which political elites allude and therefore, according to Scarbrough (1984), problematic to argue that to hold an ideology is to hold concepts like liberal-conservative or left-right.

Secondly, the view that making sense of politics in terms of liberal-conservative or left-right is reflection of 'having ideology' "entails the assumption that the language of ideologies and the language of analysis are equivalent" (Scarbrough, 1984, p. 17). If ideologies are a shorthand way of making sense of politics, and the stuff of politics is an ongoing argument about what are suitable goals and values for political systems, and how best to achieve them, then it is inappropriate to equate this with the sort of analytic language used to characterise ideologies. In Scarbrough's words "We can well agree on the use of 'liberal-conservative' or 'left-right' as analytic terms but find no agreement about what is meet and proper in the world." (1984, p. 18)

Clearly, while these criticisms may characterise the literature that Scarbrough (1984) draws upon, this is less obviously the case with the previous study. Liberal-conservative ideology is viewed as a social-representation - a set of concepts that apply to the interpretation of politics. Study one presents an analysis of the relationship between what ideological labels like 'liberal' and 'conservative' mean and political preference. Thus, study one is not concerned to any great degree with whether or not respondents can be described as holding ideology but rather whether or not their attributions of meaning for ideological labels may be related to their political preferences. In this way the study achieves a similar aim to that of Scarbrough (1984), using a different methodology, but without making the same assumption that Scarbrough (1984) makes - that ideologies are directly related to the professed beliefs of political elites (a criticism that she

herself levels at research in the attitudinal tradition). Rather it is assumed that ideology is something that reflects a voters'-eye view of political matters.

In summary, supporters of the three major parties at the time of surveying show differences in their representations of political ideology. These differences are associated with ideological identification. This is consistent with Sears' (Sears et al, 1986; Sears, 1993) contention that ideological identification plays a significant role in political preference. However ideological self-identification is not the only symbolic predisposition highlighted by Sears. Of equal relevance to this thesis is the role that party identification plays in political preference. To this end the next study examines the role and content of political party representations in political preference.

## STUDY TWO: SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS OF POLITICAL PARTIES

To date there have been no investigations of national politics within the framework of social representations theory<sup>2</sup>, though there have been a number of studies examining the dimensions of perception of political issues (Shikiar, 1974; Goddard & Russell, 1987), political figures (Shikiar, 1974; 1976; Forgas & Meynhart, 1979; Nygren & Jones, 1977; Forgas, Kagan, & Frey, 1977), and political parties (Ikeda, 1997; Forgas, Laszlo, Siklaki, & Moylan, 1995), as well as investigations of the social representations held of social movements and how those representations relate to protest behaviour (Di Giacomo, 1980). The research carried out by Forgas and his colleagues is particularly relevant as they have been concerned with the 'cognitive representation' of political objects. Indeed Forgas et al (1995) identify as particularly important to the social psychological study of politics "how political parties, the symbolic representations of different ideologies, value and attitudes are perceived by individuals." (p.482).

The studies conducted on this theme have typically required participants to make similarity judgements of the political stimulus objects, as well as rating each target on a number of fixed attributes identified as theoretically relevant. A common finding is that political perception is organised along up to three dimensions; Political orientation (eg. Republican vs Democrat), evaluation (eg. good/bad), and conservatism. For example, Forgas et al (1995) required participants to rate target parties on a number of seven-point bipolar scales such as conservative-radical, left wing-right wing, rigid-flexible, and nationalistic-not nationalistic. The aim of this investigation was to examine the cognitive representations of political parties in the newly democratic Hungary. Forgas et al state that Hungary presented an important opportunity to examine political perception in a novel situation in which the number of political parties had increased dramatically after a period of one party domination. Though this situation came about by a considerably different route than the first MMP election in New Zealand both contexts have this much in common.

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NOTE 2: This conclusion was reached following a detailed survey of the literature, the use of electronic databases, and email communication with other social representation researchers on the social representations theory mailing list SOCREP-L (SOCREP-L@taunivm.tau.ac.il).

In common with the studies carried out by Forgas and colleagues the aim of this chapter is to probe the symbolic content of specific political objects, in order to develop further a theory of how symbolic/representational content relates to political preference. If the symbolic meanings associated with objects such as the flag, or a sporting trophy, can be so potent then central to the issue of political preference must be the symbolic content of political parties themselves. The question next arises as how best to make this investigation? If symbols can be likened to social representations then symbols do not exist in a vacuum, they must be socially constructed and shared. It would be naive to assume that many of the meanings associated with political parties are not intentional on the part of political elites (though doubtless any number develop accidentally before their power is acknowledged). This construction occurs primarily through media representation of political issues, and is ultimately manifest on the day of an election when people decide who to vote for. It is the voters then that are the best mirror for what parties ultimately stand for, and it is they who should be asked what these parties represent.

While the study by Forgas et al (1995) is clearly a worthy endeavour the method used is open to criticism. If the aim is to determine social/cognitive representations in a context of change then surely it is inappropriate to make too many assumptions about the relevant elements of those representations, particularly if one is intending to use questionnaire items developed for American samples in such a different context as Eastern Europe. A more flexible way of eliciting representational content would seem more appropriate in such a climate of political change.

An alternative approach is used by Ikeda (1997), who used open ended questions to elicit political party schemas. Japanese voters were asked what came to mind when they thought of each six political parties. Responses were content analysed and frequencies calculated resulting in 150 target words. These could be broken down into seventeen major categories and subjected to cluster analysis. Ikeda notes that the respondents' salient political cognitions about the parties were different from those usually posited by political scientists: They were unlikely to mention political power, interest groups, ideology and issues, or even political leaders. Respondents most frequently made evaluative references (as much as 56% of references for each party were evaluative) and references to party characteristics and behaviour (up to 35% of references).

Unfortunately it is not enough to simply ask what a party symbolises. By their very nature symbols may be difficult to articulate, they have no tangible reality. It is in this endeavour that SRT offers a useful framework. Verkuyten (1995) has argued that political symbols are representational in nature, allowing us the freedom to examine them within a SRT framework. Just as political parties are symbols we should consider the representations of political parties in determining the symbolic/representational content.

### **VALUES AND GROUPS AS REPRESENTATIONAL ELEMENTS**

As detailed previously symbols serve to mould identity, and values associated with identity. Indeed Sears et al (1986) have theorised that at the ultimate level of abstraction symbols appeal to the values of the viewer. In the contexts in which the symbolic politics theory has been tested the most common values investigated have been related to equality. Typically positions based on symbolic politics comprise a mix of affect towards particular groups and (usually traditional) values. Thus symbolic racism involves anti-black affect and traditional equality values, the manifestation of which might be manifest in opposition to affirmative action policies (because they are counter-meritocratic). Billig and Cochrane (1979) have gone further, arguing that values are in fact symbols. They point out that the examples of political symbols such as "Freedom" and "Equality" given by Cobb and Elder (1967) bear a striking resemblance to the terminal and instrumental values identified by Milton Rokeach (1973) in his seminal work on human values. While useful as a starting point such a view ignores the way in which symbols attain and maintain potency- through communication.

Therefore we would expect that people be able to articulate the values for which a party stands, and who those values represent. Given that group-based consensus in representational content is a defining characteristic of social representations we would expect that the boundaries of ingroup definition should be recognised by supporters of the different parties- there will be consensus between supporters of the same party (Wagner, 1995). This does not mean that supporters of different parties will automatically disagree with all aspects of a particular party representation – different aspects will be emphasised, downplayed, or evaluated differently in relation to their own priorities as supporters of different parties.

A key dimension in the political domain in New Zealand politics since the beginning of the

electoral change has been that of representation. One of the motives for a change to proportional representation was that a government based on such a system should represent a greater majority of the population than under the previous simple plurality system. Of course politicians on all sides continually purport to represent everyone, or at least the greater majority. The flip side of this relates to the perception by the voters themselves as to which party or candidate best represents them.

This point has been illustrated by Reicher and Hopkins (1996), who analysed the discursive devices used by Margaret Thatcher and Neil Kinnock in speeches concerning the mid-1980's miners strike. Both leaders defined the context of the issue (in their favour) in such a way that the greatest possible proportion of the domestic audience would fall within the constructed ingroup. At the same time opponents of their respective positions were defined to an extreme minority. On one hand the instigators of the strike and violence associated with it are the NUM (National Union of Mineworkers), an undemocratic minority imposing their anti-governmental stance on others, on the other the strike is the end product of Thatcherism personified by the Prime Minister. The content of ingroup and outgroup category membership is defined in a number of ways, most notably by reference to values. For Margaret Thatcher the defining quality of the ingroup is "Britishness" comprising values such as self-reliance, freedom, and respect for order, while the pro-strike outgroup represent the antithesis of Britishness. For Neil Kinnock the constructed ingroup support peace, is motivated by concern for the wider community, and is compassionate and caring. The outgroup (narrowly defined as Margaret Thatcher) is arrogant and prejudiced, and is motivated by irrational self-interest. Both speeches identify the represented groups, and what their descriptive and prescriptive characteristics (values) are.

A similar, more descriptive, analysis of New Zealand political discourse was carried out by Praat, Tuffin, Lyons, Morgan, and Frederikson (1996) using speeches delivered by Helen Clark and Jim Bolger in 1994. This paper highlighted the discursive resources used by the leaders to characterise their own (and the other) parties. For example, Jim Bolger was shown to draw on "business" discourse in his characterisation of the National party as business-like, organised and efficient, and oriented towards the future. On the other hand, Helen Clark presented the Labour party as principled and caring, responsible and consistent. As with any public political communication the aim of the speaker is to persuade the audience in their favour, and in the case



of their respective supporters it can be assumed that this communication has been to some extent successful. It is therefore a point of interest whether these characterisations of the two parties (as presented by their leaders) will be reflected in the discourse of their supporters.

The focus of this investigation is twofold. Firstly, the analysis is exploratory with an eye to better understanding of the functions and content of representations of particular political symbols: political parties themselves. Secondly, based on previous research on political discourse we can make a number of predictions about the general patterns of responses:

We would expect that those respondents indicating a clear preference for a political party will construct the representation groups of that party in as inclusive a manner as possible, serving to legitimise that party's position as credible advocates of the electorate in general. Conversely respondents will construct the constituency of dis-preferred parties in as exclusive a manner as possible, thereby compromising that party's right to govern while improving the claim to governance of their preferred party.

Similarly, we would expect that values presented by respondents as being those their preferred party represents will be those characterising the attributed representation groups- that there will be a fit between the values the party is seen to represent and the values of the group(s) which are perceived as being the party's constituency.

More importantly, attributed representation groups, values, and ideals will function rhetorically to justify the preference of particular parties and to undermine criticism of that preference. That is to say there is an interaction between ingroup categorisation and values that justifies political preference.

Not only should supporters of different parties have generally consensual representations of their favoured parties, but there is also expected to be general agreement of the content of dis-preferred party representations.

## **METHOD**

### **Data collection and survey measures**

Instructions to the respondents were intended to encourage variability of responses – several probes were given for party associations. Respondents were asked to indicate which political party they favoured the most and which party they favoured the least, and to describe the people, values or ideals these parties represent for them. Additionally, for both the preferred and dis-preferred party respondents were asked what images (if any) came to mind when they thought about each party. Both the symbolic politics and social representations literature indicate that symbols or representations rely heavily on pictorial elements so this probe was included in an attempt to tap pictorial content of party representations. Additionally, group affiliation and values are two of the dimensions of personal and group identity found by Bettencourt and Hume (1999) as described in the previous study.

A brief note stated that responses need not be complete sentences, but could be characteristics, words, or phrases. Respondents were asked to describe both preferred and dis-preferred parties firstly in order to access negative associations for each party, and secondly as a way of obtaining additional information on the dimensions of comparison important in political behaviour (there may be important values or representation groups that respondents can only identify when describing what their favoured party does not symbolise). This item is replicated on page 243 of appendix two.

The levels of national support enjoyed by the three main parties was reflected in the responses of our sample; of the 247 replies only National, Labour, and the Alliance were favoured by more than fifteen respondents. For that reason the analytic focus of this study is on the data from the 187 respondents explicitly favouring or dis-prefering those parties (14 respondents reported a preference for New Zealand First and their responses will be included though the small sample size warrants caution). The responses were word-processed exactly as written to allow easier manipulation, with the final data set amounting to more than 9000 words. Respondents averaged 42 words per response.

As the focus of this study relates to party identification, responses from only those respondents whose party identification (the party with which they identified) was the same as the target party

for the above question (preferred parties) were included for the preferred party analyses presented below. This reduced the number of responses by 40 for that analysis.

The exact survey measures detailed above are reproduced in appendix two.

### **Analytic Procedure**

As with the previous study, the method employed is thematic content analysis. As the data available falls into the broad category of discourse a broadly content analytic procedure was followed, though considerable attention was paid to the conventions of discourse analysis and rhetorical psychology to lift the analysis above a simple enumeration of categories, resulting in a more flexible approach to analysis. Most importantly attention must be paid to how the survey responses function contextually and rhetorically.

The data was obtained in a particular context, that of a survey questionnaire examining socio-political attitudes, and the interpretation should be carried out in that light. Following the discourse analytic tradition as documented by Potter and Wetherell (1987) the answers to the survey questions should not be considered merely as a passive description of their perceptions of these political objects, or even as a simple declaration of support. Rather the discourse provided by respondents should be viewed as an active construction of their perceptions as a function of the context in which they are provided. This construction serves multiple purposes, to construct the identity (and anti-identity) of the ingroup to which the respondent is a member, as well as serving a rhetorical function (Billig, 1987; 1997) that acts as justification of the respondent's preference.

Billig (1997) contends that the specific form of discursive action involved in the giving of "opinions" is rhetorical discourse, which is argumentative and oriented towards persuasion. As such justification and criticism are central to rhetorical discourse, the speaker not only constructs their own position but also seeks to undermine alternative counter-positions.

Simply word-processing the data imparted some feeling as to the general flavour of the survey responses, and a number of themes were identified for further consideration and validation (note that discourse analysis encourages recursive consideration of the data, such that the researcher is expected to reconsider potentially important themes continually in the process of analysis).

Such an approach is “unavoidably interpretative” (Reicher & Hopkins, 1996) necessitating the inclusion throughout the analysis of representative examples of thematic discourse. The analysis below includes respondents’ replies (that are representative of the theme being isolated) to illustrate the conclusions that have been drawn. Excerpts are italicised and are included without any other modifications.

## THEMATIC CONTENT ANALYSIS

**Table 5.4**  
Tallies of preferred by dis-preferred votes for the four major parties.

PREFERRED PARTY	DIS-PREFERRED PARTY				
	National	Alliance	Labour	NZ First	
<b>National</b>		34	19	5	58 (out of 73)
<b>Alliance</b>	25		11	0	36 (out of 50)
<b>Labour</b>	28	7		3	38 (out of 50)
<b>NZ First</b>	5	2	3		10 (out of 14)
	48 (out of 64)	43 (out of 50)	23 (out of 37)	8 (out of 9)	

The table above shows cross tabulation of the distribution of most liked votes against least liked. Therefore the final column indicates the number of people preferring each of the three parties, who in turn disliked one of the other major parties. For example, of the 73 people who preferred National, 15 disliked a minor party other than Labour, the Alliance or New Zealand First.

National was both the most and least preferred party. More than a third of the 247 respondents stated that they liked National the most. Though both Alliance and Labour were equally preferred, the Alliance was second least preferred party. This final point is a reflection of the larger sample of National supporters, the majority of whom dislike the Alliance more than they dislike the traditional opposition, the Labour party. At the time of the survey the Alliance was polling second to National and therefore represented more of a threat to National than did Labour.

## PART 1: Preferred Parties

The first analytic summary covers the people, values, images, and ideals attributed to favoured parties.

### **National Party representation:**

The National party is considered by its supporters to represent the majority of New Zealanders, or most New Zealanders, specifically middle income upwards. Representation groups are relatively undifferentiated with the use of broad general terms rather than explicit reference to sub-groups. There is also reference to those who do not fall into the general categories of most/majority of New Zealanders.

*(1) "a fair cross section of [the] community", "They action issues for the good of the majority and not just catering for a particular section", "the majority of New Zealanders".*

While Nationals representation is seen as broad the specific images elicited by the image probe are clearly a privileged group; rich people, business people, and farmers. If National represents the majority then why does a minority typify that representation?

While it is important to supporters that National satisfactorily represents a majority of people there is some acknowledgment of National's unsatisfactory record concerning lower socio-economic groups, and maintenance of social services. More than any other party, National voters qualify their positive comments with some acknowledgment of the party's shortcomings. A number of themes are used to justify the National party failures to represent lower socio-economic groups. There is an appeal to the difficulty of the tasks facing the government, the suggestion being that if National isn't entirely succeeding (or some groups are being left behind) in the difficult task of running the country then it is only to be expected. Alternatively, National is seen as supporting only those who really need assistance, the implication being that some proportion of the population do not really need state assistance- they are taking advantage of the system, National does *(2) "provide social support for those in real need"*.

While National voters appear pessimistic or at least defensive (National is 'trying' but not

necessarily 'succeeding') they are certainly the best alternative. The deficiencies in support of some groups are accompanied by reference to National's long term commitment. That is to say we may not be seeing the benefit now, but we will do so (at some unspecified point) in the future **(3) "PAIN BEFORE GAIN!"**.

National are **(4) "the best of a bad bunch"**, *"economic realists"* while the opposition parties are **(5) "ineffectual"**, *"dreamers"*, *"ex-hippys"*.

Some (die-hard National voters?) see this as meaning that the National party is doing what needs to be done without giving in to popular opinion, again somewhat contradictory of the broad category National is seen to represent (the implicit suggestion is that 'popular opinion' actually consists of vocal minority groups). Pandering to 'popular opinion' is a criticism that is levelled at both the Alliance and Labour. Only the National party has the strength and commitment to do what has to be done.

#### **National Party Values:**

The successes of the National government as seen by their supporters are primarily economic, social system support is not mentioned often. The National Government is helping people to help themselves, and is motivated to improve the general quality of life through improvement of the economy.

There is a fear among National supporters of a return to the bad old days of (socialist) Labour-style Government, while National is firmly focussed on the future (pain before gain), and satisfied that the ends will ultimately justify the means. There is reference to stability, and commitment to tried and tested policy even if that stability comes at a price, hence National is also **(6) "STAIID conservative boring"**, *"boring, plodding & safe!"*. It is not clear whether this is a desirable attribute for the National party per se as opposed to being a desirable characteristic in any governing party. A change of Government in New Zealand has traditionally heralded dramatic policy swings and accompanying uncertainty that does not accompany the victory of the incumbent. It may be a case of 'better the devil you know'.

A prominent theme amongst National supporters is that party's commitment to incentives and

support for people who are willing to work for what they want, and this justifies and is in turn justified by with the pre-election package of tax-cuts passed by the National government. While incentives for productivity are considered desirable, welfarism is seen as undesirable, and rewarding of laziness. For National supporters welfare dependence is a potent negative symbol in opposition to the New Zealand ideal of self-determination. For the majority of National supporters everyone is playing by the same rules meaning that those who fail have themselves to blame.

*(7) "creating self-reliance, removing Govt umbrellas", "fostering individuals to give a go, promoting self worth", "Getting rid of cradle to grave mothering, removal of the handout".*

This emphasis on self-reliance is presented in turn leads to the proposition that the National party represents freedom of the individual.

#### **Labour Party representation:**

Labour supporters offer much more diverse descriptions of their party's representation. There is less use of general representation categories, and more explicit reference to concrete groups. The approach is much more specific in its inclusivity. Thus Labour represents the whole country including groups such as ethnic minorities, the elderly, women, and specifically financially deprived (unemployed, welfare beneficiaries, and low income earners), the emphasis is on middle New Zealand downwards.

*(8) "Economically disadvantaged people. Racial minorities. Senior citizens.", "More interested in the working class, unemployed, underprivileged than National", "helpful to the lower income section", "They represent the whole country, not just the financially comfortable", "stands for the workers", "represents a cross section of society, womens representation."*

Social status is frequently labelled by class-referential terms such as **(9)** "working class", "lower class", "blue collar workers" very much in keeping with the ideological and historical roots of the Labour party. These are the stereotypical Labour supporters.

There is frequent reference to the traditional Labour policy base; health, education, welfare. At

times recited like a mantra. (10) *"health, education and housing", "social welfare, public housing, health, education", "better housing and cost, equal opportunities, fair health system..."*

These references are particularly interesting. On the one hand they are not specifically probed for (unlike values and representation groups), and on the other they are commonly issues congruent with economic self-interest explanations of voting. However in this context they function symbolically rather than statements of position on specific issues. The three main objects "welfare", "health", and "education" are core Labour concerns and are repeated in three part lists throughout the Labour supporters' comments. Affordable housing is a relatively novel addition to the list, with the recent demise of state funded housing replaced by market rents (and an increased accommodation supplement) for low income earners.

Like National even when Labour is the preferred party support for them is qualified. There is recognition that Labour has become divorced from it's traditional constituency and values - even if we do know what Labour used to stand for there is confusion over what Labour does stand for at the moment. There is an even split between those who are pessimistic that even though Labour appears to have changed that the ghost of the 1984 government haven not been completely exorcised, and those that believe Labour has turned the corner.

(11) *"I believe they are basically for the rights of all people and the support of the less well off, however the message is very cloudy at the moment...", "Labour used to be for the working class hoping they will go back to that", "they are committed to their cause/party or they used to be".*

(12) *"now heading in the right direction and beginning to listen to the electorate", "prepared to learn from past mistakes and rectify".*

Perhaps the most damning criticism sees Labour perceived as infighting, overly critical but unconstructive, and backstabbing. This perception may be well founded when one considers the number of people to have held the Labour party leadership in recent times; Geoffrey Palmer replaced David Lange as prime minister before the end of the fourth Labour government's second term and was in turn replaced by Mike Moore less than two months out from the 1990 election (lost to National by a landslide). After the 1993 election, won by National with a single seat majority, Mike Moore was replaced by his deputy Helen Clark, who herself survived a



challenge by members of her own front bench to replace her with Mike Moore two months before the 1996 election (with the deputy leader, David Caygill, sealing the peace with his resignation in favour of one of the attempted usurpers). These very public examples of in-fighting have clearly left the Labour constituency somewhat bitter, with the feeling that Labour may be too busy with internal friction to commit itself properly to representing the electorate.

*(13) "disgraceful change of leadership after voting", "the way they attack other parties", "dissenting factions", "disparate, not cohesive, unstable", "infighting".*

Helen Clark is targeted for individual criticism. While other party leaders (and ex-Labour leaders) tend to be referred to in the positive by their party's supporters, Helen Clark is the only one who is seen as failing to live up to the party's image. *(14) "Helen endeavouring to be more like Michael J Savage".* Unfortunately some of the criticism has more to do with appearance than competence.

#### **Labour Party values:**

Above all (and despite the negatives) Labour has a social conscience, it is caring, compassionate, and fairer to all.

*(15) "people who at least start out caring", "people with [a] social conscience", "hopefully still have the values of considering people", "the country caring for each other", "good at heart".*

There is a clear emphasis on collective (social responsibility) versus individual (defined in terms of self-interest) orientation- *(16) "collective responsibility", "community values c/f individual wealth values".* The Labour party is motivated by and supportive of social justice, and the service of those who up till now have not been represented.

#### **Alliance Party representation:**

As with Labour party representation (and unlike National) the groups the Alliance represents are mentioned explicitly. Here there is a strong emphasis on diversity; the Alliance represents not only economically underprivileged, but also socially, deprived groups, with specific reference to Maori and homosexuals.

*(17) "Ordinary people", "A broad range of voters- gay, Maori, women, low income etc", "Maori, green... other racial minorities", "people interested in social justice issues: -environmental protection and sustainability, -recognition of historical injustices to Maori under the treaty", "the disparate members that make up society", "The average working man", "lower to middle class".*

The common reference to the **(18)** *"average working person"* points to the overlap in the target constituencies of the two parties with the Alliance courting the traditional Labour blue collar constituency, as well as other disadvantaged and disaffected groups for whom Labour has been the traditional advocate. The diversity of the groups represented is considered a dynamic and important attribute.

The second component of Alliance representation is environmental interests.

**Alliance Party values:**

The Alliance is prized for the diversity both of its constituency but also for its own diversity. As mentioned previously the Alliance is exactly that, comprising New Labour (whose leader Jim Anderton is the leader of the Alliance), the Greens, the Liberal party, and Mana Motuhake (a Maori political party). The Alliance therefore is perceived as representing a spectrum of different interests, combined in a truly democratic mixture.

*(19) "diverse range of people working towards common political goals", "consensus decision making", "leadership and unity", "the feeling of fellowship" , "A good blend of people, philosophies".*

The Alliance coalition of parties involved is seen to represent the heterogeneity of New Zealand in general.

The Alliance is in touch with the average New Zealander, and similar to Labour is seen as caring, and oriented towards the good of the community, not individuals. More than caring they are passionate and angry about the state of the nation and its people, and they are outspoken in their criticism of the status quo. They are morally and unselfishly supportive of the down-trodden and unconcerned about political self-aggrandisement. The Alliance prizes people over monetary

wealth.

*(20) "caring", "human values rather than monetary ones, community values", "have the best interests of the people at heart", "They have a moral reference point rather than a political one".*

The Alliance clearly represents a return to a fairer social system, and equal distribution of resources. If Alliance and Labour represent a return to a system of social welfare over-dependence (for National voters) then the National regime has meant a swing to the other extreme where people are neglected in favour of the almighty buck.

*(21) "Basic economic growth with equal regard for social responsibility of government", "fairness", "equality", "more equal distribution of our resources for the average person".*

Not only do Labour and the Alliance offer a change for the better, they offer a return to a better and simpler way of life, where people mean more than money. Once more monetary values are contrasted with community/ collective values.

*(22) "human values rather than monetary ones, community values"*

## **PART 2: Dis-preferred Parties**

This second part of the analysis examines the themes that are used by respondents who dislike each of the focus parties. It should be noted that supporters of different parties (ie. National and Labour) may dislike the same group (ie. the Alliance) and are analysed together. Where there is a difference in attribution across groups regarding the same party it will be highlighted.

### **National Party detractors:**

If National party supporters acknowledge (even tacitly) that their preferred party does not represent everyone then its detractors are even more narrow in their description of National representation. National clearly represents an older privileged minority, and the privilege of those groups is firmly centred around monetary favour. There is no mention of ethnicity, even among the 60 Maori respondents.

(23) *"Rich people", "upper class people", "Queen street farmers, business roundtable", "Business suited people sipping Latte at an outdoor cafe in the city", "well dressed elderly women with blue rinses"*.

National represents (24) *"Inherited money"*, which is an elegant counterpoint to the National supporters claims to self-reliance, of helping those that help themselves. Clearly while National supporters feel that everyone plays by the same rules, supporters of the left leaning parties make it clear that some groups are advantaged from the start.

There is a distinction to be made between the image that Labour, as opposed to Alliance supporters, hold of National. For Labour supporters, National ignores the economically underprivileged (poor people, those on welfare, unemployed) and socially underprivileged groups (gays, women, ethnic minorities) , while Alliance supporters feel that National ignores socially underprivileged groups (gays, particularly ethnic minorities, particularly Maori).

The National party is greedy, their politicians and their constituency are selfish, and their policy is self-serving. National aims to preserve the status-quo while the opposition parties favour a fairer distribution of resources.

While National may represent pain before gain, it's not them (or the privileged group they represent) that's feeling the pain. National is frequently referred to as divorced from reality, and (25) *"arrogant"*.

#### **National party values:**

The National party does not care. Money comes before people (versus pain before gain). The Government places too much emphasis on (26) *"individual wealth values"* versus (Labour) *"Collective responsibility"* and *"social conscience"*. In contrast, the opposition parties are more caring, and are not so removed from their constituency (27) *"out of step with real NZer's, no concept of what it is like to struggle"*.

The criticism of National as favouring monetary success over social support is typified by the

perception that National courts overseas favour (encourages investment), and that they are too busy making New Zealand look good for foreign investors to take notice of the pain their economic and social reforms has caused.

**Labour detractors:**

The Labour party is seen by its most ardent detractors as representing exclusively minorities, and these minorities are presented in a distinctly negative manner. Group labels are perjorative and frequently conform to stereotypes about those groups.

*(28) "Radicals, unionists, left-leaning people", "vocal minority groups, bigoted feminists/maori", "union, minority interests, politically correct", "Looking after Maoris too much, knuckling under to them".*

The Labour party has *(29) "sold the working man out"*. Particularly amongst the older voters (45+) there is some sympathy for Labour, some of whom refer back to the golden age of social democracy in New Zealand. Amongst this group Labour is seen as having the right intentions but being unable to execute them effectively.

*(30) "They know what they want, but don't know how to achieve it...pity really", "The workers. Put health & education as top values. How good it used to be before the unions & welfare got out of control", "those people that National are forgetting- the genuinely in need of social welfare help".*

The faults that characterise Labour for its supporters are emphasised by those who least favour Labour. Labour is criticised for being excessively critical and prone to infighting, and therefore not competent to fulfil their mandate as politicians.

*(31) "argumentative- they only ever seem to criticize other parties to make themselves look better", "too busy putting others down", "complete failure to give credit where credit is due", "personal attacks to shoot down policy ideas etc but offer no alternative".*

The interpretation of representation is different from that attributed to favoured parties, with cynicism that Labour only pretends to represent anyone, or that they will only do so until those

people vote for them. Thus the Labour party is expedient, they represent **(32)** *"anyone who will help them get the vote", "those people that National are forgetting- the genuinely in need of social welfare help- but this will change as soon as they're in power, like it has before", "whatever sells the votes, tell the people what they want to hear"*.

There is a clear cynicism that is not evident in attributions to favoured parties. There is a concern that the major parties are simply reflections of each other, and that apparent differences are purely superficial. The motives of Labour and its politicians are questioned, with the implication being that Labour (as a party that has played no part in Government since 1990) are desperately seeking election to give them the power they currently lack.

**(33)** *"forever seeking to give first place to personal desires of popularity", "The party represents individuals who want individual power", "self before country", "they only think of themselves"*.

A number of these respondents emphasise the individual self-interest of Labour politicians (as opposed to social justice, or collective responsibility) as the driving force the party.

Predictably, if Labour supporters are at best ambivalent towards Helen Clark then the opposition is even less positive.

**(34)** *"Helen Clarks voice! Her hair! and her bright suits!", "Helen Frankenstein!", "Helen Clark shouldn't be the leader of the Labour party", "do not like their leader"*.

#### **Alliance Party detractors:**

There is clear acknowledgment that the Alliance represents those who fall somewhere between Labour and National, in fact Labour and National are presented somewhat as two sides of the same coin.

**(35)** *"people who are unhappy with the present government", "those dissatisfied with the Labour & National application of government"*.

More frequently (and more pejoratively) the Alliance is considered by supporters of parties of

both the left and right as representing an extreme minority of the population. Alliance representation is the epitome of welfare dependence so disliked by National supporters, though welfare consumers (in today's parlance) play a much more active role than is implied by welfare dependence. Their motivation is overwhelmingly negative.

*(36) "minority's", "trendy lefties, peaceniks and those who see the world through rose tinted glasses", "welfare people", "whingers, opportunists, loony left", "opportunists, and fomenters of class division", "Free loading whingers".*

The Alliance is obviously perceived as appealing to extremists, to the disaffected and to freeloading bludgers.

While the collective nature of the Alliance can be interpreted as favouring diversity, and a wide experiential background, National and Labour supporters question the unity of five disparate parties.

*(37) "enthusiastic, but each section pushes their own barrow"*

**Alliance party values:**

The Alliance represents a return to the bad old days, *(38) "back to the old Labour style-unions etc", a "party still stuck in [the] 60's", "has beens, muddled, backward looking, 1970's economics"*. The irony is of course that this is the bad old days of Labour's heyday. Not only does it appear that some traditional Labour supporters favour the Alliance, but some traditional Labour opposition has come to dislike Alliance more. The Alliance, it would seem, has out-Laboured Labour. The symbols traditionally associated with Labour have been co-opted by the Alliance (Jim Anderton "I didn't leave Labour, Labour left me").

Ultimately the Alliance is conceived of as the resurrected spirit of socialism and therefore in opposition to National, and any conservative agenda.

Perhaps predictably, the Alliance is seen by National supporters as politically and economically naive, and by both National and Labour as lacking in experience and expertise. *(39) "woolly*

*economics", "economically illiterate", " a right old mixture of sensible and way-outs trading off to produce economic disaster".*

A frequent criticism of the Alliance, made by National supporters, is that their economic policy will see New Zealand sliding backwards economically with reference to economic indicators. **(40)** *"economic simpletons", "with some of their policies I think inflation would become too high", "higher inflation, and higher tax", "a party that will blow all the hard financial gains NZ has made over the last decade".*

The clear dimension of comparison is economic for both Labour and National supporters. Labour and National supporters are united in their lack of confidence in the Alliance to effectively manage the economy.

The Alliance does not promote self-reliance, and their agenda and policies are actively based on encouraging dependence. **(41)** *"small thinkers looking for govt handouts", "freeloaders", "a mishmash of ideas founded on the principle that "they are owed a living"", "those unwilling to assist themselves"., "encouraging dependency", and this will be at the expense of "everyone who works hard has to pay more taxes".*

While the same criticism is made of Labour by National supporters, it is more typically ascribed to the Alliance- if National represents self-reliance as a way to achieve freedom then the Alliance means (a return to) **(42)** *"state interference in most aspects of life".*

Ironically Labour criticisms of the Alliance bear a remarkable resemblance to those of National supporters. For example, the Alliance is seen as being too diverse even for Labour supporters, they represent **(43)** *"limited groups", "too many different groups", "a weak alliance of very different people who would be a disaster in government", "too many different viewpoints in one party".* If the Alliance is united it is as *"freeloading whingers"*. The Alliance is even accused of **(44)** *"living in the past", "feel they are looking back instead of forward (Nat supporter)", "Alliance represents the bad ideas of many years ago (Nat)", "backward looking, 1970's economics (Nat)", "a real cloth cap, 1930's socialist image".*



This last is interesting. The Alliance is very strongly identified as liberal or radical, which is described (in the LibCon question) as being associated with forward thinking, broad-mindedness. This does not fit with the frequent criticism of Alliance policy as old fashioned.

### **Labour versus Alliance**

Given the common ground between the Alliance and Labour, in both their members and constituency, it is particularly interesting to highlight the group of people who favour one but dislike the other. That is to say Labour or Alliance supporters who dislike each other more than the ideological antithesis of their parties, National.

As an alternative to the Alliance, Labour is seen by it's supporters as a less extreme alternative to National, (45) *"Want all people to have a fair go at life without going to extremes of welfarism & dependence on the state (as might Alliance)", "won't go to extremes that Alliance might & so destroy economic gains that are now appearing (?) after 10 years of pain"*. For at least one respondent these glimpses of economic success are not grounds for supporting the National party, though they should not be endangered by gung-ho socialism. On the other hand, Alliance supporters see Labour as having sold-out their traditional support and make little distinction between Labour and National beyond that.

Both Labour and Alliance supporters favour fairer distribution of resources than currently occurs at present (the Nats support the status quo, ie. favour themselves). There is little if any middle ground, National supporters claim Labour and the Alliance pander too much to lower socio-economic groups, while Labour and Alliance supporters claim that New Zealand's wealth is too centralised in the hands of upper socio-economic groups. Both groups of supporters claim their favoured party represents the majority of New Zealanders , and that the opposition leans too much towards the upper or lower end (characterised in extremely negative terms).

## DISCUSSION

Before discussing the actual themes derived from the survey responses it is appropriate to briefly consider a number of broader characteristics of the discourse provided. Firstly the replies are elicited as a monologue (this is no two way conversation) but they function dialogically, as if they were part of an extended interaction. This illustrates the earlier suggestion that such discourses are more than just "simple, unintrusive, neutral reflectors of real process located elsewhere." (Wetherell & Potter, 1988, p. 168). Rather discourse does things, be it justifying preference or making accusations. It is this constructive function of discourse that justifies a more flexible (and interpretative) analytic approach than traditional thematic content analysis which aims primarily to elucidate manifest themes as analytic categories as outlined in the analysis presented above. The aim of this discussion then is to draw together these themes by illustration of the functions that they serve as interpretative repertoires (Wetherell & Potter, 1988).

The expectation that representation categories of preferred parties are defined so as to encompass a majority of the electorate as possible is partially confirmed. Proponents of all three parties identify those parties as representing at least the majority of the general populace, with important qualifications given for each of the major parties. National represents the majority though not all of New Zealand, acknowledging that National does not represent the less well off. Both Labour and the Alliance represent New Zealand as a whole, with special attention to specific, under-privileged groups. For Labour those groups are primarily economically deprived, while the Alliance represents socially deprived groups. This distinction is borne out by Alliance and Labour proponents who least prefer National, with Alliance proponents seeing National as representing socially privileged (eg. EX23 "upper class people"), and Labour proponents identifying National representation as primarily financially advantaged (eg. EX23 "Rich people"). Where Labour and Alliance are presented by their supporters as virtuous because they specifically address minority interests, National supporters see their party as virtuous for not 'pandering' to minorities.

There is a clear trend for respondents to identify the groups their preferred party represents as those their least preferred party neglects, while their dis-preferred party over-represents one group. They all claim their party represents a majority, and the opposition a minority. Additionally there are differences in the levels of specificity and differentiation of representation groups both

between supporters of the main parties but also between preferred and dis-preferred party attributions. Most clearly there is a greater degree of differentiation made by supporters of Labour and the Alliance for the groups their parties represent with a greater number of groups specifically named, while National representation is characterised through broad generally inclusive terms. However, National adherents do differentiate specific groups when asked to describe the representation of their least preferred party.

It should be clear that the responses to the survey are more than simple statements about the perceptions of the respondent concerning their preferred party. The discourse presented constructs as favourable an identity for the party ( and at the same time that of the respondent) as possible, presented in such a way as to discredit implied counter positions.

Though the survey question specifically probed for representation groups and values they are clearly not independent. The values for which preferred parties stand are utilised rhetorically to justify their perceptions of the people for whom the parties stand. Thus the fact that National promotes self-reliance can be used to discredit the minority of people that National fails to represent. After all National does "provide social support for those in real need", therefore if National does not provide social support for any groups or individuals they do not really need it. This is illustrated most cogently with reference to the groups that National supporters see the opposition parties as representing, those groups are the ones that National does not represent, those who claim welfare support but do not need it. The motivations of non-represented groups are laziness and self-interest (eg. EX36 "free loading whingers"). National may oppose welfare dependence but people on welfare are presented as actively seeking a handout, theirs is an active role much different from the passivity implied by "welfare dependence". This characterization serves a number of purposes, to negatively stereotype those who National does not obviously represent, and to minimize the size of that group of 'needy' New Zealanders.

The values of the parties, as presented by their supporters, appear to differ most in their endorsement of equality and diversity for Labour and Alliance, and freedom, self-reliance, and stability for National. Importantly, freedom and equality are the two value constellations indicated by Rokeach (1973) as underlying traditional left-right/ liberal-conservative ideology. When one considers the mean liberal-conservative self-identification scores of the different parties

supporters it appears that those favouring parties representing equality and diversity have mean self-identification scores tending towards the liberal end of the scale (3.24 for Alliance, 3.15 for Labour) while endorsement of a party representing freedom and self-reliance is associated with more conservative self-identification (4.66 for National).

The combination of the promotion of self-reliance (and the associated rewards), freedom (be it freedom of the market place or freedom of choice), and meritocracy as ideals, contrasted with opposition to "welfare dependence", and the negative motivation (laziness, greed, etc) attributed to welfare recipients clearly go beyond a simple exposition of the values for which a particular party is seen to stand. This synthesis tells a 'story' about National and its supporters that is clearly part of a family of concepts referred to by Sidanius (1993) as legitimising myths. According to Sidanius legitimising myths are repertoires of "attitudes, values, beliefs, or ideologies that provide moral and intellectual support to and justification for the group-based hierarchical social structure and the unequal distribution of value in social systems" (p.207). Clearly this contrast of self-reliance against welfare dependence functions in this context as a legitimising myth justifying the ruling position (the mandate) of the National Government. National party supporters are not only justifying their preference for the party but are also justifying that party's (and by extension its constituents') position in the social and political hierarchy. This in turn, ties in with the findings of the previous study, where a conservative ideological position was associated with hierarchy enhancement, and the liberal position with hierarchy attenuation.

By comparison there is no similar complex or coherent story synthesised by supporters of the left. The concepts utilised by these supporters are much more atomic (and isolated from each other) with an overriding theme of support for equality and redress of the status-quo. An additional theme is used by a number of opposition supporters against National, not only is the National constituency insulated from the effects of National government reforms by their privileged position but that position itself does not result from self-reliance- rather it is inherited wealth, old money that allows them their position. The people National represents are themselves, by a different definition, "bludgers".

Both Labour and Alliance oppose a status-quo which advantages the already advantaged by promoting equality, and fair distribution of New Zealand resources. This does not mean that

Alliance and Labour supporters do not attribute importance to the economy. While National party supporters clearly consider the economy an important factor in determining quality of representation in the preferred party this is not the case for Labour and Alliance supporters. However, the importance of the economic/monetary dimension is clear in the context of comparison. Labour supporters who dislike the Alliance do so on a number of grounds, the primary reason being that Labour (EX45) *"won't go to extremes that Alliance might & so destroy economic gains that are now appearing (?) after 10 years of pain"*. As well as highlighting that the economy is a dimension of comparison for Labour supporters, this also illustrates that some aspects of preference may only be apparent in certain contexts.

As was to become clear in the election campaign Labour was stuck with a problem as far as economic credibility was concerned. While National vigorously promoted a programme of tax cuts to be implemented after the election, made possible by improvements in the economy and a record surplus, Labour was unable to present an effective alternative. While the Alliance was able to simply deny that there was any economic revival, Labour was in the position of wanting to point out that it was their post-1984 reforms that laid the foundation for any recovery, but to do so also re-opened the wounds of those most negatively affected. A matter of months before the election Labour went so far as to apologise for the reforms instituted under Roger Douglas, an attempt to distance themselves from a symbol acting powerfully against them. Other examples of failed attempts at symbolic manipulation are Mike Moore's frequent reference to the founder of the New Zealand welfare state, Michael Joseph Savage, and Jim Bolger's promises to return New Zealand to the 'Decent Society' it had been before the fourth Labour government.

On the one hand Mike Moore's intent was to remind the traditional Labour vote of the reasons they had always supported Labour, and indicate that after the perceived betrayal of the 1984 Labour government the party had returned to its roots. In reality, the timing was too close to the events themselves and Moore's exhortations rung hollow. In the same election Bolger's promise of a decent society must be argued as at odds with their proposed programme of welfare spending cuts and sweeping reforms. The catch cry of the 'decent society' was to come to haunt Bolger as voters asked 'where is the decent society now?'

In summary, a number of different themes were apparent in the party representations elicited

using open-ended questions. There were clear differences in the construction of each party's constituency- who they purport to represent, with both Alliance and Labour supporters offering more complex representation groups. These different constructions function rhetorically to justify the preference of the respondent, and reflect pejoratively on others not sharing that preference. Party values are marked by a distinction between freedom and self-reliance for National, and equality and diversity for Labour and Alliance.

## **PART TWO**

### **Values, political discourse, and political preference**

“So what are the values underlying the political parties’ Tweedledumb and Tweedledumber policies? What are they trying to achieve? There is no economic objective. The objective is simply popularity and to win votes.” Richard Prebble, leader of ACT (1996, p.108)

## CHAPTER SIX

### HUMAN VALUES AND POLITICAL PREFERENCE

The previous chapter reported two studies using open-ended questions to probe the representational content of political ideology, and political parties. Respondents in both studies identified a number of components to both. Of particular interest is the use of values to define the concept of ideology, as well as the political parties most and least preferred by the respondents. In both studies respondents differentiated preference for different preferences using the values of equality and freedom. In study one respondents attributed equality and freedom differentially to the two ideological positions of conservative and liberal. Additionally, as shown by the finding that National party supporters report higher SDO scores than Alliance and Labour supporters, there is a clear difference in the level of endorsement of egalitarian values. In study two respondents differentiated between most and least preferred parties by their relative support for these two values (among other concepts). Given the theoretical role played by values as the core of symbolic politics, and the findings so far, it is appropriate at this point to consider the role of values in political preference in greater depth. Verkuyten (1995) contends that it is the values that a political symbol embodies that arouses the emotions of the symboliser. In other words, there has to be some degree of congruence between the value content attributed to a political symbol (eg. freedom and the American flag) and the values held of the perceiver before that symbol has meaning for the perceiver.

From the previous two studies it appears that there are a number of values that may be implicated in political symbolism and preference. Among these values are freedom, equality, stability, and change. So far the term 'values' has not been formally defined. Perhaps the most frequently cited definition of what constitutes a human value is offered by Rokeach (1973) as an "enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of existence" (p.5). Rokeach conceptualised two types of values; beliefs about desirable modes of action which he referred to as instrumental values (eg., Honest, imaginative, Independent) , and beliefs about desirable end-states referred to as terminal values (eg. Freedom, equality, Family Security). According to this scheme instrumental values are the mode through which terminal values may be achieved; the means to the end.



Rokeach argued that considered together, values form values systems where a value system is “an enduring organisation of beliefs concerning preferable modes of conduct or end-states of existence along a continuum of importance” (1973, p.5). Thus the importance of different values should co-vary with the importance of others in the value system. Human values are strongly prescriptive in nature and form the core around which other less enduring beliefs are organised. As such they are important in a range of other processes. For example, the formation of specific attitudes is presumed to be predicated upon more general values.

This conceptualisation has been utilised in the investigation of a wide range of attitudes, and has been enthusiastically supported by consumer researchers using human values to predict product preference across a wide range of domains (Allen, 1997).

### VALUES AND POLITICS

The relationship between value systems and political preference has been subject to investigation since the heyday of social psychological values research in the late 60’s and early 70’s. Rokeach (1973) reports a series of studies intended to support a Two-Value model of politics, presented as an alternative to the more traditional left-right or radical-conservative typology. Rokeach argued that the traditional left-right continuum was not sufficient to differentiate (or make comparisons) between all the varieties of political ideologies active at the time. In its place, Rokeach proposed that the minimum dimensions necessary to describe different ideologies was two, and set out on a programme of research intended to establish that different orientations towards the values of freedom and equality described these ideologies.

Table 6.1  
Rokeach’s (1973) Two-Value Model.

Political orientations	Relative importance of:	
	Freedom	Equality
Liberal Democratic, Socialist	High	High
Conservative, Right-Wing (eg. John Birch Society)	High	Low
Communist	Low	High
Nazi, Fascist	Low	Low

According to Rokeach, adherents of different political philosophies differ in their relative support

for these two values as summarised in table 6.1 above. He supported the contention of the relative importance of freedom and equality based on a content analysis of the writings of the written works of ideologues commonly accepted as typifying different political persuasions. Rokeach and his colleagues selected as representative of communist, capitalist, fascist, and socialist orientations the writings of Lenin, Goldwater, Hitler, and a number of socialist writers (The argument being that no one individual was sufficiently prototypical). A number of raters content analysed the four 25,000 word excerpts, making frequency counts of the occurrence of sentences containing synonyms for all of Rokeach's terminal and instrumental values. The final analysis compared the relative frequency rankings of all the values for each of the exemplars.

The overall importance of freedom and equality was illustrated by the finding that they accounted for 45 percent of all terminal value occurrences. The relative frequencies seemed to support Rokeach's two-value model with the freedom and equality being ranked first and second (out of seventeen terminal values) most frequent respectively in the socialist excerpts, sixteenth and seventeenth for the Hitler (fascist) excerpts, first and sixteenth for Goldwater (capitalist), and seventeenth and first for Lenin (communist).

Rous and Lee (1978) repeated Rokeach's investigation based on the writings of exclusively American authors. Books by William Buckley, Staughton Lynd and Thomas Hayden, George Rockwell, and William Douglas were selected to represent conservative Republican, Communist, Nazist, and liberal Democratic orientations respectively. The authors found considerable variation in the endorsement of Freedom and Equality that was generally consistent with the thesis of Rokeach. In a similar vein Mahoney, Coogee, and Banks (1984) conducted content analyses of American presidential inaugural addresses. Analyses indicated that Freedom and Equality defined two basic dimensions underlying the themes of the addresses.

Levine (1978) applied the two-value model in a content analysis of a selection of New Zealand political party programmes. Simple frequency counts of the eighteen terminal values, including freedom and equality, specified by Rokeach (1973) were calculated. Given the variations in the amount of campaign material for the different parties Levine rank ordered the frequency counts of the eighteen values for each party. National ranked freedom first, and equality second, while Labour ranked equality first and freedom third. The smaller parties sampled were differentiated to

a greater extent with Social credit citing freedom and equality first and third, Socialist Unity fourth and first, and the Values Party endorsing the two values second and eighth respectively. Given the lack of parliamentary representation of the smaller parties it would appear that the middle ground of NZ politics at the time as characterised by Labour and National as system-supporting centre parties.

This chapter then, is devoted to a detailed investigation of the role values may play in political perception and preference. This investigation examines the speeches of political elites, the value attributions made by survey respondents of the major parties, and prediction of respondent preference based on the values they hold to be important. The final study of this thesis takes an applied perspective in attempting to explain some of the successes and failures of the different election campaigns with an experimental study looking at the effect of political adverts on party value representations

### **STUDY ONE: Values as symbols in political rhetoric**

Results from study one, the content analysis of open ended descriptions of preferred/ dis-preferred parties, suggest that freedom and equality, at least superficially, are important in the New Zealand political environment. However the difference in relative endorsement of the two values by National and Labour found by Levine (1978), which we would expect to be greater than found, would lead us to categorise both National and Labour as approximately equally socialist in ideological orientation (high freedom, high equality). While in retrospect this might be consistent with the political styles of the parties at the time (heavily protectionist, consensus on the importance of the welfare state, etc) it suggests that the New Zealand political environment is too homogeneous to make a thorough test of the two-value hypothesis. With that in mind it was deemed appropriate to repeat the exercise in the post-MMP environment.

The expectation that the change of electoral system would encourage a greater variety of political entities to seek parliamentary mandates was fulfilled, with six parties winning representation in the first post-MMP parliament. The successful parties represent a more diverse parliament than at any previous time, and offer a more complete test of the two-value model in New Zealand politics.

Previous content analyses have been analytically limited in that, typically, examples of discourse are selected from only a few sources (however typical those sources may be of particular political viewpoints). This has meant that sophisticated statistical techniques have not been employed in analysis as samples fail to meet important assumptions. For example, Rokeach's (1973) analysis of political writings involved examination of the relative rankings of terminal and instrumental values precluding analytic flexibility. Therefore, for the purposes of this study a more flexible approach was desirable, and the selection of samples from a number of sources (representing the different political parties) was intended to allow for more rigorous investigation of the freedom-equality hypothesis.

Similarly, while analyses of this type originally provided support for Rokeach's two-value model they have been limited to comparisons of the political discourses of either important international figures, or of exclusively American political figures. Thus, when the two-value model has been tested in other countries by evaluating the endorsement of freedom and equality in voting populations the assumption has been made that the same values of freedom and equality underlie the ideologies examined by Rokeach (1973). It is assumed that parties from the same ideological family but in different countries differ on the same values when it may be the case that parties from different cultures but commonly labelled together may in fact express their ideological position through endorsement of values other than freedom and equality.

## METHOD

### DATA COLLECTION

Data for this exercise comprised of the 93 (13 Alliance, 28 Labour, 17 NZ First, 27 National, 8 Act) Address-in-Reply speeches given at the opening of the parliamentary session following the 1996 election. As only one United New Zealand candidate, Peter Dunne, had survived the election that one speech was omitted from further analysis. The Address-in-Reply debate contests the motion that the proposed government has the confidence of a majority of the elected party representatives in the House. Each speaker is allowed 15 minutes (with the possibility of extension if there is no objection) to present a contribution, the content of which is relatively open (and indeed need not strictly follow party guidelines). The address in reply speeches are commonly used to outline the members' vision for the term of their office as well as vilify the opposition.

Transcripts of the speeches are contained in the New Zealand weekly Hansard, the official record of New Zealand parliamentary debates. Parliamentary debates have been transcribed from audio recordings of the parliamentary session, and are authorised as accurate by each speaker before printing. These transcripts were first photocopied, and then converted into a computer readable format using optical scanner and optical character recognition software. The final product comprised a word processor file of 218,349 words, with speeches averaging just over 2300 words.

### ANALYSIS

Synonyms for freedom and equality were located from a number of sources. Appropriate synonyms were taken from Billig's (1978) value content analysis of fascist propaganda and Rokeach's (1973) original content-analytic tests of the two-value model. Additional synonyms were obtained from prominent authors on the topics of freedom and equality: Berlin (1958), Dixon (1986).

Values and their related synonyms were located using the word finding functions of the word processor 'Microsoft Word' and a tally kept of their occurrence for each speaker. Each synonym was considered in the context in which it occurred and was only counted if its use in that context was consonant with either value.

## RESULTS

### THEMES

Though the inferential statistics in this study focus on the frequency of two values, freedom and equality, it is appropriate to devote some time to the actual context and usage of these values. In both cases these values were referred to in two ways- the endorsement of the value, and criticism of the negation of the value. For example, those MPs who endorsed equality and fairness (positive equality) were also likely to criticise favouritism, exploitation, and discrimination (negative equality). Similarly, those who endorsed freedom, autonomy, voluntary participation, and choice (positive freedom) were likely to criticise the use of compulsion, force, and legislative restriction (negative freedom). There were very few examples of MPs being critical of freedom or equality, in fact the only examples of criticism of positive values came from ACT and the Alliance. For example, ACT speakers denounced the teacher pay regime in which, it was argued, bad teachers were able to earn as much as bad teachers while Alliance speakers decried the freedom availed to overseas investors by the government to purchase shareholding in state resources, thereby depriving the people of New Zealand of the future value of these resources.

Many references were couched in evocative terms. As the examples give above show, freedom became liberty, equality became fairness. Deprivation of freedom became slavery and compulsion. Deprivation of equality became discrimination and exploitation.

Throughout, speakers represent themselves as champions of positive value, and opponents of the negative. To different degrees (as illustrated in the inferential results below) MPs tend to stand for positive value and oppose the negation of these values. For example, if National represents freedom then National MPs denounce Labour, the Alliance, and New Zealand First as wishing to deprive New Zealanders of their freedom to decide and to earn. Where the Alliance represents fairness and equality, National, New Zealand First (and even Labour) are criticised as seeking to deprive New Zealanders of a fair go. In some cases the lines become blurred- where does equality of opportunity stop being the freedom to achieve? Though few examples arose in the discourse used, it is apparent that these two values are not as distinct in their usage as they are in psychological theory. Attention needs to be paid not only to the frequency of usage, but also the manner of usage of potent values such as freedom and equality.

## STATISTICAL ANALYSES




Figure 6.1: Mean occurrence of combined values per speech by party

Figure 6.1 shows the mean number of value references (freedom and equality combined) made by the representatives of each party. On average, the Alliance and Act speakers make more value references (freedom and equality combined) than do Labour, NZ First and National Speakers. A one-way ANOVA shows that the parties differ significantly in their value references ( $F(4,86)=2.39$ ,  $p<.05$ ), with Tukey range tests indicating that Alliance speakers make more value references than do Labour speakers.

It was found that frequencies of occurrence of each value were uncorrelated ( $r=.02$ ,  $p=.44ns$ ). The frequencies of each value for speakers from each party were analysed using MANOVA. This showed main effects for party ( $F(4,86)=2.64$ ,  $p<.05$ ) and value type ( $F(1,88)=10.13$ ,  $p<.01$ ), as well as a significant party by value interaction ( $F(4,86)=6.27$ ,  $p<.01$ ). Overall, freedom values occurred more frequently than equality values ( $mean_{freedom}=5.96$ ,  $mean_{equality}=3.70$ ) and post hoc tests indicated that Act speakers used freedom values more frequently than their Labour counterparts ( $mean_{Act}=9.75$ ,  $mean_{Labour}=3.32$ ), with Alliance, NZ First and National falling in between. Similarly, Alliance speakers used equality values more frequently than all other parties.




Figure 6.2: Average occurrence of Freedom and Equality value references for each party (A)

Figure 6.2 shows a graph of the mean number of value occurrences in speeches by MPs of the major parties. Act, National, and NZ First politicians made reference to freedom values than equality values, while Alliance and Labour politicians showed the reverse pattern. Other than Labour, representatives of the other parties appear to clearly favour one value over another.

Figure 6.3 below shows the same data but with the parties ordered across the bottom axis in order by which they might be considered to fall from liberal (or left-wing) to conservative (right-wing). This is consistent with the ideological identification findings presented in chapter five, study one.






Figure 6.3: Average occurrence of Freedom and Equality value references for each party (B)

There is a general trend for increasing reference of each value to follow the common perception of the party's places on the left-right dimension. For example as mean frequency of equality references increases the parties are increasingly left wing, while (with the exception of the Alliance) the pattern is reversed for Freedom references.

In order to test the statistical discriminatory power of the two values, the freedom and equality frequencies were used as predictors of political party representation using discriminant analysis.

The two discriminant functions obtained both achieved statistical significance with the first accounting for 79.3% of the between-groups variance ( $\chi^2(8)=36.95$ ,  $p<.001$ ) and the second accounting for 20.7% ( $\chi^2(3)=8.41$ ,  $p<.001$ ). The correlations between the predictor variables and the two canonical discriminant functions (referred to as discriminant loadings) were  $-.388$  and  $.926$  for Freedom, and  $.957$  and  $.303$  for Equality.

Clearly, equality defines the first function while freedom defines the second function. Therefore the relative endorsement of equality and, to a lesser extent, freedom can successfully differentiate between the party representatives. Consideration of the group centroids (the group average on each function) shows that the first (equality) function discriminates most strongly between the parties, with the parties falling in right-left ideological order. The Alliance is most clearly delineated by this function. There is less spread on function two (freedom) which is consistent with its explaining the lesser amount of classification variance.




Figure 6.4: Discriminant map derived from MDA analysis of Freedom/Equality references

Additionally, the two significant functions derived accurately predicted 43% of the cases. This may be compared with the classification rate we might expect to occur at a chance level. If all five parties were equally represented that would be 20%, however as this is not the case it is appropriate to use the proportional chance rate (Hair et al, 1995) which weights the chance according to the unequal group sizes. In this case the proportional chance criterion is 23.9 or approximately 24%. Thus the obtained classification rate is significantly better than that expected at the chance level (Press's  $Q=29.71$ ,  $p<.001$ ).

Table 6.2

Classification table indicating speakers correctly classified on freedom/equality references

		Predicted Party				
		Alliance	Labour	NZ First	National	Act
Actual Party	Alliance	<b>6 (50%)</b>	5 (41.7%)	1 (8.3%)	0(0%)	0 (0%)
	Labour	3 (10.7%)	<b>17 (60.7%)</b>	2 (7.1%)	5 (17.9%)	1 (3.6%)
	NZ First	2 (12.5%)	8 (50%)	<b>1 (6.3%)</b>	1 (6.3%)	4 (25%)
	National	1 (3.7%)	10 (37%)	1 (3.7%)	<b>9 (33.3%)</b>	6 (22.2%)
	Act	0 (0%)	1 (12.5%)	0 (0%)	1 (12.5%)	<b>6 (75%)</b>

The classification table is reproduced in table 6.2 and shows the number of representatives that are correctly classified to the right party (note that the bold diagonal indicates the speakers correctly classified). The discriminant functions obtained provide equal or better than 50% classification of Alliance, Labour and Act speakers while there is considerable confusion in the classification of National and NZ First speakers. National speakers are spread across the parties with more than half of the NZ First speakers being misclassified with the parties of the left (and 50% to Labour).

## DISCUSSION

At the very least, the results of this content analysis provide some support for the contention that elite members of New Zealand's political parties differ in their endorsement of key values, in this case freedom and equality. Comparisons of the mean frequency of occurrence indicate that there are differences in endorsement of these two values, and that endorsement varies as a function of the value type, as well as speaker affiliation. The results of the discriminant analysis indicate that while both values are related to political affiliation, there is reason to believe that a difference in equality is the primary dimension of difference in this analysis.

Table 6.2 is particularly useful in interpreting the value orientations of the political parties. Just as Billig and Cochrane (1979) found in their analysis of extremists and potential extremists there is

little overlap in the value profiles of those at opposite ends of the political spectrum, in this case Act and the Alliance. This is illustrated by the relative infrequency of mis-classification of speakers from these two parties as members of other parties, and particularly in that no Alliance speakers are misclassified as Act speakers, and vice versa. Both NZ First and National speakers are mis-classified at a high rate. I am inclined to interpret this not as a limitation of the theory or analysis but rather (with knowledge of the context) as an indication that these parties (and particularly NZ First) are experiencing a period in which their identities as distinct parties may be unstable. As the units of analysis are speeches given by individual speakers one can conclude that National is a party comprised of a number of factions- those who wish to occupy more of the political centre (vying with Labour), A similar number who wish to retain a unique National position, and a smaller number favouring a move further move to the right (closer to the position of Act). On the other hand NZ First would appear to have more in common with Labour (with whom they were popularly considered most compatible) with half of the NZ First speakers being misclassified as Labour. The words of the late British Labour politician Aneurin Bevan would seem to sum up the position of NZ First; "We know what happens to people who stay in the middle of the road. They get run down" (1953, quoted in Jay, 1997, p.40).

These results also show illustrate the problems faced by the Labour party. Following an abortive coup lead by now deputy leader Michael Cullen, Labour poll support fell to the lowest point ever in the months leading up to the election (before regaining some of their support in a recovery attributed by political commentators to the make-over of Helen Clark). As the traditional party of the left they had suffered from the popularity of the Alliance, which had been able to carve off the more radical left support of Labour. The Alliance had also attracted the favour of welfare recipients who had been first gutted by the welfare reforms of the fourth Labour government then filleted by their continuation by National. Labour was unable to satisfactorily position itself in the eyes of voters- unable to claim the left wing without suffering identity conflict with the Alliance and unable to move too far to the centre and retain their traditional identity, their traditional symbols.

Of the parties analysed all but Labour showed some preference for equality over freedom or vice versa. Sidanius (1990) has argued that it may be impossible to hold freedom and equality as equally important without suffering important contradictions. The belief in equality must presuppose some negation of individual freedom, for example absolute wage equality will see

the individual denied the opportunity to earn more than their neighbour by working more hours than their neighbour. The equal endorsement of freedom and equality values by Labour may place them in a position leading to internal inconsistency in publicising their party platform. This is clearly the case with the Labour endorsement of free market reform while at the same time arguing for a more inclusive welfare policy.

The findings indicate that certainly the Alliance and probably Act (the sample of eight Act speeches being too small to draw a concrete conclusion) speakers make more references (freedom and equality combined) than do their colleagues from the other parties. Again, this is consistent with the expectation of Billig and Cochrane (1979) that extremist parties rely more on the symbolic aspect of values to mobilise their constituency. In doing so one assumes that their greater reliance on values (or the use of values in political rhetoric) is aimed at constituencies for whom values, or the symbolic and rhetorical content of values, is more extreme.

The misclassification of NZ First speakers (primarily into Labour) hint at one of the problems faced by a National-NZ First administration. For a number of reasons NZ First was generally expected to coalesce with Labour after the 1996 election. For example, Winston Peters had stated at a series of campaign rallies that only a vote for NZ First would remove National from government while the majority of NZ First candidates had expressed at least a weak preference for the Labour party. Certainly, parts of the coalition agreement reflected a desire for a more equitable division of the spoils of an improving economy, and it was this 'humanising' of the National party that NZ First banked on to retain the support of the thirteen percent of the population

The question remains as to whether freedom and equality are the best values with which to differentiate between the different orientations. Certainly both freedom and equality are required to maximally differentiate between party members, with a pattern that reflects the ideological position held by the parties. Once again it is equality that is the primary discriminator (accounting for almost 80% of the variance).

## VALUES IN ELITE POLITICAL DISCOURSE

An essential point to remember is that while this study presents a relatively descriptive analysis of the frequency of value references in parliamentary speeches, the implications go considerably further. It is not by chance that these parties endorse different values- it is by tradition and design that this comes to be. Rokeach (1973) has argued that equality and freedom are the foundation of modern political ideology because of the role they play in western democracies. That is to say that freedom and equality are not only important in political discourse. Indeed it is BECAUSE OF their social value that they are manipulated in political discourse.

As Rokeach (1973) has argued, freedom has characterised western democracy for centuries, and the quest for freedom has been manifest in any number of conflicts (eg. the American war of independence, opposition to slavery worldwide, free-trade interventions). Similarly, equality has played a significant role in defining the Australian and New Zealand national identity - Those that appear to stand out from the crowd elicit a swift negative response (Feather, 1990).

The social relevance of these values spills over into the political world as well- the social and political worlds are not separate. For the past seventy years the National party has spent more time as government than any other. At the time of the election, the National party was completing its second consecutive term in office, marked by a dramatic growth in the number of welfare recipients in the face of declining welfare spending, a growing disparity between the rich and poor in New Zealand, increasing privatisation and sale of state assets to overseas buyers, and many other concerns (Spoonley, Pearson, and Shirley, 1994). It is no surprise that the call for a return to a time of greater equality defines the political platforms of the opposition parties. Similarly, the National party is appealing to its constituency by emphasising the value that has aided their ascension in the past, They are free to achieve what they desire (though the opposition would point out that this comes at the expense of others). Freedom and Equality are not simply values but symbols themselves- they stand for something other than their strict denotation, they stand for the things that different constituencies desire.

This reflects the finding of chapter five, study one, that supporters of the opposition parties score lower on SDO than do National party supporters. This means that National party supporters favour a retention of the systems and conventions that perpetuate social division in favour of the

dominant group (defined by respondents in chapter five, study two, as farmers, business, people and the better off). On the other hand Labour, Alliance, and New Zealand First supporters favour reducing the gap between dominant and non-dominant groups (eg. racial and social minorities, the underprivileged). Sidanius (1993) contends that one mechanism through which perpetuation of a hierarchical social system is justified by the dominant group is the use and propagation of legitimising myths that make social hierarchy seem necessary. One example given by SDO researchers of such a myth is the meritocratic principle (that greater reward be a reflection of greater effort). Taking such a position allows one to argue that affirmative action policies are unfair not only to those who do not qualify for affirmative action but those who do as well (they may suffer from unfair expectations of which they may not be worthy). Such a position allows one to argue that the CEO of a large company deserves a salary higher than the average wage because they work harder than the average wage earner. Similarly, anyone who works deserves to be paid more than someone who is unemployed. This type of argument is clearly apparent in the discourse analysed here.

Historically, such myths have proven highly persuasive- and notoriously difficult to counter. Opposition to such positions almost by necessity requires the mobilisation of other values, in the above example a potential opposition between the freedom to earn as much as one is able, and rejection in favour of fair distribution of resources and wealth. Clearly, these values are mobilised through discourse and the simple frequency counts presented in the results of this study illustrate, albeit superficially, such a mobilisation. Paralleling the SDO scores of participants, National party respondents in chapter five, study two, decried welfare dependence in favour of self-reliance, Labour and (particularly) Alliance supporters countered this by calling for a redress of the status quo, criticising National for their lack of representation of minority groups- in effect mirroring the values professed by their preferred parties.

This raises the obvious point that political elites do not endorse different values simply because they are valued to some degree by different societal groups. This passive construction leaves elites at the whim of the electorate, and an unpredictable electorate at that. If, as Edelman (1964) points out, "politics is concerned with ... the authoritative allocation of values" (p. 114) then the discourse used in this study is not only reflecting the values perceived to be important- it is an active attempt to advocate for societal endorsement of particular values. In this case ACT

endorses freedom because they wish the listener to give priority to that value, while the same holds for the Alliance endorsement of equality.

## **SUMMARY**

In summary, this investigation found that there were strong party-based differences in discursive use of two theoretically important values- freedom and equality. These differences were consistent with previous findings of studies conducted in the United States and in line with the predictions of Rokeach (1973). The importance attributed to these two values discriminates between the five major parties, but has yet to be tested in New Zealand to determine their relevance to individual voters- that is to say, do voters themselves value freedom and equality to the same extent political elites appear to wish.



## **STUDY TWO: Values in social representations of political parties**

The thematic content analysis of descriptions of preferred/dis-preferred parties presented in chapter five suggested that different parties were perceived as symbolising (among other things) different values, in particular the values of freedom and equality. Study one in this chapter indicated that this perception is congruent with the rhetorical value appeals made by members of those political parties.

A limitation of the thematic content analysis was that respondents described only their most preferred, and their most dis-preferred parties. While this was appropriate for an exploratory investigation and considering constraints of space in the survey, this allows only within subject comparisons of parties representing extremities of preference. A more thorough investigation should include comparison across all of the major parties.

Therefore this next study is intended to address a number of aims. The study is intended to verify the findings of the content analysis relating to values in a more controlled manner. That is to say, all respondents were requested to evaluate the same targets on the same value inventory. Just as the content analysis produced what can be considered to be social representations of the preferred and dis-preferred parties, this study aims to examine the relationships between parties and the values comprising social representations relating to politics.

### **METHOD AND ANALYSIS**

It is appropriate to consider the survey instrument and analysis together as the analysis used prescribes to some extent the nature of the measures used. As mentioned in chapter five, study one, correspondence analysis requires that the attributes upon which the objects are rated are a good approximation of the attributes which would be expected to fully describe all of the objects. For this reason the values to be evaluated were taken from the entire pool of Schwartz (1992) value items so that each of the important value domains were represented by at least one item. A number of values with similar meanings from the same value domains were omitted.

Value attribution instrument:

Respondents were asked to complete an eight by twenty four table. They were requested to indicate for each of eight political parties (National, Labour, New Zealand First, the Alliance, Christian Coalition, ACT, United NZ, and the Progressive Greens) whether that party stands for, or opposes each of twenty four values.

The exact text was as follows:

What do our political parties stand for? What values do they represent?

Read the description of each of the values below, then indicate with a tick  any of the parties you think might "stand" for that value. If you think any parties oppose a value then put a cross  in the appropriate boxes. If you think a party neither represents or opposes a value then leave that space blank.

The order of the parties, and the order of the values was counter-balanced such that there were four different versions of the form with approximately one quarter of the respondents receiving each version. An example instrument is presented on page 259 of appendix four.

It was decided to present the analysis of only the four major parties as the minor parties (with the possible exception of ACT) receiving generally neutral profiles but for a few obvious values. For example the Christian coalition was generally neutral but for the Value "devout" which was indicated as being supported by the party for all but eleven of those who completed the questionnaire. The analytic result is to produce a single dimension defined by that value alone, on which only that party deviates from the origin.

The values presented with the parties were a subset of the Schwartz values inventory (1992). The full inventory requires respondents to rate each one of 56 values in terms of their importance to the respondent as 'guiding principles' in their lives. These 56 values were selected based on an extended program of research aimed at determining a set of values that might be considered to be 'universally' important- endorsed to a greater or lesser extent cross-culturally. The items were drawn from a pool comprising items from previous value instruments, as well as texts on

comparative religion, and as a result of discussion with religious scholars. Multidimensional analysis of data obtained from samples in 20 countries (including New Zealand) confirmed that the values may be grouped together into 11 motivational domains, in which a majority of items consistently grouped together across the majority of samples. Schwartz asserts that the values in each constellation hold a common motivational source. So for example, scores on the values of successful, ambitious, influential, and intelligent give an indication of the extent to which the respondent is motivated towards (or away from) achievement.

As well as extending Rokeach's (1973) original contention that values may serve a motivational function, it also presents an alternative to the single-item approach that has plagued value inventories which aim to be comprehensive. In practice Rokeach's use of single items to indicate the relative importance of a value type (and effectively all of its synonyms) has been criticised for the same reasons that single item scales of other kinds tend to be psychometrically deficient. By combining the values associated with each motivational domain we can hope to derive a more reliable measure of value orientation.

The Schwartz (1992) inventory was selected for a number of reasons:

- It is a relatively new measure, based on previous values research (and taking into account the limitations of past measures) which has been tested extensively cross-culturally.
- In defining the motivational domains associated with the individual values researcher is able to speculate as to the motivational basis of value-based behaviour.
- The motivational domains as composite value measures provide a more reliable measure than single-item value item measures (a criticism that has been directed at a number of instruments including the Rokeach scale; Braithwaite & Scott, 1991).
- The Schwartz inventory, while long, has been designed and tested using a rating scale (as opposed to importance rankings) which should make it easier to use as well as being less cognitively taxing.

22 items were selected for evaluation. Items were selected according to theoretical relevance to the study at hand (political perception). Two additional values: Fairness and Family values were also included. Table 6.3 below shows the values selected and the motivational domains from which they come. Each item includes a brief qualifying phrase or word. For example the value of

social justice was qualified with "correcting injustice, care of the weak".

Table 6.3  
Values selected for administration in study two.

<b>VALUE (and qualifier)</b>
<b>Social power</b> (control over others, dominance)
<b>Authority</b> (the right to lead or command)
<b>Wealth</b> (material possessions, money)
<b>Preserving public image</b> (protecting their "face")
<b>Influential</b> (having an impact on people and events)
<b>Social justice</b> (correcting injustice, care of the weak)
<b>Family security</b> (safety for loved ones)
<b>Protecting the environment</b> (preserving nature)
<b>Honest</b> (genuine, sincere)
<b>An exciting life</b> (stimulating experiences)
<b>Equality</b> (equal opportunity for all)
<b>Obedient</b> (dutiful, meeting obligations)
<b>Accepting position in life</b> (accepting life's circumstances)
<b>Reciprocation of favours</b> (avoidance of indebtedness)
<b>Freedom</b> (freedom of action and thought)
<b>Devout</b> (holding to religious faith and belief)
<b>Family values</b> (traditional values, nuclear family)
<b>Forgiving</b> (willing to pardon others)
<b>Fairness</b> (in the distribution of social/economic resources)
<b>Respect for tradition</b> (preservation of time-honoured customs)
<b>Social order</b> (stability of society)
<b>National security</b> (protection of the nation from enemies)
<b>Broad-minded</b> (tolerant of different ideas and beliefs)
<b>A world of beauty</b> (beauty of nature and the arts)

Voting intention:

Voting intention was elicited using the question:

"If an election was held in the near future, **which party would you vote for** with your party vote?"

Feeling thermometer:

Respondents were asked to rate each of National, New Zealand First, Labour, Alliance, Progressive Greens, United New Zealand, ACT, and the Christian Coalition on a scale from one to seven, where "1" meant they felt very unfavourable to that party, "4" indicated neither favourable nor unfavourable feelings, and "7" indicated they felt very favourable towards that party. All phases included these items but these studies report those from phase two.

**Analysis one**

Only data for the four major parties (National, Labour, Alliance, and New Zealand First) were included in the analysis. The data was coded with a blank (neither opposes nor stands for) coded as zero, with a cross (opposes) coded as negative one, and ticks (stands for) coded as plus one. The aggregate score for each value (for each separate party) was calculated to produce a single contingency table of four columns by twenty five rows. This was then subject to multiple correspondence analysis using the ANACOR algorithm used by SPSS 6.1.3. The Contingency table used as input for this analysis is replicated in table 6.4 below.

Table 6.4  
Contingency table of aggregate value attribution scores for the five major parties

	National	NZ First	Labour	Alliance
<b>Forgiving</b>	213	215	185	195
<b>Devout</b>	197	200	195	201
<b>Obedient</b>	218	211	205	199
<b>Accepting position in life</b>	205	211	203	211
<b>Influential</b>	235	246	252	259
<b>An exciting life</b>	195	199	208	201
<b>Social power</b>	209	220	228	258
<b>Equality</b>	253	248	215	198
<b>Reciprocation of favours</b>	203	209	205	229
<b>Social justice</b>	257	247	221	191
<b>Family security</b>	248	245	223	211
<b>Protecting the environment</b>	236	221	213	198
<b>Honest</b>	225	211	199	187
<b>Freedom</b>	213	223	219	239
<b>Preserving public image</b>	216	229	236	268
<b>Family values</b>	230	235	219	219
<b>Authority</b>	215	230	239	258
<b>Fairness</b>	251	245	222	192
<b>Respect for tradition</b>	213	231	216	217
<b>Social order</b>	231	243	220	228
<b>Wealth</b>	192	204	211	275
<b>National security</b>	205	227	215	259
<b>Broad-minded</b>	222	228	192	209
<b>A world of beauty</b>	217	213	204	207

## RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Table 6.5 below shows comparison of attributed value means and standard deviations for National, New Zealand First, Labour and the Alliance. It can be seen that Labour and Alliance were perceived to oppose the same three values the least; wealth, an exciting life, and devout. They were also perceived to stand for, or represent the same three values the most; fairness, equality, and social justice (though Labour was seen to stand for influential as much as fairness). In contrast, the most attributed value for National was wealth, followed by preserving public image, influential and social power. National was perceived to oppose honest, fairness, and social justice. New Zealand First was seen to stand for influential, authority and preserving public image, and to oppose devout, forgiving, and broadminded.

Table 6.5  
Mean value attribution ratings (all respondents, N=150)  
 (NOTE: Scale runs from 1 to 3 where 1=oppose, 2=neither oppose nor endorse, 3=endorse)

	National	NZ First	Labour	Alliance	(3,119)
Devout	2.09	2.06	2.03	1.89	1.55ns
Accepting position in life	2.11	2.29	2.14	2.15	.43ns
Forgiving	2.23	2.19	2.26	2.30	.92ns
Obedient	2.27	2.59	2.17	2.52	<b>3.36*</b>
Influential	2.68	2.71	2.54	2.52	1.00ns
An exciting life	2.16	2.29	2.03	2.11	1.27ns
Social power	2.34	2.18	2.14	1.85	<b>5.68**</b>
Equality	2.36	2.59	2.83	2.85	<b>8.10**</b>
Reciprocation of favours	2.45	2.12	2.26	2.26	1.97ns
Family security	2.34	2.65	2.80	2.85	<b>7.76**</b>
Protecting the environment	2.20	2.24	2.37	2.70	<b>4.98**</b>
Honest	2.09	2.65	2.40	2.74	<b>8.08**</b>
Freedom	2.61	2.53	2.46	2.52	.57ns
Preserving public image	2.52	2.29	2.23	1.96	<b>6.37**</b>
Family values	2.32	2.47	2.43	2.52	.81ns
Authority	2.70	2.47	2.31	2.22	<b>5.78**</b>
Fairness	2.39	2.65	2.86	2.81	<b>7.87**</b>
Respect for tradition	2.34	2.35	2.40	2.44	.23ns
Social order	2.59	2.41	2.66	2.59	.83ns
Wealth	2.59	2.11	1.97	1.96	<b>16.57**</b>
National security	2.70	2.41	2.37	2.37	<b>3.53*</b>
Broad-minded	2.43	2.53	2.60	2.63	.82ns
A world of beauty	2.23	2.24	2.20	2.41	1.06ns
Social justice	2.23	2.82	2.80	2.81	<b>12.76**</b>

+ =  $p < .10$ , \* =  $p < .05$ , \*\* =  $p < .01$

Though not included in the correspondence analysis, ACT was seen to stand most for wealth, freedom, and influential, while opposing honest, protecting the environment, and social justice. From this superficial examination it can be expected that a representation of New Zealand political parties should show greater commonalities between Labour and the Alliance, while New Zealand First and National are judged dissimilar from each other, and Labour and the Alliance.

As with discriminant analysis the maximum possible dimensionality of a correspondence analysis is equal to the number of groups minus one. In this case the three possible dimensions account for 90, 9, and 1 percent respectively. Therefore a two dimensional solution accounts for the majority of the variability. Figure 6.5 plots the row and column points on the two dimensions selected.




Figure 6.5. Two dimensional perceptual map showing results of correspondence analysis (Values indicated by circles and parties by triangles).

As mentioned in the earlier discussion of correspondence analysis, points closer to the center of the map are less influential in differentiating between different target parties. Therefore for figure 6.5 above respect for tradition and accepting one's position in life are attributes that are consensually important (or unimportant) across all four parties. Points close to each other may be considered as being related, and distal points may be considered as unrelated or opposite. There is some debate as to whether one can make point to point comparisons between row (value) and column (party) points, and for this reason it is suggested that row-point comparisons be made holistically by considering clusters of points together.

By this rationale we can suggest that the National party is commonly perceived as standing for wealth, national security, public image and reciprocation of favours more than the Alliance and Labour which in turn are perceived as promoting social order, family security, and equality more than National or New Zealand First.

the first dimension differentiates the parties best with Alliance and National furthest from each other, with Labour and New Zealand First falling between them but both closer to the Alliance than National. The order in which they fall on this dimension mirrors almost exactly their perceived positions on the left-right continuum. The second dimension serves to differentiate New Zealand First from the other parties and consideration of the values which cluster nearest New Zealand First may reveal why. The values exciting Life, authority, and influential suggest a dynamic image while the other parties are more associated with security and stability though for National it is national security while Labour and Alliance are more family oriented. This is quite consistent with the way the parties were presented in the media. Even before the election New Zealand First was the party making the greatest gains (though they lost ground in the weeks before the election) shaping to play the role of power broker while for the other parties it was business-as-usual. Clearly New Zealand First injected an element of vitality into the traditional black-white, left-right electoral competition.

Importantly, the relative positioning of the parties on the first (and most important dimension) is, from left to right, the Alliance, Labour, New Zealand First, and finally National. This reflects the common perception of the relative ideological positions of the parties on a left-right or liberal-conservative dimension.



From the perspective of the National party the representation described above does not reflect a desirable position for a political party. When the sample thought of National they were most likely to think of wealth, national security, public image, social power, authority, freedom, and reciprocation of favours. While some of these values have a generally positive connotation the majority may not. The news may not be all bad however- taken together these values suggest a desire for stability and security, a potent motivation according to Braithwaite (1994, 1997). Braithwaite has argued that while Rokeach (1973) is correct in his assertion that political positions may be defined in terms of a two-value model, those values may not be equality and security but rather two dimensions of harmony and security. This desire for security is reflected in the results of the first two studies in this thesis relating to ideological meaning and party images- liberal and conservative ideological positions were equated with change and stability. The analysis of preferred and dis-preferred parties showed that National was viewed by both supporters and opponents as maintaining the current status quo, while Labour and Alliance were viewed as more progressive (though in an ill-considered manner according to their detractors).

Again, while there is reason to expect that the family of values National is perceived as representing are less desirable than more altruistic values (such as fairness, world of beauty, or family security) they are the values that might be most related to potency. Wealth, social power, authority, and influence are more important in terms of efficacy than many of the other values used in this study. Again, this parallels the findings of chapter five, study two in that while National was not as well-liked (even by their own supporters) they were viewed as more capable than the Alliance and to a lesser extent, Labour. Similarly, it may be easier for National party supporters to acknowledge the weaknesses (or faults) of their preferred party because that party is already in power.

On the surface at least the situation is better for Labour and the Alliance - after all they are clearly viewed as representing values with more obviously positive connotations. But herein lies a problem - they are also both fighting over similar value territory. Their proximity in the plot shows that the sample discriminates much less between Labour and Alliance than any other combination of parties. Indeed, if we consider that the parties' positions on function one reflect (once again) their approximate ideological positions in relation to each other the same problems

illustrated in the previous studies are apparent once more. Labour and Alliance are making very similar promises to the electorate.

### **Analysis two**

The previous analysis utilised information from all respondents about the values all four major parties were perceived to represent (or otherwise). The resulting correspondence analysis presents a representation of the inter-relationships between values and parties, illustrating the core values attributed to each party as well as those considered consensually unimportant.

The question addressed by this second analysis is whether the values identified with the different parties are important in which party is preferred. For example, is it because Labour is identified with social justice that it is preferred by some people over other parties? Using the values which parties represent is it possible to predict from the party representations respondents' favoured parties? How important are the values parties are perceived to represent in political preference?

To evaluate these questions two further analyses was performed using the value attributions made by respondents about their favoured parties.

### **METHOD**

The data for these analysis use the party value attribution ratings presented in the previous study, as well as the feeling thermometer data for National, Labour, the Alliance, and New Zealand first (how favourable people felt towards each party on a seven-point scale).

Two sets of statistical analyses were conducted. The first regressed party value attributions of the whole sample onto each respondents' feeling thermometer ratings for that party. That is to say, the value attribution scores on each of the 22 values made for each party were regressed against the feeling thermometer score for that same party. This was repeated four times for each of National, Labour, the Alliance, and New Zealand First.

Secondly, discriminant analysis was used to determine the perception of which values differentiated support for which parties. For each respondent the value attributions of their preferred party were used to attempt to predict their preference. That is to say, if a respondent

indicated they intended to vote for National, the value attribution ratings for National only were included in the analysis.

## RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Feeling thermometer ratings for the four major parties were regressed onto the Value attributions for the four major parties. Due to the number of variables in the analysis stepwise regression was used. Variables were eliminated from the analyses using the backwards stepwise procedure which includes all variables at the first step and proceeds to eliminate those that make the smallest increments to the  $R^2$  of the equation. This method was chosen simply to reduce the number of variables in the equation while accounting for as much variance as possible, and to avoid the early elimination of important variables.

### Favourability ratings and party value attributions

Table 6.6  
Correlations between party favourability ratings (all N's between 108 and 149)

	Prog. Greens	Christian Coalition	United NZ	ACT	Alliance	Labour	NZ First
National	-.18*	.18*	.11ns	.29**	-.45**	-.14*	-.33**
NZ First	.14+	.04ns	.02ns	.03ns	.33**	-.09ns	-
Labour	.28**	-.05ns	.02ns	-.15*	.27**	-	
Alliance	.47**	.06ns	.10ns	-.05ns	-		
ACT	.30**	.43**	.61**	-			
United NZ	.59**	.55**	-				
CC	.44**	-					

+ $p < .10$ , \* $p < .05$ , \*\* $p < .005$

Table 6.6 reports the correlations between favourability ratings for the eight parties targeted. Not surprisingly liking for the three opposition parties correlated negatively with liking for National, while liking for National's potential coalition partners (the 'toxic trio' of ACT and the Christian Coalition) correlates positively with liking for National. There is a moderate correlation between liking for the Alliance and Labour ( $r = .27$ ,  $p < .005$ ), which is marginally weaker than that between

liking for New Zealand First and the Alliance ( $r=.33$ ,  $p<.005$ ). Feeling thermometer ratings for the three minor parties produced some of the higher correlations suggesting that people favour them as a block, perhaps simply because they are minor parties. This is supported by the fact that all these correlations are positive.

Tables 6.7 to 6.10 below summarise the stepwise regression results for the four parties.

Table 6.7  
Summary of Standard Regression Analysis for Value Attributions Predicting Feeling Thermometer Ratings for National (N=145)

Variable	B	$\beta$
Reciprocation of favours	.67	.19**
Honest	.61	.16+
Social justice	.56	.16+
Equality	.55	.16+
Freedom	.51	.15+
Exciting life	.56	.13+
Position in life	-.56	-.14*
Preserving public image	-.66	-.17*
Wealth	-.81	-.19*
(Constant)	1.76	

$R^2=.45$ ,  $R^2_{adjusted}=.41$

+ $p<.10$

\*  $p<.05$

\*\* $p<.01$

The regression for National was significant ( $F(9,136)=12.15$ ,  $p<.001$ ) with an  $R^2_{adjusted}=.41$ . The most important positive indicator of liking for National was reciprocation of favours. There were three values which were negatively related to liking for National, Accepting one's position in life, Preserving public image, and wealth.

This suggests that though the majority of the sample, even including National supporters themselves, perceive National as representing wealth and preservation one's public image, the people who most like National (in terms of feeling thermometer ratings) are those whose value attribution responses are that National opposes wealth, public image, and accepting one's position in life. At the same time, the more respondents perceived National to represent the other positively related values, the more they liked National. This is clearly at odds with the general view of National as indicated in the previous analysis. Whether this reflects a bias in the way people view their preferred party, or a post-preference rationalisation is impossible to tell from the

data.

Table 6.8  
Summary of Standard Regression Analysis for Value Attributions Predicting Feeling  
Thermometer Ratings for Labour (N=145)

Variable	B	$\beta$
Social Justice	.84	.31**
Equality	.57	.20*
Exciting life	.66	.17*
Wealth	.53	.13+
Preserving public image (Constant)	-.50 -.37	-.17*

$R^2=.24$ ,  $R^2_{\text{adjusted}}=.22$   
+ $p<.10$       \*  $p<.05$       \*\* $p<.01$

The regression for Labour was significant ( $F(9,136)=12.15$ ,  $p<.001$ ), with an  $R^2_{\text{adjusted}}$  of .22. There were three values positively related to liking for Labour; social justice, equality, and exciting life. Though not significant at the 5% significance level, the perception that Labour represents the value of wealth was positively related to liking for Labour. As with National, preserving public image was negatively related to liking for Labour.

Surprisingly, The more respondents perceived Labour as representing wealth, the more favourable they felt towards that party. This is contradictory to the impression given in chapter five that Labour supporters dislike the fiscal emphasis placed on politics by National and ACT, as well as the results presented in figure 6.5 indicating that National was perceived as being endorsed most strongly by National. This is clearly a point worthy of investigation - it may be that seeking wealth is a desirable goal if it is held in conjunction with values such as social justice and equality. This would suggest that wealth is only a negative value if viewed in terms of individual (or at least minority) self-interest, but is acceptable if for the good of society as a larger group (the distinction between individual and sociotropic self-interest as made by Kinder and Kiewiet, 1981).

Table 6.9  
Summary of Standard Regression Analysis for Value Attributions Predicting Feeling  
Thermometer Ratings for the Alliance (N=145)

Variable	B	β
Honest	1.01	.33**
Equality	.75	.23**
Freedom	.52	.17*
World of beauty	.60	.15+
Position in life	-.51	-.14+
Social power	-.67	-.18*
Preserving public image	-.83	-.23**
(Constant)	4.33**	

$R^2=.38$ ,  $R^2_{\text{adjusted}}=.35$

+p<.10      \* p<.05      \*\*p<.01

The regression for Alliance was significant ( $F(7,136)=11.99$ ,  $p<.001$ ), with an  $R^2_{\text{adjusted}}$  of .35. The degree to which the Alliance was seen to represent Honest, equality, and freedom were all positively related to liking for the Alliance, while the reverse was true for social power and preserving public image.

For the third time in as many analyses the perception of endorsing equality is positively related to liking for a party, though significantly it is in conjunction with freedom.

Table 6.10  
Summary of Standard Regression Analysis for Value Attributions Predicting Feeling  
Thermometer Ratings for New Zealand First (N=145)

Variable	B	β
Social justice	1.17	.35**
Broadminded	.55	.19*
Fairness	.62	.18*
Forgiving	.50	.14*
(Constant)	1.76	

$R^2=.37$ ,  $R^2_{\text{adjusted}}=.36$

+p<.10      \* p<.05      \*\*p<.01

The regression for New Zealand First was significant ( $F(4,138)=20.6$ ,  $p<.001$ ) with an  $R^2_{\text{adjusted}}$  of .36. Four values were significantly and positively related to liking for New Zealand First; social justice, broadminded, fairness, and forgiving.

For the third time out of four analyses the perception of a party's endorsement of social justice is positively related to liking for New Zealand First. Additionally, those who like New Zealand first also view it as forgiving, fair, and just. These last two values were a strong part of the message New Zealand First was trying to present - focusing on themes of fair treatment for all New Zealanders (not necessarily those wishing to become New Zealanders) and particularly Maori and the elderly. It is this odd mixture of constituencies which might lead to the perception that New Zealand first is a broadminded party.

It has already been noted that the association of equality and social justice with a party is related to liking for that party in three out of four analyses. It should also be pointed out that for three out of four parties the perception that the party represents preservation of public image is related to relative dislike for that party. Freedom is positively related to only two parties and that is predictably National (and based on the results of study one in this chapter, the Alliance as well).

These findings are limited however, in that they only indicate which perceived value endorsements are associated with LIKING for these four parties. It is after all possible (and indeed necessary) to like several parties but vote for only one. Which values discriminate between different parties? For example, people are more likely to like National, Labour, AND the Alliance if they perceive those parties as representing equality but when it comes to a decision which values are most important? The next analysis is an attempt to answer this question using discriminant analysis.

### **Discriminant analysis**

Discriminant analysis was used to predict each respondents preferred party using party value attributions for their preferred party. The analysis produced two functions which were significant at the 5% level of significance ( $\chi^2(48)=150.20$ ,  $p<.01$ , and  $\chi^2(30)=48.22$ ,  $p<.05$ ), and a third which just failed to reach significance at the same level ( $\chi^2(14)=23.19$ ,  $p=.057$ ). The three functions accounted for 75%, 13%, and 12% of the between-groups variance, respectively. As per the suggestion of Hair et al (1995) the explanatory power of the third function was deemed acceptable for further analysis. The three functions correctly predicted 72% of the respondents' voting preference (80% of National, 70% of Alliance, 63% of Labour, and 71% of New Zealand First), significantly better than chance (Press's Q=142.12,  $p<.01$ ).

Table 6.11 below shows the pooled within-group correlations between the variables included in the analysis and the three canonical discriminant functions. Shaded areas indicate the function with which each variable has the highest correlation.

Table 6.11  
Pooled within-group correlations between predictors and canonical discriminant functions

Variable	Function 1	Function 2	Function 3
Wealth	.52642	-.11995	-.10597
Social justice	-.45259	-.02617	.27321
Equality	-.36171	.16953	-.10865
Family security	-.36132	.07465	-.03540
Fairness	-.35518	.20987	.00926
Authority	.30977	-.04153	.11118
Public image	.30809	.16140	.23748
Broadminded	-.11633	.02527	-.03650
Family values	-.11073	-.09570	-.00215
Obedience	-.07522	-.55004	.05358
Honest	-.33118	-.40189	.04082
Social order	-.00964	.22860	-.18351
Protect environment	-.22680	-.15905	-.43071
Social power	.27262	.22448	.29562
Reciprocate favours	.15063	.09543	-.24379
Devout	.12859	.12030	.21721

The first function is defined most strongly by perceptions of endorsement of wealth, authority, and public image at one pole, and by social justice, equality, family security, and fairness at the other. Perception of endorsement of obedience define the negative pole of function two, with social order (and to a lesser extent social power) defining the positive end. The positive pole of function three is characterised by perception of endorsement of social power and devoutness in opposition to protecting the environment, and to a lesser extent reciprocation of favours.

Figures 6.6 below present a three-dimensional plot of the group means in relation to the three functions obtained.






Figure 6.6 3-D plot of Group Centroids for Voting Preference on Three Discriminant Functions

From these plots it can be seen that the first function differentiates between supporters of National, and the other three parties. Thus respondents who perceive their preferred party as representing wealth, authority, and preserving public image are more likely to support National, while those favouring endorsement of equality, social justice, family values, and family security, are more likely to support Labour and the Alliance. The values associated with functions one and two are of minimal importance to National supporters as shown by the near-zero mean on both functions. Once more the relative positioning approximates the general perception of the parties position on a left-right continuum.

The second function differentiates between Alliance and New Zealand First supporters with perception of endorsement of the values of honest and obedience associated with New Zealand First support and endorsement of social order with Alliance support. The final function distinguished between New Zealand First and Labour supporters with perceptions of

endorsement of social power (and to a lesser degree, devoutness) accompanying a preference for New Zealand First, and endorsement of protection of the environment and reciprocation of favours reflecting a Labour preference.

The results of the discriminant analysis are not entirely congruent with those of the regressions of values against party favourability ratings. For example, liking for National is negatively related to the perception that National represents wealth, yet the endorsement of wealth is the strongest discriminatory variable on the first discriminant function. There are at least two possible explanations for this result. Firstly, favourability does not equate to preference- that is to say, one can like a party but still not intend to vote for that party- in effect the two analyses are investigating two different things. The second possibility relates to the different statistical procedures used. When considering the regressions we are only considering one party at a time, while the discriminant analysis calculates the linear combination of values that best accompanies preference for a single party for all parties simultaneously. This results in values that may appear relevant in single-party analyses becoming redundant in multi-party analyses.

Importantly, and consistent with previous analyses, significant discriminant functions were found for the most significant combinations of parties except for Labour/Alliance. Once more this reflects the perception that the two parties share a very similar value position, which may or may not translate into difficulty deciding whether to vote for one or the other.

Given the ongoing focus on equality and freedom the discriminant analysis raises again the question of whether or not freedom is a differentiating factor in political differentiation. While equality was a significant discriminator, freedom was not. While the correspondence analysis in the first part of this study indicated that freedom was seen to be represented more by National than the other parties the discriminant analysis indicates that when other values are taken into account freedom does not contribute much to the functions that differentiate the parties.

In summary then, the analyses conducted here indicate that the values associated with different parties play a significant role in the way they are perceived by potential voters. Different values were found to be preferred attributes of different parties, and the perception that particular parties stand for certain values play a role in differentiating those parties from others. There were mixed

results as to the role of equality and freedom as defining variables in the New Zealand Political context.

### **STUDY THREE: Value profile of party supporters**

The thematic content analysis of the open-ended responses describing preferred/dis-preferred parties were characterised by attribution of freedom, self-reliance and independence on the part of National, and equality and fairness on the part of Labour and the Alliance. This distinction was supported by the content analysis of parliamentary speeches by members of the post-election parties. Freedom was cited more frequently than equality by Act, National, and to a lesser extent NZ First, while the reverse was true for Alliance, and to a minimal extent Labour, speakers. An analysis of the Schwartz values for which the parties were perceived to stand or oppose by a sample of voters suggested two dimensions of comparison. Freedom and equality were approximately opposed to each other on one of these dimensions though, once again, equality was the more powerfully related to perceptions of Alliance and Labour, in opposition to National, Act, and NZ First.

The previous study provided support for the contention that political parties in New Zealand may be distinguished in terms of their party value system. The major parties were found to differ in their use of freedom and equality in parliamentary speeches. While this study provides an up to date, and more sensitive, test of the two-value hypothesis as applied to political rhetoric we have yet to a related problem encountered by Rokeach and others. That is: Can we differentiate political party supporters by their endorsement of values, in particular freedom and equality.

If equality and freedom are considered important in differentiating between political parties by the sample will this correspond to differential endorsement of freedom and equality as personal values in the same sample of voters? If this were to be the case we would expect that National party supporters would endorse freedom more than equality as a guiding principle in their lives, while Labour and Act supporters would endorse equality relatively more than freedom. The aim of the next study is to address this question.

Therefore the aim of the next study is to evaluate the importance of values, and freedom and equality values in particular, in political preference. To this end it is appropriate to return to the body of literature on values and political affiliation.

## VALUES AND INDIVIDUAL POLITICAL PREFERENCE

Unfortunately, beyond the content analyses described previously there has been little consistent support for the proposition that supporters of different political philosophies differentially value equality and freedom. A number of studies, including a number by Rokeach himself (Braithwaite, 1994; Cochrane, Billig, & Hogg, 1973; Rokeach, 1973), have found that equality was the only useful discriminator of the two values. For example Bishop, Barclay, and Rokeach (1972) administered the Rokeach Value Survey to a national probability sample of 1233 adults aged 21 years and over, as well as asking them to name the presidential candidate they would most like to see elected in the upcoming election. Endorsement of equality differentiated the sample while freedom did not.

Rokeach (1979) has countered the lack of supportive findings by suggesting that contemporary Western societies (of which America was considered the prototype) are characterised by a strong societal emphasis on freedom, and as a result are sufficiently politically homogeneous that only the smallest minority of the population might be expected to endorse freedom significantly less than equality. While this may indeed be the case it is perhaps surprising that other values, for example a World at Peace do consistently differ across political groups even though that might be expected to be a dominant Western value as well. Indeed a World at Peace is consistently endorsed more than freedom.

The Rokeach values inventory has been used in analyses of political perception in New Zealand. A discriminant analysis of value ratings of fee-paying members of the three major parties in the early eighties (National, Labour, and the now defunct Social Credit) carried out by Ng (1982) found that discriminating values formed two dimensions. Labour and National were only distinguishable on one dimension, with Labour members valuing equality, justice, broadmindedness, a world of peace, and Friendship, while National members promoted obedience, loving, national security, an exciting life, and responsibility. Importantly the value of freedom was not a value significantly associated with either discriminant dimension, consistent with the body of critical literature already described.

If this is the case why does freedom appear to be a value commonly alluded to in previous

content analyses of conservative political communication, as well as study one in this chapter? It may be the case that the current socio-political context has given rise to a different emphasis on freedom. In our sample freedom is almost inextricably linked with self-reliance, indeed the emphasis on self-reliance is taken as signalling the National party of emphasis of individual freedom. At the height of the cold war it might be easier to explain the importance attributed to freedom by right-wing rhetoricians, but in contemporary New Zealand after a decade under increasing user-pays systems it may be the case that self-reliance is the dominant feature of individual freedom.

### **MEASURES:**

#### Ideological self-identification, Right-wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance orientation

This analysis makes use of the measures of the liberal/ conservative self-identification scale, the Right-wing Authoritarianism measure and Social Dominance orientation scales outlined in chapter five, study one, and are re-presented in appendices two and three.

#### Values Inventory

- Respondents completed a subset of the Schwartz values inventory (1992). As described in the previous study the full inventory requires respondents to rate each one of 56 values in terms of their importance to the respondent as 'guiding principles' in their lives.

37 items from eight domains were selected. Items were selected according to theoretical relevance to the study at hand (political perception). Table 6.12 shows the values selected and the motivational domains from which they come. Each item includes a brief qualifying phrase or word. For example the value of self-discipline was qualified with "self-restraint, resistance to temptation".

Table 6.12

Values and motivational domains selected.

MOTIVATIONAL DOMAIN	VALUE (and qualifier)
<b>POWER</b>	<b>Social power</b> (control over others, dominance)
	<b>Authority</b> (the right to lead or command)
	<b>Wealth</b> (material possessions, money)
	<b>Preserving my public image</b> (protecting my "face")
	<b>Social recognition</b> (respect, approval by others)
<b>ACHIEVEMENT</b>	<b>Successful</b> (achieving goals)
	<b>Ambitious</b> (hardworking, aspiring)
	<b>Influential</b> (having an impact on people and events)
	<b>Intelligent</b> (logical, thinking)
<b>SELF-DIRECTION</b>	<b>Curious</b> (interested in everything, exploring)
	<b>Freedom</b> (freedom of action and thought)
	<b>Choosing own goals</b> (selecting own purpose)
	<b>Independent</b> (self-reliant, self-sufficient)
<b>UNIVERSALISM</b>	<b>Protecting the environment</b> (preserving nature)
	<b>A world of beauty</b> (beauty of nature and the arts)
	<b>Broad-minded</b> (tolerant of different ideas and beliefs)
	<b>Social justice</b> (correcting injustice, care of the weak)
	<b>Wisdom</b> (a mature understanding of life)
	<b>Equality</b> (equal opportunity for all)
	<b>A world at peace</b> (free of war and conflict)
<b>BENEVOLENCE</b>	<b>Honest</b> (genuine, sincere)
	<b>Forgiving</b> (willing to pardon others)
	<b>Responsible</b> (dependable, reliable)
<b>TRADITION</b>	<b>Accepting my portion in life</b> (accepting life's circumstances)
	<b>Devout</b> (holding to religious faith and belief)
	<b>Respect for tradition</b> (preservation of time-honoured customs)
	<b>Moderate</b> (avoiding extremes of feeling and action)
<b>CONFORMITY</b>	<b>Obedient</b> (dutiful, meeting obligations)
	<b>Honouring of parents and elders</b> (showing respect)
	<b>Politeness</b> (courtesy, good manners)
	<b>Self-discipline</b> (self-restraint, resistance to temptation)
<b>SECURITY</b>	<b>Clean</b> (neat, tidy)
	<b>National security</b> (protection of my nation from enemies)
	<b>Reciprocation of favours</b> (avoidance of indebtedness)
	<b>Social order</b> (stability of society)
	<b>Family security</b> (safety for loved ones)
	<b>Healthy</b> (not being sick physically or mentally)

Table 6.13  
Value means and standard deviations

Domain	VALUE LABEL	Mean	SD	N
	FAMILY SECURITY (safety of loved ones)	7.46	1.02	157
	HONEST (genuine, sincere)	7.24	1.05	156
	A WORLD AT PEACE (free of war and conflict)	7.07	1.35	157
	RESPONSIBLE (dependable, reliable)	7.04	1.02	156
	HONOURING OF PARENTS AND ELDERS (showing respect)	6.94	1.21	156
	HEALTHY (not being sick physically or mentally)	6.94	1.19	157
	FREEDOM (freedom of action and thought)	6.90	1.24	156
	EQUALITY (equal opportunity for all)	6.83	1.40	157
	WISDOM (a mature understanding of life)	6.66	1.26	157
	CHOOSING OWN GOALS (selecting own purposes)	6.62	1.25	157
	SOCIAL JUSTICE (correcting injustice, care for the weak)	6.62	1.26	157
	POLITENESS (courtesy, good manners)	6.58	1.32	156
	INDEPENDENT (self-reliant, self-sufficient)	6.56	1.24	154
	BROAD-MINDED (tolerant of different ideas and beliefs)	6.54	1.32	157
	SELF-DISCIPLINE (self-restraint, resistance to temptation)	6.52	1.26	157
	PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT (preserving nature)	6.48	1.33	157
	INTELLIGENT (logical, thinking)	6.37	1.28	155
	SOCIAL ORDER (stability of society)	6.31	1.51	157
	FORGIVING (willing to pardon others)	6.21	1.36	156
	CLEAN (neat, tidy)	6.20	1.48	157
	SUCCESSFUL (achieving goals)	6.11	1.39	156
	CURIOUS (interested in everything, exploring)	6.10	1.49	157
	NATIONAL SECURITY (protection of my nation from enemies)	5.99	1.69	157
	AMBITIOUS (hardworking, aspiring)	5.94	1.38	157
	A WORLD OF BEAUTY (beauty of nature and the arts)	5.89	1.60	157
	OBEDIENT (dutiful, meeting obligations)	5.88	1.53	155
	RECIPROICATION OF FAVOURS (avoiding indebtedness)	5.82	1.55	157
	SOCIAL RECOGNITION (respect, approval by others)	5.74	1.53	157
	RESPECT FOR TRADITION (preservation of time-honoured customs)	5.65	1.67	157
	ACCEPTING MY PORTION IN LIFE (submitting to life's circumstances)	5.52	1.74	155
	MODERATE (avoiding extremes of feeling or action)	5.23	1.69	155
	INFLUENTIAL (having an impact on people and events)	4.99	1.47	157
	WEALTH (material possessions, money)	4.95	1.38	157
	AUTHORITY (the right to lead or command)	4.91	1.59	155
	DEVOUT (holding to religious faith and belief)	4.88	2.12	155
	PRESERVING MY PUBLIC IMAGE (protecting my "face")	4.82	1.75	156
	SOCIAL POWER (control over others, dominance)	3.20	1.58	155

(Scale runs from 1 to 9, where 1=opposed to my values, and 9=very important)



The respondents were asked to rate each of the values on a nine-point scale indicating the relative importance of each value as a guiding principle in their lives. The scale runs from "opposed to my values" through to "of supreme importance". According to the suggestion made by Schwartz (1992) respondents were advised to read through the values once to determine which they considered most and least important, and to give those values the highest and lowest ratings respectively to encourage them to use the whole range of ratings (appendix three).

In the interests of parsimony a subset of the inventory items was used. Table 6.13 above shows the means and standard deviations of the individual values. The values are presented in order of most important to least important, and there is a trend for the standard deviation to increase as the mean importance decreases. This indicates that there is greater consensus as to the importance of the more popular values and greater disagreement over the least. Based on this one might tentatively predict that the less important values may prove to be the best discriminators. The five most highly endorsed values are family security, honesty, a world at peace, responsible, and honouring of parents and elders which would suggest an emphasis on inter-relationships. The five least important values are social power, preservation of public image, devotion, authority, and wealth and while a little more difficult to describe seem to encompass more individual level desires.

Value orientations are popularly conceived of as specific values organised hierarchically such that individuals differentially endorse each value and that particular ordering comprises (for that individual) their value orientation. Theoretically then there is the potential for a vast array of different value orientations, while in practice a variety of social forces constrain the range such that the majority of any society will represent only a handful of primary value orientations. The aim of this analysis is to reveal the primary value orientations of the sample through the dimensional extraction technique of multidimensional scaling.

Multidimensional scaling would allow firstly the examination of inter-value compatibilities and incompatibilities and secondly an attempt to be made at determining the primary value orientations of the sample as a whole. The dimensions obtained can then be related to other constructs, such as liberal/conservative self-identification.

The values ratings were first converted to inter-value distance (similarity) measures through the SPSS PROXIMITIES function. These distances served as the input for non-metric (ordinal scale) multidimensional scaling using ALSCAL. All values were entered into the analysis, and no attempt was made to separate terminal and instrumental value types as there is little consensus in the literature as to the independence of the two types.

One through to five dimensional solutions were derived producing stress indices of .466, .244, .179, .136, and .105 respectively where the stress index is an indication of the proportion of the variance in the disparities between data points which is not explained by each dimensional solution. Additionally, squared correlation indices (RSQ) corresponding to the stress indices were calculated to determine the fit between the raw data and the different solutions. This RSQ index is analogous to the  $R^2$  measures obtained for other multivariate techniques suggesting similar constraints on suitability of the different solutions. The RSQ indices for the one to four dimensional solutions were respectively, .385, .667, .734, .793, and .843. Plotting these values against the number of dimensions (similar to a scree-plot in factor analysis) suggests an elbow around the two and perhaps three-dimensional solutions. As the three dimensional solution explains only an additional 6% of variance beyond that accounted for by the two-dimensional solution, it was decided that in the interests of parsimony the two dimensional solution would be adopted for interpretation.

The multi-dimensional scaling co-ordinates are presented in table 6.14, and the map in figure 6.7.

Table 6.14  
Dimensional co-ordinates for each value

Personal Value	Dimension	
	1	2
CLEAN	-0.316	1.5802
SUCCESS	-1.2778	-0.3471
CURIOUS	1.4071	0.0659
FORGIVING	-0.3863	-1.5172
RESPONSIBLE	0.7247	0.4405
DEVOUT	1.2732	1.6718
INTELLIGENT	-0.662	-1.0187
OBEDIENT	-0.0518	1.1818
PUBLIC IMAGE	-1.5442	0.7742
HONEST	1.4888	-0.1284
ACCEPT PORTION IN LIFE	0.6455	1.7092
HEALTHY	0.181	-0.3257
OWN GOALS	-0.8788	-1.0372
HONOUR ELDERS	0.3179	0.6812
INFLUENTIAL	-1.4844	0.0936
PROTECT ENVIRONMENT	0.3557	-1.2978
BROAD-MINDED	-0.0709	-1.5928
AMBITIOUS	-0.9301	0.1027
MODERATE	0.3875	0.4478
INDEPENDENT	-0.8214	-0.3026
SOCIAL JUSTICE	1.3875	-0.6095
WORLD OF BEAUTY	0.6944	-0.8506
AUTHORITY	-1.3206	0.1281
WISDOM	0.2315	-1.3405
SOCIAL RECOGNITION	-1.3827	0.0236
FAMILY SECURITY	1.2837	-0.1611
SELF-DISCIPLINE	0.8078	1.0938
RESPECT TRADITION	0.3109	1.65
WORLD AT PEACE	1.6119	-0.3496
REPAY FAVOURS	-1.2337	-0.3984
NATIONAL SECURITY	0.6966	1.0755
WEALTH	-1.6707	0.7887
POLITENESS	0.43	0.6229
SOCIAL ORDER	1.473	-0.5418
FREEDOM	-0.1007	-1.5264
SOCIAL POWER	-2.334	0.3176
EQUALITY	0.7573	-1.1036




Figure 6.7. Multidimensional scaling map of Wellington respondents' personal values.

As indicated earlier values that present as close to one another are held by the sample to be more compatible, while there is increasing incompatibility as values are distant from each other. For example, authority, influence, and social recognition comprise a neat constellation just on the left upper quadrant indicating that members of the sample endorsing one of those values is increasingly likely to endorse the other two to a similar extent. Conversely, members of the sample endorsing these values similarly are increasingly likely to endorse values to the right hand of the map to a lesser level (for example, honesty and forgiveness). A number of important compatibilities are evident. The relative proximity of freedom and equality is important because,

as indicated in an earlier chapter, there is a body of research that has suggested that, at least in America, people tend to display systematic differences in their endorsement of these two core values. However in this sample they are relatively adjacent and (by comparison of the means) judged almost equally important across the sample. The value 'healthy', which was a critical omission from the original Rokeach values survey, is situated in isolation almost at the origin of the perceptual map. A final observation is that taken as a whole, the parabolic arrangement of the values describes the shape of 'horseshoe'. This distinctive configuration occurs when there is a close link between one and other modality of the map, and is called the 'Guttman effect' (Doise, Clemence, & Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1993).

As well as revealing value compatibilities, the dimensions (horizontal and vertical) of the perceptual map allow interpretation of the primary value orientations describing the sample as a whole. As with factor analysis the interpretation of these dimensions is heavily subjective in nature so some attempt will be made to validate the interpretation through potential correlates.

The first (and most important as indicated by the amount of variance explained) dimension running horizontally is strongly characterised by (amongst others) the values of Wealth, public image, social power, influence, authority, independence and choosing one's own goals on the one hand, contrasted with the values of forgiving, honest, family security, social justice and order, and equality on the other. An interpretation of this opposition would be that the values on the left emphasise hierarchy in social relations, or alternatively emphasise individualism. The right hand side indicates support for inter-connectedness in relationships, not only with other people but also with nature perhaps emphasising a perception of collectivism.

The positive pole of dimension two (the upper half) indicates compatibility of values such as respect for tradition, cleanliness, accepting one's place in things, devotion, obedience, and self discipline which suggest conformity to the social expectations. The opposite pole includes the values of freedom, curiosity, broadmindedness, wisdom, choosing one's own goals and protection of the environment which indicate endorsement of flexibility and open-mindedness and self-direction.

To aid in this interpretation correlations were calculated with demographic information and also with scores from some of the scales included in the survey. Firstly scores for individual

respondents on each of the dimensions were calculated by converting the value importance ratings to z-scores and taking the mean of the sum for each respondent of the value z-scores multiplied by the dimensional weighting for each value. Thus the dimensional score for any individual will be the mean of their standardised value ratings each multiplied by the value's dimensional weighting for the two dimensions.

The dimensional scores were correlated with the measures of Social Dominance Orientation, the liberal-conservative self-identification item from the previous survey, and Right Wing Authoritarianism and all produced at least one significant correlation. There was a strong positive correlation found between the authoritarianism measure and dimension two of .51 ( $df=134$ ,  $p<.001$ ) indicating that those scoring higher on authoritarianism tend strongly towards the social conformity pole of dimension two. There was no correlation between dimension one scores and authoritarianism ( $r=-.01$ ,  $df=134$ ,  $p=.96ns$ ). Social Dominance Orientation correlated moderately with both dimensions. The correlation with dimension one was  $-.31$  ( $df=130$ ,  $p<.001$ ) and with dimension two was  $.29$  ( $df=130$ ,  $p<.001$ ) indicating that those scoring highly on Social Dominance Orientation tended towards the hierarchy/individualist pole of dimension one and towards the social conformity pole of dimension two. There was no significant correlation between dimension one and liberal-conservative self-identification ( $r=-.02$ ,  $df=126$ ,  $p=.79ns$ ), but there was a significant positive correlation with dimension two ( $r=.36$ ,  $df=126$ ,  $p<.001$ ). Both of these results offer support for the interpretations of the value orientations characterising the dimensional solution. We would expect that as high Social Dominance Orientation represents support for maintenance of dominance hierarchies that such scorers would endorse social hierarchy values. Additionally as a strong component of the popular conception of the authoritarian syndrome is adherence to societal sanctions and intolerance of deviance from those sanctions we would expect that high authoritarian scorers would endorse conformity type values, and this is strongly supported. Beyond this validation of the interpretation of the dimensional map these findings support the contention of theoretical independence between the Social Dominance Orientation and authoritarianism constructs, as well as supporting the contention of prominent authoritarianism theorists (eg. Altermeyer, 1985) that authoritarianism is not primarily focussed on power per se and the need for dominance.

This interpretation of the primary value orientations is compatible with previous work using similar

analyses. For example, the only other multidimensional scaling profile of New Zealand values (Allen, 1994), also carried out in the Wellington area derived a two dimensional solution with the first dimension interpreted as 'Power Values' versus 'Self-direction and Connectedness', and the second dimension as 'Enjoyment and Growth' versus 'Accomplishment through Social Expectations'. Additionally the first dimension correlated well with a composite individualism/collectivism measure supporting the suggestion from the analysis presented here that this primary dimension taps into an individualism/collectivism orientation. Though the overall interpretations are quite similar, the perceptual maps derived do have some interesting differences. In Allen's analysis both equality and freedom 'loaded' towards the 'Self-direction and Connectedness' pole of that primary dimension and contributed little to the second dimension.

T-tests of any gender differences on the two dimensions indicated that men (mean=-.07, SD=.30) scored significantly more towards the negative pole of dimension one than did women (mean=.62, SD=.30,  $t(130)=2.48$ ,  $p<.05$ ). There was no difference between the scores of males (mean=.01, SD=.23) and females (mean=.00, SD=.26) on dimension two. This suggests that males tend more towards the social hierarchy pole of dimension with women leaning more towards the social inter-connectedness pole. Again, this is consistent with the robust finding of Sidanius and colleagues (Pratto et al, 1994) that males endorse anti-egalitarian values more than females.

Comparisons were made between the dimensional scores of the respondents indicating an intention to vote for one of the major parties. There were no differences on dimension 1 ( $F(3, 119)=.89$ ,  $p=.45ns$ ) but significant differences were found for dimension 2 ( $F(3,119)=5.98$ ,  $p<.001$ ) with Alliance supporters (mean=-.13, SD=.24) scoring significantly further towards the negative pole than National (mean=.07, SD=.25) and NZ First (mean=.06, SD=.210) supporters while Labour (mean=-.10, SD=.20) party supporters scored more negatively than National supporters. This indicates that Labour and Alliance supporters tend more to the flexibility/ open-mindedness pole of dimension two than National and NZ First supporters, supporting the results of chapter five, study one that the liberal end of the political spectrum places greater value on these constructs. This is an important result given that, unlike discriminant analysis for example, the multidimensional scaling procedure was not specified to maximise differences between supporters of the different parties. In as far as this sample can be considered representative of the Wellington population the dimensional solution represents a social value profile of the area.

## Discriminant Analysis

To make a more direct investigation of the relationship between values and political preference the values were subjected to discriminant analysis, with political preference the dependent variable and the values as predictors.

Rather than use all 37 values as predictors it is preferable to use the composite motivational domain scores as predictor variables. This has the statistical advantage of introducing fewer independent variables into the analysis and therefore preserving degrees of freedom. For example when all values are entered the resultant discriminant functions provide for a correct classification rate in excess of 75% but the discriminant functions themselves do not reach statistical significance. The second advantage is that we can conduct rudimentary tests on the psychometric properties of the resulting domain scales.

To this end Cronbach's alphas were calculated for each of the eight domains. Table 6.15 provides the alphas as well as the mean scores in descending order for each domain (mean of the combined scores for all domain items from one to eight).

Table 6.15  
Cronbach's Alpha, mean, standard deviation and N for each Schwartz value domain

Value Domain	$\alpha$	Mean	SD	N
BENEVOLENCE	.63	6.83	.87	154
UNIVERSALISM	.82	6.58	.94	157
SELF-DIRECTION	.72	6.53	.96	153
CONFORMITY	.73	6.48	.99	153
SECURITY	.63	6.45	.85	157
ACHIEVEMENT	.68	5.85	1.00	154
TRADITION	.58	5.31	1.22	152
POWER	.76	4.74	1.13	153

The composite benevolence, universalism, self-direction, conformity, and security domains are rated approximately equally, while achievement, tradition, and power are clearly perceived as least important. As with the individual values presented in table 6.14 there is a trend of increasing standard deviation as the domain becomes less popular, indicating that there is greater consensus about the importance of domains that are rated more highly.



The alphas presented in table 6.15 compare favourably with the reliabilities reported by Schwartz (1992) across his samples, particularly given the reduced pool of items from some domains. Additionally, the mean reliability of .69 is at least as good as the majority of the samples reported by Schwartz.

A direct discriminant function analysis was performed using the eight value domain variables as predictors of the parties perceived as best representing the respondent. 120 respondents completed the question "Which party do you intend to vote for with your party vote in the October 12th election?". 107 respondents named one of the four major parties, with the remaining 13 respondents splitting between six minor parties. For this reason only the 107 major-party identifiers were retained for the analysis, and of those fourteen respondents were eliminated with missing data. 93 respondents were used in the analysis. Evaluation of assumptions for multivariate analysis revealed no obvious violations and a Box's *M* test for equality of variance of group covariance matrices indicated no significant differences.

Of the three discriminant functions calculated, two were found to be significant. The first discriminant function accounted for 58% ( $\chi^2(24)=53.5, p<.001$ ) and 28% ( $\chi^2(14)=23.7, p<.05$ ) of the between group-variability. The two significant discriminant functions correctly predict the responses of 48% of the respondents (significantly better than chance: *Press's Q*=27.13,  $p<.01$ ).

Table 6.16.  
Pooled within-groups correlations between variables and canonical discriminant functions

Value Domain	Function 1	Function 2
SECURITY	.45	.08
POWER	.38	.02
UNIVERSALISM	-.37	.30
CONFORMITY	.27	-.14
TRADITION	.26	-.25
SELF-DIRECTION	-.05	-.38
ACHIEVEMENT	.07	-.22
BENEVOLENCE	.10	.10

Table 6.16 displays the correlations between the discriminating variables and the two significant canonical discriminant functions. The first discriminant function is primarily defined by three value domains (correlations greater than .30: Hair et al, 1995); Security, Power, and Universalism. While the second discriminant function is defined primarily by Self-Direction and Achievement.

Figure 6.8 below plots the centroids of the four groups against each discriminant function. The first function differentiates between Labour and the Alliance on the one hand, and NZ First and National on the other. Thus National and NZ First respondents tend to endorse Security, Power, and to a lesser degree Conformity and Tradition, while attributing less importance to Universalism.




Figure 6.8: Discriminant map derived from MDA of value domain scores and political preference

The second function discriminates between the Alliance and National on the positive side, and Labour and NZ First on the negative. This function is defined most strongly by the Self-direction domain, and more weakly by Achievement. Respondents indicating Alliance and National tended to endorse these two values more than Labour and NZ First respondents.

The discriminant function scores for each respondent were subject to one-way ANOVA. There was a significant difference on the first discriminant function ( $F(3, 89)=12.32, p<.001$ ) with Tukey range tests indicating that proponents of Labour and Alliance scored significantly more negatively than National and NZ First supporters at the 5% level. Range tests for the second discriminant function ( $F(3,89)=5.89, p<.01$ ) indicated that Labour supporters' function scores were lower than National and Alliance, while NZ First supporters scores were lower than Alliance at the 5% level.

## DISCUSSION:

The analyses above support the contention that values are related to political preference. This was expected. However, there was reason to believe (based on the content analyses of ideological and party meanings, and the analysis of political rhetoric) that the values of freedom and equality would be of primary importance in differentiating support for different parties. There was only weak support for this expectation. Table 6.17 shows that support for the four major parties of the time can be predicted using two value dimensions. The first dimension is strongly defined at the positive pole by support for Security and Power values, and at the negative pole by support for Universalism values. Given the content of the Universalism domain stresses equality, justice and tolerance this would seem to mirror Rokeach's (1973) original suggestion that equality values define one dimension of political positioning. The second dimension is defined most strongly by the negative pole endorsing Self-direction and Achievement values, contrasted (weakly though) by Benevolence values. Given that the content of the Self-direction domain (including freedom, independence, and curiosity) seems closest in spirit to Rokeach's (1973) concept of freedom this would give cautious support for the two-value model of politics.

Once more though, it is the dimension defined by the primary domain of Universalism (equality values) that is the best discriminator between parties. This is in line with the findings of the political rhetoric analysis in the first study of chapter six, that equality was the primary discriminator between political speakers, with freedom playing a very much secondary role.

It is worthwhile at this point to note that the two poles of the primary domain are consistent with the contention made by Braithwaite (1994, 1997) that political parties may be differentiated using the constructs of International security and harmony, or in this study Universalism and Security. The fact that these are the two poles of a single dimension suggests that (if representative) Braithwaite's contention is not applicable to complex political systems such as New Zealand's.

To what extent are these findings consistent with other New Zealand based research? One of the themes that runs through the NZES that is pertinent to the current research programme is the ongoing interest with the dimensions of political opinion. In the volume *Towards Consensus?* (Vowles et al, 1995 - a summary of some of the findings of the 1993 NZES) analyses are presented that support the contention that in recent times the nature of politics in New Zealand

has bifurcated, with the increasing salience of a group of political issues that Vowles et al characterise as New Politics. Vowles et al (1995) factor analysed responses to 36 political issues (eg. helping the unemployed, privatisation of various government assets, Maori language, etc) by voter and elite samples. Both samples produced similar results with eight factors accounting for approximately 50% of the variance. These eight factors were easily interpretable as concern for the issues of privatisation, welfare, nuclear/defence ties, Maori, regulation, women, unions, and the environment. To test the proposition that these issue groupings form two separate groups of issues (New and Old Politics) scales were constructed based on the eight factors produced, and these factors were then themselves subjected to (second order) factor analysis. The expectation of two second-order factors was supported with the scales forming two relatively distinct clusters: state ownership, regulation, welfare, and unions, contrasted with Maori, defence, ecology, and women's issues.

Vowles et al (1995) analysed these eight issue factors further. The eight issue scales were correlated with scores on materialism/postmaterialism and authoritarianism/libertarianism scales to test Vowles et al's own two-factor hypothesis, and it was found that of the 'Old' politics issues, endorsement of state regulation was significantly associated with authoritarianism and support for unions with the libertarian end of the scale while all of the 'New' political issues correlated with the libertarian end of the scale. Of the eight issues only endorsement of state regulation and ownership were unrelated to postmaterialism.

The proposition made by Vowles et al (1995) then, is that New Zealanders' opinions on political issues reflects their positions on two basic dimensions – materialism/postmaterialism and authoritarianism/libertarianism, for which there is a certain level of support. How well does this dimensionality in political attitudes translate into political party preference? At the level of the voter there are only limited relationships between these two dimensions and party preference – supporters of the four major parties are relatively indistinguishable on authoritarianism/libertarianism with stronger and more systematic differences to be found in terms of materialism/postmaterialism, with National voters falling towards the materialist pole and Labour and Alliance voters leaning towards the postmaterialist pole.

Based on this summary we are finally able to attempt comparison between the formulation of the

two-dimensional hypothesis presented by Vowles et al (1995) and the values-based analyses just presented. The results of the discriminant analysis of Schwartz (1992) values domains as predictors of political support produced two significant discriminant functions: the first characterised by endorsement of security and power values (and to a lesser extent conformity and tradition), and opposition to universalism values, and the second characterised by opposition to self-direction (and to a lesser extent benevolence). To what extent do these two functions correspond to the two domains hypothesised by Vowles et al?

At least superficially the first function bears some resemblance to the construct of authoritarianism, and the second to postmaterialism. Wilson and Liu (in preparation) present regression analyses of authoritarianism scores as measured by Altemeyer's (1981) RWA scale (described in chapter 5) on to scores on the same eight value domains that shows that authoritarianism is significantly positively related to the security ( $\beta=.31$ ), conformity ( $\beta=.25$ ) and tradition ( $\beta=.21$ ) domains, and negatively related to the universalism ( $\beta=-.46$ ) domain. Other than the finding of no relationship ( $\beta=0$ ) between power and RWA all four of these implicated value domains are part of the first function of the discriminant analyses presented in this study.

Not only is there an argument to be made that these value domains are strongly related to the construct of authoritarianism, but it is possible to directly determine the relationship between individual respondent's scores on this discriminant function and their RWA scores. The discriminant analysis was conducted a second time and scores were calculated for each respondent on the two discriminant functions. These were then correlated with the respondents' RWA scores producing a correlation of  $r(134)=.46$ ,  $p<.001$  (there was also a non-significant correlation of  $r(134)=-.07$ ns between function two and RWA scores). On the basis of these findings it is reasonable to conclude that there is much in common between the politically important value domain identified in this study and authoritarianism as conceptualised in the social psychological literature. The irony is that the analyses presented here provide stronger support than that presented by Vowles et al (1995).

The reason for this inconsistency may lie in the scale used to measure authoritarianism in the NZES. The measure of authoritarianism derived from the NZES is based on responses to three items – 'Most people would try to take advantage of others if they got the chance', 'A few strong leaders could make this country stronger than all the laws and talk', and 'Most people who don't

get ahead don't have enough willpower'. A number of problems are apparent. The first is that the scale, comprising of only three items, may possess limited internal consistency (there is no indication given of the reliability of the scale). Secondly, the items are arguably not optimal for measuring authoritarianism anyway – only the second item even implies attitude towards authority. These problems, while perhaps providing an explanation for the lack of discriminatory power in the prediction of preference, raise questions over the interpretation of the findings of relationships between the 'authoritarianism' scale and issue attitudes presented in *Towards Consensus?*

What then are the prospects for comparability of postmaterialism with the second discriminant function? While the value domains comprising the first dimension are intuitively and empirically related to authoritarianism, the interpretation of the second function in relation to postmaterialism is less obvious. The value domain with the highest canonical loading on function two (self-direction) is clearly related to postmaterialism (the domain comprises of freedom, independence, choosing one's own goals, and curiosity). However, the second highest loading on function two is universalism, which at face-value may be considered to reflect transcendence of material concerns (including such values as wisdom, social justice, a world of beauty, and protecting the environment) but has the opposite valence to self-direction. Importantly, security has a very weak loading on function two, which might be quite inconsistent with the argument that this second dimension relates to postmaterialism.

Further light is cast on this matter by Wilson and Allen (in preparation) who present value analyses intended to locate the position in the values-space occupied by postmaterialism. Regression of Abramson and Inglehart's (1995) postmaterialism scale onto the full Schwartz (1992) social values inventory indicates strong positive relationships between self-direction ( $\beta=.28$ ) and benevolence ( $\beta=.27$ ) domains, and a negative relationship with security values ( $\beta=-.28$ ) which is much more in keeping with Inglehart's (1971; 1981) conceptualisation of postmaterialism.

This is not to say that postmaterialism and authoritarianism are not compatible with a two-dimensional model of politics. In terms of the NZES the measure of authoritarianism derived is unlikely to be the most suitable measure of the construct, and conclusions based on it may be unreliable. However, the results presented in this chapter do suggest that there is an important

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place for authoritarianism as a determinant or reflection of political preference. In the case of postmaterialism the NZES data indicates that this is a construct that shows systematic relationships with political preference. Whether or not postmaterialism might be a primary political dimension is difficult to determine, and is an issue that cannot be addressed directly on the basis of the data presented in this chapter (no compatible construct was included in the SSRQ) though the results of the discriminant analysis do not appear to support the contention.

Drawing on the overseas literature there is one published study that is directly relevant to the issue of the relationship between postmaterialism and social values (Braithwaite, Makkai, & Pittelkow, 1996). Braithwaite and colleagues elicited responses to Inglehart's four-item postmaterialism battery as well as Braithwaite's own values instrument tapping the two primary dimensions of international harmony and equality, and national strength and order. Braithwaite et al (1996) argue that postmaterialism is systematically related to both dimensions - in effect cutting across the values space rather than simply mirroring a single dimension. This is a similar finding to that reported by Wilson and Allen (under review) who also report that postmaterialism scores correlate to some extent with the both of the primary social value domains.

A further investigation of the role of values in political preference and opinion was carried out using these value domains and the most important of the three socio-political measures used in the first study of this theses: liberal/conservative self-identification. These three measures were regressed against the eight value domain scores with the results presented below.

### **VALUES and IDEOLOGICAL SELF-IDENTIFICATION**

A standard multiple regression was performed between liberal-conservative self-identification as the dependent variable, and the eight value domain scores as independent variables.

Table 6.17 displays the unstandardised regression coefficients (B) and constant, the standardised regression coefficients ( $\beta$ ),  $R^2$ , and adjusted  $R^2$ . The regression was significant ( $F(8,118)=4.41, p<.001$ ).



Table 6.17  
Summary of Standard Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Respondent's Liberal-Conservative Self-Identification (N=126)

Value Domain	B	β
CONFORMITY	.72	.45**
SECURITY	.34	.19
SELF-DIRECTION	.27	.16
POWER	.01	.01
TRADITION	-.04	-.03
BENEVOLENCE	-.18	-.10
ACHIEVEMENT	-.38	-.25*
UNIVERSALISM	-.72	-.43**
(Constant)	3.59	

R<sup>2</sup> = .23  
R<sup>2</sup><sub>adjusted</sub> = .18  
\**p* < .05      \*\**p* < .01

The most important domains were Conformity, Achievement, and Universalism. The finding that endorsement of conformity values is positively related with a more conservative self-identification is consistent with the analysis of meanings of the conservative position, as is the finding that universalism values are associated with a liberal self-identification.

These findings support the original argument that values are intimately associated with symbolic politics. That is to say, if ideological self-identification is related to political opinion and preference, which in turn reflects the values of the individual. As has been shown in the earlier analyses in this chapter political preference is associated with the values attributed to different parties, expanding the voter-value-party relationship further.

### **SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS**

The results of this study provide weak support for Rokeach's (1973) two-value model of politics. Additionally, this study provides more support for the argument that values are intimately related to political preference in a manner consistent with symbolic politics theory.

## STUDY FOUR: Values, advertising, and political success

The aim of this study is to apply the work on values and representations in chapters five and six in connecting the success of the parties in the 1996 election to their electoral advertising campaigns. This is done using the flagship television advertisements of each of the four major parties in an experimental setting to determine the effect of the advertisements on the party value representations held by the viewers.

As mentioned previously (chapter three) in the summary of the election results the Alliance were the both the most dramatic losers and greatest success story. A year out from the election the five-party union looked ready to usurp the position of Labour as THE party of the left. Following the election they were relegated to the role of observer even though increasing their parliamentary presence from two seats to thirteen. Just as New Zealand First had suffered from not ruling out the possibility of negotiation with National, the Alliance had suffered due to their refusal to negotiate a pre-election coalition with Labour. In the post-election autopsy the Alliance hierarchy acknowledged that this might have lead to the perception that a vote for the Alliance was a wasted vote.

A second explanation offered was that their election campaign had failed to engage the favour of supporters and potential supporters, with their television campaign receiving particular criticism.

To evaluate the potential effectiveness of the television advertising used by the major parties an experiment was conducted. The experiment required participants to make value attributions after being primed by viewing the electoral advert of one of the major parties. It was expected that successful adverts would tap into the values most positively associated with those parties. For example, based on the party representations reported in previous studies one would expect an Alliance political advertisement to emphasise values such as World of Beauty, Broadminded, and importantly, Equality. Failure to engage voters at this value symbolic level might go some way to explaining electoral success or failure.

## **METHOD**

This experiment was conducted approximately two months before the election, before the formal commencement of the election campaign, and immediately after the political party adverts intended for the election campaign had received their first public airing. This occurred on a political discussion section of the TV3 nightly news. The section presented by Anita McNaught showed the adverts prepared for National, Labour, New Zealand First and the Alliance, with comment from an advertising industry expert. This section was videotaped and the adverts transferred to a separate tape with commentary edited out. These adverts served as the stimuli in this experiment. The advert content is summarised below.

## **ADVERT CONTENT**

The National Party advert focussed purely on the prime minister Jim Bolger talking about the successes of the six-year National government. Standing in an affluently presented room Bolger primarily discussed the financial successes of his administration (eg. reducing unemployment, reducing overseas debt).

The Labour party advert presented a vignette in which a wide variety of people (ethnically diverse, of different ages, men and women) storm Wellington's Majestic building. Taking over a boardroom and replacing the businessmen seated around the table. The theme is taking back our New Zealand. Not all those seated are evicted though, the voice-over indicates that Labour will still be financially practical.

The New Zealand First advert presents obviously old silent movie footage of several gamblers around a table. The voice-over asks if New Zealanders want a say in who controls their future-humorous caricatures of some of New Zealand's Business Roundtable or themselves. The advert goes on to illustrate how these different interests have sold New Zealand's assets for their own profit. The voters should "put New Zealand First".

The Alliance political party advert was one of the most contentious, being subject to criticisms on radio talkback, editorial cartoons, and editorial letters. The advert pictures an Orangutan reacting to a voice-over describing the failures of past Labour and National governments equally. The primate belches and covers its face as each atrocity is described (and subtitled). The Alliance is presented purely as an alternative to these with few specifics about how this is the case.

## **PARTICIPANTS**

The participants in this experiment were 125 students in a second year social psychology paper. The experiment was conducted as part of each of ten non-compulsory laboratory tutorials over a period of one week. Each student participated in only one lab session, with between ten and twenty participants attending each lab. 32 people participated in the control condition, 19 in the National condition, 23 in New Zealand First, 30 in Labour, and 21 in the Alliance condition.

## **MEASURES**

Participants in different experimental conditions were supplied with a leaflet of measures. The content of the leaflets were the same for each condition but order of presentation was varied.

CONTROL CONDITION: The first page started with the line "What do our political parties stand for? What values do they represent?" followed by a value attribution matrix similar to that used in chapter 3, study 2, except that participants were asked only to evaluate the four major parties: National, Labour, New Zealand First, and the Alliance. The same instructions were used, asking participants to indicate with a tick the values the party stands for, a cross for values the party opposes, and a blank for neither stands for or opposes. There were eight forms of the measure-Values were presented in four orders:

NAT/NZF/LAB/ALL, NZF/NAT/ALL/LAB, LAB/ALL/NAT/NZF, and ALL/LAB/NZF/NAT.

Participants then filled out a feeling thermometer for each of eight parties; National, New Zealand First, Labour, Alliance, Progressive Greens, United NZ, Act, and Christian Coalition, followed by questions measuring party identification, voting intention, prime ministerial preference, and favoured coalition. A sample control condition questionnaire is included in appendix six.

EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS: The first page started with the instruction "Before evaluating the quality of the advert. we realise that the way you feel towards the [political party] may influence your evaluation. Please complete the table below so that we can get some idea of your feelings towards [political party]". This was followed by a value attribution matrix for the single party corresponding to the political advert (note that these variables were scored in the same manner as in chapter six, study two). The second page requested participants evaluate the advert on

seven dimensions; Low quality-High quality, Logical-Illogical, Unbelievable-Believable, Emotional-Unemotional, Simple-Complex, Convincing-Unconvincing, Untrue-True. Each was rated on a nine-point scale from -4 to +4. The third page required participants to complete a value attribution matrix for the other three parties. A fourth page included feeling thermometer scales for each of eight parties; National, New Zealand First, Labour, Alliance, Progressive Greens, United NZ, Act, and Christian Coalition, followed by questions measuring party identification, voting intention, prime ministerial preference, and favoured coalition. A sample Experimental condition questionnaire is provided in appendix six.

## **PROCEDURE**

A different condition was administered on each of the five days of the experiment. The first day was designated the control condition. Participants were given a control condition leaflet containing the measures to be used. They were told that the content of the lab period would involve political discussion so before beginning they should complete the questions in the leaflet to give an idea of how they felt about the different parties. Participants were then shown the adverts and encouraged to discuss them. The remainder of the lab period consisted of tutor-led discussion of contemporary approaches to studying political behaviour.

A separate experimental condition was administered on each of the remaining four days. Participants were given an experimental condition leaflet and told that the first part of the lab period was devoted to evaluating the quality of a political advert. The advert was shown and participants were told to complete the leaflet of measures.

Participants were de-briefed in lab classes the following week, with a brief discussion of the results and a call for any feedback.

## RESULTS

Two sets of comparisons are reported:

- T-tests between control group evaluations for each party and the same party from the corresponding experimental condition (eg. control group evaluation of National, and National advert experimental group evaluation of National). These are intended to illustrate the impact of the advert of a particular party on the evaluation of that party. If the advert is successful it should highlight values central to the representation of that party.
- One-way ANOVAs comparing party evaluations across all conditions (eg. evaluations of National for control and all experimental groups). Successful political adverts will not only emphasise values central to the target party representation but will likely also negatively influence evaluation of other parties (highlighting undesirable values).




Figure 6.9: Line graph of feeling thermometer ratings for each condition

Figure 6.9 on the previous page shows a line graph of the feeling thermometer scores for the control and experimental conditions. Table 6.18 summarises the same information and the results of one-way ANOVAS on the data. These revealed no significant differences in the favourability ratings for each party across the conditions. Note however that the highest favourability rating for National was found in the Pro-National condition, while the lowest favourability rating for the Alliance occurred in the Pro-Alliance condition.

Table 6.18  
Mean and SD of feeling thermometer ratings for each party across all conditions

PARTY	CONDITION					F-value
	Control	National	NZ First	Labour	Alliance	
<b>National</b>	3.38 (1.90)	4.32 (1.97)	3.78 (2.19)	4.10 (1.65)	3.05 (1.63)	(4,120)= 1.75 ns
<b>NZ First</b>	2.63 (1.73)	3.53 (2.22)	3.48 (2.06)	2.87 (1.85)	3.00 (1.38)	(4,120)= .95ns
<b>Labour</b>	4.91 (1.23)	5.47 (1.31)	5.26 (1.27)	4.63 (1.50)	4.48 (1.54)	(4,120)= 1.86ns
<b>Alliance</b>	4.45 (1.26)	4.58 (1.87)	4.70 (2.08)	4.50 (2.15)	4.25 (1.41)	(4,118)= .18ns

Though there are no significant differences in favourability ratings across the five groups there are a number of trends evident in figure 6.9. Firstly the relative levels of favourability for each party do not vary across the five conditions. That is to say for example, that in no condition is New Zealand First rated more highly than National, which in turn is not rated more highly than the Alliance, while Labour was perceived most favourably in all conditions. Further, National is rated most favourably in the National advert condition, New Zealand First rated second most favourably in the New Zealand First advert condition, while Labour receives only it's fourth highest rating (eg. second to lowest) in it's own condition while the Alliance receives it's least favourable rating in the Alliance advert condition. Ironically, Labour was rated most favourably in the National advert condition, surely a finding that National would not have been happy with even taking into account their own highest rating. Having said this it has already been illustrated in the earlier studies that liking does not necessarily equate with voting intention.

## RESULTS: T-tests

### National

T-tests comparing mean value attribution scores of the control group with the participants in the National advert condition found only one significant difference for Wealth ( $t(49)=2.59$ ,  $p<.05$ ) with the control group perceiving National to stand for Wealth (Mean=2.91) more than the experimental group (Mean=2.58). Though participants attributed freedom and equality to National more than the control group the differences were not significant (Freedom  $t(49)=1.69$ ,  $p=.09ns$ , Control=2.50,  $exptl=2.80$  and Equality  $t(49)=.89$ ,  $p=.38ns$ , Control=1.78,  $exptl=2.00$ ).

### New Zealand First

T-tests of value attributions made by control and New Zealand First condition participants indicated significant differences for two values:

- Honest ( $t(53)=2.22$ ,  $p<.05$ ) with participants in the experimental condition indicating that New Zealand First stands for honesty more than control participants (control=1.78, experimental=2.22).
- Fairness ( $t(53)=2.38$ ,  $p<.05$ ) with control participants (mean=2.06) perceiving New Zealand First to stand for Fairness less than experimental participants (mean=2.48).

Again there were no significant differences for freedom ( $t(53)=.30$ ,  $p=.78ns$ , control=2.44,  $exptl=2.39$ ) or equality ( $t(53)=1.16$ ,  $p=.25ns$ , control=1.88,  $exptl=2.13$ ).

### Labour

The following significant differences were found between control and experimental group attributions for Labour:

- Forgiving ( $t(60)=3.58$ ,  $p<.01$ ) with the control group (mean=2.25) indicating Labour stands more for this value than the experimental group (mean=1.67).
- Equality ( $t(60)=1.97$ ,  $p<0.05$ ) with the control group (mean=2.50) indicating Labour stands less for this value than the experimental group (mean=2.80).
- Social order ( $t(60)=2.09$ ,  $p<.05$ ) with the control group (mean=2.25) indicating Labour stands less for this value than the experimental group (mean=2.57).
- Natsec ( $t(60)=2.87$ ,  $p<.01$ ) with the control group (mean=2.31) indicating Labour stands more for this value than the experimental group (mean=1.87).



- Family Security ( $t(60)=2.70$ ,  $p<.01$ ) with the control group (mean=2.50) indicating Labour stands less for this value than the experimental group (mean=2.80).
- Protecting the environment ( $t(60)=2.35$ ,  $p<.05$ ) with the control group (mean=2.19) indicating Labour stands more for this value than the experimental group (mean=1.83).

The value attributions for Freedom ( $t(60)=1.68$ ,  $p=.09ns$ ) were not significantly different though the trend was for the control group (mean=2.47) to consider Labour as representing freedom more than the experimental group having viewed the advert (mean=2.17).

### The Alliance

Significant differences were found between control and experimental groups viewing the Alliance advert on six value attributions:

- Forgiving ( $t(51)=4.66$ ,  $p<.01$ ) with the control group (mean=2.34) rating the Alliance as representing this value more than the experimental group (mean=1.48).
- Devout ( $t(51)=2.72$ ,  $p<.01$ ) with the control group (mean=2.06) rating the Alliance as representing this value more than the experimental group (mean=1.57).
- Social power ( $t(51)=3.30$ ,  $p<.01$ ) with the control group (mean=1.81) rating the Alliance as representing this value less than the experimental group (mean=2.48).
- National security ( $t(51)=3.16$ ,  $p<.01$ ) with the control group (mean=2.34) rating the Alliance as representing this value more than the experimental group (mean=1.81).
- Broadminded ( $t(51)=2.63$ ,  $p<.05$ ) with the control group (mean=2.41) rating the Alliance as representing this value more than the experimental group (mean=1.86).
- World of Beauty ( $t(51)=2.33$ ,  $p<.05$ ) with the control group (mean=2.34) rating the Alliance as representing this value more than the experimental group (mean=1.90).

Importantly, there were no significant differences for either equality ( $t(51)=1.14$ ,  $p=.26ns$ , controlmean=2.69, exptlmean=2.48) or protecting the environment ( $t(51)=1.86$ ,  $p=.07ns$ , controlmean=2.59, exptlmean=2.24) though the trend in both cases is for the experimental group to rate the party as standing less for those values than the control group.

## RESULTS: ANOVAs

The four tables below report the mean value attribution scores made by participants in the control and four experimental conditions for each of the four parties, table 6.19 for the National party, table 6.20 for New Zealand First, table 6.21 for Labour, and table 6.22 for the Alliance. the attribution scores for each party were compared for the five conditions and the ANOVA results are reported in the tables.

Table 6.19

Mean scores and summary of ANOVA results for control and experimental groups for National Party value attributions

ADVERT CONDITION:	CONTROL	NATIONAL	NZ FIRST	LABOUR	ALLIANCE	F(4,120)=
	n=32	n=19	n=23	n=30	n=21	
Forgiving	1.72	1.74	1.65	1.83	1.57	.56ns
Devout	2.00	2.11	2.22	2.00	1.81	1.05ns
Obedient	1.94	2.32	1.96	1.93	1.81	.29ns
Accept Position	2.28	2.16	2.09	2.03	2.43	1.04ns
Influential	2.81	2.84	2.52	2.73	2.57	1.67ns
Exciting Life	1.84	1.89	1.96	1.90	1.60	.84ns
Social Power	2.69	2.58	2.48	2.43	2.81	1.30ns
Equality	1.78	2.00	1.78	2.07b	1.38a	<b>2.66*</b>
Reciprocate favours	2.21	2.25	2.30	2.23	2.14	.16ns
Social Justice	1.78	2.05	1.87	1.90	1.62	.90ns
Family Security	2.13	2.32	2.26	2.23	1.81	1.90ns
Protect environment	1.91	2.00	1.83	1.97	1.48	2.41+
Honesty	1.63	1.95	1.74	1.67	1.52	.98ns
Freedom	2.50	2.79a	2.35b	2.83ab	2.24a	<b>4.65**</b>
Public image	2.88a	2.84a	2.74	2.83a	2.43a	<b>3.53**</b>
Family Values	2.43a	2.63	2.52	2.43	2.00a	<b>2.69*</b>
Authority	2.78	2.79	2.57	2.70	2.62	1.00ns
Fairness	1.75	1.79	1.70	1.97	1.52	1.16ns
Respect Tradition	2.34a	2.47a	2.43a	2.07	1.81a	<b>4.15**</b>
Social Order	2.53	2.84	2.39	2.57	2.33	1.75ns
Wealth	2.91	2.58	2.65	2.63	2.67	1.62ns
National Security	2.53	2.68	2.48	2.57	2.38	.55ns
Broadminded	1.59	1.68	1.83	2.00	1.52	1.83ns
World of Beauty	1.78	1.84	1.87	2.03	1.57	2.25+

+ = p < .10 \* = p < .05 \*\* = p < .01

a denotes difference, same for c and d

Significant differences were found for five values: Alliance condition participants rated National as more representative of equality than those in the Labour condition; National and Labour condition participants rated National as representative of Freedom more than Alliance condition participants while Labour participants rated National higher on Freedom than New Zealand First participants; Control, National, and Labour participants scored National higher on Public Image

than Alliance participants; Control participants rated National higher on family values than Alliance participants; Control, National, and New Zealand First participants scored National higher on Respect for Tradition than Alliance participants.

Table 6.20

Mean scores and summary of ANOVA results for control and experimental groups for New Zealand First value attributions

ADVERT CONDITION:	CONTROL	NZ FIRST	NATIONAL	LABOUR	ALLIANCE	F(4,118)=
	n=32	n=23	n=19	n=30	n=21	
Forgiving	1.59	1.30	1.71	1.67	1.48	1.53ns
Devout	1.72	1.96	2.06	2.00	1.67	1.89ns
Obedient	2.06	2.30a	2.29a	2.03	1.67a	<b>3.05**</b>
Accept Position	1.75	1.83	1.94	1.67	2.00	.96ns
Influential	2.72	2.48	2.65	2.63	2.33	1.55ns
Exciting Life	1.94	1.78	2.18	2.07	1.90	1.68ns
Social Power	2.53	2.39	2.82	2.50	2.43	1.30ns
Equality	1.88	2.13	2.00	1.90	1.86	.47ns
Reciprocate favours	1.97	2.26	2.00	2.03	1.81	1.53ns
Social Justice	2.38	2.52	2.35	2.50	2.29	.46ns
Family Security	2.28	2.43	2.47	2.23	2.10	1.31ns
Protect environment	2.09	2.04	2.12	2.10	1.71	1.66ns
Honesty	1.78	2.21a	1.64	1.77	1.52a	<b>2.98*</b>
Freedom	2.44	2.39	2.71a	2.30	2.00a	<b>3.47*</b>
Public image	2.56	2.43	2.88	2.67	2.57	1.63ns
Family Values	2.19	2.13	2.35	2.30	2.14	.51ns
Authority	2.66	2.39	2.82	2.60	2.52	1.62ns
Fairness	2.06	2.48a	2.12	1.90a	2.00	<b>2.91*</b>
Respect Tradition	2.25	2.26	2.18	2.13	1.81	2.06+
Social Order	2.25	2.52	2.71a	2.23	2.10a	<b>2.75*</b>
Wealth	2.31	2.30	2.18	2.03	2.14	.86ns
National Security	2.50a	2.57a	2.47	2.20	1.90a	<b>4.34**</b>
Broadminded	1.53	1.43	1.41	1.67	1.43	.65ns
World of Beauty	1.94	1.74	1.82	2.07	1.81	1.43ns

+ =  $p < .10$  \* =  $p < .05$  \*\* =  $p < .01$

a denotes difference, same for c and d

Significant differences were found on six values: New Zealand First and National condition participants scored New Zealand First higher on Obedient; New Zealand First participants scored New Zealand First higher on Honesty than Alliance participants and higher on Fairness than Labour condition participants; National participants rated New Zealand First higher on Freedom than Alliance participants and higher on Social Order than Alliance condition participants; Both Control and New Zealand First condition participants rated New Zealand First higher on National Security than those in the Alliance condition.

Table 6.21

Mean scores and summary of ANOVA results for control and experimental groups for Labour

Party value attributions

ADVERT CONDITION:	CONTROL	LABOUR	NATIONAL	NZ FIRST	ALLIANCE	F(4,118)=
	n=32	n=30	n=19	n=23	n=21	
Forgiving	2.25a	1.67a	2.12	1.96	1.57a	<b>4.22**</b>
Devout	1.81	1.77	1.88	1.70	1.52	1.35ns
Obedient	2.19	2.37	2.47	2.13	2.05	1.25ns
Accept Position	2.00	2.00	1.82	1.91	1.76	.43ns
Influential	2.69	2.70	2.65	2.61	2.57	.27ns
Exciting Life	2.00	1.89	2.00	2.00	1.95	.31ns
Social Power	1.94	1.87	1.82	1.83	2.33	1.49ns
Equality	2.50	2.80	2.65	2.52	2.33	1.65ns
Reciprocate favours	2.09	1.93	2.17	2.30	2.10	1.22ns
Social Justice	2.66	2.80	2.82	2.57	2.57	1.07ns
Family Security	2.50a	2.83a	2.65	2.57	2.14a	<b>4.99**</b>
Protect environment	2.19ab	1.83b	2.29ab	2.17	1.81a	<b>2.76*</b>
Honesty	1.91	1.97	2.41	2.0	1.71	2.23+
Freedom	2.47	2.17	2.47	2.30	2.33	.86ns
Public image	2.69	2.53	2.76	2.39	2.43	1.40ns
Family Values	2.41	2.57a	2.35	2.35	2.00a	2.20+
Authority	2.31	2.23	2.35	2.43	2.52	.75ns
Fairness	2.66	2.70	2.65	2.26	2.62	1.85ns
Respect Tradition	2.28	2.03	2.41	1.96	1.90	2.40+
Social Order	2.25b	2.57a	2.64ab	2.26	2.14a	<b>2.51*</b>
Wealth	2.06	1.77	1.88	1.78	2.10	1.38ns
National Security	2.31	1.87	2.35	2.13	2.23	2.39+
Broadminded	2.13	2.07	2.24	2.39	2.10	.72ns
World of Beauty	2.16	1.97	2.12	1.96	1.95	.73ns

+ =  $p < .10$  \* =  $p < .05$  \*\* =  $p < .01$

a denotes difference, same for c and d

Significant differences were found on four values: Labour was rated more highly on Forgiving and Family Security by control group participants than those in the Labour or Alliance conditions; participants in both the Labour and Alliance conditions rated Labour lower on Protect Environment than either control or National condition participants; Labour and National condition participants rated Labour higher on Social Order while control group participants scored the party higher than did Alliance participants.

Table 6.22

Mean scores and summary of ANOVA results for control and experimental groups for Alliance value attributions

ADVERT CONDITION:	CONTROL	ALLIANCE	NATIONAL	NZ FIRST	LABOUR	F(4,118)=
	n=32	n=21	n=19	n=23	n=30	
Forgiving	2.34b	1.48a	2.35b	2.09b	2.10b	<b>5.41**</b>
Devout	2.06	1.57	2.00	1.83	1.90	2.43+
Obedient	2.19	2.00	2.59a	1.87b	2.20	<b>3.32*</b>
Accept Position	2.09	1.67	1.76	1.96	1.87	1.29ns
Influential	2.56	2.33	2.65	2.17	2.30	1.88ns
Exciting Life	2.03	1.81	2.06	2.09	2.00	.92ns
Social Power	1.81b	2.48a	2.29	1.83b	2.10	<b>3.52**</b>
Equality	2.69	2.48	2.53	2.65	2.73	.69ns
Reciprocate favours	2.19	1.95	2.00	2.04	1.83	1.40ns
Social Justice	2.78	2.90	2.71	2.61	2.70	1.31ns
Family Security	2.50	2.76	2.48	2.52	2.53	.97ns
Protect environment	2.59	2.24	2.59	2.48	2.57	1.32ns
Honesty	2.09	2.19	2.34	2.04	2.10	.20ns
Freedom	2.34	2.19	2.11	1.91	2.03	1.68ns
Public image	2.66b	2.48	2.71b	2.21a	2.40	<b>2.49*</b>
Family Values	2.41	2.33	2.47	2.39	2.50	.26ns
Authority	2.19	2.19	2.29	2.13	2.10	.28ns
Fairness	2.66	2.67	2.59	2.43	2.60	.69ns
Respect Tradition	2.21	2.05	2.06	1.83	2.23	1.87ns
Social Order	2.28	2.43	2.59	2.17	2.20	1.50ns
Wealth	2.00	1.71	1.94	1.74	1.67	1.45ns
National Security	2.34a	1.81b	2.17	2.04	1.80b	<b>4.04**</b>
Broadminded	2.41	1.86	2.23	2.30	2.20	1.78ns
World of Beauty	2.34	1.90	2.06	2.04	2.13	1.93ns

+ =  $p < .10$  \* =  $p < .05$  \*\* =  $p < .01$

a denotes difference, same for c and d

Significant differences were found for five values: Alliance condition participants rated the Alliance lower on Forgiving than all other conditions, and higher on Social Power than those in the control or New Zealand First conditions; National condition participants rated the Alliance higher on Obedient than did New Zealand First condition participants; New Zealand First condition participants rated the Alliance lower on Public Image than National or control condition participants; and Alliance and Labour condition participants rated the Alliance lower than control condition participants on National Security.

## DISCUSSION

The finding that the Alliance was perceived least favourably by those people who viewed the Alliance advert supports the original argument that the advertisement was unsuccessful. The reasons for this lack of success may be found in the analyses of what the parties were seen to stand for. The Alliance was rated as endorsing social power most, and forgiving and national security least of the four parties rated in the Alliance advert condition. Additionally, though not significant, the Alliance was seen received the lowest endorsement ratings of the four parties for world of beauty and protection of the environment.

These findings indicate that following the advert the Alliance was not only associated by the participants as representing values that are viewed negatively and typically associated with the National party (social power), but also the Alliance was not seen to represent the values which are intimately associated with it's popular image, those relating to protection of the environment (see chapter five, study two). This must surely put the Alliance in a bad position when one of the defining images they represent is not elicited by their advert. This itself may be a potential problem for negative campaigning- the Alliance advert was clearly negative, saying little about the Alliance itself while attacking the other parties. The fact that the other three parties were perceived more unfavourably in the Alliance advert condition than any other experimental condition indicates that the negative campaigning conducted might be a successful way of attacking other parties one must also be careful to present something positive and substantive about one's own party in order to avoid the scenario that Alliance found themselves in- receiving their own lowest evaluation in the same condition in which their own advert was presented.

Clearly the parties must emphasise their own positive message in order to be successful. National is associated with financial and economic matters, that is what was emphasised in their advert, and that was where they were viewed most positively, even by non-National supporters. Similarly, the clear success story was Labour, whose advert was evocative and rich in symbolism- the replacement of the businessman (all were male) by the people of New Zealand (but not at the expense of the economic revival, mind) was clearly a positive image. More than any other advert, the Labour presentation gave the message that a vote for Labour would put more than Labour in power- it would put the people of New Zealand in the driving seat and ahead of purely monetary interests. This is consistent with the image of Labour (and the Alliance)

apparent from the analysis of open-ended party images obtained in study two of chapter five-people before money. Having said this though, Labour was still perceived most favourably in a non-Labour condition. In the Labour advert condition Labour was still perceived more favourably than the other parties, but only on a relative level, having had the effect of suppressing the other parties' levels of favourability as well.

## **ANALYSIS TWO**

The previous analyses are very fine-grained, focusing on individual values and showing that the political party adverts used as stimuli influence (however briefly) the salience of different values. The analyses presented are not entirely satisfactory however, as they do not take into account the great number of statistical comparisons being made. The risk of accepting (incorrectly) a significant difference at the  $p < .05$  level is increased the more comparisons are made. For this reason the following analyses reduce the number of comparisons being made (by reducing the comparison values through factor analysis).

The responses to the value attribution instruments were subjected to principal components analysis for each target political party. In all cases five factors were extracted that accounted for approximately 50% of the variance in individual responses. These factors were rotated using a varimax procedure and factor scores for each participant saved as new variables. This allowed comparison of the factor scores across the five conditions of the experiment. The results of these analyses are presented below.

It should be obvious that the aim of political party adverts is to present the target party in as positive a light as possible - emphasising positive attributes and down-playing others. At the same time one would anticipate adverts to be intended to make opposition parties look as bad as possible. An advert then, will be considered to have worked if it makes the target party look good, and non-target parties look bad.

### **Value attributions for the National Party**

The five factors extracted accounted for 52.3% of response variance with the largest factor accounting for 22% alone. Interpreting the factors was not an easy process. The five factors extracted were labelled broadminded, fairness, national strength, tradition, and materialism.

Regression of feeling thermometer ratings for National onto the scores from the five factors produced a significant regression ( $F(5,119)=13.92$ ,  $p<.001$ ) with a multiple-R of .61 ( $R^2_{\text{adjusted}}=.34$ ). Tradition and materialism proved to be insignificant predictors but factor scores for Broadminded ( $\beta=.42$ ,  $p<.001$ ), National Strength ( $\beta=.17$ ,  $p<.05$ ), and Fairness ( $\beta=.40$ ,  $p<.001$ ).

Table 6.23  
Factor loadings for National Party value attributions

LABEL:	FACTOR:	1	2	3	4	5
<b>Broadminded</b>	Exciting Life	.73				
	World of Beauty	.72				
	Broadminded	.68				
	Protect Environment	.55				
	Fairness	.50				
	Forgiving	.50				
<b>Fairness</b>	Obedient		.75			
	Social Justice		.73			
	Honest		.50			
	Equality		.48			
<b>National Strength</b>	Freedom			.73		
	National Security			.64		
	Social Order			.50		
	Authority			.48		
	Public Image			.46		
	Influential			.42		
	Reciprocate Favours			.41		
<b>Tradition</b>	Family Values				.72	
	Respect Tradition				.71	
	Devout				.70	
	Family Security				.53	
<b>Materialism</b>	Accept Position					.66
	Wealth					.57
	Social Power					.54
	Eigenvalue	5.38	2.77	1.68	1.46	1.27
	% Variance explained	22	12	7	6	5

Factor scores for each condition were compared using ANOVA (with Tukey post-hoc tests used to identify difference pairs), indicating that there were significant differences for the national strength and tradition factors. Table 6.24 below shows the means and F-test results for each factor. Scores in the National advert condition were significantly higher than in the Alliance and



New Zealand First conditions on National Strength, but roughly the same as in the Labour and control conditions. Similarly, the scores for the tradition factor were approximately the same in the National and New Zealand First conditions compared to the Alliance condition. The big differences occur between the National condition and the Alliance condition. As well as these significant differences there is also a non-significant trend for National to be rated highest on Fairness in the National advert condition than any other.

Table 6.24  
ANOVA results for comparison of National Party factor scores for five conditions

Condition:	Control	Nat	NZF	Lab	All	F(4,120)=
1. Broadminded	-.05	-.11	.14	.32	-.43	1.98ns
2. Fairness	-.14	.34	-.08	-.02	.02	.74ns
3. National Strength	.14b	.39bd	-.33c	.28bd	-.60a	4.46**
4. Tradition	.09b	.31b	.36b	-.14	-.61a	3.68**
5. Materialism	.16	-.11	-.13	-.19	.26	1.01ns

a differs from b. c differs from d, e differs from f, at  $p < .05$

T-tests were used to compare control and experimental National party advert condition scores on the factors but none of the comparisons were significant suggesting that the advert neither emphasised good attributes or de-emphasised negative attributes of the National party.

Based on the expectations outlined above, the National party advert succeeds in emphasising one positive factor associated with liking for National more than opposition adverts present National negatively - National Strength. Additionally, though marginally non-significant National is rated highest on Fairness in the National condition.

## Value attributions for the Alliance

Table 6.25  
Factor loadings for Alliance value attributions

LABEL:	FACTOR:	1	2	3	4	5
<b>Fairness</b>	Equality	.71				
	Fairness	.71				
	Social Justice	.67				
	Honest	.59				
	Broadminded	.51				
<b>Self-Transcendence</b>	Exciting Life		.75			
	World of Beauty		.69			
	Protect Environment		.53			
	Forgiving		.45			
	Devout					
<b>Security</b>	Reciprocate Favours			.64		
	Accept Position			.63		
	Freedom			.62		
	National Security			.57		
	Wealth			.56		
<b>Power over Others</b>	Authority				.71	
	Social Power				.64	
	Public Image				.54	
	Influential				.47	
<b>Conformity</b>	Family values					.78
	Family Security					.47
	Respect Tradition					.46
	Obedient					-.40
	Social Order					
	Eigenvalue	3.68	2.84	1.65	1.53	1.44
	% Variance explained	15	12	7	6	6

The five factors produced were labelled fairness (emphasis on equality, fairness, social justice), self-transcendence (exciting life, world of beauty, protecting the environment), security (reciprocation of favours, accepting one's position, freedom), power over others (authority, social power, public image), and conformity (family values, family security, and respect for tradition). The five factors extracted accounted for 46.4% of total variance.

Regression of Alliance feeling thermometer ratings on the factor scores resulted in a significant regression ( $F(5,115)=2.82$ ,  $p<.05$ ), though accounting for considerably less variance than the previous analysis for National (multiple- $R=.33$ ,  $R^2_{\text{adjusted}}=.07$ ). Of the five factors only the fairness

scores were significant predictors ( $\beta=.20$ ,  $p<.05$ ), with a trend for Power over Others ( $\beta=-.16$ ,  $p=.07ns$ ).

Table 6.26  
ANOVA results for comparison of Alliance factor scores for five conditions

Condition:	Control	Nat	NZF	Lab	All	F(4,118)=
1 Fairness	.16	.01	-.25	-.03	-.07	.58ns
2 Self-transcendence	.23b	.31b	-.06	.07b	-.63a	3.28**
3 Security	.53bd	.02	.04	-.26c	-.49a	4.51**
4 Power over others	-.03	.52bd	-.51a	-.18c	.44bd	4.32**
5 Conformity	-.02	-.20	-.14	.07	.24	.61ns

a differs from b. c differs from d, e differs from f, at  $p<.05$

Comparison of the mean factor scores across the five advert conditions indicated significant differences for Self-Transcendence, Comfort, and Power over Others. In the case of Self-Transcendence and Comfort the Alliance was rated lowest in the Alliance advert condition, and equal highest on Power over Others. Considering the regression results in which high scores on fairness and low scores on Power over Others being predictive of liking for the Alliance this is clearly problematic. Firstly the Alliance is rated no better on Fairness in the Alliance condition. Secondly, the Alliance is perceived as valuing Power over Others more in the Alliance advert condition than any condition other than the National condition.

Additionally, t-tests comparing control and experimental Alliance advert condition scores produced three significant differences: lower scores for self-transcendence ( $t(51)=3.36$ ,  $p<.01$ ), security ( $t(51)=3.97$ ,  $p<.001$ ), and a higher score for power over others ( $t(51)=-1.93$ ,  $p<.05$ ).

From this it can be concluded that the Alliance flag-ship advertisement is something of a failure. Not only does it fail to make the sorts of positive associations such an advert should make (in comparison to the control group) but it actually makes the Alliance look worse than the other political party adverts!

## Value attributions for Labour

Again, the five factor solution accounted for around half of the response variance (47% to be precise). Factor loadings are presented in table 6.27 below.

Table 6.27  
Factor loadings for Labour value attributions

LABEL:	FACTOR:	1	2	3	4	5
<b>Collective Responsibility</b>	Social Justice	.70				
	Family Security	.70				
	Equality	.70				
	Honest	.57				
	Obedient	.57				
	Fairness	.56				
	Social Power	-.48				
<b>Post-materialism</b>	Protect Environment		.64			
	Exciting Life		.61			
	World of Beauty		.60			
	Broadminded		.49			
	Forgiving		.45			
	Devout		.43			
<b>Nationalism</b>	Freedom			.62		
	Wealth			.58		
	National Security			.55		
	Influential			.45		
	Reciprocate Favours			.43		
<b>Conformity</b>	Respect Tradition				.59	
	Public Image				.57	
	Social Order				.56	
	Family Values				.54	
<b>Humility</b>	Accept Portion					.65
	Authority					-.51
	Eigenvalue	3.83	2.67	1.79	1.64	1.33
	% Variance explained	16	11	7	7	6

The five factors obtained were labelled Collective Responsibility (highest loading values were social justice, family security and equality), Postmaterialism (protecting the environment, exciting life, and world of beauty), Nationalism (freedom, wealth, and national security), Conformity (respecting tradition, public image, and social order), and Humility (accepting one's portion and, loading negatively, authority).

Table 6.28  
ANOVA results for comparison of Labour factor scores for five conditions

Condition:	Control	Nat	NZF	Lab	All	F(4,118)=
1 Collective respons	-.10	.28b	-.07	.37b	-.53a	3.11**
2 Postmaterialism	.25b	.36bd	.17b	-.41a	-.28c	3.05**
3 Nationalism	.17	.13	-.09	-.27	.12	.97ns
4 Conformity	.05	.25	-.29	.25	-.32	1.85ns
5 Humility	-.05	-.00	-.19	.11	.12	.39ns

a differs from b, c differs from d, e differs from f, at  $p < .05$

As can be seen from table 6.28 above, Labour is rated highest in the Labour advert condition on Collective responsibility, and lowest on Nationalism. Unfortunately, experimental participants also rated Labour lower on Postmaterialism in the Labour advert condition than in any other, and this is clearly problematic as indicated by regression of feeling thermometer ratings onto factor scores. The regression was significant ( $F(5,117)=6.07$ ,  $p < .001$ ), with a multiple-R of .45 ( $R^2_{\text{adjusted}}=.17$ ). Of the individual factors scores, those for Collective Responsibility ( $\beta=.39$ ,  $p < .001$ ) and Postmaterialism ( $\beta=.19$ ,  $p < .05$ ) were significant predictors of feeling thermometer scores for Labour. This indicates that the advert has succeeded in emphasising Collective responsibility but this has been traded against postmaterialist concerns.

T-tests showed that experimental condition participants rated labour higher on Collective responsibility ( $t(60)=-2.04$ ,  $p < .05$ ), and lower on Postmaterialism ( $t(60)=2.97$ ,  $p < .01$ ) than control participants with a non-significant trend for Labour advert participants to rate Labour lower on Nationalism than control condition participants ( $t(60)=1.75$ ,  $p=.08ns$ ).

### Value attributions for New Zealand First

The five factors extracted accounted for 49% of total variance. The five factors were labelled Order (social order, family security and respect for tradition loaded highest on the factor), Consideration (forgiving, devout, broadminded), Openness (exciting life, honest, national security, and freedom), Authoritarian (influential, public image, and accepting one's portion), and Power (wealth, social power, and social justice).

Table 6.29  
Factor loadings for New Zealand First value attributions

LABEL:	FACTOR:	1	2	3	4	5
<b>Order</b>	Social Order	.74				
	Family Security	.62				
	Respect Tradition	.62				
	Fairness	.57				
	Family Values	.51				
	Equality	.49				
<b>Consideration</b>	Forgiving		.75			
	Devout		.71			
	Broadminded		.56			
	Reciprocate Favours		.55			
	Protect Environment		.49			
	World of Beauty		.47			
	Obedient		.44			
<b>Openness</b>	Exciting Life			.75		
	Honest			.52		
	National Security			.46		
	Freedom			.42		
<b>Authoritarian</b>	Influential				.74	
	Public Image				.67	
	Accept Portion				-.41	
	Authority				.40	
<b>Power</b>	Wealth					.70
	Social Power					.60
	Social Justice					-.58
	Eigenvalue	4.33	2.35	1.99	1.69	1.46
	% Variance explained	18	10	8	7	6

Table 6.30 shows the ANOVA results of comparisons of the New Zealand First factor scores for the five conditions.

Table 6.30  
ANOVA results for comparison of Alliance factor scores for five conditions

Condition:	Control	Nat	NZF	Lab	All	F(4,118)=
1 Order	.00be	.36bd	.52bdf	-.24c	-.53a	4.47**
2 Consideration	-.04	.08	-.16	.29	-.23	1.10ns
3 Openness	.10	.14	.10	-.02	-.36	.90ns
4 Authoritarian	.04	.43bd	-.29c	.19	-.35a	2.32*
5 Power	.13	.35	.01	-.25	-.14	1.21ns

a differs from b, c differs from d, e differs from f, at  $p < .05$

Participants in the New Zealand First advert condition rated the party highest on Order and openness, but second lowest on Consideration and Authoritarian. These are clearly mixed results, but indicating that New Zealand First is perceived as heavily endorsing Order which makes clear sense in relation to their advertising campaigns (emphasis on law and order for example). T-Tests showed only a significant trend for New Zealand First advert participants to rate New Zealand First higher on Order than control condition participants ( $t(53) = -1.98, p < .05$ ).

Again, the subsequent regression was significant ( $F(5,117) = 5.40, p < .001$ ) with a multiple-R equal to .43, translating into a  $R^2_{\text{adjusted}}$  of .15. Consideration ( $\beta = .32, p < .01$ ) and Openness ( $\beta = .23, p < .01$ ) were positively associated with liking for New Zealand First, confirming the mixed success of the advertisement, making relatively salient the positive quality of Openness, traded against lower perceptions of Openness.

### Discussion

These secondary analyses support the original conclusions about the relative success of the political party adverts. In the particular case of the Alliance the advert clearly fails to emphasise positive characteristics associated with liking for the Alliance, while failing to play down negative characteristics detrimental to favourability of the Alliance.

Which adverts are the winners? Relative to the Alliance advertisement all of them. In the case of Labour and New Zealand First some positive characteristics are enhanced (collective responsibility for Labour and openness for New Zealand First) but other desirable attributes are negatively affected (postmaterialism for Labour, and consideration for New Zealand First). National on the other hand are relatively undamaged (but also not promoted) by their advertisement.

Overall, this study indicates that the impact of political adverts is highly complex. Not only can the advert improve or reduce the favourability of the party for which it is a vehicle, but it also impacts on the way in which other parties are perceived as well.

Clearly this study is limited in a number of ways. While it was surprising to get any significant differences at all the suspicion must be that any shift in value-attribution caused by this experiment must be of a short-term nature. Secondly, while there are trends in the flow of party favourability and some significant differences in the values attributed to parties the differences in favourability across conditions were not statistically significant. It may very well be the case that the values parties are seen to represent will be affected by the advertisements, but the impact on favourability is unclear.



## CHAPTER SIX: SUMMARY

The four studies presented in this chapter have at their heart the value-preference relationship. The interest in values arises out of the theoretical arguments for the symbolic politics model- that is that political symbols are invested with value content that evoke those same values in the viewer. The values a political object represents must resonate with the values held by the individual for their to be the symbol-symboliser relationship upon which the symbolic politics thesis rests.

The first study looked at the use and frequency of two particular values in the political context- freedom and equality. These two values were originally implicated in political preference by Rokeach (1973) and the analysis presented indicated that the two values of freedom and equality do indeed discriminate between politicians representing different parties. Freedom was endorsed over equality for the more conservative parties while the more liberal parties exhibited the approximate reverse.

The second study used survey data to examine the values attributed to different parties. There were clear differences found in the way the parties were perceived, as well as the manner in which the attribution of different values differentiated between preferences for those parties. The study produced a graphical illustration of the political value representation which the sample of Wellingtonians held of politics at the time.

The third study considered the impact of value on preference from the perspective of the voter themselves. Using survey data two dimensions were found that encapsulated the greater variation in social values. Supporters of different political parties were found to differ on the second dimension which also correlated with the liberal/conservative self-identification measure used in the previous chapter. Discriminant analysis of the composite value domain scores and political preference provided weak support for Rokeach's (1973) two-value model of politics, with endorsement of Universalism and Self-direction values playing a significant role in differentiating supporters of different parties. This was contradictory to the results of a regression analysis of these value domain scores against the ideological self-identification measure in which it was found that while Universalism, Achievement, and Conformity were significantly related to self-identification, Self-direction was not.

The final study used an experimental design to investigate the practical question of whether the apparent failure of the Alliance to live up to its pre-election promise might in some part be due to the failure of its advertising campaign. Indeed, experimental participants who viewed the Alliance advert and rated the favourability and value-attributions of the Alliance rated the party more negatively than those viewing the other party political adverts. Investigation of the value-attributions caused by the advert indicated that the party was perceived as representing values that were ordinarily incongruent with the perception of the Alliance.

Taken as a whole these studies support the contention that social values, and their attribution to political parties, plays a significant role in the electoral success of a political party. Additionally, they support the theoretical association between symbolic politics and social values.

## **PART THREE**

### **Social interaction and political behaviour**

“To New Zealanders of any age, adopting an ideological stance is akin to obscenely exposing oneself. People may espouse and even employ ideologies, but they should keep them covered in public.” (A.K.Grant, 1971, p. 125)

## CHAPTER SEVEN

### SOCIAL NETWORKS, PREFERENCE, AND IDEOLOGY

The aim of studies one and two in the previous chapter was to investigate political behaviour from the perspective of Moscovici's (1972) theory of social representations. This investigation illustrated the relationship between the personal values of the individual, the perceived value representations of the parties, and political preference. Study three built on the theme of values and political preference, using individuals' value profiles to predict their political preference, while the final study used an experimental methodology to investigate whether party political adverts influence the way parties are perceived.

A broader aim of this thesis however, is to view political behaviour not just from the position of the sovereign individual but also from the viewpoint of the social context in which the individual exists. According to social representations theory the content of social representations mediates behaviour, but this goes hand in hand with the process of social representation: the generation and propagation of these representations as shared knowledge (Moscovici, 1988).

The aim of this chapter then, is to illustrate the process by which social representations of politics and political parties are transmitted through the electorate. The first study in chapter five determined that there were differences in interpretations of the ideological positions attributed to different parties and themselves. Clearly, representations obtained differ across different groups, primarily across groups expressing preference for different parties. How does this come to be? How do members of particular groups come to hold similar representations of these objects?

While social representations theory proposes that representations are transmitted through social interaction and communication the greater body of investigation into this process has evaluated the impact of media-related representations. For example, Moscovici's seminal work (1972) examined the way in which the concepts of psychoanalysis were first presented in mainstream and religious print media and how over time these concepts came to be assimilated into common knowledge to the point where these concepts in turn were used to explain other phenomena, old and new. While media clearly plays an important role in social transmission a second, and perhaps more fundamental, role falls to the everyday social interactions that occur when people come together. The process of social interaction as transmission is perhaps so much of a given

that beyond this assumption this fundamental process has received little empirical attention in the social representations literature.

The question arises then, of how we might investigate the social propagation of representations. Social representations theory contends that there will (indeed by definition must) be a certain level of consensus within a collectivity as to the content of different representations in order for those representations to be more than simply individual-level representations. The sharedness of these social representations means that when members of a collectivity interact and communicate they do so with a common understanding, or a world view. Alternatively when people interact across a group divide (say strong Labour affiliates and strong National affiliates) they do so with different representational information at their disposal. This representational content will play an important role in the content of the interaction should the nature of the interaction overlap with the content of their different representations (eg., if politics or a related topic is the focus of the interaction).

This would lead us to expect that social interaction gives rise to shared representational content through two processes; inter- and intra-group interaction. For example we would expect that interaction in an attitudinally homogeneous group (what Knoke and Kuklinski (1982) have referred to as a homophilous environment) would lead to reinforcement of those shared attitudes. Alternatively interaction with attitudinally heterogeneous discussants might lead either to the attitudinal de-alignment, or no change in attitudinal strength and direction. This clearly has implications for political discussion whether it be explicitly persuasive or not.

### **POLITICAL BEHAVIOUR AND SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT**

How has the role of the social environment in political behaviour been approached in the past? Clearly this is a question that should be addressed to the Columbia (sociological) and Michigan (social psychological) schools. On the one hand Lazarsfeld et al found that secondary group memberships were most strongly predictive of preference and went on to derive a theory in which partisanship develops out of explicitly persuasive interaction with secondary group members. Alternatively, the Michigan theorists argued that it was party identification as a product of long-term primary relationships (family etc) that forms the basis of political preference. Both approaches assume partisan commitment to be the product of social influence, from family or from other group-based relationships.

The Michigan emphasis on early childhood socialisation encouraged a raft of studies in the late 60's and 70's from which a number of factors were highlighted in the transmission of partisanship (for examples see Jennings & Niemi, 1981; Tedin, 1974). Family social influence is argued to derive out of greater intimacy and frequency of interaction. Indeed intimacy and number of sources are two of three factors identified by Latané (1981) as important in accounting for interpersonal social influence. Latané argues that the impact of social influence is determined by the strength or intensity of the source of influence, the number of sources, and finally the immediacy of contact (both in time and location). In terms of political social influence, socialisation studies have found mixed support for the importance of intimacy in family-based influence (Jennings & Niemi, 1981). In contrast, Lazarsfeld and colleagues (Berelson et al, 1954; Lazarsfeld et al, 1968) based their explanation of political preference on secondary group memberships, with primary importance given to class, religion, and residential area. It was in these environments that partisanship was expected to develop, and indeed be transmitted through a process of contagion (Harrop & Miller, 1987).

This 'social cohesion' approach to influence invoked by the Michigan school has been compared and contrasted with a structural equivalence model by Burt (1987). According to Burt, social cohesion is a process of social influence in which socialisation between discussants is more likely to result in persuasion as frequency and salience of communication occurs. Alternatively, social influence may be more likely to occur if the source occupies similar circumstances. Just as Downs (1957) suggested that as an informational shortcut voters might seek out partisan political information from sources they deem to have the same characteristics as themselves, Burt (1987) argues that influence is dependent on the extent to which discussants occupy similar structural locations. As Huckfeldt and Sprague (1991) point out that this goes beyond merely having the same characteristics as discussants, but rather arises out of shared patterns of social interaction and relationships- people who work together, attend the same churches, clubs, and unions, are more likely to be structurally equivalent.

Burt (1987) illustrated the potential significance of structural equivalence in a re-analysis of a study by Coleman, Katz, and Menzel (1966, cited in Burt, 1987) examining the spread of medical innovation among medical practitioners. According to Burt, status anxiety occurred when doctors became aware that other doctors in structurally similar situations adopted new medical practices.

This anxiety could be averted by adopting the same practices becoming identified practitioners in the same structural circumstances.

In practice, useful structural equivalence data is difficult to come by, requiring as it does quite exhaustive detail about the social characteristics of every person in the structure. This becomes impractical when one is interested in large scale networks or behaviours like voting. Thus the effects of social environment on political behaviour were originally evaluated using aggregate level data in the investigation of context effects.

### **CONTEXT EFFECTS**

Social contexts are important because they constrain the potential social interactions of individuals and groups. Contexts may be defined according to any number of criteria- countries, states, churches, neighbourhoods, workplaces, or social clubs. In turn these different contexts vary in their social characteristics- the relative proportions of Catholics or Jews, Maori or Pakeha, men and women, middle aged people and adolescents, etc. In this way the type of context limits the nature of interactions within them- for example, people living in working class neighbourhoods are more likely to interact with working class people.

Importantly, social contexts generally exist beyond the ability of the individual to change them- Carmines and Huckfeldt (1996) give examples of party workers or religious proselytisers as exceptions, but generally speaking contexts are relatively enduring. Similarly, this doesn't preclude the possibility of inter-contextual migration- people may still move contexts for any number of reasons. For example, Irish Protestants in a catholic neighbourhood, unemployed farming workers moving from rural to urban locations in pursuit of employment etc.

When it comes to political behaviour such self-selection is a potentially serious problem, but there are plausible reasons for expecting consequences to be minimal. For example, there are many more likely reasons for migration other than that people choose to locate themselves in Auckland instead of Hamilton for political reasons (Erikson, Wright, & McIver, 1993). Another important point arises out of the finding of Huckfeldt and Sprague (1990) that whites are increasingly less likely to vote Democrat in areas in which blacks are most concentrated (thus supporting the finding by Key (1949) that white racial hostility in the American south varied according to the relative concentration of whites and blacks in different counties). In this circumstance it is unlikely

that these context effects grow out of self-selection- would we expect racially hostile whites to locate themselves in areas with a greater concentration of blacks than others?

The context effects literature has been criticised for other reasons, most notably for a practical reliance on aggregate level data (eg. census, electorate polling booth data, etc). Just as the symbolic politics literature is open to criticism for disparity between the theoretical and methodological levels of articulation, so to is the majority of context effects literature in specifying a social level phenomenon which is expressed ultimately at the level of individual level preference.

Dunleavy (1985) has been particularly critical of the work on context effects arguing, legitimately, that there has not been enough attention paid to specifying the process by which social context leads to social influence on political matters. Dunleavy argues that the preferences of others in a social context do not simply rub off onto those around them. This position is argued based on his own data in which participants were asked to indicate which of nine reasons were most relevant in their decision to vote for a particular party. Only two percent of the sample indicated that they were influenced by people around them in deciding to vote for a particular party. One reason for this finding may be that as media politics of coverage of politics has increased, there has been a corresponding decrease in the occurrence of political discussion between associates. This in turn is reflected in the figure reported by Dunleavy: "Personal contacts were mentioned by negligible numbers of respondents as influences on their voting or as important sources of political information" (p213).

This position has not been supported by a number of surveys in which participants were asked to indicate whether or not they engaged in political discussion (Erbring, Goldenberg, & Miller, 1980; Mitchell, 1962; Rudd, 1992). For example, in a survey of the Dunedin electorate during the 1960 election campaign Mitchell (1962) reported that 21% of the electorate indicated that political discussion was their primary source of political information. As recently as 1990 Rudd (1990) reported that 28% of Dunedin North electors indicated that they had actively tried to persuade political discussants to vote for a particular party or candidate. The indications are that even with the increase in political media coverage, frequency and importance of political discussion does not appear to have dropped off.



Though the surveys conducted for this project did not ask whether political discussion was seen as an important factor in the voting decision, first phase participants were asked for the most common sources (other than radio, television, and newspapers) from which they gained political information. Table 7.1 below summarises the responses.

Table 7.1  
Sources of political information other than radio, television, or newspapers.

Source	Frequency	Percentage
Other people	48	19.6%
Workmates	19	7.8%
Political party information	18	7.3%
Magazines	10	4.1%
Family members	8	3.3%
Associations	3	1.2%
Church	3	1.2%
Teletext	2	.8%
Political meetings	1	.4%
Union reps	1	.4%
No response	131	53.5%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>245</b>	<b>100%</b>

Of the 245 participants 53.5% made no response. The remainder identified ten other sources of political information, with the most popular being "Other people" nominated by around 20% of the sample. In fact of the 46.5% of participants making a response 30.7% indicated other people (family, workmates, and others) as sources of information, with a further 3.2% indicating social contexts. So, of the valid responses 73% were either specific people, or social contexts. At the very least this would suggest that even discounting attempts at active persuasion by social contacts, social interaction is an important source of political information. As illustrated throughout this thesis, the sort of information provided by political partisans about politics is coloured by their own preferences, meaning that information gleaned through social interaction is subtly (or obviously) biased.

Dunleavy and Husbands (1985) assign more importance to the role of social location than social interaction as a determinant of voting, and in so doing Dunleavy appears to contradict his own argument, "People will not necessarily (and perhaps not often) articulate the influence of their social location instructing their votes- the phenomenon may be objectively apparent to an analyst

without being explicitly recognised by voters as involved in their decisions" (p.18). On the one hand voters cannot be trusted to articulate the specific sources that influence their decision, yet an objective authority is able to deduce those important influences.

The error made by Dunleavy (1985), and implicitly in a great amount of social influence and social context research, is that political persuasion resulting from social interaction does so through overt persuasion. In the social psychological literature this is not surprising given the traditional reliance on the laboratory experiment in investigating social influence. Realistic relationships in an empirical setting have been dispensed with in favour of experimental control (Petty & Cacciopo, 1986), similarly non-verbal cues are eliminated through the use of experimental settings such as the "minimal-groups paradigm" upon which much recent research into inter-group relations is based (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). That is not to say that persuasion does not occur through peripheral routes- Petty and Cacciopo (1986) argue that persuasion may occur through peripheral routes (such as body language, emotive speech, etc) but that it will be less enduring than that caused by more overt methods.

The assumption of overt persuasion in political influence is pervasive. For example, in an investigation of the effect of partisan political environments in Israel, Burstein (1976) operationalised the level of partisanship using such variables as whether or not the respondent knew anyone highly involved with a political party, the frequency of communication with political organisations and whether or not the respondents received housing or employment assistance from political organisations. In another example, Zuckerman, Valentino, and Zuckerman (1994) conducted a study to determine whether people who attend rallies, become members of political parties, or work in political campaigns are more likely to vote for those parties. These studies assume overt persuasion, and focus on potentially unusual persons who are actively engaged in politics.

The social network may also play an important role other than serving to influence political preference directly. A homogeneous social network also acts to insulate members from alternative points of view. For example, Finifter (1974) surveyed Detroit car-plant workers for social network and preference information. The study found that 60% of strong Democrats indicated non-congruent friendships (that their contacts did not share the same strength or

direction of political preference). In contrast, only 3% of strong Republicans indicated non-congruent friendships. This finding is even more startling given that at the time, less than 20% of the sample gave a Republican preference. Of the participants with three or more congruent friendships, 31% were strong democrats compared with 15% Republicans. These results indicate that the Republican majority tended to cluster together to a greater extent than the Democrat majority. Finifter interpreted these results as indicating that the friendship group in this context operated as a protective environment for "political deviants".

From a social representations perspective the shared content of representational knowledge need not come about through explicitly persuasive communication. The contents of social representations are inter-related such that communication centring on particular representational elements will be made sense of in the context of related elements. Theoretically then, a social representational approach to political knowledge rejects the contention that as political matters are not necessarily salient they have little impact outside of the sphere of explicitly political behaviour (Converse, 1964; Sears & Funk, 1991). Thus, political behaviour is not based solely on knowledge derived from political sources directly concerning politics. Rather, political information must be made sense of from a broader consideration of its place in the body of social or common sense knowledge.

Moreover, the social environment is central to the stability and durability of social representations. While social interaction has been assumed to be central in the generation and transmission of social representations there has been little systematic consideration of the functions of the social environment in the aetiology of social representations.

## **SOCIAL CONTEXT EFFECTS IN NEW ZEALAND**

There is a relative paucity of research on interpersonal environment effects in New Zealand. The NZES has included a number of variables which may be construed as tapping interpersonal environment, for example requesting participants to make preference attributions for their partner/spouse. The 1990 NZES found that of the 66% of the sample living with a partner/spouse 58% made preference attributions for their partner/spouse. Of this number, two thirds of the respondents reported a party preference congruent with that of their partner/spouse (Vowles, 1992).

A survey in three Auckland electorates in 1978 asked respondents to indicate the party preferred by the majority of their neighbours, the majority of their friends and the majority of co-workers (Prince, 1985). Two thirds of the 186 respondents claimed to receive no preference cues from the neighbours with whom they interacted. There was greater congruence between respondents and co-workers with 34% endorsing the same party as that perceived to be preferred by the majority of their friends (37% did not give a preference for their co-workers) while 42% endorsed the same party as the majority of their friends. These findings led Prince to comment that

"however this is interpreted, it cannot be twisted to indicate some sort of overwhelming rush to yield to the supposedly crushing force of conformity with one's neighbours that some of the American writers conjured up from their imaginations."  
(1985, p.120).

Prince's (1985) findings, and the conclusion to which they lead, are themselves open to criticism. Most importantly the question may be difficult for the respondent to answer- given that we would expect respondents to be unable to name the affiliation of at least a few of their contacts it may by extension be difficult for the respondent to indicate truthfully the party they believe a majority of associates to support. That is to say that while they may be able to name the affiliation of some but not all contacts there may in some cases be too little information upon which to infer the affiliation of a majority. To then conclude that there is little support for context effects is at the very least somewhat hasty.

The aim of this study was to determine to what degree (if any) social interaction could be shown to influence political preference and perception. This was done using information about social contacts gleaned from the first of the four surveys carried out. It was expected (in line with the

contentions made in the social representations literature) that there would be a clear relationship between the political composition of the respondents' social networks and their own preference. That is to say, the greater the degree of homogeneity in the preferences of the network, the greater the likelihood of the primary respondent (the person completing the survey) possessing the same affiliation as the network. At the same time it was expected that the political composition of the network would be a better explanation of primary respondent preference than (as argued by Dunleavy and Husbands, 1985) the social-locational composition of the respondents' network.

#### **METHOD:**

The data for this study comes from the first survey phase (appendix two). Data on accuracy of preference attributions came from the final phase in which the social network measure was repeated, with those respondents completing the phase requested to pass on a secondary questionnaire to one member of their network (appendix seven).

Occupational class: Respondents' Dunleavy class was categorised according to their occupation as outlined in Dunleavy and Husbands (1985, p.123):

- Manual workers: Wage earners in blue-collar (manual) occupations working for private or public sectors bodies or other organisations.
- Non-manual workers: Wage earners in white-collar (non-manual) occupations not responsible for the supervision of others, again in the employ of other people or organisations.
- Controllers of labour: Wage earners in white-collar occupations responsible for the supervision and management of other people's labour, again in the employ of other people or organisations.
- The petit-bourgeoisie: Self-employed in any occupation, not responsible for supervision of other people.

In practice, respondents who are self employed AND employ others are included in the final category (Dunleavy & Husbands, 1985, p.123). Where respondents were unemployed or retired they were categorised according to their former occupations. Where possible respondents not indicating their former professions were categorised according to their last occupation registered in the electoral roll. Where possible female respondents indicating their occupation as family-oriented were categorised according to the occupation of their partners. Of the 248 first

phase respondents 91 (or one-third of the sample) were unable to be classified, due either to incomplete occupational information, or being unclassifiable under Dunleavy's taxonomy (eg. retired or unemployed with no way of determining previous occupation).

Respondent preference: Respondents completed a set of items requesting information about their own political preference. Party identification was measured by the standard two-part item "Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a National voter, a Labour voter, an Alliance voter, or what?" followed by "If you do think of yourself in this way, how strong is that feeling of support? (circle a number below)" with a seven-point scale from 1 to 7 where "1" was anchored as "Very Weak" and "7" was anchored "Very Strong".

Respondents also indicated their likelihood of voting in the coming election with the question "How likely are you to vote in the next general election? (circle a number from 1 to 7)" where "1" was anchored "Very Unlikely" and "7" as "Very Likely". Voting intention was ascertained with the item "If an election was held in the near future, which party would you vote for with your party vote?".

Social network variables: Social network characteristics were obtained by requesting that respondents supply details of their four best friends with the caveat that "these should be among the most important people you have had contact with regularly in the last six months. You may include your romantic partner, and/or family members if you think of them as important friends." Information was solicited on friends' demographic characteristics : gender, age, ethnicity, occupation, as well as their initials. Respondents were asked to indicate the nature of their relationship with their associate (romantic partner, family, friends, co-workers, or other), the closeness of the relationship (for 1 to 10 where 1 means not that close, and 10 means extremely close), how often they communicated (daily, weekly, monthly, or yearly). Finally respondents gave information about political interest (from 1 to 10 where 1 means not very interested, and 10 means very interested), whether or not they usually agree or disagree politically with their associates, and who they think their friends would vote for.

Characteristics of the primary respondents' social environment were obtained using a social network measure in which the respondent provided information about people with whom they felt they had important relationships. Used as part of a mail survey rather than face-to-face or

telephone surveying this offers the advantage that the effort falls entirely on the respondent in providing the information. In common with other methods, however, there is a considerable possibility of perceptual bias on the part of the respondent. That is to say respondents may project their own preference onto their network members, incorrectly assuming they possess the same preference.

Previous researchers have attempted to estimate accuracy of preference attributions by contacting social network members. For example, Laumann (1973) found 73% accuracy in respondent attributions of network members' party identification. In a more recent study Huckfeldt and Sprague (1991) found sample to be around 75% accurate. In a later survey phase we attempted to estimate accuracy of preference attributions by requesting respondents pass on a secondary questionnaire to one of the people they named as part of their social network.

The full measure is included in appendix eight.

## ANALYSIS ONE

The attributed preferences of network members were recoded into six categories- National, Labour, Alliance, NZ First, Minority party, or no party affiliation. For the purpose of these analyses the voting intention and party identification of the primary respondents was similarly recoded. New variables were calculated for each respondent representing the number of friends falling into each category.




Figure 7.1: Breakdown of friends' political affiliation by primary respondent voting intention.

Figure 7.1 above gives an illustration of the average number of friends (maximum of four) who are identified by the primary respondent as supporting National, Alliance, Labour, NZ First, minority parties or who have no identifiable affiliation. This is broken down according to the expressed voting intention of the primary respondent. It is apparent that the friendship networks of the respondents are dominated by associates supporting the same party as the respondent. For example the greater number of friends of National affiliated respondents themselves support National (the large white band). Indeed, for major party supporters, respondents reported more friends affiliated with their preferred party than friends affiliated with other parties (For National respondents  $F(5,375)=42.16$ ,  $p<.001$ ), for Labour respondents  $F(5,300)=38.01$ ,  $p<.001$ ), for Alliance respondents  $F(5,250)=10.43$ ,  $p<.001$ ), while for NZ First respondents  $F(5,45)=1.46$ ,  $p=.22ns$ ). The result for NZ First affiliated respondents most likely reflects the minority status of



NZ First supporters in the general population. Of practical importance (for the parties themselves) is the fact that only National and Labour supporters' networks (on average) comprise a majority of congruent friends. Those supporting the Alliance or New Zealand First cannot expect to have a network that is dominated by like-minded friends. The reason for this must be related to the proportion of the voting population aligned with each of the parties- at a purely chance level one would expect a random sample to be dominated by Labour and National supporters as they are the dominant parties at present. Similarly, as a party loses popular favour the level of representation in any given network might be expected to decline. For example, if National voters comprised 50% of the voting public then a random sample of four people should include (on average) two National supporters. If National's share drops to 25% this would be reflected in the random sample. To retain a 50% level of network representation a National supporter would have to actively seek out like-minded contacts.

Similarly, figure 7.2 below illustrates the average number of friends attributed preference for the six voting classes, broken down according to the Dunleavy class of the primary respondent.




Figure 7.2: Breakdown for number of friends' political affiliation by Dunleavy class of respondent

It is clear that network members' preference is spread more evenly across respondent classes than for respondent affiliation, though the networks of controllers of labour appear to be

dominated by National supporters (more than 50%).

### **DISCRIMINANT ANALYSES**

Two multiple discriminant analyses were run to compare the predictive utility of Dunleavy social class and social network variables. The SPSS DSCRIM procedure does not allow the entry of variables in separate blocks (as in regression). For this reason two analyses were completed. Firstly, using only Dunleavy class as predictor variables, and secondly using both Dunleavy class and social network variables. Differences in the percentage of correctly classified respondents may then be compared using the McNemar's repeated-measures chi square procedure described by Tabachnick and Fidell (1996, pp. 545-546).

#### **MDA USING ONLY DUNLEAVY CLASSES**

The first analysis produced a single significant discriminant function ( $\chi^2(9)=16.95$ ,  $p<.05$ ), accounting for 73.8% of the between-groups variance. This function correctly predicted 42.9% of responses, significantly above chance level (Press's Q=21.43,  $p<.01$ ).

The pooled within-groups correlations between variables and the function were  $r=-.78$  for controllers of labour,  $r=-.43$  for petit bourgeoisie,  $r=.41$  for manual workers, and  $r=.55$  for non-manual workers. Group centroids for the significant function were  $r=-.35$  for National supporters,  $r=.24$  for Alliance supporters,  $r=.34$  for Labour supporters, and  $r=-.02$  for NZ First supporters. Thus categorisation as petit bourgeoisie and controllers of labour is more predictive of National support, while categorisation into manual and non-manual classes is more predictive of Alliance and Labour preference.

#### **MDA USING DUNLEAVY CLASS AND NETWORK VARIABLES**

The second discriminant analysis produced a maximum three significant functions. The first ( $\chi^2(27)=145.93$ ,  $p<.01$ ) accounted for 51.40% of between-groups variance, the second ( $\chi^2(16)=75.44$ ,  $p<.01$ ) for 34.42%, and the third ( $\chi^2(7)=23.96$ ,  $p<.01$ ) accounted for the remaining 14.18%. Together these three functions correctly predicted 67.46% of responses, significantly better than chance (Press's Q=121.5,  $p<.01$ ).

Table 7.2 below summarises the pooled within-group correlations between each variable and the three significant functions.

Table 7.2  
Correlations between predictors and discriminant functions

Predictors	Function 1	Function 2	Function 3
National friends	.78	-.18	-.18
Controller of labour	.27	-.10	-.23
Non-manual	-.20	-.08	.06
Manual	-.14	.11	-.08
Alliance friends	-.48	-.70	.30
Labour friends	-.41	.61	-.20
NZ First friends	.03	.32	.77
Petit-bourgeoisie	.17	.08	.25
Minority party friends	-.09	.01	-.18
Non-affiliated friends	-.01	-.03	.03

The first function is strongly defined by National affiliated friends ( $r=.78$ ) and to a lesser extent by Alliance ( $r=-.48$ ) and Labour ( $r=-.41$ ) affiliated friends. Group centroids for the four predicted groups (National=.98, NZ First=.50, Alliance=-.75, Labour=-.90) indicate that the first function differentiates between National and NZ First supporters, and Alliance and Labour supporters. The more National friends one has, the more likely one is to support National, while Alliance and Labour affiliated friends are predictive of Labour and Alliance support.

The second function is defined by Alliance affiliated friends ( $r=-.70$ ) and Labour affiliated friends ( $r=.61$ ) and to a lesser extent by NZ First affiliated friends ( $r=.32$ ) suggesting that this function differentiates between Alliance, Labour, and NZ First supporters. This is supported by the group centroids (Alliance=-.98, National=-.06, Labour=.82, NZ First=1.51). Alliance supporting primary respondents' networks are characterised by fellow Alliance supporters while Labour, and to a greater degree NZ First supporters' networks comprise of Labour and NZ First supporters.

The third function is weighted most heavily by NZ First affiliated friends, and serves to differentiate NZ First supporting respondents from everyone else as indicated by group centroids (Labour=-.29, National=-.15, Alliance=.24, and NZ First=2.05).

Importantly the correlations between the Dunleavy class variables and the discriminant functions are weak- none surpassing the recommended  $\pm .30$  threshold for interpretation suggested by Hair et al (1995). From this the preliminary conclusion may be drawn that the Dunleavy class variables are of secondary importance in predicting votership when the social network variables

are included.

Comparison of the classification from the two analyses (42.9% compared to 67.5%) indicates that classification is improved by the inclusion of the social network variables. It is possible to determine if classification improves significantly upon the addition of new variables by using McNemar's repeated-measures chi square. To do so it is necessary to tabulate for each case whether group membership was predicted correctly or incorrectly before and after the addition of predictors ( in this case the social network variables). Table 7.3 below shows cross-tabulation of correctly and incorrectly classified cases after each stage.

Table 7.3  
Correctly/incorrectly classified cases after inclusion of class and social network variables

		First step classification (CLASS)	
		Correct	Incorrect
Second step classification (NETWORK)	Correct	37	48
	Incorrect	11	41

Cases that have the same result at both steps (correctly or incorrectly classified at both steps) are ignored as they do not change. Table 7.3 shows that 48 cases incorrectly classified after the first analysis were correctly classified after the second, while only 11 cases were incorrectly re-classified after being correctly predicted at the first analysis. This improvement in classification is significant with  $\chi^2(1)=23.20$  at  $p<.01$ .

Finally, the effect of network homogeneity on identification was assessed by comparing the strength of party identification of respondents in a homogeneous and congruent network (a majority of the network are attributed the same preference as the main respondent) with the strength of party identification in heterogenous or non-congruent networks. Congruent homogeneous networks were defined as those in which three or more of the four network members were attributed the same preference as the primary respondent. Of the 201 primary respondents indicating a party identification with a political party only 63 met the stringent definition of congruent homogeneity. A t-test was used to compare the strength of party identification for the two groups indicating that the mean strength of party identification for

respondents in a congruent homogeneous network (Mean=5.25, SD=1.62) was significantly higher than that of respondents in heterogeneous networks (Mean=4.61, SD=1.66,  $t(199)=2.57$ ,  $p<.05$ )<sup>3</sup>.

## DISCUSSION

From the two discriminant analyses described above it can be concluded that while Dunleavy class membership does indeed account for a significant amount of the variance in political preference, the inclusion of social network produces a significant increase in predictive accuracy. When all variables are included it is clear that Dunleavy class membership plays a secondary role in the prediction of votership.

These results also offer encouragement for the contention that social interaction plays an important role in political behaviour, in accordance with the prediction of social representation theory. It has already been shown that representational differences in the perception of political parties plays a significant part in political preference, and with the above results it is now possible to argue that these important representational differences may be related to social network composition, and hence ultimately deriving out of social interaction.

Finally, the comparison of strength of party identification for respondents in sympathetic homogenous networks with respondents in heterogeneous networks indicates that social network characteristics are related to the strength of political identification. For example, Respondents who identify with a party whose networks comprise a majority of members attributed with the same preference in turn identify more strongly with that party.

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Note 3: The analyses were run including party identification (four variables were computed for each respondent based on party identification with one of the four target parties). Two discriminant analyses were run, the first including Dunleavy class and party identification variables, to which social network variables were added for the second analysis. While party identification variables alone accurately predict 77.1% of the sample, decreasing to 76.6% after addition of Dunleavy class, the accuracy of prediction increases almost another 10% to 85.9% when social network variables are added. The pattern of results remains the same with the party identification variables loading on the functions previously best defined by the corresponding social network variables (eg. National party identification loads with number of National friends).

This finding is problematic though, in that the direction of causality of this relationship is unclear. It is unclear whether those respondents who identify more strongly with a party have a tendency to over-attribute the same preference to their network, to base friendships on socio-political similarity, or whether occupying a space in a homogeneous sympathetic environment enhances the strength of identification of the respondent. This has important ramifications for social representations theory in that a finding of social environmental facilitation of identification supports the theoretical contention that socially communicated representations represent some part of the foundation of social identity, in this case political social identity. With no data available to test these alternative hypotheses one can only suggest that, just as it has been found that party identification and political attitudes influence each other (Harrop & Miller, 1987) in all likelihood the relationship between social network and strength of identification will run both ways. This point is one that may best be addressed through over-time replication with the same sample.

## **ANALYSIS TWO**

The previous analysis indicated (with some reservations) that social network plays an important role in political preference. Discriminant analyses using social network composition and Dunleavy class membership to predict voting preference indicated that social network effects prove to be useful predictors of preference compared to, and independent of, social position as defined by Dunleavy class membership. As well as undermining the dismissal by Dunleavy and Husbands (1985) of interpersonal relationships as an influence on preference, this study provides further support for the use of social representation theory for investigating political behaviour.

## **IDEOLOGY, REPRESENTATIONS, AND SOCIAL INTERACTION**

In the social network literature the link between social network and political ideology has been made by Erickson (1982). Erickson argued that theoretically social network should be related to ideology, both in terms of influencing content as well as strength. That is to say, the political alignment of one's network will influence one's own in exactly the same way as illustrated above for political preference. Erickson's (1982) contention has yet to be tested.

According to Moscovici (1988) there are at least three ways that representational knowledge becomes social knowledge. Representations may be shared by members of "highly structured" groups such as parties, cities, or nations (p.221) without having been originally produced by

those. These *hegemonic* representations are rooted in history and tend to endure independently of the successes of the groups holding them. Examples might be the pre-eminence of the democratic principle typified by the United States, or the dominance of liberal individualism in the West.

Alternatively representations may become social through contact and circulation of knowledge among related subgroups. Representational knowledge is added to and transmuted and shared once more with other groups. Moscovici suggests that representations about mental illness are examples of these *emancipated* representations, as would be the representations of psychoanalysis documented by Moscovici (1961) himself. In these examples the knowledge and experiences of medical professionals, mental health professionals, and lay people are shared among the general population and integrated into the social knowledge of all the groups involved.

Finally, Moscovici identifies a family of representations that are generated through social conflict and controversy, and as a result the content of these representations will differ across groups. "These *polemical* representations must be viewed in the context of an opposition or struggle between groups and are often expressed in terms of a dialogue with an imaginary interlocutor" (Moscovici, 1988, p. 222). Moscovici gives as an example of polemical representations the different versions of Marxism circulating in France. It is into this family of representations that political representations may be classified.

As illustrated by the correspondence and discriminant analyses in chapter six, part two, of party value attributions, the parties are perceived as occupying positions on a primary dimension that closely resembles the traditional left-right or liberal-conservative continuum. Similarly, the analysis of ideological meanings in chapter five clearly indicated inter-relations between ideological components that were tied to the ideological identification of the respondent. When considered from the perspective of social representation theory this indicates that social representations of politics are organised in a number of ways, and an important one seems to be the traditional ideological dimension. If this is the case then, as illustrated in the previous analysis, one's social environment should structure the way one perceives politics. That is to say, the characteristics of important social interactants should be predictive of liberal-conservative self-identification. As with the previous analysis the aim is to determine the strength of association between social network variables and political ideological identification. While not as

rich as the multi-variable analyses presented previously, the ideological self-identification measure is a potential surrogate as a simplification of this primary dimension.

### **STUDY ONE: METHOD**

The measure of liberal-conservative self-identification was administered as part of the first survey phase, the same phase as the social network measure. Respondents were presented with a seven-point scale, with 1 anchored as "Liberal" and 7 as "Conservative" with the instruction "Frequently people use the terms "liberal" and "conservative" to describe their political beliefs. How would you rate yourself in these terms? (circle a number from 1 to 7)".

In order to test the proposition that social interaction influences the way people perceive politics it was intended that the social network data used in the previous analysis should be regressed onto liberal-conservative identification. In so doing it is possible to control for other important considerations that were unable to be taken into account in the discriminant analysis, specifically the serious problem of perceptual bias, and the potential problem of mis-specification of the derived equation.

Though a highly useful procedure for analysing group-based differences/commonalities where the "dependent" variable is categorical group membership, the SPSS DSCRIM procedure does not allow the entry of multiple blocks of predictor variables, meaning it is difficult to evaluate the unique explanatory power of a block of variables. Similarly, discriminant analysis suffers from the same limitations as MANOVA in terms of statistical assumptions, meaning the inclusion of dichotomous variables (for example, party identification dummy variables) leads to problems deriving functions, and at the classification phase. In this analysis the dependent variable is an interval measure and therefore amenable to multiple regression analysis, which allows greater flexibility in the use of dummy variables (Hair et al, 1995).

The inclusion of dummy variables for party identification means an attempt can be made to control for perceptual bias AND address the potential criticism that the regression equation may be mis-specified due to the omission of party identification as an independent variable. The rationale for these assertions is presented below.

While it should be clear how inclusion of party identification prevents mis-specification a more



detailed discussion of perceptual bias is warranted to illustrate how inclusion addresses the issue.

As detailed in the introductory summary of research in political behaviour the party identification has assumed paramount importance in psychologically oriented voting research. From the Michigan perspective party identification is the predisposition upon which the actual vote is based. Empirically this has meant that explanatory models place heavy emphasis on party identification, moderated by various other variables such as issue position or candidate preference. However this thesis has chosen instead to consider party identification as relatively less potent variable in an environment replete with new parties for whom party identification may not develop in the assumed manner. The inclusion of party identification as an independent variable serves to strengthen the argument made in this chapter for the following reasons. If party identification is less relevant in a time of electoral volatility nothing is lost by including it. Alternatively if party identification is an antecedent of voting behaviour and social network effects are found even after accounting for party identification then one can conclude that social environment does play a significant role even when including such a heavy weight variable.

Secondly, the inclusion of party identification as a predictor addresses the potential problem of perceptual bias. Perceptual bias arises when people incorrectly attribute characteristics to social network members by projecting their own characteristics onto them. In the context of the social network measure used for these analyses perceptual bias occurs when a respondent assumes that at least one member of the network possesses the same preference as themselves. Thus when perceptual bias occurs it is based on the preference of the respondent being attributed to the network member. If every respondent in the sample attributes their own preference to their network members then the political composition of the network will not have any explanatory use beyond the preference of the respondent themselves. By entering respondent party identification at the first stage of the regression we are able to assume that any significant increase in  $R^2$  may be uniquely related to the inclusion of the network composition data.

A similar argument may be made in relation to the causal direction of the network-preference relationship. That is to say that if people select people with whom to associate on the basis of consistency between their own political preference, then we would expect that party identification would account for the variability in the prediction of voting preference at least as well as network

characteristics. Alternatively, if network composition influences voting preference to a greater extent than party identification then we may have greater confidence that the network effect is based on more than just network self-selection.

## RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Examination of the simple correlations between number of friends attributed preference for National, Labour, Alliance, NZ First, Minority parties, or no preference and liberal conservative identification indicate relationships in the expected direction. These correlations are summarised in table 7.4. below:

Table 7.4.  
Correlations between number of friends attributed preference and primary respondent ideological self-identification

	National	NZ First	Labour	Alliance	Minority	No Vote
<b>Liberal-Conservative Identification</b>	.26 (p<.01)	-.06 (p=.41)	-.14 (p<.05)	-.17 (p<.01)	-.02 (p=.77)	-.05 (p=.44)

Of the party-specific correlations, all but that between number of NZ First affiliated discussants and ideological self-identification were significant, with number of National friends positively correlated, and both Labour and Alliance friends negatively related to self-identification. There was no relationship between minority affiliated or no-attribution discussants and self-identification.

Table 7.5 summarises the results of sequential regression analysis in which party identification dummy variables were entered in the first block, with the social network variables entered as the second block. After the first step the regression was significant ( $F(4,216)=10.27, p<.001$ ) giving an  $R^2$  of .16. The regression remained significant after the addition of the social network variables ( $F(9,211)=6.22, p<.001$ ) with an  $R^2$  of .21, and increase of .05 over the first block of variables. The increase of .05 is significant at the  $p<.05$  level of significance indicating that the social network variables account for a significant amount of the variance in liberal-conservative identification ratings after accounting for party identification.

Overall, the significant regression suggests that social networks are predictive of ideological self-identification. As expected, party identification is statistically related to self-identification, with NZ

First and National identification being associated with higher scores (indicating greater conservatism) on the ideology scale. It is interesting to note that while this is the case there is no corresponding negative association between Labour and Alliance identification and ideological self-placement. Even after including party identification in the first block of variables, social network characteristics were significantly predictive of ideological self-placement.

Table 7.5.

Summary of Sequential Regression Analysis for Party Identification (Block 1) and Social Network (Block 2) Variables Predicting Respondent's Liberal-Conservative Self-Identification (N=220)

Party Identification		B	$\beta$	sr <sup>2</sup>
BLOCK 1	National	1.62	.46**	
	Labour	.34	.10	
	Alliance	.13	.03	
	NZ First	.64	.14*	
$R^2=.16, R^2_{\text{adjusted}}=.14$				.16**
Social Network		B	$\beta$	sr <sup>2</sup>
BLOCK 2	National	.50	.19*	
	Alliance	-.58	-.41**	
	Labour	-.50	-.38*	
	NZ First	-.34	-.14*	
	Minority Party	-.02	-.01	
(Constant)	3.23			
$R^2=.21, R^2_{\text{adjusted}}=.17$				.05*
* $p < .05$		** $p < .01$		

## STUDY TWO: METHOD

The same methodology was used with a student sample in mid-1998. The aim of this study was to support the findings of Analysis Two: Study One with a different sample and at a different time.

The Participants were students in a second year social psychology paper at Victoria University. As part of a distraction task between experimental conditions of a laboratory activity the students completed a questionnaire asking questions about a number of socio-political issues, the Schwartz values inventory, the social network measure, feeling thermometer ratings towards the five highest polling parties at the time (National, Labour, Alliance, ACT and New Zealand First), and the liberal/conservative self-identification item used in Phase One of the general population

sample. As the party identification question was not used in this survey the feeling thermometer ratings were used instead. The Questionnaire is appended in appendix seven.

## RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Examination of the simple correlations between number of friends attributed preference for ACT, National, Labour, Alliance, NZ First, or Minority parties, and liberal conservative identification indicate relationships generally in the expected direction. These correlations are summarised in table 7.6. below:

Table 7.6.  
Correlations between number of friends attributed preference and primary respondent ideological self-identification (student sample)

	ACT	National	NZ First	Labour	Alliance	Minority
<b>Liberal-Conservative Identification</b>	.08 (p=.15)	.26 (p<.01)	.14 (p<.05)	-.24 (p<.01)	-.25 (p<.01)	-.02 (p=.39)

Of the party-specific correlations, all but that between number of ACT affiliated discussants and ideological self-identification were significant (though in the expected direction), with number of National and New Zealand First friends positively correlated, and both Labour and Alliance friends negatively related to self-identification. There was no relationship between minority affiliated and self-identification.

Sequential regression of liberal/conservative identification scores onto, firstly, feeling thermometer ratings and, secondly, social network variables produced an increase in  $R^2_{\text{adjusted}}$  of .08 on top of the  $R^2_{\text{adjusted}}$  of .18 accounted for by the feeling thermometer ratings. This increase in  $R^2_{\text{adjusted}}$  was again significant at the 5% level of significance. Overall, the regression was significant ( $F(11, 140)=5.84, p<.001$ ) accounting for 26% of the variance. The strongest network predictor were number of Labour ( $\beta=-.24, p<.01$ ) and ACT ( $\beta=-.14, p<.10$ ) friends.

## **GENERAL DISCUSSION**

That social network characteristics possess a statistically significant relationship with ideological identification after controlling for party identification or feeling thermometer ratings provides support for a number of arguments:

- Firstly, that the statistical relationship found between social network and political preference in the MDA results in analysis one is unlikely to occur as a result of colinearity between party identification and social network. That is to say, similarity of political views in a social network are less likely to occur through some self-selection process in which the primary respondent exclusively develops social ties with people displaying attitudinal similarity.
- Secondly, the perception of political similarity in one's social network is not simply a reflection of a bias in perception. That a social network effect is apparent after controlling statistically for party identification indicates that the perception of network preference is not purely the result of the primary respondent over-attributing their own preference to their friends.
- Thirdly, and most importantly, the characteristics of a social network (hypothetically a reflection of communicative content) influence the ways in which primary respondents summarise their political world in terms of the traditional left-right or liberal-conservative continuum. In short, the social representations one holds of politics are a reflection of the representational content to which they gain access through group and individual communication.

From the analysis detailed above it appears that even from such an indirect measure of social interaction, social networks are significantly related to ideological self-identification. In this particular analysis liberal-conservative self-identification is interpreted as reflecting the way in which laypersons commonly interpret the political world, their polemical representation of matters political.

## **ESTIMATION OF ACCURACY OF PREFERENCE ATTRIBUTIONS**

In order to evaluate the accuracy of primary respondent preference attributions, primary respondents were sent one final questionnaire, following participation in the fourth survey wave. The fourth phase of the survey programme repeated the social network measure with the original first phase respondents. 152 main respondents completed and returned the measure and as a result were sent a further secondary survey which they were requested to pass on to one of the

persons whom they had described in the social network measure. These secondary respondents were required to describe themselves on the same dimensions upon which they had been rated by the primary respondent. This measure is presented in appendix eight. Of the 152 secondary surveys sent out, 101 were passed on, completed, and returned by a network member. A little over half of the secondary respondents were romantically linked with the primary respondent, 20% were family members, with the remainder comprising of friends and co-workers.

Comparison of primary and secondary respondent answers indicated a reasonable level of accuracy. 71% of political preference attributions by primary respondents were correct, though this figure includes 11 primary respondents who were unable to make an attribution for their discussant and automatically incorrect. Excluding this group improves accuracy to 80%. The type of relationship did not affect level of accuracy though, counter-intuitively, the prediction rate for romantic partners was lower (77%) than for family (88%) or friends and co-workers (82%).

In line with the findings of Huckfeldt et al (1995), preference attributions were more reliable when the respondents possessed the same actual preference as their discussant. When respondents shared the same preference, primary respondent attributions were more accurate (88%) compared to non-congruent preferences (60%,  $\chi^2(1)=7.93$ ,  $p<.001$ ). Importantly, attribution accuracy was unaffected by level of political interest of either respondent, or frequency of political discussion between respondents. This suggests that discussants whose interactions are more politically focussed are no more able to make accurate preference attributions than those with non-political interactions.

It must be acknowledged that the method employed for checking accuracy of preference attributions is not itself free of criticism. By allowing primary respondents to select which of their network members should complete the secondary questionnaire it is possible that the primary respondents select secondary respondents with whom they are most familiar. This in turn might inflate the apparent accuracy of preference attributions. One defence of this might be that, as indicated above, primary respondents in fact performed worst in predicting the preference of spouses (with whom one might assume the respondents are most familiar), suggesting that if (as is likely) the secondary respondent sample is biased towards the more familiar then this in fact might deflate the accuracy results. Ideally of course, such a test of preference attribution would be best achieved by the use of snowball sampling with all network members being contacted.

## SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The analyses described above support the contention that the social environment plays a significant role in political behaviour, whether it is ideological self-identification or actual voting preference. From a theoretical perspective it has been argued that these effects occur through social transmission and reinforcement of representational knowledge upon which political behaviour is based. Rather than assume the importance of social environment in the propagation of social representations these studies have explicitly measured aspects of social environment using a social network measure. For this reason these findings are theoretically important not only in relation to political preference but also in illustrating what has been a fundamental (and unaddressed) assumption of Social Representations theory.

Just as these results support the arguments made about the representational basis of political preference they also contradict the view presented by theorists from a number of traditions (eg. Dunleavy & Husbands, 1985) that social environment is unimportant in political behaviour. Dunleavy and Husbands (1985) have explicitly rejected social environment as an influence on political behaviour, in favour of an increased emphasis on media effects. Similarly, the rational choice literature has tended to ignore the role of social context by favouring a view of voting behaviour as an almost exclusively individual-level act.

Given the relatively weak findings of the social network analyses is it possible that the finding that social networks may explain 5% of the variance in the dependent variable is due instead to sample bias? So far, the issue of sample bias has been broached only briefly, with it being concluded through comparison of sample demographics with those of the national census for the sample area that the sample appears at least superficially representative. What of non-demographic sources of sample bias? I shall attempt to show that the most obvious sources of non-demographic bias are unlikely to affect the conclusions of this study.

One potential source of bias relates to the level of political interest across the sample. This is particularly relevant to the current study in that it might be expected that a respondent's increased interest in politics might in turn reflect a social network with a greater than average interest in politics and therefore lead to inflation of the apparent impact of social networks on political preference. At it's worst such a bias would mean that the best conclusion that could be drawn on the basis of this data is that the political preference of people who are particularly

interested in politics is likely to reflect/be reflected by their social network. The question then, is two-fold. Firstly, is it possible to determine if the sample is unrepresentatively interested in politics, and secondly, if this were to be the case what would be the implications for the conclusions of this study?

As regards the first question the simple answer is no, it is not possible to know whether the sample is any more interested in politics than the 60% to 70% of non-respondents. It is however possible to look within the sample to address the second question by comparing sub-groups of the sample. Firstly, as shown by the result reported in the last statistic at the end of analysis one previously, there was a significant difference in the strength of political identification displayed depending on the degree of homogeneity of the respondent's social networks. That is to say, respondents in homogeneous political networks tended to report stronger party identification than did people in more heterogeneous networks. This at least suggests that even if the sample is unrepresentative in terms of the level of their political interest there is sufficient variation within the sample in terms of their political networks to go some way to addressing this question.

A stronger case must still be made to show that the findings may be due to greater than average interest in politics. The fourth survey phase included the item "How important are political matters to you?" with respondents able to indicate a score between 1 (not at all important) and 7 (very important). 25% of the sample indicated on this scale that they were at best neutral as far as political matters are concerned (eg. indicated a score of 1, 2, 3, or 4). I have no doubt that this is not representative of the population as a whole, but that does not automatically discount the findings of this study. If the finding of a social network effect were due to a sample bias then we would expect that the preference of people with a lower interest in politics would be less accurately predicted than those with a high interest in politics. This proposition was tested using the social network data from the fourth phase, by comparing the level of political interest for people whose political preferences were correctly and incorrectly predicted using exactly the same model as presented in the previous analyses.

It was found that there was NO significant difference between the levels of interest of people correctly classified compared to those incorrectly classified ( $F(1,132)=3.19, p=.07ns$ ). Before the reader leaps from their chair pointing out that the result only narrowly fails the criterion for significance and that there is a clear trend for this to be the case it must be pointed out that the



means of the two groups were opposite to the direction expected by the interest-bias theory. That is to say incorrectly classified respondents were MORE likely to be interested in politics (mean=5.39, SD=1.36) than their correctly classified counterparts (mean=4.92, SD=1.71).

This finding makes an important contribution to the study, not only does it appear that the finding that social networks contribute to political preference is not due solely to this bias in the sample, it does in fact suggest the opposite - I would argue that the more interested in politics you are, the less likely your social network contributes to your political preference. Put simply, it appears to be the case that people who are interested in politics are also more likely to be knowledgeable about politics and therefore have more information upon which to base their preference - they do not need the opinion of their social network to decide who to vote for. On the other hand, the less interested in politics you are the more likely it is that your own preference is based on the opinions of the important people around you. It may in fact be the case that the conclusions from this study underestimate the relationship between social network and political preference.

The final argument against this particular bias (and biases in general) is that these findings have been replicated in non-New Zealand environments. Liu, Ikeda, and Wilson (1998) present an alternative analysis of this data, as well as similar data from Japan, that shows the same result. Using multinomial logit analyses the authors show that even after including the level of political interest of the primary respondent and the members of the network, there is a significant contribution made to political preference by the interpersonal political environment in both New Zealand and Japan. This finding is particularly encouraging as the Japanese sample in this analysis was dramatically larger than the sample presented here, but with the same general finding.

## CHAPTER EIGHT GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Chapters one to four set out the basis for his thesis. Following a survey of contemporary explanations of political behaviour, an attempt was made to re-formulate one of the less known theories- symbolic politics. Simply, symbolic politics theory as conceived by Sears (1986; 1993) contends that political behaviour is based on the activation of certain symbolic predispositions (including political ideology, party identification, and racial prejudice), which are evoked by the symbolic content of a particular political symbol (an issue, person, icon, party, etc). A number of reasons were given for the relative failure of the symbolic politics thesis to gain favour, and a rationale was given for re-framing symbolic politics theory within a broader theory of social behaviour, that of social representations theory (Moscovici, 1973; 1988).

In summary the reasons given for this re-framing of symbolic politics theory were as follows. Definitional problems have meant that little attempt has been made to determine what the content of important political symbols might be, and how that content relates to the content of one's symbolic predispositions. Secondly, symbolic process is presented as a process that is divorced from one's social world- it is a process purely applied to matters of a political nature. There is little reason that there be such a process related only to stimuli with political content, indeed if this were to be the case what are the boundaries of political content- where does an object stop being a political one and not a social one. Thirdly, the practical level at which the theory is evaluated is at odds with the level of theoretical articulation- that is to say symbolic politics must be a social-level phenomenon, specifying as it does its roots in social interaction. Yet the research into symbolic politics has been primarily survey-based, requesting individuals to answer items on purely inter-psychic phenomena. It is desirable then to attempt to place political behaviour in the social context in which it occurs- communication and interaction with others.

It was proposed that these major shortcomings might be addressed by taking a step back and re-articulating symbolic politics theory within social representations theory. Social representations theory is a knowledge-structure theory which has been compared with schema theory in that social representations are conceived of as families of inter-related ideas, concepts, or lay-theories about the way the social world works. These lay-theories are generated and propagated

through interaction and communication with others, or through other media. In this way we would expect that those exposed to the same media information, or interacting with the same people should base their understanding of the world and things in it upon the same information. Applied to politics this means that people who are exposed to, and seek out, the same information will have an understanding of politics based on similar representations, and representational content. These political representations are interwoven with any other representations to form the social knowledge of the individual. In this way, even those individuals with no overt interest in politics still share some of the same political representations as those around them.

Potential political symbols then may be political stimuli, whether political issues, political figures, political parties, or even stimuli that have no obvious political connotation. Behaviour concerning the political stimulus will depend on the content of the representations that pertain to the object.

A key feature of political symbols and political representations so conceived is the role of social values. Examples of reactions to political symbols may be shown to obviously relate to the values those symbols embody (the American Flag or the America's Cup for example), and the relevance of value content of any symbol should relate to the level of endorsement of those and other values by the symboliser.

Representational content (values, groups, attributes) of a political object should vary across populations. That is to say that members of different collectives will differ in the content of representations (not just those pertaining to politics), and those differences should be to some degree systematic. A Tory in Britain has a different view of the role of the state in the economy to a Labour supporter- indeed this is a difference that defines the boundary between being a Tory, or being a Labour supporter. This is not to say however that Labour and Conservative supporters have nothing in common, rather there are only certain domains in which representational differences are the foundation for group identities. For example, while Labour and Conservative party supporters are likely to hold different views about the role of the state there is no reason to expect that Labour supporters think Pepsi is better than Coke.

Such intra-group homogeneity is not a random occurrence- it is a product, as well as an antecedent, of the group itself. Group-based representations occur in part through communication between group members. Our conversation is framed by the representations we

hold of the way the world works- for example our representations about social interaction, social hierarchy, or indeed politics. When we interact our representational knowledge dictates the domains of information, and the positions taken on that information, that are relevant to any conversational interaction. Thus interaction with like-minded individuals will serve to reinforce what we think, and interaction with antagonists may either weaken or even exaggerate representations. For this reason social interaction plays an essential role in a social representational theory of symbolic politics.

The inclusion of the social environment as an important variable adds another dimension to symbolic politics- it draws attention to the use and manipulation of symbols by media and political elite, as well as individuals. Representational knowledge is not static- it is dynamic to the extent that it can be added to, reinforced, or even weakened over a period of time. This in turn means we are open to manipulation, and what better example of attempted manipulation than political party broadcasts and adverts, door-to-door political proselytisers, or political talkback? these attempts just serve to illustrate the conviction of political participants that it is possible to convince people that their party is the only alternative, and from a theoretical perspective to do so it is necessary to change the representations upon which such decisions are based.

In it's original incarnation symbolic politics appeared a passive process with the symboliser apparently subject to an ever-changing sea of symbols, reacting expressively rather than instrumentally. This alternative conceptualisation presents a more realistic view of political opinion and behaviour, the individual may resist manipulation or integrate it into their world view, participate in manipulation or make an active decision not to participate. In turn a vast industry is developing around the attempt to find the most effective ways of convincing people of what is good for them. At the time of writing this is perfectly illustrated by the controversy in a tea cup surrounding the involvement (or otherwise) of the prime minister Jenny Shipley in the tendering of a health ministry advertising contract for millions of dollars.

The result of the reconceptualisation of symbolic politics in this way has been the focus on the role of social values, discourse, and interaction in political preference and opinion. This was summarised in figure 4.1, re-presented below as figure 8.1 in which social interaction at the electorate level (eg. between electors), elite discourse (reinterpreted through the media or more directly), and social values.




Figure 4.1. Reconceptualisation of symbolic politics

To this end the remainder of thesis has been devoted to investigating the implications of these different domains for symbolic politics.

Part one focused on the content of ideological representations- the meaning of ideological labels, and how those meanings relate to ideological self-identification. The use of the descriptive statistical technique of correspondence analysis showed that supporters of different parties ascribe different meanings to the terms "liberal" and "conservative". This was extended by the use the multiple discriminant analysis which indicated that in the balance of probability supporters of different political parties display intra-group representational homogeneity and inter-group heterogeneity in that they may be differentiated by the meanings they use to discriminate between ideological labels. This was an important result as it allowed the later use of ideological self-identification as representational shorthand for further analysis.

The second section of part one presented an investigation of the representational content associated with preferred and dis-preferred parties. Again, there was a degree of within-preference consensus and inter-preference variability that was theoretically consistent with social representations theory. Further the atomic concepts used by respondents to describe their favoured and unfavoured parties were clearly inter-related, in that a number of themes were apparent. For example, National supporters justified their preference by the use of a freedom/ self-reliance repertoire that supported their preference and acted rhetorically to weaken implicit alternative repertoires. Similarly, supporters of the Alliance and Labour parties justified their preference by appealing to an equality repertoire critical of the socio-political status quo. These

repertoires were likened to the concept of legitimising myths offered by Sidanius (1993) as one of the mechanisms through which group-based hierarchy may be attenuated or enhanced.

Part two, adopted the theme of social values as both representational elements and as an intrapsychic foundation for political preference. Part one elicited a number of value associations, in particular freedom and equality. A survey of the social values literature showed that there are historical and theoretical precedents for the importance of these two values in political preference. Study one presented a thematic content analysis of parliamentary speeches that showed that to a great degree party membership can be discerned on the basis of the relative frequency of appeals to the values of freedom and equality. While this was generally consistent with the original contentions of Rokeach (1973) it was contradictory to the previous finding of Levine (1973).

Study two in this section approached the issue of values from a different angle. A survey was used to elicit a political value representation of the major political parties. Once again there were clear differences in the values associated with National, New Zealand First and the liberal twosome of Labour and the Alliance. The values parties were perceived as representing were shown to relate to the favourability of each party.

The emphasis of the third study switched the values held by the respondents themselves (rather than those associated with the parties), the expectation being that those values perceived to be of importance in differentiating parties in terms of the way they are viewed would be those values held to be important by the supporters of those parties. This was only partially confirmed using composite value scales designed by Schwartz (1992). Equality values were shown to be more important in differentiating supporters than freedom/ self-reliance values. Additionally, the multidimensional scaling procedure ALSCAL was used to reduce the value instrument to two primary value orientations- interconnectedness versus social hierarchy on the one hand, and flexibility versus rigidity on the other. This was consistent with the previous Wellington area analysis carried out by Allen (1994). Additionally both dimension were found to correlate to some extent with several socio-political measures. In particular the second dimension correlated with the ideological self-identification measure first used in part one. It was no surprise then that supporters of different parties displayed significant differences on this dimension, consistent with the ideological differences elucidated in part one. This indicates that there is a certain basic value

dimension that is implicated in political preference- something akin to liberal versus conservative political ideology.

The final study of this section took a practical look at changes in value attribution that may be caused by political advertising. Groups of students viewed one of a series of advertisements and made value attributions for the major parties. It was found that the relative levels of favourability of the four parties differed in relation to the values made salient by the adverts. In particular the Alliance advert had a negative effect on that party's perception and could be linked to a failure by the advertisement to emphasise core Alliance values, while highlighting undesirable values.

The final empirical chapter focused upon the final aspect of the triumvirate of ideas implicated in the social representational theory of symbolic politics, that of social interaction. A survey was undertaken to evaluate the theoretical contention that political representations should vary as a function of the interpersonal political environment in which the respondent interacts. It was shown that the political composition of the primary respondents' political network was a better explanation of primary respondent preference than the sociological concept of social position emphasised by electoral sociologist Patrick Dunleavy (Dunleavy & Husbands, 1985). Given the earlier findings related to ideology as a social representation, the finding that social network composition was predictive of ideological self-identification, was interpreted as supportive of a role for social interaction in defining representational content. This finding was further supported by replication using a student sample.

In sum, the findings presented in these studies offer support for the contention that social values, communication, and social interaction are implicated in a social representational process of political preference and opinion that is consistent with the symbolic politics thesis.

Rather than make the ever-popular statement that further research is required to shed further light on these phenomena I will instead briefly focus on the limitations of this research.

Some of the problems that undercut the symbolic politics thesis are no less intractable following this research programme than before- they have instead been circumvented by reconceptualisation of the symbolic politics process in terms of social representations theory. I would argue that this is as satisfactory a result as we are likely to find given the nature of some of

the problems that are apparent. Secondly, there is a significant statistical caveat to be acknowledged - many of the analyses presented here make use of descriptive statistical methods that at best present results that are indicative, rather than definitive of the sorts of association hypothesised. Additionally, statistical methods such as discriminant and regression analysis are manifest variables analyses and to no small extent the form of data collected sets prescriptions on the results obtained. Where possible statistical and practical attempts have been made to determine the causal direction of the relationships presented. For example, results of the follow-up survey to secondary respondents in chapter seven gave a certain degree of certainty that primary respondents are not merely projecting their own preference onto their network, a certainty that is augmented by the statistical controls applied in the same study.

On a more positive note, ground has been made in addressing the contextual position of symbolic politics- it is an active social process rather than an intra-psychic phenomena, and the studies presented here offer some insight into the way in which political preference and opinion may be better investigated. In particular the use of social networks measures offers hope for the contextualised study of phenomena broader than just political behaviour.

Similarly, this thesis has traversed a number of literatures, and has drawn on disciplines other than psychology. This eclecticism has been mirrored in the different forms of analyses presented. While the greater part of the studies make use of survey data, and therefore restricted in response variation, even there an attempt has been made to avoid merely presenting analyses of differences in scores on a raft of psychological measures. For example, part one makes extensive use of open-ended questions to probe the meanings of political labels and objects. Where possible the interpretative subjectivity that can accompany the analysis of such data has been offset by the complementary use of more traditional statistical analysis. At the same time the studies presented have used archival data in the form of parliamentary speech transcripts, naturally occurring data if ever there was any, as well as utilising an experimental methodology in the execution of study four of chapter six. It is my hope that such a marriage of qualitative and quantitative, experimental and correlational analyses will become more common in the discipline of social psychology and other fields of social scientific inquiry.

On a further practical note, this endeavour derives no small amount of ecological validity out of the use of real people as respondents in the four phases of surveys. As indicated by Sears



(1985) the majority of research in social psychology continues to be carried out with the participation of undergraduate psychology students. What this makes up for in convenience it loses in credibility, particularly as the basis for theory-building. The research findings presented here reflect the spice that comes from a heterogeneous sample that would have been impossible using a captive population of students.

Finally, though this thesis has by necessity concentrated primarily on theoretical issues, considerable light has been shed on the unique political position New Zealand occupies. This thesis cannot hope to capture the volatility of the political events that occurred before, during, and after the research programme. It has however illustrated some of the important inter-relationships between the parties and their supporters. The positions of the Alliance and New Zealand First are particularly relevant given that one or the other would have held the balance of power after the election. Though New Zealand First was to be the winner in that particular race this thesis has at times captured the difficult position a new and populist party may find itself in. The ambiguous position of New Zealand First was reflected in study one of chapter six, where the value profile of its speakers was clearly more befitting of a Labour coalition partner, than a National one. Similarly, only one of the analyses presented successfully discriminated between supporters of Labour and the Alliance- that using social network variables to profile the interpersonal political environment we operate in. This only serves to emphasise the importance of such analyses in this and future enterprises.

I shall finish on this final point- this study of politics illustrates the conjunction of practical and theoretical concerns in research. While some little theoretical ground has been made, no little amount has been made in the practical study of a very real phenomenon.

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**APPENDIX 1: Demographic comparison of sample with 1996  
Census information**

	<b>Sample Percentage</b>	<b>Census for Target Area</b>
<b>Gender</b>		
Male	53.1%	48.9%
Female	46.9%	51.1%
<b>Age</b>		
under 20	0.4%	NA
20 to 29	18.1%	23.7%
30 to 39	20.6%	24.1%
40 to 49	22.7%	19.3%
50 to 59	19.7%	13.2%
60 or older	18.5%	19.7%
<b>Ethnicity</b>		
NZ-European	64.1%	74.2%
NZ-Maori	26.5%	12.7%
Pacific Islander	2.9%	7.0%
Asian	5.7%	6.0%
Other	0.8%	0.01%
<b>Education</b>		
School Certificate (5th form)	24.3%	16.8%
Sixth Form Certificate	11.7%	16.0%
Higher School Certificate (7th form)	7.5%	10.1%
At least 1 year tertiary study	18.8%	18.3%
Bachelor's degree/Trade Certificate	30.5%	29.8%
Postgraduate qualification	6.7%	9.0%

## APPENDIX 2: Phase One Survey Questionnaire

**A) First, name one or two past or present New Zealand Politicians or MPs that you like:**

1) \_\_\_\_\_

2) \_\_\_\_\_

What is it about these people that you like, or that makes them good politicians? (You don't have to write complete sentences, just characteristics, words, or phrases).

**B) Next, name two past or present New Zealand politicians or MPs you dislike:**

1) \_\_\_\_\_

2) \_\_\_\_\_

What is it about these people that you dislike, or that makes them bad politicians?

We want to know how you feel towards some of the political parties in New Zealand. The scale below runs from 1 to 7, where "1" means you feel very unfavourable toward a party, a rating of "4" means you feel neutral toward a party, and "7" means you feel very favourable toward a party. Please circle the number that best describes your feelings (if you don't know anything about a particular party, then circle the "No Opinion" option.)

	Very Unfavourable		Neutral		Very Favourable			
	↓			↓		↓		
<b>National</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	(No opinion)
<b>Alliance</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	(No opinion)
<b>Labour</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	(No opinion)
<b>New Zealand First</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	(No opinion)
<b>Progressive Greens</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	(No opinion)
<b>United New Zealand</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	(No opinion)
<b>ACT</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	(No opinion)
<b>Christian Democrats</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	(No opinion)
<b>Conservatives (formerly RoC)</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	(No opinion)
<b>Christian Heritage</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	(No opinion)

C) Who is your MP at the moment? \_\_\_\_\_

Which party do they represent? \_\_\_\_\_

D) How happy are you with your MP's performance since the last general election? (Circle a number)

Very Unhappy    1       2       3       4       5       6       7    Very Happy

E) Would you say that New Zealand is worse off, or better off economically compared to a year ago?

Much Worse Off    1       2       3       4       5       6       7    Much Better Off

F) Looking ahead, do you think that a year from New Zealand will be worse off, or better off economically?

Much Worse Off    1       2       3       4       5       6       7    Much Better Off

G) Would you say that you are worse off, or better off financially compared to a year ago?

Much Worse Off    1       2       3       4       5       6       7    Much Better Off

H) Looking ahead, do you think that a year from now you will be worse off, or better off financially?

Much Worse Off    1       2       3       4       5       6       7    Much Better Off

I) Below is a list of issues. Please circle the number on the scale that represents how satisfied or dissatisfied you feel with the state of these issues under the present government:

	Very Unsatisfied			Neutral		Very Satisfied	
	↓			↓			↓
Crime	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Economic Growth	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Education	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Environmental Issues	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Health	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Inflation	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Social Welfare	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Treaty of Waitangi Issues	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Unemployment	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Foreign Investment in NZ	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

J) Of the ten issues listed above, please write down the three most important issues to you personally:

1st) \_\_\_\_\_

2nd) \_\_\_\_\_

3rd) \_\_\_\_\_

K) Next, for the same issues indicate whether you think they will get worse, stay the same, or get better if your preferred party wins the next election. Circle "(W)" if you think the situation will get worse, "(S)" if you think it will stay the same, and "(B)" if you think the situation will get better.

	worse / ↓ (W)	same / ↓ (S)	better / ↓ (B)
Crime	(W)	(S)	(B)
Economic Growth	(W)	(S)	(B)
Education	(W)	(S)	(B)
Environmental Issues	(W)	(S)	(B)
Health	(W)	(S)	(B)
Inflation	(W)	(S)	(B)
Social Welfare	(W)	(S)	(B)
Treaty of Waitangi Issues	(W)	(S)	(B)
Unemployment	(W)	(S)	(B)
Foreign Investment in NZ	(W)	(S)	(B)

L) Below is a list of statements about different political opinions. Read them carefully, then circle the number that represents how much you agree or disagree with each statement. The scale runs from 1 to 7, where "1" means you disagree completely, and "7" means you agree completely.

Remember, there are no right or wrong answers so the best answer is your own opinion.

	Disagree Completely ↓ 1	2	3	4	5	6	Agree Completely ↓ 7
<b>It is the government's responsibility to make sure everyone is provided for financially.</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
<b>Women should be free to choose whether or not to have an abortion.</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
<b>The government has gone too far in giving preferential treatment for racial minorities.</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
<b>There is too much promotion of environmental protection at the expense of economic growth.</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
<b>There should be more incentives to force unemployed people to seek work.</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
<b>Increasing foreign ownership of New Zealand resources is necessary for further economic growth.</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
<b>Unions need more power to protect the rights of workers.</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
<b>There should be more social and legal independence for Maori people.</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7



M) Which party did you vote for in the last three elections? (If you didn't vote, then circle "Didn't vote")

1987) \_\_\_\_\_ (Didn't vote)  
 1990) \_\_\_\_\_ (Didn't vote)  
 1993) \_\_\_\_\_ (Didn't vote)

N) Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a National voter, Labour voter, Alliance voter, or what?

\_\_\_\_\_

If you do think of yourself in this way, how strong is that feeling of support? (circle a number)

Very Weak      1      2      3      4      5      6      7      Very Strong

O) How likely are you to vote in the next general election? (circle a number from 1 to 7)

Very Unlikely      1      2      3      4      5      6      7      Very Likely

P) At the moment, which political party do you prefer the most? \_\_\_\_\_

What sorts of people, and what kinds of values do you think this party represents? (There are no right or wrong answers so the best answer is your own opinion)

What images come to mind when you think of this party?

Q) Among the parties that have a chance to win the next election, which one would you least like to see in power?

\_\_\_\_\_

What sorts of people, and what kinds of values do you think this party represents?

What images come to mind when you think of this party?

R) If an election was held now, which party would you be likely to vote for? \_\_\_\_\_

What party do you think is the most likely coalition partner for this party? \_\_\_\_\_

Please tell us where you get your information about things related to politics. Below is a list of possible sources.

**A) What newspaper(s) do you read most often? (If you don't read any newspapers, then write "NA" in the first space.) Don't worry if you can't think of the exact number of times you read a paper, just give us a general idea.**

First, which newspaper(s) do you read? (please specify)	Second, how many days a week do you read this/ these paper(s)?						
1) _____	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2) _____	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3) _____	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

**B) Which news programmes do you watch most often? (If you don't watch TV news, write "NA" in the first space. If you don't have a TV, write "no TV" in the first space.)**

First, which news show(s) do you watch? on which channel? (please specify)	Second, how many hours a week do you watch this/ these news show(s)?	
1) _____ Channel: _____	_____	hours
2) _____ Channel: _____	_____	hours
3) _____ Channel: _____	_____	hours

**C) What radio programmes do you get political information from? (If you don't listen to radio political broadcasts write "NA" in the first space.)**

First, which radio show(s) do you listen to? on which station? (please specify)	Second, how many hours a week do you watch this/ these show(s)?	
1) _____ Station: _____	_____	hours
2) _____ Station: _____	_____	hours
3) _____ Station: _____	_____	hours

**D) Are there any other places, people, or ways you frequently get political information from?**

**G) Frequently people use the terms "liberal" and "conservative" to describe their political beliefs. How would you rate yourself in these terms? (circle a number from 1 to 7)**

Liberal    1        2        3        4        5        6        7        Conservative

**H) Different people have different ideas about what "liberal" and "conservative" mean. What do these terms mean to you?**



Please describe your four best friends. These should be among the most important people you have had contact with regularly in the last six months. You may include your romantic partner, and/or family members if you think of them as important friends.

	FRIEND#1	FRIEND #2	FRIEND #3	FRIEND #4
<b>FRIEND'S INITIALS:</b>				
<b>FRIEND'S GENDER:</b> (Write M or F)				
<b>FRIEND'S AGE:</b>				
<b>FRIEND'S OCCUPATION:</b>				
<b>ETHNICITY:</b> Write 1 for NZ Pakeha/European, 2 for NZ Maori, 3 for Asian, 4 for Pacific Islander, and 5 for other (please state)				
<b>YOUR RELATIONSHIP:</b> Write 1 for romantic partner, 2 for family, 3 for friends, 4 for co-worker, 5 for other.				
<b>HOW CLOSE ARE YOU?:</b> From 1 to 10, where 1 means not very close, and 10 means very close.				
<b>HOW OFTEN DO YOU TALK TO EACH OF THESE PEOPLE?</b> Write 1 for daily, 2 for weekly, 3 for monthly, and 4 for yearly.				
<b>HOW INTERESTED IN POLITICS DO YOU THINK THEY ARE?</b> From 1 to 10, where 1 means not very interested, 10 means very interested.				
<b>HOW OFTEN DO YOU TALK TO EACH OF THESE PEOPLE ABOUT POLITICS?</b> Write 1 for daily, 2 for weekly, 3 for monthly, and 4 for yearly.				
<b>DO YOU USUALLY Agree OR Disagree ABOUT POLITICS?</b> Write A or D				
<b>WHO DO YOU THINK YOUR FRIENDS WOULD VOTE FOR?</b> Write the party name				

Which of your friends know each other? In each of the boxes in the bottom table write an "F" where two people are friends, an "A" if they know each other, and leave the box blank if they don't know each other.

**EXAMPLE:** If only "Friend 1" and "Friend 4" are friends, then you would look along the row headed "Friend 1" and down the column headed "Friend 4", and write "F" in the box where the two meet. All the other boxes would be blank. This is how your table would look:

	Friend #4	Friend #3	Friend #2
Friend #1	F		
Friend #2			
Friend #3			

Please fill in the table below, indicating which of your friends are : friends ("F"), acquaintances ("A"), and leave boxes blank where they don't know each other.

	Friend #4	Friend #3	Friend #2
Friend #1			
Friend #2			
Friend #3			

Finally, we would like you to give us some background information about yourself.

Are you? (tick one)	<input type="checkbox"/> Female	<input type="checkbox"/> Male
What is your age?	_____	
Where were you born?	_____	
How many years have you lived in New Zealand altogether?	_____	
What is your nationality? (tick one)	<input type="checkbox"/> New Zealand	<input type="checkbox"/> Other: _____

What is your marital status? (tick <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> the appropriate box)		
<input type="checkbox"/> Single	<input type="checkbox"/> Married	<input type="checkbox"/> Widowed
<input type="checkbox"/> Romantically involved	<input type="checkbox"/> Separated	<input type="checkbox"/> Other: _____
<input type="checkbox"/> Defacto	<input type="checkbox"/> Divorced	_____
Do you have any children? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No		
If yes, how many of your children live with you? _____		
Which group best describes your ethnic origins (tick <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> the most appropriate box)?		
<input type="checkbox"/> New Zealand Pakeha/European	<input type="checkbox"/> New Zealand Maori	
<input type="checkbox"/> Pacific Islander (please specify: _____)		
<input type="checkbox"/> Asian (please specify: _____)		
<input type="checkbox"/> Other: _____		

What is your current occupation? _____		
How long have you been working in this occupation? _____		
What is your highest level of education? (tick <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> the appropriate box)		
<input type="checkbox"/> Up to 5th form	<input type="checkbox"/> Up to 6th form	<input type="checkbox"/> Up to 7th form
<input type="checkbox"/> More than 1 year of study towards a qualification at a polytechnic or university		
<input type="checkbox"/> Bachelors degree / trade certificate / advanced trade certificate		
<input type="checkbox"/> Post graduate degree		
What is your living arrangement? (tick <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> the appropriate box)		
<input type="checkbox"/> Live in parents home	<input type="checkbox"/> Own your own home	
<input type="checkbox"/> Rent	<input type="checkbox"/> Other: _____	
What is your household income? (tick <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> the appropriate box)		
<input type="checkbox"/> Up to \$20,000	<input type="checkbox"/> From \$40,000 to \$60,000	
<input type="checkbox"/> From \$20,000 to \$40,000	<input type="checkbox"/> More than \$60,000	

Are you a regular church-goer?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	If yes, which one? _____
Are you a member of a union?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	If yes, which one? _____
Are you a political party member?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	If yes, which one? _____
Are you a member of an environmental group?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	If yes, which one? _____

**THE END.**

Thanks very much for your participation.

## **APPENDIX 3: Phase Two Survey Questionnaire**

How do you feel about the **political parties in New Zealand**? The scale below runs from 1 to 7, where "1" means you feel very unfavourable toward a party, "4" means you feel neutral toward a party, and "7" means you feel very favourable toward a party. Please circle the number that best describes your feelings (If you don't know anything about a particular party, then circle the "no opinion" option.)

	Very Unfavourable			Neutral	Very Favourable			
	↓			↓			↓	
National	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	(No opinion)
New Zealand First	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	(No opinion)
Labour	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	(No opinion)
Alliance	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	(No opinion)
Progressive Greens	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	(No opinion)
United New Zealand	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	(No opinion)
ACT	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	(No opinion)
Christian Coalition	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	(No opinion)

Of the parties listed above, which one best represents people like you? \_\_\_\_\_

Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a National voter, a Labour voter, an Alliance voter, or what? \_\_\_\_\_

If you do think of yourself in this way, how strong is that feeling of support? (circle a number below)

Very Weak                      1            2            3            4            5            6            7            Very strong

How likely are you to vote in the next general election? (circle a number from 1 to 7)

Very unlikely      1            2            3            4            5            6            7            Very likely

Who would you most like to see as the **next prime minister** of New Zealand? \_\_\_\_\_

If an election was held in the near future, **which party would you vote for** with your party vote?

\_\_\_\_\_

What party do you think is the most **likely** coalition partner for your favoured party?

\_\_\_\_\_

Which **candidate** do you think you would vote for with your electorate vote?

\_\_\_\_\_

Which party does this person represent? \_\_\_\_\_

Circle the number that reflects how favourable you feel towards each of the people as **prime minister**. "1" means you feel very unfavourable towards the person, "4" means neutral, and "7" means you feel very favourable towards that person. If you don't know much about them, circle the "no opinion" option.

	Very unfavourable			Neutral	Very favourable			
	↓			↓			↓	
Jim Bolger	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	No opinion
Winston Peters	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	No opinion
Helen Clarke	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	No opinion
Jim Anderton	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	No opinion

Would you say that there is such a thing as a "New Zealand national character"?

YES  NO  (MAYBE: \_\_\_\_\_)

How would you describe the New Zealand National character?

Can you think of anyone who exemplifies (or provides a good example of) this character?

\_\_\_\_\_ (you can write more than one name)

Do you identify with this type of character, or do you think it doesn't apply much to you?

IDENTIFY WITH  DOESN'T APPLY MUCH TO ME  (Not sure)

Do you think there is such a thing as a "typical New Zealander"?

YES  NO  (MAYBE: \_\_\_\_\_)

Can you describe the typical New Zealander?

Would you say that this "typical New Zealander" is anything like yourself?

YES  NO  (MAYBE: \_\_\_\_\_)

What kinds of things make New Zealand **positive and distinct** (different) from other countries?

In what ways do you think New Zealanders are **positive and distinct** from people in other countries?

Are there any ways in which New Zealand or New Zealanders are **less positive or deficient** (or weak) compared to other countries or people from other countries?

Is there such a thing as "**Pakeha identity**"?

YES  NO  (MAYBE: \_\_\_\_\_)

Can you describe what Pakeha identity might be?



Do you prefer the term "**Pakeha**" or "**New Zealand European**" to describe New Zealanders of European origin? PAKEHA  
NEW ZEALAND EUROPEAN (Other term: \_\_\_\_\_)

Why?

Is there such a thing as "**Maori identity**"?

YES  NO  (MAYBE: \_\_\_\_\_)

Can you describe what Maori identity might be?

What do you think of the **Treaty of Waitangi**?

Do you think Maori Treaty claims against the Crown should be settled at a **faster or slower rate**?

FASTER  SLOWER  ABOUT THE SAME

Do you think more, less, or about the same **amount of money** should be set aside for Maori Treaty claims (than the \$1 billion limit proposed by the government)?  MORE  LESS  ABOUT THE SAME

Do you think that ordinary people in New Zealand will benefit from the **prompt** settlement of Treaty claims?

YES  NO  (MAYBE: \_\_\_\_\_)

Do you think the issues involved in Maori Treaty claims can ever be **settled for good**?

YES  NO  (MAYBE: \_\_\_\_\_)

If New Zealand becomes a Republic, do you think the Treaty should become an important part of the **new constitution**?

YES  NO  (MAYBE: \_\_\_\_\_)

Do you support New Zealand becoming a **Republic**?

YES  NO  (MAYBE: \_\_\_\_\_)

If New Zealand were to become a Republic, do you think there should be **separate governing bodies** for Maori and non-Maori?  YES  NO  (MAYBE: \_\_\_\_\_)

Is there anything about the **direction of race relations** in this country that concerns you?

Do you think that race relations in New Zealand are getting better or worse?

BETTER  WORSE  ABOUT THE SAME

Do you think that economic conditions for Maori in New Zealand have been getting better or worse?

BETTER  WORSE  ABOUT THE SAME

**EVALUATING OUR LEADERS**

Read through the list of opposites below, and circle the number on each row that best represents how you would describe each leader. If you think the leader is highly intelligent, for instance, circle the "1" next to intelligent. If you think they are somewhat stupid, circle a "5" or "6". If you think they are neither stupid nor intelligent, circle "4". If you are unsure or have no opinion, circle "NS" next to the item.

<b>JIM BOLGER</b>	Intelligent	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Stupid	NS
	Charismatic	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Dull	NS
	Principled	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Unprincipled	NS
	Strong	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Weak	NS
	Caring	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Heartless	NS
	Consistent	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Inconsistent	NS
	For the people	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	For themselves	NS
	Honest	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Deceitful	NS
	Not racist	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Racist	NS

<b>WINSTON PETERS</b>	Intelligent	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Stupid	NS
	Charismatic	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Dull	NS
	Principled	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Unprincipled	NS
	Strong	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Weak	NS
	Caring	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Heartless	NS
	Consistent	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Inconsistent	NS
	For the people	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	For themselves	NS
	Honest	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Deceitful	NS
	Not racist	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Racist	NS

<b>HELEN CLARKE</b>	Intelligent	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Stupid	NS
	Charismatic	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Dull	NS
	Principled	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Unprincipled	NS
	Strong	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Weak	NS
	Caring	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Heartless	NS
	Consistent	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Inconsistent	NS
	For the people	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	For themselves	NS
	Honest	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Deceitful	NS
	Not racist	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Racist	NS

<b>JIM ANDERTON</b>	Intelligent	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Stupid	NS
	Charismatic	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Dull	NS
	Principled	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Unprincipled	NS
	Strong	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Weak	NS
	Caring	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Heartless	NS
	Consistent	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Inconsistent	NS
	For the people	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	For themselves	NS
	Honest	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Deceitful	NS
	Not racist	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Racist	NS

Of the characteristics listed above, which do you think are the three most important for a LEADER?

1. \_\_\_\_\_ 2. \_\_\_\_\_ 3. \_\_\_\_\_

Which do you think are the three least important?

1. \_\_\_\_\_ 2. \_\_\_\_\_ 3. \_\_\_\_\_

**WORK AND LIFE EXPERIENCES**

Have there been any changes in your life during the last 6 months that you would describe as "MAJOR" (these might include having a baby, getting divorced, getting a big promotion, changing jobs, etc.)? YES NO

If there have been any major changes in your life, please describe them:

Please circle any words that describe your position at work (circle as many as are appropriate):

- |            |                   |                       |               |
|------------|-------------------|-----------------------|---------------|
| Temporary  | Permanent         | High status (at work) | Medium status |
| Low status | I work for others | Others work for me    | Secure        |
|            | Insecure          | Satisfying            |               |

This page is a survey of your **PERSONAL VALUES**. Since there are no right or wrong answers, the best answer is your personal opinion. Circle a number on the scale next to each item that represents how important these values are AS GUIDING PRINCIPLES IN YOUR LIFE.

First, **Read all of the items carefully**, and choose the value that is most important to you - give that a rating of '6'. Next, choose the value that is least important and give that a '-1' or '0'. Finally, go on to the other values and rate them as well.

	Not at all important		Important				of supreme importance		opposed to my values
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	-1	
<b>Equality</b> (equal opportunity for all)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	-1	
<b>Social power</b> (control over others, dominance)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	-1	
<b>Freedom</b> (freedom of action and thought)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	-1	
<b>Social order</b> (stability of society)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	-1	
<b>Politeness</b> (courtesy, good manners)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	-1	
<b>Wealth</b> (material possessions, money)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	-1	
<b>National security</b> (protection of my nation from enemies)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	-1	
<b>Reciprocation of favours</b> (avoidance of indebtedness)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	-1	
<b>A world at peace</b> (free of war and conflict)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	-1	
<b>Respect for tradition</b> (preservation of time-honored customs)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	-1	
<b>Self-discipline</b> (self-restraint, resistance to temptation)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	-1	
<b>Family security</b> (safety for loved ones)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	-1	
<b>Social recognition</b> (respect, approval by others)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	-1	
<b>Wisdom</b> (a mature understanding of life)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	-1	
<b>Authority</b> (the right to lead or command)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	-1	
<b>A world of beauty</b> (beauty of nature and the arts)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	-1	
<b>Social justice</b> (correcting injustice, care of the weak)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	-1	
<b>Independent</b> (self-reliant, self-sufficient)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	-1	
<b>Moderate</b> (avoiding extremes of feeling and action)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	-1	
<b>Ambitious</b> (hardworking, aspiring)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	-1	
<b>Broad-minded</b> (tolerant of different ideas and beliefs)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	-1	
<b>Protecting the environment</b> (preserving nature)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	-1	
<b>Influential</b> (having an impact on people and events)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	-1	
<b>Honoring of parents and elders</b> (showing respect)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	-1	
<b>Choosing own goals</b> (selecting own purpose)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	-1	
<b>Healthy</b> (not being sick physically or mentally)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	-1	
<b>Accepting my portion in life</b> (accepting life's circumstances)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	-1	
<b>Honest</b> (genuine, sincere)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	-1	
<b>Preserving my public image</b> (protecting my "face")	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	-1	
<b>Obedient</b> (dutiful, meeting obligations)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	-1	
<b>Intelligent</b> (logical, thinking)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	-1	
<b>Devout</b> (holding to religious faith and belief)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	-1	
<b>Responsible</b> (dependable, reliable)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	-1	
<b>Curious</b> (interested in everything, exploring)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	-1	
<b>Forgiving</b> (willing to pardon others)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	-1	
<b>Successful</b> (achieving goals)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	-1	
<b>Clean</b> (neat, tidy)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	-1	

Which of the statements below do you have a positive or negative feeling towards? Beside each object or statement, place a number from '1' to '7' which represents the strength of your positive or negative feeling. If you have a strong negative feeling then circle '1', if you have a strong positive feeling circle '7', and if you feel neither positive or negative circle '4'

	Strongly Negative ↓				Neutral ↓				Strongly Positive ↓
Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
We should have increased social equality.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
All groups should be given an equal chance in life.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
In getting what you want, it is sometimes necessary to use force against other groups.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
It is okay if some groups have more of a chance in life than others.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
No one group should dominate in society.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
If certain groups stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
Group equality should be our ideal.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
We should strive to make incomes as equal as possible.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
It's probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the bottom.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
We would have fewer problems if we treated people more equally.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
Inferior groups should stay in their place.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
It would be good if groups could be equal .	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		

Read each of the statements below, and then rate how strongly you agree or disagree with each. If you disagree completely with a statement, circle '1', if you agree completely circle '7'. If you feel neutral circle '4'

	Disagree completely ↓				Neutral ↓				Agree completely ↓
I take a positive attitude toward myself.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
On the whole, I'm satisfied with myself.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
I feel that I can't do anything right.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
I feel I do not have much to be proud of.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
I feel that my life is not very useful.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
I feel that I am a person of worth, on an equal plane with others.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
I am able to do things as well as most other people.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
At times I think that I am no good at all.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
I feel I have a number of good qualities.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
All in all, I'm inclined to feel that I'm a failure.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		

	Strongly Disagree ↓			Neutral ↓			Strongly Agree ↓
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
When deciding who to vote for, I think about how much other people who vote for this party are like me	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
The image a party portrays is an important part of my decision whether to vote for it.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I compare the pros and cons for all the parties before deciding whom to vote for.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
A person should be loyal to a political party through thick and thin.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I usually only think about who to vote for at the last minute.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
The party I vote for makes me proud to be a New Zealander.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Usually my vote for a party is based on a gut feeling.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I believe in exercising self-control and not being impulsive when deciding my vote.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I look to my friends or family to see if they approve of who I might vote for.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I vote for the party that best represents my values.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I think it is important to select the most effective party.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I always find out specific details about each party's policies before deciding whom to vote for.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I believe in being logical and rational when deciding who to vote for	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Our customs and national heritage are the things that have made us great, and certain people should be made to show greater respect for them.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
One good way to teach people right from wrong is to give them a good stiff punishment when they get out of line.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
It's one thing to question and doubt someone during an election campaign, but once a person becomes prime minister we owe them our greatest support and loyalty.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
People should pay less attention to the Bible and traditional forms of religious guidance, and instead develop their own personal standards of what is moral and immoral.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
National anthems, flags, and glorification of one's country should all be de-emphasized to promote unity among all people of the world.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Our prisons are a shocking disgrace. Criminals are unfortunate people who deserve much better care, instead of so much punishment.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Organizations like the army have a pretty unhealthy effect upon people because they sometimes require unquestioning obedience of commands from superiors.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Youngsters should be taught to refuse to fight in a war unless they themselves agree the war is just and necessary.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Phew, finished! Thanks for helping us.

## APPENDIX 4: Phase Three Survey Questionnaire

How do you feel about the **political parties in New Zealand**? The scale below runs from 1 to 7, where "1" means you feel very unfavourable toward a party, "4" means you feel neutral toward a party, and "7" means you feel very favourable toward a party. Please circle the number that best describes your feelings (If you don't know anything about a particular party, then circle the "no opinion" option.)

	Very Unfavourable			Neutral	Very Favourable			
	↓			↓			↓	
<b>National</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	(No opinion)
<b>New Zealand First</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	(No opinion)
<b>Labour</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	(No opinion)
<b>Alliance</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	(No opinion)
<b>Progressive Greens</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	(No opinion)
<b>United New Zealand</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	(No opinion)
<b>ACT</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	(No opinion)
<b>Christian Coalition</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	(No opinion)

Of the parties listed above, which one best represents people like you? \_\_\_\_\_

How important are political matters to you? (circle a number from 1 to 7)

Not at all important    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    Very important

Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a National voter, a Labour voter, an Alliance voter, or what?

\_\_\_\_\_

If you do think of yourself in this way, how strong is that feeling of support? (circle a number below)

Very Weak    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    Very strong

How likely are you to vote in the next general election? (circle a number from 1 to 7)

Very unlikely    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    Very likely

Who would you most like to see as the next prime minister of New Zealand? \_\_\_\_\_

Which party do you intend to vote for with your party vote in the October 12th election?

\_\_\_\_\_

What party do you think is the most likely coalition partner for your favoured party?

\_\_\_\_\_

Which candidate do you intend to vote for with your electorate vote?

\_\_\_\_\_

Which party does this person represent? \_\_\_\_\_

**POLITICAL PARTIES**

What do our political parties stand for? What values do they represent?

	NATIONAL	NZ FIRST	LABOUR	ALLIANCE	CHRISTIAN COALITION	ACT	UNITED NZ	PROGRESSIVE GREENS
Read the description of each of the values below, then indicate with a tick <input type="checkbox"/> any of the parties you think might "stand" for that value. If you think any parties oppose a value then put a cross <input type="checkbox"/> in the appropriate boxes. If you think a party neither represents or opposes a value then leave that space blank.								
<b>Forgiving</b> (willing to pardon others)								
<b>Devout</b> (holding to religious faith and belief)								
<b>Obedient</b> (dutiful, meeting obligations)								
<b>Accepting position in life</b> (accepting life's circumstances)								
<b>Influential</b> (having an impact on people and events)								
<b>An exciting life</b> (stimulating experiences)								
<b>Social power</b> (control over others, dominance)								
<b>Equality</b> (equal opportunity for all)								
<b>Reciprocation of favours</b> (avoidance of indebtedness)								
<b>Social justice</b> (correcting injustice, care of the weak)								
<b>Family security</b> (safety for loved ones)								
<b>Protecting the environment</b> (preserving nature)								
<b>Honest</b> (genuine, sincere)								
<b>Working hard</b> (for one's rewards)								
<b>Preserving public image</b> (protecting their "face")								
<b>Family values</b> (traditional values, nuclear family)								
<b>Authority</b> (the right to lead or command)								
<b>Fairness</b> (in the distribution of social/economic resources)								
<b>Respect for tradition</b> (preservation of honoured customs)								
<b>Social order</b> (stability of society)								
<b>Wealth</b> (material possessions, money)								
<b>National security</b> (protection of the nation from enemies)								
<b>Broad-minded</b> (tolerant of different ideas and beliefs)								
<b>A world of beauty</b> (beauty of nature and the arts)								







**ATTITUDES**

c

We are interested in the attitudes and opinions of New Zealanders concerning current social and political issues. On the following pages, you will find a series of statements about some issues. Read each one, and then indicate how much you agree or disagree with them by circling a number on the scale below each one.

For each of the statements below we would like you to try and describe why you feel the way you do. Be as brief or as detailed as you wish.

We have found that people give the best indication of their true attitudes and opinions when they do not think too carefully about the statements, but rather, simply base their judgements on their own **values** relating to the present issue, and life in general. Therefore, in evaluating each of the statements try to base your answers on your own personal **values**.

<b>Disagree</b>		<b>Neutral</b>		<b>Agree</b>
<b>Completely</b>				<b>Completely</b>
↓		↓		↓

**It is the government's responsibility to make sure everyone is provided for financially**

1   2   3   4   5   6   7

Briefly summarise the reasons for your position:

**The government has gone too far in giving preferential treatment for racial minorities.**

1   2   3   4   5   6   7

Briefly summarise the reasons for your position:

**There should be more incentives to force unemployed people to seek work.**

1   2   3   4   5   6   7

Briefly summarise the reasons for your position:

**There should be more social and legal independence for Maori people.**

1   2   3   4   5   6   7

Briefly summarise the reasons for your position::

**ATTITUDES**

d.

We are interested in the attitudes and opinions of New Zealanders concerning current social and political issues. On the following pages, you will find a series of statements about some issues. Read each one, and then indicate how much you agree or disagree with them by circling a number on the scale below each one.

For each of the statements below we would like you to try and describe why you feel the way you do. Be as brief or as detailed as you wish.

We have found that people give the best indication of their true attitudes and opinions when they think about as many of the possible consequences as they can of the action or event described. Therefore, when evaluating each of the statements, think about the **consequences** it would have if the statement advocated were adopted, or if the event described were to occur, and base your judgement on the desirability of these **consequences**.

	Disagree Completely ↓		Neutral ↓		Agree Completely ↓		
<b>It is the government's responsibility to make sure everyone is provided for financially</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Briefly summarise the reasons for your position:							

<b>The government has gone too far in giving preferential treatment for racial minorities.</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Briefly summarise the reasons for your position:							

<b>There should be more incentives to force unemployed people to seek work.</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Briefly summarise the reasons for your position:							

<b>There should be more social and legal independence for Maori people.</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Briefly summarise the reasons for your position::							

**Miscellaneous**

Please indicate on the scales below how much you agree or disagree with each statement.

	Strongly Disagree			Neutral		Strongly Agree	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I usually prefer complex to simple problems.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I enjoy the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of thought.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Thinking is not my idea of fun.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I prefer things that require little thought to things that are sure to challenge my thinking abilities.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is a good chance I will have to think in depth about something.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I get satisfaction from deliberating hard and for a long time.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I only think as hard as I have to.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I prefer to think about small, daily projects to long term ones.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I like tasks that require little thought once I've learned them.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
The idea of having to rely on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I really enjoy jobs that involve coming up with new answers to problems.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Learning new ways to think doesn't excite me very much.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I have to solve.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
The notion of thinking abstractly appeals to me.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I prefer jobs that are intellectual, difficult, and important rather than ones that are quite important but do not require much thought.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I feel relieved rather than satisfied after completing a job that required a lot of mental effort.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
It's good enough that something gets the job done; I don't care how or why it works.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect me personally.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

For each of the items listed below, please indicate approximately how many times over the past 3 days you ate this food:

Red meat (e.g., beef) \_\_\_\_\_ White meat (e.g., chicken, pork, etc) \_\_\_\_\_

Seafood/Fish \_\_\_\_\_ Dairy products (e.g., milk, eggs, cheese, etc.) \_\_\_\_\_

Using the scale below, how much do you consider yourself a vegan (a person who eats vegetables, grains, etc. but no animal or seafood/fish products) versus an omnivore (a person who eats vegetables, grains, etc. and most animal and seafood/fish products)? Please circle your response.

**Vegan**    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10    **Omnivore**

Which one of the following types of eaters do you consider yourself to be. tick one response.

- Omnivore- Eats most animal and seafood/fish products as well as vegetables, grains, etc..
- Dairy and Fish Vegetarian – Eats dairy and seafood/fish but no white or red meat.
- Ova-Lacto Vegetarian – Eats dairy products but no seafood/fish, white or red meat.
- Vegan – Eats absolutely no animal products including dairy, seafood/fish, white or red meat.
- Other: Please specify \_\_\_\_\_

**PHEW! Finished at last. Thanks again for your help ☺**

## APPENDIX 5: Phase Four Survey Questionnaire

How do you feel about the **political parties in New Zealand**? The scale below runs from 1 to 7, where "1" means you feel very unfavourable toward a party, "4" means you feel neutral toward a party, and "7" means you feel very favourable toward a party. Please circle the number that best describes your feelings (If you don't know anything about a particular party, then circle the "no opinion" option.)

	Very Unfavourable		Neutral		Very Favourable			
	↓			↓				
<b>National</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	(No opinion)
<b>Labour</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	(No opinion)
<b>New Zealand First</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	(No opinion)
<b>Alliance</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	(No opinion)
<b>ACT</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	(No opinion)
<b>Christian Coalition</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	(No opinion)
<b>United New Zealand</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	(No opinion)
<b>Progressive Greens</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	(No opinion)

Of the parties listed above, which one best represents people like you? \_\_\_\_\_

How important are political matters to you? (circle a number from 1 to 7)

Not at all important    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    Very important

Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a National voter, a Labour voter, an Alliance voter, or what?

\_\_\_\_\_

If you do think of yourself in this way, how strong is that feeling of support? (circle a number below)

Very Weak    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    Very strong

How long before the election were you decided who you were going to vote for? \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

Who would you most like to see as the next prime minister of New Zealand? \_\_\_\_\_

Who do you think will be the next prime minister of New Zealand? \_\_\_\_\_

Did you campaign for a political cause leading up to the election?    YES     NO

If yes, who did you campaign for? \_\_\_\_\_

Which party did you vote for with your party vote in the election? \_\_\_\_\_

What party do you think is the most likely coalition partner for your favoured party? \_\_\_\_\_

Which electorate candidate did you vote for with your electorate vote? \_\_\_\_\_

Which party does this person represent? \_\_\_\_\_

Imagine that you are a 3rd Form Teacher assigned to develop a course outline for teaching History in New Zealand (Aotearoa). The first thing you need to do is to decide what you think are the ten most important events in New Zealand history. These are events that every child growing up here should know about. A list of these events will help you design your lesson plans. So write down each event (these events could be processes taking place over time as well as singular events) on the list below.

**Ten Most Important Events in New Zealand (Aotearoa) History**

*Brief Description of each event*

1. \_\_\_\_\_
2. \_\_\_\_\_
3. \_\_\_\_\_
4. \_\_\_\_\_
5. \_\_\_\_\_
6. \_\_\_\_\_
7. \_\_\_\_\_
8. \_\_\_\_\_
9. \_\_\_\_\_
10. \_\_\_\_\_

Here are some different periods in time and places that you may or may not consider to be relevant to your course on history in New Zealand. For each of the times and places that follow, rate how likely you would be to include it in your class on a scale from 1 to 7, with 1 being Not Likely, and 7 being Very Likely. Use the scale below:

**How likely would you be to include a section on:**

	Not Likely			Maybe		Very Likely	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
11. New Zealand (Aotearoa) from 1000 to 1500	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
12. Polynesia from 1000 to 1500	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
13. Australia from 1000 to 1500	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
14. Great Britain from 1000 to 1500	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
15. New Zealand (Aotearoa) in the 1700's-1800's	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
16. Polynesia in the 1700's-1800's	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
17. Australia in the 1700's-1800's	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
18. Great Britain in the 1700's-1800's	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
19. New Zealand (Aotearoa) in the 1900's	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
20. Polynesia in the 1900's	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
21. Australia in the 1900's	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
22. Great Britain in the 1900's	1	2	3	4	5	6	7



Now imagine that you are reviewing modules to teach history to your class, and have been asked to edit some text. For each of the sentences on history below, circle the word in the bracket that you think best completes it.

23. In 1769, Captain James Cook [**discovered / rediscovered / reached**] New Zealand.
24. The Maori population in New Zealand was [**200,000+ / 125,000 / 85,000 / 40,000 / 20,000**] prior to European arrival and changed to [**200,000+ / 125,000 / 85,000 / 40,000 / 20,000**] by 1900.
25. The first phase of contact between Europeans and Maori, from 1769-1830, can best be described as [**mutually agreeable trade / European exploitation of Maori / Maori tolerance of Europeans**].
26. The Musket Wars of the 1820's are best described as [**major warfare of iwi against iwi / minor skirmishes between Maori and Pakeha / minor skirmishes of iwi against iwi**].
27. The Maori chiefs who signed the Treaty of Waitangi [**were tricked into signing / misunderstood / fully understood / understood their version of**] the Treaty.
28. From the 1840's to the 1860's, European [**colonists / settlers**] and Maori [**natives / people**] fought a series of engagements known as the [**Land / New Zealand / Maori**] Wars. [**British / Pakeha**] soldiers in most of these engagements [**outnumbered / were outnumbered by**] Maori [**warriors / soldiers**]. In these battles (like the Wairua [**massacre / afay**]), European casualties were usually [**less than / greater than**] Maori casualties.
29. In 1858, Te Wherowhero became the king of the Maori [**nation / tribes**].
30. Settlers from Europe who arrived in New Zealand from 1830-1880 can best be described as [**poor labourers / farmers and craftsmen / gentlemen and capitalists**] who arrived because of [**poverty / greed / hope for a better life**].
31. The Native Land Act in the 1870's allowed [**European / Pakeha**][**settlers / squatters**] to purchase land from Maori individuals instead of groups.

Read each of questions below, then circle the number that best represents your opinion.

32. The Treaty of Waitangi has had some **positive consequences** for Maori. Do you think these reflect the motives (e.g., **fairmindedness**) of the Europeans who helped prepare the treaty?  

Not very likely	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very likely
-----------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	-------------
33. The Treaty of Waitangi has had some **negative consequences** for Maori. Do you think these reflect the motives (e.g., **malice or greed**) of the Europeans who helped prepare the treaty?  

Not very likely	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very likely
-----------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	-------------
34. The Treaty of Waitangi has had some **positive consequences** for Europeans. Do you think these reflect the motives (e.g., **fairmindedness**) of the Maori who helped prepare the treaty?  

Not very likely	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very likely
-----------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	-------------
35. The Treaty of Waitangi has had some **negative consequences** for Europeans. Do you think these reflect the motives (e.g., **malice or greed**) of the Maori who helped prepare the treaty?  

Not very likely	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very likely
-----------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	-------------
36. How well do you think Europeans have honoured their end of the Treaty of Waitangi?  

<b>Reasonably well</b>								
↓								
Not well at all	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Extremely well
37. How well do you think Maori have honoured their end of the Treaty of Waitangi?  

<b>Reasonably well</b>								
↓								
Not well at all	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Extremely well
38. If a financial settlement of treaty claims is made, should it be considered to be absolutely final (i.e., no further claims)?  

<b>Maybe</b>								
↓								
Definitely Not	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Definitely Yes
39. Should the Maori language be taught to all New Zealanders in school?  

<b>Maybe</b>								
↓								
Definitely Not	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Definitely Yes

We are all members of different social groups and categories. Some examples of these are gender, race, religion, nationality, and various clubs. Please consider your memberships in the groups described below and think about how you feel about them.

Please read each statement carefully, then circle a number which represents how much you agree or disagree.

	Disagree completely		Neutral		Agree completely	
	↓		↓		↓	
My nationality (eg. New Zealander) is not very important to me.	1	2	3	4	5	6 7
I hardly ever think of myself in terms of my nationality.	1	2	3	4	5	6 7
I feel a sense of great pride in my national group.	1	2	3	4	5	6 7
My nationality is very important in who I am	1	2	3	4	5	6 7
I often think of myself in terms of my nationality	1	2	3	4	5	6 7
I feel that I can trust people of my own nationality more than people from other countries.	1	2	3	4	5	6 7
My ethnicity (that is Pakeha/ European, Maori, Pacific Island, Asian, etc) is not very important to me.	1	2	3	4	5	6 7
I hardly ever think of myself in terms of my ethnicity.	1	2	3	4	5	6 7
I feel a sense of great pride in my ethnic group.	1	2	3	4	5	6 7
My ethnicity is very important in who I am	1	2	3	4	5	6 7
I often think of myself in terms of my ethnicity	1	2	3	4	5	6 7
I feel that I can trust people of my own ethnicity more than people from other ethnic groups.	1	2	3	4	5	6 7
My gender is not very important to me.	1	2	3	4	5	6 7
I hardly ever think of myself in terms of my gender.	1	2	3	4	5	6 7
I feel a sense of great pride in my gender identity.	1	2	3	4	5	6 7
My gender is very important in who I am	1	2	3	4	5	6 7
I often think of myself in terms of my gender	1	2	3	4	5	6 7
I feel I can trust persons of my gender more than people of the other gender.	1	2	3	4	5	6 7
My family is not very important to me.	1	2	3	4	5	6 7
I hardly ever think of myself in terms of my family.	1	2	3	4	5	6 7
I feel a sense of great pride in my family.	1	2	3	4	5	6 7
My family is a very important in who I am	1	2	3	4	5	6 7
I often think of myself in terms of my family	1	2	3	4	5	6 7
I feel that I can trust people in my family more than people from other families.	1	2	3	4	5	6 7
My work group is not very important to me.	1	2	3	4	5	6 7
I hardly ever think of myself in terms of the group I work with.	1	2	3	4	5	6 7
I feel a sense of great pride in my work.	1	2	3	4	5	6 7
My work group is very important in who I am	1	2	3	4	5	6 7
I often think of myself in terms of my work group	1	2	3	4	5	6 7
I feel that I can trust people at work more than people outside of work	1	2	3	4	5	6 7

Please describe your four best friends. These should be among the most important people you regularly interact with (including parents and siblings). You may include your romantic partner if you think of this person as an important friend. Approximately, how many people can you think of that fit this description? \_\_\_\_\_

	FRIEND#1	FRIEND #2	FRIEND #3	FRIEND #4
<b>FRIEND'S INITIALS:</b>				
<b>FRIEND'S GENDER:</b> (Write M or F)				
<b>FRIEND'S AGE:</b>				
<b>FRIEND'S OCCUPATION:</b>				
<b>ETHNICITY:</b> Write 1 for NZ Pakeha/European, 2 for NZ Maori, 3 for Asian, 4 for Pacific Islander, and 5 for other (please state)				
<b>YOUR RELATIONSHIP:</b> Write 1 for romantic partner, 2 for family, 3 for friends, 4 for co-worker, 5 for other.				
<b>HOW CLOSE ARE YOU?:</b> From 1 to 10, where 1 means not very close, and 10 means very close.				
<b>HOW OFTEN DO YOU TALK TO EACH OF THESE PEOPLE?</b> Write 1 for daily, 2 for weekly, 3 for monthly, and 4 for yearly.				
<b>HOW INTERESTED IN POLITICS DO YOU THINK THEY ARE?</b> From 1 to 10, where 1 means not very interested, 10 means very interested.				
<b>HOW OFTEN DO YOU TALK TO EACH OF THESE PEOPLE ABOUT POLITICS?</b> Write 1 for daily, 2 for weekly, 3 for monthly, and 4 for yearly.				
<b>HAVE YOU PERSUADED ANY ONE TO YOUR POINT OF VIEW?</b> 1 if you persuaded them, 2 if they persuaded you, or 3 for neither.				
<b>DID ANY OF THESE PEOPLE CAMPAIGN FOR A POLITICAL PARTY?</b> If so, for which party?				
<b>WHO DO YOU THINK YOUR FRIENDS VOTED FOR?</b> Write the party name				

Do any of your friends know each other? YES  NO

Which of your friends know each other? Indicate which of your friends know each other by drawing a line between them. For example, if Friend #1 above knows friend #3 you would draw a line between the boxes of friend #1 and friend #3.

Friend #1

Friend #2

Friend #3

Friend #4

How frequently in the lead up to the election did you talk about politics with people not on the list above?

Very Infrequently      1      2      3      4      5      6      7      Very Frequently

**PHEW, FINISHED! You deserve a rest. THANKS FOR YOUR HELP ☺**

Under MMP we are more likely to get multi-party Governments. In the boxes below please summarise what you see as being the areas of agreement and disagreement between each of the unions listed.

**AREAS OF AGREEMENT**

<b>NATIONAL and NEW ZEALAND FIRST</b>	<b>LABOUR and NEW ZEALAND FIRST</b>

**AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT**

<b>NATIONAL and NEW ZEALAND FIRST</b>	<b>LABOUR and NEW ZEALAND FIRST</b>

Of the two options above, which is your preferred coalition/Government, and why?

Of the two options above, which arrangement do you see as the greatest betrayal, and why?

On the scales below indicate how favourable you feel towards each coalition/arrangement listed.

	Very Unfavourable	Neutral	Very Favourable
	↓	↓	↓
<b>NATIONAL and NZ FIRST</b>	1	2 3	4 5 6 7
<b>LABOUR and NZ FIRST</b>	1	2 3	4 5 6 7
<b>LABOUR and NATIONAL</b>	1	2 3	4 5 6 7
<b>NATIONAL, ACT and UNITED</b>	1	2 3	4 5 6 7
<b>LABOUR, NZ FIRST and ALLIANCE</b>	1	2 3	4 5 6 7

Under MMP we are more likely to get multi-party Governments. In the boxes below please describe your emotional reaction to each of the arrangements listed.

**NATIONAL and NEW ZEALAND FIRST**

**LABOUR and NEW ZEALAND FIRST**

**Of the two options above, which is your preferred coalition/Government, and why?**

**Of the two options above, which arrangement do you see as the greatest betrayal, and why?**

On the scales below indicate how favourable you feel towards each coalition/arrangement listed.

	Very Unfavourable			Neutral	Very Favourable		
	↓			↓			↓
<b>NATIONAL and NZ FIRST</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
<b>LABOUR and NZ FIRST</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
<b>LABOUR and NATIONAL</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
<b>NATIONAL, ACT and UNITED</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
<b>LABOUR, NZ FIRST and ALLIANCE</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

## APPENDIX 6: Advert Evaluation Experiment Questionnaire

**NOTE:** There are five versions of the questionnaire. Control condition participants completed only pages one (value attributions to for all four parties) and four (Feeling thermometer and political dependent variable items). All experimental condition participants completed pages two (advert evaluation items) and four (Feeling thermometer and political dependent variable items) and, depending on the experimental condition, one of the four versions of the two value attribution pages (1a to 1d and 3a to 3d).

What do our political parties stand for? What values do they represent?

Read the description of each of the values below, then indicate with a tick <input type="checkbox"/> any of the parties you think might "stand" for that value. If you think any parties oppose a value then put a cross <input type="checkbox"/> in the appropriate boxes. If you think a party neither represents or opposes a value then leave that space blank.	NATIONAL	NZ FIRST	LABOUR	ALLIANCE
Forgiving (willing to pardon others)				
Devout (holding to religious faith and belief)				
Obedient (dutiful, meeting obligations)				
Accepting position in life (accepting life's circumstances)				
Influential (having an impact on people and events)				
An exciting life (stimulating experiences)				
Social power (control over others, dominance)				
Equality (equal opportunity for all)				
Reciprocation of favours (avoidance of indebtedness)				
Social justice (correcting injustice, care of the weak)				
Family security (safety for loved ones)				
Protecting the environment (preserving nature)				
Honest (genuine, sincere)				
Freedom (freedom of action and thought)				
Preserving public image (protecting their "face")				
Family values (traditional values, nuclear family)				
Authority (the right to lead or command)				
Fairness (in the distribution of social/economic resources)				
Respect for tradition (preservation of time-honoured customs)				
Social order (stability of society)				
Wealth (material possessions, money)				
National security (protection of the nation from enemies)				
Broad-minded (tolerant of different ideas and beliefs)				
A world of beauty (beauty of nature and the arts)				

Before evaluating the Quality of the advert, we realise that the way you feel towards National may influence your evaluation. Please complete the table below so that we can get some idea of your feelings towards National:

Read the description of each of the values below, then indicate with a tick <input type="checkbox"/> any of the parties you think might "stand" for that value. If you think any parties oppose a value then put a cross <input type="checkbox"/> in the appropriate boxes. If you think a party neither represents or opposes a value then leave that space blank.	NATIONAL
Forgiving (willing to pardon others)	
Devout (holding to religious faith and belief)	
Obedient (dutiful, meeting obligations)	
Accepting position in life (accepting life's circumstances)	
Influential (having an impact on people and events)	
An exciting life (stimulating experiences)	
Social power (control over others, dominance)	
Equality (equal opportunity for all)	
Reciprocation of favours (avoidance of indebtedness)	
Social justice (correcting injustice, care of the weak)	
Family security (safety for loved ones)	
Protecting the environment (preserving nature)	
Honest (genuine, sincere)	
Freedom (freedom of action and thought)	
Preserving public image (protecting their "face")	
Family values (traditional values, nuclear family)	
Authority (the right to lead or command)	
Fairness (in the distribution of social/economic resources)	
Respect for tradition (preservation of time-honoured customs)	
Social order (stability of society)	
Wealth (material possessions, money)	
National security (protection of the nation from enemies)	
Broad-minded (tolerant of different ideas and beliefs)	
A world of beauty (beauty of nature and the arts)	



Before evaluating the Quality of the advert, we realise that the way you feel towards Labour may influence your evaluation. Please complete the table below so that we can get some idea of your feelings towards Labour:

Read the description of each of the values below, then indicate with a tick <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> any of the parties you think might "stand" for that value. If you think any parties oppose a value then put a cross <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> in the appropriate boxes. If you think a party neither represents or opposes a value then leave that space blank.	LABOUR
Forgiving (willing to pardon others)	
Devout (holding to religious faith and belief)	
Obedient (dutiful, meeting obligations)	
Accepting position in life (accepting life's circumstances)	
Influential (having an impact on people and events)	
An exciting life (stimulating experiences)	
Social power (control over others, dominance)	
Equality (equal opportunity for all)	
Reciprocation of favours (avoidance of indebtedness)	
Social justice (correcting injustice, care of the weak)	
Family security (safety for loved ones)	
Protecting the environment (preserving nature)	
Honest (genuine, sincere)	
Freedom (freedom of action and thought)	
Preserving public image (protecting their "face")	
Family values (traditional values, nuclear family)	
Authority (the right to lead or command)	
Fairness (in the distribution of social/economic resources)	
Respect for tradition (preservation of time-honoured customs)	
Social order (stability of society)	
Wealth (material possessions, money)	
National security (protection of the nation from enemies)	
Broad-minded (tolerant of different ideas and beliefs)	
A world of beauty (beauty of nature and the arts)	

Before evaluating the Quality of the advert, we realise that the way you feel towards New Zealand First may influence your evaluation. Please complete the table below so that we can get some idea of your feelings towards New Zealand First:

Read the description of each of the values below, then indicate with a tick <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> any of the parties you think might "stand" for that value. If you think any parties oppose a value then put a cross <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> in the appropriate boxes. If you think a party neither represents or opposes a value then leave that space blank.	NZ FIRST
Forgiving (willing to pardon others)	
Devout (holding to religious faith and belief)	
Obedient (dutiful, meeting obligations)	
Accepting position in life (accepting life's circumstances)	
Influential (having an impact on people and events)	
An exciting life (stimulating experiences)	
Social power (control over others, dominance)	
Equality (equal opportunity for all)	
Reciprocation of favours (avoidance of indebtedness)	
Social justice (correcting injustice, care of the weak)	
Family security (safety for loved ones)	
Protecting the environment (preserving nature)	
Honest (genuine, sincere)	
Freedom (freedom of action and thought)	
Preserving public image (protecting their "face")	
Family values (traditional values, nuclear family)	
Authority (the right to lead or command)	
Fairness (in the distribution of social/economic resources)	
Respect for tradition (preservation of time-honoured customs)	
Social order (stability of society)	
Wealth (material possessions, money)	
National security (protection of the nation from enemies)	
Broad-minded (tolerant of different ideas and beliefs)	
A world of beauty (beauty of nature and the arts)	

Before evaluating the Quality of the advert, we realise that the way you feel towards the Alliance may influence your evaluation. Please complete the table below so that we can get some idea of your feelings towards the Alliance:

Read the description of each of the values below, then indicate with a tick <input type="checkbox"/> any of the parties you think might "stand" for that value. If you think any parties oppose a value then put a cross <input type="checkbox"/> in the appropriate boxes. If you think a party neither represents or opposes a value then leave that space blank.	ALLIANCE
Forgiving (willing to pardon others)	
Devout (holding to religious faith and belief)	
Obedient (dutiful, meeting obligations)	
Accepting position in life (accepting life's circumstances)	
Influential (having an impact on people and events)	
An exciting life (stimulating experiences)	
Social power (control over others, dominance)	
Equality (equal opportunity for all)	
Reciprocation of favours (avoidance of indebtedness)	
Social justice (correcting injustice, care of the weak)	
Family security (safety for loved ones)	
Protecting the environment (preserving nature)	
Honest (genuine, sincere)	
Freedom (freedom of action and thought)	
Preserving public image (protecting their "face")	
Family values (traditional values, nuclear family)	
Authority (the right to lead or command)	
Fairness (in the distribution of social/economic resources)	
Respect for tradition (preservation of time-honoured customs)	
Social order (stability of society)	
Wealth (material possessions, money)	
National security (protection of the nation from enemies)	
Broad-minded (tolerant of different ideas and beliefs)	
A world of beauty (beauty of nature and the arts)	

Before rating the quality of the advert we realise that your own opinions about strike action by the Public Service Association may influence your evaluation of the quality of the advert.

Please indicate the extent which you think the PSA strike is:

<b>Bad</b>	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	<b>Good</b>
<b>Beneficial</b>	+4	+3	+2	+1	0	-1	-2	-3	-4	<b>Harmful</b>
<b>Foolish</b>	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	<b>Wise</b>
<b>Favourable</b>	+4	+3	+2	+1	0	-1	-2	-3	-4	<b>Unfavourable</b>

Now rate the advert on each of the items below:

<b>Low Quality</b>	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	<b>High Quality</b>
<b>Logical</b>	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	<b>Illogical</b>
<b>Emotional</b>	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	<b>Unemotional</b>
<b>Simple</b>	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	<b>Complex</b>
<b>Convincing</b>	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	<b>Unconvincing</b>

Please rate the other major parties in the same way?

Read the description of each of the values below, then indicate with a tick <input type="checkbox"/> any of the parties you think might "stand" for that value. If you think any parties oppose a value then put a cross <input type="checkbox"/> in the appropriate boxes. If you think a party neither represents or opposes a value then leave that space blank.	NZ FIRST	LABOUR	ALLIANCE
Forgiving (willing to pardon others)			
Devout (holding to religious faith and belief)			
Obedient (dutiful, meeting obligations)			
Accepting position in life (accepting life's circumstances)			
Influential (having an impact on people and events)			
An exciting life (stimulating experiences)			
Social power (control over others, dominance)			
Equality (equal opportunity for all)			
Reciprocation of favours (avoidance of indebtedness)			
Social justice (correcting injustice, care of the weak)			
Family security (safety for loved ones)			
Protecting the environment (preserving nature)			
Honest (genuine, sincere)			
Freedom (freedom of action and thought)			
Preserving public image (protecting their "face")			
Family values (traditional values, nuclear family)			
Authority (the right to lead or command)			
Fairness (in the distribution of social/economic resources)			
Respect for tradition (preservation of time-honoured customs)			
Social order (stability of society)			
Wealth (material possessions, money)			
National security (protection of the nation from enemies)			
Broad-minded (tolerant of different ideas and beliefs)			
A world of beauty (beauty of nature and the arts)			

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Read the description of each of the values below, then indicate with a tick <input type="checkbox"/> any of the parties you think might "stand" for that value. If you think any parties oppose a value then put a cross <input type="checkbox"/> in the appropriate boxes. If you think a party neither represents or opposes a value then leave that space blank.	NZ FIRST	NATIONAL	ALLIANCE
Forgiving (willing to pardon others)			
Devout (holding to religious faith and belief)			
Obedient (dutiful, meeting obligations)			
Accepting position in life (accepting life's circumstances)			
Influential (having an impact on people and events)			
An exciting life (stimulating experiences)			
Social power (control over others, dominance)			
Equality (equal opportunity for all)			
Reciprocation of favours (avoidance of indebtedness)			
Social justice (correcting injustice, care of the weak)			
Family security (safety for loved ones)			
Protecting the environment (preserving nature)			
Honest (genuine, sincere)			
Freedom (freedom of action and thought)			
Preserving public image (protecting their "face")			
Family values (traditional values, nuclear family)			
Authority (the right to lead or command)			
Fairness (in the distribution of social/economic resources)			
Respect for tradition (preservation of time-honoured customs)			
Social order (stability of society)			
Wealth (material possessions, money)			
National security (protection of the nation from enemies)			
Broad-minded (tolerant of different ideas and beliefs)			
A world of beauty (beauty of nature and the arts)			

Please rate the other major parties in the same way?

Read the description of each of the values below, then indicate with a tick <input type="checkbox"/> any of the parties you think might "stand" for that value. If you think any parties oppose a value then put a cross <input type="checkbox"/> in the appropriate boxes. If you think a party neither represents or opposes a value then leave that space blank.	LABOUR	NATIONAL	ALLIANCE
Forgiving (willing to pardon others)			
Devout (holding to religious faith and belief)			
Obedient (dutiful, meeting obligations)			
Accepting position in life (accepting life's circumstances)			
Influential (having an impact on people and events)			
An exciting life (stimulating experiences)			
Social power (control over others, dominance)			
Equality (equal opportunity for all)			
Reciprocation of favours (avoidance of indebtedness)			
Social justice (correcting injustice, care of the weak)			
Family security (safety for loved ones)			
Protecting the environment (preserving nature)			
Honest (genuine, sincere)			
Freedom (freedom of action and thought)			
Preserving public image (protecting their "face")			
Family values (traditional values, nuclear family)			
Authority (the right to lead or command)			
Fairness (in the distribution of social/economic resources)			
Respect for tradition (preservation of time-honoured customs)			
Social order (stability of society)			
Wealth (material possessions, money)			
National security (protection of the nation from enemies)			
Broad-minded (tolerant of different ideas and beliefs)			
A world of beauty (beauty of nature and the arts)			

Please rate the other major parties in the same way?

Read the description of each of the values below, then indicate with a tick <input type="checkbox"/> any of the parties you think might "stand" for that value. If you think any parties oppose a value then put a cross <input type="checkbox"/> in the appropriate boxes. If you think a party neither represents or opposes a value then leave that space blank.	NZ FIRST	LABOUR	NATIONAL
Forgiving (willing to pardon others)			
Devout (holding to religious faith and belief)			
Obedient (dutiful, meeting obligations)			
Accepting position in life (accepting life's circumstances)			
Influential (having an impact on people and events)			
An exciting life (stimulating experiences)			
Social power (control over others, dominance)			
Equality (equal opportunity for all)			
Reciprocation of favours (avoidance of indebtedness)			
Social justice (correcting injustice, care of the weak)			
Family security (safety for loved ones)			
Protecting the environment (preserving nature)			
Honest (genuine, sincere)			
Freedom (freedom of action and thought)			
Preserving public image (protecting their "face")			
Family values (traditional values, nuclear family)			
Authority (the right to lead or command)			
Fairness (in the distribution of social/economic resources)			
Respect for tradition (preservation of time-honoured customs)			
Social order (stability of society)			
Wealth (material possessions, money)			
National security (protection of the nation from enemies)			
Broad-minded (tolerant of different ideas and beliefs)			
A world of beauty (beauty of nature and the arts)			



How do you feel about the **political parties in New Zealand**? The scale below runs from 1 to 7, where "1" means you feel very unfavourable toward a party, "4" means you feel neutral toward a party, and "7" means you feel very favourable toward a party. Please circle the number that best describes your feelings (If you don't know anything about a particular party, then circle the "no opinion" option.)

	Very Unfavourable			Neutral	Very Favourable			
	↓	↓	↓	↓	↓	↓	↓	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	(No opinion)
National								
New Zealand First								
Labour								
Alliance								
Progressive Greens								
United New Zealand								
ACT								
Christian Coalition								

Of the parties listed above, which one best represents people like you? \_\_\_\_\_

How important are political matters to you? (circle a number from 1 to 7)

Not at all important    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    Very important

Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a National voter, a Labour voter, a New Zealand First voter, an Alliance voter, or what? \_\_\_\_\_

If you do think of yourself in this way, how strong is that feeling of support? (circle a number below)

Very Weak    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    Very strong

How likely are you to vote in the next general election? (circle a number from 1 to 7)

Very unlikely    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    Very likely

Who would you most like to see as the **next prime minister** of New Zealand? \_\_\_\_\_

If an election was held in the near future, **which party would you vote for** with your party vote?

\_\_\_\_\_

What party do you think is the most **likely** coalition partner for your favoured party?

\_\_\_\_\_

Which **candidate** do you think you would vote for with your electorate vote?

\_\_\_\_\_

Which party does this person represent? \_\_\_\_\_

**APPENDIX SEVEN: Student social network questionnaire**

**Social Science Research**

Are you: Male  Female       What is your age?: \_\_\_\_\_ What is your ethnicity? \_\_\_\_\_

The scales below ask you to indicate how favourable or unfavourable you feel towards each of the five major parties in parliament at the moment. mark the circle that indicates how you feel about each one where the scale runs from 'unfavourable' through 'neutral' to 'favourable'.

	Very Unfavourable			Neutral			Very Favourable
ACT	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Alliance	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Labour	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
National	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
New Zealand First	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Sometimes we hear people using words like 'conservative' or 'liberal' to describe their opinions about politics. On the scale below mark the circle that best represents where your views on politics in general fall, where the scale runs from politically 'liberal' to politically 'conservative'.

Liberal                           Conservative

	FRIEND#1	FRIEND #2	FRIEND #3	FRIEND #4
<b>FRIEND'S GENDER:</b> (Write M or F)				
<b>ETHNICITY:</b> 1 = NZ Pakeha/ European, 2 = NZ Maori, 3 = Asian, 4 = Pacific Islander, 5 = other.				
<b>YOUR RELATIONSHIP:</b> 1 = romantic partner, 2 = family, 3 = friends, 4 = co-worker, 5 = other.				
<b>ARE THEY VEGETARIAN?</b> Write down if they are vegetarian, vegan, or omnivores.				
<b>WHO DO YOU THINK YOUR FRIENDS WOULD VOTE FOR?</b> Write the party name				

**PHEW! Finished at last. Thanks again for your help ☺**

**APPENDIX EIGHT: Secondary respondent questionnaire**

**SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH PROJECT**

In the course of the last year and a half we have been conducting a project looking at how New Zealanders think about politics, history, and culture. Part of the research involved asking ordinary New Zealanders like you to give some details about the people who are important to them so we can see how one's social network affects the way they see themselves and the world.

**One of those people was the friend who has passed this questionnaire to you.**

In order to get an indication of how accurate their perceptions of their social network is, we would appreciate it if you could take a few minutes to complete this brief survey and return it in the postage paid envelope included. The questionnaire is completely confidential and there is no way we can trace it back to you, all questionnaires will be analysed together so no individual response is examined. Please note that this is independent academic research and is therefore not carried out for the benefit of any political party. Any material based on it is available in the public domain.

**INITIALS:** \_\_\_\_\_ **GENDER** (circle one): Male Female

**AGE:** \_\_\_\_\_ **OCCUPATION:** \_\_\_\_\_

**ETHNICITY:**     NZ Pakeha/European     NZ Maori     Asian  
                   Pacific Islander     Other (Please specify): \_\_\_\_\_

How close are you to the person who gave you this questionnaire? Circle a number between one and ten that represents how close you feel you are.

**Not at all close**    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10    **Very close**

How many years have you known the person who gave this questionnaire to you? \_\_\_\_\_

How often do you talk to this person?     daily     weekly     monthly     yearly

**How interested in political matters are you?** Circle a number between one and ten that reflects how interested you are.

**Not at all interested**    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10    **Very Interested**

**Generally speaking**, do you usually think of yourself as a National voter, a Labour voter, a NZ First voter, an Alliance voter, or what?

\_\_\_\_\_

If you voted in the recent MMP election, which party did you vote for with your party vote?

\_\_\_\_\_

Did you campaign for a political party before the election? If so which party was it?

\_\_\_\_\_

**Thanks! Your help is vital, and very much appreciated.**  
If you have any questions please contact Marc Wilson at Victoria University on 479-1000 ext.8232