

A PLACE FOR SHADOWS

A Prolegomena to the Authorship  
Practices and Films of  
Joanna Margaret Paul


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*the films of*  
**Joanna Margaret Paul**  
By Dick Whyte



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## *Thank you all, from the bottom of my heart...*

This essay is dedicated to the late Joanna Margaret Paul. Though I never personally knew her, her art has touched me deeply. Sadly, in 2003, she died in a tragic accident. She will be missed by a large number of family, friends and the NZ art-community alike.

Jane and Mary Paul, Joanna's sisters and the entire Paul family, for their support of this project.

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*Chapter –1*  
*Introductions*  
*(of an Unknown Author)*



Robert Cross: Photograph of JMP (1996)



## 0. Preconceptions: Subjections, Objections and Interjections

0) This is an “authorship” study of New Zealand artist Joanna Margaret Paul, with specific reference to her “experimental film” works. Though I will draw on a wide range of theorists, my overall approach is what Laura Marks calls “intercultural cinema.” For Marks the term “intercultural cinema” refers to a specific “genre” or “movement” of experimental films created by authors caught “between two or more cultural regimes of knowledge.”<sup>1</sup> Intercultural film-makers include feminist, queer, indigenous and immigrant authors (any “minority” which possesses its own “regime of knowledge” and makes experimental film) living in “Western metropolitan areas,”<sup>2</sup> whose *dominant* culture is capitalist, masculine, “hegemonic, white and Euro-American”<sup>3</sup> (a second regime of knowledge). What draws intercultural cinema together (and indeed, one could argue, experimental film in general) is an oppositional stance toward capitalist ideology, the commodification of the art object and the uniformity of classical narrative forms. As David Bordwell and Kristen Thompson write, experimental films are “often deliberate attempts to undercut the conventions of commercial narrative filmmaking”<sup>4</sup> and, as Marks writes, intercultural cinema “flows against waves of economic neocolonialism,” and is “suspicious of mass circulation... [as] making commercial cinema still involves significant compromises.”<sup>5</sup>

1) The paragraph you have just read asks three questions, which will form the structure of this introduction: 1) Who is Joanna Margaret Paul, and how are her films examples of the “genre” intercultural film? 2) What is an “authorship study,” and how does intercultural cinema shift the “function” of authorship? And, 3) What does an “intercultural” reading of Joanna's films from the perspective of

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1 Laura Marks, *The Skin of the Film [SoF]* (Duke University Press, 1999) p1. Marks refers to intercultural cinema first as a “movement” and then suggests that it might be considered a “genre.”

2 Marks, *SoF*, p1.

3 Marks, *SoF*, p7.

4 David Bordwell and Kristen Thompson, *Film History: An Introduction* (McGraw Hill, 1994) p191.

5 Marks, *SoF*, p9 & 3.



“authorship” practically entail in terms of textually analysing Joanna's films? Marks does not explicitly give an account of “intercultural authorship,” discussing the movement as a “genre” brought together by a (political *and* aesthetic) “tendency” to “reject” mainstream cultural production.<sup>6</sup> Having said this, I find Marks' interweaving of Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze and Walter Benjamin's thoughts is suggestive of an authorship theory which explores, expands and explodes what it means to be an “author” in terms of experimental film-making. In this introduction I aim to tease out the personal, political and poetic implications of intercultural cinema in terms of authorship, drawing predominantly on Marks, Foucault, Benjamin and Annette Kuhn. This will lead to the “body” of the essay, a textual analysis of my experience of Joanna's films from an intercultural, metaphysical, noological and phenomenological perspective, framed by the work of Deleuze, Marks and Vivian Sobchack.

2) Laura Marks' *The Skin of the Film* (as with this text) is heavily influenced by Deleuze's approach to cinema. Marks, like Deleuze, refers to a wide range of authors and disciplines (from modern physics, philosophy and semiotics, to cooking, sewing and theology) and introduces a great deal of specialist terms, drawing on Deleuze's vast taxonomy of cinematic “signs.” As Donato Totaro writes, “Deleuze's postmodern style is part of its appeal – playful, mercurial, and open to creative interpretation. Terms that are meant to carry critical weight are introduced offhandedly and then left hanging for pages. One neologism gives birth to three others.”<sup>7</sup> Some terms are introduced and then forgotten, never to be mentioned again.<sup>8</sup>

This approach may seem, at the outset, to be scattered and impressionistic. However, for Marks, like Deleuze, the intent of this approach is to create terms which are not only *used* in the text (in my case, to analyse the experimental films of Joanna Paul) but also *useful* to the reader in their subsequent experiences with experimental cinema and cultural production in general.

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6 Although Marks does write, “the genre allows films to be read... as authorial texts,” (*SoF*, p7) she never accounts directly for the ideological problems surrounding authorship as a critical discourse.

7 Donato Totaro, *Gilles Deleuze's Bergsonian Film Project*. Internet WWW page, at URL: <[http://www.horschamp.qc.ca/9903/offscreen\\_essays/deleuze1.html](http://www.horschamp.qc.ca/9903/offscreen_essays/deleuze1.html)> (version current 1/1/2008).

8 Such as “matter-images” and “light-images” in *The Movement Image*, Deleuze's first book on cinema.

3) This is what Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari refer to as a “tool box.” As Brian Massumi writes, “the reader is invited to lift the dynamism out of the book entirely, and incarnate it in a foreign medium, whether it be painting or politics. The authors steal from other disciplines with glee, but they are more than happy to return the favour. Deleuze's own image for a concept is... a “tool box.” He calls this kind of philosophy “pragmatics” because its goal is the invention of concepts.”<sup>9</sup> Barbara Kennedy suggests that Deleuze's cinematic concepts offer “a new vocabulary in contemporary film-philosophy... creat[ing] refreshing plateaus and different vocabularies for us to think about film.”<sup>10</sup> However, these terms are not fixed, or fully determined. As Jason Sperb writes of Marks' use of Deleuze's terms, “One should try to build upon them, and perhaps even discard [them] entirely when done — in the way that scaffolding is removed after the building is completed.”<sup>11</sup> For Deleuze this leads to a philosophy of “becoming” (rather than being) which “drives” (rather than desires) the “body” of this text. During the course of this analysis we will *become* woman, animal and film (among other things). But first, let us become acquainted.

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9 Brian Massumi, “Translator's Foreword: The Pleasures of Philosophy,” in Deleuze and Guattari [*D&G*], *A Thousand Plateaus [TP]* (1980: Continuum, 2004) p xv. Pragmatics is a term Deleuze lifts (in part) from C.S. Peirce. See also Deleuze and Foucault's discussion of the “tool box” concept in “Intellectuals and Power,” in Michel Foucault, *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice* (Cornell University Press, 1977) p208. Foucault also “preferred the... metaphor of the toolkit. Foucault invited his readers... to pick up what they found usable and ignore or discard the rest.” Jana Sawicki, “Queering Foucault and the Subject of Feminism,” in Gary Gutting (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Foucault* (Cambridge University Press, 2005, 2nd edition) p379.

10 Barbara M. Kennedy, *Deleuze and Cinema: The Aesthetics of Sensation* (Edinburgh University Press, 2000) p27.

11 Jason Sperb, *Laura Marks: The Skin of the Film*. Internet WWW page, at URL: <[http://dr-mabuses-kaleidoscope.blogspot.com/2007/05/laura-marks-skin-of-film\\_15.html](http://dr-mabuses-kaleidoscope.blogspot.com/2007/05/laura-marks-skin-of-film_15.html)> (version current 1/1/2008).

## 1. Personal Affects: Qualities and Powers

“The personal is the political.”<sup>12</sup>

“We are surrounded by things which make our lives shadowy... While I don't have a television, don't like CDs and refuse plastic bags at the supermarket, it's true that I too inhabit that shadow world.”<sup>13</sup>

Joanna Margaret Paul not only made films but drew, wrote poetry, painted, made photographs, sculptures and curated exhibitions (among other things). As Anne Kirker writes, “early on Joanna Paul adopted a multidisciplinary approach.”<sup>14</sup> Joanna was the daughter of “creative and forward-thinking parents”<sup>15</sup> Janet and Blackwood Paul, whose small press published some of New Zealand's 'seminal' modern-literature.<sup>16</sup> Janet was an exhibiting “modernist” painter, and Joanna was surrounded by experimental art and philosophy from a young age. As Joanna writes, “the Phaidon art books, the Plischke furniture, the whole furniture of modernism. Taken for granted, enjoyed, repudiated.”<sup>17</sup>

Both her sisters are also artists. Becoming an artist was something that came naturally in Joanna's family. Joanna remembers, “it was easy for me in the 60s & bred to it, to feel Cézanne as an influence sucked dry. I respect [my mother's] meditations on Cézanne, her discoveries, the landscapes, Chinese painting, the

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12 Deborah Shepard, *Reframing Women* (Harper Collins, 2000) p125.

13 Joanna Margaret Paul, in Gregory O'Brien, *Lands and Deeds: Profiles of Contemporary New Zealand Painters* (Godwit Press, 1996) p77.

14 Anne Kirker, *New Zealand Woman Artists: A Survey of 150 Years* (1986: Craftsman House, 1993) p199.

15 Emma Bugden and Greg Donson, “Introduction,” in Bugden, Donson, and Gregory O'Brien (ed.), *Beauty, Even: Joanna Margaret Paul 1945-2003* (Wellington City Gallery, 2004) p5.

16 “From 1965 to 1969 the firm published some good books now regarded as 'seminal' and some foolish ones. Few were 'good selling titles'. We had no capital reserves but the Blackwood and Janet Paul Ltd Catalogue for 1965-66 shows 26 titles as 'NEW'.” Janet Paul, “Hints of Becoming,” in Margaret Clark (ed.), *Beyond Expectations* (Allen & Unwin/Port Nicholson Press, 1986) p19.

17 Joanna Paul and Allie Eagle, “Letters from Room to Room,” in Marian Evans, Bridie Lonie & Tilly Lloyd (ed.), *A Women's Picture Book: 25 Women Artists of Aotearoa* (GP Books, 1988) p94.

Tao.”<sup>18</sup> Significantly, in her early twenties ”Joanna studied both painting... English and philosophy at Auckland University in the 1960s.”<sup>19</sup> As Marks writes of intercultural and experimental film-authors, “Most... are familiar with contemporary critical theory – indeed, steeped in it,”<sup>20</sup> meaning that the author also “assumes the interestedness, engagement, and intelligence of its audience.”<sup>21</sup> Joanna not only made “art” but (like many experimental film-makers) also wrote aesthetic theory and philosophy informed by critical (as well as creative) thinking. Although relatively unknown as a film-maker, Martin Rumsby notes that Joanna was also the “first woman of experimental film-making in New Zealand... between 1970 and 1982 she made over 30 experimental films and became the first New Zealand film-maker after Len Lye to create a body of experimental films and also the first to do so in New Zealand.”<sup>22</sup>

Joanna made her films entirely by herself. They are all “short” by conventional standards (the longest of Joanna's films, *Port Chalmers Cycle*, runs between 17 and 20 minutes, depending on the speed it is projected at; most run for around 3 minutes, the length of a standard roll of film). Joanna dominantly worked on the (then) recently developed super8mm film, intended for “home” use. As Sheldon Renan writes, “eight millimetre is even less expensive than 16mm, and its equipment is now the easiest of all to come by. Traditionally 8mm has been a home-movie medium, as well as one for beginners in creative film-making. Recently, however, accomplished film-makers have begun to explore (and explode) 8mm.”<sup>23</sup> Renan cites American super8 film-makers Stan Brakhage (an influence on Joanna), Robert Branaman and Ken Jacobs. To this list we can add the films of New Zealand film-makers Derek Cowie, Ronnie van Hout and Joanna Paul (to name just a few).<sup>24</sup>

There are no actors, as such, in Joanna's films, and no people at all appear in half of them. Those people that do appear are Joanna's friends and family. The

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18 Paul and Eagle, p95.

19 Bugden and Donson, p5.

20 Marks, *SoF*, p13.

21 Marks, *SoF*, p19.

22 Martin Rumsby, “A Place Near Here” (2003) p3. Originally published in *Illusions* #35 (Winter, 2003). However, I am referencing an expanded version sent to me by Martin in 2004. She was most well known as a painter and poet.

23 Sheldon Renan, *The Underground Film* (E.P. Dutton, 1967) p23.

24 Rumsby, p2.

objects and places which Joanna pulls into focus are all drawn from her *personal life* (houses she has visited, places she has been, things she has seen). These are common practices for experimental, intercultural authors.<sup>25</sup> The content of Joanna's films ranges from quick montages of places (*Gravestones, Gardens, Remnants of a Demolished Wharf*), cities (*Auckland 1971, Round Picton, Port Chalmers Cycle*), houses (*Bosshards House, Aberharts House, Details of a House Interior*), and landscapes (*Barrys Bay, To the Bay*); to films which push the image towards abstraction and the limits of perception (*Roses, Aramoana*); to films depicting women and children (family, friends and her daughter Maggie) engaged in everyday activities (a woman irons the washing in *Task*, a child draws crayon pictures in *Maggie Documentation*, someone unpacks a bag in *Bag*, a woman gets dressed in *Jillian Dressing*). As Rumsby writes, "Paul's films varied from personal documentary, to lyrical landscape to ritualised performance in work that often spoke of the domestic situation of women."<sup>26</sup>

Irrespective of their differences, Joanna's films repeat two fundamental affections: 1) they are all completely silent, and 2) they all lack a conventional, linear narrative. As Joanna writes, "Silence is essential for visual concentration; fiction action anecdote or contrivance of any kind are *rejected*."<sup>27</sup> In a long line of experimental film-maker/theorists (including Germaine Dulac, Maya Deren, Nathaniel Dorsky, Stan Brakhage) Joanna refers to her films and paintings as "visual poetry,"<sup>28</sup> in *rejection* of mainstream narrative forms. As Marks writes, intercultural cinema "suspend[s] the representational conventions that have held narrative cinema for decades."<sup>29</sup> This begs the question: why does experimental film oppose the mainstream film industry? In the first place, the mainstream industry is *perceived* as a capitalist mechanism, interested primarily in monetary gains (rather than self-expression, or social change). This in itself is not necessarily problematic, but may become so when we take into account that historically the

25 Renan, p25, and Stephen Dwoskin, *Film Is* (Peter Owen, 1975) p23.

26 Rumsby, p2-3.

27 Paul, "Shibusha," in Corinne and Arthur Cantrill (ed.), *Cantrills Filmnotes #47/48* (1978) p10. My italics. Intercultural cinema is "marked by silence." (Marks, *SoF*, p21)

28 Paul, "Shibusha," p10; Paul and Eagle, p92; and particularly "Notes on a Poetic Language" [*NPO*], in *Sport #9* (Spring, 1992). As Stephen Dwoskin writes of Dulac, "for her the ideal film would be one that brought into force rhythmic movement without any dramatic characters... a *symphony of vision* and the *poetry of seeing*." (Dwoskin, p26-7)

29 Marks, *SoF*, p1.

mainstream industry has been criticised for being sexist, racist, homophobic and Eurocentric (both in terms of the distribution of jobs *in the film industry* and the stereotypes which exist *in the films produced by this industry*).

For this reason experimental film has always been a “genre” (or movement) made up of various “minorities” repressed by the “state” they live in, who are often denied entry into the mainstream film industry. Historically “white males” have dominated positions of knowledge and power and, as Claudia Moscovici writes, “women, slaves, ethnic and racial minorities, and the working class all tend to be more or less historically and conceptually excluded from full citizenship”<sup>30</sup> (which includes the rights of authorship within mainstream culture). Joanna, as a feminist woman living in New Zealand in the 1960s and 70s, was part of a “minority” culture, living in a *dominantly* male, white, heterosexual culture. Annette Kuhn notes that women, for instance, “had fewer opportunities than men to involve themselves in film production, particularly in the commercial film industry.”<sup>31</sup> Where they could get “work” they were invariably in positions of less power (and therefore less earning potential) than men. As Deborah Shepard writes, “from the 1970s woman have been drawn to experimental film as an alternative medium for expressing radical ideas.” Shepard continues, “Multi-media artist Joanna Paul... used the medium to explore her personal world. As a member of the feminist art movement in Christchurch in the 70s she was encouraged by the feminist validation of the domestic arena which was summed up in the slogan 'the personal is the political'... she said: 'Painting for me as a woman is an ordinary act – about the great meaning in ordinary things.’”<sup>32</sup>

\* \* \* \*

Without intending to ask questions or make problems, in the above paragraphs I have done both in equal measure, unpacking what Michel Foucault calls the 'author-function' and invoking the concept of *authorship*. In describing a film-maker by 'name', as the sole creator of a film, I move beyond a casual

30 Claudia Moscovici, *From Sex Objects to Sexual Subjects* (Routledge, 1996) p3.

31 Annette Kuhn, *Women's Pictures: Feminism and Cinema* (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982) p8.

32 Shepard, p125.

reference (Joanna's proper-name) to a 'functioning' critical concept which categorises, complicates and capitalises on the name of an author. Joanna's films, I have argued, are intercultural, experimental, feminist and poetic, all of which, in some form or another, reject the "mainstream" industry (in Joanna's case, as a filmmaker, Hollywood cinema) and the mass commodification of art. Firstly, this rejection functions as a reaction to the omission of high powered jobs *for* and the negative stereotyping *of*, minority "regimes of knowledge." Secondly, experimental cinema rejects the dominant, clichéd and predictable narrative constructions of mainstream film.

However, according to Foucault, the practice, or discourse, of "authorship"<sup>33</sup> functions to reinforce the *repression, discipline* and *punishment* of other authors and the *commodification* of art in general. As David A. Gerstner writes, Foucault argues that the "bourgeois construct of authorship... the *master author*... was a discourse secured through a particular ideology,"<sup>34</sup> a dominantly white, male, capitalist (and Christian) ideology. This ideology represses, disciplines and punishes authors (legally, socially, and historically) who do not have the same ideas (ideologies) as the dominant "state."

For Foucault the author is not a person, but a "function" which "subjects" us to a particular way of thinking through artistic discourse. As Gary Gutting writes, "Foucault suggests... that the play of individuals' thought, in a given period and disciplinary context, takes place in a space with a structure defined by a system of rules more fundamental than the assertions of the individuals thinking in the space."<sup>35</sup> Foucault's project, in his own words, "has been to create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made into subjects,"<sup>36</sup> *subjected* to capitalist (or "state") *objectives*, maintained by "practices" such as "economics, technology, politics,"<sup>37</sup> and, significant to this discussion, authorship. The problem then becomes: am I reinforcing the bourgeois state, the very thing

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33 The ways in which we are used to when discussing the 'discipline' of authorship.

34 David A. Gerstner, "The Practices of Authorship," in Gerstner & Janet Staiger (ed.), *Authorship in Film* (Routledge, 2003) p12. My italics.

35 Gutting, "Introduction – Michel Foucault: A User's Manual," in Gutting (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Foucault* (Cambridge University Press, 1994, 1st edition) p9-10.

36 Foucault in Paul Rabinow, "Introduction," in Rabinow (ed.), *The Foucault Reader* (Peregrine Books, 1986) p7.

37 Rabinow, p4.

Joanna challenged and rejected, by writing about her work from the perspective of authorship?

Foucault's (tentative) answer to this problem is to suggest that authors need not exist and that we might consider "discourse" as "authorless."<sup>38</sup> However, as Gerstner and Staiger both point out, the issue of authorship is still important to critics who wish to bring attention to a lesser known author whose work, without critical attention, may simply vanish into the "archive" without a trace. As Staiger writes, the critical "death of the author came at a time particularly nonadvantageous for some individuals – feminists, gay and lesbian activists, and antiracists."<sup>39</sup> But, on the other hand, am I simply repressing other authors and empowering the commodification of Joanna's work in replicating the classical model of authorship? Gerstner writes in earnest, "the issue of authorship is certainly perplexing,"<sup>40</sup> and Foucault himself laments that, "there is a decided absence of positive propositions in this essay, as it applies to analytic procedures."<sup>41</sup>

However, I believe that Foucault's work provides a stable ground from which to begin an investigation into intercultural authorship. The author has four main functions according to Foucault: 1) A legal function which represses, disciplines and appropriates the author through contracts, copyright and censorship; 2) An historical function which determines who is an author (and who is not) and what is authored (and what is not), regulated by "dominant" ideology; 3) A social function which produces "status" for the author's name and therefore saleable "products" which are useful to the pursuits of capitalism, and; 4) Textual functions which determines our "mode of being" toward the text in terms of interpreting meaning.<sup>42</sup> An author does not *choose* to participate in these "functions," but participates in them through the very act of authoring and writing about authorship within our current cultural paradigm.

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38 Foucault, "What is an Author?" [*WA*] (1977), in Rabinow (ed.), p119-20. "All discourses, whatever their status, form, value, and whatever the treatment to which they will be subjected, would then develop in the anonymity of a murmur... What difference does it make who is speaking?"

39 Janet Staiger, "Authorship Approaches," in Gerstner & Staiger (ed.), p29.

40 Gerstner, p21.

41 Michel Foucault, "What is an Author?" in John Caughie (ed.), *Theories of Authorship* (Routledge/British Film Institute, 1981) p289. These lines, in the final paragraphs of "What is an Author?" in Caughie, are not contained in the Rabinow edition.

42 Foucault, *WA*, in Rabinow, p108-113. See also Staiger, p28.



In my opening paragraphs I have; 1) Written of Joanna as 'unifying' a number of texts, who could be held accountable for these texts (and therefore disciplined and punished by the legal state); 2) Said that she is an author, and therefore implied that others are *not authors*; 3) Produced "status" for her (as yet) unpublished films by comparing them to Len Lye and writing that she was the 'first woman of NZ experimental film', and; 4) Possibly 'subjected' myself to a "mode of being"<sup>43</sup> toward Joanna's texts (the "poetic" and "feminine"). In light of this I would argue that Foucault's analysis is *not* an authorship study and does not address the question "What *is* an Author?" (as the title claims) but rather asks: "What *are* the restrictions which are placed on every author within society, *and* how does this "function" affect (producing qualities and powers) our discourse about authors?" Foucault no longer asks *what* an author is "being," but questions *how* a person "becomes" an author in a given society.

In this respect Foucault's project is extremely useful to intercultural theoretical interventions, in that he illuminates the restrictive structures which experimental cinema (and art in general) was (and is) in the process of rejecting. As Jana Sawicki notes, Foucault "shared with feminists a sense of their importance of resurrecting "subjugated knowledge," ways of thinking and doing that have been eclipsed, devalued, or rendered invisible within dominant apparatuses of power."<sup>44</sup> More significantly, Claudia Moscovici points out that Foucault himself illustrates that "claiming the universal subject is dead" (as he does for the universal "author function") is "only the rhetorical beginning of the difficult philosophical and political process of modifying exclusionary or dominative political and symbolic structures and relations." In light of this Moscovici suggests that "what kind of subjectivity survives or can be generated in its stead – is the rigorous work that... needs to be pursued."<sup>45</sup>

Gerstner points to Walter Benjamin, working in advance of Foucault (and post-structuralism in general), as a possible entry point into the debate surrounding authorship and subjectivity. Benjamin sees authorship in a similar light to Foucault:

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43 Staiger, p28.

44 Sawicki, p381-2.

45 Moscovici, p2.

it is a repressive, disciplinary mechanism, “functioning”<sup>46</sup> to “subject” authors (and audiences) to state ideology. Though Benjamin was writing in a fascist/capitalist state and Foucault is writing in an advanced capitalist state, their descriptions of the “author function” are remarkably similar.<sup>47</sup> However, Benjamin also sees real political *power* in how an author *personally* chooses to interject/interact with this structure. This “choice” Benjamin calls a “tendency” at the level of the “means of production.”<sup>48</sup> In cinema, for example, the dominant commercial mode, initiated by the Hollywood studio-system, undoubtedly appropriates the author's name legally and transforms their works into commercial products. Experimental cinema, however, has consistently chosen to develop “their own forms and institutions over the years since the 1920s”<sup>49</sup> and to “operate entirely outside of the value system that we have come to know as the Hollywood construct.”<sup>50</sup>

Therefore, I propose that if there is a 'master-author' in discourse “that is handy for capitalism to promote,”<sup>51</sup> then there must also be another type of 'author-function', some sort of avant-garde or experimental 'author-function', firmly in opposition to the capitalist ideologies of the mainstream cinema.<sup>52</sup> This would be an alternative to Foucault's analysis, superimposed over and co-existent with his, in all times and places. As long as there has been the capitalisation and suppression of the authors name there have been authors working beneath the surface, in the underground, creating alternative sites of discourse. If we can say that Hollywood cinema serves to reinforce what I would call a 'master-discourse', the experimental

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46 Walter Benjamin specifically uses the term “function.” Benjamin, “The Author as Producer,” in Peter Demetz (ed.), *Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings* (Schocken Books, 1986) p770.

47 Many see a direct connection between capitalism and fascism. As Mark Seem writes of Deleuze and Guattari's first collaboration, “*Anti-Oedipus* begins by reviving Reich's completely serious question with respect to the rise of fascism: 'How could the masses be made to desire their own repression?' This is a question which the English and Americans are reluctant to deal with directly, tending too often to respond: “Fascism is a phenomenon that took place elsewhere, something that could only happen to others but not us. It's their problem.” But is it though?” Mark Seem, “Introduction,” in D&G, *Anti-Oedipus* (1972: Continuum, 2007) pxviii. As Alex Cox writes, “If you're a fascist in Hollywood, you work with great regularity. If you're not, you don't – so I don't.. There is no place in Hollywood for certain directors. It has to do with the big corporations owning the studios and being tied to the military-industrial complex.” John Walker (ed.), *Halliwell's Filmgoers Companion* (Harper Collins, 1997) p101.

48 Benjamin, p777.

49 Kuhn, p3-4.

50 Gwendolyn Audrey Foster & Wheeler Winston Dixon (ed.), *Experimental Cinema: The Film Reader* (Routledge, 2002) p1.

51 Staiger, p28-29.

52 As Foucault writes, “Where there is power, there is resistance.” (in Staiger, p48)

author-function sets up an 'open' or 'free-discourse'<sup>53</sup> providing on the one hand, a challenge to the dominant-model and on the other, new forms of pleasure for audiences wanting an alternative to mainstream narratives.<sup>54</sup>

Foucault points to two definitive moments in which the author functions (to reproduce 'master-discourse', or produce 'free-discourse'); 1) the text “after the fact”<sup>55</sup> (there and then) and, 2) what Mikhail Bakhtin would call the text in the *here and now*.<sup>56</sup> Functions 'after the fact' (there and then) reflect on those things which usually wouldn't occupy your mind while watching the film (such as production, distribution, exhibition and certain aspects of reception). Those in the *here and now* are related specifically to the experience of the film and what positions you can occupy as a subject while viewing it (phenomenological). For Foucault it is specifically the “number of signs that refer to the author”<sup>57</sup> which cause the author to 'function' in the *here and now*, causing possible 'subject positions', through the use of 'shifters' (personal pronouns, adverbs of time and place and conjugation of verbs). It is in this section that Foucault's influence on post-structuralism can be felt strongly. For this reason, the following section is divided into two halves: the *there and then* and the *here and now*.

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53 This should not be confused with Pier Paolo Pasolini's 'free-indirect-discourse' which we will discuss later.

54 The use of 'master' and 'free-discourse' is a nod toward the revolutionary ideas of George Hegel and Karl Marx concerning the relationship between the 'master' and the 'slave'.

55 Foucault, p288.

56 Gerstner, p13.

57 Foucault, p288.

## 2. Tendencies: Political Actions and Poetic Situations

“The precise relationship of the avant-garde to American commercial film is one of radical otherness.”<sup>58</sup>

“The question then becomes: How can one reduce the great peril, the great danger with which fiction threatens our world.”<sup>59</sup>

The first three of Foucault's “functions” relate to the 'there and then' (concerning the legal appropriation, categorisation and status of the author) while the final “function” concerns the textual experience of the spectator in the 'here and now' (shifters). The first series of functions are what Foucault might call a “genealogy,” while the second series of functions address what Foucault calls “archaeology.”<sup>60</sup> I will also argue that Joanna's films *do not function* in capitalism. This is a significant personal-political choice. Experimental films have historically been perceived as a “minor” art (in terms of “success” measured in terms of capital, audience attendance and investment return). Because of this Joanna's “personal” *choice* to make a form of art which *would not* make money (which *could not* make money) is potentially a “political” choice. Joanna made her films, like other experimental film-makers, for “very little money,”<sup>61</sup> without the aid of crews, or producers. She is, as Benjamin says, an “author as producer,” shooting, editing and organising the screening of her films *herself*.

Foucault writes that the author-function is 'regulated by the culture in which it circulates'. In this case, we may assume that 'free-discourse' is regulated by the

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58 P. Adams Sitney, *Visionary Film* (Oxford University Press, 1979) pviii.

59 Foucault, *WA*, p118.

60 “Genealogy,” as Foucault writes, “poses the problem of power and of the body (of bodies), indeed, its problems begin from the imposition of power upon bodies.” (Thomas Flynn, “Foucault's Mapping of History,” in Gutting (ed.), p35, 2nd edition) “Archaeology,” on the other hand, “indicates a possible line of attack for the analysis of verbal [or visual, or musical] performances.” (Foucault, in Gutting, p5, 2nd edition)

61 Renan, p17.

'counter-culture' in which it circulates.<sup>62</sup> So the question becomes: in what ways does the production, distribution, exhibition and reception differ from mainstream discourse, and challenge the “function” of the 'master author' as the state sees it?

### 2a. There and Then: Political Actions

0) Firstly, as I have said, the author “functions” legally to produce contracts, censorship and copyrights. Joanna, however, does not work with a crew and half her films have no humans in them. In those that do have people in them, they are her friends and family. Her films require no legal contracts of any kind. However, in authoring a work and showing it publicly, you enter into a contract with *society*.

0.1) Firstly, if you have not had your film censored, then you are *subject* to state intervention should anyone be offended by your production. To get a “rating” for a film costs money. For a Hollywood producer this cost would be nominal (in comparison to the cost of making the film). For an experimental film-maker, the price of rating a film is often much more than the cost of producing the film, thus making it much harder for them to *legally* screen their works. Also, because intercultural, and experimental cinema is often made by people oppressed by the state, their work is also more likely to contain ideas which the state considers transgressive.<sup>63</sup> Historically it has been the experimental ideas of “minorities” which have had the most trouble getting past the censors and whose screenings are most often shut down by the authorities. As Dwoskin suggests, this indicates a shift from the repressive “laws” of the state, to the “values” of the capitalist state (which are, for him, the “real oppressors”). Dwoskin writes, “The standard commercial outlet would not look at them and the censors would not pass them... So they went 'underground'; they wanted a free cinema.”<sup>64</sup> In response, many experimental

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62 As Kuhn writes, feminist countercinema, operating as a 'counter culture', “may be defined as film practice which works against and challenges dominant cinema.” (Kuhn, p157)

63 “Speeches and books were assigned real authors, other than mythical or important religious figures, only when the author became subject to punishment and to the extent that [their] discourse was considered transgressive.” Foucault, *WA*, in Caughie, p285.

64 Dwoskin, p23.

exhibitors screened “films 'privately' and therefore bypassed the laws regarding public exhibition.”<sup>65</sup>

0.2) Legal “copyright” appropriates the authors work after a certain length of time, sometimes while the author is alive, denying them access to their own works. This is done primarily when the artists works are *worth* something to a “company” who wishes to control the copyright (in order to make money from selling the author's work as a mass-produced product/*object*). Joanna's films, however, are not owned by a company. Many of Joanna's films were given as 'private' gifts to the people who appear in them, which complicates the notion of a legally stable “author” who can be exploited. The titles added by the *New Zealand Film Archive* after her death (which are the only copies currently available for viewing) categorise Joanna's films as 'personal records' rather than 'short films' or 'experimental films' (or any other category which may have been suitable) further distancing Joanna from a legal definition of “authorship.” As well, when I met Mary and Jane, Joanna's sisters, before writing this thesis, Mary mentioned that one of the films in the collection attributed to Joanna could very well *be authored by her*. Due to this, I am unsure if Joanna functions successfully to 'unify' the texts collected under her name at all.

1. Secondly, the author “functions” to “designate” what kinds of texts are considered authored (what is a “quality” product) and who can and cannot become an author (who will have access to the “power” of authorship). As Foucault writes; “Consequently, we can say that in our culture, the name of the author is a variable that accompanies only certain texts to the *exclusion* of others: a private letter may have a signatory, but it does not have an author; a contract can have an underwriter, but not an author; and similarly, an anonymous poster on the wall may have a writer, but they cannot be an author.”<sup>66</sup> However, in “counter-culture” artistic production these (illusionary) restrictions do not exist. Experimental art (and cinema) has always worked to expand the social definition of art, to embrace mediums usually ignored by the mainstream. This is important not just to the counter-culture in general, but also to specific feminist critical practices. As Cook

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65 Dwoskin, p53.

66 Foucault, *WA*, in Caughie, p284.

notes, master-discourse traditionally involved the “suppression of certain forms of discourse developed by women out of their history of oppression: some examples would be embroidery, diaries and letters... the personal diary form, for instance, has always been a means of self-expression for women to whom other avenues were closed. The suppression of the 'personal'... brings to the surface specific problems and contradictions for women.”<sup>67</sup> Joanna herself writes that she is “aggressively in support of the 'minor' – I like my work to relate to a room rather than a gallery.”<sup>68</sup>

Many of Joanna's films were, in fact, *letters* sent to her sister Mary Paul in Australia and her films also belong to the filmic diary-form. As Renan writes, “Traditionally the 8mm has been a home-movie medium... recently, however... film-makers... have broken down any supposed barriers that existed between home-movies and art.”<sup>69</sup> All of Joanna's work as an author plays into this function; as a painter she worked almost exclusively in water-colour and *gauche* (both considered 'amateur' mediums) and one of her major works as a curator was organising the woman's exhibition 'A Seasons Diaries', which “began when Joanna Paul read The Pillowbook of Sei Shonagon and asked some women friends to document their lives during October 1977.”<sup>70</sup> Joanna, and experimental practice in general, worked consistently to make previously *invisible forms of art visible*.

2) Finally, the author functions to produce “status” in our culture. The more status the author's name commands, the more “products/objects” they can sell (the more they are “worth”). Certain “authors,” for instance, have a particular status (more freedom to “act”) in the production of a film. A Hollywood “producer/author” has more “power,” more “status,” on the set of their production than other workers (and therefore gets paid more money). In Benjamin's terms a “film set” (he uses a classical theatre production) is comprised of “complicated machinery... gigantic supporting staff... [and] sophisticated effects,”<sup>71</sup> all of which cost large amounts of money (often millions of dollars) and involve the hierarchical

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67 Pam Cook, “The Point of Self-Expression in Avant-Garde Film” (1977-8), in John Caughie (ed.), *Theories of Authorship* (Routledge, 1981) p272.

68 Paul, in O'Brien, p68.

69 Renan, p23.

70 Marian Evans, “This Used to be the Other Side of a Fence and it's Green Here Still,” in *Visual Diaries with Contemporary NZ Film and Video Makers* (Exhibition Catalogue, March, 1986).

71 Benjamin, p777.

arrangement of workers from the author/producer down, mimicking the ideologies and class struggles of the “state.” For Benjamin (coming from a Marxist position) the central problem with capitalism is that it seeks to protect the (so-called) “upper-classes” (the rich and powerful; here, the “authors” of social meaning – the producers, the writers, the directors) and repress the lower-classes (the cleaners, the drivers, the runners). The status of the author on set is identical to that of the bourgeois and upper-class, working to protect their status as author (subjecting the workers to a position of non-author) for the duration of production, distribution and reception. Joanna's films (like most intercultural, experimental films) as I have said, are shot and edited solely by her, and exemplify what Pam Cook calls the 'artisanal' mode of film production.<sup>72</sup>

2.1) As Cook writes, “The film-maker, like a craft worker, is in control of all aspects of the process of production and distribution/exhibition, retaining rights of ownership over her or his film... it implies a particular mode of production which is small-scale and therefore, in a capitalist economy, lies outside the dominant system. The 'product' does not have an immediately available market, or audience, and is not geared to profit, therefore the means of production must be as cheap as possible [and] made by individuals or small groups.”<sup>73</sup> This also means that the film-maker is never forced by a contracts (or any legal documents) to make their film by a certain time, or in a certain way; the artisan is free to work when (and how) they please. And since the subject matter is personal and usually focuses on “things in their actual life,”<sup>74</sup> rather than carefully dressed sets and locations, the film-maker can work wherever they please. As Cook writes, “Historically, therefore, artisanal production stands in opposition both to the capitalist economic organisation... and the structure of labour within the industry.”<sup>75</sup> Rather than being *organised*, the artisan has an entirely *organic* working schedule. Joanna herself writes, “I have never worked well in a studio – they seem like dead places to me... I'm painting things like the coffee cup after a visitor has left. I am trying to capture

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72 Cook, p272.

73 Cook, p272-3.

74 Renan, p25.

75 Cook, p273.



an idea from life, pursuing it in a poem or a painting or a collage or a photograph.”<sup>76</sup>

2.2) The author also gathers “status” socially as a “name,” and this “name” can be used to “brand” products. The Hollywood author's name, for instance, is not just used to sell their own product (the film) but also used to sell candy bars, soft-drinks, popcorn, merchandise and future movies. The mainstream “film experience” does not just include the film itself, but also all the advertising and extra expenses (and expectations) which come with it. When I go to a mainstream movie, for instance, I like to buy tangy fruits (a kind of lolly). Without tangy fruits my (mainstream) movie experience really isn't the “same” (*homogeneous*). Experimental cinema, however, is not screened at mainstream cinemas (and never has been). There are no candy-bars and no advertisements (and often no seats – *bring a cushion*). I do not *expect* anything from the experimental film experience before going. Every screening is a potentially new and unknown situation (*heterogeneous*). Artisan-films are not made by companies and therefore do not 'compete' in the marketplace (for “status”). They are “a deeply personal cinema... self-distributed or distributed by a small but dedicated group of truly independent distributors,”<sup>77</sup> usually friends or other film-makers. Films are screened in art-galleries, museums, schools, living rooms, festivals and film-archives. Joanna's films, for instance, were screened by Martin Rumsby in the 1980s as a part of 'Invisible Cinema', in which Martin travelled around NZ and Canada screening experimental films from his backpack.<sup>78</sup> Significantly, Martin was a *friend* of Joanna's, rather than a business associate and no 'profit' was made from these exhibitions.

Although there are many more ways in which experimental cinema counters dominant “authorship” practices, the above relations should suffice to illustrate certain aspects of 'free-discourse', in particular their radical difference to master-discourse in terms of production, distribution and exhibition. Historically, Joanna's *choices* (and those of most, if not all, intercultural authors) provide an alternative to 'master-discourse' and the capitalist ideology which invisibly flows through it. But

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76 O'Brien, p68.

77 Foster & Dixon, p2.

78 Rumsby, p4.

Joanna's films are also experiences to be had in the present tense, not just existing as historical (ideological) moments, but also as radical and personal experiences in the *here and now*. This indicates a change from the socio-historical to the *phenomenological*, my focus shifting from social positioning, to spectator positions.

### 2b. Poetic Situations: Here and Now

3) Finally Foucault shifts his attention to the 'here and now', the moment in which the spectator receives the text and the potential 'meanings' constructed by the text. Foucault argues that the (master) author “functions” to create an *absence* of the author, an 'empty space' (a “subject-position”) which any spectator (regardless of sex, race, age, nationality) can 'fill' with their bodies and minds. It is this 'empty space' which Foucault suggests that we interrogate, this space which is not an 'author' but precisely the opposite: it is the author's deliberate 'absence', functioning as a “position” which “subjects” the spectator to a particular mode of reading (or watching). This 'subject-position' is fixed, and functions to 'unify' the fragments of any text into a coherent “statement,” or singular meaning. It also functions to 'unify' the spectator and ignores their differences in terms of gender, sexuality, race, ethnicity, and so on (as it is designed for a 'uniform' spectator).

As with the production, distribution, exhibition and reception, the manner in which intercultural cinema 'functions' in the *here and now* is radically 'other' to mainstream textual practices. On the one hand intercultural textual practices counter-act those of dominant media practices (as such, I will devote a short space to discussing feminist critical responses and general attitudes toward the textual operations of master-discourse, before moving on to the manifold ways in which experimental cinema 'counters' this). On the other hand, this mode of 'countering' may give way to a *new experience*, which is no longer 'counter' to anything, but 'productive' in ways previously *invisible*.

Annette Kuhn observes that the dominant-form of textual practice has a “highly specific set of rules.”<sup>79</sup> She calls this the 'classic realist text' “in relation to film sometimes called the classic Hollywood text.”<sup>80</sup> According to Kuhn the defining feature of the 'classical realist text' is the effacement of the author (or 'speaker/seer') which “perpetuates illusionism, the notion that, in the case of cinema, what is on screen is an uncoded reflection of the 'real world'.”<sup>81</sup> In terms of generating (or 'reading') meaning in the text, this becomes problematic. As discussed, the dominant-form (often) suppresses voices of minority cultures (by controlling *who* can be an author and what can be considered authored). Then it “hides the marks of enunciation,” in which we cannot locate an “identifiable source,”<sup>82</sup> thus effacing the fact that it is a 'vision' (or text) formed largely by white, male, heterosexual (and often Christian) authors. This gives the effect of the author being both 'absent' (as an idea) and simultaneously 'present' (as ideology).

Kuhn identifies two ways in which this 'illusionism' works as an ideological operation. The first is the “concealment of processes of signification,”<sup>83</sup> which enables the audience to forget that they are watching a narrated, authored and ideologically powerful image. No representational image is without a hidden dimension, without an ideological power (to conform, to resist, or to create anew). The second concerns the available subject positions for the audience to occupy, or as Foucault would put it, the manipulation of 'shifters'. Kuhn argues that 'classic realist texts' “position their reading subjects as unitary and non-contradictory, and thus as neither active, nor as capable of intervention, in the signification process.”<sup>84</sup> That is, we are given a single, homogeneous subject-position to occupy while experiencing the film in the 'here and now'. These two practices work together to efface the 'author' and we, as the audience, are stitched into the film's fabric. This process, called 'suture', is central to the classical text and refers to the way in which we are bound into the text as subjects “in the form of a stand in... [for] the element

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79 Kuhn, p38.

80 Kuhn, p28.

81 Kuhn, p156.

82 Kuhn, p50.

83 Kuhn, p157.

84 Kuhn, p157.

which is lacking.”<sup>85</sup> The *authorial* voice.

Kuhn argues that the 'classical realist text' is a form of 'histoire' (story making) “in which the source of enunciation – that absent term, the camera or author, which controls the discourse and organises the narrative logic – is suppressed, the verb tense is an indefinite past of already completed events, and the more distant, impersonal pronouns of “he,” “she,” and “it” are engaged.”<sup>86</sup> Kuhn comments that this has the effect of making “cinematic discourse – the process of meaning production – *invisible*.”<sup>87</sup> This is problematic considering that many feminist theorists have argued (after Laura Mulvey) that “mainstream films addressed a male rather than a female spectator and... [that] female actors were objects not subjects, served up for the pleasure of a masculine spectator.”<sup>88</sup>

Finally, classical realist cinema tells 'stories', building “identification with fictional characters” which are often stereotyped and cliché. Kuhn continues, “by means of these identifications, the spectator is drawn into the film, so that when questions posed by the narrative are resolved by its closure, the spectator is also 'closed', completed or satisfied.”<sup>89</sup> Thus the classical realist text has “one” dominantly intended meaning, and treats every audience member as if they had a “uniform” relation to the filmic world (positioning us as unitary *subjects*).<sup>90</sup>

In Foucault's analysis, it is not only 'histoire' which produces 'uniform subjects' but also its pair, 'discours'. Histoire, as I have said, is equivalent to using the verbal pronouns 'he' and 'she'. In textual 'discours', however, “the enunciative source is present... and the discursive relation is foregrounded by the engagements of the pronouns 'I' and 'you'.”<sup>91</sup>

The use of 'discours' and 'personal pronouns' is often seen as a solution to the problems surrounding the 'invisibility' of the author. However, though 'discours'

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85 Caughie, p298.

86 Sandy Flitterman-Lewis, *To Desire Differently* (Illinois University Press, 1990) p14.

87 Kuhn, p18. My italics.

88 Shepard, p126.

89 Kuhn, p157-8.

90 By “one meaning” I simply mean that, for instance, *The Terminator* (dir. James Cameron, 1980) has one dominant plot which can easily be described and therefore *sold*. A robot which looks like a human goes back in time to kill a woman, to win a future war between machines and humans. This is sometimes called “high concept,” indicating a film plot which can be easily communicated in one or two sentences. This enables the idea of the film to spread as a “meme” (which Richard Dawkins aligns with viruses).

91 Flitterman-Lewis, p14.

presents a significant difference from 'histoire' in terms of audience experience, the 'subject-position' (in Foucault's terms) remains *unitary*. Many film documentaries utilise a voice-over referring to an "I" and sometimes to a "you." This "I" still links together the various fragments of the text into a cohesive statement. Furthermore, the term "you" is usually only used in circumstances when "I" am an individual, but in textual discourse the term "you" refers to *anyone* who watches the film, thus positioning the audience as unitary, when the audience may be of *any* sexuality, gender, race or ethnicity. Finally, in terms of authorship, Foucault argues that terms like "I," "me" and "you" (when spoken by the "author" of the text) do not refer to the actual author, but to a re-presentation of the author as a character, as a second (or even third) ego. The author is therefore still absent to some degree. In this sense 'discours' does not provide any solutions to Foucault's problems with authorship.

For Benjamin, like Foucault, while we are subjected to the views of the authorial voice (reading the "pre-produced meaning" in the act of viewing) we are also (invisibly) subjected to the ideologies contained in the production history of the film (the "means of production"). For Benjamin, like many experimental film authors and feminist theorists, the question then becomes: in what way can a text be constructed which does not, 1) Make invisible the "means of production," and produce the "illusion" of a uniform, coherent world, and, 2) Subject us to a pre-produced, pre-prepared and unitary position? The answer to both of these questions relates to the second part of Benjamin's thesis. On the one hand, as I have shown, he argues that the author might make *choices* at the level of production which indicate a certain political tendency. On the other hand he indicates a choice at the level of the 'text' which has the power to turn the audience into collaborators, to "induce other producers to produce."<sup>92</sup> This is what Benjamin called the "audience as producer." Similar to Benjamin's notion of spectators as producers (rather than 'uniform-subjects') are Kuhn, Gustav Bachelard and Julia Kristeva's conceptions of the "poetic," and Deleuze's "any-space-whatevers" and "time-images."

How does one create a text which encourages the audience to *become* creators, to *become* collaborators? Rather than "subjecting" us to an "objective" construction of "information" (whether in the *narrative* plot of a (hi)story, or the

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92 Brecht, in Gerstner, p13.

narrated plot of a documentary discourse) Benjamin argues that an author might choose to, 1) Produce texts with cheap, publicly available material and make these “means of production” visible to the audience in the experience of the text, thus reminding them of how easy it is to become an author (*after the fact*) and, 2) Produce texts which actively seek to create confusing, contradictory, non-cohesive images, thus suggesting that the author has not answered all the questions raised by the work and that each spectator will have to decide on the “meaning” for themselves existentially (*here and now*). As Gene Youngblood writes, “Because it is entirely personal it rests on no identifiable plot and is not probable, the viewer is forced to create along with the film.”<sup>93</sup> The “uniform subject” is deconstructed and replaced with a multiplicitous “spectator-producer,” capable of *intervening* in the production of meaning. In both cases Benjamin suggests that these texts are “meant to make the audience adopt a critical attitude.”<sup>94</sup> As Joanna herself writes, “Complexity, plurality essential in a contemporary world where there is no common understood. No common reader.”<sup>95</sup>

3.1) Joanna's films use the cheapest possible equipment and are made, as I have said, by a single person. Nothing in Joanna's films is pre-planned, or prepared. Everything feels improvised and performed as if by chance. The subject matter, as I have said, is drawn from her personal life, and could be found in any house, on any walk, through any city. Joanna's films, like many examples of experimental and intercultural cinema let the audience know, “If one had the *desire* to do it, anyone could make a film.”<sup>96</sup> In order to *remind* the audience of these things Benjamin suggests that one must counteract and constantly challenge the 'illusion' effect of dominant media by making the “means of production” visible through 'distancing' the audience from the text. As Kuhn writes, “Distances are created everywhere which are, on the whole, detrimental to illusion.”<sup>97</sup> Benjamin, drawing on Bertolt Brecht's work as a playwright (which he uses as a central example) describes a text which is a clash of “models,” incorporating title-cards,

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93 Gene Youngblood, *Expanded Cinema* (Clarke, Irwin and Company, 1970) p64.

94 Kuhn, p161.

95 Paul and Eagle, p95.

96 Foster & Dixon, p3.

97 Brecht, in Kuhn, p161.

folk-songs, poetry and non-realist acting (among other things) *interjected* throughout a more traditional narrative.

In Joanna's films I am 'distanced' in one particular way: *silence*. This silence was, in Joanna's words, 'essential' to her cinema.<sup>98</sup> Silence distances me from the screen and reminds me that the image is not 'real', but an authored construction. Joanna's films also distance me in terms of her embodied use of the super8 camera. The films shake, move and jolt, just as a camera really does when it is used to record memories (rather than when it is used to create an 'illusion' of the 'real' world). There is no point at which I can forget the 'authored' instance, or that this film is enunciated by a 'camera eye'. In this sense, I am constantly reminded of the camera, and its "means of production" as I watch. Not only this, but because there is no particular narrative, or plot, I am given the space to reflect on the production of the image (which would not usually dominate my mind in a mainstream narrative film).

3.2) How does a text make the audience into producers of meaning? By creating the kind of text which has no one interpretation: by making a film which resists uniform description. Brecht's clashing of modes, for instance, means that the audience is able to reflect on the construction of the text and their role in the production of meaning as they watch the text. As the various interjections (songs, inter-titles and so on) are so different to the narrative sequences, they bring to the fore the processes involved in producing meaning. As Brecht writes, the audience is forced "*to think*, to reflect on [their] position in the process of production."<sup>99</sup> Kuhn astutely points out that there are at least two ways of making the audience aware of their role in the production of meaning: 1) The 'deconstructive' and, 2) The 'feminine', 'open' or 'poetic' model of discourse. Brecht's 'distances', or interjections, produce what Kuhn calls a 'deconstruction'. As Kuhn writes, deconstructive cinematic practice "works by a process of breaking down... the textual operations and modes of address characteristic of dominant cinema."<sup>100</sup> However, in producing a deconstruction of dominant codes, the purely deconstructive text still signifies a semi-unitary viewer. As Kuhn writes, deconstruction has a point to prove, an axe to

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98 Paul, "Shibusha," p10.

99 Brecht, in Gerstner, p12.

100Kuhn, p160.

grind, and “in some degree works in the direction of closure, of restricting the range of meanings potentially available [in] a text.”<sup>101</sup> The 'poetic' incorporates 'deconstruction' but also works to produce images which move “towards the construction of new, non dominant forms”<sup>102</sup> of cinematic enjoyment, and “privilege relations of subjectivity which are radically 'other' to the fixity of subject relations set up by dominant forms.”<sup>103</sup>

Similarly, Gustav Bachelard writes that the 'poetic image' “must appear and reappear... in the very ecstasy of the newness of the image.”<sup>104</sup> Bachelard, like Benjamin, sees the poetic image as an unprepared experience, which can be intellectually 'shocking' (“nothing prepares a poetic image”<sup>105</sup>) having the power to “make of the reader a poet.”<sup>106</sup> For Bachelard “Poetry... introduce[s] freedom in the very body of the language. As a result, poetry appears as a phenomenon of freedom.”<sup>107</sup> Here, this is a freedom from the dominant unitary subject-position (which pervades the dominant forms of textual discourse available to an author: *histoire*, *discours* and *deconstruction*). Similarly, Roland Barthes refers to the difference between “the pleasure to be obtained by closure or resolution” of the classical text “and the 'bliss' (*jouissance*) of the text which challenges such pleasures.”<sup>108</sup> How do Joanna's films create “poetic” images? Firstly, I am always aware that a camera is looking at the images and that an author is selecting them and cutting them together. Secondly, most of Joanna's films use a fragmented style of montage which denies narrative representation and a close-up (fragmented) mise-en-scene which constantly oscillates between representation and abstraction.

Kuhn, drawing on feminist theorist Julia Kristeva, aligns the possibility for a “feminine” authorship practice with the 'poetic-image'. In the first place, “A text may embody or produce the poetic to the degree that it brings to the fore the processes by which it constructs *its own meaning*”<sup>109</sup> and works against closure (of

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101Kuhn, p16.

102Kuhn, p167.

103Kuhn, p168.

104Gustav Bachelard, *The Poetics of Space* (1958: Beacon Press, 1969) pxi.

105Bachelard, pxx.

106Bachelard, pxxi.

107Bachelard, pxxiii.

108Kuhn, p17.

109Kuhn, p13. Kuhn is drawing primarily on Julia Kristeva (1976).



the 'plot') which “is a feature of dominant 'masculine' language, to the extent that such a language embodies a hierarchy of meanings, and implies a subjection to, a completion and closure of, meaning.”<sup>110</sup> Joanna's films are what Kristeva calls a 'radical signifying practice' “which challenge dominant modes by placing subjectivity in *process*, making the moment of reading one in which meanings are *set in play* rather than consolidated or fixed.”<sup>111</sup>

The more abstract a film becomes, the more the spectator has to draw their own conclusions as to what the images *mean*, the more a spectator has to construct meaning for themselves from the fragments of things *seen*. In terms of Gilles Deleuze's fascinating study of cinematic signs, central to Marks textual analysis of “intercultural cinema,” Joanna's films are “time-images.” Deleuze begins by analysing cinematic-images into two kinds: “movement-images” and “time-images.” In Marks' reading of Deleuze, the “movement-image” refers to the clichéd 'classical realist text' of dominant, Hollywood, narrative cinema.<sup>112</sup> The “time-image,” however, characterises “avant-garde works that, in their suspicion of representation, force the viewer to draw upon his or her subjective resources to complete the image.”<sup>113</sup> The first two signs of the “time-image” are “optical images” and “sound images” (what we *see*, and what we *hear*).<sup>114</sup> In the time-image the 'visual' and 'aural' are disconnected, foregrounding the construction of the image. The cliché “movement-image” does not cause the spectator to examine the difference between what is 'seen' and what is 'heard' (it gives the illusion of being 'invisibly' or 'naturally' constructed). Joanna's films, as I have said, are silent and produce a continual “time-image,” a constant disconnection between the seen and the heard. When I listen I hear nothing but the natural sounds of the theatre: other audience member's moving around, breathing. *I hear the projector*. The repetitive clack of the machine seems to sink into the image, giving the flickering pulse a kind of mechanical rhythm, her film's fragmented montage having the effect of

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110Kuhn, p17.

111Kuhn, p12. Kuhn cites Helene Cixous (1980) and Julia Kristeva (1975). My italics.

112Which Marks also extends to narrative and experimental “documentaries.” See Laura Marks, “The Sign of the Times: Deleuze, Peirce and the Documentary Image” [*SoT*], in Gregory Flaxman (ed.), *The Brain is the Screen* (University of Minnesota Press, 2000), p194.

113Marks, *SoF*, p42.

114Sometimes called 'opsigns' and 'sonsigns'.

what Deleuze calls an *assemblage* (rather than a narrative).

It is worth quoting Marks at length here; “The optical image, because it cannot be explained and mobilised into action, requires the viewer to puzzle over it. The inability to recognise an image encourages us to confront the limits of our knowledge, while the film's refusal to extend into action constitutes the film's refusal to “explain” and neutralise the virtual image [into an 'actual', pre-formed meaning].<sup>115</sup> Because the viewer cannot confidently link the optical image with other images through causal relationships, she is forced to search her memory for other virtual images that might make sense of it.”<sup>116</sup> The optical-image calls into play our “attentive recognition” (rather than our habitual, “motor-sensory” memory). Marks continues, “Attentive recognition is a participatory notion of spectatorship, whose political potential shouldn't be ignored. If a viewer is free to draw upon her own reserves of memory as she participates in the creation of the object on screen, her private and unofficial histories and memories will be granted as much legitimation as the official histories that make up the realm of the cliché – if not more.”<sup>117</sup>

Foucault's analysis of “discursive practices” and textual “subject-positions” is what he calls an “archaeology.” Marks argues that by making me aware of my position in the process of producing meaning, a film is capable of providing a site (or “situation”) in which the spectator does “archaeology,” in which I am encouraged to *do* philosophy in order to begin to comprehend the images from a perspective of 'meaning'. Marks' archaeology finds its tools largely in Deleuze's analysis of what might be understood as the 'subject positions' produced dominantly in the cliché, 'classical realist text' (*movement-images*) and the various 'producer positions' in avant-garde, experimental cinema (*time-images*).

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<sup>115</sup>Deleuze contrasts the 'virtual' to the 'actual' state of the image. Drawing on quantum-theory Deleuze argues that the “virtual image” exists in a multiplicity of states before “actualising” in the *here and now*. A 'classical realist text' (movement-image) works to “actualise” the image (and to suppress the virtual multiplicity of every image). A time-image releases the virtual and refuses to “actualise” the image into a known form. As Robert Pastor writes, “In quantum physics, multiple possibilities exist—are superposed—and it is not until observation (or, synonymously for this purpose, measurement) that the state function collapses to just one of these actualities.” Robert Paster, *New Physics and the Mind*. Internet WWW page, at URL: <<http://newphysicsandthemind.net/6.html>> (version current 1/1/2008).

<sup>116</sup>Marks, *SoF*, p47.

<sup>117</sup>Marks, *SoF*, p48.

### 3. Representation, Reflection and the Poetic

“Sound people are like water.”<sup>118</sup>

“How we see what we see—the process of vision—how one ‘interprets roses’, the subtle changes of colour or linear direction yielded to an intent gaze, and then what happens when one turns one head—never cease to interest me. The visual world is inexhaustible.”<sup>119</sup>

“I find the cinematographic philosophy of Gilles Deleuze most useful to explore how intercultural cinema performs a multiphased activity of excavation, falsification, and fabulation... from deconstructing dominant histories to creating new conditions for new stories.”<sup>120</sup>

Let us very quickly recap: I am arguing that Joanna's films are “time-images.” In 'movement-image cinema' shots progress according to the “sensible,”<sup>121</sup> according to a comprehensive, linear narrative. The time-image draws attention to its own status as an “image” and “assembles” images in a fashion that does not produce expected “actions,” or “reactions,” but foregrounds cinema's essentially fragmented nature. As Marks writes, the time-image “is contrasted with the sensory-motor image of movement-image cinema, in particular the cliché, a commonsense, hegemonic idea that extends unproblematically into *action*.”<sup>122</sup> Within “time-images” the viewer's own resources are drawn upon in order to “complete” the image, and they are turned into a self-aware “producer” of meaning. In Marks' terms, the time-image leaves a “gap” for each viewer's own “regimes of knowledge” to be used in constructing “meaning.” A feminist carpenter who loves

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118Janet Paul, p11.

119Joanna Paul, *A Chronology* (Exhibition Catalogue: Wanganui, 1989) p5.

120Marks, *SoF*, p26.

121Marks, *SoF*, p31.

122Marks, *SoF*, p46. My italics.

philosophy, for instance, will have different “regimes of knowledge” than a capitalist business manager who loves flower arranging. In Joanna's films, and other intercultural cinema, these regimes of knowledge are equally called upon in each viewer. In cliché, mainstream movement-image cinema, on the other hand, the “gaps” are closed, artificially *sewn* together (as in “suture”) and the multiplicity of spectators are produced (initially) as a unified “consumer” in a capitalist society. When I watch a cliché, mainstream film there is no need to draw on feminist politics, carpentry, business management or flower arranging. In Joanna's films, however, I have the option to draw on any of these “knowledges” in my activity of collaborating with the film, in my attempt to produce meaning.

Joanna's “time-images” are firstly 'real' super8mm home-movies, foregrounded by their silence and the unconventional manner in which they were screened (and for me, the way they have been transferred to DVD). Joanna's films function as 'real' home-movies, circulating in the personal worlds of Joanna's family and friends. Because their “meanings” as home-movies are private, and inaccessible to me (I wasn't at any of the events depicted in the films and don't personally know any of the people) I feel often feel meaningfully 'distanced' from the images. These are like what Deleuze calls “recollection-images,” important to Marks readings of intercultural cinema. As Marks writes, “because official histories,” which narrative, mainstream cinema is one example of, “with their official image repertoires [*movement images*], are often at odds with the private histories of disenfranchised people, it is *recollection-images* – such as memories... [that] confront the public and the private with each other.”<sup>123</sup>

But these recollection-images are not within my “regime of knowledge.” As a spectator I confront Joanna's filmed recollections, coming face to face with them, but as Joanna's films and images are so personal, so much a part of her private history, there is no way for me to enter into discourse with them. *They do not seem to mean anything*. As Marks writes, “What is more disturbing is when the optical image cannot be connected to any living memory,” or cannot be “recollected” as an “image.” Marks continues, “When I find a high school yearbook at a flea market... I confront a virtual image that does not correspond to my [previous] experience...

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123Marks, *SoF*, p50.

When attentive recognition fails – when we do not recognise or cannot remember – it creates.”<sup>124</sup>

The optical-image, when it does not extend into recognition, for the public audience, dovetails into “seeing,” into a kind of “attentive perception.” As Deleuze writes, characters in time-image cinema halt the “action” of the narrative, and “the viewer's problem becomes 'What is there to *see* in the image?' (and not now 'What are we going to see in the next image?')”<sup>125</sup> In Joanna's films, rather than a *character seeing on screen*, the “film's eye” (the screen) is the “character” of the film and it is me, the spectator, who is left to finally SEE. But what is it which I am left to see? Or, as Marks writes, “To raise the stakes of the optical image, we might ask what's the point of “finally SEEING” if there's nothing to see? What's the point of having our clichés and preconceptions blown away if we have no subsequent course of action?”<sup>126</sup> What does it mean to SEE?

In returning me to “seeing,” to “perception” itself I argue that Joanna's films foreground the act of “perception” itself, foregrounding what Deleuze calls “perception-images” (a way of “thinking” seeing). Perception-images are the first register of the “movement-image.” By returning me to visible “movement-images,” to self-aware perception-images, Joanna's textual choices perform a cinematic archaeology which I can re-perform in the experience of the films. There are three registers to the movement-image: perception, affection, and action. Deleuze writes that, “A film is never made up of a single kind of image... Nevertheless a film, at least in its most simple characteristics, always has one type of image which is dominant: one can speak of an active, perceptive or affective montage, depending on the predominant type.”<sup>127</sup>

Firstly I find that Joanna's films foreground their perception-images, and I am drawn to contemplating the nature of perception itself. However, on a second viewing I find that the “affection-image” is foregrounded. At other times, I find “action-images” foregrounded. In Joanna's style of montage I find all three modes of image foregrounded, all at the same time. This style of montage is not unique to

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124Marks, *SoF*, p50.

125Deleuze, in Marks, *SoF*, p63. My italics.

126Marks, *SoF*, p63.

127Deleuze, *The Movement Image* (1985: Athlone Press, 1989) p70.

Joanna's filmmaking practices (Stan Brakhage is another obvious example, as is Marie Menken, or Nathaniel Dorsky) but her manner of handling it and expressing its contents within these formal restrictions (as I have outlined earlier; silence, fragmented assemblage, personal subject matter, non-narrative) is unique to her. For Deleuze one of the key differences between movement-images and time-images is the gap between habitual and attentive-recognition (images which need no thought to understand and those that must be *thought through*). In Joanna's films I find a kind of *attentive movement-image* (in which I am made aware of the limits of movement with respect to time).

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*Either*: Sometimes when I watch Joanna's films I see through a “perceptive eye,” and find the poetry of vision flowing through the images, linking the fragments together (as I have indicated above). This is the first register of Deleuze's movement-image.

*Or*: Other times when I watch Joanna's films I don't see “perceptions” as such. Instead, I see concrete assemblages, pure fragments, affection-images merging together in what Deleuze calls an “any-space-whatever” (the second register of the movement-image). While perception-images designate a relationship between the frame and that which is framed, the affection-image is designated by close-ups and in particular the close-up of the face (or objects which 'face' us).

*Both/And*: As I watch Joanna's films more and more I get used to thinking with both of these concepts in my head at the same time. This allows me to make further connections between images. Perception comes into contact with affection, and affection with perception. An action-image, the third register of the movement-image, then occurs *between* them. Though it may seem unusual for a filmmaker to foreground three different modes of viewing, in poetic texts (and particularly the haiku poem, as we shall see) this is common practice. It is important to realise that this is not a randomness of meaning, or non-meaning (non-sense). Joanna's films shatter meaning (the time-image) and in its wake produce works which have

genuine multiplicities of readings, creating new and vibrant connections between self-aware cinematic thought (attentive movement-images, rather than habitual, clichéd movement-images).

Something Rosalind Krauss wrote about the abstract painter Piet Mondrian feels applicable to Joanna's work here, considering her grounding in 'modernism'; “Given the visual, or formal, consistency of Mondrian's mature style and the passion of his theoretical pronouncements, we would think that work of this sort would have to hold one position or the other [either/or]; and because the chosen position contains a definition about the very nature of the goals of art, one would think that an artist would certainly not want to confuse the issue by seeming to imply both [and]. Yet this is exactly what Mondrian does.”<sup>128</sup>

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*Either*: On the one hand, the time-image, “powerless to draw upon resources of common sense [the spectator] question[s]... everything about how *this* particular image got to be constructed from a given *perception* [or perception-image].”<sup>129</sup> The “perception-image” is the first register of the movement-image and refers (initially) to the image's possibility of belonging to one of three categories of “textual practice” as I have discussed in the previous section: 'histoire' (what Deleuze calls an “objective” perception-image), 'discourse' (a “subjective” perception-image, which includes “point-of-view” shots from a character's, or camera's, perspective), and what Deleuze, after Jean Mitry, calls a 'semi-subjective' perception-image (which I will talk about in detail later). Crudely, the perception-image details the relationship between, 1) A character, or object (who also 'sees') and 2) The frame which sees everything (in the film) and positions the characters and objects in relation to the camera-eye (and spectator). Deleuze suggests that there are two ways of treating the perception-image, regardless of its status as objective, subjective or semi-subjective: *either* to suppress the “perceiver” (privileging the perceived, what is *represented* on screen), *or* to make us aware of the perceiver/camera in relation

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<sup>128</sup>Rosalind E. Krauss, *The Originality of the Avant-Garde and Other Modernist Myths* (The MIT Press, 1985) p19.

<sup>129</sup>Marks, *SoF*, p42.

to the perceived/character (thus drawing my attention *out of the frame*, to the body doing this perceiving). Deleuze calls this, after Pier Paolo Pasolini, 'free-indirect-discourse', or the "poetry of cinema."<sup>130</sup> In Joanna's films there are constant reminders that the 'eye' of the camera is in the act of seeing, regardless of the mode of discourse (subjective, objective or semi-subjective). Some of Joanna's films foreground objective perception-images, while some foreground subjective perception-images. Others foreground semi-subjective perception-images. However, regardless of the initial 'state' of the image, all of her films also produce a sense of 'free-indirect-discourse' (an eventual breakdown of objectivity and subjectivity).

Self-conscious 'free-indirect-discourse' is what Deleuze and Guattari might call a 'rhizome' structure (rather than the 'tree' structure of classical 'narrative').<sup>131</sup> A 'rhizome' has two (or more) layers which interact, rather than one linear plot (whether you are talking plots of movies, or plotting a graph). In cinematic 'free-indirect-discourse' there are (at least) two layers (the frame and what is in the frame), each able to establish *multiple* points of connection *between* them. In Joanna's film *Task*, for instance, the "objective" status of the frame is foregrounded, while simultaneously the character performing the task (ironing the washing) is foregrounded as a "subject" (subject to the codes of 'histoire'). In *Bosshard's House*, a film which highlights its "subjective" frame, I am shown a series of "objects" one after the other. In all cases subjects are layered over objects, and objects over subjects. This 'rhizome' structure allows for a constant *play* between the nature of subjectivity and objectivity to occur in Joanna's films.

Later in *Bosshard's House* I see a 'subject', a woman who I come to think of as the 'mother' of the Bosshard children (though I cannot be sure). As a 'subject' she is not 'subjected' to the view of the camera and takes power in looking *directly at the camera*. In this moment the image shifts from a perception-image to a classical "affection-image" (a close-up of the face), the second register of the movement-image. The woman's action of looking directly at the camera changes the relationship of the subjective and objective perceptions, "shifting" them. She

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<sup>130</sup>Deleuze, *MI*, p74.

<sup>131</sup>D&G, *TP*, p3-28.



becomes the 'subject' and the camera's status as an 'object' is revealed in the reversal of glances. Hence, there is now a subject/object on both sides of the relationship between the perceiver (the 'eye' of the camera) and the perceived (on screen). In this instance subjectivity and objectivity have been set in 'process' and shatter the usually fixed categories of “objects” and “subjects” to produce a “reversal.” As Kristeva writes, in the poetic subjectivity (and objectivity) are placed “in *process*, making the moment of reading one in which meanings are *set in play* rather than consolidated or fixed.”<sup>132</sup>

As the perception-image is replaced by an affection-image (which Deleuze significantly links to “expression” and the “face”) and the subjective and objective change places I am reminded that the 'eye' of the film is not just *thinking* the images in a certain way (histoire, discourse, semi-subjective, free-indirect) but is also *existentially* present to the seen/scene. Joanna's films foreground the embodied existence of the camera, regardless of the modes of perception. In this moment of reversal I experience another kind of “time-image.” This time-image renders the perception as “a stranded eyeball,”<sup>133</sup> as an “empowered eye.”<sup>134</sup> Deleuze writes that certain time-images may indicate the “genesis of an unknown body”<sup>135</sup> and that the affection-image is a mode of “becoming” which has transformative powers.<sup>136</sup> Hence, I argue that the “eye” of the film is a “genesis of an unknown body” which “becomes” the woman who looks at it. In this moment I (the spectator) become the woman also, and find myself looking at the house from her perspective, seeing things as a mother might, thinking (as much as is possible) her thoughts. In terms of Mulvey's critique of the dominant cinema's “male centred perspective” my “becoming female” through the 'eye' of the camera is politically (and personally) significant. Joanna's films 'change' me, rather than 'fix' me. I am opened, rather than closed.

Here I would like to draw on Vivian Sobchack's work, as Marks does, to thicken Deleuze's concepts. Sobchack, referring to Maurice Merleau-Ponty,

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132Kuhn, p12. Kuhn cites Helene Cixous (1980) and Julia Kristeva (1975). My italics.

133Deleuze, in Marks, *SoF*, p42.

134Marks, *SoF*, p19.

135Deleuze, *The Time-Image*, in Marks, *SoF*, p127.

136Marks, *SoT*, p196-7.

describes a movement between subjectivity and objectivity (a “reversal”) which allows them to change places and interact with each other, much as I have described above. Classically, our perception is thought of as “subjective,” as partial, and therefore limiting. Going back to Rene Descartes' philosophy the notion of subjectivity (in the West) has been perceived as cutting us off from “objective” world (because I experience *everything* through the senses, which are subjective by their very nature, I cannot know the outer world as objective). However, in Merleau-Ponty's analysis when someone looks us in the eye there is an exchange of “subject” and “object.” In seeing someone see us, we finally SEE that we are *both* subject *and* object, rather than a “unified subject.”<sup>137</sup> When I see someone looking at me I realise that, for them, I am part of the objective world, and hence I have genuine knowledge of this object, *for I am the objective*. This is what Merleau-Ponty calls “intersubjectivity.”<sup>138</sup> Intersubjectivity involves at least “two subjectivities properly speaking, two subjects each of which has its own first person existence,”<sup>139</sup> in which subjectivity and objectivity are superimposed, and entangled “one in the other,”<sup>140</sup> forming “a *single system*”<sup>141</sup> of intersubjectivity.

One form of “intersubjectivity” is foregrounded in Joanna's films through the “signed” relations of looking and the use of 'free-indirect-discourse'. This intersubjectivity is not Sobchack's concern however. For Sobchack it is the intersubjectivity of the film and the spectator which grounds an existential phenomenology of cinema. For Sobchack, one may choose to experience all films as a perpetual “time-image,” in which the perception continually *expresses a stranded eyeball*. Every film *perceives*, regardless of how it chooses to “think” this perception. For Deleuze the screen is a “brain” which “thinks” images.<sup>142</sup> For Sobchack the screen is an “eye” which “lives” images, and *expresses* a “body” which we, as spectators, “wear” intersubjectively. Very crudely, if the film is a big

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137The 'universal subject' “symbolically and politically represent[s] the interests and ideals of a highly privileged and determinate community of (usually) men.” (Moscovici, p3)

138Gary Brent Madison, *The Phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty* (Ohio University Press, 1981) p37-45.

139Madison, p41.

140Merleau-Ponty, in Madison, p40.

141Madison, p40.

142As Deleuze writes, “The brain is the screen... Cinema isn't theatre, rather it makes bodies out of the grains.” Deleuze, “The Brain is the Screen: An Interview with Gilles Deleuze,” in Gregory Flaxman (ed.), *The Brain is the Screen* (University of Minnesota Press, 2000) p366. These “bodies out of grains” are significant in terms of the “unknown bodies” I analyse in the first chapter and the “grains” I analyse in the second.

'eye' (visibly perceived through) then it also implicates a big 'body' (invisibly expressed) which we, as the audience, experience with our bodies (intersubjectively). As Sobchack writes, “Thus, Merleau-Ponty's primacy of perception is always also a primacy of expression, the latter articulated as the visible gesture of the former,” and therefore “every lived body [here, a film's body] is both the subject of perception and expression and an object for perception and expression in a simultaneous subjective and objective modality.”<sup>143</sup>

However, Sobchack argues that a film cannot *intentionally* express its own existential presence, and maintains that this is a freedom which belongs to the spectator alone. I would argue that “intercultural cinema” constantly expresses its own bodily presence, forming an “intersubjective machine” foregrounding “perception” as an ongoing *process*, which never completely closes, or fixes the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity for the spectator. Perception, intersubjectivity, and the “film's body” are the subjects of the first chapter of this thesis, which seeks to explore the way in which Deleuze's “film brain” might “think” its own intersubjective “body.”

Gene Youngblood gives another interesting take on this same problem, applied directly to experimental cinema. What could be interpreted as a cinematic example of Merleau-Ponty's 'intersubjectivity' is described by Youngblood as “Synaesthetic Cinema” in which there is the “simultaneous perception of harmonic opposites.”<sup>144</sup> This amounts to the perception of space and time as a “space-time continuum. It is neither subjective, [or] objective... but rather all these combined.”<sup>145</sup> Synaesthetic cinema does not use traditional dualisms, such as 'he and she' or 'I and you', operating instead on a new logic of “*both/and*,” which in physics is called triadic logic,<sup>146</sup> breaking down traditional notions of succession, observing the *superimposition* of particles in space and the *entanglement* of particles in time, in which “the subjective and objective are one.”<sup>147</sup> Drawing on Buddhism, quantum physics and Michael Snow's *Wavelength*, Youngblood

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143Vivian Sobchack, *The Address of the Eye [AoE]* (Princeton University Press, 1992) p41.

144Youngblood, p81.

145Youngblood, p81.

146Youngblood, p81-2.

147Youngblood, p46.

describes “Synaesthetic Cinema” as a process of perceiving without “‘meaning’ in the conventional sense. Its meaning is the relationship between film and viewer. We are interested in what it *does*, rather than what it *is*... The confrontation of art and spectator, and the spectator's resultant self-perception, is an *experience* rather than a meaning... [which] replaces object-consciousness with metaphysical relation-consciousness... romance is born in the space between events.”<sup>148</sup>

I would argue then, that Joanna's films have not only a 'body', a “‘point of view upon the world,’”<sup>149</sup> but also have (through being *self-conscious* of its viewing position as an 'I/eye' and 'body') a 'mind' which itself thinks about the act of perceiving images in general. This argument is put forward by Bruce Kawin in *Mindscreen*, who writes that “it is possible to encode the image in such a way that it gives the impression of being perceived by a consciousness.”<sup>150</sup> He goes on to write, “Self-consciousness most often expresses itself through mindscreens, characterising the aural and visual fields as those of *its own* mentation.”<sup>151</sup> Thus, through seeing itself as a film, Joanna's films *think* about themselves, or have a *mind*. And as I am given the silence to contemplate this consciousness as it 'thinks' about its own manner of perceiving the world (perception-images), I am entwined in the 'flesh' of the film's thought (affection-images). *Perception reverses into expression*. I think *with* Joanna's films, perhaps even *as* them, questioning my previous assumptions about the manner in which I have come to act toward cinema. As Merleau-Ponty writes, “this new reversibility and the emergence of the flesh as expression are the point of insertion of... *thinking in the world of silence*.”<sup>152</sup>

*Or*: On the one hand Joanna's films foreground the process of “‘perception,”” the first register of Deleuze's “movement-images,” and Sobchack's intersubjective “film body.” On the other hand Joanna's films also foreground each image's *fragmented* nature as “affection-images” and belong equally to what Deleuze calls the “any-space-whatever” (a special case of the affection-image). An “any-space-whatever” is firstly a space which foregrounds the essentially fragmented nature of

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148Youngblood, p126-7.

149Sobchack, *AoE*, p39.

150Kawin, pxi.

151Kawin, p19.

152Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible* (Northwestern University Press, 1968) p144-5. My italics.

film and, in its most extreme forms, rejects linear narrative altogether. An any-space-whatever not only foregrounds fragmentation, but also the “emptiness” of spatial organisation.<sup>153</sup> Once emptied this “space” then fills with shadows, lights, greys (and then colours). Affection-images (or “affects,” as Deleuze affectionately refers to them) designate the realm of the close-up and in particular the close-up of the “face” (though it can equally refer to objects). The cliché affection-image is constructed so that we do not notice the transition from perception to affection, from the longer-shot to the close-up. The poetic affection-image foregrounds the (essentially) fragmented nature of film, and draws the eye away from 'representation', delving into the 'abstract' recesses of the “film's mind” and “thought” (*philosophy*).

The second chapter of this thesis looks at Joanna's films from the perspective of the “any-space-whatever” and the foregrounding of “fragmentation,” “emptiness,” and “shadows.” This, I will argue, when interwoven with Sobchack's notion of the “film body,” produces what Deleuze and Guattari call a “Body without Organs” (a “BwO”), or in this case, a “film's BwO.” Bodies have two ways of being “organised” according to Deleuze and Guattari. Firstly we are organised according to our “desires,” which are prepared by capitalism. When I go to the shop and buy food this food was prepared for me, and I am pre-organised to consume it. Everything I consume is prepared for me, and “subjects” me to the processes of mass-consumption. The organised body is a “consumer,” a body organised to desire commodity.

The BwO refers to bodies which organise themselves differently from those modes of organisation which help the “state” (of capitalism) to “function” successfully in terms of “meaning.” The BwO is opposed to all state (static) “organisation”<sup>154</sup> and all fixed philosophical systems.<sup>155</sup> The BwO is an assemblage (of fragments) rather than a narrative.<sup>156</sup> It is a “rhizome” of “becomings” populated by “multiplicities” (rather than a “narrative” of “beings” populated by “unities”). There are a vast number of tendencies and terms which lead to the construction of a

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153Or of the film-body's “organs.”

154D&G, *TP*, p175.

155One does not produce systems, but free-floating, useful concepts (a *toolbox*).

156D&G, *TP*, p179.

“full body without organs,” some of which I will discuss in the body of this essay (and some which I will not). The BwO, like the any-space-whatever, is “emptied” and then “filled” with intensities (lights/shadows). In one sense the BwO refers to those bodies which the state defines as “mad” or “insane” and in other senses it refers to any bodily experiences which are not limited to pre-organised mass-consumption. Meditation, creating art, flower arranging, rock-climbing, philosophy, poetry – all these (and many other practices) may bring the consciousness and body of a person closer to their BwO, to an experience of the body as pure “intensities.” The BwO is that which interweaves “free-indirect-discourse” (an “act of perception”) and an “any-space-whatever” together, occurring in the “gap” (or “chiasm”) between them.<sup>157</sup>

*Both/And:* Firstly, in clichéd movement-image cinema the “perception-image” is dominantly 'histoire' and avoids poetics. Secondly, close-ups, or “affection-images,” are not used to accentuate fragmentation, but to convey character's thoughts through a facial expression. Drawing on C.S. Peirce's taxonomy of signs, Deleuze indicates that these images work in cycles within narrative. In a scene, for example, we pass from the character perceiving (objective perception-image), to the object/subject they see (subjective perception-image), to a close-up of the “face,” which suggests the characters internal feelings and thoughts toward what they have seen (affection-image). Then they perform an “action” (the action-image).

In clichéd movement-images this same structure is also repeated at the level of the story structure: the hero sees a problem (in a disaster movie: the hero sees the impending disaster) and then *thinks* of a way to solve the problem (the affect-image: how can I save myself, and as many people as possible in the *face* of such a disaster?). These two images, “perception” and “affection,” are then sutured together with an expected, clichéd, predictable, and hegemonic “action-image” (the hero saves the day). In the clichéd “action movie” don't we all already know the hero will succeed? In the clichéd “romance film” don't we already know the lead couple will wind up together at the end? Isn't everything already known from the opening

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<sup>157</sup>There is an “*actuality of perception*, a “zeroity” in the order of the deduction of signs and images... It signals a kind of body without organs.” Peter Canning, “The Imagination of Immanence,” in Flaxman (ed.), p339-40.

shots which establish our hero, and “his” goal? These are “action-images,” images which affirm expectations of the “narrative.” Art-cinema, experimental-cinema and the avant-garde do not produce cohesive narratives. They cease the development of clichéd “action-images” in order to return to seeing anew (to finally SEE). As action is suspended the spectator enters the “any-space-whatever.”

Joanna's “action-images” do not come at the end of watching her films, but in watching them again. In re-watching them I find my mind emptied of all the things I had experienced thinking “through” Joanna's 'visual philosophy' in terms of perceptions and affections. Exhausted, I let the images wash over me and I begin to fill with brief, but very real “haptic-images” or “cinesthetics.”<sup>158</sup> As Marks writes of intercultural cinema, “though it only directly engages two senses, [it may] activate... a memory that necessarily involves all the senses.”<sup>159</sup> This might involve the eyes transmitting a “sense that functions like the sense of touch”<sup>160</sup> to the body. Similarly we might smell, taste and (in the case of silent films, such as Joanna's) hear the films. Joanna's images inspired my eyes and body to create the un-smelled, the un-tasted, the un-touched, the un-heard in my body as an experience of smell, taste and touch. Haptic-images, I argue, constitute the “poetic register” of the action-image, just as free-indirect-discourse and any-space-whatevers are the poetic registers of, respectively, perception and affection-images. The third chapter of this thesis will discuss these “haptic-action-images.”

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The three chapters which make up the body of the thesis, as I have indicated, are organised around the “Perception,” “Affection” and “Action” of the “film's body” on my “body” as a spectator and the “bodies” on screen. This “poetics of bodies” is particularly relevant to Joanna's feminist practices, forming an intercultural weave between her status as a woman in the 1970s and the body of the “male-centric” state in which she lived. Her films, poems, paintings, and writings, all draw on Buddhist, Taoist, and more generally, Chinese and Japanese

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<sup>158</sup>My body-without-organs is emptied and then filled.

<sup>159</sup>Marks, *SoF*, p22.

<sup>160</sup>Marks, *SoF*, p22.

aesthetic and religious regimes of knowledge, which I find illuminating in discussions surrounding intersubjectivity, becoming, fragmentation, emptiness and action. These are concepts which have been central to Buddhist and Taoist thought for many centuries (though many of them are relatively new in Western philosophical systems). Joanna's work, as a Catholic New Zealander, draws on her understanding of Japanese and Chinese art, without seeking to *represent* (and potentially mis-represent) these cultures *as* images. Rather, Joanna's collected works echo the “structures” and “aesthetics” of Chinese and Japanese poetry and painting.

As Anne Kirker writes of Joanna's painting and poetry, “Common to both idioms is a haiku-like sense of the power of a single moment or thought quintessentially stated.”<sup>161</sup> The haiku poem has many points of comparison to experimental art and intercultural cinema in the West. The haiku is often comprised of fragmented words, and relies on the spectator to *complete* the poem.<sup>162</sup> More significant to this study is that Joanna's films seem to mimic the structure of the haiku almost exactly (which Deleuze and Guattari align with “rhizomes” and the “BwO”). Furthermore, to become a BwO in 'writing' is to begin to cross wires everywhere: to find structural connections between different cultural regimes of knowledge and to offer ways out of the text at every point. Hence, although it may seem strange to draw on a literary device when looking at the practice of experimental film, I feel that by describing how to write “haiku” within this essay, I become an “author as producer” myself, encouraging you, the spectator, to gain the necessary knowledge to write your own haiku, to exit this text and begin your own intercultural creative journeys.

In light of this, in the first chapter I will draw extensively on the “haiku” poetic structure to 'open' my Deleuzian reading of perception-images in Joanna's films. In the second chapter I will draw on the Dali Lama's concept of “emptiness as a field of compassion” and the yin-yang to accompany Deleuze's “any-space-whatever.” In the third chapter I will draw briefly on the notion of action-through-inaction, central to Buddhist and Taoist understandings of the “body” (with

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<sup>161</sup>Kirker, p200.

<sup>162</sup>Harold Henderson, *An Introduction to Haiku* (Doubleday Anchor, 1958) p3.



similarities to the “body-without-organs”). At the end of the third chapter there is one final development. Once the images have produced “synaesthetic,” or “haptic images” in my process of viewing, I leave the films. After “time” images begin to return to me, but not as visual images. *Words* begin returning to me (loosely) in the form of haiku poems. *I become a poet*. These words, which have previously been fixed to the striated space of organised lines smooth into rounds, curves and water falls –

As with Deleuze's toolbox method these terms are meant to provide leaping off points from the text, moments of intertextuality which may remain unresolved, like loose threads. These threads are not “unfinished” but are intended to create a fine tapestry which can be woven not only in the words that I have chosen to say, but also in the vast amount of ideas I have had to discard. I attempt to use terms not as end-points, but like Deleuze, “as effects that traverse their analyses, generating ever new effects, as points of reference indeed, but also as points of intensity and signs pointing a way out: *points-signs* that offer a multiplicity of solutions and a variety of directions for a new style of politics.”<sup>163</sup> And, hopefully, a new style of “poetics.”

In returning me to poetic “movement-images,” to the “site” of cinema, from the perspective of “time-images,” Joanna's films take me on a journey through the anatomy of a “film body,” building the film body part by part. First I build the 'eye' of the body, and begin to *perceive*. This perception then expresses its embodied nature, suggesting there is a fully functional “film body” which lives the eye's perceptions (this is the subject of chapter one, “Perceptions”). This body is not “organised,” but disconnected and fragmented in the any-space-whatever, which produces a space for the “spirit” of cinema to arise (this is the subject of chapter two, “Affections”). Finally this body, my body, as the spectator, begins to produce experience from within, in the form of “sensations” and “words” (which is the subject of chapter three, “Actions”). “Perceptions” and “Affections” take the 'language' of film to its limits, to the edges of what can be said with words. Joanna's films, after all, are *moving images*, not words. As I attempt to get closer and close to Joanna's films with my words (this essay) I find language itself is exhausted, that

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163Seem, *Anti-Oedipus*, pxxi.

it is missing expressions and lacks terms for describing certain kinds of experiences; especially those which relate to minority regimes of knowledge not easily categorised within dominant culture.<sup>164</sup> As Adrienne Rich writes, “Whatever is unnamed, undepicted in images, whatever is omitted from biography, censored in collections of letters, whatever is misnamed as something else, made difficult-to-come-by, whatever is buried in the memory by the collapse of meaning under an inadequate or lying language – this will become not merely unspoken, but unspeakable.”<sup>165</sup>

This thesis is, finally, not an archaeology, or a phenomenology, strictly speaking, but a “nomadology,” or a “noology” (another of Deleuze and Guattari's terms used to describe the process of becoming a BwO). Each stage in this process they call a “plateau” and each plateau introduces a plethora of new terms and concepts which populate it (what they call *packs*, or *bands*). As with Benjamin's “author as producer” nomad-art is “irreducible to the State apparatus” and is therefore “outside its sovereignty.”<sup>166</sup> Nomadic art does not produce a 'unified subject' (either in terms of characters *in* the work, or spectators *of* the work) but a “pure and immeasurable multiplicity,” just as Joanna's works produce thousands of tiny fragments, which refuse to merge into a 'preformed' meaning. Rather than producing a uniform 'bond' and then “implementing [fixed] binary distributions between states,” nomadic art *unties the bond* and “sees all things in relations of *becoming... [particularly] a becoming-woman.*”<sup>167</sup> Just as Mulvey argues that 'mainstream' cinema addresses us as 'males', Deleuze and Guattari suggest (like Foucault) that society in general positions us as 'white, male, heterosexual consumers' (*majority rules*).

This is why there is no “becoming-man,”<sup>168</sup> for we have all already become “men” by growing up in the modern capitalist state, subjected to a 'position' predetermined by our current “state philosophy.” Feminist thinkers have further linked 'masculine' thought to 'unity' and Aristotelian 'ontology' (a theory of an

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164“Intercultural cinema appeals to the limits of naming... and this is where it is most transformative.” Marks, *SoF*, p21.

165B. Ruby Rich, “In the Name of Feminist Film Criticism” (1978) in Patricia Erens (ed.), *Issues in Feminist Film Criticism* (Indiana University Press, 1990) p268.

166D&G, *TP*, p388.

167D&G, *TP*, p388.

168D&G, *TP*, p320.

'absolute unity' among all things 'being'). As Kuhn writes, “[Luce] Irigaray... argues on behalf of a feminine language which operates outside the bounds of an 'Aristotelian type of logic' which she sees as informing masculine logic.”<sup>169</sup>

Deleuze, after Henri Bergson, develops a philosophy of 'becoming' (rather than being). Nothing is ever 'being', for 'being' implies a *fixed state*. Being, as a theory, “functions” but it does not produce anything *new*. Deleuze suggests we look at the world in its endless becoming – *without stopping*. As Deleuze and Guattari write, “man is majoritarian par excellence, whereas becomings are minoritarian... women, children, but also animals, plants and molecules, are minoritarian.”<sup>170</sup> In Joanna's films these are the multiplicities that populate the images: women, children, but also plants, and animals, and shots which abstract the visual world and produce particles which look like molecules, and cells, and atoms. I argue that Joanna's films are sites/sights for a series of different “becomings” from mothers doing laundry, to children drawing pictures, to Joanna's friends playing on the swings, to dogs, and bees, to shadows, lights, atoms, waves, intensities – to the film itself.

As Vivian Sobchack writes, “I want to begin again. That is, I want to mistrust what has become a certain ground, the premises, of contemporary film theory”<sup>171</sup> and to “restore... to reflection about cinema the existential experience of the medium's *openness* and the spectator's *freedom*.”<sup>172</sup> Though Sobchack does this largely through the classical cinema, in which the phenomenological experience must be done 'after the fact' Joanna's films (and intercultural cinema) invite us to do this *here and now*, displaying directly cinema's 'openness' and my 'freedom'. Sobchack calls for the freedom of the audience member, which I support wholeheartedly. I am simply asking if there are times when the author exerts this same freedom as a social, political and textual choice.

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169Kuhn, p11.

170D&G, *TP*, p321.

171Sobchack, *AoE*, pxvi.

172Sobchack, *AoE*, pxviii. My italics.

*Chapter 0*  
*Perceptions*  
*(of an unknown body)*



*Fig. 2. Swings [film still]*  
(dir. Joanna Paul, super8mm, 1972)



## 0. The Poetry of *Movement*

“The *subjectivity* of my poetry... resists the eye of the camera... I dislike the *objectivity* of the camera”<sup>173</sup>

“I also enjoy the abstraction possible with the camera, movie or still & the gter resistance to the purely *subjective* offered thru that lens.”<sup>174</sup>

“By a continual *interchange* invest the I (eye) with isolation.”<sup>175</sup>

“By constantly changing one's lens, one sharpens awareness of the given medium; medium becomes subject.”<sup>176</sup>

“A vision of space might be, indeed, a vision of vision, as seeing as Other.”<sup>177</sup>

0) In this chapter I intend to unfold the various “attentive perception-images” within Joanna's films. I have suggested that Joanna's films initially foreground a kind of “time-image” in which I find my “attentive recognition” directed toward *perception* itself and the various modes in which cinema 'thinks' through perception, in terms of Deleuze's analysis of “movement-images.” What does this mean practically? Deleuze writes that, in the first place “perception [is] double, or rather ha[s] a double reference. It can be objective or subjective. But the difficulty lies in knowing how an objective perception-image and a subjective perception-image are presented in the cinema. What distinguishes them?”<sup>178</sup> Crudely, an objective perception-image can be defined as an image which “remains

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173Paul, in O'Brien, p69. My italics.

174Paul, in Evans, Lonie & Lloyd (ed.), p97. My italics.

175Paul, *NPL*, p2. My italics.

176Paul, “Shibusha,” p10.

177Alexander Greenhough, *Hereness and Thereeness: On the Structures of Cinematic Space* (MA Thesis, Emory University, 2005) p97.

178Deleuze, *MI*, p71.

external to [the] set,” in the third-person. A subjective-image is an optical 'point-of-view' in which we see the diegetic world from the perspective of a character “who forms part of that set.”<sup>179</sup> As I have said, classically, these demarcate the distinction between *histoire* (objective) and *discours* (subjective) as discursive practices and form the beginning of a cinematic “archaeology” (an investigation into the subject-positions assigned to me in the act of spectating).

1) A third of Joanna's films are, after my initial watching, “subjective,” in the sense that the view forms a part of the set of things seen. For a film to be subjective the perception must be acknowledged as *present* to the set it is filming, indicated firstly by the movement of the “camera eye” and secondly, by characters *in the film* looking directly at the “camera eye.” Joanna's subjective films not only 'think' from a subjective position, but also foreground these “rules,” providing me a site in which to dig up subjective traces, foregrounding the mindscreen.

2) Three of Joanna's films are, initially, shot in the “objective” style and construct the perceiver as “absent” to the “set.” As with subjectivity, this “mode”<sup>180</sup> of perception is *accentuated* in Joanna's objective films through reference to the rules and codes of “histoire” (the camera is still and foregrounded as *invisible* to the characters, for instance).

3) Deleuze adds a third mode of perception, as I have said, called 'semi-subjectivity', to which half of Joanna's films belong. In order for a film to 'think' in terms of subjectivity, or objectivity, there must be *people* within the frame. Without a person/character in the frame (who may potentially look at the camera) I cannot decide if the perception is definitively “within the set” (*discours*) or “outside the set” (*histoire*). It is both semi-subjective and semi-objective simultaneously. It is 'open' to interpretation.

4) Central to all three modes of perception in Joanna's films is the visibility of the “frame” in relation to what it frames; of the viewing-view's (real) limits, in relation to the viewed-views potential to “become visible.” Each film foregrounds *one* of the three dominant cinematic subject-positions, as if Joanna had made these films to illustrate the film's thoughts on *perception itself*, as well as that which the

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<sup>179</sup>Deleuze, *MI*, p71.

<sup>180</sup>We will remember that these kinds of “rules” (the available subject-positions from which to construct meaning) belong to the *fourth* category of Foucault's author function, my “modes of being” toward the text.

perception sees. As Ian Wedde writes of Joanna's works, "their detail, scale, relationship, sequence, and duration might disclose ways of *thinking* rather than merely ways of *representing* a result, an out-there."<sup>181</sup> These thoughts are, in Joanna's films, "archaeological" (concerned with the visibility of subject-positions). As Marks notes, many intercultural films are visual forms of "archaeology," dedicated to digging through the previously buried layers of private histories (often conflicting with official histories).<sup>182</sup> Over the course of watching Joanna's films I felt I couldn't help but become very "attentive" to her systematic use of cinematic "subject positions," as if the "set" of films were a kind of silent, poetic, *visual-philosophy*: a filmic research site in which to dig up cinematic discursive practices.

Deleuze, however, describes these first "words" of cinema (the perception-image, analogous to the linguistic "noun," to a basic "naming" function) as "purely nominal, negative, and provisional."<sup>183</sup> The cinema is really a perception (the "camera eye") framing another perception (a character in the frame). As I have said this is what Deleuze describes as "free-indirect-discourse," a term borrowed from Pier Paolo Pasolini.<sup>184</sup> Deleuze argues that free-indirect-discourse is the combination of "what is seen" (within the frame) and the "way in which it is seen" (the framing, as a thought of the screen/brain) which together creates a "look" of things, a "style," a "poetics" of the moving image. As Catherine J. Bisley writes, seeming to echo Deleuze's thoughts, Joanna "repeatedly iterates the importance of the frame... [Tony] Bellette comments that "The relationship between Joanna Paul's poems and paintings is best seen in this process of transference and reorganisation of objects, or words"... the frame creates meaning by showing these relationships."<sup>185</sup>

I have suggested that there are two kinds of films: those that do not make us aware of free-indirect-discourse (classical movement-images) and those that do (*poetry of cinema*).<sup>186</sup> As Deleuze writes, "we can see images in the cinema which claim to be objective or subjective – but here something else is at stake: it is a case

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181 Ian Wedde, "Rain on the Hills," in Budgen, Donson & O'Brien (ed.), p17.

182 Marks, *SoF*, p28.

183 Deleuze, *MI*, p71.

184 Deleuze, *MI*, p72.

185 Catherine J. Bisley, *The Poetry of Joanna Margaret Paul* (Research Essay, Victoria University, 2006) p3-4.

186 Deleuze, *MI*, p74.



of going beyond the subjective and the objective toward a pure Form which sets itself up as an autonomous vision of the content.”<sup>187</sup> Joanna's films make me aware of this “autonomous vision” which both lives its vision *existentially* and 'thinks' in terms of subjectivity and objectivity. I perceive not only the “objects” (or “nouns”) *in* the frame, but also the “frame” itself (not unlike a “pro-noun,” or “before noun”).<sup>188</sup> For example, in *Jillian Dressing*, one of Joanna's “objective” films, I am not only aware of Jillian dressing, but the fact that the camera addresses her as “she” (in the third-person). In *Bosshard's House* the camera does not address people in the third-person, but as friends, as “subjective,” and personally meaningful “yous.”<sup>189</sup> By isolating each mode of perception I am made aware not only of *what* I see, but importantly, *how* this given perception got to be here. The “frame of the screen” becomes, in Deleuze's terms, the “brain of the screen,” no longer simply a window to look through, but a mind which “thinks” objects (as objective, subjective or 'open') *before* us.

As Deleuze writes, “A [thing/person] is on the screen, and is assumed to see [or be in] the world in a certain way. But simultaneously the camera sees [it/them]... from another point of view which *thinks*, reflects and transforms the viewpoint of the character.”<sup>190</sup> As Bisley writes, often the “object is coloured by Paul's subjective aesthetic.”<sup>191</sup> Equally I find that “subjects” are coloured by Joanna's “objective” aesthetic (in those films with objective “frames”) and that semi-objects/semi-subjects are coloured by her semi-subjective/objective aesthetic (in those films which are 'free' from the perception of others).

In this way Joanna's films return me to the most primal “sign” of cinema: *perception*. I return to the cinema's very first words: I perceive (*eye see*).<sup>192</sup> In this I

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187Deleuze, *MI*, p74.

188Deleuze, *MI*, p59. Deleuze compares the perception-image to a “noun” in terms of its function in the filmic statement (in that it names/sees an “object”). I would argue that a film which foregrounds the act of perceiving the noun (a self-conscious free-indirect-discourse) constitutes a “pronoun.”

189Significantly, the term “you's” is considered grammatically incorrect in English. However, without a plural to “you” there is no way to speak of the camera's multiplicitous subjective address (in that it looks at everyone equally in a frame, addressing “you's”). In order to describe Joanna's films with words it is often necessary to distort grammatically “correct” language.

190Deleuze, *MI*, p74.

191Bisley, p4.

192As Tom Gunning writes of early (pre-1906) cinema, the “primal scene” of the film's eye: “Its unique power was a 'matter of *making images seen*,'” rather than preparing the “scene” for narrative. Gunning, “The Cinema of Attractions: Early Film, Its Spectator and the Avant-Garde,” in Thomas Elsaesser (ed.) *Early Cinema* (Routledge, 1990) p56.

find “poetry,” as Pasolini says. But what *kind* of poetry? In words there are many ways to make a poem, and to “frame” the poetic image. I would suggest that Joanna's films are structured like a Japanese “haiku” poem. There are many similarities between the haiku and Joanna's films, as I began to discuss in the introduction. Haiku are usually about simple, everyday subject-matter (trees, gardens, animals...) just as Joanna's films are. They are also comprised of a minimum vocabulary, reducing the image to its bare necessities, to nothing but a “trace.” Like intercultural cinema, and the ‘poetic image’ (as Bachelard, and Kristeva define it) in general, the haiku uses the “*power of suggestion*”<sup>193</sup> to reach beyond what is written on the page (the *representational meaning* of words). As Harold Henderson writes, “only the outlines... are drawn, and the rest the readers must fill in for themselves.”<sup>194</sup>

By making the haiku extremely simply it is able to be “read” by anyone, without any specialist knowledge. It is not a “time-image” but a “movement-image.” However, after multiple readings you may begin to notice the poem can be read in an entirely different way, or perhaps even three or four different ways. It is for this reason that haiku reading itself is an art, a “knowledge” transmitted in repeated readings of the poem.<sup>195</sup> The haiku has no fixed meaning. It suggests a number of entry points into producing meaning for yourself. Within these unfoldings of meanings, I find another kind of time-image, arising out of the foregrounded movement-image, a kind of time-image which addresses the spectator's “perception” directly. This is achieved through the use of a number of special terms, such as “cut-words,” “pillow-words,” and, particularly, “pivot-words.”<sup>196</sup>

Deleuze and Guattari call these complexes “floating lines.”<sup>197</sup> A “pivot-word” (or line) is a word that can be read in many different contexts within the

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193Henderson, p2.

194Henderson, p3.

195Much as the folds of “origami” leave a “map” of how the object was made.

196Kireji is Japanese for “cut-word.” A cutting-word “has its function dividing the two component elements of a haikai [haiku] verse.” Donald Keene, *World Within Walls* (Grove Press, 1976) p575. “[L]ike *kana*, which usually marks the end of a haiku, and *ya*, which divides a haiku into two parts that are to be equated or compared.” (Henderson, p8)

197D&G, *TP*, p288. Arthur Cooper writes that “This technique... belongs... to all the best poetry in the world.” He adds, however, that the Chinese language (and following on from this logic, the Japanese, whose language has many Chinese influences) is “particularly well suited to it.” Cooper, *Li Po and Tu Fu* (Penguin, 1973) p30.

frame of the poem, foregrounding the multiple meanings of various words and the ways in which words produce meaning. In the Japanese language very few words have a single meaning and their “order of thought is almost the direct opposite from ours.”<sup>198</sup> Every term in Japanese potentially allows for the meaning of the word (and the poem) to literally “pivot.” The way in which *you* stress the words in the series, significantly “shifts” the meanings *you* produce (in accordance with their 'open' structure). In this sense, the haiku poem “folds” into itself, not happening in a “line of action” (from point A to B to C) but as an incomplete list, which (may) awaken my “attentive perception.”<sup>199</sup> In this moment I actively superimpose the “terms” in order to produce meaning for myself, having to draw on my own bodily frame to complete the image. Deleuze and Guattari argue that these kinds of words/lines/shots constitute lines of “becoming.” Take the following “open” haiku poem;

light  
leaves  
grass

At first glance it is a list: light, then leaves, then grass. To read the poem this way I am myself, a person, looking at words. Each word has a single meaning: the word “light” indicates light from the sun, the word leaves “leaves” from a tree, and the word “grass” grass on the ground. I picture it: there is light, and there are leaves, and there is grass. The poem is really just three words. But when I frame it in with “body,” bringing the images together in my “mental landscape,” it *becomes* something. The light becomes *perception* (light enables perception), the tree leaves an *affection* fragmenting the light and the grass the completion of the *action* of the image (the light hits the ground).

Something is missing: a shadow on the grass (of the light coming *through*

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198Henderson, p179.

199“Joanna was a keeper of journals and inventories. (What is her book Unwrapping the Body but a bound, annotated, and illustrated 'list'?). However, there is an important distinction to be made between the impulse to itemise the world and the impulse to commodify it – Joanna's art being an ardent instance of the former and a negation of the later.” Gregory O'Brien, “Always quartettish thoughts,” in Bugden, Donson, and O'Brien, p29.

the leaves). This is the “any-space-whatever.”<sup>200</sup> Then there is a reversal: the grass becomes the *affect/face* covered in shadow, and the leaves a *perception* of the light's *action*. The shadow is entirely a “mental-image” I receive in my mind, not contained on the page. This is *me* completing the image, not only finding a meaning, but learning something of haiku structure as I read. In completing the image I had to interject a number of “frames” to organise the three things. Then they “moved,” and “came to life.” I had to add this movement and invent/create/produce *shadows cast by enlightened leaves on the grass*.

But this is only one way of reading the poem. Perhaps I do not read light as “light” from the sun. What if I read it as “light” weight? Then the leaves are “light” on the air, falling from the tree to the grass below. I imagine falling through the air and the soft touch of the grass. There is a certain sensation of “*becoming leaf*,” while in the last reading I was “*me*” standing nearby perceiving the scene. In this reading the “leaves” also “leave” the tree, before floating to the grass (pivots of poetry always keep folding, unlike “turns” in a plot).<sup>201</sup> But what if I read it as the grass, covered in leaves, heating in the mid-day sun. Do I not *become* grass suddenly, with so many light leaves piled on top of me? Then I imagine me again picking up the leaves: they are a hot pile, the grass steaming underneath. This kind of poetics (irrespective of their medium; film, literature, painting), as Deleuze and Guattari write, create for the spectator a “floating” time of “*becoming*.”<sup>202</sup>

These are just a few of the meanings which can come from the pivot-words “light” and “leaves” and serves to illustrate the ways in which multiple meanings can be made from the one text. In Joanna's films I find exactly the same structure as the haiku. We begin with very simple “perceptions,” which are what Deleuze calls “solid” (in the sense that they resemble objective, subjective and “open” perceptions *solidly*).<sup>203</sup> I am placed in this “solid perception” for most of the film and then, usually in the second half, there is a single-shot which has the effect of a

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200This is expanded on in the next chapter.

201As Bisley notes, “Paul’s “process of vision” is continuous, reflecting Charles Olson’s comment that “one perception must immediately and directly lead to another” (273).” (Bisley, p5)

202D&G, *TP*, p290.

203For Deleuze “solid” perception-images relate to distinctions between subjectivity, objectivity and semi-subjectivity. (*MI*, p71-76) When one of these forms is distinct, there is a solid perception-image: “This is the status of solid, geometric and physical perception.” (*MI*, p217)

“pivot-word” in the haiku, reversing and “shifting” the meaning of early images in the series. In all three modes of film the “pivot-shot” acts as a moment of *intersubjectivity*. In the subjective and objective films this intersubjective moment comes when a character looks directly at the “camera's eye,” or the “camera's eye” is addressed indirectly. In this moment the object/noun and the brain/eye are brought into direct contact and I experience a new “time-image,” inside a “movement-image,” inside a “time-image.” I *become* the body/mind of that which looks at (and affects) me. These kinds of time-images, as Deleuze writes, open onto the “genesis of an unknown body.”<sup>204</sup>

In the subjective and objective films this is not a “film body,” as Sobchack describes it, but *some* body in the film, a “real,” present body housing the perception (a *body house*). These time-images awaken me to the realisation (real-eye-sensation) that this “view” is *really there*, no matter what codes, or signs it is “thinking” the image with. As Sobchack argues, the perception *expresses* the presence of a body which perceives. I would argue that this body (through being perceived itself) expresses “somebody” which the perception is *becoming*. In this moment the objective and subjective change place and perception *reverses* into expression. I go back to the images I have seen before and re-read them from the perspective of this “body.” These images transform the flow of thought into what Deleuze calls “liquid perception.”<sup>205</sup> Liquids flow under the frame and reconnects the disparate parts. Like the any-space-whatever of the affection-image, I would describe this as an “any-perception-whatever”<sup>206</sup> which “opens” the perception onto a “body” in the film. This body I “become” and my perceptions (images/thoughts) take on qualities of that body.

In the “semi-subjective” films I find something slightly different. I find that

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204Deleuze, *The Time-Image*, in Marks, *SoF*, p127.

205For Deleuze “liquid” perception-images refer to the “existential” nature of the “eye” and the potential for a reversal of the subjective and objective poles. As Deleuze writes, liquid perception enables the “possibility of passing from the subjective to the objective pole... the more the privileged centre [the eye] is put into movement.” (*MI*, p76) “The perception of that which crosses the frame or flows out. The liquid status of perception itself.” (*MI*, p217)

206The any-space-whatever is made of “fragments” (affection-images) of space, it foregrounds cinema's essentially fragmented nature. For Deleuze the affection-image and the any-space-whatever are where movement becomes time-image cinema. In the second chapter I will examine Joanna's films as affections and fragments. Here I am suggesting that we begin in perception, in a self-awareness of free-indirect-discourse which “fragments” the layers of the “eye” (what is seen, what sees, how it sees it) into an “any-perception-whatever” (opening perception onto an “unknown body”). There, I begin with affection and fragment the film horizontally (rather than vertically).

the “film's body,” as Sobchack describes it, is foregrounded. As I have said, Sobchack argues that the film's body *cannot* self-consciously see its own framing, its own “mind.” Sobchack writes, “The frame is invisible to the *seeing* [and hence, in Deleuze's term, the *thinking*] that is the film.”<sup>207</sup> The frame is a limit. Joanna's films take me to this limit, continuously drawing my eyes to the “frame” as visible to me (the spectator). In the “open” films I find that the film itself sees its own frames, both in terms of the “frame” around the images and the “frames” in the projector. 1) In Joanna's films shots are constantly overexposed, underexposed, and significantly, *change* exposure mid-shot. When light interferes with the vision of the “film's eye” the eye sees the “frame” expressed as a “limit” of vision (in *light*). Joanna's films produce “light-images” continuously, framing the seen/scene in such a way that I become aware of the choices the “eye” makes in seeing. Frequently the exposure changes mid-shot and light becomes visually palpable. 2) When the eye moves fast, there is a different affect. I start to see the projected “frames” of the film and feel the choices which the “mind” of the film makes in projecting the images back to its self. A camera which is thrown violently this way and that (such as my vision in the “open” films) produces images which are hard for a projector to project. In this moment my attention is shifted from the unity of a frame which *perceives*, to the multiplicity of frames *expressed*. This is not a “representation” of the film-strip (as in many avant-garde films) nor a “representation” of a camera.<sup>208</sup> Joanna's films, through fast movement and use of light create an experience for me (the spectator) which includes the “limits” of the projector and the camera intersubjectively foregrounded. These constitute brief moments in which the “reel” film's body is existentially engaged by the film's intentionality.

In all cases the introduction of an “intersubjective” image (from faces, facings and “unknown bodies,” to the light and movement-images of the “film's body”) is a kind of “affection-image” (a firstness/body which arises from the zero/ground of perception). As the film makes me aware of its “existential vision” through an affection-image, I *become* the body of the film's perception: either an “unknown (virtual) body” or the “film's (reel) body.” Affection is the realm of

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207Sobchack, *AoE*, p131.

208Sobchack discusses the potential for self-reflexivity when the camera sees itself, but never the self-consciousness of a “film's eye” interrogating the limits of cinematic vision.

“becoming” and forges a pathway between the movement-image and the time-image. As Marks writes, “Deleuze translates Peirce's category of Firstness as the affection-image, an image of barely contained feeling or affect. “It is quality or power, it is potentiality considered for itself as expressed.” In the affection-image a becoming-other occurs; for as soon as we have sensation or feeling, we change. Thus, in the affection-image there is an enfolding of perceiving self into perceived world.”<sup>209</sup> In the haiku poem I quoted above, the difference in meanings is then a multiplicity of “bodies” and “becomings.” In one reading I am me watching the leaf, and the grass. In the next image I “become leaf,” falling from the tree, and in the next I “become grass,” leaves piled on top of me. I am folded into the grass and the light. When I become leaf I am folded into the air. In Joanna's films I find a similar experience, each film a series of “becomings,” each becoming initiated by a single shot, like the pivot-word of the haiku. This “shot” is “intersubjective,” and for me “intercultural.” It is a fold of my body and the film's body into one, in which I eventually “become film” itself, becoming “machine.”<sup>210</sup>

“Pivot-shots” (or floating-lines) are one example of the “challenging relationship... in which the act of reading, meanings are grasped as *shifting* and constantly in process.”<sup>211</sup> This is achieved through the use of “intrusions from the 'real world'”<sup>212</sup> and intersubjective “pivots” or “shifts” (firstly in the form of direct/indirect address to the camera and secondly through the breakdown in perception of movement and light). “Pivots” of the first kind open on to an “unknown body” *in the film*, some (real) body. “Pivots” of the second kind refer to the film's (reel) body, an existential film body (as Sobchack describes). The first two sections of this chapter deal with the shift from solid subjectivity to liquid subjectivity/objectivity, and the reverse effect in the objective films. The third section deals with the “shift” to the “film's body” as existentially intentional in its

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209Marks, *SoT*, p196-7.

210As Vivian Sobchack writes, “the film's material body always engages its possibilities as a non-human body... as a cyborg.” (*AoE*, p163) Sobchack is drawing on Donna J. Haraway's notion of the “cyborg” which, as Sean Redmond writes, “heralds its potential to transform identity from one being predicated on essentialised gender roles [particularly the male/female binary] to one that swims in its own liminality.” Redmond, *Liquid Metal: The Science Fiction Reader* (Wallflower Press, 2004) p157. See Haraway, “A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism in the 1980s,” in Redmond, p158-81.

211Kuhn, p12.

212Kuhn, p170.

own right, as an eye/I (a *seer*).<sup>213</sup> The following chapter is therefore broken into three sections: subjective, objective, and 'semi-subjective' (open, or free) perception-images, each detailing the constant process of “building a body.” In conclusion I will discuss the “body-without-organs,” in relation to the “film's body,” arguing that Joanna's films constitute a “film-body-without-organs,” which *empties* itself of representation and approaches the *invisible*, populated only by shadows, whites and greys. In this chapter I approach the *visible*, the “perception-image,” as seeing and being seen (viewing and viewed). In the next chapter I shift my viewing to the invisible and imperceptible. As Marks writes, intercultural cinema often happens in the space “between discourse and the visible, on the one hand, and what is unsayable and unseeable, on the other.”<sup>214</sup> This chapter is about discourse and the visible, while the next is about the unseeable and the unsayable (any-spaces-whatever).

As I have said, there are two ways to read Joanna's films: as “perception-images,” grounded in “movement,” or as “affection-images,” grounded in the “any-space-whatever.” Here, I begin with “movement-images of perception,” not “affection-images in any-spaces-whatever” (where they also belong). Joanna's films return me to “perception” it is true, but another audience member may find a return to “affection,” no less interesting or vital. This chapter, as I have said, will deal with perception-images and subsequent action and affection-images (as they are grounded in perception<sup>215</sup>) which offer me a selection of “unknown bodies” to “become.” These bodies are the bodies specifically of women: I find myself “becoming woman.” This, as I have said, Kuhn calls a “poetic (open) cinema,” a form of “feminine” perception, a relationship between spectator, film and author, in which multiple subjectivities and objectivities (and gradients *between* them) are put into *process*, rather than left standing still.

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213Deleuze refers to characters within “any-spaces-whatever” and “time-image” cinema as “seers,” in that they become existential wanderers, people simply “on the move” (the plot begins to *thin*, rather than *thicken*). In Joanna's films the film's existential body/eye as perceiver (and expresser) is the character who *becomes* a seer, who enters a philosophical “refrain.” Refrains are central to the nervous system of a “body-without-organs” and “rhizome” structures (see D&G, *TP*, p342-86). “So just what is a refrain? *Glass harmonica*: the refrain is a prism, a crystal of space-time. It acts upon that which surrounds it, sound or light, extracting from it various vibrations, or decompositions, projections, or transformations.” (*TP*, p384)

214Marks, *SoT*, p200.

215Rather than any-spaces-whatever (ungrounded affection-images).



### 1. Subjects & Affections

I am watching *Bosshard's House*. It opens with shot of a road. Across the road is a house which I look toward. A car goes past, and then “I” cut to the other side of the road. The camera “walks” up the path, and “looks” around. It angles up to see the top of the house and then moves in close to something on the porch. *Another cut* – “I” am inside the house, looking around empty, shadowy rooms. Each shot feels within the set it films, the viewer making up one of the possible objects in the visible world. These are undoubtedly “subjective” perception-images (this I have processed almost without thinking). But what kind of subjectivity and what kind of perception? Philosophy is riddled with conflicting theories of knowledge, subjectivity and perception. This is what Deleuze has called a philosophical “crisis.” Faced with this “crisis” each philosopher works out their own way of conceiving of knowledge, subjectivity, and perception. The crisis is this: if we are limited to perceptions *of* things, we cannot know things-in-themselves. We are cut off from “objective” knowledge. But, if we ourselves are “objects” (to others), couldn't we approach the outside (objectivity) from the inside (subjectivity)? This is where Deleuze, Foucault, Sobchack, and Merleau-Ponty's thoughts converge: on the inside, which is really the outside (an interiority which positions us exteriorly). Can we not know the outer “objective” world in-ourselves, as our bodies interior exterior? The question then becomes: how do Joanna's (subjective) films *think* their own subjectivity as objectivity? How do they shift from subjectivity into objectivity and thus displace the “metaphysical heritage where “subjectivity” is conceptualised as disembodied, unchanging, masculine and univocal.”<sup>216</sup>

Although relatively simple, the opening shots from *Bosshard's House* contain a large amount of information. Firstly: the perception is on one side of the road, and it *waits*. A car goes past. What does this indicate? That the perception

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216Moscovici, p26.

obeys the “rules” of the society it films. This also indicates that there are “objects” within this perception, “real” objects with “real” effects. The perception waits for the car because the car is *dangerous* to the perception, it is a moving object. Deleuze writes that perception is firstly perception *of* movement in the frame, of objects, or “nouns.” Here I perceive a “noun” in the foreground (the “house”) which suddenly becomes the background, as the car *becomes* the foreground. After the car has passed there is an empty space where the car was, *an emptied foreground*. This foreground seems to vibrate, but before the house has time to reassert its position, I *cut* across the road. This foregrounds the perception of the *camera*, of an “inhuman” perception (which can *cut*). In a single shot (and a cut) I have learned not only that the film is “subjective,” but that it seems to be from a camera's perception, and that it is a real “object” which must wait for other “objects.” Rather than simply perceiving objects, or subjects, I am aware of a “subjective” mindscreen *layered* over “objects” (within this perception). Subjectivity is foregrounded and becomes 'free-indirect-discourse', a camera-consciousness which transforms the seen into a “subjective perception” seeing an “object.” As Deleuze writes, 'free-indirect-discourse' often involves a kind of mise-en-scene which “makes the camera await the entry of a character [or moving object] into the frame... The perception-image finds its status, as free-indirect-subjective, from the moment that it reflects its content in a camera-consciousness which has become autonomous ('cinema of poetry').”<sup>217</sup>

Then the camera “walks up the path.” What does this mean, “walks” up the path? It means I “see” the footsteps of (someone) in the way the frame moves and that this is *accentuated* by the shooting style. I feel the presence of somebody, but not an “unknown body,” or the “film's body.” Combined with the “reality” of the super8 camera and the “realness” of the feet as they step up the path, I begin to read these films as personal, home-movies, as totally “subjective” films, in which Joanna herself is walking around *with a camera*. As Jean Mitry writes, in perceptions “called subjective... The camera advances down the street, I advance with it; it climbs the stairs, I climb with it. I therefore experience, in the moment,

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217Deleuze, *MI*, p74.

the *walking* and the *climbing* or, at least, everything happens as if I did.”<sup>218</sup> Sobchack, citing Don Ihde, describes these effects as “instrument-mediated perception,” in which the “perception” (I watch) is “mediated” by an “instrument” (the camera).<sup>219</sup> Thus, I do not see the world (perception) as the world, but through a “machine,” which changes my “experience” of the world. The machine in *Bosshard's House* not only perceives, but *expresses* (through movements) the *body* which holds the camera and *sees* with it. But these movements do not feel *imitated* (as if it is trying to be a body, like a classical “point-of-view” shot) but clearly “mediated.”<sup>220</sup>

In Joanna's “subjective” films she “sees” the world with a camera attached to her body and I “see” the world through the camera, which expresses both the camera's perception and the bodily movements of Joanna, in the frame. Though this relation is the same for all camera movements, in *Bosshard's House* (and poetic cinema in general) the bodily movements of the camera-operator (who is also the director/producer) are foregrounded. As I move through the world I am constantly aware of the “real” body which holds the camera. I see in the image that a person is walking the camera up the path (it does not walk alone, always in pairs). As it is walked up the path the camera swings from side to side in a “looking” motion. In the swinging of the camera from side to side, looking this way and that (common to all Joanna's “subjective” films) the frame “mediates” Joanna's body with my experience of the perception as a moving-image. Furthermore, in “seeing” footsteps (*expressed*) there is a second object which comes into contact with this body, the pavement, which is transmitted through the *body as mediator*, to the camera (and then to my perception). The “expressed” (Joanna) becomes the “mediator,” and the “mediator” (the camera) becomes an “expression” of the pavement's surface. On the one hand I think of the image as things *in* the frame (the car, the house) and on the other I think of the frame itself, drawn to its subjective, bodily movements, sensing a whole world off-screen which is *altering* the world I see on screen. In terms of Deleuze's free-indirect-discourse we might add a layer. There is an object

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218Mity, in Sobchack, *AoE*, p235.

219Sobchack, *AoE*, p186-187.

220Sobchack gives a long analysis of *Lady of the Lake* in reference to subjective perception (images) which “imitate” a body (“false” or “borrowed” bodies) from the first-person perspective (see *AoE*, p230-48).

(*seen*), and a subjective (*seer*) or “I” (which thinks what is being seen) as Deleuze indicates, but there is also something suggested between them, a relationship between the camera and the body which intertwines them in a “single system” (the intersubjective “eye”).

In the subjective film *Swings* I become aware of this instrument-mediation even more powerfully. The perception-image is “of” friends at a swing and the camera makes it obvious that it is “there.” It stands amongst the friends and takes a turn on the swing. People look at the camera. The camera is not outside the scene (objective) nor “semi-subjective” (a being-*with*, without being *there*) but *is* one of the characters, participating in the event subjectively.<sup>221</sup> As the “eye/I” swings on the swings the frame transmits the movements (the bumps and knocks) of the swing, through Joanna's body, to the camera, to me as perception. But this is not a perception simply of objects, but the objects mediated by a “swinging eye,” which *abstracts* the images. As the shot swings I am taken from one extreme to the other. In the middle the shot blurs and I see an abstract shot (a time-image) but there is no “time” to “contemplate” it. The “time-image” comes to a stop and directly transmits the limits of the swing to to me, gathering energy as it slows down. Then the camera plunges back into an abstract time-image. All this in just mere micro-moments of the film.

As I am placed in a subjective “state of mind,” I turn my “attentive perception” to the *objects* which are framed by this *subjective* mindscreen. I return to *Bosshard's House*. I cut inside the house and see a child's painting, an “object.” This painting is not important to me (the viewer) and neither is it in relation to an action which a subject/character is doing (as objects will be in Joanna's “objective” films). This is simply an object (a noun) and a subjective pronoun (the “eye/I”) looking at the object. Then I cut to an empty dining room: I see a table flanked by empty chairs. I cut around the chairs. Then a clock. Then a series of paintings. The first is *not* by a child (it depicts religious imagery) and the second (of a peacock) I am not sure. The third is completely abstract making it impossible to tell whose painting I am looking at. Finally, I am shown a painted paper-maché mask.

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<sup>221</sup>A semi-subjective camera is not “one” of the characters, but is *with* the world (both there and not there). A kind of anonymous view which moves *among* things. I will discuss semi-subjectivity in reference to “open” perception (see Deleuze, *MI*, p72).

Are these artworks by children or adults? Suddenly I am uncertain and feel that I would not like to comment either way. I think of the first painting: *that might not be a child's painting either*. It may be an artist imitating a child's painting.<sup>222</sup> Why did I feel the need to make the distinction within my description? What did it make you feel about the painting? I want to go back and look at them again. What were simple things have become “time-images,” images which confuse me and make me want to reinvestigate the grounds of my perception (an optical-image). I had perceived the first painting as a child's painting (a noun, plus a description, an adjective, analogous to the affection-image: *childish*). Now I am not so sure. On a second watch I find I cannot be certain if an adult or child did it. I find that I have to take off all descriptions of the “noun” and return to the “paintings” as purely nominal perceptions.<sup>223</sup>

As I watch the images I have seen again I fall into reverie, into a “subjective” time-image, lost in my own thoughts. I notice that each “thing” in the “list” of objects represents Joanna's main aesthetic interests: the “minor” arts (the paintings), emptiness (the house) and time (the clock). Although the shots appear disconnected, I slowly become aware of more subtle connections, in a kind of backward narrative, plotting my movements in reverse, rather than anticipating what is coming ahead of time (the cliché).<sup>224</sup> I notice, for instance, one of the paintings in the background of the shot of the clock. This signals a shift (the clock-face, an affect). In Joanna's “objective” films I (think I) see what is coming ahead of time: the completion of a task. In her subjective films I have no idea. I have approached a house and then come inside to look about. The family doesn't seem to be around (at first).

Then I think of the paintings: 1) Religious iconography, 2) A representational painting, and 3) An abstract painting. In the first the artist uses religious “symbols,” while in the second the artist uses “icons” to produce the likeness of a peacock. In the third painting there is neither a “symbol,” nor an

<sup>222</sup>Or even “becoming child.”

<sup>223</sup>As I have said, Deleuze aligns perception-images with the linguistic “noun.” The “perception of” is a “pro-noun.”

<sup>224</sup>Bisley notes this in Joanna's poetry as well: “In her series each object gathers meanings that colour what is to come, as well as referring back to what has come before: this creates an internally coherent world.” (Bisley, p27) One might call a narrative something which is *externally* coherent (I know the external relations of shots in space and time) while the “poetic” refers to the *internal* relations of a “film-body” (becoming sensible, rather than *being* sensible from the outset).

“icon.” The “abstract” seems to mediate the “symbolic” and the “iconographic,” forming a “liquid” space between them, through which the symbol becomes an icon (and icons become symbols). The abstract is indexical, signifying an existential connection to the painter's hand.<sup>225</sup> The mask is strange however. It both represents both an “icon” for the shape of a head, and is a “symbol” of tribal life. Finally, it is coloured “abstractly” (the index). At the same time it is a real headdress, a covering for the face. The mask is a kind of “zero” which gathers together the other three, just as Deleuze describes “perception” (or “zeroness”). I think of putting the mask on and perceiving through its eyes.

Then there is a shot which breaks me out of these time-images and places me solidly back in the “movement-image.” I see a person *doing* something. This person is hunched over a board in the kitchen cutting bread with a knife. I see them not as “subject” to my perception but as an “object” looked at. Their face is at the edge of the frame and I do not find myself looking at it. Instead I look at the “action” which the body performs in the frame. This is an action-image: *cutting bread*. Watching the person cut bread I mentally hear someone calling out “Come to the table, it's ready” as a pure reflex.<sup>226</sup> In suddenly introducing “life” to the image, everything has come to life. *I hear the unheard*. The action-image produces an action in my mind: a voice, a sound.<sup>227</sup> Then, the other images suddenly connect, weaving a tapestry. The empty-room is the dining-room where they will eat the bread. The clock shows the time (I check: three o'clock, time for afternoon-tea). The paintings show who will be at the table (*both* the children *and* the adults). I realise that so far the house has been empty. Where have the children and adults been? I remember the sunny day outside (which feels so long ago). They must have

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<sup>225</sup>My distinction concerns the difference between symbols and icons (using C.S. Peirce's terms), or relation-images and affection-images (to use Deleuze's terms). The “icon,” properly speaking, is a sign which refers to its object by “resemblance,” while a symbol does so by social “convention” or “law.” Icons and symbols are, in Peirce's terms, examples of firstness and thirdness. Between them is the “index” (secondness) which refers to its object existentially (action-image). By way of example: classical realist paintings use iconic-signs, while symbolist paintings use symbolic-signs (not forgetting that a painting may be both). Peirce gives the example of smoke as an indexical-sign for fire (as the smoke is existentially connected to the fire). I would argue that many abstract paintings, which heighten the materiality of the brush stroke, are indexes (as they existentially index the brush stroke). See Thomas Gouge, *The Thought of C.S. Peirce* (Dover, 1950).

<sup>226</sup>This would not have happened if the film had sound.

<sup>227</sup>This is a point I will return to in the third chapter. When vision produces the other senses (recalling touch, sound, taste and smell) it is called “synaesthesia,” or, in Laura Marks words, “haptic” vision (referring primarily to touch). For now I will leave this thread open, a mere outline.

been in the backyard.<sup>228</sup>

This kind of “action-image” is very different from cliché movement-images, which suggest an action to be accomplished at the outset and then completes this action in the final stages of the film. As I have said, this structure (arguably) constitutes a large portion of classical cinema: an initial “situation” is disrupted, which suggests an “action,” which eventually restores the “situation.”<sup>229</sup> *Task*, one of Joanna's objective films, on a superficial level, illustrates this well. There is washing (the disrupted situation), which leads to the washing being done (the action I see) which restores the state to balance (the washing is done). In *Bosshard's House*, however, the classical “action-image” works in *reverse*. There is not a situation which prepares a predictable action, but an unexpected action which causes the images to make sense *backwards*. As Joanna writes, “And I should like – it's a Maori proverb, to walk backwards into the future.”<sup>230</sup>

While in a time-image (which caused me to think of Joanna's interest in art) I was disrupted by a movement-image (the person cutting bread) which folded outward and unexpectedly connected the images (in a moving-time-image). In this I find a memory-image which is not caused by me needing to “figure out” the images. Instead it is a memory which occurs *once the figuring out is done*. As Laura Marks writes, intercultural cinema provides us the space to call up “associations that are probably somewhat different from the artists' and other viewers' associations with them.”<sup>231</sup> Here, I am strongly reminded of staying at my Nana and Poppa's. We used to go there every holidays. I haven't thought about that in years.

I watch the family eat. This is a “situation” following the “action” of cutting the bread. When they finish eating the “situation” becomes its own “action” (the “action” of eating) which opens onto another “situation” (after lunch: *what will we do?*). Layers of actions and situations interlock, each image in the chain becoming the middle of one action-complex, the end of another and the beginning of their

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228Later, re-watching the opening shots I find a human is just visible beyond the house.

229This is what Deleuze calls the “large form” action-image. (*MI*, p142) As Kuhn writes, “the structure of classical narratives works in such a way that stories are opened by a disruption of some equilibrium... and works towards a resolution of the initial disruption.” (Kuhn, p17)

230Paul and Eagle, p97. My comma.

231Marks, *SoF*, p146.

own, depending on where I start reading the sequence.<sup>232</sup> Again I enter a “recollection-image,” a memory, a “time-image.” The only place I ever ate afternoon-tea was at my Nana and Poppa's house. At their house, no matter what your age, everyone knew the day stopped at 3pm (remember the clock) when it was, as Winnie the Pooh would say, “time for a little smackeral something.”<sup>233</sup>

I remember other images. My Nana would often paint watercolours, their house was full of them, the walls covered in paintings (the paintings!). And their large wooden chairs and tables: how big they seemed when I was younger (I think back to the close-ups of the *emptied* chairs). Because we were usually on holiday, after eating we would sit around in the garden, or on the deck. The adults would drink coffee and the kids would play. As I am thinking this, Joanna's film *shows me these images*. This feels like a traditional action-image all of a sudden: an expected action unfolds. I see the Bosshard family on the grass, relaxing in the sun. I stop watching the film and look out the window. I don't know why. I feel slowed down, like I used to at my Nana and Poppa's. Relaxed in a way my adult life does not allow for. I feel attuned to looking at things differently, everything slightly calmer. *Trees on the other side of the valley quiver in slow motion.*

I look back to the film. At this point the images become more random, like the list I first perceived: there are shots of the family outside, the garden, more images from inside the house, shots of the street outside the house and a workbench. I am thrown into a kind of “time-image” again, in which I am struggling to comprehend the connections. A memory comes: my Poppa had a wood workshop, and my Nana had a vast garden. I think of these in connection to the range of art works I have seen. The workshop is a place of *turning* wood into art, and the garden is another kind of art (where the wood grows). Paintings are done on paper (also made of wood) with colours from within the earth's dirt belly.

But there is another shot which shifts my perception again, this time to an *intersubjective* position. This is the “pivot-shot” of the film, causing a moment not

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<sup>232</sup>This is what D&G call a “rhizome” structure: “Any point of a rhizome can be connected to anything other, and must be. This is very different from the tree or root [classical narrative] which plots a point, fixes an order.” (*TP*, p7) Rhizomes produce multiplicities, rather than unities. (*TP*, p8)

<sup>233A.</sup> A. Milne, “In Which a House is Built at Pooh Corner for Eeyore,” in *The House at Pooh Corner* (1928: Methuen, 1973) p3. A time-image from my childhood.



of memory, but of “becoming.” So far these perceptions have collapsed into time and I have been delving into my memories, remembering my own life (mediated by Joanna's memories). Now, I am in the kitchen with “mother Bosshard” (I assume). While cleaning up she suddenly looks *directly at the camera*. In this moment I perceive a full-blown “affection-image” (a face). As she looks at the camera the “subjective” perception of “objects” (instrument-mediated free-indirect-discourse) reverses. The camera suddenly becomes an “object” *looked at* in the world, and the “object” which I look at, the woman, becomes the *subjectivity* of the film.<sup>234</sup> The eye perceives itself perceived and in this moment *expresses* a body which does this perceiving, which is looked at. As Marks says, “In the affection-image a becoming-other occurs.” I become the mother of the family, “becoming woman” (as Deleuze would say). So far I have been thinking of these objects as “things.” When I look at the house like a mother I find I have a different perspective. However, as I am not a woman, I imagine this is another kind of “time-image” for me. I *cannot* become woman, can I?

I return to the images: I see empty rooms, this time the children's rooms. The camera looks at toys scattered on the ground. Quite by surprise I think to myself: *mess!* This is not a normal “me” thought. Then I see a child on their bed reading. The camera pans to the floor showing the toys lying dormant. I think of my mother: “Pick up that mess Richard!” she would say. Repeatedly I pan from the children to the floor. I become angry at the children, seeing them laying about when there is work to be done. Where is mother? Cleaning up the lunch dishes in the kitchen. I always thought that my mother was annoying, but now that I have become “other” (to myself) I start to feel differently. In the process of “becoming mother” I took on her “body” metaphysically. This is not the “instrument-mediated perception” of subjective perceptions, but a “mentally-mediated perception.” As I “become mother” and begin to look around the house I realise that, to the mother, the house is an extension of her body. She sees the house as related to how she is “seen” as an object. When it is untidy it *reflects* on her.

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<sup>234</sup>Although a look from a person to the camera is common in films (especially in documentaries, self-reflexive fiction and early cinema) the specific effect of foregrounding firstly, objects in the frame as “objects” and secondly, the camera as “subjective,” is rare. It is specifically the foregrounding of ‘free-indirect-discourse’ as objects seen by subjects (and subjects seen by objects) which produces the necessary conditions for the image to become “intersubjective.”

I think of Joanna coming to visit for afternoon tea. Then I think of the/my mother looking at the house before Joanna (and I) arrived. My mum would always have to clean a little before people came over. I never understood it, but now I kinda get it. To my mum the house is an extension of her body (like Joanna's film "body house") and this body is *looked* at by others (what Mulvey calls *scopophilia*).<sup>235</sup> Before people arrive what does my mother feel? *As if the objects of the house look at her*. Deleuze describes two kinds of affection-images: the face, and the object which becomes like a face.<sup>236</sup> Everything in the film turns into a face, thousands of eyes perceiving me (every speck of dust an eye). *Everything is facing me*. When Joanna first came into the house what did she do? She looked around. She may have been looking *subjectively*, but to the mother she perceives *objectively* (the mess). A mother's perspective of the house, I realise, is both "objective" and "subjective" (it is intersubjective). As Marks comments, this has the power to "shift... the hierarchical relationship between subject and object, indeed dissolves the dichotomy between the two, such that erstwhile subjects take on the physical, material qualities of objects, while objects take on the perceptive and knowledgeable qualities of subjects."<sup>237</sup> In Joanna's films the subject (here, the mother) takes on the physical qualities of the house, while objects take on the power to "subject" her to certain feelings of inadequacy or lack in the eyes of (m)others.

But I also think of all the paintings by children I have seen. There is a particular shot after I have "become mother" of a wall filled with children's art. The effect of seeing so many pictures suddenly gathered together in the one space (where before I saw each art work separated from the rest) suddenly *fills me* (becoming wall) with the "meaning" of those first shots. *The paintings become her children*: as her children grow up and leave the nest their paintings will remain. They will forever "become" an indication of a mother's (and/or father's) pride in their children's *existenz*. The mother does not wrap her second body in "major," or

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<sup>235</sup>Reading this paragraph to my wife, she said, "When people commented on the way I kept house, it was like a physical blow to my body."

<sup>236</sup>"*The affection image is the close-up, and the close-up is the face,*" (Deleuze, *MI*, p87) but also "[t]here are affects of things." (*MI*, p97) More significantly, the face becomes a "partial object," and the partial object becomes like a face, or a "faceified object" which is able to "express." (*MI*, p97)

<sup>237</sup>Marks, *SoF*, p141.

“official art,” but with the “minor arts.” Looking at the wall of paintings I suddenly capture glimpses of “becoming.” Each picture is like an eye looking out on to other worlds, other times, piled one-a-top-the-other. I notice changes between the paintings, each representing a stage in her children's lives. I think about the way I stopped drawing things when I was a kid. It was when I realised that my drawings didn't really look like the things they were meant to be. I remember thinking that this meant I wasn't 'good' at drawing. I wonder what I thought before that? Before I knew the difference between (socially determined) good and bad art? A child, I realise/remember does not think, or see, in terms like “children's art” or “minor arts.” They do not even see “art” really. To a child, I would argue, a painting is an *act* (not an art) of doing something (pure creation without judgement). A child does not think in terms of “success.” Much like the experimental film-maker, they are freed from the constraints of the “business of art” (in which 'good' and 'bad' is determined by financial return).

A child does “art” for the pure pleasure of doing it, much like the experimental film-maker. As Foucault notes, the category of “author” subjects the majority of people to the status of “non-author.” There is a moment, as a child, when I felt this distinction, in which the difference between “art” and “not art,” between “author” and “non-author” is determined (for you: I am subjected). For some (myself included) this can be an alienating experience, mentally distancing one from the “means of producing” art. This happens as the child realises that their drawing is not the same as others, that it cannot produce art which others respond to. That's when I stopped drawing, when I realised I could not *reproduce* the effects of others (for others). I am moved to start drawing again, but this time I will *produce* my own marks (for me) taking pleasure in the doing (rather than expecting anything). I take a crayon and start to draw, becoming child, beginning again –



*Universe-S*  
(Dick Whyte, crayon on paper, 2006)



## 2. Activities & Objectives

What is an objective perception-image? A movement-image that is called “objective” is analogous to the third-person-address of “histoire,” rather than the first-person “discours” of the subjective perception-image. Histoire is most commonly associated with 'classical realist text' found in mainstream cinematic practices. Three of Joanna's films (*Task*, *Jillian Dressing* and *Bag*) all use a style of perception which is very similar, on the surface, to the “classical” objective perception-image. The frame is “still” in every film (rather than the “instrument mediated perception” of the subjective films) and the characters in the films give no signs of being aware of the camera's presence. Although there are just three films which use what is classically called an 'objective' (perception) image, they are each so different from the rest of Joanna's work, I feel they constitute a category all of their own, with its own complex processes. Note: if there is a way of putting our “subjectivity into process,”<sup>238</sup> as Kuhn writes, then perhaps there is also a way of putting “objectivity into process.”

As well as using “objective” perception-images, these three films also focus on a single “action” for the duration of the film (rather than the collage, or scrap-book feel of the subjective films, indicating a memory-perception). The “action-image” is also central to the construction of classical-cinema's “structure” (Deleuze's “action” film). In *Jillian Dressing* I watch a woman perform the *action* of getting dressed and putting on make up (in silhouette). In *Task* I watch a woman's hands as she performs the action of ironing and folding washing. In *Bag* I watch hands as they perform the action of unpacking a bag and then packing it again. In all three films I watch “her” do the action for three minutes, never taking my eyes off the action. These are objective action-images. However, they are not the “actions” of the classical film, but those which are dominantly *absent* from classical cinema. As Marks writes, intercultural cinema “read[s] significance in

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<sup>238</sup>Kuhn, p12, citing Helene Cixous (1980) and Julia Kristeva (1975).

what official history overlooks”<sup>239</sup> (dressing, washing, ironing). Joanna's films feature women in private action (rather than males engaged in public actions). They picture women doing “work” which is seldom seen in mainstream movies, and seldom seen at all with such attention to detail: women ironing washing, dressing, putting on make up, unpacking a bag. As Laura Marks writes, “intercultural artists... interrogate the historical archive, both Western and traditional, in order to read their own histories in the gaps.”<sup>240</sup> Here the “gaps” of the mainstream film archive are both illuminated *and* filled by Joanna's films. However, as well as watching the performed “objective” (the “action” she is subject to), the objective *perception-image* (the fact that the camera is *not* there) is *foregrounded*. This creates a sense of “free-indirect-objectivity.”<sup>241</sup>

Classical cinema editing is often referred to as 'invisible editing', meaning that it does not impinge on the viewer's consciousness as they watch the film. The camera is completely invisible to the characters, and largely to the spectator. Even though we know it *was* there, in the act of watching, we suspend this knowledge in order to comprehend the story. This is the nexus of 'histoire' as a discursive practice. In Joanna's “objective” films the camera is invisible to the characters (the women who iron, who dress, and who pack) but this is made visible to *me*, revealing for the spectator the “codes” and “conventions” of objective discourse. These three films foreground objectivity firstly through the constant *stillness* of the frame (unlike the constant *movement* of the subjective perception). A “still” frame suppresses the spectator's experience of the camera's presence and produces a “silent” discourse which is said by no-one (from no-where). In Joanna's three films the camera is still, but it is not still like a classical film. Having no tripod the camera is *trying to be still* (and not always succeeding). In these moments the camera is foregrounded as a 'free-indirect-objective' perception-image, a seeing which thinks itself unseen.

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239Marks, *SoF*, p28.

240Marks, *SoF*, p5.

241Pasolini and Deleuze refer to 'free-indirect-discourse' specifically in terms of subjectivity, in rough camera movements which have a habit of obsessively “making the camera felt” as a moving, living consciousness. (*MI*, p74) This Deleuze also refers to as 'free-indirect-subjective'. Given this, I have merely extrapolated that the camera's “objectivity” may be equally “felt” in the film (through the 'obsessive' *lack* of movement) and that this might be called existential, or self-conscious “free-indirect-objectivity.”

Secondly, an “objective” perception-image watches from “outside” the set of actions it films (and cannot be *seen* by the characters). Joanna's films accentuate this by ensuring that the characters *cannot* look at the camera: two of the women are off-screen (bar their hands and arms) and Jillian is silhouetted (which hides her eyes). Each woman is made *invisible*. Read by themselves, these films might seem insignificant, but coupled with the subjective films, they create a *polar opposite*. In this sense, I find a “free-indirect-objective” perception, which looks at a “subject” (an *actress*) perform an “objective” (action-image). Like the “*historical*” perception of classical cinema, these three films “subject” their characters to a “uniform objective” (but unlike classical cinema they make this *visible*). In the previous section Joanna foregrounded a subjective mind looking at objects. Now I find an objective mind, subjecting that which it looks at to performing tasks. Joanna's films, read in series, are reversals of each other. At this point I constructed a table of differences between the objective “action-image” and the subjective “perception-image” (outlined in the previous section) as illustrated by Joanna's films;

<u>Subjective</u>	<u>Objective</u>
Moving	Still
Can & does look at camera	Cannot look at camera
Many Shots	One Angle/One Shot
Multiple Perceptions	One Action
Many People	One Character/Actor
Camera Eye/I/There	No-One/Nowhere
Bosshard's/My Friends	Jillian/She/Her
Discourse	Histoire

Joanna's films, when looked at in series, produce a complex “binary” in which every feature of the subjective film is mirrored in the objective films,



foregrounding their different codes and conventions. As Marks says of intercultural cinema, they can do the job of “archaeology,”<sup>242</sup> forming a part of the “archive” which makes visible (and deconstructs) the official “rules” and “codes” of discursive practices.<sup>243</sup> As Marks writes, “The acts of excavation performed in *these* works is primarily deconstructive, for it is necessary to dismantle the colonial histories that frame minority stories before those stories can be told in their own terms.”<sup>244</sup>

For Deleuze the “action-image,” as I have said, belongs to the register of “secondness.” As Marks writes, “Struggle enters the sign in Secondness, for here everything exists through opposition: this and not that, action-reaction, and so on.”<sup>245</sup> As I enter into the free-indirect-objective mindscreen of the film, looking at a “subject” perform an “objective,” I begin to think this way, my mind in a very different state from that which I found myself in when framed subjectively (which opposed nothing, and suggested a visible camera “facing” the world, in a constant state of “firstness,” or affection for the world). I become aware that the “objective” frame causes me to “judge” and to create oppositions (while in the subjective films I was caused to “remember”). As Deleuze writes, “There is no *subject* which acts without another which watches it act, and grasps it as acted, itself assuming the freedom of which it *deprives* the former.”<sup>246</sup> Placed in an objective-mindscreen, in a head full of “secondness,” I see opposition everywhere between the action-images of classical cinema and the action-images of Joanna's films.

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242Marks, *SoF*, p8 & 25.

243This binary model extends much further than film and literature. Classical physics, for instance, believes there is “one” way of knowing the universe and that the “rules” worked out on Earth (for space, time, motion, and so on) would hold anywhere in the universe (indicating that the universe is 'homogeneous'). Like 'histoire' and cliché movement-images, classical physics has “one” meaning, “one” conclusion (or answer) and is designed for “one” kind of experience. Modern physics, on the other hand, like the time-image, shatters the expected actions of the movement-image and recognises that the universe is a complex machine made up of a multiplicity of different kinds of “experiences” (of which the Earth is only one example) each with their own heterogeneous “rules” and “codes” in terms of space, time, motion (and so on).

244Marks, *SoF*, p25. My italics.

245Marks, *SoT*, p197.

246Deleuze, *MI*, p74. My italics.

The classical action-image works *with* affection-images (the close-up of the face). Without the close-up of the face there is nothing for me to *identify* with.<sup>247</sup> In Joanna's three objective films there are no affection-images, no faces: I cannot look *at* the women. This is significant in terms of Laura Mulvey's critique of classical cinema. Mulvey, as I have said, argues that classical cinema addresses a male subject, representing women as "objects" for masculine pleasure. Here I cannot look *at* the women (as objects: their bodies occur off-screen or in the dark) and am instead made aware of their status as *subject* (to the objective view).

Furthermore, in classical-cinema the "action" is completed: the hero (usually a male) always succeeds in their task. In this moment we, as the spectator, are also completed and closed. As I have said, the "action-movie" begins with a "situation" (a threat to the world), which prompts a predictable "action" (the hero attempting to save the day), which restores the initial "situation" (the threat is averted). In Joanna's "objective" films the "situations" either side of the "action" are never shown and the action itself is never completed (though I *had* imagined it would be at the beginning of the film). As an audience member, I am never "satisfied" by the task and there is no "closure." As Kuhn writes, "One of the arguments on behalf of a feminine language is that it works against that very closure which, it is suggested, is a feature of dominant 'masculine' language."<sup>248</sup> Rather than having my (arguably, masculine) "desire" to see a task completed, I am left in the never ending cycle of the 'feminine' task. Citing Roland Barthes, Kuhn "makes a distinction between the pleasure to be obtained from the closure or resolution of the classical narrative, and the bliss (*jouissance*) of the text which challenges such closure... which goes beyond, or is outside the pleasure of the fixation of the subject-reader of the classical narrative."<sup>249</sup>

0) In *Bag* I see the hands of someone unpack a bag and then pack the bag up

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247As Kuhn argues, "In the classical realist text, action typically pivots on central characters... [who] tend to become objects of identification for readers... [and that] a series of close-ups and medium close-ups... immediately signals the centrality of the... character to the narrative." (Kuhn, p31)

248Kuhn, p17.

249Kuhn, p17. Though I am not a psychoanalyst, and nor is this paper in any way psychoanalytical, I have embedded a crude "beginning point" for a possible psychoanalytical "fold" in my use of the terms desire, drive, *jouissance* and body-without-organs. In this text I have largely referenced the BwO in terms of art theory (as Deleuze and Guattari discuss in *A Thousand Plateaus*) but it is an equally powerful psychoanalytical intervention (see D&G, *Anti-Oedipus*).

again, all from the same 'objective' perception. When they finish the task however, I do not sense any completion. In the second half, the bag is packed again, but as the clothes are replaced, it stores up the energy of the action. When it is completely packed, I know that it must *unpack* itself again at another time. The packing of a bag in-itself is not an action which stops, but which only lead to further situations: Where are you going with the bag? Where have you come from with the bag? The bag is like a spring, coiling up as it is filled, gathering the potential of an emptying to come. A bag implies a journey, and when the bag is completely emptied (for just a moment in middle of the film) the wide open spaces of the open road unfolds from within the bag's vacant shadows.<sup>250</sup>

1) In *Jillian Dressing* the unfinished quality of the action is more direct: the film simply ends before Jillian has finished getting ready. The real act of dressing takes much longer than the three minutes we watch and Joanna's editing accentuates this. For me, a person who gets dressed in a matter of minutes usually (a classical "male") this experience is jarring and somewhat unusual. It takes so long for "her" to choose her clothes, to select the things she wishes to wear that day (from my perspective, to another audience member it might seem "normal"). Further accentuating this is the fact that Jillian is always in silhouette meaning that I never really "see" the clothes she puts on.<sup>251</sup> There is nothing complete in this image. Instead everything is incomplete, like a thread slowly coming apart. Rather than sewing me into the image (as in suture) I become aware of my distance from the image.<sup>252</sup>

2) In *Task* I do see the task completed, but *I* do not feel completed by it. As she finishes the ironing I sense not that the task is completed, *but that it has only just begun*. I imagine her having to pack away the clothes, and then the clothes being worn, and then her here again at the ironing board doing the same task. I imagine clothes on the line outside and in the washing basket waiting to be done. Returning to the films I see the three of them as a mini-narrative, each folded over

250A mini "any-space-whatever," a "bag-without-organs." See next chapter.

251Interestingly enough the one piece of clothing I catch a glimpse of has the design of an American flag on it, the key producers of the "action-film."

252My wife, while proof-reading this text, wrote in the margins, "When I had anorexia I always felt incomplete, as if I were unfinished. The only time I feel that way now is sometimes when I am putting on make-up, looking at myself in the mirror."

the other. First the clothes are worn (in *Jillian Dressing*). Then Jillian's clothes are washed and ironed (in *Task*). In *Bag* they are packed away, and unpacked. Then they are worn again. Then washed and ironed again (and so on). Rather than a narrative which ends, this narrative loops infinitely.

Deleuze writes that the “action-image” mediates two “situations” (the disrupted world at the beginning, and the restoration of peace at the end, for instance). In Joanna's objective films I see only an “action,” the two “situations” on either side unknown. These are filled by the other two films in the series, the chain forming a kind of “repeating-machine.” This causes me to shift from a “solid perception,” to a “liquid perception.” Unlike the liquid subjective perceptions (which flowed from shot to shot) this “liquid perception” flows out the beginnings and endings of the films themselves, causing me to connect the three films to each other, creating, as I have said, a kind of rhizome/machine. A narrative-machine goes from A to B to C, with each part following the other in a necessary linear order. In a “rhizome” the parts are interchangeable: *in any order a rhizome becomes red*. No part of this “rhizome” is the definitive beginning, middle or end (in the story of “washing”). They all play this function, shifting from position to position, folding over one another. Any one of the films can be read as *both* the situation *and* the action, each superimposed over one another. *Task* is an action, which prepares the situation of *Bag*. *Task* is simultaneously a situation which follows the action of *Jillian Dressing*. The same can be said for each film in this series.<sup>253</sup>

Finally the *awareness* I have of the “objective perception” (*cinema poetry*) in Joanna's three objective films foregrounds the way in which the women are “subjects,” rather than “objects.” The “objective” perception in these three short films openly “subjects” the women to its gaze, and cuts them into fragments, making them *invisible*. They are not “objects” to be watched but foregrounded as “subject” to a view which “thinks” them this way. The objective frame/gaze also foregrounds the women as “subject” to their objective – to iron, to dress, to pack

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<sup>253</sup>This function is similar to that which I found in the subjective films, with one important difference: in the “subjective” films the action-sequence unfolded “inside” the frame (just as subjectivity designates perception *inside the set*) while the action-sequence of the objective films unfolds “outside” the frame (just as objectivity designates perception which is *outside the set*).

and unpack – destined never to complete their task.

Through being put in an objective frame of mind, I have slipped into objective thought, opposing the “illusion” of classical-cinema with the “real” effects of objectivity on subjects both in the film, and in the audience. Deleuze, as I have said, aligns the “action image” with C.S. Peirce's secondness (judgements and *contrasts* between binaries). While watching these action-images I have found myself deconstructing classical action-images, contrasting and judging them against Joanna's. However, in the second half of all three films there is a single moment (a “pivot-image”) which shifts my experience, which causes a change in my perception, opening onto memory and intersubjective becoming.

3) In *Task*, at the very end of the film, the woman finishes her task and arranges the iron on the ironing board *facing the camera*. She almost presents the iron, arranging it almost as if *for* my perception. Still, I do not see her face. It is in the deliberateness of her action that *she is revealed as an actor*. Her body turns slightly and it feels as if she is addressing the camera. She seems hesitant, as if Joanna had not told her what to do when she was finished. The status of the perception-image shifts from objective to subjective (the camera is suddenly present to the set). The camera becomes the “subject” and the woman becomes the “objective-perceiver.” This is a time-image, a genesis of an unknown body. Perception and expression reverse and I “become” the woman in the film (a moment of “intersubjectivity”). I suddenly see something I hadn't noticed before: *I think differently*. The way she placed the iron and blanket on the ironing board had a feeling of “pride” in it, as if she was displaying them to me because she felt proud of her work.

I go back and watch the film again. This time the I see the washing as the “subject” and “object” of her vision. I am not the real “her” but a second “her” looking down at the image: *looking over her work*. It is as if the “her” I *see* is the “subjective-woman” (whose hands perform the task) and the “objective-perception” is “her” mind, checking over the work she is doing, making sure it is well done (just as I had found in the “subjective” films – *all lines lead to Egypt*). As Deleuze writes, free-indirect-discourse provides “an oscillation of the person between two

points of view on [themselves], a hither and thither.”<sup>254</sup> This is a time-image, drawing on my memory-image: *I am reminded*.

I think back to my mum when I was a kid and her ironing (the only experiences I really have of ironing clothes). I remember that mum would groan when I wore un-ironed clothes. I could never figure out why it was important to her. I never understood my mother, I guess. Now I realise that her children (and the way they *look*) are like the “house” of *Bosshard's House*. My body was an extension of my mother's and the clothes I wore, the way I looked (when I was a child) *affects* the way she perceives herself (objectively). Searching through my memory I find that I do not have many memories of *seeing* her do the ironing. Maybe it was because I never made her feel good about it. I always persisted in wearing my clothes un-ironed no matter what she said. *Perhaps she began to iron invisibly*. It is not that I *never* saw my mother ironing, but only that I know for what I saw, there were thousands of hours I *never* saw, years of effort put into my appearance, with no thanks from me. I never had a conversation once with my mother about how much ironing there was. I could always finish my homework: my tasks were completable.

Mum's housework I “real-eyes” was *actually* never done. I wonder what kind of pride she felt in a job which was never finished? I know that a “job well done” is so much more satisfying when someone compliments you on it *after* its completion. No-one is there to compliment the woman who does the ironing, day in and day out, but herself. I suddenly felt a warmth for my mother, something deep and powerful. The kind of satisfaction she received for ironing would have to be located outside the realm of being seen (hence, the objective perception-image). Unlike the satisfaction received from others, the satisfaction of house-work is self-provided: unpaid, and often unnoticed.<sup>255</sup> I certainly never made her feel like it was worth anything to me! This *moved* me, literally.

After watching the films I got up and performed an action *with my body* (much like the action of drawing I took up at the end of the previous section). I called my mother and told her about this experience, and I thanked her for doing

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<sup>254</sup>Deleuze, *MI*, p74.

<sup>255</sup>Moscovici (p25) notes that Irigaray “argues that in the exchanges and “division of labour” between men and women, women's exchanges have all too often taken the form of unreciprocated giving, a gift of the “self” with no return.”

that, all those years ago. I felt like I had understood something profound about my mother's life and the things she did. Once again, as with the subjective films, I found the “genesis of an unknown body” in the film, which again turned out to be the vision of a “mother.” Using a self-conscious and poetic free-indirect-discourse Joanna's films foreground subjectivity (which leads to objectivity) in one mode of film, and then objectivity (which leads to subjectivity) in others. As Deleuze writes, “is it not the cinema's perpetual destiny to make us move from one of its poles to the other, that is, from an objective perception to a subjective perception, and vice versa?”<sup>256</sup> In Joanna's films this perpetual destiny is foregrounded and heightened for my experience as a viewer, giving me the chance to deconstruct cinema as a model of perception.

The films *Jillian Dressing* and *Bag*, like *Task*, also have similar pivot-shots within their objective mindscreen, creating spaces for interjection, and intersubjective exchanges. At the end of *Bag*, for instance, the bag is *presented* to the camera, the camera suddenly moves like a “subjective” perception and the film becomes “subjective.” Similarly, in *Jillian Dressing* there is a shot in which Jillian's arm passes through the frame, causing an “intersubjective shift.” But I will leave “you” to discover these unknown bodies for “yourself.”

### 3. Open Frames & Free Thoughts

Joanna's “open,” or “free,” films borrow from both the subjective and objective modes. The camera is “semi-subjective” (in the sense that it *moves*) and “semi-objective” (in the sense that no-one looks at the camera). *Semi-Subjectivity*: In Joanna's “open” films, such as *Napkins*, *Roses*, *Port Chalmers Cycle*, *Round Picton*, or *Body House*, the movement is not like that of a *person* holding a camera, nor of a “real” body in contact with the world (as in the “subjective” films). The movements are wild and unrestrained. In *Roses* the camera launches into the roses, and in *Port Chalmers Cycle* it turns round and round, in a dizzying “pirouette” (like

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<sup>256</sup>Deleuze, *MI*, p71-2.

a “pivot”).<sup>257</sup> Here I find a movement which is “alien” to me, a kind of seeing that is “inhuman.” *Semi-Objectivity*: In Joanna's “free” films there are no humans, and therefore nothing to definitively mark the perception as objective or subjective. In *Gravestones* I simply see image after image of gravestones. In *Roses* I see image after image of a rose bush. In *Body House* I see images of a dilapidated house, and in *Remnants of a Demolished Wharf* I see images of a demolished wharf. No people. Only things.

This is what Deleuze, citing Jean Mitry, calls a “semi-subjective” perception. A semi-subjective perception is a “being *with*” the world, a curious *expression* which Deleuze characterises as a *perception* which “moves amongst” the things in the film, “no longer mingl[ing] with the character[s]” (as subjective) and yet not on the “outside” either (the objective). Instead, the “eye of the camera” takes the form of an “anonymous viewpoint of someone unidentified”<sup>258</sup> among the things of the film-world. However Joanna's films are not only “semi-subjective,” but also “semi-objective” (an *equal* intermixture).

This has the effect of presenting me with a series of “nouns” completely ungrounded, and open to interpretation. There are no faces, or events to reconnect these images with. In *Gravestones* I feel the film saying “gravestone! gravestone! gravestone!” instead of “I saw the gravestone” (subjective), or “The gravestone” (objective). In *Roses* I hear “roses! roses! roses!” In *Body House* I hear “wall! wall! wall! window! wood! dirt! ground!” Watching from the perspective of perception I find that the films *list* objects, in “series,” without a pronouns (subjective) or articles (objective). Like the poem I quoted in the introduction to this chapter there is nothing *before* the noun (no *histoire*, no *discours*).

light

leaves

grass

In reading this poem I “became leaf” and I “became grass.” Deleuze and

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257“I hold on/ to the face/ of a rose.” Paul, in Bisley, p16.

258Deleuze, MI, p72.



Guattari also talk of the potential to “become animal.” An animal, arguably, sees neither subjectivity, or objectivity as these are human constructs.<sup>259</sup> In *Gravestones* I see images which are “open,” without distinctive markers, freed from the play of glances which code subjectivity and objectivity. Near the end I see an affection-image of dog ferreting in the ground. In seeing the dog close-up (an affection-image) I “become dog.” Watching *Gravestones* again I realise how many of the grave-images have writing foreign to me on them, distancing me from using my language (which dictates subjective, and objective distinctions) making me like a dog who looks, unable to see anything but marks in grey stone. But does a dog even see “grey stone”? What is it to become dog? The way in which the camera looks around and moves freely reminds me most of a dog, particularly the way the camera shakes and peers at the ground from a low perspective.

In *Roses* I “move amongst” the roses erratically, the images becoming abstracted, filled with a pure redness. In the middle of the film there is a shot where the camera actually moves into a single rose and the screen goes black. In this moment I am suddenly placed in a “time-image,” left to think: what have I become? I am in the flower. I realise, I am a *bee* flying around the rose bush, weaving back and forward!

Joanna's films all contain such readings, various “unknown bodies” arising from within the films, each built from the ground up (the perception/eye as zero). Each film foregrounds its own perception, leaving the space for an “unknown body” to arise between the enacted “expression” latent in the “perception-image.” I find myself thinking things I had never thought about before, understanding things I hadn't thought of in years. Before watching Joanna's films, and attempting to translate my experiences of them into language, I had never thought that language might structure my perception, or that subjectivity and objectivity might be “illusions.” I never thought of perception as 'thought'. But then again, I don't think I had ever really thought closely about what an “animal” sees, or that it might be different from what I see. I had never thought that a woman would see the world

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<sup>259</sup>As Sobchack writes, “A cat cannot look at a king for the same reason it cannot see a film.” (*AoE*, p53) A “film,” like an “author,” is a “function” of social discourse, requiring “prior reflexive knowledge” (*AoE*, p53) of the function of the “king” and “film” in relation to “subjects” and “objects.” The “cat,” however, is not “subject” to the “film” in the way a person is and has no interest in it as an “object” of consumption.

differently, simply because of the way she was positioned to think of herself (if I am being honest). I knew we had different experiences, but I had never thought of the structure of *experience* as being different. In Joanna's films there seems to be a “series” of structures which systematically provide the perfect “site” for unpacking the “eye” of cinema, and its various capacities for *becoming*. As well as a site of intervention, I find a “sight” of invention, in which new and unthought experiences of becoming-woman, becoming-child and becoming-animal occur.

These “becoming-animals” liquefy the solid perception, as I have written of the subjective and objective perceptions of bodies, and flow *through* the images in *time* (both backwards and forwards: they are a *liquid*). But there are two kinds of images in Joanna's open films which cause another kind of “intersubjectivity,” which does not open onto unknown (virtual) bodies, but onto the “film's body” (as Sobchack calls it). The first of these images is the “movement-image,” and the second is the “light-image.” These two images begin Deleuze's books on cinema. They are the *birth* of cinema for him. Light at very high speeds cools, until we see it as concrete movement, and this is the cinema. This movement-light is *perceived*, and the perception-image becomes the first register of the movement-image. Deleuze spends very little time discussing movement or light-images in-themselves, and seems to imply that a pure-movement image does not exist without one of the three “registers” added to it (movement and light are *imperceptible*). In Joanna's “open” films movement and light are taken to their limits: pulsing, curved and quick. The film is both an “eye,” and a “body,” endowed with an existential power to become *movement* through the *light* of the world (what Merleau-Ponty might call a kind of “flesh”).<sup>260</sup>

*Body House* opens with an image of a wall, a “brick wall.” It says, as I have said, “wall,” and nothing more. I am close to it – too close. Added to the wall is a quick movement of the camera to the right. The movement is so fast that the wall *abstracts*. In this moment of abstraction there is an “action-image” which arises within the “open perception.” The swift movements break down the perception/camera/eye and as the wall “becomes abstract,” I see the real *frames* of

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<sup>260</sup>As Sobchack notes, “flesh” is a concept Merleau-Ponty used to designate the “shared material nature of the lived body and the objective world.” (*AOE*, p56, n3)

the film. There is a *stutter* in the mechanism. I see the projector struggling. In *Roses* the eye moves so fast everything turns to a fiery liquid. The movements test the projector, and camera, placing them in tension with each other. The roses “face” me *and I am nothing but the wind*, thrown this way and that. In *Port Chalmers Cycle* there is a shot which jolts up and down a road, looking down at the pavement. It is like no human perception I know. In each of the jolts there is a sudden breakdown and I see the “frames” stuttering, becoming briefly visible. These kinds of movements are prevalent in Joanna's “open” films (especially shots in which the camera turns, and spins).

Here, the “perception” of the film “sees” its own projection, spreading itself across time and space. The projection of the film, for Sobchack, represents one of its film's “organs.”<sup>261</sup> The camera is the “organ of perception” (like an eye) and the projector is the “organ of expression” (a projection of light). In Joanna's open films the “organ of perception” is taken to the “limit” of the frame (as Sobchack says, the perception/frame is a “limit”). At the “limit” the film becomes conscious of its own “organ of expression.” This is similar to the way in which my own vision breaks down when I move my head quickly around without centring my perception on anything. My perception *of* things breaks down and I sense a “gap” between my physical “eye” and my intentional “I.” My mind (my intentional “I”) is performing an action which my “eye” cannot successfully translate into *solid* vision. I sense a disparity between the “world” and “myself.” As the projector sees its own expressive function, the “film's body” catches a glimpse of its own “reel” body, and enters into an intersubjective relation with its second self (the projector). The film becomes aware of itself existing in three places, splayed across time and space, self-consciously seeing, recording, and projecting (perceiving, remembering and acting).

Joanna's movement-images break down the perception-image on one side, revealing to me the projector in its “reel” relationship with/as the “film's eye.” On the other side Joanna continually uses images of “light” which take me in the other direction. When I see an image of “light” I become aware of the intersubjective fold between the “eye” and the “real” world it films. In *Gravestones*, for example,

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<sup>261</sup>Sobchack, *AoE*, p222.

the gravestones are set against black silhouetted mountains. The light of the sky cannot be contained by the “eye” and streaks run from the edges of the mountains to the gravestone. The gravestone and the mountain suddenly become “thick” with space and light shoots from the sky to the ground. These beams of light rush from the “there” where the “camera/eye” is through time and space to the “here” where the projector is, *remembering* the light. Like my own process of vision the light of the world rushes into my eyes, passes through the memory (where certain parts are retained while others are lost) and then projected as an “image” for my conscious mind to relate to. I do not see *through* my eye. Instead I see an image constructed some time after the eye has done its seeing. In this moment the film sees its own “real” body, made of nothing but light. In Deleuze's terms the film's brain 'thinks' this, becoming 'self-conscious' of both it's own “reel” body and its own “real” body. On the one hand the film is made of light (just as the person's body is nothing but atoms and energy). On the other it is made of physical substance (the projector: reel movement). Another gap opens between these extremes, and there is a vast space produced, filled with moving-light: this is the “film's body.”

The unity of the “eye,” as it reflects on itself in relation to reel movement-images and real light-images, breaks down in Joanna's “open” films, and yet it is no longer a “breaking-down.” The “eye” in these films *intentionally* goes through these things time and time again, as if intent on interrogating the *limits* of its own perception (frame) in relation to its own capacity to express an existential presence. This is achieved primarily through heightening the 'distance' between the *subjective* intentions of the “I” and the *objective* existence of the “eye.” This distance, this gap: ever widening, filled with light. The light is blinding. I feel my eye straining to see. I am brought into contact with *my own existential eye* and become intersubjectively entwined in the film. As this happens, I feel, as I have foregrounded in the introduction, my own eye and body get bigger, matching the size of the film. We might say the “affection-image” is an “enlargement,” and in this final perception-expression relation I feel both an embodied enlargement and a shift from the “perception-images” of the “film's eye,” to the “any-spaces-whatever” of the “film's mind.” I feel my skin begin to stretch, my eye mingling

with the light of the film body, becoming light. I blink many times. *I become film and in becoming film I become nothing but light. I am the light.*

#### 4. Time to Conclude

What of all these “becomings” then? Where to from here? For Deleuze a series of becomings eventually leads to “becoming imperceptible.”<sup>262</sup> In Joanna's films this happens through “becoming light.” This piece of light is not in any one place or time. It is everywhere at once. But this is only from my perspective. The purpose of a series of “becomings” is to alter the speeds and movements of the body, to take them to their limit, and in this limit to become *everything*. Like Kuhn's notion of “feminine discourse” my subjectivity (and objectivity) are put into process, and I am made “open” to so many new modes of experience, in particular a “feminine perception.” I have “become woman,” unable to retain my position as a male desiring completion and closure.

In this way Joanna's films do the work of “archaeology” on themselves, each time taking perception to its limit. At the “limit” language ceases to work: subjectivity and objectivity switch places and I *become* somebody.<sup>263</sup> I move from archaeology, to the process of “building an (unknown) body.” As Marks writes, “this process describes the movement from excavation to fabulation, or from deconstructing dominant histories to creating new conditions for new stories.”<sup>264</sup> But where does this lead us? In this chapter I have collapsed the series into perceptions and “unknown bodies.” Once I have discovered the “film's body” in the “open” films, I go back and watch the subjective and objective films. I notice that they all have the same attention to “light-images” (beams of light visible on the white clothes in *Task*, beams of light visible at the edges of Jillian's silhouette in *Jillian Dressing*, and so on). These images make it impossible for me not to see the existential presence of the eye. All Joanna's films foreground a “film body” which

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<sup>262</sup>D&G, *TP*, p309. All becomings begin with “becoming woman.”

<sup>263</sup>Rather than “I coulda been a contender.” (*On the Waterfront*, dir. Elia Kazan, 1954)

<sup>264</sup>Marks, *SoF*, p5.

'I can' read if I want to. In going back, with this new “mindscreen” in place, I find that “perceptions” become “imperceptible.” Though I am seeing perceptions, they are no longer perceptions. Pure expression. Pure affection. I notice that all the shots have a thick layer of grain over them, which I ignored when I 'thought' the images through perception. I also notice the constant abstraction of perception.

In this chapter I read *for* perceptions and in each film I found a number of perception-images which opened onto becomings. But now I have trouble retaining a sense of perception and all the images seem to be “affections,” corresponding to what Deleuze calls an “any-space-whatever.” In this chapter I have read the films as if they are “connected” by their silence, by a “time-image” which gathers them together and prepares them for movement-images to arise. In this way Joanna's films, as Deleuze and Guattari write of Eastern poetry, allow the spectator “to produce extremely complex dynamic relations on the basis of intrinsically simple formal relations.”<sup>265</sup> Let us say that the perceptions discussed here are the 'simple formal relations', while the “affect” designates a series of 'complex dynamic relations' (becomings). These 'simple formal relations of becoming' were completed in the perceptive and expressive “foregrounding” of the “film's body,”<sup>266</sup> becoming visible in broken walls, abstract movements and fissures of light. In movement and light-images I find a path by which I can “build a body” in the cinema. But what kind of body is this “film-body”? Sobchack's film body is predicated on the “frame” (the limit) of the film being *invisible* to the perception of the film. In Joanna's films this organisation, also central to classical-cinema, is challenged, and the “frame” is made constantly *visible* to the perception that is the film. Joanna's “film body” thinks of itself, unpacking itself piece by piece, fragment by fragment. This is a concept not alien to Joanna: “I put together *Unpacking the Body* 1977 as *assemblage* of texts & objects.”<sup>267</sup>

Hence, I am arguing that Joanna's “film body” is now an “any-space-whatever,” a “body without organs,” an “assemblage” of pure “affection.” In this

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265D&G, *TP*, p288-9.

266It is worth noting that in fore-grounding the body there were “four” kinds of bodies produced (four “grounds” immanent to the “film's body.” 1) A movement from subjective to objective (becoming house/mother); 2) A movement from objective to subjective (becoming woman); 3) A movement from subjective/objective to objective/subjective (becoming animal), and 4) A movement in the opposite direction (becoming film/light/imperceptible).

267Paul and Eagle, p81. My italics.

chapter are bodies which have not been “built,” but which existed ready-made in my *memory*. The any-space-whatever exists between “movement” and “memory,” drawing on the ineffable quality of the images to be the “essence” of something *between* the shots, not contained in the perceptions, or representations.

As I have said, Joanna's art oscillates between the visible and invisible. Here I have spoken of “visible” bodies. Now I move to the invisible. The “body-without-organs” begins as a series of “becomings,” and yet it is more. First it is the building of a body. Then it is the “emptying” of the body and a de-connecting of the “expected” organisation of the body (rather than a clear connection between the parts). The any-space-whatever is the realm of the “assemblage,” of fragmentation and emptiness. No longer do I look for “representations” or “perceptions” (narratives) but for the “imperceptible” and the “abstract” (poetry). In this chapter I have concentrated on those images which I can make some sense of, but in each of Joanna's films there are as many images which float away, which I cannot “see,” which are covered in shadows and light, blacking or whiting out the “seeing” that is the film. In the “any-space-whatever” I find more and more time-images, more and more becomings of more and more strange things. In the emptied film-body “the story suspends in order to contemplate this emptiness.”<sup>268</sup> Here, I have been finding stories, working back to the “figure” through a “figuring out.” Now I release these figures, and return to the films as affection, as “concrete” abstraction.

Hence I move from perception to affection, to a new “zero” point, the previous perceptions extinguished.<sup>269</sup> I begin from a new ground of “expression.” Deleuze places perception at “0” and affection/expression at “1.” Sobchack grounds cinema not only in perception, but in expression as a reversible “0.” Joanna's films offer me *both* views, simultaneously superimposed over one another. And between these views there will be many other points of contact. Rather than one modality Joanna's films layer the perceptive and affective faculties (detailed in this chapter and the next) over top of one another (the subject of the third chapter, a

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268Marks, *SoF*, p5.

269When grounded in perception-images affection-images are a firstness to perceptions zero. When viewed as an any-space-whatever affection-images become their own “zero,” grounding the uprising of “time-images” in reverse (a “minus one” or “negative firstness”). As D&G write, rhizomes constitute “multiplicities with  $n$  dimensions having neither subject nor object... and from which the One is always subtracted ( $n - 1$ ).” This is the state of the “any-space-whatever,” a multiplicity of fragments which have no subject or object, from which the One is constantly subtracted.

return to *action*). To have (at least) two lines and many various points of contact between them, rather than a 'unified' structure, is what Deleuze and Guattari call a "rhizome," integral to "becoming" a "body-without-organs." Haiku, as I have said, are also "rhizomatic" in structure, as are "becoming woman," and "becoming-animal." Music (*the refrain*) is also central to the structure of the "body-without-organs," to "becomings," and "rhizomes." Music is pure "becoming." Music does not "represent" anything, but is an abstract mosaic of waves and shallows, of intensities and depths. Interestingly, Joanna's films originally were "worked out on music paper."<sup>270</sup>

The rhythmic fragments of the any-space-whatever move beyond representation, into the realms of the film's "spirit." The "refrain" is a particular mode of musicality central to the plane-of-immanence which one passes through in constructing a BwO. The "eye" enters into its own refrain, perceiving only an assemblage of rhythms, and intensities. As Deleuze and Guattari write, the refrain "does not operate in a homogeneous space-time, but by heterogeneous blocks. It changes direction... Rhythm is never on the same plane as that which has rhythm,"<sup>271</sup> just as the any-space-whatever is comprised of fragments which foreground their heterogeneity. It is "refrains" which assemble spaces, and territories, which may be converted into "any-spaces-whatever." As Gregory O'Brien writes, "Joanna finds music an important presence underlying her work. 'While there isn't a literal connection,' she explains, 'sometimes music can open up clues as to where a painting should go or how a particular work can develop. I once put a grid over a still life to get a similar effect.'<sup>272</sup>

Finally, not every revolution of the film's perception has been discussed here: you may find other transformations, other "becomings." I have not tried to comprehensively look at all of Joanna's films, but chosen a few that best illustrate the kind of structure (the haiku) which I feel that Joanna has used in her films. As I have said, as well as being an "essay" (tree) about Joanna's films, I hope that this

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<sup>270</sup>Paul, "Shibusha," p10.

<sup>271</sup>D&G, *TP*, p346. The "refrain" designates the "expressive" element of the BwO (just as the affection-image designates the expressive elements of the movement-image). In the refrain and "*expressive qualities or matters of expression enter into shifting relations with one another that "express"...* [and] there is an autonomy of expression." (*TP*, p349-50)

<sup>272</sup>Paul, in O'Brien, p77. Alexander Greenhough has written on the similarity between "grids" in modernist art and "any-spaces-whatever" (which he calls "equivalent spaces"). See Greenhough, p68-90.



text might also act as a “tool box” (rhizome) for thinking *through* Joanna's films. A “tool box” cultivates concepts which will hopefully be useful anywhere, in any situation, though they may have a specific design (or purpose) initially. Joanna's films all “de-sign” a particular series of perceptions (de-signing them, breaking them down) and then “design” (through their arrangement into three “kinds” of perception) a sort of “map” of cinema.<sup>273</sup> Maps, rather than tracings, are essential to the BwO. I become a “cartographer” of film, making a map of its territories, of its various becomings in the hope that some one else may find their way back. Now I switch my way of thinking. These are not perception-images: they are affection-images, any-spaces-whatever, assemblages of thought in the film's mind, and tactile experiences for the film's (reel/real) body. To the end of time we proceed, forever an eternal beginning, *areturninground* –

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<sup>273</sup>“All of tree logic is a logic of tracing and reproduction... its goal is to describe a de facto state, to maintain balance in intersubjective relations... The rhizome is altogether different, a *map and not a tracing*... It fosters connections between fields, the removal of blockages on the body without organs... It is itself a part of the rhizome.” (D&G, *TP*, p13)

*Chapter 1*  
*Affections*  
*(of an unknown consciousness)*



*Fig. 4. Gravestones 1 [film still]*  
(dir. Joanna Paul, B&W, 16mm, c. 1975)



## 1. The Space of the Body: Assemblages and Any-Spaces-Whatever

“Desired to pass from confusion of darkness voice things in a room full presence of darkness to the simple, Passed through a white square to air to 0.”<sup>274</sup>

“One may know the world without going out of doors. One may see the Way of Heaven without looking out the windows.”<sup>275</sup>

“My interest is in a poetic language; or more precisely the non-literal levels on which words operate and which allow the possibility of poetry.”<sup>276</sup>

“I’m reading a book of critical writing by Margaret Atwood, who believes that poetry is the heart of language, the activity through which language is renewed & kept alive (that fiction writing is the guardian of the moral & ethical sense of the community).”<sup>277</sup>

In the last chapter the film foregrounded its own “existential eye” and “body” and these became the main “characters” of the film for me. Integral to Foucault's analysis of authored discursive practices is Roman Jakobson's conception of “shifters.” In the final stages of his analysis Foucault argues that neither 'histoire' or 'discourse' use real 'shifters'. Shifters refer to signs which are linked to their speaker (or, in this case, seer) *existentially*.<sup>278</sup> A 'shifter' in conversation refers to terms like “I” or “me” (for instance) which is existentially linked to the “speaker” (unlike the term 'couch', for instance, which does not

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274Paul, “Written at St Omar,” in Jack Ross (ed.), *Brief #32* (May 2005) p49.

275*Tao Te Ching*, in St. Elmo Nauman Jr., *Dictionary of Asian Philosophies* (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979) p331.

276Paul, *NPL*, p1.

277Paul and Eagle, p96.

278Roman Jakobson, “Shifters, Verbal Categories and the Russian Verb” (1957) in *Selected Writings II: Word and Language* (Mouton, 1971) p132.

depend on an existential link to the speaker's body). In Joanna's films there is, as Sobchack writes, an "address of the *eye*," which points to its own bodily presence on the seen/screen (both in movement-images and light-images) as existential. The "eye" is existentially foregrounded through continuous images of light, reminding me that the "eye" is not separated from the world, but entwined with it, both then and now. The eye of Joanna's films therefore constitutes a "visual shifter" (the film's visible body) which *moves* itself (rather than a "non-shifter," most commonly used in 'histoire', which would not draw attention to the "address of the eye"). The space between the "eye" and the things it "sees" (the perceived and the perceiver, the viewed-view and viewing-view) is accentuated and then filled with *light*. The "film's body-space" *moves* or *shifts* into this light-space, and through intentionally pushing movement and light to their limits, thinks of itself *as* perceived light, as movement expressed. Sobchack writes, "Because a film behaves and acts, its present movement adds dimension to the flat space... Abstract space is dynamised as habitable, as "lived in," as described in the depth of movement... Thus, space in the film becomes the *situation* of existence."<sup>279</sup> For Sobchack, this is an experience possible when watching *any* film. Joanna's films accentuate this effect, making the 'existential' situation visible to the spectator within the chain of signification (rather than before the chain of signification, as Sobchack argues).

How does one build a "space" then, and therefore the "body" of the film with it? Deleuze offers two ways; 1) We may plot a narrative space in which events, and characters experience space and time in a linear fashion, perceived in such a way as to be clearly *visible*, *audible* and *sensible* to the audience. Space is constructed as 'unified' and disguises the heterogeneity of film as homogeneity. In terms of the "film's body" this kind of space is sensibly *organised* and "closed." 2) The second kind of space begins in *emptiness*, often emptied of humans and representation, as Joanna's films are, and then proceeds to build a space "fragment by fragment."<sup>280</sup> Each fragment corresponds to a sliver of space, a singularity, an affection-image (the close-up of the face, or that which 'faces' us). An affection-image here is a close-up which "retains the same power to tear the image away

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<sup>279</sup>Sobchack, *AoE*, p61-2.

<sup>280</sup>Deleuze, *MI*, p108.

from spatio-temporal co-ordinates,<sup>281</sup> to abstract it from classical (Euclidean) spatial organisation. Deleuze calls this kind of space an “any-space-whatever.” Any-spaces-whatever are firstly *fragmented* and then they are *emptied* of representation. When images become *invisible* (I see only shadows, whites, lights, and greys) space is “emptied.” When an image becomes abstracted and I cannot tell what it is (often by getting too close to it) the image is also “emptied” (of readable content). Film Noir, German Expressionism and what Deleuze calls Lyrical Abstraction (a kind of filmic “impressionism”) all “empty” space in this way (the shadow) and in it, for Deleuze, there are produced “affections” of the spirit in the form of emptied and disconnected images.<sup>282</sup>

He writes, “There are therefore two states of the any-space-whatever... *disconnected or emptied spaces.*”<sup>283</sup> In each of these spaces there is a pure “potentiality” released from the fragments in which the spectator may approach the realm of the “spirit.” As Deleuze writes, “*Space is no longer determined, it has become the any-space-whatever which is identical to the power of the spirit.*”<sup>284</sup> Crudely: because there is nothing to hold the fragments together (usually provided by a narrative unity) they give way to an ineffable sense of the “spirit” of things which exists between the fragments, which does not reside in our everyday, material perceptions of the world (it is poetical and metaphysical). The “any-space-whatever” has the power, for Deleuze, to restore a metaphysics to physics, and a physics to metaphysics, to restore the *spirit of film to itself*. Deleuze writes, “This is what Bresson suggested in his theory of ‘fragmentation’: we pass from a closed set that is fragmented to an open spiritual whole [the essence/spirit] that is created or recreated.”<sup>285</sup> Bresson's films, and his short book of cinematic philosophy, *Notes on Cinematography*, were very important to Joanna, and one can see his ‘theory of fragmentation’ expressed throughout all of her films, regardless of their distinct perceptions (discussed in the last chapter). As Bridie Lonie writes, Joanna's works were “fragments of sensory experience, connections drawn between ideas and

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281Deleuze, *MI*, p96.

282Deleuze, *MI*, p112.

283Deleuze, *MI*, p120.

284Deleuze, *MI*, p117.

285Deleuze, *MI*, p117.

things.”<sup>286</sup>

Deleuze argues that an any-space-whatever also has the power to render the various fragments “equivalent,” each image philosophically “indifferent” to one another (rather than “different”). Alexander Greenhough developed a similar conception of fragmented space (in reference to Bresson's films) which he calls “equivalent-space.”<sup>287</sup> In Bresson's work, like Joanna's, each shot corresponds to an “affection-image” (a close-up) which tears the image from time and space. In classical-cinema the close-up is used to pick out the central character, or to indicate some object of importance. When a film is entirely comprised of close-ups, of affection-images, every fragment has the *same* importance (equivalence). In the previous chapter I picked out shots which signalled shifts, which were important. These created narratives. Now every image seems to blur into the last, every shot woven into a sprawling mosaic of shadows and light. *Every shot is picked out: no shot is picked out.* As Greenhough, quoting Bazin, writes that in an equivalent-space “everything that is happening... is of like importance,” in which no shot, sequence or scene “can be said to be more important than another, for their ontological equality destroys drama at its very basis.”<sup>288</sup>

By limiting the film to close-ups, the “any-space-whatever” foregrounds the essential “fragmentation” of cinema and its power to cut up bodies (and objects) into thousands of tiny pieces. All films are made of affects, of fragments, of a “complex” (as Deleuze calls it). It is complex because “it is made up of all sorts of singularities that it sometimes connects and into which it sometimes divides.”<sup>289</sup> A classical (Euclidean) film-space ‘unifies’ its filmic fragments, thinking ‘homogeneously’. The any-space-whatever returns film to its real/reel status as “divided,” to its actual existenz as an “assemblage,” foregrounding multiplicity over unity and spatial ‘heterogeneity’ (over ‘homogeneity’).

Deleuze also describes a series of “affects” in which shadows obscure a character's facial “expression,” signifying *struggle of spirit*. One only need think of the characters in Film Noir (and the shadowy worlds they inhabit) to see understand

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286Bridie Lonie, “Joanna Paul, a view from here,” in Budgen, Donson & O'Brien (ed.), p26.

287See Greenhough, p68-90.

288André Bazin, in Greenhough, p70.

289Deleuze, *MI*, p105.

what he means. Other characters are bathed in light, opening themselves to the *alternation of the spirit*. Thirdly, characters may alternate between the shadows and the light, caught in moments of indecision. In these moments of indecision between the light and the dark we find the “grey” of *indifference*. For Deleuze, it is from this “in(ter)difference” that philosophy is born.

Joanna's “affection-images” are the *expressed* face of the film, rather than *perceived* faces in the film. The “eye” is a “character” which experiences “so many concrete modes of existence”<sup>290</sup> made up of shadows, whites and greys. We do not see characters struggling with thought, but rather “become” the character who thinks: the screen becomes a projection of the “film's mind.” Furthermore, the any-spaces-whatever are no longer exterior spaces in which characters lose themselves. Rather, they are an “interior” assemblage of the film's body. In Joanna's films shadows do not “represent” struggles with moral or ethical issues (as Deleuze sees them in fictional, narrative cinema) but rather “present” a “film-mind” struggling to comprehend perception (in) itself.

Joanna's film-mind begins again, from nothing, my eye alternating between representation and the shadow (no-representation). Like the characters Deleuze writes of, I have to make a *choice* (becoming existential). In the last chapter I *chose* perception. Now I let shadows dominate (the space is emptied). Not only shadows, but also the *brightness*. Between them there is a philosophy of spirit (in the *gaps* of vision). Furthermore: from within the shadow I discover specks of white gathering energy. Equally: within brightness I find shadows. As Deleuze writes, “As soon as this light is reached it restores everything to us. It restores the white to us, but a white that no longer confines the light. It finally restores a black to us, the black which is no longer the cessation of light.”<sup>291</sup>

In Joanna's films it is the “film's body” and “mind” which are “emptied” and “disconnected,” producing a series of fragments, an assemblage.<sup>292</sup> Joanna's film-body, in terms of Deleuze and Guattari's analysis of “bodies” and “power,” is a “body-without-organs,” a body which “empties” itself in order to feel only

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<sup>290</sup>Deleuze, *MI*, p114.

<sup>291</sup>Deleuze, *MI*, p117.

<sup>292</sup>D&G use the term “assemblage” to refer to the “fragmentation” and “dismantling” of the “BwO” before it is “emptied” and “filled” with intensities. (see *TP*, p165-84).



intensities and waves of becoming.<sup>293</sup> The body-without-organs de-organises (and de-connects) the various parts of the body and crosses their wires, not content to proceed in a linear, or cliché fashion (as with the any-space-whatever).<sup>294</sup> Just as there are two kinds of space, there are two kinds of “film-body.” 1) The first body is organised to make sense, to produce a striated space which prepares the linkages of each movement-image. 2) The second breaks with these connections, and de-organises itself, producing a smooth Reimannian space and with it a BwO. As Deleuze and Guattari write, “Reimann space... cannot locate [its] spaces in relation to each other without a new convention. Each vicinity is therefore like a shred of Euclidean space, *but the linkage between one vicinity and the next is not defined and can be effected in any number of ways*,”<sup>295</sup> thus calling on the spectator's active production of meaning through thinking (film thought).

Throughout this process I imagine that the “film's face” becomes one of Deleuze's characters who is placed in a pure struggle of affection, in a metaphysical philosophy of shadow, white and the spirit. Covered in shadow the cinema-space (the “film's mind,” seated behind the screen/eye) becomes like Plato's cave, a return to the *genesis* of Western thought. As Daniel Frampton writes, “Film-thinking resembles no one single kind of human thought, but perhaps the *functional spine of human thinking*.”<sup>296</sup> This functional spine is theory of “being,” a philosophy of spirit, enacted in images. As Anne Kirker writes, Joanna “takes recognisable motifs to suggest a state of being that transcends the physical.”<sup>297</sup> This is not only the “brain of the screen,” but the brain of the film-body. Furthermore, it is not only a “mindscreen,” but a mind-space, a moonscape: filled with crater-shadows, flat-light, moon-grey and the white sound of night.<sup>298</sup> In Joanna's films “space” itself is foregrounded. As Joanna writes, “Since leaving home... I have tried to pay attention

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293D&G: “A BwO is made in such a way that it can be occupied, populated only by intensities. Only intensities pass and circulate.” (*TP*, p169)

294D&G: “The BwO... is opposed to that *organisation* of the organs called the organism.” (*TP*, p175, my italics) The “organisation” I am referring to is narrative organisation of organs (shots) into a linear, orderly progressions. As Joanna writes, “Fiction action anecdote or contrivance of any kind is rejected.”

295D&G, *TP*, p535.

296Daniel Frampton, “Introduction” to *Filmosophy*. Internet WWW page, at URL: <<http://www.filmosophy.org/articles>> (version current at 1/1/2008).

297Kirker, p200.

298Both Deleuze and Marks mention the connection between lunar-spaces,, moonscapes and any-spaces-whatever. See Deleuze, *MI*, p121.

to the effects of light, the way light explicates the world; the complimentary burr produced by adjacent colours... the sense in which this linear (interface) of object/area can be used to define *spaces* w. the same or greater clarity than objects – the possibility here for a visual poetry.”<sup>299</sup>

In this chapter I intend to unfold the philosophical wanderings of the film's mind emptied of representation, emptied of images. It is shadows, whites, lights and greys which fill this “film mind,” which pass across the “film's body without organs,” corresponding to the “existential any-space-whatever” of the “film's spirit.”

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<sup>299</sup>Paul and Eagle, p92.

## 2. A Place for Shadows: The Emptiness of the Orient

“I cd see the light/  
shadows in the white.”<sup>300</sup>

I think of shadows which fall over. Darkness covers the s(cr)een. Shadows on the porch, cutting the frame in half. Shadows creeping over the grass, sinking into every object. Shadows flatten the grey pavement. In between the green of every leaf. Shadows of fences: striated spaces spilling over the lawn. Shadows in the foreground, making a dark frame around a now brightened image. Shadows in the evening, in the morning and in the high noon sun. Shadows in houses, in rooms, in the forest, and city. Shadows on dirt grounds. Jillian becomes a shadow. Shadows fall inward and outward, over things and under things. Everything either receding into shadow, or framed by it. Joanna Margaret Paul's films are a *place for shadows*: as she herself writes, “it's true that I too inhabit that shadow world.”<sup>301</sup> Coupled with Deleuze: “a space full of shadows, or covered with shadows, becomes an any-space-whatever.”<sup>302</sup> What effect do these shadows have on my experience of vision?

The shadow is the *opposite* of vision and contrasted with the visible it provides a difference by which vision can be defined: I see it, but I do not see it. In *Port Chalmers Cycle*, *Bosshard's House* and *Napkins* (or any number of Joanna's films in which I am plunged into total darkness) I see only the absence of other things and in this, I see the shadow. Only by knowing the limitlessness of shadows do I encounter the difference between “vision” and *vision sans vision*. In this sense, while the “light-image” opened Joanna's films onto the visible, the shadow frees the film from “seeing” and “being seen.” Vision is replaced with “visions,” and images

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<sup>300</sup>Paul and Eagle, p92.

<sup>301</sup>Paul, in O'Brien, p77.

<sup>302</sup>Deleuze, *MI*, p111.

become “imagination.” In Joanna's “any-spaces-whatever” time-images draw on the mind, rather than the memory. Bachelard argues that the poetic image is a “new” kind of image. Deleuze writes of “noo-images,” and “optical-images,” arguing that they break with the expectations of “vision,” having the potential to awaken the *spirit* of the spectator (which leads to *philosophy*). When I am in darkness I have no body with me, and I can only “imagine” where I am. As Bachelard writes, “In order to clarify the problem of the poetic image philosophically, we shall have recourse to a phenomenology of the imagination.”<sup>303</sup> In Joanna's films I find that this becomes a phenomenology of *shadows*.

The shadows are so numerous in Joanna's films that I could *just watch them* (ignoring what the image represents, its “perceptions”) and see a completely different film. Here I find films made not of “perception-images,” but of “imperception-images.” In *Port Chalmers Cycle*, for instance, there is a shot with a shadow in the foreground, filling up the space, dwarfing everything else. In the background I see a house and a white “thing” hanging on a clothes-line (an article of clothing which I cannot recognise). The shadow has the effect of *flattening* the screen. The objects which occur in this flatness seem disembodied, cut off from everything in the world. I flick between the two perceptions unable to reconcile them. On one hand, the house and the clothes-line exist in the world of perception (of real things). On the other, the shadow opens on to an “any-space-whatever” and an “optical image” (an image which I cannot re-cognise). This optical-image, if I *continue* to look at it, shatters the perception-image. I *stare* into it, trying to see what it is. No amount of looking gives me a noun to name the image with, apart from the general conceptual term “abstract.” Something Ian Wedde wrote about a series of Joanna's drawings is equally applicable to her film-making here; “Inside are three small ink drawings: of details, but details of what, exactly? They could derive from peering even more deeply into the detail of the cover, a microscopic, almost forensic view.”<sup>304</sup> As Marks writes, “The optical image defamiliarises the cliché by severing it from its context. The resulting image looks rarefied and abstract compared to the thickness of clichéd images.”<sup>305</sup> If I read the perception-

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303Bachelard, pxiii.

304Wedde, p16.

305Marks, *SoF*, p46.

image as the cliché, then the shadow is that which severs the cliché from its context. In Joanna's films "I can" read them either way. In the last chapter I read for perception, which deconstructed the cliché in order to produce unknown bodies. Here I read the optical-image occurring in an any-space-whatever, which makes up a corresponding "body-without-organs."

However, as Marks points out, it is really the cliché (perception-image) which is abstract, and the optical-image which "thickens." At the end of the last chapter I found that images were nothing but light. This abstracts my notion of the "object." The house in this shot is not a house then, not an object (or a subject): it is beams of light (the same goes for the washing line). Representation becomes "thin" and without a unified "organisation" of perception. The space which is covered in shadow becomes "thick" and "full," seeming to fold back into the image and expand. The house and the washing line suddenly flick into the foreground, and the shadows become the background.<sup>306</sup> As Deleuze writes, shadows accentuate the *flatness* of the screen, "by 'an inversion of the values of light and dark', by an inversion of perspective," shifting "depth to the forefront."<sup>307</sup> As I continue to watch Joanna's films I begin to realise that almost every shot is drenched in some kind of "shadow." All perception and representation floats into the background (the floating-world) and I see nothing but shades of grey. I watch *Body House*, or *Auckland 1971*, but I no longer see the films as "individual," they merge into one another. All of Joanna's films become, in a sense, "equivalent," each a chapter of some flickering shadow-theatre.

I continue watching *Port Chalmers Cycle*. More and more shots steeped in shadow. A shot of leaves and a wooden pole leaning against a flat black background. The blackness "shifts" into the foreground, while the leaves and wooden pole seem to get smaller. Then a faint white grid projected on a shadow-graph (window frame). The grid looks fragile and disembodied like that. The flatness of the shadow starts to falter and gives way to a new depth. This depth seems infinite: a thickness of shadow which is endlessly expansive (a white cross in a shadow-space has no depth and yet it is *only depth*). These spaces, constantly

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306 "The ground constantly changes direction." (D&G, *TP*, 545)

307 Deleuze, *MI*, p112.

comprised of close-ups, enlarge the film's "eye" and the space of its body. In Joanna's films this enlargement is pushed to its limit, shadows constantly expanding and *thickening* the spaces which they flatten (and then extend). As Deleuze writes, "the shadow extends to infinity."<sup>308</sup> I stare into the shot lost in the "emptied space" of the shadow. I feel as if the "film-body" is being "emptied" of its representations, turned into a vast cavernous shadow, becoming a giant cinematic "body-without-organs." Then another shot of the same window and something reflected in the glass. Or perhaps something behind the glass: a curtain? I can't tell. It reflects the window inside it, and floats in the emptiness of a black space. The empty space expands around the thing and the "thing" seems to get smaller in the frame. Representation is shrunken, and shadows expand, "giving space a great depth."<sup>309</sup>

Then a shot of a garden: leaves of green and white 'glinting' shadow-spaces. The whole left half of the screen is completely black, opening onto a vast space. The plants are no longer plants to me: they have become the edges of the shadow. Then a shot of a window close up, the top of it completely black. The black seems to expand *into* the screen. There is a tiny curved orange "light" in the centre of the screen. The light seems to rush away from me in the depth. Then: a shot in which there is only the tiniest shred of representation left, indifferently grey and far off in the background. *Infinite space*. Then there is a change in exposure and the grey becomes a blinding white suddenly, light firing from the blackness to the "existential eye," awakening a sense of becoming in me (the light-image triggering a return to "affection" in its pure state). Connected to the "existential eye" I feel *myself* shrinking as the blackness expands. A pool of darkness into which I sink. I am reduced to the size of the small light in the previous shadow, with nothing but emptiness around me. I imagine that I am a single "light receiver" of the "film's eye" and that the "empty spaces" are gaps between me and the next "light receiver." I am becoming the place where the eye and world meet, and "mingle." For Merleau-Ponty this is one way in which my body is "folded" into the world. Merleau-Ponty argues that we are not separate from the world, but actually folded

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308Deleuze, *MI*, p111.

309Deleuze, *MI*, p111.

into it, our flesh in constant exchange with the flesh of the world (light, waves, intensities).<sup>310</sup> In this sense we are neither subject, nor object, but an “interject,” spliced into the machine assemblage of the universe. To my usual mode of thinking an eye is just an eye. To a “light receiver” *in* the eye, the eye is an entire universe in which it lives intersubjectively with other “light receivers,” each with their own consciousnesses and situated existence. *My eyes thin(g)king.*

More and more shadows follow. Then there is a shot which plunges me completely into shadow with nothing to see. I do not become a speck of light, but am suddenly myself, alone in the cool, dark depths. I am imperceptible and I am blind. The shadow flattens and then extends to infinity creating an infinite “film-body” in which I am suddenly lost. I am shrunken. There is no sound and everything around me seems *quieter* than before. The room in which I am in has gone completely black as well. In the next shot I cut to an image of two elderly people slowly walking along the road. They are dwarfed by the frame, drifting into the distance. I feel that I have *become* them in the previous image; my body shrinking, my hearing and vision slowly fading from view (viewed or viewing). I am becoming “elderly.” In this moment I *see* again, re-grounding the affection-image in a perception-image, shattering the any-space-whatever.<sup>311</sup> Unlike the previous chapter which passed from movement to time, these films enable the passage from time *back* to movement.

I find these “becomings” arise everywhere in Joanna's films: images taking on the qualities of bodily transformations, as I have described in the last chapter. But what happens when there is no representational image to link the “becoming” too? What happens when I become *nothing*, but still become. Perhaps I become becoming itself? Or is this what Deleuze calls “becoming imperceptible.”

0) In a later section of *Port Chalmers Cycle* the eye “jolts” down a road. The frame moves erratically up and down. In this moment, as I have said, the film's

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310“In Merleau-Ponty's account, time and space are thick, almost viscous with experience. “Memory is built out of the progressive and continuous passing of one instant into the other, and the interlocking of each one, with its whole horizon, into the thickness of its successor.” Our perceptions fold us into this thick world at the same time as they demarcate us from it.” (Marks, *SoF*, p148) As Deleuze writes, “His task is one of interpreting the Heideggerian fold as a “chiasm or interlace” between the visible [*visible*] and the seeing [*voyant*].” Deleuze, *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque* (University of Minnesota Press, 1993) p146.

311These kinds of readings will become the central “machine” of the third chapter.

“existential eye” and “body” is foregrounded. The body moves like none I know, jaggedly making its way up the street. 1) In the first shot the wall to the left casts a shadow, but it does not flatten the screen. It is a veil. 2) In the second shot of the sequence, the eye directs us to the ground itself, and follows the line of the shadow, contrasting it with the pavement, covered in little black specks. The pavement is bright and framed next to the shadow loses its representational qualities and becomes like an “abstract” painting of black paint flicked at a canvas. The shadow in this shot is thicker and begins to flatten.

3) In the third shot of the pavement, the image starts out overexposed and then shifts quickly to underexposed, contrasted against a thick black shadow (which slowly fills the frame). The eye heads for the shadow, the shadow getting *bigger and bigger*. 4) In the fourth shot the eye plunges into the shadow and I become infinitely small against the infinitely large canvas of the black screen. I am thrown into the “emptied space” like a speck of paint, becoming smaller and smaller. This emptied space is not becoming anything else, not grounded in a perception to follow. I am thrown into the film's body, emptied of all its “organisations.”<sup>312</sup> Every representation is complemented by a shadow in Joanna's films and these shadows connect *all* the films together, organising the films according to a kind of “essence.” This essence is what Deleuze calls the “qualisign” of the any-space-whatever.<sup>313</sup> Shadows become openings in the frame, extending from one film to another (spilling out, falling over). Although Joanna's films all offer different becomings at the level of perception, in the any-space-whatever I find “pure becoming.” The films are “one” in a sense, but within this “one” there are a number of different speeds and intensities. It is both the one and multiple simultaneously.

Perhaps I could say this shadow is the “spirit” of Joanna's films? As Deleuze writes, “*the any-space whatever... is identical to the power of the spirit.*”<sup>314</sup>

312D&G: “The BwO is not opposed to the organs,” such as the organ of the eye, “rather, the BwO and its “true organs,” which must be composed and positioned, are opposed to the organism, the organic *organisation* of the organs.” (TP, p176, my italics)

313A “qualisign” is something we appreciate for the sheer existence of its qualities, in its ineffable “realness.” The shadows are not “shadows-of,” but “shadows in-themselves,” or “shadow-singularities.” As Deleuze writes, one example of a qualisign, borrowed from C.S. Pierce, might be “a field of corn which becomes boundless, 'dazzling yellow immensity'.” (MI, p108) There is always an immensity, an exaggerated enlargement, of the 'qualisign': it is *bigger* than you. Incorporating Sobchack's notion of the spectator's existential, embodied experience of cinema, as the 'qualisign' gets bigger, I get smaller.

314Deleuze, MI, p117.



In reducing my perceptions to “nothing,” to the blank screen (an optical-image, a time-image) I am reminded that cinema begins as *nothing* but black celluloid. Next to “movement” and “light-images” those images which deny representation, or “non-images,” are the “essence” of cinematic perception. Light, which is moving hits black celluloid. From this the “film's life” is born and grows (the author its parents, so to speak). The darkness of the shadow produces a particular kind of film-body which “empties” itself in preparation for being filled with new “intensities” (a BwO). As Marks writes, “Deleuze [suggests] that the absence of images, such as with a black or white screen, underdeveloped or snowy image, has the 'genetic power' to restore our belief in the world... to bring something new out of the ruins of the image.”<sup>315</sup>

From the disconnected spaces of all Joanna's films I find “something new” arising, a sense of spirit, of wholeness to the parts. But this wholeness is not like that of narrative. It does not connect the parts in any order. I am left to arrange them as I please, the shadows providing linkages in any direction, to any shot. I think of my own body. When I walk around outside and the sunlight hits me, all of this sunlight is reflected off me. I take in light as heat and I take it in directly through the “eyes.” Other than my eye, there is no “light” *in* my body, so to speak, only a vast “shadow.” Light awakens me to that which is outside my organised body, but it is shadows which flow *through* the body, which “empty” it. I am nothing more than a grain of sand, a single atom, or something smaller, a “quark” perhaps, lost in the deep, thick caverns of the film's body-without-organs.

As Deleuze writes, “If we want to grasp an event we must not show it... we must not pass along the event, but plunge into it, go through all the geological layers that are its internal history (and not simply a more or less distant past).”<sup>316</sup> The event of the “spirit” is just such an event. The only way to express spirit is to *not* express it and to perceive “nothing.” The only way to examine the nature of this spirit is to pull it apart, to separate the layers (or strata) of perception and affection “in order to,” as Marks writes, “resist the order that would be imposed by working on one stratum alone.”<sup>317</sup> This is a kind of textual “archaeology.”

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<sup>315</sup>Marks, *SoF*, p42.

<sup>316</sup>Deleuze, in Marks, *SoF*, p29.

<sup>317</sup>Marks, *SoF*, p29.

*Between* all these nothings (fragments of non-images) there is the “film's spirit.” In the sequence from *Port Chalmers Cycle* I described above I see a continual renewal of the shadow and its many geological layers. *Eye* pass from the struggle between the material (flat) screen and the representational screen, to the struggle between the material (physical) screen (the brain) and the mind (metaphysical) screen (thought). Along the way *I* experiences a whole series of imperceivable events: becoming light, becoming atom, smaller and smaller, as the shadow-space gets larger and larger. Finally I become the shadow-spirit of the “film” itself and, as Deleuze notes on the power of certain shadows, I pass “on the spot from one space to the other, from physical space to spiritual space.”<sup>318</sup> As if echoing my experiences Joanna writes, “I have pursued the beauty of suggestion and things concealed.”<sup>319</sup>

But it is not only in the struggle of darkness that I find the film's spirit, but also the “white space.” As Deleuze writes, “Darkness and the struggle of the spirit, white and the alternative of the spirit are the first two procedures by which space becomes any-space-whatever.”<sup>320</sup> White space is not just the “light” but the “whiteness” of walls, of roofs, of wooden hand-rails and of the sky covered in a veil of cloud. It *reflects* the light, just as the shadow deflects the light. The shadows are not a “completion” of this process of making “spirit,” but only one way to “empty” the film's body, to de-connect space and form a “new dependence” of its parts. If there are shadows everywhere in Joanna's films (and there are) then equally there are white “luminous” spaces everywhere. *Port Chalmers Cycle* opens with shots half filled with the city, half filled with a brilliant cloud-white-sky. It is the white I *watch*. It flattens the screen and makes everything else in the frame seem so much *darker*. I cut to a close-up tracking along white wooden hand-rails forming a network of criss-crosses, blinding and “flat.” Here shadows fill in the spaces between the rails and the background. The white becomes a lattice weaving of “matter” in the “spirit” of the shadow. I am reminded of all the window frames I have seen, all their “crosses” hanging in the shadows. The white space is

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318Deleuze, *MI*, p117.

319Paul, “Shibusha,” p11.

320Deleuze, *MI*, p117.

“luminous,”<sup>321</sup> and the shadow, in its spirit, is “numinous,” an expanse of nothing.<sup>322</sup> As Rosalind Krauss writes, “If the window is this matrix of ambivalence, and the bars of the window – the grid – are what help us to see, to focus on, this matrix,” then “the work of art can allude, and even reconstitute, the forms of being.”<sup>323</sup>

For Deleuze the luminous is a semi-religious, spiritual space and in *Port Chalmers Cycle* I feel the “religion,” or “spirituality,” of the white light. Following the shot of the hand-railing, there is a series of shots of a white, luminous sky. In these shots there are also buildings, and in particular a church. The church is grey and the sky shines, seeming to be that which the “existential eye” is *focused* on. The light pulses and I notice the edges of the church waver, the light making them quiver. The representation loses its solidity, and becomes unstable. I pass from the physical, to the metaphysical again (to a blanket of white). This white does not expand and empty (for me) but *fills up*. As I focus on the “white space” I see that it is filled with little black specks. Even in the white I find the shadow-spirit extending. Each of these little black specks I imagine to be one of the num(in)erous “black screens” of Joanna's films. The white becomes a spiritual space of black “matter.” Black and white exchange places, embracing each other in a “yin-yang.” Inside the black there is white, and equally inside the white is the black. Furthermore, inside the white specks I find more black (and vice-versa). Neither can be without the other. Neither is wholly material or spiritual, physical or metaphysical. Everything is *between*. When the shadow is spirit, the white is the material which forms a “pleat.” When the white is spirit, the shadow becomes a “fold” in matter. Joanna, in her own words, was always interested in “that which takes you beyond sensation... I'm interested in the experience that goes beyond, for instance, the landscape. It's something you can read in abstract or spiritual terms as

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321Deleuze: “The white... is primarily that which circumscribes a space corresponding to the luminous.” (*MI*, p93)

322We must remember, as Yasunari Kawabata writes, “Here we have the emptiness of the Orient... but it is not to be taken for the nihilism of the West. The spiritual foundation would seem to be quite different.” Kawabata, *Japan, the Beautiful, and Myself* (1968: Kodansha International, 1981) p41. This is an “emptiness” which has the potential to be filled, not an “emptiness” opposed to the full. This is a point I will return to in the conclusion. A line from one of Joanna's poems springs to mind: “numinous/ luminous/ tremulous/ amorous” (Bisley, p33). In this chapter I move from the “numinous/luminous” to the “tremulous” grey, to the “amorous” love of the totally emptied space, in the void. This is “emptiness as a field of compassion.”

323Krauss, p17.

well as representational terms and that isn't a contradiction. Perhaps I am talking about "religious" imagery."<sup>324</sup>

The white space does not "extend" (as the shadow does). Instead, it *expands*. The white seems to pulse and flicker *within* the eye, thickening the previously flat space of the screen. In a particularly striking shot I see thin black branches silhouetted against a "blinding white" (I cannot even call it "sky"). The screen flickers, the eye cannot keep internally "still" (though it does not move exactly: *it moves without moving!*). The eye did not change position in space, moving on the outside. This is a movement on the inside. The white screen seems to curve, resembling the lens of an eye. I see black specks in the white. As Joanna writes, "The way a lamp-post changes from dark to light from red to green against a changing background occupied me in many small watercolours & all paintings done by 'light of day'; just as stresses in relation to one's own body the continual adjustment of the view as one's body/perspective shifts – have engaged me say in larger oil window paintings. 'Space is curved'. My intuition attempts to put that knowledge into practice."<sup>325</sup>

Deleuze argues that shadows on the face of a character represent a "struggle" for the character, usually their thirst for "evil."<sup>326</sup> The white represents their "spiritual choice,"<sup>327</sup> or alternative. Placed in the "existential eye" of a "film body" the film itself (its intentional consciousness) is this character (who I have become). The struggle is no longer between the "moral" and the "ethical" (as Deleuze goes on to analyse in the "narrative-film") but between perception and affection, between flatness and depth, between depth and spirit, and finally between the black and the white, the ultimate "difference," leading to an experience of philosophical and/or spiritual "indifference" (when we choose not to choose, to let the two co-exist, entangled and superimposed, in all times and spaces).<sup>328</sup> This film itself is a "character" engaged in philosophically reflecting on perception itself (and

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324Paul, in O'Brien, p75.

325Paul and Eagle, p92.

326Deleuze, *MI*, p117.

327Deleuze, *MI*, p113.

328"Indifference has two aspects: the undifferentiated abyss, the black nothingness... in which everything is dissolved – but also the white nothingness, the once more calm surface upon which float unconnected determinations." Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* (1968: Continuum, 2004) p36.

more importantly, the difference between perception/representation and the imperceptible). In what, at first, seems like a classical Hegelian dialectic “eye” have moved from the subjective-mind of the shadow (eye cannot see) to the objective-mind of the white (eye see! white is not the shadow) to the absolute-mind of spirit. But within this “absolute” mind there is no “one” synthesis (an “absolute”) but two more: the white-in-black and the black-in-white. I move from a Hegelian synthesis of a thesis (black) and antithesis (white) to a yin-yang pattern, which repeats what is outside on the inside. To the Taoist there really is no black and no white. They are illusions. Black *is* white and white *is* black. They are not opposed (as in Hegelian and Aristotelian philosophy) but complimentary, and reversible (as in Merleau-Ponty). Black is immanent to white. White becomes the ground upon which black emerges. Only the space between them is real. As Merleau-Ponty writes, seeming to echo Taoist thought, “What we have to understand is that there is no dialectical reversal from one of these views to the other; we do not have to reassemble them into a synthesis: they are two aspects of the reversibility and this is the ultimate truth.”<sup>329</sup>

Due to the “existential” nature of the “eye” there is no “synthesis,” instead there is a “folding” of terms into a multiplicity. Thinking as the “film's mind” (the “screen-brain,” the “mindscreen”) no longer commenting on events, or remembering them, but experiencing them in the present, produces a philosophical becoming, leading me back to “nothingness” (both luminous and numinous, representation moved to the background). As Joanna writes, “If you're interested in the play of light then the subject can be as matter-of-fact as a post or a letter box; I'm looking for something that's almost nothing.”<sup>330</sup> And as Greg O'Brien notes of her painting, but equally applicable to her films, “While landscape painting is one of Joanna's principal concerns, she does not consider it an end in itself. Rather, it is a way of investigating perception and spirituality.”<sup>331</sup>

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<sup>329</sup>Merleau-Ponty, in Sobchack, *AoE*, p4.

<sup>330</sup>Paul, in O'Brien, p73.

<sup>331</sup>O'Brien, p75.

### 3. Any-Space-Whatever: De-Connected

“Last night I was in the Kingdom of Shadows. If you only knew how strange it is to be there. It is a world without sound, without colour. Everything there - the earth, the trees, the people, the water and the air - is dipped in monotonous grey. Grey rays of the sun across the grey sky, grey eyes in grey faces, and the leaves of the trees are ashen grey. It is not life but its shadow, it is not motion but its soundless spectre.”<sup>332</sup>

“What clarity is sought will more than likely have to do with attention to detail, with the careful calibration of scale, with the *limits of relationship*, with the coherence of sequence, and with the exact syntax of duration.”<sup>333</sup>

“Grey our uncertainty, our seeking, our indifference.”<sup>334</sup>

“LIKE curved headstones / grey slabs / rest in the / sculpture garden.”<sup>335</sup>

In the last section I entered the mind of the film; not only the “brain” (the *physical* mechanisms revealed in the last chapter) but the mind, that “thinking” part. This thought, taken from the point of view of fragments and shadows, began as a theory of difference, a difference between imperceptible dark and perceptible light. This gave way to the difference (and repetition) *between* the light and the dark, the alternation of the spirit, the interlacing of black and white. Finally there was no “difference,” the two exchanged places, spirit/shadow and matter/light in constant reversal, each folded/pleated into the other (the white rays of the silhouette, and the black specks of the white space).

Between the two are the shades of “grey.” The grey does not “fall on the

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332Maxim Gorky (1896), in Frampton, p1.

333Wedde, p15. My italics.

334Deleuze, *MI*, p117.

335Bernadette Hall, “Bread for Isaiah: Joanna Margaret Paul,” in Ross (ed.), p60.

film's face," but is in the *thick* of the world. The shadows and light fall "here" in the film's body (where I am: the theatre), while the grey is "there," still apart from me, at a distance. If the black and white might be considered the *emptying* of the film's body, the grey is what *fills* this space (with intensities, energies, speeds, and waves). As Deleuze writes, "This time, it is the empty space which is all of a sudden filled."<sup>336</sup>

The shadows, the light, the black and the white make up the any-space-whatever, but what is the "any-space-whatever" filled with? In *Gravestones* fragments of gravestones, one after the other. In *Roses* fragments of roses, and in *Auckland* fragments of Auckland. Nothing is ever seen whole: I never see the graveyard itself, only tiny little pieces of gravestones, building the space "fragment by fragment" (a space made up of de-connected "ideas" or "thoughts," floating in an "any-space-whatever"). All of Joanna's films, however, return to grey: especially the grey of concrete, of gravestones, of side-walks, of car-parks, of walls, and of buildings. From black, to white, to grey: a phenomenology of "tones" (approaching spiritual indifference). Joanna's film *Gravestones*, being comprised exclusively of close-ups of "grey" s(tones), is the perfect site for analysing and thinking through this "spiritual indifference."

The "gravestones" are firstly fragmented. I see *bits* of gravestones, and never the whole. There are never wide shots in which to locate previous close-ups. In Joanna's films the close-up is used in almost every shot, fragmenting objects and people. *Auckland* is shown as so many fragmented moments, and *Roses* are shattered into thousands of tiny pieces. As Deleuze writes, "The law of this space is 'fragmentation'. Tables and doors are not given whole."<sup>337</sup> When a film is comprised only of affection-images, when the whole film is a collection of fragments with no predetermined relation to one another, the "affection-image" becomes an "any-space-whatever." This "fragmentation" exists at the level of *both* montage *and* mise-en-scene: 1) the gravestones brought to the foreground of the mise-en-scene (closer and closer and closer) and then, 2) repeated *over* and *over* again in the montage, fragment (of gravestone) by fragment. At the end of the last chapter I

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<sup>336</sup>Deleuze, *MI*, p121.

<sup>337</sup>Deleuze, *MI*, p108.

described the effect of the continuous stream of gravestones as equivalent to saying (or writing) “gravestones! gravestones! gravestones!” In the any-space-whatever I become acutely aware that a more precise translation (taking account of the fragmentation) would be something like “grav-, -tone, -aves, sto-, -vest-, -rave-” (and so on).<sup>338</sup> In a “perceptive” mode of viewing I did not see the fragmentation. I saw objects, re-membered by an “unknown body.” Now the “film’s body” itself is fragmented across time and space. Time and time again I *appear* before the gravestone: nothing but grey(ve s)tones.

What effect does this have on my experience of space? Classically space is used to “orient” the viewer and the characters, to “place” things in a causal relation with each other. Robert Bresson (central to Deleuze’s definition of the any-space-whatever) argues that fragmentation, or rather, foregrounded fragmentation (as an “any-space-whatever”) causes the usual dependence on space as “homogeneous” (as a singular, monolithic hyperdoche) to break down and reveal *new* linkages. If space is no longer “one” (fragmented instead) then what “connects” things? Perhaps, that which is unseen: the *spirit*. As Bresson writes, “On *fragmentation*: This is indispensable if one does not want to fall into *representation*. To see beings and things in their separate parts. Render them *independent* in order to give them a new dependence.”<sup>339</sup> In *Gravestones* I see the gravestones, but I do not see them as a representation of a “graveyard.” I never *see* the graveyard. The usual way of organising the “stones” is removed and I am opened onto new potentials.<sup>340</sup>

For Deleuze this begins the process of awakening a “camera consciousness,” which meditates on a single image: on the “gravestones,” in *Gravestones*, the “roses” in *Roses*, the “napkins” in *Napkins*. Deleuze uses two films by Joris Ivens, *Rain* and *Bridge*, to illustrate his reading of silent, poetic, experimental “any-space-whatevers.”<sup>341</sup> In *Rain* I see shots of rain, one after the other, as it falls on the city. In *Bridge* I see a “rapid montage of seven hundred

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338One might image a similar “poem” for each of the titles of Joanna’s films: “Motorway,” “Roses,” “To the Bay,” “Peonies,” “Napkins,” “Green” and so on (titles from Paul, “Shibusha,” p11). In the last chapter I investigated “pivot-words,” here these terms become “cut-words.”

339Bresson, *Notes on Cinematography* (Urizen Books, 1977) p46. In Bresson’s original the words “fragmentation” and “representation” are in capitals, not italics.

340We pass from the actual to the virtual, which restores the pure potentiality of the any-space-whatever. As Deleuze writes, “It is a potentiality.” (*MI*, p111)

341*The Bridge* (dir. Ivens, 1928) and *Rain* (dir. Ivens, 1928).



shots,”<sup>342</sup> the bridge not built “bolt by bolt” but “fragment by fragment.” As Bela Balazs writes of *Bridge*, “This metallic construction is dissolved in immaterial images, framed in a thousand different ways. The fact that this bridge can be seen in a multiplicity of ways renders it, as it were, unreal... These are visual variations on which it would be difficult for a goods train to travel.”<sup>343</sup> Similarly, as I watch the “gravestones” pass by I do not find myself imagining that a “mourner” would exist here; I cannot place anyone in the space, for there is no “space.” Rather, there is an “any-space-whatever” into which “eye” fall, an endless expanse of shadows, whites and lights.

Deleuze, quoting Balazs, writes that the rain of Iven's *Rain* is not “a determined rain which has fallen somewhere. These visual representations are not unified by spatial or temporal representations. What is perceived here... is not what rain really is...’ [rather] it is a set of singularities which presents rain as it is in itself... which combines all possible rains and makes up the corresponding any-space-whatever.”<sup>344</sup> In a sense then, I do not perceive the shots of the rain or bridge (or gravestones) as organised in Cartesian space and time “co-ordinates.” Instead, I enter into the *feeling* of rain as a pure quality, the *essence* of the “rose” or “napkin” in-itself. This essence is ineffable and cannot be grasped or described exactly. It can only be *felt*.<sup>345</sup> I am not the *seeing* the rain or bridge (as rain or bridge) but neither is it “a concept of bridge... [nor] the individuated state of things defined by its form... It is a pure *potentiality*.”<sup>346</sup> This potentiality is “qualisign,” the “spirit” of the thing which flows *between* the images: not its physical being, but its metaphysical becoming.<sup>347</sup>

But what is this potential? What is the “essence” of a gravestone, or of a rose, or of rain? To propose a theory of an essences is to begin a metaphysics and in making a metaphysical distinction we must first confront the distinction between “matter” and “spirit” (between an Aristotelian *ontology* of matter and a Hegelian

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342Deleuze, *MI*, p111.

343Balazs, *Le Cinema*, p167 (in Deleuze, *MI*, p110-11).

344Deleuze, *MI*, p110-111.

345The any-space-whatever, like self-conscious free-indirect-discourse is felt through expression (the reversal of perception). Both are recesses of the movement-image as 'poetry'.

346Deleuze, *MI*, p111. My italics.

347Deleuze, *MI*, p117.

*phenomenology* of “spirit”). Aristotle's theory runs something like this: if there is a gravestone (which there is) and this gravestone is a part of the set of “gravestones” (every gravestone in existence) then there must be something “essential” to every “gravestone” in the set, something which constitutes the singular “essence” of “this” thing here, and not “that” thing there. This constitutes a theory of “being,” of what the gravestones are “being” in-themselves, differently from all other things which are also “being.” This then, is an *ontology* (and for Aristotle ontology is the cornerstone of metaphysics). As Marks writes, quoting Merleau-Ponty, “Words most charged with philosophy are not necessarily those that contain what they say, but rather those that most energetically open upon *being*.”<sup>348</sup> For Aristotle the object of metaphysics was ontology: a theory of what is “being.”

As if to illustrate this *Gravestones* is punctuated with the odd shot of something which is *not* a gravestone: a pole fallen on the ground, a dog ferreting in the grass, a chequered floor, some trees, concrete broken on the ground. Given that the film is called “gravestones” and most of the shots make up a set of “gravestones,” these “other” shots must belong to the set of “not-gravestones.” I notice that the pattern I have established in the section on shadows is now *repeated* on the gravestones. From perception, to the imperceivable. From gravestones, to things that are “not-gravestones.” This way of thinking, oscillating between “being” and “not-being” is where Western philosophy begins: it is a kind of “first thought.”<sup>349</sup> This “difference” is an “opposition” and collapses the gravestones into secondness, into a kind of “action-image.” The “gravestones” build up a steady rhythm and then suddenly *collide* with that which is not a gravestone.<sup>350</sup> As the images collide there is a new kind of *becoming*: the trees, the fallen over pole, the dog, all participate in the any-space-whatever (taking on the qualisign). I start to see “graves” everywhere: the concrete in disrepair a grave for stones. The fallen

<sup>348</sup>Marks, *SoF*, p141. My italics.

<sup>349</sup>Since the times of ancient Greece Western philosophers have devoted much time to this 'problem' of 'being' (Plato, Aristotle, Hegel, Heidegger, Deleuze, *et al.*). F.E. Peters writes, “The question of the nature of being first arose in the context of Parmenides' series of logical dichotomies between being [*on*] and non-being (*me on*).” Peters, *Greek Philosophical Terms* (New York University Press, 1967). Being is such an important word to metaphysical philosophy that when it disappeared from the language of Latin, philosophers and thinkers (notably Benedict Spinoza) perceived its absence, and invented words to stand in for it (in Spinoza's case, '*esendai*'). As Spinoza writes, “Latin does not lend itself to such a mode of expression [as 'being'].” Spinoza, *Ethics* (1677: Wordsworth Classics, 2001) pLXXXIV. As Deleuze and Guattari write, “After all, is not Spinoza's *Ethics* the great book of the BwO?” (*TP*, p170)

<sup>350</sup>Deleuze describes the any-space-whatever as a “a space of tactile value.” (*MI*, p108)

over pole becomes a “dead sign.” I see trees and imagine falling leaves, the stark trunk a “gravestone” for the winter. A broken gravestone itself having passed, nothing more than an incomplete utterance: a bro / ken, sen / te . nce (a stutter). Everything becomes a “gra–” in the mind of the film.

The emptiness of the film's mind is filled with “gravestones” and yet everything which one might “say” to describe the gravestone is exhausted. Is a gravestone only in a graveyard? No, gravestones occur everywhere. A gravestone is anywhere there are graves made, or to be made. A gravestone is a marker for a “passing” of any kind. But it is more than this too: a gravestone is a kind of poem, a way of describing the trees, or the fallen down sign, a way of making these things live again (just as Joanna's films have done for so many “dead” images). Poetry brings to life that which has died. As Bachelard writes, the 'poetic' is made from those kinds of “images which have not [yet] been experienced, and which life does not prepare, but which the poet creates; of a living what has not been lived.”<sup>351</sup> I look harder and harder at the gravestones: they start to lose their material reality. I strain my eyes more and more peering into the b(g)rain of the screen, wondering what it is I am looking at.

Then I enter the grey(e s)tones in search of the gravestone. The gravestones are made up not only of grey, but also tiny bits of pure “white.” Against them I see stark silhouettes of small withered trees and old rusted gates (everything a “grave”). Inside the grey I also notice specks of black: tiny living shadows. Everything begins to come together. The two spirits, the two matters: difference emerging in the indifference of the any-space-whatever. The grey I suddenly notice is not the same from *greystone* to *gravestone* (from fragment to fragment). One is a darker grey, the next lighter. But darker and lighter than what? What “grey” do I mentally compare them to? I find I have no answer for this question. Each grey becomes a singularity, as if it were its *own* colour. Pavement-grey is not the same as sky-grey, or gravestone-grey. But this gravestone and that gravestone are not the same either. What does it mean to say, “These things are the *same* colour.” This statement, once sensible to me, is now completely insensible. Nothing is the *same*. Sameness can only be found in *absolute difference* (everything is the same, because everything is

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351Bachelard, pxxvi.

different). What at first seemed like a Hegelian synthesis of black and white into grey, now explodes into a multiplicity of variations and tones. I wonder how many different colours there are inside grey? And how many other differences which words and concepts unify without us noticing. I think of what I would say if someone asked me what “colour” a gravestone was. Once I might have said “grey.” But now, what I am used to calling “grey” is not actually grey but so many concrete *variations* colliding. As Joanna writes, “by allowing *difference* between what are virtually identical signifiers [to be experienced] we are pressed up to the limits of what can be said.”<sup>352</sup> Grey is a word which collects together many different “colours,” unifying them into “one” thing (*grey*). Further straining my eyes, looking only at the grey, I notice for the first time that there is a thin layer of “grain” over the image. Though this layer is thin, the more I look the thicker it becomes (and how much *thinner* the representational image gets). The harder I look, the more the image breaks down into shimmering multiplicities: *all the images abstract and turn to star dust*.

Laura Marks writes often of the grain of the film and its effect on the audience. She notes that, in one film, “The large grain of the images... breaks down any figure ground relationship.”<sup>353</sup> In *Gravestones* I let the grain dominate my vision, every image shattered turning into tiny particles, like a fine *fur* over the surface of the film's eye (the film becoming animal, growing hair). This dissolves all previous differences into one seething mass of gaseous plasma. Nothing is left but a vast, infinite sphere, completely emptied of matter: there is only energy. I am flung into this chasm, it reaches around me and I get smaller and smaller till I am nothing but a single atom/grain in the gravestone. In “becoming grain” (becoming atom) *I become everything*. As Deleuze and Guattari write, “If one reduces oneself to one or several abstract lines... then one becomes-everybody/everything.”<sup>354</sup> I notice in watching Joanna's other films that they all have this layer of grain, some thicker and more affective than others. This atomic intensity spreads out over the films. *I see nothing but grain!* As Marks writes, “The effect of this surface density is to invite a kind of vision that spreads out over the surface of the image instead of

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<sup>352</sup>Paul, *NPL*, p1.

<sup>353</sup>Marks, *SoF*, p154.

<sup>354</sup>D&G, *TP*, p309.

penetrating into depth.”<sup>355</sup> No more the spaces of shadow and white (neither deep nor shallow) but an endless see/thing mass. When I watch *Task* with this in mind I hardly see the woman ironing the clothes: I see atoms and the grainy surface of the screen. The film starts to boil, to create gaseous linkages. As I peer into the atoms I notice that between each one there is further space, an emptiness which is space *inside* space. An emptiness which is *within* emptiness.

I feel my own eye made of atoms and I become the screen, the projector, the gravestones, the roses, Auckland – I become *everything*. My eye tingles. This sensation begins to spread out over my body. I *feel* the images with my body suddenly, the rich textures of the film on my skin. These are what Marks calls “haptic images.” As Marks writes, “The works I propose to call haptic invite a look that moves on the surface of the plane of the screen for some time before the viewer realises what she or he is beholding. Such images resolve into figuration only gradually, if at all.”<sup>356</sup> Marks continues (referring to a film in which she gets closer and closer to images of material), “I realize that the tape has been using my vision as though it were a sense of touch; I have been brushing the (image of the) fabric with the skin of my eyes, rather than looking at it.”<sup>357</sup> Here I have moved (without moving) closer and closer to the gravestones, eventually becoming them. I do not touch them with my hands, but they touch me as atoms, on the inside (which is actually the outside: *the within that folds without*). As Deleuze and Guattari write, “Kerouac's dream, and already Virginia Woolf's, was for the writing to be like the line of a Chinese poem-drawing. She says it is necessary to “saturate every atom,” and to do that it is necessary to eliminate, to eliminate all that is resemblance and analogy, but also 'to put everything into it'.”<sup>358</sup>

At the level of my “actual body” I am me sitting in the theatre, but at the level of my “atomic body” *I really am everything*. My body suddenly feels alive, every atom awake and full of energy. I look back at the film (still *Gravestones*, it is one of Joanna's longer films) and I get a whiff of something, like musty air, or dirt.

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
355Marks, *SoF*, p137.

356Marks, *SoF*, p162-3.

357Marks, *SoF*, p127.

358D&G, *TP*, p309. Both Kerouac, and Woolf were Christian Westerners (like Joanna) whose lives were significantly changed by Taoist beliefs and philosophies. This is the empty-fullness of the Orient, rather than the empty-not-full of nihilism.

I get a cold feeling under the the still grey skies. *I realise I am smelling the gravestones and I am feeling the chill of the air where they are, in a time which I have never experienced.* I feel a shadow fall on my face. This time it is not a philosophical (in)difference: the grey-shadow-tone and I are one. I am the light. I am the roses. I am trees and cars and flowers and stones. I am I am I am I am—



*Fig. 5. Yin-Yang*

#### 4. Conclusion: The Third Meaning

“It spreads an “experimental night” or a white space over us; it works with a “luminous dust”; it affects the visible with a fundamental disturbance, and the world with a suspension, which contradicts all natural perception. What it produces in this way is the genesis of an unknown body.”<sup>359</sup>

Something Joanna said about an exhibition of hers in an eight sided room applies, I think, to her entire oeuvre; “They pursue a line of enquiry generated by the need to connect. Some patterns emerge – they also ponder a question; at what point does a house/a community disintegrate and cease to function.”<sup>360</sup>

No longer the old questions: what is this being (and what is it not being). No longer is this an author or isn't it. No longer fixed categories. New questions: at what point does the perceivable *become* imperceptible?<sup>361</sup> At what point does the author, or language, for instance, cease to function. At what point does matter *become* atoms? Or hot *become* cold? Or white *become* black? And at what point can they *reverse* and cease functioning as absolute, or uniform, in their difference. The Taoist, following the principles of the yin-yang, might answer: there is always hot in cold, waiting to become, and of course there is cold in hot as well. Hot and cold are only perceptions, or illusions (*maya*). In reality the water is water and nothing more. Hot and cold are the two sides of the yin-yang and its message is: they do not really exist! They are relative (no longer absolute). But also: they are *in* each other, intersubjectively entwined.

As Arthur Cooper writes, *yin* and *yang* “were originally topological terms,

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<sup>359</sup>Deleuze, in Marks, *SoF*, p127.

<sup>360</sup>Paul, *Fragile Communities – Intimate Maps* (Exhibition Catalogue, Wellington City Gallery, April 1986). In the same exhibition, a number of bonsai-trees were assembled to accompany the paintings: “Lastly to Mr and Mrs Barlow and the Bonsai Society for lending and looking after the bonsai trees.” Paul, *Paris is Changed, Alas!* (Exhibition Catalogue, Wanganui, February 19 – April 30).

<sup>361</sup>D&G, *TP*, p309.

like 'shine' and 'shade'," yang for the "sun itself," and yin for the "moon," the shadows, and that which "reflects the sun's light." It is a balance between the two sides, in any binary situation (and not all situations are binary) which brings "harmony" and constitutes one path of the Tao. All perceived opposites, once placed in the "yin-yang machine" becomes "intersubjective," as Merleau-Ponty describes. There is no "black" or "white," but only "tone-singularities," each as rich and variant as the last. But equally, white is black and black is white, each becoming the other. This becoming, or change, indicates an "energy" between them (*grey*). We mediate this "changing" thing with the body (perceptions) and form binary states. I say water from the fridge is cold (indicating a solid state) but to an icicle the water is not cold. The icicle is too cool to be "cold." Hot and cold are only indicators of *your* "temporal" state, relative to your own temperature. The sun is extremely hot. To the sun the things we call "hot" are "cold." All those terms which I had believed were fixed suddenly come unhinged and I am deeply moved. A tingle spreads out inside me: *is that the movement of atoms?*

In *Gravestones* (and all Joanna's films) I found the "struggle" of black within black and the "alternative" of the white in white. Then I found the black in the white and the white in the black (a yin-yang). Then they vanished (no black! no white!) and produced "grey." Then the grey dissolved and turned into the multiplicity of "grains." The "essence" of the gravestone was not found in opposition, but in "difference and repetition." White is different from black, but it repeats black and is essentially made of black. Black is different from white, but it repeats white somewhere within it. "Black" and "white" as "solid" concepts do not exist. In the second section I found that form and matter broke down into atoms: everything becoming "grain." I *become* everything, and yet everything *becomes* me. The macrocosm is the microcosm. In terms of "reading" each film, or thinking "concretely" (rather than in the abstract) there are an infinite number of concepts we might put in the spaces of 'yin' and 'yang'. Many thoughts float around, some taking hold and developing. Other drifting away—

0) I realise, I am scientifically "one" with the universe and yet this "one" is a multiplicity of atoms in a flow of energy, each with their own potential



*consciousness*. When I am the size of an atom, I think like an atom (and I return to myself convinced the atom *thinks*). This is more akin to Leibniz's theory of the monad, than modern science's view of the atom. This means that I am “me,” but I am also intersubjectively entwined with so many other consciousnesses (atoms) *inside* my body (which also intermingle with the real *outside*: on the inside). As Gene Youngblood writes, “The First Law of Thermodynamics states that energy is constant: it cannot be created or destroyed; its forms can change but not its quantity.”<sup>362</sup> This means the energy which makes up my body was present at both the beginning *and* end of the universe. *I am so very old.*<sup>363</sup>

1) Although differences (between men and women, between East and West, between Maori and pakeha) exist at the perceptive levels, and really do effect people's experience of this world, these differences do not *really* exist (outside experience). They are social constructions. Binaries are certainly useful in everyday thought (to make simple decisions involving our tastes) they cannot access the 'real', the virtual multiplicities of the non-actualised strata. Really we are all made of the same particles, the same space, all mingled into this non-actualised 'plane of immanence' (as Deleuze calls it). This is what the Dali Lama calls an “emptied space” of “compassion.”<sup>364</sup> In this emptiness there is “nothing,” but this nothing is not “no-thing,” but the “no-difference” which repeats in *everything*. This “no-difference,” or “indifference” is compassion (I become like everybody/everything).<sup>365</sup> As the Dali Lama writes, “Empty' means self-less, without self... it is like zero... [It] is nothing. But yet it is something... It is emptiness, and at the same time it is the basis for *everything*. We can investigate. When we investigate we cannot find any *thing*. We will just find emptiness. As to

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362Youngblood, p62-3.

363As Deleuze and Guattari write, “To be present at the dawn of the world. Such is the link between imperceptibility, indiscernibility, and impersonality – the three virtues.” (*TP*, p309)

364See His Holiness, The Dali Lama of Tibet, “Compassion as a Field of Emptiness,” in Rene Weber (ed.), *Dialogues with Scientists and Sages* (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986) p127-35. “It is from the point of view of objects that have the quality of emptiness [*sunya*, or “space”], that you get compassion.” (p135) That is, it is from the point of view of the gravestone that has the qualisign of emptied (and *de-connected*) *sunya*, that I feel a sudden and unmistakable compassion for *everyone and everything* (compassion in-itself). In the last chapter, similarly, the bodies produced a series of “compassions” for my mother and past women's experiences.

365The Dali Lama says that everything is “dependant” on everything else and that independence is an illusion. This is the process of the emptied and de-connected film-body becoming re-connected (intersubjective). If everything is “inter-dependent” then the key to happiness is “compassion.” (p134)

their nature things do not exist in accordance with how they appear.”<sup>366</sup>

2) Joanna was from New Zealand, and in New Zealand there is a colonial (majority) and indigenous people (the Maori). Like other cultures in similar positions racism, and racial tension, often gives rise to protesting and nationwide awareness of racial issues. Along with this, the Springbok tour happened in 1981 (during the period Joanna was making films) fuelling New Zealand's awareness of its own colonial history. Key to political disputes between the (still) largely “colonial” government and Maori activists is the *Treaty of Waitangi*, the treaty which supposedly gave the Queen of England sovereignty over Aotearoa. However, while the Maori text indicated a “yin-yang” style arrangement of sharing and interrelations, the Western text indicates a kind of Aristotelian binary in which one side (England) *dominates* the other. As I.H. Kawharu writes, “The Maori text predicates a *sharing* of power and authority in the governance of the country between Crown and Maori. The English text is about a *transfer* of power, leaving the Crown's sovereign and Maori as *subjects*.”<sup>367</sup> This difference mimics the differences between the “author function” and Benjamin's “author as producer.” The author function “subjects” the spectator, while the “author as producer” *shares* their power to create. Equally I might put the concepts of males and females in the “yin-yang machine” and reach a similar conclusion: men are women, women are men. It is only through social conditioning that we think of ourselves as “binary.” The yin-yang suggests dissolving all oppositional, binary thought so that we may find ways of *becoming* each other.

3) In New Zealand feminist politics, and racial politics are never far from one another. As Eagle writes to Joanna, “I remember you read and re-read Monique Wittig's *The lesbian body* – you assimilated a lot of her ideas, a kind of internalisation that I went through, other women went through, of claiming our bodies back – much like... I imagine, the tangata whenua claiming back the land.”<sup>368</sup> And later, in the same series of letters, Joanna writes, “We were in your 'cigarette' box car, Allie, arguing as we do about politics – I got out at the traffic lights where the street was filled with a procession of black people – I could see the

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366Dali Lama, p134.

367I.H. Kawharu, *Waitangi: Maori and Pakeha Perspectives of the Treaty of Waitangi* (Oxford University Press, 1989).

368Paul and Eagle, p85.

sweat on their faces. The moment I joined them the procession dissolved & I was climbing a hill with gleaming furrowed brow... I cd see the light/ shadows in the white.”<sup>369</sup>

4) In *Gravestones* I might think of Joanna's first child who died after only a brief period on this earth, imagining the slow release of her spirit into the universe (*becoming universe*). I do not find a sadness in this representation of death (though it is sad) but a kind of life which lives again: *matter returns to energy*. Everything is everything.<sup>370</sup> As Bisley writes about Joanna's poems concerning this tragic event, “however, while death is constantly present in the poems, it is not so much a lamentation as a reflection.”<sup>371</sup> In one poem, Bisley notes that, “while a large full stop at the end of the poem signals the finality of death, the large comma that parallels it at the top of the page modifies this effect. Imogen is described as “numinous,” a figure that reveals the presence of divinity as well as the “numen,” the presiding divine power. Coupled with these references to divinity, the comma can be considered as alluding to Paul’s belief in an afterlife. Imogen has been wrested from life, but she is “not dead not/ rested.” Paul negates death by locating it between two nots.”<sup>372</sup> These are the two “nots” of the yin-yang and the “nots” of metaphysics (“meta” is the plural of “me,” meaning “nots” in Greek). These are rhizome knots in a forest of trees: not living, not dead. No longer *either* “either/or” or “both/and” but now “neither/nor.”

4) For all the things I can think about, which come to me *later*, none are so interesting as the experiences I find in the film itself as I watch. The yin-yang is not the end of Taoist philosophy but only a beginning point. Let us say that space and time are in the yin-yang. Usually I think of space and time as separate entities. In the yin-yang space and time are intermixed. They are a part of each other (spacetime). Classical physics believed they were separate, but the binary is only a perception, a useful way of referring to experience (as modern physics has discovered). If time and space are intertwined and wholly together from the beginning, then, as the Buddhist says: “No space, no time!” When one becomes a

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369Paul and Eagle, p92.

370Not everything is “one.”

371Bisley, p13.

372Bisley, p33.

Buddhist, or Taoist (or Zen) monk, there are a series of questions you have to go through. A series of riddles: adventures with the shadow and light.<sup>373</sup> These develop the mind toward higher and higher planes of consciousness, until you can “become” the wind, the sky and the babbling brook. One such riddle is: “What are you?” The answer to this riddle is *not* to use words. There are no words which can describe what an “essence” or “spirit” is.

The “answer” in Buddhism is to step forward with the body and to thump your hand on your chest. Of course, one cannot just *perform* this action. You must mentally mean the act and understand it as “real.” I thump my chest to show I am my body first (space and time, *second*). As the thump hits the body the atoms resound and I feel my body in its true multiplicity (as a “body-without-organs”). My body empties, in order to feel the “real” intensities of energy within the body (the *tao*).<sup>374</sup> What we feel with the “everyday-mind” is not the atomic-body, the “body first” (or first-body). We are seated in the “second body,” the body which defines things through opposition (secondness, action). “Non-action is advised by the *Tao Te Ching*... Do nothing and do everything.”<sup>375</sup>

In this “non-action” however I find a new kind of “action.” I find smells, and sounds, and tastes, and touches. I find everything which I had previously thought absent from the images. I see in a way I had not thought possible before. It was as if I were seeing Joanna's films *for the first time*. Suddenly I experience what Marks calls a haptic-image. As Marks writes intercultural cinema often shows us that “memory may be encoded in touch, sound, perhaps even smell, more than in vision.”<sup>376</sup> This is the action of inaction, a movement without movement. This is a kind of Taoist cinema, which plunges me into confusion, in order to *clear* the mind. After Joanna's films finish I feel almost as if I have meditated, the rhythm of the shots like the click of the “rosary beads.” I had never really noticed this connection between Taoism and Catholicism before. Joanna was a Catholic and yet she was also attracted to Zen, to Taoism and to Buddhism. Thoughts pull at the edge of the universe—

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373Deleuze, *MI*, p117. Or *meditations* (both in the Buddhist and Cartesian sense!).


374“The all-pervading energy of nature.” (Nauman Jr., p329)

375Nauman Jr., p332.

376Marks, *SoF*, p129.



*Chapter 2*  
*Actions*  
*(of an unknown duration)*



*Fig. 6. Task [film still]*  
(dir. Joanna Paul, super8mm, 1982)



## 0. Bodies & Light: Words in the Snow

“Women might try to do filmically what literary theorist Helene Cixous had urged women writers to try: 'Write yourself, the body must be heard, then will spring forth the immense resources of your unconscious, which are associated with wealth and abundance'. ”<sup>377</sup>

“Given the nature of memory, the audiovisual image necessarily evokes other sense memories, perhaps even memories that belong to that “unknown body.” For example, when I am watching a scene shot in a garden in Sahani Mootoo's *Her Sweetness Lingers* (1994), close-ups of magnolia flowers remind me of how they feel and how they smell, and the buzzing of the insects remind me of the heat of summer. ”<sup>378</sup>

“Is it really so sad and dangerous to be fed up with seeing with your eyes, breathing with your lungs, swallowing with your mouth... Why not walk on your head, sing with your sinuses, see with your skin, breath with your belly. ”<sup>379</sup>

“It ain't no sin, to take off your skin, and walk around in dem bones. ”<sup>380</sup>

Returning from nothingness, my body made of pure energy, every atom saturated in feeling and expression, I find myself alive to the films in a whole new way. Having exhausted both perception and the archives of my philosophical and scientific “memory” I look back (turning about face). I see perceptions again, but I have no need to analyse (or synthesise) them. These perceptions unwrap and enwrap me, as I have said, in an “any-space-whatever.” In the previous chapters I

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<sup>377</sup>Shepard, p127-8.

<sup>378</sup>Marks, *SoF*, p148.

<sup>379</sup>D&G, *TP*, p167.

<sup>380</sup>William S. Burroughs on the Tom Waits album *The Black Rider* (1993). William Burroughs is a BwO par excellence: his books are comprised of fragments, cut-ups. He also organised himself (his life) differently to the state organisation of the organism (*TP*, p166).



passed from the “perceptible” to the “imperceptible” to the “unthought” (from movement to time, and into the uncharted regions of the spirit). Now we pass from “perception” to the unhearable, the untouchable, the unsmellable, the untasteable (to the *insensible*).

Marks calls these experiences “haptic visuality.” Authors of intercultural cinema (and more generally, experimental film-making practices) construct haptic-images “in part by refusing to make their images accessible to vision, so that the viewer must resort to other senses, such as touch, in order to perceive the image.”<sup>381</sup> Marks continues, “Haptic visuality is distinguished from optical visuality, which sees things from enough distance to perceive them as distinct forms in deep space: in other words, how we usually conceive of vision... Haptic looking tends to move over the surface of its object rather than to plunge into illusionistic depth, not to distinguish form so much as to discern texture.”<sup>382</sup> This experience happens slowly, not all at once, just as it has in my experience of all Joanna's films. Gradually I realise that I am watching *grains of light* and that I am *bodies made of energy*. There is no “film body,” but neither is there “my body.” In the grey(n) of Joanna's films I found the film and myself were not “one,” but “all” (at once).

These sensations are sometimes fleeting, sometimes very strong. They happen in all sorts of ways. As I have noted, Joanna's films are full of close-ups, constantly panning quickly over things (wall, ground, flower, window). While watching *Body House*, for instance, my eyes get a strange sensation, as if they are '*running*' over the image, in the same way that I might *run* my hands over a texture (the same way water might *run* over my hands). As I think “water” my eyes feel *colder*. My eyes conjugate the verb, transforming “to run” into the “running” of the eye. An eye cannot “run,” *but things can run over it* (see with your foot! walk with your eye!). The perception-image, or noun, turns into an action-image, or *verb*. As Marks writes, the “camera treats them like bodies, caressing the buildings, searching the corners of shutters and stone-latticed windows like folds of the skin.”<sup>383</sup> *Body House* continuously brings me (too) close to concrete walls: *falling over*. I perceive the quality of the temperature from a distance (the cold stone wall)

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381Marks, *SoF*, p159.

382Marks, *SoF*, p162.

383Marks, *SoF*, p157.

and then I *feel* it. Marks writes, “In haptic *visuality*, the eyes themselves function like an organ of touch.”<sup>384</sup>

I notice in *Port Chalmers Cycle*, for instance, that I feel colder in the shadows and warmer in the sun. Folded into darkness: floating in light. These “sens” are created by a “heat” happening in the *past*, which for a brief moment exists *now*, changing my experience of the *present*. As Joanna writes, “it excites me when the past & present are bonded together.”<sup>385</sup> Obviously the temperature in the room (here, where I am watching Joanna's films) has not changed, but my body *feels* a change (there, where “eye” am). These images are created by “that” (the sun) happening in the *past* (there), which for a brief moment, exists *now* (here), changing my experience of “this” space and my existential body temperature. In *Aberhart's House* something even more profound happens. Outside (there) it is windy: green shadow leaves tremble. I drift off. I am watching, but I am not attentive. Then suddenly I feel something different in my body: I feel warmer. My mind comes back and I find that I am looking at a shot from *inside* the house now (while before I was outside). When the eye goes outside again (later in the film) I feel the sensation again, more attentive to it this time. Wind is another constant sensation in Joanna's films: many times I see wind flapping washing furiously on the line and grass/trees/leaves trembling. At other times the wind murmurs, gentle, like a summer's day (a cool and welcome breeze). Wind, then, has a multiplicity of possible “sens,” many different “haptic visions,” depending on the kind (care) of wind. I feel *that* wind *there* on this skin *here*. Is this a *virtual* memory of wind which my body invents? Or is it an *actual* memory of *that* wind *there* which the camera retains?

Sobchack sees these “haptic images” (what she calls “cinesthetics,” after the term “synaesthesia”) as a kind of freedom, or 'poetics', available to the modern theorist. Sobchack suggests that the “body” and its “haptic,” or “cinesthetic” sensations constitute “an attempt... to explicate the way in which the cinema is somatically intelligible and, moreover, richly meaningful in this register, I want to alter the binary structure suggested by previous formulations and, instead, posit the

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384Marks, *SoF*, p162.

385Paul and Eagle, p97.

film viewer's lived body as a carnal “third term” that chiasmatically mediates vision and language, experience and image.”<sup>386</sup> I might call the first chapter (perceptions) the *first* term, and the second chapter (affections and any-spaces-whatever) the *second* term. My “body,” as a spectator, and the “film's body” (as a single intersubjective system) mediates these two images, rendering them as two “layers” (in a rhizome) which enables perception and affection to come into contact. This body does not synthesise these two layers, but finds them co-existing, seeing “perceptions” and “any-spaces-whatever,” representation and grain, at the same time.

Sobchack aligns these moments with moments of “almost blindness” she experiences in the mainstream film *The Piano*.<sup>387</sup> She writes, “It offers... a relatively rare instance at the movies in which the cultural hegemony of vision is overthrown, an instance in which my eyes did not “see” anything meaningful and experienced “an almost blindness” at the same time as my tactile sense of being in the world *through my fingers* grasped the image's sense in a way that my forestalled or “baffled” vision could not.” In Joanna's films I am constantly faced with such images, constantly in a state of blindness (as I have looked at in the second chapter). Sobchack goes on to say that, “My experience of *The Piano* was thus a heightened instance of our common sensuous experience of the movies: the way in which we are in some way touched by the substance of images, to feel the visual atmosphere envelop us, to experience weight.”<sup>388</sup> In Joanna's films, and intercultural cinema in general, “haptic vision” often dominates my vision, no longer a mere “moment,” but a veritable “monument” to our vision's ability to translate touch, smell, sound, and taste.

As Sobchack writes, “Positing cinematic vision as merely a mode of objective symbolic representation, and reductively abstracting – “disincarnating” – the spectator's subjective and full-bodied vision to posit it only as a “distancing sense,” contemporary film theory has had major difficulties in comprehending how

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386Sobchack, “What My Fingers Knew: The Cinesthetic Subject, or Vision in the Flesh” [*WFK*] (2000) *Senses of Cinema* on-line journal. Internet WWW page, at URL: <<http://www.sensesofcinema.com/contents/00/5/fingers.html>> (version current 1/1/2008) p6.

387Interestingly enough, *The Piano* (dir. Jane Campion, 1993) is a New Zealand production.

388Sobchack, *WFK*, p7-9.

it is possible for human bodies to be really “touched” and “moved” by the movies.”<sup>389</sup> In this sense, the classical model of “space and time” *distances* the audiences (places them in an objective relation to the screen). “Haptic visuality” is never at a distance, but always at “close-range.” This is what Deleuze and Guattari call “nomadic art” (art made by a “body-without-organs”).<sup>390</sup>

In this section I become one of Joanna's art-works: *unpacking the body*. I could go on listing the ways in which I feel certain touches, or smell certain smells, or hear certain sounds. There are so many moments and so many more micro-moments of “sens” in Joanna's films, that to continue listing them would be redundant. However, the BwO allows not only for these new “sens” to occur, but also for a “gap,” which enables the thoughts from the “unknown bodies” (of the first chapter) to populate the BwO (of the second). The BwO is always populated by packs, by multiplicities. This is not a “reading” of Joanna's films (at a distance) but a kind of “speaking” (or seeing) *as* her films. Clusters of images form visual poems everywhere: in the thick of things, without warning.

The first section of this chapter deals with my experience of “haptic vision” in Joanna's films. The second section concerns another effect: the spontaneous hearing of words and writing of poems. Laura Marks writes, “In any case an audiovisual image evokes bodily associations, so that when I hear crickets and see a magnolia I remember the prickle of sweat on my skin, and (nanoseconds later) the *words* for the smell of a magnolia – *pungent, sap-like, always about to rot (!)* - emerge from the emotional associations I formed with magnolias when I did smell them.”<sup>391</sup> As I watched Joanna's films I had a similar experience: words started coming to me. These words I realised were haiku poems. It is worth noting that the words Marks writes down has a haiku structure of three lines:

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389Sobchack, *WFK*, p5.

390As I have said rhizomes, nomads, refrains, becoming, multiplicity: these are all strata of the BwO or “parastrata” through which the nomad war machine moves (the *vortex*). “Desert traveller and nomad of the steppes.” (*TP*, p166) The grain of the hot blind desert sand skin. Nomad Art: “First, “close-range” vision, as distinguished from long-distance vision; second, “tactile,” or rather, “haptic” space as distinguished from optical space.” (*TP*, p543) As Laura Marks astutely point out “optical visuality” is not the same as an “optical-image” (belonging to Deleuze's time-image model of cinema). Optical visuality in *A Thousand Plateaus* refers to “movement-image cinema,” while “haptic visuality” forms in the fragments of the “any-space-whatever,” and the “time-image” (just as “nomadic art” and close-range vision arises/a rhizomes/ from the assemblage of the BwO).

391Marks, *SoF*, p148.

pungent  
 sap-like  
 always about to rot!

Marks has become a haiku poet and seemingly without her knowledge (she certainly never mentions this). Marks' arrangement of words, like a haiku, requires a frame/body to be added by the audience member. Marks did not write the words: "I smell pungent magnolia," but found the words fragmented, one at a time, in a 'literal' any-space-whatever. Like the rhizome structure of the haiku and the use of shadows and light in Joanna's films (and poems, and paintings) the lines *float*. What is pungent? I know because I have read Marks description of the writing of the poem, but without it, these new words may inspire a number of images to arise in the spectator. After Joanna's films I found myself full of words. I found myself writing poems frantically and when I looked back on the pages and pages of notes I had amassed earlier, I found poems there too. *I became a poet*. I had not intended to write poetry, to become poet. It was not consciously enacted. What seemed the most significant in this final becoming was that even though I didn't know if anyone else would enjoy my new poems, I didn't seem to care. *I like them and this is all that matters*. I felt a satisfaction in writing them which was not "hegemonic." The satisfaction I found in writing these poems was like that of the women in Joanna's films: I did not need validation, I liked them for what they were, my "little phrases."<sup>392</sup>

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<sup>392</sup>When I wrote this I got a tingle, and looked again. "My children," it read. I felt compassion toward *words* as if they were real, living things.

## 1. Bodies & Light : Meditations

“afterward: the hallowed days/  
scoured by God.”<sup>393</sup>

As I come out of the grey, from the indifference of being, into the full becoming of the body-without-organs as sensation *creator*, there is a particular shot which comes to mind from Joanna's film *Auckland 1971*. I see a cloud-grey-sky, my body dissolved into atomic vibration and grain. Then I notice, at the bottom of the screen, a sudden burst of colour: a rainbow. The “grain” turns into “rain” and I am soaked in drops of colour. I sniff the damp earth smell after the rain and I feel the cool wind on my face. I think of these “colours” as a bow which plays the strings of my body-instrument. The “sens” are a “song,” a sort of concert of feelings, thoughts and emotions, all suddenly re-membered from various sites and sights: *an assemblage of spirit-images*. As Joanna writes, “The TONES (of a landscape) are delicate vehicles of emotion... while colour can express the spirit.”<sup>394</sup> As I have said, Deleuze and Guattari align music as the art form most suited to “becoming.” Music is inherently “abstract” (in that it does not re-present anything). It is not like a film, or a painting, which is “there” to my “here.” Music is all around. It is *in* things. Joanna's films I find music everywhere. The “film's body,” which I have been kinetically “listening” to (as Sobchack would say), suddenly *sings!* No words, just a “sens” of rhythmic tones–

In the same film, just a moment earlier, I had seen black *concrete* with white *flowers* drawn on them. Concrete and flowers are two images which continuously occur in Joanna's films. In concrete the black, the grey and the white all merge. The flowers, carved in white, stand out, shimmering. The flowers are drawn in chalk.

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<sup>393</sup>Paul, in Bisley, p35.

<sup>394</sup>Paul and Eagle, p92. Joanna writes; “If the intellect enjoys LINE – line is everywhere under siege from the stress of coloured fact.” (Paul and Eagle, p92)

The image of the sky and the image of the chalk-flower come into contact. Between the two images there is a “gap” in which I sense the flower-dust washed away in thought. As Wedde notes, “Drawing rain on the hills: this might be done not by making marks, but by thinking. The thinking might appear as blank sheets of paper, as blank spaces on sheets of paper; or not at all (except in thought).”<sup>395</sup> I become the dust of the flowers, the rain pounding on the pavement. I become the pavement. To the pavement the rain is not “cold,” or “wet,” or even “falling.” It is just “rain.” Not the concept “rain” but as Deleuze says, the “*qualisign*” (the essence, the spirit, the being and finally *becoming* of rain). The pavement, like the animal, does not experience subjectivity and objectivity, or any “binary” (the pavement opposes nothing, it has no “secondness”). The pavement, if it experiences anything, experiences the pure ineffable “essence” of firstness, of affection (compassion). The pavement is in continual, spiritual reverie. This reminds me of a poem I had recently read by the Japanese haiku poet Raizan, pointing out of Joanna's texts. I walk to my bookcase and find the book. I open it:

spring rain—  
 reflected in the ox's eyes  
 unaware it falls<sup>396</sup>

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I return to the Bosshard's, this time feeling like a welcomed guest. I have been here many times now. The first time I was a stranger, looking at the house as if it meant nothing to me. Then, through the intersubjectivity of the mother's eyes I became the house itself and the body of the mother intermingled with the house's body, the one standing in for the other. Then the house turned to nothing but shadows and light. This time I return fully embodied, sensing the previous perceptions and affections, as actions *in my body*. I feel the warm sun outside as I approach the house. I feel the car rush past and a sudden gust of particles gather

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<sup>395</sup>Wedde, p15.

<sup>396</sup>Raizan, in Keene, p63. *My translation*.

around me. I smell the car *exhausted*. Cut to the garden: I hear birds and I smell the grass, the trees, the sky. I notice that everything is still: *there is no wind today*. These images work off one another, always in contrast, reminding me in reverse of what I am experiencing. Then we cut inside and it is shadowy. In the bedrooms upstairs I feel the stuffy heat of a summer's day indoors.

And smell! And taste! When the bread is cut I smell it. I smell the browning bananas in the fruit bowl. When I see the family butter the bread and eat it, I begin to taste it. I *experience* the food, in a sense. But what kind of food do I taste? Sobchack notes that Richard Dyer, for instance proposes that “*all* cinema [is], at base, a 'cinema of sensation'.”<sup>397</sup> Dyer argues, for instance, that the “musical” is not exclusively 'narrative' but, like the experimental and intercultural film, engages the audiences 'sensations' directly through non-narrative affects and even 'poetic' events (particularly in the colour and movement of dance, the songs, and, by extension, taste, smell and touch). He suggests that the musical was a direct response to the “depression,” offering visions of abundance, energy and intensity, which allowed their audiences, even if just for a moment, to escape the reality of scarcity, exhaustion, and poverty.<sup>398</sup> I remember something: a scene from *Meet Me in St. Louis*. There is food piled on the table: *an abundance of food*. I remember my mouth watering and desiring (if you are following the psychoanalytical subtext) *that* food *there*. In Joanna's films, on the other hand, I see a meagre, or “minor” feast. Bread, butter, and some spreads. Fruit. And then tea on the grass. All things I usually have around the house, which I could eat right now if I want. Because the food she has chosen to focus on is easily attainable, I do not fantasise about eating *that* food and I do not want *their* actual food (I do not “desire” anything). Instead I have my own experience of “food” as *this* (virtual) “food” in my mouth.

*This* food I ingested *with my eyes* (eat with your eyes! become a BwO!). It is not my stomachs (nihilistic) emptiness and *desire* (blocked) which is played upon, but rather my mouths “empty-fullness” which is *driven* to the creation of sensation.<sup>399</sup> This is experienced not in the mouth, but in the eye and the brain. My

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397Sobchack, *WFK*, p3.

398Richard Dyer, “Entertainment and Utopia,” in Simon During (ed.), *The Cultural Studies Reader* (Routledge, 1993) p376.

399D&G talk of an emptiness which is blocked, a “botched” BwO. This is the emptiness of nihilism, of the West, of nothingness. The BwO empties in order to allow intensities to pass across it. The desire of lack is the desire of



eye was emptied and then filled with atomic awareness. And then it expresses *like a mouth*. It empties the mouth of its actual/real “sense” and fills it with a virtual/potential “sens.” All cinema may indeed engage our sensations, but the kind of sensation can differ markedly in its politics, and the choices which it suggests (to experience this mouth, this food, or to covet *that* one). As Marks writes, “Theorists who call for a return to the senses often treat sense experience as prediscursive and, hence, as natural. This is a position I dispute... They tend not to acknowledge that sensuous knowledge is cultivated.”<sup>400</sup>

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Marks writes, “I have come across a handful of works that use images of fabric to appeal to memory, to invite a more tactile kind of vision, and to call upon a specific cultural knowledge associated with specific fabrics.”<sup>401</sup> In *Task* the woman firstly irons a white piece of clothing: bright. It optically flattens the screen, as she literally flattens the material with the iron. I am reminded of the various shots of white fabric flapping on clothes-lines in *Aberhart's House*, alive with a furious gusto. The “white” (as we looked at in chapter two) is equivalent to the “alternative of the spirit.”<sup>402</sup> In becoming the mother (this time) I am flattened by the task of the ironing as it “piles on top of her” (my *spirit* flattened). I am a pile of leaves in the hot sunlight, smouldering. I am the hot and tired grass beneath, praying for the wind to free me. *I feel the heat of the iron*. The alternative to heat here is the wind. The alternative to the flattened spirit is the curved and wild spirit. Where is the mother now? What does she do when I do not see her? When her work is done for the day?<sup>403</sup>

Another shot: coloured pegs on the clothes-line. I imagine them clamping the mother's spirit to the line. In “nomadic art” (a body-without-organs, or a stage

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psychoanalysis. The filling of emptiness is the drive of the BwO.

400Marks, *SoF*, p144.

401Marks, *SoF*, p168-9.

402Deleuze, *MI*, p117.

403Maybe she is making an experimental film? Joanna says, “As a woman painting is not a job, not even a vocation. It is part of life, subject to the strains, and joys, of domestic life. I cannot paint unless the house is in order. Unless I paint I don't function well in my domestic roles.” (*Spiral I*)

in its becoming) Deleuze and Guattari speak of a “smooth space,” rather than a “striated space.”<sup>404</sup> The washing-line is like a striated space, with a narrow length and markers which segment the line, each of them tying the mother's spirit to the line-task. Colour, Deleuze writes, is defined by its “absorbent characteristic.”<sup>405</sup> The coloured pegs absorb a part of her spirit and attach it to the striate of the washing. But she is free for the time being, like the wind which blows the clothes into a wild fluster. *Suddenly I feel the wind*. This gives me a feeling of “freedom,” a special kind of freedom I only feel when the wind is in my face.<sup>406</sup>

The second piece of fabric she irons in *Task* is black (forming a yin-yang with the first piece). Here we find the *struggle of the spirit*. This struggle is with the “mother” herself. As E. Ann Kaplan notes, “feminism was in part a reaction against our mothers... This made it difficult for us to identify with Mothering, and to look from the position of the mother... The mother as a complex<sup>407</sup> person in her own right, with multiple roles to fill and conflicting needs and desires.”<sup>408</sup> As I have said, Joanna's films (her “subjective,” and “objective” films in particular) “focussed on her immediate world and the day to day realities of being a mother caring for small children.”<sup>409</sup> Perhaps Joanna's films do not only deconstruct a “male” audience, but possibly some “feminist” audiences as well? This has a curious effect on my use of language: I say “some” feminists, rather than “feminist” in the singular. I find it hard to think in terms of “feminist,” or “feminism.” Both of them imply a 'unified' cause, which may not be the case. As Annette Kuhn argues, feminism, and feminist activity “cannot be defined either *a priori* or universalistically.”<sup>410</sup>

There may not even be “feminism” then. Instead there are different *kinds* of feminisms and different kinds of real people who believe a 'multiplicity' of things. Unlike the classical Aristotelian binary, which perceives of a problem between the 'singular' and the 'plural' (which must be 'unified' in some way) there is no problem.

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404D&G, *TP*, p389.

405Deleuze, *MI*, p118.

406There is a “distinction between “free action” in smooth-space and “work” in striated space.” (D&G, *TP*, p540) When my wife proof-read this text she wrote in the margins, “This describes my experience of laundry, the wind *is the good part*.”

407Remembering that Deleuze calls the “affection-image” a “complex.”

408E. Ann Kaplan, “The Case of the Missing Mother,” in Erens (ed.), p126.

409Shephard, p125.

410Kuhn, p10.

Perhaps there is no uniform “feminist,” who forms a part of the plural of “feminists,” which has an essence (a totality, an absolute). Instead, I find a Taoist view in which the “one” and the “plural” are not problems, but *illusions*. Between them there is a gap: why is there not a word to signify a person who has feminist beliefs, which doesn't “subject” them to being a part of (a pre-defined) set of “unified” feminists (who do not exist). There seems to be no way to avoid this: it is inbuilt into the unity and plurality of every word (which implies a “totality,” an “essence”). Martin Heidegger, an existential phenomenologist whom Sobchack draws on (particularly in reference to space), shifted the meaning of the word 'existence' to “existenz” (referring to non-universal, lived existence). Existenz is not subjective or objective, it is always intersubjectively *between*. Take a seemingly simple description of myself: I say I am 'here', for example, instead of 'there'. 'Here' and 'there' in traditional terms are opposed (what is there *cannot* be here). However, as Heidegger notes, “the there *points* to a here,”<sup>411</sup> and equally the 'here' points to a 'there'. When I look at things, the 'there' is drawn 'here' into my body (as an image) and equally my 'there' is constantly enlightened 'there' (as an image for others to see).

In a similar shift between the 'feminine' (here) and 'not-feminine' (there) I start to think of 'feminism' and the 'feminine' as “feminenz,” a kind of feminine quality, not specific to women, which is enacted in a multiplicity of varying ways. Heidegger's philosophy, like Taoism, is based on a sense of existential “care,” or “compassion” which occurs in the “gap” (spread) between existence and existences, in the “emptiness” of these concepts (rather than the “opposition” driven philosophy of Aristotle).<sup>412</sup>

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In *Jillian Dressing* I do not look *at* Jillian's body. As I have said she is firstly in silhouette and secondly, shown as a mirror reflection. Still, I *become* her. How? And when? As I watch I notice that her *real* elbow is in the corner of the

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411 Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time* (1926: Blackwood Press, 2004) p171. My Italics.

412 As Heidegger writes: our being's “existential meaning is care.” (*Being and Time*, p65)

frame for much of the film. At certain times it flicks over the frame, drawing my attention to it, as an intersubjective “pivot.” I *become* Jillian. Continuing to watch, my eye is drawn to the shadow (struggle) of her arm. I struggle, moving between watching her in the mirror, and watching her real arm. The weird thing is, I had never noticed it before. I go through my notes on the film (and my earlier descriptions). None of them mention it. The arm was *invisible* to me, even though it is clearly *there*. Suddenly it is this arm *here*, my arm, and my body which is in the mirror. She begins by brushing and arranging her hair, and I feel tingles up and down my scalp, a kind of *spreading* out of sensation.<sup>413</sup> When she brushes her hair I feel that warm, tingly feeling which I always get when someone else brushes my hair. *Jillian is brushing my hair!* When she takes off her top I am, again, not looking *at* her, but feel my skin suddenly come alive to the cool air. It is doing it again now as I write. I feel *cold*, but in a nice way. As Deleuze and Guattari write, one kind of BwO is populated by “intensities of cold, *refrigerator waves*.”<sup>414</sup>

When Jillian puts on make-up I feel her fingers on my face, smoothing its surface, bringing my sure-face to life. I start to make weird expressions as I watch, stretching my face. My face feels *energetic*. It is like being given a massage. For Joanna, as I have said, the medium (of film) becomes subject (*message*). Here the subject (*me*) becomes the medium of the “film's body” (*massage*). This reminds me of Siegfried Kraucer, “who saw the uniqueness of cinema in the medium's essential ability to stimulate us physiologically, and *sensually*, to *address* the spectator as... “a human being with hair and skin.” Kraucer writes, “The material elements in that present themselves directly stimulate the *material layers* of the human being: [their] nerves, [their] sense, [their] entire *physiological substance*.”<sup>415</sup>

These “haptic images,” these experiences of “touch,” are unusual for me. They are not things I am used to (especially as a male). I do not sit in front of the mirror and look at myself. When I do look in a mirror it is only for a few moments. When I brush my hair I do not look in the mirror. To be perfectly honest, I could do

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413As Deleuze writes, the affection-image is “suitable for extracting the birth; the advance and the *spread* of the affect.” (*MI*, p110, my italics). I remember the bread of *Bosshard's House*, of *Aberhart's House* and the butter spread on its lunar surface, smoothing the space.

414D&G, *TP*, p168.

415Kraucer, in Sobchack, *WFK*, p3.

without mirrors. But for Joanna, “I used to feel vis a vis a familiar landscape, completed by it; as much as by my face in a mirror.”<sup>416</sup> It is in the application of make-up that I feel the most out of place. I am reminded of the “mask” in *Bosshard's House*. I realise make-up is like a mask. I do not like wearing it. As Cynthia Heimel writes, “Wearing make-up is asking for approval. Wearing make-up is an apology for our actual faces. Wearing make-up makes it seem as if a woman has something to hide.”<sup>417</sup> Perhaps it is here that I find “darkness and the struggle of the spirit.”<sup>418</sup>

Behind Jillian is a window which provides the alternation of spirit in the light: “As a transparent vehicle, the window is that which admits light – or spirit – into the initial darkness of the room.”<sup>419</sup> I alternate, oscillating between the enjoyment of being a woman (of doing things that are *for* women alone) and the pain of being a woman (constantly looked at by men, her image appropriated by male viewers). I do not feel this way very often as a “man,” or at the very least, as “me.” Women who I have talked to tell me that this is a common feeling for them: caught both in the cold glass gaze of a social-mirror, and in their own loving gaze. As Krauss writes, the window/mirror moves “first, towards the flow of birth...the “source” – but then, toward the freezing into stasis or death.”<sup>420</sup>

This struggle was particularly visible when Joanna was producing films, prevalent especially in feminist discussions surrounding representation in general. As Sonia Michel notes, “According to one school of thought, any cinematic representation of women within patriarchal culture inevitably constitutes them as objects of desire. Lesage disagrees with this position, arguing that it is possible to “decolonise women's sexuality,” to overcome objectification.”<sup>421</sup> As Michel writes, this struggle is played out between the “de-sexualisation” of the image (Jillian is placed in silhouette) and the “re-sexualisation” of the image (the eye of the mirror/spectator). These are connected by an alternating light, framing the struggle.

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416Paul and Eagle, p93.

417Cynthia Heimel, “Ageing: Fact or Fiction?,” in *Get Your Tongue Out of My Mouth, I'm Kissing You Goodbye* (Pan, 1993) p136.

418Deleuze, *MI*, p117.

419Krauss, p16-17.

420Krauss, p16-17.

421Sonia Michel, “Feminism, Film, and Public History,” in Erens (ed.), p244.

But perhaps this alternation is more personal than political? I am reminded of something I read by Joanna, concerning the connection of certain art-works to her real life: “But the interstices of a not so happy marriage, or a bereavement, might be visible between things or in the shadows of a window or a mirror.”<sup>422</sup>

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In *Sisterhood*<sup>423</sup> there is more attentive detail to the specifically “haptic” feelings of fabric and material. The opening shot is covered in white textured light which “folds” into the screen and seems to pulse. I emerge from the “fold” into images of a house which seems to be empty. A thin, transparent “veil” of fabric remains over the eye of the camera for the duration of the film. This covering of the eye engages my haptic sense directly. When I see someone walk on grass and then feel this, the effect could be said to be “indirect.” When something actually touches the film's eye (and mine) it may be considered a “direct-haptic-address,” an assemblage, or “dressage” for the eye. *The fabric brushes over my eye*. I feel its surface. It is kind of spongy and soft, and very *smooth*. As Marks writes, “Following the folds of silk as they dissolve into grain and resolve again... I realize that the tape has been using my vision as though it were a sense of touch; I have been brushing the (image of the) fabric with the skin of my eyes, rather than looking at it.”<sup>424</sup>

How odd to have the eye caressed. What I find most interesting about “haptic-images,” is that when they “touch” the eye it is an *enjoyable* experience (unlike the same effect in the “real” world). As I peer through the fabric, my eyes become attentive to the the “grain” of the “reel” screen as well. Marks, drawing on Deleuze, aligns “haptic-images” with “attentive recognition” (which I have already discussed in reference to “time-images”). This “attentive recognition,” in Joanna's films, as I have said, becomes alert to its own multiplicity, to its own “perceptive organ.”

As I find my eye attentive to its own “skin,” as an “eye-without-organs,” so

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422Paul, *A Chronology*, p5.

423Also labelled as *Detail of a House Interior*.

424Marks, *SoF*, p127.

to speak, the “veil” of my totalised vision is lifted and I see the back of my eye. It has its own thin, watery “film.” It is made of thousands of tiny luminous spheres, all shimmering. I feel closer to my eye, as if I am looking at it in “close-up” rather than “at a distance.” Images of the world become blurred and abstracted to me and my own eyes are pulled into focus. I do not really see “one” image, I see thousands of tiny dots, like a pointillist painting. My eye loses its usual organisational sensibility, and shatters into multiplicitous sensations. As Marks writes, “tactility cannot be a distance sense.”<sup>425</sup> The closer one gets to something, the more “haptic” vision becomes. Connected to the “minor arts” Joanna worked in, Marks writes that haptic visuality, what Deleuze and Guattari call nomadic art, “is usually relegated to minor traditions”<sup>426</sup> like weaving, patchwork quilts, or watercolours.<sup>427</sup>

The layers in *Sisterhood* are complex: there are the “things” (nouns), the “film's eye,” the perception of things through the veil (the “pronoun”) and the “grain of the screen.” These layers all seem to 'leave' one another, like the pages of a book (read one by one, layer by layer). The “veil” moves between all these layers of the film, folding them into one another. The “veil” is the “fold.” The “film's eye” is no longer theoretically “folded” into the world, but literally intermeshed with the objects it sees. It is *woven* into the world it perceives, *colours* becoming like *water*. This folding of the eye into the world is what Sobchack, after Merleau-Ponty, calls the reversibility of perception and expression. Significant to my line of thought, Sobchack writes, “perception and expression are interwoven threads, the woof and the warp that together form a seamless and supple fabric, a whole cloth of existential experience.”<sup>428</sup> In *Sisterhood* this description *comes to life*.

Deleuze and Guattari's analysis of “nomadic art,” which includes haptic vision, smooth space, close-range vision (affection, any-space-whatever), and fabric (all of which are intimately connected to each other in the BwO) is useful here. The nomad is always “moving,” never still.<sup>429</sup> The nomad wanders in the

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425Marks, *SoF*, p132.

426Marks, *SoF*, p168.

427D&G also relate the “patchwork quilt” to fragments and assemblages of space, or “Reimannian space.” As D&G write, “Reimannian space is pure patchwork. It has connections or tactile relations. It has rhythmic values not found elsewhere.” (*TP*, p536) Just as the any-space-whatever it is rhythmic and tactile.

428Sobchack, *AoE*, p13.

429D&G, speaking of the BwO write: “Nomadism as the movement (keep moving, even in place, never stop moving, motionless voyage, desubjectification).” (*TP*, p177)

desert, in the *grains* of experience. Nomadic art is made of a “smooth space.” I imagine the “veil” as just such a “nomad,” wandering through the various “strata” (the other layers of the eye). If the “nomad” is that which moves, and the “strata” are the layers moved between, then the movement itself is the “parastrata” of being. Nomadic thoughts, as Deleuze and Guattari write, “cross thresholds of deterritorialization on their own stratum and *between* strata.”<sup>430</sup> The term strata is used in geology to designate a layer of earth. The movement between them, their becoming visible, and the deterritorialisation of the strata, is the work of Foucault's archaeology. The “official archive” fixes the strata, and archaeology pulls the strata apart. Nomadic art moves between the strata, doing the work of archaeology in itself, as Marks writes of intercultural cinema. What does archaeology actually do? Nothing but sift through the layers of sedimentary thought, in search for that which shatters thought, of that which gets in between the “gaps” of thought.

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As I have said, “smooth space” is essential to nomadic art. The two modes of smooth space are, 1) The process of creating “enveloped distances,” such as the “veil” effect I have described above, and, 2) A process where “determinations... are connected by the process of frequency or accumulation.”<sup>431</sup> In *Sisterhood* I find that there is a process of accumulation of the images of *windows* and *bowls*. In single sequence of four shots I note; 1) Light from a window on the wall, engulfed in shadow and distant from the eye. I cannot see the source of the light, only its reflection; 2) A close-up of a window, the frame forming a *black* cross. I do not see *through* the window, it is dirty, and luminous. However, it is not white, but a steel *grey* mottled with black and white specks; 3) A woman (silhouetted) drawing back blinds (I see *through* the window, a clear view of the outside world, no longer obscured). In these three shots I have moved from light *struggling* in the dark (shot one), to the grey *indifference* of concrete across which the 'struggle' was striated (shot two). Then the “blinds” are made to see, the struggle eases, and I *open my*

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430D&G, *TP*, p60. My italics.

431D&G, *TP*, p536.



eyes (shot three). All this is mediated by the white 'cross' of the window. How does this construct a religious metaphor?

In the first shot I am distant from god (light). In the second shot there is a white “cross” silhouetted in black (the spirit struggling with the cross) against the grey indifference. I will call the cross the “spiritual alternative,” indicating oscillation between two things. In the indifferent grey 'white' and 'black' arise in chaotic patterns (specks of dust and light). Joanna was a Catholic, who had a great deal of interest in Eastern thought (particularly the Tao). Could I see her struggle with the “cross” here? Not wanting to end her relationship with Christianity, struggling to reconcile it with Taoism? Oscillating between the two, I wonder how they might be reconciled myself. Perhaps the “veil” is that which brings these views closer and closer together, which forms an inter-religious nomad?<sup>432</sup>

What of the bowls? There are vases and bowls everywhere in the background, but it is three bowls picked out (pulled close) that I am interested in here. There is; 1) A bowl covered in flowers; 2) A plain wooden bowl on the dining room table, and; 3) A cloudy fish bowl, emptied of fish. The bowl covered in flowers I see twice and the wooden bowl I see twice also. The fish-bowl I see only once. Many argue that the “bowl” or the “cup” in Christian mythology is an indication of the “sacred feminine,” a balancing power equivalent to the masculine God.<sup>433</sup> One name for the sacred feminine is “Sophia,” which means *wisdom*, from the Greek word “philosophia” (the love of wisdom).<sup>434</sup> Significant to my stream of thought, Sophia is likened to a *veil* and to the *void* (the emptiness of compassion).<sup>435</sup> Sophia, in some senses, is a decidedly Eastern image. This causes me to recall

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432Joanna: “You now keep confronting me, Allie, with this question of christianity.” (Paul and Eagle, p90)

433As popularised by Dan Brown's novel *The Da Vinci Code* (Corgi, 2004). The original research that Brown is drawing on can be found in Michael Baigent, Richard Leigh and Henry Lincoln, *The Holy Blood and the Holy Grail* (1982: Arrow Books, 1996).

434Sophia is, for instance, mentioned in the Apocrypha. She says, “I was set up from everlasting, from the beginning, before the Earth came into being. When there were no depths I was brought forth... When God prepared the heavens I was there. When God established the clouds above I was there. When God assigned the boundaries of the sea, when God laid the foundations of the earth, I was by God's side.” Alexander Waugh, *God* (Review, 2002) p19. Sophia was always with God *in the beginning*.

435“Sophia, who is called Pistis, wanted to create something, alone without her consort; and her product was a celestial thing. A veil exists between the world above and the realms that are below; and shadow came into being beneath the veil; and that shadow became matter; and that shadow was projected apart. And what she had created became a product in the matter.” Anon, *The Hypostasis of the Archons*, The Nag Hammadi Library. Internet WWW page, at URL: <<http://www.gnosis.org/>> (version current 1/1/2007).

something: in the 1940s there were a number of texts discovered in Egypt which caused the Christians worldwide to reconsider some of their fundamental views (or to reaffirm them, depending on how they are read). These texts are possibly those which were cut out of *The Bible* early in Christian history. Sophia was entirely cut out of *The Bible*, and the “sacred feminine” is nowhere to be found (although, as I have said, she is mentioned in the Apocrypha).

In one shot (of this bowl) light gathers between its edges and the screen. Light is given a visible energy, streaming from the top of the bowl out of the frame's edges. Here light is not distant and flat, but suddenly *alive*. How is it made alive? Through a tension between the frame, and the object in the frame. It is the empty gap between them that the light “fills” (a pure energy). This image of light is not made of rays (like the light discussed in chapter one) but of light-dust (grains). God is called “light” in *The Bible*, and Sophia, it would seem, is the “shadow.” Does this light grain imply that God is not “one,” but a multiplicity? This thought takes on an urgency when one notes that the “Old Testament” of *The Bible* uses the word “elohim” constantly to refer to God. As Alexander Waugh writes, “The word elohim, strictly speaking, means 'gods' (it is a plural word) and most specifically refers to the heavenly assembly of the sons and daughters of El which, at one time, ruled over the ancient Canaanite and Israelite religions. The word has caused no end of embarrassment in Jewish and Christian circles since it occurs over 1500 times in the first fifteen books of the Bible... in which only one god is *supposed* to exist. To solve the problem Elohim has been mistranslated as God (with a capital G) such as we find at Genesis 1:26, 'And God said, Let *us* make... in *our* image... after *our* likeness' – Whoops!”<sup>436</sup>

Perhaps Joanna is suggesting that the true “light” of God is found in the multiplicity of the feminine “cup,” the “chalice” (rather than in the distance of reflected light entering into struggle, or the “second,” unified God who rules us as “subjects”). Or am I reading too closely, too intimately? Joanna herself writes, “perhaps I am talking about “religious” imagery – the natural world as a garment of G-D [the Hebraic device Joanna uses suggestive of a divinity] and also a storehouse

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436Waugh, p30.

for metaphor.”<sup>437</sup> I was never interested in religion to this extreme before I studied Joanna's films. While studying her films I had my own “crisis of faith,” in a sense. I found myself suddenly unsure that there was *definitely* no “God.” I asked myself if I believed in spirit, in God and I found myself unsure. By God I do not mean any kind of God which has been described, and certainly not a Christian God. I use the word to refer to something which cannot be explained. What is Spirit? What is God? What is Soul? More and more questions, and no answers to attach them to. I feel an opening, a sudden rushing, a welling up–

Something is beyond words, beyond even *sensation*. Between the two windows, the first which I have read as the distant light of classical Christianity, and the second which reaches a point of indifference, there is a shot of a woman sleeping. The woman rises and opens the curtains letting light into the room. Later we see her look at the camera. *I become woman*. Her eyes are weary, her expression tired. I feel like the tiredness of women, of the daughters of Sophia (a kind of wisdom lost to men). I feel the weariness of a thousands years of dust in my *heart*. But I also feel love.

All the writers who closely analyse Joanna's work mention Joanna's relationship with God, and she herself spoke openly of *both* her Catholicism *and* her relationship to the Tao (as well as the (somewhat) unusual practice of combining religious metaphor, with feminist politics, experimental poetics, and personal documentary). In the West these subjects sit uneasily. As Allie Eagle, commenting on Joanna's work, writes, “domesticity and the pleasures of spirituality make an awkward match.”<sup>438</sup> In Eastern forms of poetry this is not the case. The art of the “haiku” is a celebration of “spirit” in simple, everyday and ordinary language. Where does the “spirit” of haiku come from? The realisation that *no* situation is really ordinary, or everyday. Every moment itself is new and exciting. But where do we find the 'scale' of a moment? Perhaps I say that each of Joanna's film is a new moment for me. Then I say that scene is a new moment. And then that shot. And then that thing in the shot. And then that grain of light. *And and and*. Then I think of the shot of light distant on the wall. I am in Plato's cave watching

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437O'Brien, p75.

438Lonie, p25.

shadows on the wall. The grey window striated with struggle. Grey walls of the stone cave cold on my hands as I feel my way out of the dark. *Then I open the blinds, and step into the light—*

## 2. Words & Snow : Origami Thoughts

On one side of my body I feel the film as a skin, as a second body, a body house which I can reside in, a vast emptied/full space which I may pack, unpack and sift through like an archaeologist on a dig, sand in their eyes and between their clothes and skin. Or perhaps I am more like a miner, knee deep in mud panning for nuggets of go(l)d.

Throughout this process (which takes place across the main three chapters, as well as between them) I have become more and more aware of “me.” But what about the film's body? Sobchack argues that the “film's body” is “transcendental,” something which is above, over and invisible.<sup>439</sup> The traditional Christian God is also “transcendental.” To claim to know the essence of anything other than the self is to “transcend” the “limits of perception.” Our perception, as philosophy has classically understood it, radically cuts us off from the world, it is a “problem.” If we perceive only light and not any *thing*, then we cannot perceive the (real) world. Joanna's film-body was not transcendental, but “immanent” (in movement, and light-images). This caused the body to unravel itself in the “difference machine” of shadow/light. Giving the body “time” is also, in a Deleuzian sense, giving it an immanent self-consciousness, a brain which *becomes* the cinema. I have spoken in the previous chapters of the size of the film's eye, which is always *bigger* than mine. As the film makes me aware of its immanent existentiality (which is transcendently realised in Sobchack's work) I *increase* in size. Then the film increases in size again, “becoming affection.” I get smaller. Slowly I get smaller and smaller and smaller, until I am nothing but an atom. This caused my skin to come alive and all my other sensations with it. Then the film and I became

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<sup>439</sup>Sobchack, *AoE*, p25.

*equivalent* in size, “sizeless” in a sense (there can be “no size” when everything is the “same size”). So began this chapter, in a state of *equivalence*.

But what of the film's *existential* presence? So far, I have only dealt with how the film shifts my thoughts and never how my thoughts (or eye) shift the film's experience? For instance, the image is “big” on screen, and my eye, where it ends up, is “small.” Take *Gravestones* as an example. A shot of a gravestone is set against a mountain, framed so that the gravestone dwarfs the mountain. The *affect* is an enlargement, and here the gravestones are contrasted for extra-enlargement. The expanse of grey space further expands the image on screen. Then I imagine the gravestone hurled at me (rather than me thrown into the emptiness) *becoming light*. The light, on its way to my eye, folds down (origami light) and “becomes image.” Then it goes into my mind, as pulses of energy, and floats into the back of my head. It gets smaller and smaller and smaller. I forget the image. Then I see a new one and the same thing happens. *Gravestones* gather in my mind. When the film ends all the gravestones vanish from my thoughts, and I feel clear and very calm, as if I had just meditated.

As I sit there I realise that I feel very aware of something, but I do not know what. Then I start to realise it is a *poem*. It is a poem about the film *Gravestones*. I had not written a poem in years. I used to write a little bit, but eventually gave up. Why did I give up? I didn't feel like my work was worth anything (*honestly*). Poetry (back then) made me feel very small. It was a very large thing, very close to me and yet indistinguishable from any ground. When I tried to write a poem in my mind it was like looking into a black hole, or alternatively, if I tried to look out there for one, I found nothing but a blinding light. Now I see (in my mind) a *grey*. In the grey there is both black and white. It is the grey of one of the gravestones (and it is the yin-yang *spinning*). Then a poem came to me. I did not “write” it. Rather, it simply appeared, as if from nowhere, said by no-one. It was as if the images (which had gotten smaller and smaller) had *been* somewhere, and then when they could get no smaller they turned “about face” and headed back to me with *news*—

still grave stones remain  
 still grave stone remains  
 still grave stones—

The poem was a haiku (of course). This is not all Joanna's doing. Years ago, when I was trying to write better poetry I had learned how to write a simple form of haiku. I would go into nature and look at things and try and write poems about them. They were painful experiences in the end and I kept none of the poems I wrote. Here, I found a poem I was pleased with, but not because I expected someone else to like it (a kind of action-image, an expected result). I did not mind what anyone else thought of it, because I liked the way it made me *feel*. I loved this poem and that was enough: my first in more than six years! There was something so satisfying in the experience of writing it outside the worry of what another person might think of it. I felt kind of *energised*. I wondered if it would work with another film? I watched *Task*. Afterwards I sat very still again, and thought about the experience. I started to “get” words. I wrote them down:

all those folded clothes  
 must have been a thankless task—  
 I had a brother too!

It made me laugh and weep (I sent a copy to my mum). This was a strange experience. I did not *want* to write these poems exactly. Once I shifted my brain into the gear of thinking about writing them it just did it. The first one was not of my doing at all. I had no thought of writing a poem when I put the tape in. It just happened. These particular films had moved me deeply when I first saw them and remain favourites of mine. Watching *Task* again a year later I found more words arising in my mind:

hands  
 iron  
 fold

This illustrates perfectly the “pivot words” which are used in haiku to shift meanings between the strata (lines). The terms “iron” and “fold” refer to the ironing and folding of the washing, obviously. But fragmented as they are, the terms might refer to a more 'poetic' meaning such as the “iron fold” of handcuffs which tie her to the ironing board. It was this understanding that had been missing from my understanding of haiku previously. I had thought the secret was to unlock the essence of things and describe it. Rather, it was to create poems which allowed the reader to do the work of an archaeologist: to dig and sift for meaning. By the same token the haiku allows for easy digestion, having a surface meaning which is readable to *anyone*. In this moment of creation I felt a transformation of myself into a “poet” of some kind. Not a poet who is determined by capitalist measures (the striated space of charts and best-seller lists) but by my own determination. Becoming intensities which fill the white page. Are these poems “war machines” or “images of thought.” *Is this noology?*

“Noology,” pure “images of thought” and “war machines.” What do I make of these curious terms? What connection can I make? Deleuze and Guattari write a kind of poetry too: assemblages taking the form of slogans (at times) and haiku (at others). As Deleuze and Guattari write, “They come like fate, without reason, consideration, or pretext,”<sup>440</sup> just like the poems I found in my mind. Note that Deleuze and Guattari use a pronoun with no subject: What does the term “they” refer to? Who are they? And what comes? *Images of thought*. What are they? The “war machine,” they claim, “is exterior to the State apparatus.” How is it *exterior* to the state? By converging at the inner-most point (where the gravestones went in order to “become the poem”). Let us say there is an inner and an outer, which are opposed in the classical way (such as subjectivity and objectivity, space and time, the body and the mind). Let us then say that our “inner-most” self (our atomic self

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440D&G, *TP*, p390.

perhaps) is a “thirdness.” This inner-most may also be a kind of outer-most, a point of “intersection” between the two. *Perhaps there is no inner and no outer.* As Joanna writes, “painting, for me, is a dialogue between the inner and the outer. I am a tentative person but I have more certainty on the page than off it. Painting is like touching, like touching your subject. I don't want to nail it down.”<sup>441</sup>

One of the places “war machines” are found is in certain games. Haiku poetry began as an almost Hegelian game of “thesis-antithesis” called *Haikai no Renga*.<sup>442</sup> In *Haikai no Renga* a group sits around and one of them comes up with a phrase containing a “contradiction” (for instance: I want to cut but don't want to cut, I am sad and I am not sad, and so on) which each poet then “solves” with a haiku poem. *Haikai no Renga* poems are not written by one person, but a multiplicity, a pack (like the way dogs and children play “games”). It is not played to “compete” but to “think.”<sup>443</sup> There is no winner of the game of poetry, only players. There is no one way to complete the synthesis but endless ways.<sup>444</sup> The best beginning lines are remembered and played again and again. And the way these players are arranged in space is different also. The space of the “war machine” is smooth and allows for “the possibility of springing up at any point,” just as I now find finished poems springing up at any point while watching Joanna's films, without thought, *concrete* lines in my head. And I like them! I collect them. They are a way of remembering my experiences with Joanna, someone I never met (and yet feel so close to). Complete before I have written them, *arriving finished*.<sup>445</sup> As Deleuze and Guattari writes, “At any rate, here they are; it seems that every morning there are more of them.”<sup>446</sup>

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441Paul, in O'Brien, p77.

442Keene, p11.

443D&G use the Eastern game of Go to example the “smooth space” of the “war machine.” They say; “Go is war without battle lines [striate], with neither confrontation nor defeat, without battles even; pure strategy.” (*TP*, p389) They contrast this to chess, which occurs in “striated space.”

444This is why *Haikai no Renga* are only 'almost' Hegelian. George Hegel's reading of the 'dialectic' maintains that there is one “absolute” synthesis.

445“One speaks without knowing while the other replies without having understood.” (D&G, *TP*, p417)

446D&G, *TP*, p390.



grey  
stone                                  after  
light                                    image–  
                                                 *poetry*

*all things float*

Deleuze and Guattari describe the nomadology (a *minor science*) of the war machine as a process which moves from “*turba* to *turbo*,” rather than from point to point. This they call the “*vortex*.”<sup>447</sup> Time moves from A to B to C, but at each point time is taken for A to reach my eye, and B to reach my eye, and so on. The flow from the “object” to the “eye” to the “image” in my mind, to wherever these images go, is the *vortex*. Images go into the memory. From the memory I can *recall* them. But here images have been *created* for me, arriving ready made from the depths of my being. As Deleuze and Guattari write, “from bands or packs of atoms to the great vortical organisations.”<sup>448</sup> The yin-yang, though it is represented as a “still,” often has arrows above and below it indicating its *movement*. This movement is a “spinning,” a vortex which occurs between any two points which are placed in the black and the white. Like Joanna's films, “speed [and] swirling movement is an essential feature of [the] war machine.”<sup>449</sup> As with my experiences of Joanna's films as affection (war machines are *affections*!) the war machine is aligned with “spiritual voyages effected without movement, but in intensity, in one place: these are part of nomadism.”<sup>450</sup> I get the feeling that I have experienced a war machine in Joanna's films, a thought which was transmitted directly from her to me: *the gift of poetry*. As Bachelard writes, “Make of the reader a poet... the joy of reading appears to be the reflection of the joy of writing, as though the reader were the writer's ghost. At least the reader participates in the joy of creation that, for

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447D&G, *TP*, p399.

448D&G, *TP*, p399.

449D&G, *TP*, p421.

450D&G, *TP*, p421.

Bergson, is the sign of creation.”<sup>451</sup> Similarly, for Ralph Waldo Emerson the highest goal of the arts was to inspire new artists to emerge anywhere, arranging oneself in an open space, with <sup>452</sup>“the possibility of springing up at any point—

wind's shadow—  
leaves  
tremble

a weary  
field of  
dust

atoms  
made of  
concrete

birds sing  
the branches  
play

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<sup>451</sup>Bachelard, pxxi-xxii.  
<sup>452</sup>D&G, *TP*, p421.

silhouette  
addressing  
mirror

car exhausts  
flower garden—  
collide

rain bows  
chalk flowers  
run

whales gather  
at dusk  
to sing

edges  
of the universe?

every thing  
each moment—  
superimposed

crayon  
lends the page  
a hand

Everything c  
                  u  
d          r  
e v e n the movement of space—

*sound—*  
from the two environments

paper felt  
ink  
think

four thousand trees rise—  
on a single blade of grass

hard edged shadows  
*cool!*  
sunlight on a wooden deck

only by contemplating  
nonsense does it mean something—  
*poetry*

matter  
distilled—  
atoms

an environment for light—  
*the universe*

light  
black  
white  
grey  
*rainbow!*

rose  
rose  
rose  
rose

frame tilted—  
*disconnected space*

still—

*life*

a

r

c

beyond  
sensation—  
*ideas*

a  
re  
tu  
rn  
in  
g d  
r n  
o u

but we cannot stop for a moment—  
*her language continues to fold*

light  
window  
moon



now

you

have

read

*these words*

,





*Chapter 3*  
*Inconclusions*  
*(of an unknown end)*



*Fig. 7. Gravestones 2 [film still]*  
(dir. Joanna Paul, B&W, 16mm, c. 1975)



### New Beginnings

“Poetry makes language *care* because it renders everything intimate. This intimacy is... the result of the bringing-together-into-intimacy of every act and noun and event and perspective to which the poem refers. There is often nothing more substantial to place against the cruelty... of the world than this caring.”<sup>453</sup>

“One could almost imagine Deleuze saying, like Walt Whitman, 'You say I contradict myself; Very well, I contradict myself. I contain multitudes'.”<sup>454</sup>

This is not a conclusion. It is a series of inconclusions and inclusions, amendments to certain unavoidable stratifications of thought. I began this essay by making a series of fairly rigid distinctions between mainstream-commercial cinema and experimental-intercultural cinema. I then suggested that Joanna's films returned me to 'narrative' from a 'poetic' perspective, interjecting narrative-images into the poetic (liquid) stream, opening onto “unknown (virtual) bodies.” These give me two 'analytical' categories: the 'poetic' (P) and the 'narrative' (N), which together describe the 'substance' of art (in a classical Aristotelian manner). The “poetic” I will align with “time” (just as Deleuze aligns experimental cinema with time-images) and “narrative” with “movement through space” (just as Deleuze aligns narrative, action-based cinema with movement-images). The classical mode of analysis (what Deleuze and Guattari call “state philosophy”) then places limits on the machine, or (in Foucault's terms) represses and disciplines the categories: some things are poetic and some things are *not* (some things are narrative and some things are not). One is good, and one is bad (moral dimension). One is personal and intimate and the other is public and distant (and so on). This is a philosophy of “being” (enacting an ontologically and ideologically powerful ritual). I look back at

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<sup>453</sup>John Berger, in O'Brien, p71.

<sup>454</sup>Marks, *SoF*, p26.

the past and feel appalled at the mistreatment of so many minority cultures (and not only at the hands of the West; I am thinking of China's treatment of Japan, for instance). Ideological analysis re-presents obvious arrangements of power across historical situations and allows us to see how the “official archive” has shifted, and how it has stayed the same. Ideological analysis, as Bill Nichols writes, “proposes obviousness, a sense of 'the way things are' within which our sense of place and self emerges... Ideology is how the existing ensemble of social relations represents itself.”<sup>455</sup>

1. However, what Deleuze suggests is a philosophy of *becoming*. No more ideology: *noology is exterior to the state apparatus*.<sup>456</sup> No longer the questions “Is this *either* poetic *or* narrative?” and “What one thing is this being?” or the statements “This is poetry! This is good!” and “This is narrative! This is bad!” (or visa-versa, depending on whether or not you like your expectations to be met).<sup>457</sup> I found that Joanna's films allowed for modes of 'becoming' through interjecting 'narrative' images into 'poetic' ebbs and flows. These produced the becomings of unknown bodies, the film's (intersubjective) body, the film's (philosophical) mind and my own nomadic wanderings – sandstorms of light (*all lines lead to Egypt*). This mode of interjection I will call “P/N” (signifying “narrative interjecting poetry,” or poetry *becoming* narrative).<sup>458</sup> Hence, though Joanna's films are dominantly 'poetic', their poetry is not in *staying* absolutely “poetic,” but through *changing* into something else (keeping on the move, wandering and exploring). “P/N” practices are very rare in modern culture and are dominantly referred to as 'poetic cinema'.

2. P/N is only one possible 'synthesis' of P and N, in terms of experimental film practices. I have mentioned a second in this text, which Kuhn calls 'deconstruction'. Kuhn used Brecht's plays (with their clashing of narrative forms

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455Bill Nichols, *Ideology and the Image* (Indiana University Press, 1981) p1.

456D&G, *TP*, p387.

457I find my tastes are variable rather than fixed. A movie I thought was great, can suddenly take a turn for the worse, while films which seem to be empty, suddenly fill with poetry. But there is always the possibility of returning to the other view, of getting from one to the other *and* back again.

458On the one hand an ideological function (*interjection*) and on the other a noological function (*becoming*). They are *reversals* of one another. Reversals are central to the philosophies of Merleau-Ponty, Sobchack, Deleuze and Foucault alike. All their philosophies produce functions consisting of four categories (derived from two reversible layers, or strata, of time/duration).

and sudden distances) to example deconstruction, drawn from Walter Benjamin's analysis. Deconstruction, as I am defining it, works primarily through interjecting “minor” narrative forms and unexpected interruptions, or situations, into “major” narrative forms (or the other way around). For this reason I will call deconstruction “N/N” (signifying “narrative forms interjecting narrative forms,” or narrative becoming other-narrative). Deconstruction constitutes a second 'experimental' (and sometimes intercultural) cinematic practice. One can observe deconstruction at work everywhere in modern culture. Self-reflexive (mainstream, Hollywood) comedies like *Airplane*, or *Scary Movie* are examples of deconstruction, as are William Burroughs' experimental, cut-up novels like *The Soft Machine* and *The Ticket That Exploded*, or Jean-Luc Godard's *Two or Three Things I Know About Her*. Assemblages of de-connected, fragmented fissures, lines, scenes, thoughts, and paragraphs, pages and photographs ripped from a vast pulsing, seething textual multiplicity (newspaper articles, poetry, crime novels, and medical textbooks, to Hollywood, mythology and pop music).<sup>459</sup>

3. I have also discussed pure “assemblages,” a special case of the “any-space-whatever” in which poetic-image follows poetic-image, without the fusion of narrative-images. Joanna's films began this way for me, and at all times they float *between* P/N and what I will call “P/P” (which signifies “poetic-images interjected into other-poetic-images,” and the poetic *becoming* other-poetic). Joanna's films, before watching them as a series and arranging them into the triad of subjective, objective and semi-subjective (perception-images), were entirely comprised of P/P images from my perspective. It was only with “time” and contemplation that P/N images began to a-rise from (*a-rhizome*) the ruins of inter-poetic-images.

4. I have already suggested one manner in which mainstream narrative films might engage with experimental practices (as textual production): *deconstruction* (N/N). In conclusion I would like to suggest a fourth category in which the poetic-image interjects within the narrative-image, thus creating a “becoming” in the opposite direction of Joanna's films. Paul Coughlin calls these poetic interjections into commercial and popular narrative cinema “sublime moments” in which a

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<sup>459</sup>One can also see the deconstructive impulse in narratives within narratives, like the play within a play, or film within a film, or play within a film (and so on).



particular image subtly shocks the spectator out of the narrative, prompting them to experience something “individual, personal, and subjective.”<sup>460</sup> Like Bachelard's poetic-image, the “sublime-image” causes the spectator to see something they are familiar with in a new, or unexpected way (or indeed, something they are *unfamiliar with* seen in a new way). As Coughlin writes, when “the spectator re-sees something for the first time... the sublime moment occurs within the spectator, it is the subjective appraisal of the image which is significant.”<sup>461</sup> This process is known as *defamiliarisation*.

Defamiliarisation involves 'ordinary' or 'banal' subject-matter, which would not normally be the focus of a film, or the focus of the spectator's everyday vision (which ranges from house-work to explosions) transformed by the affective qualities of the cinema. Coughlin argues that “This may be a gesture, a look, a movement, an object; the more ordinary, the more profound the process of defamiliarisation.”<sup>462</sup> Coughlin distinguishes these more subtle forms of 'poetry' from Brecht's deconstructive forms which work with “sudden and incessant displacement of images by other images.”<sup>463</sup> 'Sublime moments', on the other hand, might be said to include all the quieter “moments of various and manifold natures”<sup>464</sup> in which 'poetics' interject with more classical 'narratives'. I will define a poetic-image in narrative as any image working against the spectator remaining within the narrative, which causes them to think of the “means of production,” or the “production of meaning.” This final category I will call “N/P” (signifying “poetry interjecting narrative,” or narrative *becoming* poetry). These four categories I have worked out according to a mathematical methodology, introduced to linguistics by Roman Jakobson, echoing yin-yang logic (rather than an absolute Hegelian “synthesis”). While Hegel says “where there are two, they will make one,” Jakobson says that “where there are two, there will arise *four*” (a multiplicity). In this case there are no “problems” between the two concepts, no opposition *per se*, but only multiple points of contact between their various layers

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460Paul Coughlin, “Sublime Moments,” *Senses of Cinema*. Internet WWW page, at URL: <[www.sensesofcinema.com/contents/00/11/sublime.html](http://www.sensesofcinema.com/contents/00/11/sublime.html)> (first published 2000, version current 1/1/2008) p1.

461Coughlin, p3.

462Coughlin, p3.

463Coughlin, p2.

464Coughlin, p2.

(rhizome). The categories within these points of contact are the manifold ways in which a text passes/changes/shifts from one to the other (from P to N, from N to P, from N to N and from P to P).

Each of these four experimental textual practices indicate *choices* which an author (or selection of authors) make consciously and intentionally, in order to practice experimental thought, indicating that they are, in some way or another, dissatisfied with the “state” of things (of unities and opposites: in which narrative and poetry forever skirmish). These movements are not only found in what I have previously been calling experimental cinema, but *everywhere* and *anywhere* people feel oppressed and subjected to invisible power. I think of all those people in the world who feel that culture subjects them to positions they do not *want* to fill, who feel that culture denies them a basic kind of free-will (*who doesn't feel this way?*). In Hollywood, and mainstream cultural production, I imagine there would be a vast number of people who feel oppressed within these high-stress commercial institutions (from cleaners, to writers, to drivers, and so on). Wherever there are bad working conditions, and 'invisible' social prejudices, there are real people living and becoming. One kind of author makes ethical sacrifices to reach a large audience, while another remains true to their ideals, but is hardly known. *No-one wins*. It was never meant to be a game!

The functions I have pointed to should suffice to illustrate four possible exit points for an investigation into experimental authorship practices at the level of the text, just as Foucault's four functions in “What is an Author?” delimit authorship practices at the level of the legal, social and historical discipline and punishment of authors (genealogy and archaeology). On the one hand a “political function” (making poetics all the more urgent). On the other a “poetic function,” leading back in the other direction. A “name” does not make a film. Who makes movies move? *Real people*, actual “bodies” interacting physically with cameras and the worlds they exist in every day. I am suggesting an existential reading of authors which observes their choices at both the political and poetic levels (and those points of contact between the film and the spectator, in terms of thinking phenomenologically).

The “personal/public function” designates an author's “personal” (Pr) choices in terms of interaction, or non-interaction with the “public” (Pb). These two categories (personal and public) combine (at first) in four ways, indicating four kinds of personal becoming. I will call these four affections: Pr/Pb, Pb/Pr, Pr/Pr and Pb/Pb. These functions cross strata with Foucault's description of the “author function.” 1) Pr/Pb indicates the author's “personal” choices when relating to the “public.” Do they organise their work to be mass-produced, or produce only what is needed? Does their production create a lot of waste? Do they screen their films in multiplex theatres, or on street-corners? Does the author produce writings on their text? Or make any public statements? Do they perform for crowds? Do they have a persona, or are they shy? (and so on); 2) Pb/Pr indicates the manner in which the public chooses to interact with the text in their own personal spaces. Does the spectator sit quietly? Do they speak, and yell at the screen? Or do they gather with friends and talk though the film? Does the spectator pay to see it in the multiplex, or to “illegally” download it for free?; 3) Pr/Pr indicates the manner in which the author personally chooses to relate to themselves on “set.” Do they put themselves at the head of hundreds of citizens, in command of a veritable army? Do they have “power”? How do they act when given this power? Do they choose to work as an artisan? To make works entirely by themselves, operating outside the mainstream industry? and; 4) Pb/Pb, which indicates the way the public interact with each other, and in particular the existing writings about the author and their works by critics, and theorists (which crosses paths with “reception theory”).

\* \* \* \*

These three “functions,” or “machines” (the personal/public, the political/personal, and the poetic/narrative) create a triad comprised of three “regimes of knowledge,” all contributing to various consistencies, unities, flows, and inconsistencies, multiplicities and blocks (all at the same time, superimposed and entangled) in the becoming of the film and the choices the author makes in this becoming (from production, to distribution, to reception and reflection).

The method of working out a function's 'categorical imperative' intermixes two paired “functions” producing four lines of enquiry, four strata, four ways for something to change from one thing into another. All texts (and all authors) are undoubtedly subject to capitalism. This “being-in” capitalism is currently *necessary*. An author needs to live, after all and presently a 'living' means earning money (and therefore working within the capital-machine). However, all texts equally construct potential moments of poetry for their audiences. This interaction is never simply a dominance of one over the other, but a shifting, moving, amorphous site of power.

I believe the study of “experimental practices” (time-images, poetic-images and so on) should not be confined to experimental film-making, but applied to any images which “speak” to their audience, which stand out of the crowd and which mark a new entry point into classical, stale narratives (and equally classical, stale poetry) and redefines the “order of things.” Equally I believe that writing criticism about the personal and political practices of authors is a necessary discipline, revealing the ways in which real people struggle with capitalism, poverty, subjectivity, individuality, community (and so many other very *real* concepts) every day (in many multiplicitous and different ways). Once I began looking for existential, ethical, caring, compassionate, experimental practices in mainstream culture, I began to find them everywhere (*anywhere!*). For all the functioning repressive institutions and socio-legal concepts, there are as many real people trying to remain indifferent to the horror of the modern world, trying their best to make some kind of difference (in-difference).

Experimental practices are what I would call an “existential authorial ethical aesthetic.” There are two ways to interpret “ethics,” a kind of “turning” around which ethics establishes itself. 1) Ethics concerns firstly those moments when one chooses to transgress, or oppose certain moral laws, codes, or conventions. 2) Ethics secondly involves a landscape of thought outside pre-determined codes, which Deleuze and Foucault have argued leads to the evolution of thought, care, creation, art, expression (and so on). This is the ethics defined by the “self” (no longer in opposition to morality). This is Spinoza's ethics. His work was a radical

departure from the dominant thought at the time (in which God's laws were absolute and unquestionable). This may be why Deleuze and Guattari regard Spinoza's *Ethics* as the book of the BwO.

\* \* \* \*

In Foucault's terms “genealogies” and “archaeologies” determine the manner in which social constructs subject people to more and more ordered (and fixed) states of being, behaving and thinking. This is the organisation of the “state body,” of the “consumer body” and even the “slave body.” Ethics might be said to reverse this state and come at the same problem from another angle. *Ethics*: what existential, ethical choices can a person make in their “practices of the self” (their everyday living) to produce new thoughts, and new experiences? How does one produce change, and energy, with thought?

In order to live in society I must obey the laws of the state. If I do not, then I am dominantly perceived as transgressive and must be punished. This kind of thinking would be fine if there was not (*still!*) invisible forms of institutionalised racism, sexism and homophobia flowing (often subtly) throughout most cultural production. If no-one produced ethically transgressive material, no-one but white males would have legal access to land-ownership, basic human-rights (and their perceptive and expressive citizenship). I do not blame anyone for this. It is so “invisible” that it is often hard to notice. But, equally, poetry flows through every text, every moment—

Within this function-machine, real author's make real decisions. I feel that the complex relationship between those who choose to explore “experimental practices” (at the level of the personal, the political, the poetic, and any combination of these) in public forums and those who “do not perceive the choice,” are only just beginning to be properly understood. I hope that this work might add to the growing body of knowledge on 'poetics' and its positive contribution to the socially communicable images of thought. The categories which I have supplied here (politics, poetics, personality) are only three of many more which will arise in

the author's embodiment of the film-body *there and then* (and our re-embodiment of it *here and now*). No longer absences, no longer lack.

Psychology is, for instance, another thought which comes to mind, as is 'phenomenology', 'philosophy', 'perception', 'powers' and 'passions' (these two belonging to "affections," and modes of "becoming," as central to Spinoza's *Ethics* as they are to Deleuze, Guattari and Henri Bergson). It is these notions which came to dominate Foucault's late works also. As James Bernauer and Michael Mahon write, "A special curiosity motivates [Foucault's] final works, the curiosity that "enables one to get free of oneself.""<sup>465</sup> Gerald Bruns also connects Foucault's "ethics of the self" to his early writing on modernism's fragmentation. As Foucault writes, "however erudite my books may be, I've always conceived of them as direct experiences aimed at pulling myself free of myself."<sup>466</sup>

\* \* \* \*

What I am suggesting is that *both* the moral *and* ethical choices of the author as a "real (some) body" (personal-political) grounds the "film's (*unknown becoming known*) body" and "brain" (poetic-narrative) allowing for infinite points of contact between a multiplicity of strata (*the personal is the political is the poetic is the personal is the political...*) from which the "private thinker" might draw out a virtual philosophy of authors; to dig into the earth of cultural production, to "finally SEE." The choices I have shown Joanna making illustrate one unfolding, in one particular direction (*digging her rock-like meditations on seeing!*).

The less writings an author produces, the less we know about their existential thoughts. The less an author discusses their actual filmmaking processes, the more their practices become invisible (for the spectator). This does not mean an author did not make them, but they are harder to map (easier to trace). What is interesting in these functions is not "what" they say, but "how" they function to structure what *we* say and what interventions might be made into these structures by *me* in the *here and now*. How is an author perceived? How can they be

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<sup>465</sup>James Bernauer and Michael Mahon, "Foucault's Ethical Imagination," in Gutting (ed), p161, 2nd edition.

<sup>466</sup>Gerald Bruns, "Foucault's Modernism," in Gutting (ed.), p350, 2nd edition.

perceived?

Interventions (and inventions) cannot be located without a thorough knowledge of the “order of things” as they stand. Perhaps what I am suggesting is that *all* authors are intercultural. *Perhaps I have been learning to walk with my eyes?* Through the mapping of repressive state structures I find so many gaps, intervals and fissures, so many fragmented, and forgotten fossils, which allow for the smoothing out of capitalism's striated space. I find so many bodies-without-organs and so many becomings, that it is impossible to continue maintaining an absolute distinction between narrative and poetry. These experiences exist in texts everywhere, of any kind (from televised sport to home-movies, to greeting-card poems and everything in between). The poetic-image allows for the traditional existential questions concerning “understanding the self” (being and nothingness: *emptying the body*) to fall away and for questions of “understanding others” (care, ethics, fields of compassion) to emerge (filling the emptiness). The poetic also opens the path to enjoyment of the self as an incarnate “body” (the BwO). Take televised sport: perhaps I become the player as I watch? Does my body become the player (covered in sweat)? Do I understand the pressure that each player goes through, caught in the heavily competitive job of being a sport's star? *Do I care?* Or do I keep all this at arms distance (*its just not my thing*).

I am beginning to suggest (tentatively) that there may be no more need for questions like “Who am I?” and “What am I being?” *No more why why why*. Instead new sayings assemble: “I am being me!” “How do I become you?” “How do you become me?” “What else can I become?” and most importantly “How do I get back to me again when I am finished with all this becoming?” *Only through finding out*. No more thought “at a distance,” but rather intimate, close-range models of aesthetic phenomenology, noology and archaeology. These “minor” sciences would seek not only to analyse art for the pleasure of others, *but to radically change the (my) self in the process of reading through aesthetics, taking seriously the ways in which you play at becoming others*. Just as a child runs around the house on all fours becoming horse or dog or cat, so the adult must learn to play again. To laugh and draw and sing. No longer the old questions “To be or

not to be?” (what *one* thing will I be when I grow up) but instead “Is there anything I can *do*?” and “In what ways can I do this to function as an ethical and useful member of people-kind?” (the minor and major things I can do to effect real change in the only person I really know: myself). The question then becomes: *How do I continually effect change in myself? How do I avoid stasis?* The answers arrive without thought: *By continually resisting change. By staying perfectly still.*

In conclusion: I maintain this is *not* a conclusion. These are *beginnings* and *inconclusions*. As with the rhizome layers of Joanna's films (origami verbs) this chapter may have arisen where you expected a concluding “situation” to be. I have attempted to resist the “unifying-function” of a traditional conclusion, and suggest that where the conclusion of a thesis would usually be there might be a multiplicity of unfoldings, inclusions, silences, collisions, cohesions/

a n d f r a g m e n t s –









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## *Appendix II: Filmography*





*Airplane*  
(dir. Jim Abrahams, David Zucker, Jerry Zucker, 1980)

*The Bridge [De Brug]*  
(dir. Joris Ivens, 1928)

*On the Waterfront*  
(dir. Elia Kazan, 1954)

*The Piano*  
(dir. Jane Campion, 1993)

*Rain [Regan]*  
(dir. Joris Ivens, 1929)

*Scary Movie*  
(dir. Keenan Ivory Wayans, 2000)

*The Terminator*  
(dir. James Cameron, 1980)

*Two or Three Things I Know About Her*  
(dir. Jean-Luc Goddard, 1967)



*Appendix III: Joanna Paul Filmography*



	<i>Body / House</i>	.1
<i>Gravestones</i> (aka. <i>Boshard Family @ Akaroa c. 1975</i> )		.2
	<i>Jillian Dressing</i> (aka. <i>Woman in Silhouette</i> )	.3
	<i>Aberharts House</i> (aka. <i>Old Farmhouse and Family</i> )	.4
	<i>Sisterhood</i> (aka. <i>Detail of a House Interior</i> )	.5
	<i>Swings 1972</i>	.6
	<i>Round Picton</i>	.7
	<i>Green – Barrys Bay</i> (aka. <i>Green BB</i> )	.8
	<i>Pat France</i>	.9
	<i>Auckland 1971</i>	.10
	<i>Woman Things</i>	.11
	<i>Magda</i>	.12
	<i>Maggie Documentation</i>	.13
	<i>Maggie Documentation [Tiger]</i>	.14
	<i>Maggie Documentation [Tiger &amp; Girl]</i>	.15
	<i>To the Bay</i>	.16
	<i>Barrys Bay</i> (aka. <i>Landscape Study</i> )	.17
	<i>Port Chalmers Cycle</i>	.18
	<i>Peony</i>	.19
	<i>Task</i>	.20
	<i>Motorway</i>	.21
	<i>Children – Imogen</i>	.22
	<i>Seacliff</i> (aka. <i>Landscape – Seacliff</i> )	.23
	<i>Thorndon</i>	.24
	<i>Movements A</i>	.25
	<i>Aramoana</i>	.26
	<i>Blue</i> (aka. <i>Blossom – Blue Flowers</i> )	.27
	<i>Maggies Dream Time</i> (aka. <i>Gardens</i> )	.28
	<i>Barrys Bay 2</i> (aka. <i>BB2</i> )	.29
	<i>Aramoana 2</i> (aka. <i>Remnants of a Demolished Wharf</i> )	.30
	<i>Maggies Drawings</i> (aka. <i>Park II/Roundabout/Running Girl/Marigolds</i> )	.31
	<i>Bag</i>	.32







