

**THE FIT BETWEEN POLICY, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PARTICIPATORY  
DEVELOPMENT IN AID ASSISTED EDUCATION PROJECTS IN KENYA**

**By**

**Josephine Syokau Mwanzia**

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## ABSTRACT

This research critically examines the efficacy of mainstream aid development projects that embrace people-centred, participatory approaches and government partnerships with multilateral and bilateral agencies (donors), civil society and local communities to enhance benefits of empowerment and social change to disadvantaged people. The thesis used an example of an aid project, the Basic Education Improvement Project (BEIP) which the GOK implemented in partnership with the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and disadvantaged communities in urban slums and marginalised rural areas particularly Arid and Semi Arid Lands (ASALs).

The thesis further drew upon structural and poststructural perspectives to respond to the developmental challenges posed by the theories of modernisation, dependency, ADev and postdevelopment and to assess the 'fit' between policy, theory and practice of participatory development (PDev) and its relationships to participatory democracy (PDem). Core ideas came from Robert Chambers Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA), Rowlands' classification of power, Arnstein's ladder for citizen participation and Ife's approach to community development (CDev).

To understand the meanings and impacts of the BEIP structure, partnerships, participation, empowerment, sustainability and social change, and the relational dynamics it generated, the thesis used multiple research methods based on qualitative, case study and grounded theory methodologies. These were chosen because of their compatibility with the critical theory used to analyse government-to-donor led and people-led development as enacted in the BEIP and their sensitivity to researcher flexibility and contextual and unique features of the research.

The research shows that mainstream PDev management through bureaucratically organised structures of management and governance creates new forms of centralism where representative democracy (RDem) rather than participatory democracy (PDem) are used. Despite having a strong focus on holistic and balanced development, the enactment

and implementation of partnerships and participation within an aid delivery system, and through representatives and technical experts, limited benefits of empowerment and social change to the disadvantaged people.

Indeed, participation and collaboration in the BEIP enhanced the teaching and learning environments of the targeted schools and increased awareness of rights to the disadvantage people. However, not only did accountability remain top-down but partnerships emerged through competitive, not cooperative relationships. Such top-down approaches and elite-to-elite social networks contributed to social exclusion, further marginalisation of the disadvantaged people, and risked accentuating dependency on external aid. For these reasons, the thesis argues that emancipation of disadvantaged people and realisation of sustainable development are more likely to emerge through interventions that increase participatory practice, where government partnerships with civil society and local communities draw upon cooperative principles, that promote structures and discourses of citizenship and rights and that focus on the grassroots, not the nation-state as the locale for social change.

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## ABBREVIATIONS

ADev	-	Alternative Development
ASALs	-	Arid and Semi-arid Lands
APRM	-	African Peer Review Mechanism
BEIP	-	Basic Education Improvement Project
BOGs	-	Boards of Governors
CBOs	-	Community Based Organizations
CDev	-	Community Development
CDF	-	Constituency Development Fund
DFID/ODA	-	Department for International Development/Organization for Development Assistance, the official development agency for the UK government
EFA	-	Education for All
ERS	-	Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation
FGM	-	Female Genital Mutilation
FPE	-	Free Primary Education, Kenya's equivalent for Universal Primary Education.
GDP	-	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	-	Gross National Product
GOK	-	Government of Kenya
IMF	-	International Monetary Fund
KNUT	-	Kenya National Union of Teachers
KESSP	-	Kenya Education Sector Support Programme
LATF	-	Local Authority Trust Fund
MDev	-	Mainstream Development
MDGs	-	Millennium Development Goals

MTEF	-	Medium Term Expenditure Framework
NARC	-	National Alliance Rainbow Coalition
NBA	-	Needs Based Assessment
NGOs	-	Non Governmental Organizations
ODA	-	Organization for Development Assistance
OPEC	-	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PDev	-	Participatory Development
PDem	-	Participatory Democracy
PIU	-	Project Implementation Unit
PPAs	-	Participatory Poverty Assessment
PRA	-	Participatory Rural Appraisal
PRSP	-	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PTAs	-	Parents-Teachers Associations
RBA	-	Rights Based Assessment
RDem	-	Representative Democracy
SAGAs	-	Semi Autonomous Agencies
SMCs	-	School Management Committees
SWAP	-	Sector Wide Approaches to Planning
UK	-	United Kingdom
UNESCO	-	United Nations Educational, Social and Cultural Organisation
USAID	-	United States Agency for International Development

## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION

The Basic Education Improvement Project (BEIP<sup>1</sup>) was an intervention designed by the Government of Kenya (GOK) to help increase access to education and reduce poverty in marginalised areas in rural and urban areas. According to official documents, the BEIP aimed to reduce poverty by empowering<sup>2</sup> the disadvantaged<sup>3</sup> people take ownership of the policies, decisions and development changes it impacted upon. Thus, the GOK aimed to empower disadvantaged communities to take control of their own lives through the participatory development (PDev) processes of the BEIP.

This thesis critically examines the impact of the BEIP on disadvantaged people living in urban slums, pockets of poverty in areas of low, medium and high agricultural potentials and Arid and Semiarid Lands (ASALs) in Kenya. In so doing, it interrogates the value of stakeholders'<sup>4</sup> participation in the BEIP and the conditions that contribute to empowerment and social change. Mainly, it draws upon Ife's (2002) approach to

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<sup>1</sup>The project investigated as part of this research.

<sup>2</sup>Friedmann (1992) talks of empowerment as a highly contested word that implies different forms of 'power' and 'disadvantage'. Slim (2003, cited in Ife, 2002) says empowerment is overused and is about to lose meaning. However, Ife (2002) identifies disadvantages based on gender, class, ethnicity/race, poverty, age, physical disability, grief, sexual problems, loneliness etc. Thus, empower[ing] is a process of enabling disadvantaged people to better manage the socio-cultural, political and economic conditions which either promote or inhibit their full participation in the live of society.

<sup>3</sup>Disadvantage is used to describe the socio-economic and political contexts of the people whose lives the BEIP was intended to improve and their relationships with the structures that govern their lives. Individuals who have been marginalised based on gender, class, age, poverty and ethnicity such as women/children/youth, illiterate, poor, and special needs people are disadvantaged, marginalised or deprived. Communities in rural ASALs and urban slums are disadvantaged either by virtue of living in remote areas mostly in adverse climatic, environmental and housing conditions where they lack access to most social amenities or due to political/territorial affiliations (see GOK, 2004a, 2005b).

<sup>4</sup>Stakeholders denote people who, according to the focus for this study had experiences of involvement in the BEIP and the policies that informed the project planning, implementation and monitoring and evaluation processes. These are technocrats (policy-makers, planners, educationists), political elites, teachers, parents, multi[bi]lateral donors, media groups and civil society (NGOs, political elites, special groups, e.g. PTAs, BOGs, SMCs, religious organizations, communities (schools and neighbourhood).

community development (CDev) to assess the ‘fit’ between policy, theory and practice of PDev and its relationships with PDem in aid development projects that engage government partnerships with donors, civil society and local communities.

Chapter one sets the scene for this critical inquiry. It begins by situating the thesis within the political economy and PDev policy contexts in Kenya. Following, the rationale for the study is stated in terms of the problem explored in the thesis, purpose, research questions and significance. Synopses of the research design and (de)limitations are then given. The chapter concludes with an outline of the thesis chapters.

### **Political Economy and Policy Background of the Study**

The political economy and indicators of human development in Kenya show that economic progress does not necessarily translate into enhanced wellbeing, let alone serve in the interests of the disadvantaged people. Since the ascendancy to power of the National Alliance Rainbow Coalition government in 2003–2007, real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate has appreciated from 2.8% (2003), 4.3% (2004), 5.8% in 2005 (APRM, 2006) to 6.1% (2006)<sup>5</sup>. However, this economic growth has not been matched by improvements in the quality of the lives of disadvantaged people. For example, Kenya’s total population by June 2007 was estimated at 36.9 million with an alarming poverty rate of 56.8% (APRM, 2006; GOK, 2005a). Notwithstanding, this poverty rating is relative as it is based on the national census of 1999. Policy documents (GOK, 2003c; 2005b) and research (Mukudi, 2004) suggest an increasing trend of about 60% of people living below the (relative) international poverty line of one dollar per day. These poor people can neither access nor support quality livelihoods.

In the case of education, for example, disadvantaged people have not been able to fulfil their obligations and actively exercise their right to education, even after the introduction of free and compulsory primary education (FPE). The implementation of FPE

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<sup>5</sup> See US Department of State, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2962.htm>, accessed on 21 October, 2007.

in 2003 saw a total of 1.2 million out-of-school children enrolled in formal public primary schools. Additional 300,000 enrolled in Non-Formal Education centres. Yet, 1.5 million children still remained out of school (GOK, 2003b).

Similarly, adult literacy level is estimated at 85.1%<sup>6</sup> (2007). This is an increase from 82% (2002) (APRM, 2006, p. 55) when enrolment in adult literacy programmes begun to rise after experiencing significant a drop between 1979 and 2001. Illiteracy represents itself more dramatically among the poor with gender disparities (61% women: 39% men). There are also regional disparities. In the Coast and North Eastern Provinces, a literacy level of just 37.7% (1999) was recorded (GOK, 2005b).

Other areas with high poverty levels and which have a similar literacy trends include urban slums and rural areas particularly ASALs. These areas experience long spells of drought-famine, diseases and death of livestock (the main source of income). Pockets of poverty in areas of low, medium and high agricultural potentials such as among the Luhya of Western and Luo of Nyanza Provinces experience perennial floods. Lack of infrastructure (access roads, electricity, telephone), insecurity, cattle rustling, lack of access to safe water and healthcare all together heighten disadvantages and inhibit sustainable livelihoods in marginalized areas.

The GOK is well aware that economic growth has yet to benefit all its citizens and has placed great faith in interventions, such as the BEIP as a way to address the situation. A key concern of this thesis is to establish the extent to which the participatory approaches used by the GOK to ameliorate the impact of disadvantages caused by poverty, class, gender, ethnicity, culture and other environmental, socio-economic and political factors, enable disadvantaged people to take control of their futures. Policy documents (GOK, 2001b; 2004b) attest that for the GOK, disadvantage increases demand for state support, particularly in education, health and other social services. It also means inefficiency in

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<sup>6</sup> See US Department of State, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2962.htm>, accessed on 21 October, 2007

economic growth because the disadvantaged masses are not optimizing their economic, social and political potentials.

To help resolve these and other problems, the GOK (2001b; 2005a) has promoted partnerships with technocrats, political elites, donors, civil society, local communities and the disadvantaged themselves. These partnerships claim to support sustainable educational development among disadvantaged people and generally promote PDev. The GOK sees participation as a means for the disadvantaged to hold government structures accountable for good governance and delivery of quality services. Participation also has a moral dimension. It is a mechanism for empowering disadvantaged people to access their collective and individual rights and obligations. In other words participation in aid development aims to enable disadvantaged people overcome their disadvantaged condition and empower them to enjoy the good life that is their right (Chambers, 2005). While advancing a discourse in PDev, the GOK has also enacted policies to increase the contribution made by its development interventions towards promoting economic growth and human development.

This thesis questions the efficacy of these reform policies and projects to empower and socially transform the disadvantaged people in sustainable ways. The GOK (1965) policy focus on PDev can be traced from the Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965. Upon assenting to the human rights declaration of 1948 at independence (1963), the government entered into a partnership with local communities to combat disease, illiteracy and poverty (read structural disadvantages) on a 'harambee' (Kiswahili equivalent for pooling/pulling physical and human resources together) basis. As set out in this policy, the GOK has been establishing an environment conducive for human development. In the case of education, the GOK develops policies, school curricular, employs teachers and assesses and evaluates the impact of its policies and educational development programmes and projects. The GOK has thus been supporting education as the main way out of poverty, illiteracy/ignorance and disease, and a precondition to sustainable development. Harambee



was founded on principles of a social democracy deriving from indigenous cultural practices of participation. A central theme of this social democracy ensured all people participated as equal partners by pooling resources to address human development issues of mutual interest to the collectivity of society at different levels (family, village, school, district, Province and national).

Current research (Murunga, 2002) appreciates that the harambee policy bore political meanings. Although rarely acknowledged, harambee was founded on principles of PDem. It was based on the acknowledgement that the state has a responsibility to reduce structural disadvantage and to facilitate access to rights and obligations that were not readily accessible during the colonial time (Saitoti, 2002). In this regard harambee was meant to facilitate enjoyment of civic and human freedoms (independence). In order to be liberated from ignorance, disease and poverty, communities relentlessly invested time, human and physical capital to enhance educational development. Through harambee more than 90% of all secondary schools in the category of district and provincial schools were built (GOK, 2001a).

Through the Gachathi Report (GOK, 1976 #904), the GOK legitimated and began to support harambee schools (initially built and supported by communities). This legitimation made laudable unique and distinctive state-community relationship(s) that are rarely acknowledged. According to Chambers (2005) “the gradual legitimation of harambee secondary schools...and their progressive incorporation into the official education system is an example of a powerful grassroots movement forcing the government’s hand, of the tail wagging the dog” (p. 90). This statement represents a glimpse of rich relationships amongst the GOK, donors, civil society and local communities whose research has remained elusive. Research (Murunga, 2002), PDev practice (Tondon, 1995) and government policy documents (GOK, 2001b; 2003b; 2004b) indicate that over the years harambee has assumed new meanings and has been subject to abuse. A core challenge of attempts to address poverty, illiteracy and disease through

harambee is that benefits of empowerment and social change to the disadvantaged people have remained unrealised (Thomas, 1987).

Compared to other areas, disadvantaged people in ASALs have not been able to expand educational facilities and to increase participation of their children in education (Mukudi, 1999, 2004; Sifuna, 2005a, 2005b). For this reason disadvantaged people in these regions have been receiving grants from the government and donors. Most of the schools in these regions have been built and at times repaired by the same donor agencies that built them (Burkey, 1993; Mulenga, 1999). Because of this dependency on government and donor funding, technocrats and elites came to the belief that disadvantaged people are conservative and resistant to change (Sifuna, 2005a, 2005b).

Contrary to these beliefs, research (Mbaku, 2000a, 2000b, 2004; Nasong'o, 2004) is increasingly showing that disadvantaged people are not the primary cause of the poor conditions they suffer. Murunga (2002) has argued that elites' interests in market-based development, both in the public and private sectors, for example, contributed to the implementation of the now defunct cost-sharing policies of the IMF and the World Bank's structural adjustments programmes in the 1980s. To its credit, the cost-sharing policy emphasized good governance through processes of decentralisation of government authority and deconcentration of responsibility for human development away from central government to the private sector, local government and communities (World Bank, 1996 #45). The problem is that as these neoliberal forms of participation gained currency, meaningful participation in harambee projects dwindled, partly because the cost-sharing policy reform was implemented without due regard to the existing realities and unique contexts of the Kenya people.

The focus on privatisation appeared to privilege markets over PDem while reducing the role of the government towards expanding the education sector. Indeed as detailed later, it relieved the government the 'burden' of having to build schools while sharking the same to the very communities that had borne such responsibility since independence.

Despite the focus on decentralisation, in practice very little was done to facilitate downward accountability to the people whose lives the policy sought to improve. For these reasons and others, participation in cost-sharing policies cut against human development through removal of government subsidies in all social sectors including health and education. As a result disadvantaged people could neither afford educational costs and healthcare nor engage with harambee processes to build schools as they had previously been doing. Consequently, the cost-sharing policy contributed to increased dropout and low enrolment and participation rates of children from disadvantaged households (GOK, 2001a; 2005b). According to Tondon (1995) participation in cost-sharing policies legitimised elites' hegemonic powers and facilitated the government to abdicate its responsibilities to the people much as harambee did. Arising from these views and others, the GOK has 'repealed' the cost-sharing policy vide Sessional paper No. 1 of 2005 (GOK, 2005b).

Arguably then, the convergence of the weakening of participation in harambee and the imposition of cost-sharing policies is significant because it widened 'political spaces' for community and donor interests into policies and major public sector reforms such as those based on Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP), Participatory Poverty Assessments (PPAs), medium term expenditure frameworks of the IMF and the World Bank and Sector Wide Approaches to Planning (SWAP) of the DFID as outlined in the Kenya Education Sector Support Programme (KESSP 2005–2010). Within these policy reforms discourses of partnerships, participation, democracy, rights, governance and empowerment have gained new currency. A key impetus driving these reforms comes from the view that when stakeholders participate in policies and programmes that affect them, development will be sustainable. For this reason, the GOK has embraced PDev and engrained participation in all public sector strategic plans and projects such as the BEIP. These participatory strategies seek to enhance achievement of the Millennium Development Goals relating to poverty, education, health and gender. Policy documents

(GOK, 1965; 2001a; 2004a; 2004b; 2005a; 2005b) attest that the participatory approaches are drawn upon rights-based perspectives.

UNESCO (2006) in a draft strategy for ‘education for sustainable development in Sub-Saharan Africa’ endorses this rights-based perspective by stating:

“...all activities involved should be developed in a holistic approach where education activities include concrete actions towards i) poverty reduction; ii) peace and social and political stability; iii) gender equality and equity; iv) health promotion; v) environment sustainability; vi) culture in relation to skills, behaviours and values to be promoted; and vii) the enforcement of the principles of good governance and transparent management” (p. 13).

This holistic approach defines the areas of focus for this particular research and also the different areas of emphases in the design and implementation of PDev in the BEIP and its broader strategies. In particular, the KESSP (2005-2010) facilitates participation and partnerships through the SWAP processes under the auspices of DFID. KESSP is a conglomeration of 23 programmes. This strategy holds that participation and partnerships empower the disadvantaged people to control their futures. As part of the infrastructural programme of KESSP, as shown in later chapters, the BEIP provided a mechanism for targeting services and addressing the structural and rights deficits of disadvantaged people through participation and partnerships.

This is in tandem with the DFID’s (2000) manifesto on human rights where participation is a mechanism for “...enabling people to realize their rights to participate in, and access information relating to the decision-making processes which affect their lives” (cited in Chamber, 2005, p. 103). These mainstreamed PDev approaches work by integrating global and indigenous perspectives of participation. The KESSP for example, is a hybrid of SWAP, harambee and indigenous principles of participation, namely ‘pooling resources into one basket’. These hybridised genres of PDev strategies have been invited to facilitate the creation of government partnerships on an equal basis with local communities, multilateral and bilateral donors, civil society, media and the private sector to support Education for All (EFA) goals and sustainable development.

SWAP promotes the view that development cooperation at the macro level translates into similar partnerships between the government, donors, civil society and communities at meso and micro levels of development management (Klees, 2001). In this case partnerships provide 'political spaces' for disadvantaged people to influence and make policies and development projects responsive to their needs (Cornwall, 2003). Through partnerships and participation, the GOK aims to foster government and donor commitment, multidimensional accountabilities and country ownership of the development interventions and decisions enacted through the PRSP which is:

“...a country-owned framework to strengthen the impact of public action on poverty...key underlying principles include country ownership and commitment, results orientation, comprehensive strategy for different dimensions of poverty, partnerships with stakeholders and medium to long-term strategies and perspective for external commitments” (GOK, 2002, pp. 2, 3-4).

The role of government is to enhance “conditions for the poor [disadvantaged]...to exploit their full potential [to drive development in the country since] development initiatives will succeed to the extent that they are people-driven, and emphasize full capacity utilization” (GOK, 2002 #204, pp. 1-2). Enabling disadvantaged people to direct and control development and thereby own the process has been and still is a major challenge to the GOK, technocrats, elites and donors. The main issue concerns “how to best involve the people to tap the latent indigenous knowledge and potential within communities” (p. 1). As a way of overcoming this challenge, as is the case elsewhere, the GOK seeks to hybridise indigenous perspectives of participation and harambee with the more global, through the PRSP, KESSP and the mechanisms used to implement these policies. The World Bank (2000b) states that:

“[It] is interested in incorporating the people’s perspective into project work so as to narrow the gap between professionals and the intended beneficiaries. Methods of attending to cultural and behavioural factors – listening to the people -... are as important to effective development work as are the more widely tools of financial or economic analysis (in Botchway, 2001, p. 135).

As indicated in the Bank's statement 'hybridised' processes of participation in Kenya are seen to avail indigenous knowledge, information, skills and culture as a way of addressing disadvantages caused by class (elites and illiterate, rich and poor, rural and urban, global and local). Here participation is seen as a mechanism for enhancing the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of development processes. Ultimately, participation will promote good governance and equitable distribution of goods and services. Thus participation is seen to be ushering in a "new paradigm" (GOK, 2002, p. 2) in development thinking and practice. This 'shift' aims to build donor, government and community relationships and strengthen collaboration and commitment towards ensuring sustainable economic growth and poverty alleviation.

Participation here is tied with issues of democracy, inclusion, governance and poverty. The aim is to enhance positive changes on the part of disadvantaged people. Democracy and empowerment are important themes of the Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment creation (ERS) (2003-2007). Here, participation aims "to empower Kenyans and... provide them with a democratic political atmosphere under which all citizens can be free to work hard and engage in productive activities to improve their standards of living" (GOK, 2004a, p. v). To achieve democracy and empowerment the GOK in its ERS plan of action states:

"Rapid economic growth is the only assured way of reducing poverty and enhancing gainful employment opportunities in Kenya in the long run. However, in the medium term, interventions that increase access to social services and reduce inequality can improve the situation of the poor even before the impacts of rapid economic growth begin to be felt. Furthermore, there are segments of society who, due to their vulnerability, marginalization or lack of skills will be unable to benefit from improving socio-economic conditions. The focus [in the meantime] is to address the issues relating to the poor, marginalized and vulnerable groups, which, even in a 3-year recovery period, cannot be allowed to await general economic improvement but must be tackled as part of a wider socio-economic agenda" (p. 31).

A contributing factor towards increasing efficiency in economic growth and cost-effectiveness in human development interventions as set out in ERS reviews and the

Vision 2030 policy reforms and mechanisms proposed (GOK, 2006, 2007) is industrialisation and privatization of key government functions and deregulation of certain state corporations. In these policy contexts, social sectors must reduce existing inequalities, create employment and empower disadvantaged people by increasing access to affordable and quality healthcare and education services. They must also promote government partnerships with donors, civil society and local communities and embrace people-centred and participatory approaches in all development interventions.

### **Statement of the Problem**

While the GOK policy focus has embraced PDev discourses on partnerships, people-centred and participatory approaches, in practice, little is known about the extent to which these policy reforms and their mechanisms such as the BEIP, in a real sense increase benefits of empowerment and social change to the disadvantaged people. As highlighted above, participation, partnerships and empowerment are not new technologies in the Kenyan political economy and policy contexts. Policy documents (GOK, 2001a; 2001b) acknowledge that PDev approaches in the mainstream government face challenges of enabling disadvantaged people to control and direct their own development. The GOK policy focus and agenda on participation and partnerships is both an indication of political will towards human development and PDev approaches. These approaches in part adhere to Murunga's (2002; 2005) suggestion that bottom-up approaches to development are more likely to enable disadvantaged people to direct their own development in sustainable ways. Regrettably, little is known about the extent to which these approaches adhere to PDev, PDem and bottom-up change.

Despite continued use in human development policy and practice, Chambers (2005) adds that local universities in Kenya have largely marginalized indigenous participatory technologies in their research, although they are best suited to carry out such analysis. Elsewhere in Africa, only a handful of research (Biggs & Smith, 1998; Botchway, 2001;

Choguill, 1996) has evaluated the empowerment and social change value of participation to the disadvantaged in relation to broader issues of structural disadvantage, rights and obligations. In her evaluation of the extent to which the use of participatory methods are at all critical for PDev to occur and the conditions under which participation ensured empowerment and sustainability of social change by the disadvantaged<sup>7</sup> in a Canadian-Ghanaian government supported programme in Ghana, Botchway (2001) found that participation was being used to supplant fundamental structural reforms required for empowerment and social change to occur.

Such findings add to the problem that there is insufficient understanding about what constitutes participation and the conditions that contribute to benefits of empowerment and transformation to the disadvantaged people in sustainable ways. On this problem Mikkelsen (2005) recounts that “of the uses and understandings of participation and associated terms such as ‘empowerment’, there is no one a priori strategy for *who* participates in the development *mainstream*, in *what*, *why* they participate, and *how* and on *which conditions*” (p. 58). A related problem comes from critics who argue that participatory approaches are being mainstreamed in policies and sector reforms and are tyrannizing development decisions and debates without evidence of empowerment and social change (Cook & Kothari, 2001) and without clear understanding of how local stakeholders and in particular the disadvantaged, access and experience participation (Hayward, Simpson, & Wood, 2004). Again, there is no clear evidence of reduced poverty to prove the PDev’s emancipatory claims (Cleaver, 1999).

Likewise, Shepherd (1998) contends that participation in development “...has lacked the analytical tools and...adequate theoretical framework” (cited in Hickey & Mohan, 2004b, p. 59). Despite brave assertions that participation is ‘political’ (White, 1996), the lack of a coherent theoretical framework, in part, makes PDev insufficiently

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<sup>7</sup>Botchway talks of ‘Community’ and ‘Village’ meaning participation at the grassroots levels or local people’s participation.



theorized and depoliticized in practice (Kapoor, 2002b). For example, participation has alternately been used to denote participatory methods, PDev and even structural reforms that involve collaborative-dialogical processes with stakeholders (Mikkelsen, 2005). Such usage has led to suspicion that participatory rural appraisal (PRA) methods have come to replace the actual democratic practice of participation and become a convenient and controllable substitute for it (Biggs & Smith, 1998).

A central problem of this research is that PDev approaches<sup>8</sup> ignore questions about inclusiveness, the role of facilitators<sup>9</sup> and the personal behaviour of elites that overshadow, or sometimes ignore questions of legitimacy, justice, power and the politics of gender and difference in pursuit of consensus (Kapoor, 2002b). While the GOK embraced PDev discourses to promote partnerships with donors and communities Murunga (2007) and Nasong'o (2007) contend that donors' interests in markets, elites' attitudes, approaches and disadvantaged people's relationships with the social, political and economic structures that govern their lives are potential inhibitors to participation in aid development policies and decisions. Yet, the extent to which such interest and the principles the government and donors use inhibit PDev and PDem is still unclear.

For example, the GOK aims to promote partnerships through SWAP policies. The impact of this policy and its relationships with implementing mechanisms such as the BEIP has yet to be researched. As cited before, SWAP encourage pooling resources into one basket and letting the ministry of education take an active role in coordination. Policy documents (GOK, 2003c) attest that a core challenge of SWAP to technocrats is "how to harness all the support promised by well-wishers" in a sustainable way (GOK, 2003b, p. 59). Issues remain about how to harmonize the divergent perspectives of all change agents to come up with a coherent participatory process that is acceptable and empowering to the

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<sup>8</sup> For example, Robert Chambers' Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) methods, which aim to enable local communities to take control of their own development, are described as overly empiricist. The methods privilege experience over theory and practice.

<sup>9</sup> Change agents- in the context of the thesis stakeholders.

disadvantaged. SWAP partnerships seek permanent solutions to challenges of human development by redefining roles of the state, donors, civil societies and subjects of development in policies and their implementing mechanisms.

Considering the scarcity of theoretical and practical information about the empowerment and social change benefits of participation and partnerships to disadvantaged people, and the conditions that contribute to such benefits in sustainable ways, the need for research to address these knowledge gaps cannot be overemphasized. This is the kind of information disadvantaged individuals and communities need to better engage with the social, political and economic structures that govern their lives. The GOK, donors and civil societies also need such knowledge to optimize benefits of empowerment through PDev and PDem to disadvantaged people in ASALs. Nkinyanki (1981) confirm this need in his quotation of a Maasai's experience with the Kenyan Ministry of Education PDev approaches by saying:

“The fundamental problem of education with pastoral people...is changing their attitude by creating something they believe in. Most pastoral people are not looking for a hand-out; such an attitude is repulsive to them. What they want is something they can really participate in as their own, right from the beginning...it's the whole attitude, the whole approach towards pastoral people that's wrong. People begin with the assumption that these people cannot change. And so they bring in things, sometimes consciously, sometimes unconsciously, that completely antagonize the people and stop them from helping themselves (cited in Sifuna, 2005b).

Central to this problem are questions about how technocrats' decisions implicate state, donors and community interests and commitments, and how the resulting relationships enhance or limit empowerment and social change to disadvantaged people. One of the challenges is that power is frequently delusional and conceals the extent to which participatory processes are manipulative (Cook, 2003) and marginalizing rather than liberating disadvantaged people. Encapsulating this subtle character of participatory approaches Tondon (1995) avows:

“...in the name of participation the people are made creators of their own poverty (called development) much like in the way the colonials in

Africa used to get people to participate in the building of village roads, and the way people in Post-independent Kenya engaged in “harambee” projects, thus relieving the government from carrying out its responsibility to the people” (p. 32).

What is clear here is that the GOK and change agents can advocate ‘inclusion’ of disadvantaged people into development without necessarily addressing inequalities of class, gender, ethnicity, culture and poverty (Cornwall, 2002). This tendency of PDev to further marginalize and cement hegemonic powers requires close scrutiny.

### **Purpose of the Study**

The rationale for this research is twofold. Firstly, as noted above, the purpose of this study is to critically examine the extent to which the approaches and principles used in the BEIP contributed to benefits of empowerment, social change and sustainable development for disadvantaged people. Secondly, it hopes to assess the ‘fit’ between policy, practice and theory of PDev and its relationships with PDem in aid development programmes that engage government partnerships with donors, civil society and local communities, and to use this assessment to shed light on theoretical debates that are ongoing in development. To date, few (if any) studies have explored the impact of the BEIP on disadvantaged people. The BEIP provides a unique opportunity and balanced way to assess the impact of people-centred and participatory approaches within government-donor-led development. All the primary and secondary schools supported through the BEIP which were investigated were built through harambee or GOK partnerships with Community Based Organisations (CBO), Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), donors and local communities. To illustrate this theoretical and practical convergence between government-to-donor led and people-led development, and to assess the empowerment and transformative value of people centred and PDev approaches as promulgated in the BEIP, the thesis draws upon Ife’s (2002) model for CDev. One advantage of adopting Ife’s model is that it offers a holistic and more balanced way to assess the impact of the BEIP through its ecological and social justice perspectives. Its

emphasis on empowerment and change from below provides a unique way to respond to the developmental questions posed by modernisation, dependency, Alternative Development (ADev) and postdevelopment.

However, despite these advantages, there have been few, if any, applications of his theory and model to real-life development contexts. For these reasons this research offers an opportunity to advance both practical and theoretical knowledge. Central to this research are the meanings and impacts of development, democracy, partnerships, participation, empowerment, sustainability and social change to inequalities based on poverty, class, ethnicity, culture, gender, bureaucracy and other social, economic, political and environmental factors. Previous sections have revealed that governments, donors, NGOs and other change agents would appreciate information on how PDev may effectively be used to reduce structural disadvantage, reduce social injustices and how to manage relations of power and control in favour of the disadvantaged people (Cook & Kothari, 2001; Cooke, 2004; GOK, 2003b; 2003c; Hayward et al., 2004).

This research specifically responds to calls for primary research that pays attention to the different contexts and purposes for participation in order to determine what forms of participation are more likely to optimize empowerment and social change benefits for the disadvantaged. It thus enhances debates by paying attention to who actually participates in the development initiatives and who does not, either through exclusion or self-exclusion, and for what reasons (Cornwall, 2000, in Mikkelsen, 2005, p. 60). It also seeks to broaden understanding about how PDev utilizes indigenous knowledge as a means of building communities on the basis of cooperation to enhance democracy, empowerment, and vertical and horizontal accountabilities (Chambers, 2005; Gaventa, 2002, 2004; Gaventa & Valderrama, 2001).

The thesis also contributes to debates enhanced by Brown (2004) in (Hickey & Mohan, 2004b) about the ideological origins, typologies and problems with RDem and PDem in PDev management and governance. It also advances debate in the area of

motivations, interests and principles underpinning participatory approaches as suggested by Hayward, Simpson and Wood (2004). To address the practical and theoretical aspects of the research problem, the study takes one example of a project<sup>10</sup>, the BEIP, and uses the data to enhance academic debates on practice, policy and theory of PDev. The BEIP was chosen due to its focus on participation, partnerships, empowerment and sustainability, which are central themes in this research.

The thesis first critically describes the objectives and the organizational and management structures used to enact and implement the BEIP. Second it interrogates the partnerships generated to ascertain their approaches and principles. The focus is upon whether there is a 'level ground' on which stakeholders participated as equal partners and the extent to which these features provided an opportunity to empower the disadvantaged without further disenfranchising them. Third, it explores the processes and outcomes of participation with a focus on the aims, meanings, challenges and opportunities that the BEIP offered towards emancipation and transformation of the disadvantaged. Fourth, it critically examines the extent to which the management structure, participation and partnerships challenged structural disadvantages arising from bureaucracy, culture, gender, age, poverty and broader environmental, economic and political factors that inhibit emancipation and sustainable development.

Here, the thesis uses the themes emerging from the data to appraise Ife's (2002) model and the broader theories of modernization, dependency and ADev from which PDev largely draw upon. The aim is to valorise the perspectives of disadvantaged people based on their experiences and perceptions. The significance of this aim cannot be overemphasized given the current marginalization of the perspectives of disadvantaged people in current PDev policy, theory, practice and academic debates (Ife, 2002). Thus, the

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<sup>10</sup>A project is a bounded development plan of action with defined key result areas. Projects focus on certain issues of concern to governments, institutions, individuals, groups or sets of special groups. A project life span runs for 3-5 years during and after which the anticipated outcomes/impact is expected to manifest on the targeted individuals and groups.

thesis deconstructs government and donor (pluralist and elitist) perspectives of participation, empowerment and sustainability and reconstructs new discourses of the same based on the perspectives of disadvantaged people.

### **Research Questions**

The thesis attends to the research problem and helps achieve its purpose by answering the question: *To what extent did the BEIP principles, approaches, structures and the practices generated by the management structures, partnerships and participation, contribute to benefits of empowerment, transformation and sustainable development to the disadvantaged people?* To help attend to the breadth and depth in the data, the following sub-questions are also considered:

1. How did the principles and approaches that underpinned the BEIP management structure satisfy contextual conditions for PDev, PDem and empowerment?
2. To what extent were the BEIP partnerships formed on an equal basis, and to what extent did they promote development cooperation and accountability?
3. To what extent did the processes and outcomes of participation in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the BEIP increase control of development by the disadvantaged people?
4. To what extent did the management structure, participation and partnerships challenge dominant discourses and structural disadvantages based on culture, gender, poverty and broader socio-economic, environmental and political factors?

### **Significance of the Study**

The implications and significance of this research to PDev policy, theory, practice and research cannot be underestimated. Studies aimed to tease out power and control relationships in PDev approaches, with a view to contributing insights on how such relationships affect the process of participation and the empowerment and transformational

benefits for the disadvantaged, are scant. A lot of PDev studies tend to focus on how participation contributes to empowerment and social change in macro-economics terms that in most cases are insensitive to the socio-cultural and political dimensions. When such sensitivity is demonstrated, it tends to conceal details of power, and control relations that pervade the process of participation.

For example, a recent case study evaluating the possibility of the Kenyan PRSP to integrate community priorities into the overall strategy, and to implement them, evaluated stakeholders' participation in purely macro-economic terms (Swallow, 2005). The study observed significant disparities between community (grassroots) and district (meso-regional) priorities, but similarities between community priorities and the overall PRSP. Such disparities could in part suggest bureaucratic power in play, where the final decision on what priorities to address in the final PRSP rested with the national office, not the communities. There is also a possibility of issues of trust and accountability which were tenuously (if at all) addressed. On a broader scale, other studies have attempted to determine the value of participation based on cost-benefit and stakeholders' analyses (World Bank, 1992, 1994, 1996) and aspects and typologies of participation within project boundaries (Pretty, 1995).

In Kenyan education and other social sectors relationships, related information appears in reports and programme appraisals. Such information is neither available in documented and/or published form, nor accessible, partly because it is classified information whose 'confidential' label limits access to few individuals/groups. In other cases, the information is uncoordinated and also specific to particular project(s), programme(s) or school(s). Yet it is such information that policy makers, development partners, civil societies, teachers, parents and local communities require in order to optimize their participation and maximize individual and corporate empowerment, and social, economic and political change. To 'release the power' of such information this

thesis critically examines experiences and perceptions of technocrats, parents, teachers, educationists and political/community/village leaders who participated in the BEIP.

The thesis also critically examines the organization, formation and functions of SMCs, BOGs, PTAs and Programme Coordination and Implementation Units of the BEIP to contribute knowledge about representation and its implications to PDev and PDem. The thesis contributes useful information for planning, implementing, monitoring and evaluating ongoing and likely future PDev initiatives. The thesis thus informs the practice of PDev by governments, donors, educationists, technocrats, planners, headteachers, SMCs/PTAs/BOGs and broader civil societies. Planners and policy-makers will find this study useful with regard to public-stakeholders' engagement in policies and programmes that affect them. Specifically, the thesis will greatly inform programmes' service-user/recipient and donor engagement with disadvantaged groups which previous research has not adequately critiqued.

For social sectors whose focus on human development interventions is to increase access to human and political rights and where participation is a critical determinant of emancipation and transformation, this thesis has a great deal to contribute. The value of the thesis is that it generated new knowledge based on disadvantaged people's indigenous ideologies about participation, empowerment, partnerships, transformation, democracy and sustainability, and according to how they experienced and perceived these features within the BEIP. The marginalisation of the 'fusion' of indigenous people and the more global perspectives of these features in PDev rhetoric, renders this study the more significant.

Most importantly, education is a value laden and critical enterprise in steering human and equitable development in any country, especially in facilitating favourable changes for nations, communities and individuals (GOK, 2001a; 2005b; World Bank, 2000a). A critical inquiry into participatory processes in the education sector has potential to illuminate possible pitfalls of PDev. In this vein, the thesis encapsulates the overarching challenge of PDev namely "to enable and empower those who are marginalized, powerless



and poor to gain for themselves the better life that is their right” (Chambers, 2005, p. 115) and critically examines the extent to which the BEIP and its management, partnership and participation processes lived up to such a promise.

Finally, the study is a preliminary inquiry into participation as an essential component of a sustainable, empowering and transformative development process, and the different ways in which it is perceived and experienced by different stakeholders in a service oriented education sector, which could be furthered by future research. Although based on empirical data and themes that emerged in the BEIP, the study findings have potential to contribute information regarding PDev and the empowerment of disadvantaged people in other settings. This is more so where development management assumes representative<sup>11</sup> and participatory<sup>12</sup> democracy.

### **Research Design**

The research used a qualitative case (BEIP) study design to answer the outlined research questions and to explore the research problem from a holistic perspective. A qualitative case study design was chosen so as to allow for in-depth understanding of the empowerment and transformational value of PDev for the disadvantaged people. This is in line with qualitative research perspectives that promote explication of global issues affecting human development through local case studies that rely on primary rather than secondary data. Through a discovery, rather than confirmatory orientation, stakeholders’ relationships of power and control, approaches to participation, partnerships and their underlying principles and models of empowerment/management are revealed. The qualitative case study design is informed by both constructivist and interpretivist epistemologies and utilizes multiple research methods, document analysis, interviews and

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<sup>11</sup> Refers to participation through representatives where members confer their right of decision-making to an individual or a group who in turn assume that responsibility on behalf of the members.

<sup>12</sup> Refers to popular participation where all affected members have to actively be engaged.

participant observation (chapter three). A total of 60 one-on-one interviews, eight focus groups with a total of 81 participants and participant observations of 557 participants were made in 20 primary and 10 secondary schools.

Participants were drawn mainly from SMC, BOGs, PTAs and individual parents, teachers and technocrats. These methods and multiple data sites enhanced reliability of the research design and allowed for thick and rich descriptions of the components of the BEIP by triangulating multiple data sources. Documents were also analysed for information to compliment empirical data. The study design also took advantage of grounded theory data collection and analysis techniques to allow the researcher an opportunity to maintain a constant and continual interactive relationship with data and to identify themes pertinent to the research problem, purpose and questions as they emerged (Creswell, 2003, 2005; Gleser & Strauss, 1967). Synonymous with grounded theory, the research design and its components evolved with every step of data collection and analysis. Nonetheless, it maintained empowerment and transformation as central to PDev.

### **(De)limitations**

A detailed account of the delimitations of the research is provided in chapter three. Meanwhile suffice to state that participation in the BEIP and its related policies bounded the extent and type of data sites and sources. The BEIP is typical in this study because it involved partnerships between an international donor, OPEC, GOK, communities and other stakeholders. The situation of the BEIP within a public sector social service delivery system made it fit well in the trajectory between ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ perspectives of PDev and to provide empirical data that could be used to inform future research in Kenya and other countries. The BEIP thus has potential to address the stated research questions and to meet the study purpose. However, the broad trajectory established in the research meant that data were highly condensed.

## **Chapter Outline**

Chapter Two reviews the relevant literature, and outlines and critiques key theoretical perspectives of PDev. Chapter Three discusses the research design and methods of data collection, synthesis and analysis. The next four chapters present the empirical findings. Chapter Four directly responds to key supporting question one. It critically describes the objectives and management structures of the BEIP. Chapter Five considers partnerships. Chapter Six considers the process and outcomes of participation. Chapter Seven looks into the extent to which the management structure, participation and partnerships challenged dominant discourses and structural disadvantages arising from bureaucracy, culture, gender, poverty, environmental, socio-economic and political factors. Chapter Eight concludes, summarizes main findings and considers implications arising from the research for practice, theory, policy and future research.

## CHAPTER TWO

### THEORIES AND MODELS OF PDEV AND EMPOWERMENT

#### Introduction

This chapter critically reviews literature on the theoretical basis of mainstream PDev<sup>13</sup> and empowerment models. The review is used to create a theoretical framework through which the thesis enhances knowledge of PDev in later chapters. It first critically examines contemporary debates about what constitutes development according to modernisation, dependency, ADev and postdevelopment theories. Along with these, the opportunities and challenges these theories pose to the thesis' aim of examining the fit between PDev policy, theory and practice in the BEIP are highlighted. The strengths and weaknesses of participatory and empowerment models which donors and governments have used to address the developmental challenges posed by these theories are then critically examined. Reference is made to Robert Chambers PRA, Arnstein's ladder for citizen participation, Rowland's nomenclature of power and Ife's approach to CDev. A conclusion is drawn in terms of the advantages of Ife's model to the thesis.

It is important to understand the theoretical foundations of mainstream PDev because despite a focus on empowerment, social change and sustainability, development theory and practice to date have not enabled disadvantaged people to take control of their futures. To address this gap, policy-makers, civil societies, researchers and theorists are increasingly emphasising the need for democratic practice, participation and partnerships in aid interventions. The view is that when disadvantaged people participate in policies and programmes that affect them, development is more likely to be sustainable.

This view is embodied in mainstream PDev, albeit in discrete case studies rather than in one coherent theory. These cases show that mainstream PDev has emerged due to

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<sup>13</sup> Pieterse 2001 differentiates between MDev (focuses on economic growth), mainstream alternative development (in this case mainstream PDev) which is state-donor led and alternative development (ADev) (which focuses on grassroots, local, community) and is NGO (civil society) and people-led.

increased awareness about the deleterious effects of capitalist economic progress (mainstream) and human development (alternative) models. Thus, mainstream PDev is essential as it represents a marked convergence in development theory and policies. As exemplified in the structures on poverty reduction strategy papers, medium term expenditure framework, sector wide approaches to planning and participatory poverty assessment, mainstream PDev has ‘blurred’ the neat divisions between the mainstream and alternative development models. These policies provide ‘political space’ for donors, policy-makers, civil societies and disadvantaged communities to better engage with participatory and cooperative development practice through its discourses of participation, partnerships, democracy, governance, rights and empowerment.

However, despite the conventional view that participation is ‘good’, contemporary debates reveal that ‘development’ and ‘participation’ have assumed different meanings over history and the concepts remain highly contested. For example, mainstream PDev is polarised between protagonists on one hand and critics on the other. This polarisation mean that neither have questions of power and control been adequately researched, nor have they been engaged with in practice, despite the need for such analyses being emphasized (Hickey & Mohan, 2005, 2004b). Where PDev approaches have been used, there is neither clear evidence of reduced ‘poverty’ nor is there evidence that participatory methods contribute to ‘sustainable development’ (Cleaver, 1999).

The failure of development to liberate the poor, to echo Pieterse (2001), comes from ‘theoretical posturing’ (or ‘pretentiousness’) between proponents and critics of mainstream and alternative development about what constitutes development and an empowering and transformative model of development to disadvantaged people. Such posturing has limited effective understanding of the benefits of the mainstream and alternative development models. Indeed, the attempt by proponents to build appeal for alternative development through politics of the ‘bad mainstream’ and the ‘good alternative’ has depoliticized development and relegated the significance of inequalities (Pieterse,

2001), concealed the empowerment and social change benefits of participation (Williams, 2004) and the dangers of 'localism' (Mohan & Stokke, 2000).

To attend to these gaps and the structural disadvantages and issues of governance and accountability identified in chapter one, Ife's approach to CDev is chosen because its ecological and social justice perspectives provide a more balanced view of empowerment than is currently the case in PDev discourses. Arising from the thesis' structural and poststructural perspectives, this chapter argues that we need to (re)politicise development and participation (or PDev) and to re-imagine empowerment as an open-end and ongoing process of engagement with longer-term political struggles at a range of spatial scales (Williams, 2004). The emphasis on the active participation of the government, civil society and the disadvantaged people draws upon the view that more permanent solutions to structural disadvantages will be found within reshaped political networks and within structures and interventions that promote participatory practice and which link themselves to discourses of rights, democracy and citizenship (Mohan & Stokke, 2000). To put this view into perspective, the chapter will now critically analyse the meanings of development based on modernisation theories and highlight the opportunities and challenges it poses towards creating a theoretical framework for understanding PDev.

### **Modernisation**

Theories of modernisation assume different interpretations and methods of achieving development depending on whom and where they are applied. This section considers in generic terms the modernisation ideologies relating to dual society, neoliberalism and technocratic planning (or managerialism) as these offer insight about the origins and typologies of mainstream PDev as promulgated in state-donor led development. Core strengths of modernisation theory come from its focus on reducing poverty as a central outcome of development and emphasis on the valuable role of the government in development planning and human development. However, its potential to

advance this thesis' theme on empowerment is limited since it ignores questions of inequality, culture and agency in favour of economic progress and markets.

According to Isbister (1991), modernisation theories focus on identifying deficiencies in Third World countries, such as the absence of democratic institutions, capital, technology and a lack of modern industries. Speculation is then made about ways of repairing these deficiencies (in Makuwira, 2003). One way of repairing deficiencies draws upon the 'dual society' thesis, which holds that the 'traditional' and 'modern' sectors of developing societies are independent (Frank, 1969, cited in Kapoor, 2002). Lewis (1964, cited in Willis, 2005), describes the traditional sector as comprising of subsistence agriculture and some urban self-employment. The modern sector consists of commercial agriculture, plantations, manufacturing and mining.

The former sector is 'underdeveloped' (backward, stagnant and static) because it has lacked exposure to the outside capitalist world. The latter is modern because of such exposure. Albeit, the traditional society can be modernized through the infusion of capital, institutions and values (Frank, 1969). The process of modernisation includes the spread of market relations, industrialization through technological diffusion, westernization, nation-building and state formation for post-colonial inheritor states (Pieterse, 2001). Modernisation is thus a process through which the underdeveloped world transforms itself from "tradition to modernity" to achieve optimal development (Isbister, 1991, p. 38). The development processes entails structural changes in national economies, including a shift away from a rural-agriculture-based to an urban-manufacturing economy (Lewis, 1964) with a corresponding migration of people from rural to urban areas to work in the industries—metropolitan life is better than rural life.

According to Lewis, development takes place when the 'surplus' and un(der)employed people move from the non-profit oriented (or traditional sector) to the modern (or capitalist) sector. The assumption is that 'growth-based' innovation ensures 'mutual benefit' for both the traditional and modern sectors. Lewis contends that such

mutual benefits cannot be optimized within subsistence economies, as these trap people in poverty. He thus advocated for foreign investment of the modern into the traditional sectors. Lewis argued that governments should encourage foreign companies to invest their capital into domestic industrial development through a process of “industrialization by invitation” (cited in Willis, 2005, p. 42). The benefits accruing from the industrial processes of the capitalist sector socialised and integrated the traditional sector in ways that resulted in higher levels of productivity.

Despite presupposing that mutual benefits flow from one sector to the other, capitalism is implicated as overpowering the traditional sector. Nasong’o, (2007) explains how the introduction of Imperial rule in Kenya contributed to the emergence of a ‘modern’ society which depended on capitalist, and a subsistence society which relied on non-capitalist economies. Nasong’o describes how the capitalist economy imposed itself on to the subsistence economies with dire consequences to the *social democracy* which majority of the Kenyan people’s social, economic and political lives drew upon. The dual society perspective is important to this thesis since it emphasises reducing poverty as a key result of development. Its recognition of the existence of other forms development (subsistence economies) beyond capitalist economic progress and the valuable role of government in development planning and human development are critical to the thesis theme on empowerment, social change and sustainability. As detailed in later chapters, disadvantaged people in Kenya depend on subsistence economies for their livelihoods.

Thus, subsistence economies provide a basis for rethinking development and reshaping the lives of disadvantaged people where approaches to capitalist economic progress have failed to realise mutual benefits and led to neoliberalism. According to Willis (2005), neoliberalism assumes that development is economic progress and the route to greater economic growth is through redistributive markets and reduction of state intervention and control letting the market set prices and wages. Such an approach, it is assumed, ensures the most efficient allocation of resources, thereby optimizing growth



rates with concomitant social benefits. Aid development as promulgated by trade and economic corporations (IMF, World Bank, OECD, WTO, OPEC) and other multilateral agencies) are seen to foster neoliberalism (Ife, 2002).

However, to reverse the negative effects of capitalist and market economies, these organisations have integrated people-centred and participatory approaches in their policies for international development. As said before, the structural adjustment programmes of the IMF in Kenya (1980s) focused on increasing citizenry participation in human development. The focus on cost-sharing facilitated the government to reduce subsidies in education, health, energy and other social sectors. It also rationalised the civil service and encouraged privatisation of some government functions and services such as transport, energy and housing. These policies sought to enhance good governance through deconcentrating (or decentralising) the responsibility of human development away from the government to the private sector and the citizenry.

The Kenya poverty reduction strategy paper (1999) developed through the support of the World Bank strengthened the question on good governance and increased emphasis on participation in policies and development programmes. Though well intentioned, the emphasis on economic capital production, profits and redistributive markets came to mean liberalization of economies through rolling back the state, deregulation and privatization. This thesis is pessimistic about containment of states and free markets because, for example it is true of Kenya (Nasong'o, 2004) amongst other developing countries (including the Tigers of South East Asia) that have made progressive economic growth with concomitant benefits to human development have had a great deal of state control (Willis, 2005). Containment of states contributes to imposition of policies and structures through the processes of technical planning.

Technical planning draws upon the view that development can only be actualised in a capitalist environment, not a communist one. "Development planning" (cited in Willis, 2005, p. 34-35) or 'Eurocentric technocratic' (Escobar, 1995) approaches are based on

sharing technical know-how from North-to-South (a single path of progress to development and modernisation). Ideally, this process entails embracing the social, cultural and economic systems of developed countries– emulating western ways of thinking and doing so as to achieve growth-based innovation which developed countries see as essential to development in general (Burkey, 1993). As such governments of developing countries are encouraged to emulate corporate styles of management to increase productivity and efficiencies in service delivery (Ife, 2002).

A core weakness according to Ife (2002) is that development managerialism ignores questions of governance, which emphasizes processes with a view to increasing the ‘rule of development by the people’ not the corporate or market system. Managerialism enables aid agencies (e.g. World Bank) to use ‘extractionist’ methods (Chambers, 2002) (such as cost-sharing within structural adjustment programmes) that appropriate the moral value of participation to support modernisation’s neoliberal agenda (Cook, 2004) without necessarily attending to global inequalities (Pieterse, 2002) and the root causes of poverty (Cornwall, 2002). Where neoliberalism assumes development managerialism (free markets and containment of states) the process of development places technological progress over human development (Pieterse, 2000).

As Escobar (1996) argues, the linear-process-based development and dichotomic thinking (traditional and modern sectors) fail to recognize the range of societies in the South and the needs and requirements of the local populations. A related problem concerns how containment of states and increasing control of development by the market affects legitimacy of state and agency of disadvantaged people. Despite erecting monuments of modernism–vast infrastructures and big dams, development as modernisation impinges on government legitimacy and local agency.

Despite historical peculiarities and ambivalence about the control of development either by state on the one hand or by donors and markets on the other, modernisation is underpinned by the principle of ‘catching-up’ with the developed world (Pieterse, 2001).

Modernisation is in keeping with the view that the state's role in development is to maintain law and order within which the market can operate efficiently (Willis, 2005). It raises the question of poverty but fails to adequately address. Instead, modernisation practices accentuate global and domestic inequalities (Pieterse, 2002). Modernisationists believe that poverty can be reduced through good policies and practices (Brohman, 1996; Isbister, 1991) but the critical perspectives of dependency challenge such optimism.

## **Dependency**

This section considers how dependency theorists have responded to the development challenges of poverty (or inequality). It explores three main perspectives (i.e. structuralism, dependency and poststructuralism). The main argument is that despite some protagonists appeal for poststructural perspectives, ideally, dependency theories, usually work in concert with structuralism (Kapoor, 2002a). Theorists contextualise their development perspectives on historical terrains and view capitalism as a world system.

The strengths of dependency theory to this thesis come from its focus on holistic development and emphasis on the need for development planning to be sensitive to local contexts. Its attempt to expose the failures of capitalist economic progress from the standpoint of the 'periphery' and the focus on culture and agency allows the thesis space to valorise perspectives of the disadvantaged people. Nonetheless, dependency's proclivity towards the nation-state conceals effective understanding of how the interests and activities of policy-makers and donors redefine culture beyond and within the nation-state and how culture inhibits empowerment and social change. Again, 'delinking from state-led development' (Frank, 1969) as a way to address the failures of capitalist economies and state-led development inhibits political empowerment while encouraging violence through class struggle and guerrilla warfare. There is therefore ambivalence with regard to the character of states and donors and the roles they play in addressing developmental questions of poverty, agency and global-local inequalities.

Such ambivalence is evident in the way structuralists contest internationalisation of capitalism, how dependency questions development outcomes (or underdevelopment) and how poststructuralists use a discourse analysis to accord agency to the nations of the South during and after colonialism while offering strategies to ensure dependent relationships do not necessarily initiate underdevelopment. For example, though critical of theories of modernisation and capitalism, structuralists were not calling an end to Eurocentricism. According to Willis (2005), structuralists premised that the process of development in Latin America, would assume a different path from the one advocated by Eurocentric theorists. With this view they emphasized the importance of structure and historical contexts and advocated for national development strategies – greater state intervention to protect national industries from unnecessary competition from the more efficient and established international firms, establishment of local industries and import-substitution industrialization, erecting tariff barriers, and local land reforms to address the inequalities created by imperialism and capitalism. Thus, structuralism advocated for a capitalist-based development suitable for local contexts arguing that the failures of development were but one process of development. Hence capitalism is still the saviour.

Dependency theorists differs, by arguing that underdevelopment (dependency) was generated by the very same historical process which contributed to economic development (Frank, 1969, cited in Kapoor, 2002). According to Frank, economic growth in some rich countries has resulted in the impoverishment of the undeveloped world through internationalization of capitalism, which progressively began to grow in influence and dominated world trade<sup>14</sup> (Isbister, 1991, cited in Makuwira, 2003). Capitalism and imperialism are thus the causes of underdevelopment, not the saviour. Based on his analysis of Chile and Brazil, Frank argues that the imperialism and colonialism that accompanied modernisation were based on appropriation of economic surplus. This process integrated into global capitalism even the most isolated areas of undeveloped

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<sup>14</sup> See also Ife, 2002; Pieterse 2001, Willis, 2005 and Murunga & Nasong'o, 2007, for the Kenyan case.

countries and created ‘metropolises’ from which to manage and direct development in the ‘satellites’ (Frank, 1969). Rather than facilitate mutual benefits from the countries at the ‘centre’ to the countries at the ‘periphery’ of international trade, the role of the nation-state is to accentuate inequalities. These ‘bourgeoisies’ (policy-makers and planners) are collaborators with imperialism. Their role is to support market and power shifts to the centre. To break hegemonic powers of capitalism and dependency ties, Frank assumes socialism. This is to be arrived at through revolutionary “class struggle” including “guerrilla warfare” (p. 371-372, cited in Kapoor, 2002, p. 648- 649).

Frank’s view allows space to promote the empowerment and social change discourse from the perspectives of disadvantaged people. However, the thesis is cautious about delinking from state-led development as it inhibits political empowerment and revolutionary class struggle contributes to violence<sup>15</sup>. For these reasons, this thesis aligns with the structural and poststructural perspectives which promote collaborative and peaceful ways to address hegemonic powers of international capitalism and breaking dependency ties development such as those held by Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto’s (1979). These *dependentistas* use a discourse analysis to examine how social groups and practices reproduce and/or resist imperialism in the post-colonial period. To them dependency is neither secondary, nor the result of an abstract logic of capital accumulation, but of particular relationships and struggles between social classes and groups at the international as well as the local level. To promote development the state can at time seek alliances with multinational agencies. In other situations the state can promote alliances with local classes and groups to better insulate itself from foreign corporate interests. These also differentiate between dependency during the colonial period and the ‘new’ dependency characterized by US multinational corporate power.

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<sup>15</sup> For example in class struggle revolutionary group have contributed to tribal clashes (Kenya), genocide (Rwanda and Burundi, Sudan), and political insurgence (Philippines, Somalia and Democratic Republic of Congo). It is also difficult to place the role of crime gangs, religious sects and vigilante groups in this view.

These different types of dependency mean that, given the appropriate socio-political alignments, dependent relations can generate some growth and do not necessarily have to induce underdevelopment: “in spite of structural ‘determination’, there is room for alternatives in history” (p. xi). Cardoso (1973) suggest an “associated-dependent development” and emphasises that “it is possible to expect development and dependency” (p. 94, in Kapoor, 2002, p. 650). This optimism is premised on the view that although structural determination is burdened with western ideologies and may promote dependency, it contributes to some economic progress and has achieved progress in human development, in areas such as education, health and employment. Nonetheless, Cardoso and Faletto agree with Frank in suggesting that ties of dependency need to be broken. Though not definitively, by constructing “paths towards socialism” (p. xxiv, 19) and establishing more autonomous development through regional cooperation (Furtado, 1970) so as to modify and work from within capitalism, not to change it.

These dependentistas holistic-systemic approach to development enable the thesis to explore the participatory and partnership relationships of the donor, government and local communities as they occurred in the BEIP. Dependency’s recognition of a state role in human development and intentions to expose imperialism and international capitalism (eurocentricism) from the standpoint of the periphery, provide useful insights towards examining the extent to which donors-states enhance disadvantaged people’s power to control development. The challenge is that, though critical of modernisation, in this thesis’ structural and poststructural perspectives, these dependentistas’ views represent *superior* types of modernisation because there is not a single modernity but multiple<sup>16</sup> ‘modernities’

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<sup>16</sup> Critics of dependentistas (Frank, 1969) now argue that underdevelopment is not entirely a consequence of western capitalism. Capitalism is not immanent to imperialism. For example, the Atlantic Ocean slave trade which saw West Africans transported to the North and Latin Americas to work in real estate plantations and the Indian Ocean slave trade promulgated by Arabs introduced East African communities (including Kenya) to different kinds of capitalism, long before Imperialism. Pieterse (2001) has also shown that *eurocentricism* represents a multiplicity (communism, easternisation, Japanisation) of modernities that do not necessarily originate from Europe. Pieterse also argues that

in colonial inheritor countries (Pieterse, 2001). The contradiction is that endogenous perspectives that espouse delinking from international capitalism, global trade and national development also adopt modernisation ideals. While remaining critical of liberal modernity, dependency theory suggests that underdeveloped countries can transform capitalism from being an enemy to a saviour (Isbister, 1991). Here the state's role is to facilitate self-sufficiency by enabling the emergence of local industries and technologies to compete with those of the West (Burkey, 1993). Cautious of the inequality that remains unchallenged by this approach, structuralism and dependency conveniently combine to accentuate state control through economic and human development planning, tariff barriers against foreign imports and direct state intervention in the workings of the economy (Willis, 2005). This does not augment well with a PDev framework that seeks to increase control of development by the disadvantaged people.

The problem is that by espousing development as economic growth, dependency ignores and legitimates difference and denies agency to the Third World (Frank, 1969). When it bestows agency, the agent is identified with the nation-state. According to Kate Manzo (1991) a weakness is that by assuming that agency, empowerment and social change are possible from the confines of the nation-state, dependency “treats the individual nation-state in the Third World as the sovereign subject of development” (p. 6). This equation of the political subject with the nation-state makes dependency overlook how its own nationalist and statist inclinations and structures can dismiss or suppress diversity, agency and culture. By looking at culture as a subordinate element in their politics, dependentistas neither examine the politics of and within culture, nor are they aware of the ways in which culture frames their own analysis (Kapoor, 2002a). Yet, (in)dependent relationships also entail agents who “are not only great names...but also small unimportant folk...as well as policymakers” (Spivak, 1985, p. 254). To build on how culture provides a

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ethnocentric and endogenous efforts to development also assume capitalist approaches. Also see Willis (2005).

knowledge basis for rethinking and reconstructing disadvantaged people's development, the meaning of development according to ADev is given.

### **ADev**

This section builds on the meaning of development based on how ADev responds to the poverty, inequality and cultural questions raised by modernisation and dependency theories. Knowing how ADev responds to the technical and moral questions of development will help to highlight what sets ADev apart from MDev. ADev provides a strong basis for the thesis to create its espoused theoretical framework since it recognises the need to balance between economic progress and human development. The section will expound on this notion of balanced development as it works through the ADev discourses of culture, participation, democracy, rights and change from below. A core weakness relates to the overemphasis on participation which risks negating government responsibility while inhibiting political empowerment of the disadvantaged people.

Pieterse (2001) says that development according to ADev is economic progress plus human development. This is because in attending to the questions posed by modernisation and dependency, ADev retains belief in economic growth and accordingly '*redefines*' development goals to include human development. These redefinitions stem from three fundamental questions which Dudley Seers (1972) asks about development:

“What has been happening to poverty? What has been happening to unemployment? What has been happening to inequality? If all three of these have become less severe, then beyond doubt there has been a period of development for the country concerned. If one or two of these central problems have been growing worse, and especially if all the three have, it would be strange to call the results 'development', even if per capita income had soared” (in Makuwira, 2003, p. 18).

Proponents have interpreted Dudley's questions in different and sometimes competing ways. Generally, ADev is concerned about poverty reduction to improve people's wellbeing (Chambers, 1997), global inequalities (Pieterse, 2001), cultural agency, democracy, social justice, empowerment (Freire, 1970; Friedmann, 1992; Ife, 2002) self-sufficiency and sustainability of development processes (Burkey, 1993). The assumption is



that development is not just about economic progress. It is also about “enhancing individual and collective quality of life” (Simon, 1999, p. 2). Again, development is not only a question of physical facilities (e.g. schools, clinics, roads, dams) but one that is also primarily of people who are in constant relationships with each other and the social, economic and political systems that govern their lives: what development does to people and the way that development is done matters (Burkey, 1993). According to Ife (2002) these relationships entwine the *environments, methods, processes and goals* of development inseparably. The aim is to increase agency in development of the hitherto excluded by avoiding technical and cultural subjection.

### ***Subjection, Culture and Agency***

ADev aims to repeal the deleterious effects of neoliberalism, economic progress and technical imposition by focusing on the grassroots. Burkey (1993) underscores the failure of aid programmes which use structural approaches. He invokes the awareness of the susceptibility of development by donors and technocrats to perpetuating dependency in Third Worlds without offering solutions to poverty on a self-reliant and sustainable basis. Burkey assumes that donors and technocrats’ awareness of the deleterious effects of neoliberalism and technical imposition urges them to adopt more empowering and sustainable methods of development. In his view there cannot be emancipation from paternalism and sustainable development cannot occur unless change agents treat people not as objects (passive recipients of aid) but as subjects and creators of knowledge that can help shape their own futures on a self-reliant basis.

To achieve self-reliant development Burkey offers alternatives that emphasize processes, approaches and grassroots/community-led development rather than donor-to-state-led/national development, but, as detailed later, without delinking from the state. This shift to people-led-development has a cultural imperative. According to Martinussen (1997) development should be viewed as the *history of each and every culture* in the

world. Development is “a culturally grounded process” where outsiders [donors, researchers or technocrats] can neither formulate objectives nor “define what is development outside their own cultural sphere” (p. 45, in Makuwira, 2003, p. 14). The idea of culture radicalises development by assuming that *development is a process of change that is controlled by the people themselves*, not specified levels of achievement (Ife, 2002; Yamamori, Myers, Bediako, & Reed, 1996).

ADev thus espouses developing and respecting people’s cultures, knowledge/skills, institutions, economic, social and political processes as well as the people themselves (Ife, 2002). Central to ADev are not just structural disadvantages caused by the popular eurocentricism but also those akin to state, bureaucratic and cultural paternalism. Here, ADev seeks autonomy of the nation-state by breaking ties with international capitalist corporations. For this reason, in contrast to the earlier perspective, ADev accords *agency* to disadvantaged people. The locus of development is not the nation-state (as is the case with dependency theory) but the grassroots. The focus on grassroots aims to valorise into policies and development theory and practice (Cornwall, 2003; Spivak, 1985) the so often marginalized voices of victims of ethnicity, racism, sexism, gender, inequality, class, culture, bureaucracy and other forms of social, economic and political exclusion. Development is here tied with political notions of democracy, rights, social justice and empowerment with participation being seen to have the wherewithal to deliver them all as detailed in the next sub-section.

### ***Participation***

Ideally, participation can be seen to govern ADev practice. The International Development Bank (in Feeney, 1998) aver that:

“Participation in development is both a way of doing development - a process - and an end in itself. As a process, it is based on the notion that individuals and communities must be involved in decisions and programmes that affect their lives. As an end, participation in development means the empowerment of individuals and communities. It means increased self-reliance and sustainability” (p. 8).

Burkey's (1993) definition which is more methodological and process-oriented implies that ADev assumes a collaborative approach. Here, participation is "an educational and empowering process in which people in partnership with each other and those able to assist them, identify problems and needs, mobilize resources, and assume responsibility themselves to plan, manage, control and assess the individual and collective actions that they themselves decide upon" (p. 205). Burkey's description implies mutual benefits, learning in tandem, double accountability, relationships-to-network building and spans of management and control. It posits all those involved as self-reflective of the actions and decisions that they individually and collectively make.

Again, *collective action* is necessary to achieve empowerment and to address problems requiring resources beyond the means of the individual. Since individuals and states lack sufficient resources, Burkey asserts that collective undertakings require an *organizational structure* which is broadly based and which ensures continuity of action independent of individual leadership. The need for an institutional framework partly explains the adoption of participatory and people-centred development approaches in MDev by mult(b)ilateral agencies and the subsequent emergence of mainstream PDev.

Paradigmatically, Pieterse (2001) argues that mainstream PDev has blurred the neat divisions between MDev and ADev. This theoretical merger is evident in his definition of MDev as "everyday development talk in developing countries, international institutions and international development cooperation" (p. 94). Here the UN agencies, the nation-state and its health and education ministries constitute the institutional framework through which to achieve human development. While the nation-state is the context for economic growth, the World Bank and the IMF provide technical support in terms of economic development planning and macroeconomic stabilization.

Development must promote pro-poor policies such as PRSP and its methods of measurement such as the PPAs (World Bank, 2000c), Robert Chambers' PRA (Robb, 2002) and SWAP (Klees, 2001). In these contexts, participation aims to make policies and

programmes sensitive to the needs of the people they affect and allow proper integration of methods, processes, targeting and allocation of resources to where they are needed most. The role of civil society, through the discourses of ADev, is to provide “a flexible position of critique” to the approaches the government and donors use to implement structural reforms and human development (Pieterse, 2001, p. 80).

Considering this thesis’ concern about agency, the civil society’s role could be seen to strengthen questions about the role of economic growth, democracy, culture, knowledge and agency in human development. For this reason, development is the management of the changing relations of power and hegemony—the management of the promise of delivering ‘development’ to the disadvantaged poor (Pieterse, 2001) with a focus on inequalities and structural disadvantages (Ife, 2002). Participation is here believed to ensure ‘integrity’ of development practice and outcomes (Ife, 2002). As the emblem of *democratic* development practice (Mikkelsen, 2005), participation facilitates development of the people and their structures and institutions, by the people with their benefactors (Burkey, 1993) for their wellbeing, which is their *right* (Chambers, 2005).

### ***Democracy and Rights***

Collectively, ADev aims to democratise development processes and build communities, by empowering them to gain control over life enhancing systems and structures that govern their lives (Ife, 2002) through participation. ADev on a personal level aims to promote the right of self-determination (participation) (Chambers, 2005). To realise these rights on a sustainable basis, Oxfam (in Feeney, 1998) states that:

“Participation is a fundamental right. It is a means of engaging poor people in joint analysis and development of priorities. Its ultimate goal should be to foster the existing capacities of local, poor women and men and to increase their self-reliance in ways that outlast specific projects. The purpose of participation is to give a permanent voice to poor or marginalised people and integrate them into the decision-making structures and processes that shape their lives” (p. 7)

This understanding of participation as a democratic right, method and outcome of development, brings to the fore questions about how to democratise development in ways that optimize empowerment and social change benefits to disadvantaged groups that constitute the world's largest populace. This question remains contested between critics and proponents of ADev and mainstream PDev. Generally, Ake (1996) says that the democracy that is suitable for Africa must have four attributes: 1) People must have some real decision-making power over and above the formal consent of electoral choice. This requires a powerful legislature, decentralization of power to local democratic formations and considerable emphasis on development of institutions for the aggregation and articulation of interests. 2) A social democracy that focuses on concrete political, social and economic rights. This differs from liberal<sup>17</sup> democracy which emphasizes political freedoms and rights alone. Social democracy entails investment in the improvement of health, education and capacity to enable people to meaningfully participate in the life of society. 3) A democracy that emphasizes, in a balanced way, collective and individual rights. It must recognize nationalities, subnationalities, ethnic groups and communities as social formations that express freedom and self-realization. Such social formations should be granted rights to cultural expression, political and economic participation. 4) A democracy of incorporation—an inclusive politics which engenders inclusive participation and equitable access to state resources. It must ensure special representation in legislatures, of mass organizations of the youth, labour movements and women's groups, which are typically marginalized, but without whose active participation, there is unlikely to be democracy or development (p. 132, cited in Murunga & Nasong'o, 2007, p. 6).

This understanding of development as a democratic practice is closely linked to the view of participation as a right. Both derive from the view that attainment of people's choices and development can be provided in an atmosphere where the government and the *civil society* play an active role (Brohman, 1996; Friedmann, 1992). Again, political

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<sup>17</sup> See (Ake, 2000, p. 10, also in 1996b, cited in Murunga & Nasong'o, 2007, pp. 4-5).

empowerment cannot be attained outside of state machinery since each government has a responsibility to develop its people. According to the World Development Report (1997) (p. 17, in Brett, 2003, p. 23) the government has to ensure good governance and sustainable development by fulfilling minimal, intermediate and activist state functions. Governments must address market failure (providing public goods and services) and improve equity (protect the poor). In the former, the government has to ensure defence, law and order, property rights and macro-economic management. It also has to provide public health, basic education, overcome imperfect information and coordinate private activity (fostering markets and cluster initiatives). In the latter function, the government must adopt anti-poverty programmes and disaster relief strategies, provide social insurance, redistribution of pensions, family allowances, unemployment insurance and asset redistribution. The fulfilment of these obligations demands that the government adopts a model of development cooperation and partnerships as:

“...the government cannot choose whether, but only how best to intervene, and government can work in partnership with markets and civil society to ensure that these public goods are provided’ (p. 27).

The realisation of the roles of government and civil societies in human development show that ADev and MDev goals are not always contradictory and competing as the literature on PDev suggests. Mainstream PDev has ushered in a social justice perspective (Gandhi, 1964; Ife, 2002) and a rights-based approach to development. The rights-based perspectives, a new wave of thinking that sees poverty and other disadvantages as deprivation of rights and entitlements, and the subsequent understanding of ‘development as freedoms’(Sen, 1999) are being pushed from both the MDev and ADev perspectives. From Sen’s (1999, p. xii) view, ADev espouses the “removal of various types of ‘unfreedoms’ that leave people with little choice and little opportunity for exercising their reasoned agency.” The quest on rights seeks to enhance good governance and accountability of duty-bearers (donors, government, civil society) to rights-holders (citizenry, disadvantaged people). Duty-bearers must be responsible for their actions and

demonstrate commitment to facilitating wellbeing of current and future generations. The view is that when development assumes a rights-based approach, then the moral and technical issues of development and the participatory methods employed will be effectively addressed (Cornwall & Nyamu-Musembi, 2004).

The move away from development as ‘assistance-charity’ to ‘claims’ and ‘demands’ (rights) means that transparency and responsibility in addition to accountability must also exist (Gregory, 2007). Gregory argues that there is a very fine line between responsibility and accountability. The former entails ‘moral choice’ and mostly applies to governance. Despite having sensibilities of ‘answerability’, the concept of accountability is loosely used in current development policy and management. Critical questions linger around the rights-based perspective in aid development management. Given the socio-embeddedness of rights, there are issues with prioritisation. Because rights are universal narratives, whose point of view applies in what circumstances?

In view of these, Korten (1990) redefines development as “a process by which members of a society [read nation-state] increase their personal and institutional capacities to mobilize and manage resources to produce sustainable and justly distributed improvements in their quality of life consistent with their own inspirations” (p. 67, in Pieterse, 2001, p. 82). Korten argues that the heart of development is institutions and politics, not merely money and technology, despite the latter being undeniably important. Apart from signifying dissatisfaction with development-as-growth, these redefinitions are marked with ‘adding-on-to’ MDev objectives, values and approaches that were previously considered ‘alternatives’. Chambers (2005) and Hickey and Mohan (2004b) argue that development must contribute to social transformation: reducing poverty to improve wellbeing, towards justice, inclusiveness and sustainability (Korten, 1990), restoration of

land ownership rights and distribution of power<sup>18</sup> (Murunga & Nasong'o, 2007) and empowerment, avoiding bureaucracy through democratization (Ife, 2002).

UNDP (2002) also emphasizes deepening democracy in a fragmented world and stresses the importance of freedom and choice in development:

“Politics matter for human development because people everywhere want to be free to determine their destinies, express their views and participate in the decisions that shape their lives. These capabilities are just as important for human development – for expanding people’s choices –as being able to read or enjoy good health” (p. 1) .

The point is that there is need to embrace holistic development which balances across the political, social and economic spheres of society. To achieve such balanced development it is not only individuals that are to change but also institutional change must reflect a democratic culture. In this context, structural reform, economic growth and human development are tied together. Arising from these views and after Nerfin (1977, in Pieterse, 2001, p. 75), ADev could be seen as a *Third System* comprising citizen politics whose importance become apparent when juxtaposed with the failed development efforts of the government (First System) and economic/market power (merchant or Second System). Here, ADev is development *from below*, where the community is the primary agent and technocrats and donors participate in disadvantaged people’s development not the other way. The next subsection expounds on the view of change from below.

### ***Change From Below***

The actualization of ‘organic development’ that is people-driven, not state-donor-NGO-led implies a more radical view of development than is currently appreciated in development rhetoric (Ife, 2002). An ideal ADev approach assumes, *bottom-up* as opposed to top-down development. Realising bottom-up change demands a 360° reorientation in development thinking. It means that technocrats, international institutions, and NGOs participate in people’s local development, not the other way (Chambers, 1997, 2005; Ife,

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<sup>18</sup> Especially in countries with experiences of colonialism (Hickey & Mohan, 2005; Mikkelsen, 2005; Murunga, 2002; Murunga & Nasong'o, 2007).



2002; Pieterse, 2001). Pretty and Guijt (1992) emphasize that to achieve people-driven development requires reshaping of all practices and thinking associated with development assistance. As a process of change, development “will have to begin with the people who know most about their own livelihood systems. It will have to value and develop their knowledge and skills, and put into their hands the means to achieve self-development” (p. 23, cited in Mikkelsen, 2005, p. 55).

Through its critical advantage, ADev aims to increase the power of the disadvantaged masses over the structures that govern their lives so that they may better be able to assume their right and obligations to drive their own futures. The problem is that protagonists of ADev have tended to advocate against the ‘bad mainstream’ and promote the ‘good alternative’. Such practices alienated the disadvantaged from the structures that govern their lives while inhibiting political empowerment. To address these gaps Friedmann (1992) and Brohman (1996) suggest that, civil society and donors should work in *collaboration* with governments to attain political will and increase benefits of empowerment and social change. Collaboration cannot be critical as it will increase access resources, networks and information by disadvantaged people. Otherwise a developmental view that constantly opposes state structures means that the disadvantaged will perpetually remain marginalized. The continued posturing between MDev and ADev and the failure to deliver the promise of development to the disadvantaged people ushers the era of postdevelopmentalism—*a critique and rejection of development* in total on account of its failures, its attitudes and perspectives.

### **Postdevelopment**

Postdevelopment draws on the view that as it has been enacted to date, development does not work. Development has failed to achieve a minimum standard of living for the majority of the poor of the world. In developed and developing worlds alike, even the wellbeing of middle level working class is also at risk because macroeconomic

policies threaten these with rationalization, removal of tenure of job security, and increasing unemployment for fresh graduates. In tandem with postdevelopment discourses, the conundrum explored in the thesis is that technocrats, who spearhead policies, are barely assured of progressive wellbeing and survival.

Yet these are the people, to whom the deprived look upon for enhanced development and empowerment. What faith have the deprived in the systems that govern their lives and the dominant socio-economic order given that micro-macroeconomic policies are anti-human development? Escobar (1995), a post-development protagonist, challenges the efficacy of organic-natural development in MDev aid programmes and the whole idea of ADev. Escobar posits that the concept of 'development' emerged in rhetoric after World War II as "a response to the problematization of poverty" (p. 45) that occurred during this period. In this view, [aid] development cannot be seen as a product of natural processes of knowledge leading to the discovery of the problems addressed therein. Instead development emerged out of a discursive process governed by modernisation thinking. It was here believed that development would occur if capacity of the hitherto excluded in development was increased. This resulted in the construction of the world of 'haves' and 'have nots', the making of the First World (developed) and Third World (undeveloped). Escobar's view resonates with dependency theories and ADev (Brohman, 1996; Friedmann, 1992; Rahnema, 1997) by focusing on grassroots development but now taken further to development as a power/knowledge regime (Pieterse, 2000, 2001).

This is a departure from the imposed development practice that disregards local knowledge. It challenges the assumed practices of domination not only within economic growth theories and neoliberal markets but also within dependency-structuralist approaches and the ADev 'paradigm' itself. Escobar rejects development not least because of its immanent character but also because "development was-and continues to be for the most part, a top-down, ethnocentric, and technocratic approach, which treated people and

cultures as abstract concepts, statistical figures to be moved up and down in the charts of progress” (Escobar, 1985, p. 44).

This does not mean “an end to the search for new possibilities of change... It should only mean that the binary, the mechanistic, the reductionist, the inhumane and the ultimately self-destructive approach to change is over” (Rahnema, 1997, p. 391, in Makuwira, 2003, p. 19). Postdevelopment in this case heralds a new era of inward looking, localisation of knowledge, reflexivity and, creates space for grassroots engagement in searching for alternatives to MDev practices which alienate and degrade people’s knowledge and culture. In this regard postdevelopment resonates with ADev because as a critical theory, it does not raise criticisms that are peculiar to itself, except for the rejection of development (Pieterse, 2000).

The internal and external challenge that postdevelopment poses to modernization, dependency and ADev theorists is that of delivering the development promise to the poor without causing them more harm. Postdevelopment’s central argument is that Eurocentric ideals continue in a more subtle way to dominate development and to impose structures based on models of the industrialized world (Escobar, 1992). Despite different approaches, “development has been and still is the westernization of the world” (Latouche, 1993, p. 160, cited in Pieterse, 2000, p. 178). It is the new continuity with colonial administration (Cook, 2003; Escobar, 1995). Here even dependency’s Ethnocentrism and ADev’s endogeneity are just but cover-ups for modernization’s failures as Latouche (1993, p. 161) validates:

“...the most dangerous solicitations, the sirens with the most insidious song, are not those of the ‘true blue’ and ‘hard’ development, but rather those of what is called ‘alternative’ development. This term can in effect encompass any hope or ideal that one might wish to project into the harsh realities of existence. The fact that it presents a friendly exterior makes ‘alternative’ development all the more dangerous.”

On this view, development should be rejected *tout court* not least because it is still driven by international capitalism and was conceived within modernization, but because

the positions of the 'foreign bad' and 'local good' deny the agency of the Third World. Indeed such dichotomic thinking negates the extent to which the South also owns development (Pieterse, 2000). According to Esteva (1985) development has been based on "irresponsible experiments" which have collapsed indigenous infrastructure, cultural and social networks that poor people depend on for survival. It has created poverty (Tondon, 1995). Although 'development' for most of the time is 'westernization' of culture, the failure of development cannot primarily be blamed on Eurocentricism.

Pieterse (2000) argues that such a stance ignores the diversity that the term has come to denote. Eurocentricism, North-South and West-East applies to the imposition of external ideologies not necessarily from Europe. Eurocentricism may also refer to undemocratic, managerialistic and paternalistic practices akin to bureaucratic regimes and multilateral donor corporations. The salient view to this thesis and which protagonists of capitalist economic growth such as Sachs (1992) agree with is that the 'one-size fits all' approach to development is flawed. Development is also rejected not merely on account of its results, but because of its world-view, mindset and intentions, particularly, using developing countries as laboratories of failed development and governance systems (Pieterse, 2001). For example, many developing countries governments have used western science as an instrument of power transforming themselves into what critics of modernization discourse call 'laboratory states' (Visvanathan, 1988). Laboratory states, ideally, pave the way for the "transference of unresolved conflicts" and "perceived inadequacies of [the West's] own liberal democratic political systems" in the name of PDev (Kapoor, 2005) into Third World States. This is to say development has not only failed to provide the anticipated outcomes to developing countries. It has also contributed to an increase in global inequalities and risks that threaten the stability of democratic regimes (Kothari, 1988) and sustainability of global economies in both capitalist and socialist states in the South and North (Pieterse, 2002). This means a more radical

understanding of development is necessary if the vision of people-driven or organic development (as opposed to an imposed one) is ever to be realized.

Concomitant to structural and poststructural views, this thesis supports Escobar's call for 'alternatives to development' (Escobar, 1992). However, to reject 'alternative development' on account that it was 'midwived' within modernization, is to ignore that development practice more often than not precedes policy and theory (Pieterse, 2001). The point is that the terms 'poverty' and 'participation' have a longer history than development itself although rhetoric predates these to post World War II. In practice, participation in development is universal knowledge, because people all over the world are always engaged in their own development in their own way (Ife, 2002; Tondon, 1995). In this case, this thesis accepts 'alternatives to development' as a 'pathway' towards the deconstruction of structures and discourses that cause dehumanization and reconstruction of alternative structures and discourses of power and social change from the vantage point of the deprived themselves. This allows 'space' to explore current discourses of empowerment which, ideally, are discourses of domination—views of the deprived are themselves marginalized (Ife, 2002). Starting with Robert Chambers PRA the next section explores the models states and donors use to empower the disadvantaged.

## **Models of Empowerment**

### **Robert Chambers PRA**

Robert Chambers PRA framework is important to our understanding of change from below, roles of change agents and the pitfalls of mainstream PDev. Chambers (1994c; 1997) states that to better fit as constructors of disadvantaged people's development, change agents must transform themselves into learners. They must abandon their top-down attitudes, professional expertise and institutional behaviours. They must constantly reflect on the extent to which their actions inhibit development of their subjects. Chambers assumes that personal changes in the behaviour and attitudes of development practitioners

lead to professional changes— taking up participatory methods (e.g. PRA). These will ultimately contribute to institutional change with a culture of information sharing for research and partnerships. In this case participation is a *method, process and outcome* of development, research and empowerment.

With the emphasis on subjects of development, Chambers argues that participatory methods are important to get *information* from the marginalized because most policy-makers are unaware of the needs of the rural poor as most of them live in urban centres. In this case development takes place by including those who are previously marginalized within development activities with a view to challenging the biases of development projects that make the disadvantaged invisible (Chambers, 1983). The development process also entails *learning and empowering* processes (Chambers, 1994b, 1997) through gaining new capacities and confidence to face realities of social development. Chambers (1983, 1995, 1997) argues that PDev practitioners must be reflectively engaged with the process of development so as to check how their facilitator roles inhibit or promote learning and empowerment.

Change agents must engage as *learners* who are sensitive and responsive to local knowledge. Chambers acknowledges that the challenge of change agents is to ‘*unlearn*’ their world so as to better fit as constructors of disadvantaged people’s lives. The development process that is empowering calls for a vision of *transformed relationships* that seek to abolish dichotomies of ‘uppers’ (technocrats, donors, NGOs) and ‘lowers’ (disadvantaged people). Thus, Chambers says:

“In an evolving paradigm of development there is a new high ground, a paradigm of people as people...on the new high ground, decentralization, democracy, diversity and dynamism combine. Multiple local and individual realities are recognized, accepted, enhanced and celebrated. Truth, trust, and diversity link. Baskets of choice replace packages of practices. Doubt, self-critical self-awareness and acknowledgement of error are valued...For the realities of lowers to count more, and for the new high ground to prevail, it is uppers who have to change (p. 188, cited in Williams, 2004, p. 560).

As in “putting the last first” (Chambers, 1997), participation is seen to empower the marginalized to challenge the powerful directly. Here participation is not just “...an opportunity to form enduring relationships” (partnerships) but also one through which “to confront and transform over-centralized power” (Chambers, 2005, p. 115). PDev should also aim to empower “the deprived and the excluded” and enable them to challenge the “exploitative elites” that dominate them through monopolistic political and economic structures (Ghai, 1988, pp 4, 5). Chambers’ method of transformation neither aligns with the dichotomic thinking espoused in dependency theory or the socialist endogenous alternatives. Chambers is also dismissive of hegemonic powers of the ‘cold war’ genre.

Yet, the anticipated new relationships replaces hegemonic powers of domination (Eurocentricism or Ethnocentricism) with free-floating relationships of mutual empowerment for all involved (Williams, 2004). There are winners and losers. Critics see PRA methods as instrumental-extractive (Cornwall, 2002, 2003) when appropriated in aid development because they neither lead to reduced poverty nor sustainable development (Cleaver, 1999). The populist assumption that ‘uppers’ are capable of changing themselves and that ‘lowers’ can compete equally with uppers is thus paradoxical. It obscures more than it reveals about how uppers are to change.

According to Williams (2004), Chambers’ view of transformed relationships conceals practitioners’ self-interest in the status quo and does not highlight any structural constraints any reform-minded individuals would face in challenging it. Despite celebration of diversity, democracy and relational dynamism, Chambers’ method of transformation is highly individualistic and heavily reliant on voluntarism<sup>19</sup>. Mikkelsen (2005) acknowledges the value of voluntarism but argues that it fails to realize that in an

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<sup>19</sup> Voluntarism denotes the PDev practice where CBOs (women or self-help groups) ‘choose’ to organize around issues of mutual interest without being coerced and contribute resources to achieve their goals. In recent works, Chambers (2005) argues that in policy planning, there are cases when autocratic decisions should be made to ensure the poor do not miss out in development. This refers to affirmative action policies and special programmes for disadvantaged people. Voluntarism can thus be seen to emphasise choices, self-determination and responsibility towards enhancing live conditions.

increasingly globalising World, not many democratic societies depend purely on voluntary activities to initiate development.

On these shortcomings, Cleaver (1999) argues that PDev is being mainstreamed without convincing proof of outcomes in the improvement of the lives of subjects of development. Again the process of individual and institutional transformation is mythological: it reveals little about the ways in which individual instances of change (say through PRA or 3-5 years projects) are built into longer-term projects or alliances for change, or about the changing form and role that participatory activities might take on in different stages of a development process (Williams, 2004). Another critique of PDev is that “development practitioners excel in perpetuating the myth that communities are capable of anything, that all that is required is sufficient mobilization (through institutions) and the latent capacities of the community will be unleashed in the interest of development” (Cleaver, 2001, p. 46, in Williams, 2004, p. 561).

While appreciating that PDev tends to treat communities as homogenous and unproblematic in their spatial boundaries, rather than multiple and overlapping, it is insightful to note that as outlined in chapter one communities through self-help harambee projects has contributed immensely to educational development in Kenya. What development rhetoric fails to acknowledge is that even though states *pose* as if they are in control and may reflect some form of democratic governance, as is the case in Kenya, human development in developing countries, including provision of physical facilities and other infrastructure, has largely remained in the hands of the citizenry. Some of these criticisms against voluntarism, community, local agency on the basis of globalization (either downwards or upwards) are conspirational and far too exaggerated from reality.

As we will see later in the thesis PDev approaches affect disadvantaged people (more than elites). Mainstream PDev largely draws upon voluntarism to increase access to education and healthcare, even in the wake of UPE policies (see chapter six). To argue that community is often a thing of development projects making, in which case




what are arbitrary divisions of space are naturalised, and the power effects of these divisions are ignored (Williams, 2004) is not only to deny existence of sub-nationalities and ethnic tribes but also to negate understanding of how culture is reproduced within such boundaries in aid development projects that espouse to empower these groups. The failure to recognise the rights of such communities make practitioners of PDev to idealise people's cultures as problems for development programmes to respond to, without necessarily unpacking that culture, or seeing it as a product of internalised power relationships (Williams, 2004). As Williams (2004) summarises mainstream PDev stands accused of three major main failings: of emphasizing personal reform over political struggle, of obscuring local power differences by uncritically celebrating the community and of using a language of emancipation to incorporate marginalized populations of the Global South within an unreconstructed project of capitalist modernization. Contrary to Cook and Kothari's (2001) suggestion that the chapter on PDev should be closed, because it has failed to emancipate the poorest of the global South, these criticism urge that a development approach which seek to balance between global and local perspectives is needed (Mohan & Holland, 2001). Such an approach will repoliticise development and participation (PDev) by unmasking the repressive structures of gender, class, caste and ethnicity that operate at the micro-scale but are reproduced beyond it (Cornwall, 2002). One of the challenges towards the actualisation of this dream is that participation is defined in micro-economic terms as Arnstein's ladder for citizen participation shows.

### **Arnstein's Ladder for Citizen Participation**

States and donors have used Arnstein's (1969) ladder of eight rungs (Figure 1) to promote citizen participation. Each rung represent a type of participation. The ladder promotes the idea that participation should allow for "the redistribution of power that enables the have-not citizens, presently excluded from the political and economic processes, to be deliberately included in the future....Participation is the means by which [have-not

citizens] can induce significant social reform which enables them to share in the benefits of the affluent society” (p. 216 in Hayward et al., 2004, p. 99).



**Figure 1: Arnstein's Ladder of Citizen Participation (Arnstein, 1969)**

According to Arnstein, participation unlashes the power to achieve individual and collective social development and for influencing structural reforms. Ife (2002) concurs with Arnstein in defining empowerment as “giving power to individuals or groups, allowing them to take power into their own hands, redistributing power from the ‘haves’ to the ‘have nots’...” (p. 53). Such definitions call to mind questions about the types of power donors and governments engender to promote through PDev approaches. The conundrum demonstrated here is that of ‘giving’ and ‘taking’ power. Arnstein’s view has been instrumental in human development (health and education) both in the mainstream and alternative realms. In theory, her ladder indicates that there are different degrees of citizen participation (though, in practice, a clear distinction between levels may not be possible). Reading the ladder from bottom to top, it suggests a hierarchical view that promotes active-direct full participation by all those development interventions directly affect as the goal to be achieved. This is a value-laden view that delegitimizes non or peripheral participation (Hayward et al., 2004). The view fails to recognize the value of ‘choice’ as a form of empowerment in itself. The deleterious effects of this view become apparent when

considered from the perspective of mainstreamed PDev interventions that take the form of policies, sector programmes and projects.

Health and educational policies and sector programmes essentially affect the entire populace. By virtue of paying taxes, as citizens who share national identity and entitled to equal access to services and on the basis of civic and human rights, other people in addition to the disadvantaged explicitly have critical stakes in government-donor supported programmes. Again individual citizens may hold multiple stakes. Some may be parents, education professionals, teachers, policy-makers and administrators. Together with these, other government representatives, donors, civil society and NGOs are important interest groups through which the voices of disadvantaged people are directly (PDem) or indirectly (Representative democracy (RDem)) heard in policies and aid programmes. This means that understandings of the empowerment and social change value of PDev cannot be limited to those directly targeted in specific programmes.

This thesis acknowledges the view that affecting empowerment and social change to the disadvantaged depends on their participation in the life of society. Tritter and McCallum (2006) argue that Arnstein over-emphasises ‘distribution of power’ and the notion of ‘full’ participation as the goal of development. Concentration on participation to attain citizen control, “limits effective response to the challenge of involving users.” [It also] undermines the potential of the user involvement process...[and] “ignores the existence of different relevant forms of knowledge and expertise” ( p. 156). Although her theoretical emphasis on redistribution of power implies different power types, in practice it assumes that elites and the disadvantaged have common-equal power bases. Ideally, Arnstein’s view does not take into account the complexity of power and control relations of the process of development and how participation in practice really occurs.

Moreover, it fails to recognize that participation is a goal for some users not just a means. Furthermore this “...lack of complexity in the conceptualization of [Arnstein’s] model, its failure to consider the process as well as the outcomes, or the importance of

methods and feedback systems” (Tritter & McCallum, 2006, p. 158) has paid lip service to critical relationships between these and their impact on the anticipated benefits of empowerment to disadvantaged people. This uncritical application and lack of a more nuanced model to guide challenges of user involvement and public participation obscures an empowerment and transformative participatory process. Tritter and McCallum, in line with the point of this thesis, argue that there is need for a nuanced model to guide user and public participation in aid programmes that involve government and donor partnerships with disadvantaged people. Such a model should assume that:

“User engagement and empowerment are complex phenomena through which individuals [in a discursive manner] formulate meanings and actions that reflect their desired degree of participation in individuals’ and societal decision-making processes; Public involvement is likely to fail where there is a mismatch of expectations or method; User involvement requires dynamic structures and processes legitimated by both participants and non-participants” (p. 157).

These processes are empowering and enabling at the services system, organizational, community and individual levels. They are also legitimating of the participation of all interested stakes at these same levels. These four levels are particularly important to the thesis because they indicate levels at which structural disadvantage and social injustices are perpetuated. While the aim of participating in development processes is to increase disadvantaged people’s power and control over decisions taken at the services system, organizational, community and individual levels, it should be recognized that an imbalanced increase in either socio-economic or political power is counter productive. As earlier said, accentuating eurocentricism, ethnocentricism and ‘island mentality’ that encourages neoliberalism and depoliticization of development cannot be overemphasized here.

Concomitant to the purpose of this thesis, the challenge for PDev at this point in time and in the thesis is one of enhancing political and socio-economic power bases available to the disadvantaged while optimizing government, donor and other change agents’ accountabilities and responsibilities. It also relates to the conditions and principles

under which benefits of empowerment and social change for disadvantaged people would be optimized without causing them more harm. This requires a critical reflection on the principles underpinning hierarchal views of citizen participation.

Arnstein framework is of value as it accounts for participation as a process of individual economic empowerment. It assumes that the 'few' economically powerful will make value judgements in favour of disadvantaged people and will be willing to give up power (or change the social order). Such a view provides limited scope to address the developmental challenges discussed earlier in ADev and MDev. A central question for actualizing empowerment benefits through PDev concerns the structures donors and governments use to manage development and the extent to which these optimise benefits to the greatest number of people who are excluded (Brown, 2004).

According to Willis (2005), PDev as promulgated by governments, normally decentralizes functions and devolves authority through committees to regional, local governments and community (grassroots) levels to achieve empowerment. The focus of ADev is to consolidate collective decision-making power on the part of disadvantaged people who, in essence, according to this perspective, should be the drivers of change, and to provide mechanisms to develop local governance structures and increase local control and autonomy. Participation is one mechanism by which disadvantaged service users are to be enabled to claim rights of access to and control over, life enhancing forces through existing and newly established institutions (Nunan, 2006).

As said earlier, organizations are also candidates of empowerment. Again, it is not the disadvantaged who are to change, but also facilitators of development (Chambers, 1997). In these contexts, the notion of sharing surplus of the 'affluence of haves' with the poor falters, because it only presents one dimension of development-economic capital or technical expertise. Here the aim of participation is to optimize benefits to a few individuals and corporations (elites and elite groups). These are in turn shared with

disadvantaged people. This makes sense because poverty and unemployment are major causes of disadvantages in Third World countries.

Nonetheless, this microeconomic understanding errs not by implicating power levels and disadvantages but by downplaying their role in determining the process and outcomes of participation. By assuming that power can be redistributed from haves to have-nots, and by attempting to define participation in purely microeconomic terms, Arnstein's ladder, in practice, privileges the technical over the moral component of development. Of course elites, donors and technocrats have a role in development. Albeit, they are representatives of dominant groups, whose interests and motives are likely to impinge on processes and outcomes of empowerment. According to Nunan (2006), empowerment occurs through integration of all interests in new structures, as demanded by new policies and legislation, capacity building, performance monitoring and evaluation, decentralization of power and functions among others. Here the disadvantaged are enabled to capture emerging opportunities not only for income generation but also for improving the totality of wellbeing and for maintaining favourable environmental conditions for sustainable change. Other than economic power vide where the disadvantaged are presented as powerless if juxtaposed with donors and elites, Arnstein's ladder is unclear about what other forms of agency are in the concept and process of participation. However, it invokes citizenship.

Turner (1993) defines citizenship "as a set of practices [judicial, political, economic, or cultural] which define a person as a competent member of society, and which as a consequence shape the flow of resources to persons and social groups" (p. 2). This definition shifts citizens' participation from social capital to political capital. It also defines membership not in terms of beneficiary-benefactor relationship but in terms of identity. Hickey (2002) contends that the failure of transnational NGOs to engage with the political context in which "citizen participation" is contested in developing countries has partly contributed to the depoliticization of PDev and thereby its failure to attain empowerment.

Hickey argues that empowerment is likely to occur if PDev is underpinned by citizenship in service of emancipation of disadvantage groups. Here citizenship offers certain advantages both as a form of analysis and as a guide towards policy and strategic action, although this potential remains unfulfilled.

‘Citizenship participation’ is a means by which the convergence of people’s agency and their participation in specific interventions might be understood (Gaventa, 2002). The link between citizenship and PDev is understood in terms of the interaction between a series of institutional norms and agency-led practices. Hickey (2002, p. 842) contends that PDev approaches will only yield genuine processes of empowerment if they shift towards a political notion of citizen participation. In this case participatory citizenship enables people to play an active role in shaping the future of society through political debates and decision-making.

This discourse supports this thesis’ view of benefits of change from below, as it implies that citizenship could be gained “from below” through organized struggle rather than waiting for it to be conferred “from above” (Hickey, 2002, p. 842). Its compatibility with bottom-up approaches means that it appeals to disadvantaged groups. Such appeal makes it the more significant to the BEIP. Citizenship from below aims to empower citizens in ways that enable them to claim their participation in development initiatives based on their civic rights. It thus situates participation in a broader range of socio-political practices or expressions of agency, through which people extend their status and rights as members of a particular political community thereby increasing their control over socio-economic resources (Hickey & Mohan, 2004a). The combination of citizenship and the rights-based perspective earlier discussed are likely to enable PDev to overcome its ‘apolitical’ and ‘localist’ nature by allowing citizens ‘space’ to claim their rights while building on its strengths in the forging of community-based capacity and trust (Hickey, 2002).

Current forms of citizenship and PDev have not achieved much owing to their engagement with programmes of capacity building, which lack the capacity to empower in a radical way. As detailed in chapter eight, a targeted civic education of a more political kind than is currently the case is desirable. Hickey notes that the problem is located within a dual tendency to depoliticize issues and strategies of participation, and overlook the local and historical contexts of citizenship formation in developing countries. He challenges PDev practitioners, especially multilateral, bilateral and transnational NGOs to increase their role of nurturing mutual support and social solidarity, or promoting values of social responsibility and reciprocity, of supporting and mobilizing citizenship in the interests of the entire community. The essence of this role is participation, is political and social action and is citizenship itself.

This argument impresses on the thesis that a more radical and activist approach is necessary for an empowering and transforming process, and that it would be located with CSOs in partnerships with government machinery, but highly dependent on disadvantaged people's capability to collectively organize themselves around citizenship and rights agendas. Mamdani (1993) affirms that the challenge towards attaining emancipation underlies with the forms of organizations and participation that characterized the historical development of popular movements in Africa and not necessarily with participatory methodologies or capacity building characteristic of aid development. A central question about partnerships relates to how social networks are (de)reconstructed within aid development and what kinds of power they involve. Rowland's classification of power offers some leverage here.

### **Rowlands Classification of Power**

According to Rowlands (1997, 1998) (Table 1) the kind of power we often think about is that used to get other people to do what we want, or the power that other people have to make us do something. This power can take the form of material, markets,



education, positions as in bureaucracy etc. This is “power over”. It is typically regarded as the most important form of power because it is associated with processes of marginalization and exclusion through which groups and individuals are portrayed as “powerless”. Other identifiable dimensions of power which should be considered as part of the development process include: ‘power to’, ‘power with’ and ‘power within.’

**Table 1: Dimensions of Power**

1. Power over: the ability to dominate. This form of power is finite so that if someone obtains more power then it automatically leads to someone else having less power.
2. Power to: the ability to see possibilities for change
3. Power with: The power that comes from individuals working together collectively to achieve common goal
4. Power within: feelings of self-worth and self-esteem that come from within individuals.

Source: Adopted from (Rowlands, 1997; 1998, in Willis, 2005, p. 102).

There is a very fine line between these dimensions. Nonetheless, recognition of the diversity of power beyond ‘power over’ helps the thesis to analyse how the policies and strategies used in the BEIP sought to enhance what forms of power to disadvantaged people. Paradigmatically, it aids the thesis to balance with the way modernization, dependency and ADev ideals are implicated in the BEIP. The thesis view is that, while NGOs, donors and governments may be able to provide a context within which a process of empowerment is possible, it is only individuals who can choose to take those opportunities and to use them. NGOs tend to use such approaches to accentuate government failures and to accord credit to themselves as being better able to engage with grassroots development than governments. Yet, the application of Arnstein’s framework in developing countries (Choguill, 1996) to measure these forms of power revealed that in states where there is no social welfare systems, it encouraged government to shirk their responsibilities to the citizenry. This revelation that institutions can have malign effects on disadvantaged people and hide under the guise of user-involvement to perpetuate self-

interest, is critical to this thesis. Although NGOs can easily engage with the deprived, their activities are not void of power.

Indeed to say that NGOs are better able to empower, though logical, encourages the view that the disadvantaged can depend more on aid than on democratically elected government structures for their development. How sustainable is aid development? Will the donor trust the deprived to drive development and unconditionally refuel the tank when it runs empty? The thesis returns to these questions in later chapters. Meanwhile the thesis differs from the individualistic and institutional approaches pluralists and elites use. These blame the individual and accentuate vulnerability (Chambers, 1974; Cornwall, 2003) while blurring non-economic inequalities at micro-macro levels of development (Pieterse, 2002). When institutional reforms are done, they tend to assume disciplinary dimensions (Cornwall & Brock, 2004). Although there are individual exceptions, disadvantage and exclusion are not primarily the fault of individuals.

There are structural constraints as a result of disadvantaged people's relationship with the economic, political, social, environmental and cultural/spiritual systems that govern their lives (Freire, 1970). In this case, Rowlands' nomenclature of 'power over', 'power within', 'power to' and 'power with' is open to different uses. It can be applied practically and pragmatically and on the earlier identifies levels at which services are provided. Albeit, it does not reveal much about how these different powers operate in cases where they are applied differently or at one and the same time. Pragmatically, can the process and outcomes of participation be separated from the broader systems in which development occurs? Separation of projects from the socio-economic and political structures in which they are institutionalized has been the norm, not the option in aid development (Botchway, 2001; White, 1996).

Either way, the problem is that 'power over' within aid programmes is reduced to economic capital or technical expertise, so that those who are endowed 'redistribute' their surplus to the have-nots. Such a reductionist mentality equates all forms of capital to the

extent that even human capital and popular agency are constructed in terms of 'deficiencies.' It is paradoxical that the Third World, though highly endowed in human resources, in empowerment terms is seen as lacking in popular agency. Such reductionism (World Bank, 1992, 1994, 1996) is what makes participation complex and highly contentious. Some may choose to focus on the rights dimension, process or outcomes. Consequently, participation becomes a 'technical' prescription which denies the very agency of the subjects of development and supplants structural reforms necessary for authentic empowerment to occur (Botchway, 2001). On the basis of participation as a democratic practice and right, donors, governments and civil societies have responsibility to set up conditions for disadvantaged individuals and groups to empower themselves. The next section builds on this point by exploring Ife's approach to CDev delineates the roles of the government, civil society (including donors) and communities while highlighting its strengths and weakness to this thesis.

### **Ife's Model for CDev**

Ife (2002) provides a more expanded view by describing participation as democracy (PDem), not development (PDev) to emphasize the political nature of development. It is based on the structural and poststructural view that to achieve empowerment, development should engage with the structures and systems that govern people, their development process and outcomes. Otherwise any reforms at the individual and institutional level will attain limited social change. In reflection to earlier sections, PDev aims to affect permanent changes on a progressive basis. In this case, empowering processes are likely to be those that identify themselves with the 'rule of the people,'<sup>20</sup> not those that assume managerialism as in development corporations.

This complexity and distinction is important. As detailed in later chapters, development managerialism is paradoxical. As in dependency theory it can advocate

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<sup>20</sup> Ife describes democracy as rule of the people to draw the distinction between governance and management.

diversity, without necessarily affecting change in hegemonic powers (Ife, 2002). An empowering process is one that aims to increase the power of the disadvantaged over live enhancing structures (Table 2), with a focus on the ‘conduct’ of development.

**Table 2: Power Over Live Enhancing Structures**

1. Power over personal choices and life chances
2. Power over the definition of need
3. Power over ideas
4. Power over institutions
5. Power over resources
6. Power over economic activity.
7. Power over reproduction

Summarised from Ife (2002, p. 57-59).

Although burdened with the language of redistribution, Ife’s view is radical compared to contemporary notions of empowerment in aid programmes. It takes into account questions of imposition and hegemony through its focus on obligations (including rights /needs), education, PDem [decentralization] and accountability. Empowerment makes the ‘heart of humanity’ and involves the deprived being able to access and exercise their humanity to the fullest. The extent to which the BEIP enhanced these forms of power on the part of disadvantaged people is central to the ideas presented about the management structure, participation, partnerships, empowerment, sustainability and social change in subsequent chapters.

Ife (2002) identifies three ways for achieving empowerment and social change: policy and planning, social and political action and education and consciousness raising. Empowerment through policy and planning is achieved by developing structures and institutions to bring more equitable access to resources or services and opportunities to participate in the life of community. Empowerment through social and political action emphasizes the importance of political struggle and change in increasing power, even in an activist sense of the approach. Here participation enables people to increase their power through some form of action that equips them to be more effective in the political arena. Furthermore, empowerment through education and consciousness-raising takes into

consideration the importance of a broad-based educative process in equipping people with the necessary knowledge and information. It incorporates notions of consciousness raising to help people understand the society and the structures of oppression, giving people the vocabulary and the skills to work towards effective change.

Since empowerment is core to development, Ife cautions that there are some types of power that need not be sought: power to exploit others, the power to wage war, or power to destroy the environment. It takes into account the fact that the process of participation as the means of empowerment can indeed corrupt the (un)anticipated development outcomes. It thus imbues such processes with a moral role that seeks social and environmental justice. This aligns with Gandhi's (1964) philosophy that— development practitioners and governments should become the change that they would like to see in the World. It also urges eurocentricism to 'backtrack' on 'hypocrisy',<sup>21</sup>. This is because neither can justice be attained through unjust means, nor can wrong means result with right ends (in Ife, 2002).

To this end, Ife's model is based on maintaining a balance between an ecological perspective and a social justice perspective. These promote the idea that a sustainable development approach will necessarily engender a balance between local and global perspectives. An ecological perspective values balance (between social, economic and political systems), harmony (mediation of conflict, consensus building-to promote peace and non-violent solutions to potential conflict) and equilibrium (capacity to incorporate opposing positions e.g. personal and political, male and female, theory and practice, conflicting cultures, local and global etc). The rule of equilibrium emphasizes the importance of the relationship between systems and the need to maintain a balance between them. An ecological perspective encourages holistic approaches and cooperation as opposed to competition as it seeks to maintain a balance between its constituent parts.

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<sup>21</sup> In an international conference on Southern Perspectives on Development: division or dialogue, held at and organized by Otago University, NZ, in collaboration with DevNet, in Nov-Dec 2006, Robert Chambers, a keynote speaker urged on donors, development practitioners to embrace error and emphasized that the hypocrisy of the 'west' needs urgent redress.

The discourses about eurocentricism, ethnocentricism, localism and delinking from state-national development are ones of domination and oppression, not of balance and mutual interest (Ife, 2002). These are essentially important to understanding the relational dynamics in the BEIP. The thesis returns to the ecological perspective later when discussing how the BEIP integrated its principles of holism, sustainability, diversity, organic, balanced development and the relational dynamics these generated.

A guiding principle in analysing relational dynamics draws upon Ife's social justice perspective view that while changes to the individual and organizations are important, unless changes are made to the basic structures and discourses of oppression, which create and perpetuate an unequal and inequitable society, programmes will have very limited impact on disadvantaged people. This enables the thesis to critically engage not just with the structures within the BEIP but also the broader cultural, social, economic, environmental and political systems which backgrounded participation. Such engagement allows space to evaluate the feasibility of empowerment and social change benefits to disadvantaged people based on the actual conditions, experiences and perceptions. A social justice perspective respects change from below, popular agency, rights-citizenship agendas and integrity in the process and outcomes of development.

On the basis of the structural and poststructural ideals on which the ecological and social justice perspectives draw, Ife's model offers more advantages to the thesis. Its focus on principles of valuing local culture, knowledge, skills and processes of development not only reinforces the thesis' view on change from below, organic development and democratic practices, but also has the potential to better explicate the contradictions between MDev and ADev. Again Ife's view that the processes of development and participation involve interactions with people and making decisions which are not value free, gives it an added advantage over the previous models. His idea of empowerment as intertwined in both the process and outcome of development challenges the reductionist

notions in aid programmes that limit empowerment to capacity building as opposed to engagement with broader forms of marginality.

Ife's model is nonetheless not free of the criticism raised against structuralism and ADev. Donors have been criticized for 'domesticating' participation and for using the language of participation and empowerment to 'legitimize' predetermined agendas (Cornwall, 2002, 2003; Gaventa, 2004; Gaventa & Valderrama, 2001). Participation is used to support elites' interests in aid programmes without necessarily engaging with the root causes of disadvantages (Cornwall, 2002). In the name of promoting ownership of aid programmes and sustainable development, participation has become the tyranny, where PDev is advocated without necessarily affecting meaningful emancipatory and empowerment benefits to disadvantaged people (Cook & Kothari, 2001).

Such practices attest to tokenism (Arnstein, 1969), cooption and coercion PDev methods (Chambers, 2002) where the relationships assumed to exist between, governance and improvement of accountability and responsibility cannot be ascertained. Protagonists of participation as democracy question this assumed relationship and the efficacy of PDev in an aid delivery system to, in a real sense, emancipate disadvantaged people (Brown, 2004). David Brown argues that participatory approaches underpinned by the need to increase aid are inimical to national ownership because they distort political relationships. For this reason, political relationships based on concessional aid flows cannot be considered as the starting point to promote ownership of development processes by disadvantaged people. Other central concerns to this thesis are questions relating to who participates, with what benefits and for whom?

This question is very important to our understanding of the benefits that can be gained from participatory approaches. It also leads to the question on class dynamics, government, donor and disadvantaged people's interests and principles assumed in mainstreamed PDev. It also enables us to be aware of the deleterious effects of participatory approaches and how these could be addressed. For example, participation

creates new forms of ‘professionalism’ whose moral superiority is ensured by a more socially inclusive orientation (Brown, 1995, 1998; Chambers, 1997; Mulwa, 1994). As Brown (1998) contends, participatory spaces in contexts of revitalized professionalism tend to be less socially inclusive and less transparent than other alternatives. Indeed, PDev here reinforces hegemonic powers against the hitherto excluded and disadvantaged. We need to understand the conundrums through which dominant discourses in PDev sustain the status quo.

There are tensions in respect of how donors and governments reconcile their competing interests to actualize participation in ways that empower, disadvantaged people. Government development strategies are typically underpinned by certain priorities at any given time. Although it might be assumed that democratically elected governments, ideally, serve in the interest of their constituencies, there are representational issues (Brown, 2004; Hickey & Mohan, 2004b). Donors usually seek to remain faithful to their mission statements and mandates (Craig & Porter, 2003). As earlier said, there is always complexity with regard to how participation in policy and planning is stated. Taking cognisance of the complexity of participation in policy design and implementation strategies is critical, as it provides space for “understanding how people organise themselves, what their needs are, how policies will impact on populations and what linkages are required...are key to the success” (Harper, 1997 , p. 776). Is making empowerment a direct policy-programme objective enough to make government and donors accountable and responsible to the disadvantaged? Is mainstreaming participation and establishing bureaucratic structures of representation enough to facilitate people-driven development? These questions necessitate rethinking of the dominant social order and a focus on processes that work to change it; to bring the disadvantaged to the centre of development as subjects, not objects of development designed elsewhere. That is:

“The proposed beneficiaries of development must be active participants in all aspects of the processes that are intended to improve their lives as well as those intended to transform the contexts and conditions within which



they must live, and upon which their well-being depends” (Bopp, 1994, p. 24, cited in Makuwira, 2003, p. 30).

Enhancing the responsibility and accountability of donors and the government to disadvantaged people is a key aim of the thesis. The main concern for governments and donors relates to how best to convert a political interest, namely the wellbeing of disadvantaged people, into a technocratic dimension of public administration (Brown, 2004) and a moral dimension of enabling disadvantaged people to access and exercise their collective and individual civic and human rights (including the right to self-determination). Ife (2002) points out that the irony with aid development, according to democratic socialists is that it is not only individuals that are disempowered.

Though portrayed as villains with donors, in the face of international capitalism and global markets, governments have become just as powerless as individuals. After surrendering most of their power to global corporations which determine what happens in policies (as opposed to democratically elected structures), governments find that they are not able to influence, let alone effectively implement, the social policies they enact to improve the lot of their populace. On the basis of this view donors’ practices with regard to the ‘conduct’ of development and assertions of consensus in development cooperation are questionable. Governments can actually be on the ‘driver’s seat’ but pretend not to see whose hands they can see are driving the wheel (Chambers, 2005). Against this background, it is daunting that donor perspectives and the burgeoning literature by pluralists and elites at one and same time, applaud ‘anti-colonialist’ development practices but barely represent a strong engagement with disadvantages. Except where elites and pluralists claim to reduce poverty, through processes of ‘inclusion’ into neoliberal economies and redistributive markets, in practice their approaches relegate the role of diversity and inequalities in development (Ife, 2002).

## **Conclusion**

“These are times of hard-edged, efficiency-driven, competitive management. To talk of honour today is to risk sounding a bit high-minded or romantic - as if there were ever a time when honour was a saving grace in the corridors of government power. We still need strong and principled...government leaders and civil servants. Addressing structural disadvantages and social injustices in fair and responsive ways is the measure of government power. If that challenge is not met, public cynicism about the legitimacy of democratic structures will deepen. The government will continue to be seen as comprising democratic structures that are far removed from the realities of disadvantaged people, inhumane...and uncaring to its people” (Gregory, 2007, p. 5).

This chapter has shown that development as enacted to date has not liberated the disadvantaged masses, partly because of theoretical and practical posturing between proponents and critics of capitalist economic growth and human development. Such posturing had alienated the disadvantaged from effectively engaging with the structure that govern their lives while inhibiting political empowerment. There is nonetheless consensus in their views that emancipation can barely thrive outside of people-power (PDem), which assumes popular agency (grassroots) or state-national approaches. Development requires balance between social and economic capitals which are heavily reliant on political will (Friedmann, 1992). The convergence of these sensibilities: the realization that it is not just economic progress that matters in development, but that political and social capital are equally important and, also, the transcendence of the development discourse beyond technicalities to include questions of moral choice, social justice and freedoms, makes the contribution of this thesis the more significant.

State-led development in developing countries more often than not succumbs to internationalization of capitalism and market power, while endogenous and grassroots development promises more than it can deliver (Pieterse, 2001). The value of Ife’s model to the arguments advanced in this thesis is in attending to PDev’s theoretical and practical ‘disconnects.’ The main weaknesses of a framework that focuses on community-based services could be summarized as follows: Government(s) may justify certain policies intent to reinforce the status quo or hegemony which may further marginalize disadvantaged groups. For example, by supporting an agenda of government to reduce public spending

and facilitate the reduction in the share of government spending on human services, community-based services could be described as covert privatization where they provide a rationale for the withdrawal of government responsibility and a corresponding move to a market-oriented approach; government(s) may relinquish its responsibility as the principle duty-bearer for supporting basic needs and thereby force the family to accept a greater burden for providing educational facilities; community-based service models could be blamed for placing a disproportionate burden on women as a result of traditional roles and because of higher levels of participation in the community sector, thereby not actually addressing structural disadvantage but reinforcing marginality; it could limit the travel of people to areas where they might access better services and may mean that the regions that are already endowed with resources benefit better than those that are less endowed (Ife, 2002).

Though these weaknesses have been glossed over here (and will be returned to later in the thesis), they represent a strong critique on PDev that promotes the idea of community-based services. Notwithstanding, Ife's framework provides a more balanced way to contextualize and promote understanding of participation as a democratic process for increasing access to educational services and as a process for empowering the poor, than is the case at present. Ife's model has been used in western communities and has not been readily explored in developing countries to identify any similarities or differences. This is an opportunity for this research to contribute insight on how participatory approaches may enhance/hinder empowerment for marginal groups. Ife's framework is likely to at least overcome some of the weaknesses with current PDev practices in government-donor assisted programmes in three main ways:

First, the framework is neither a 'blue print' nor a 'prescription' for development. Rather it allows room for adaptation and analysis of empowerment based on social, political and economic, personal/spiritual, environmental and cultural contexts and type(s) of disadvantage. Second, the framework is based on both structural and post-structural

assumptions that “it is the dismantling of the dominant structures of oppression, and the reconstructing of dominant discourses of power”, which must be at the centre of any programmes intent to effect empowerment and progressive social change (Ife, 2002, p. 57) through the ecological and social justice perspectives, which are dependent on each other for effectiveness of empowerment. These perspectives speak to the theory and put into perspective rights-based citizenship and popular participation approaches to PDev and integrate them into one model through which to empower and transform the disadvantaged, and also build communities.

Third, the ecological and social justice perspectives mean that issues of marginality are likely to be better contested. Here agency for demanding and claiming quality services based on civic and human rights is likely to be robust through participation in policy and planning, social and political action and education and consciousness raising, which the thesis premise as not independent. Although they may be conflicting, their interrelatedness enables a complementary role in actualising a vision for a people-driven development perspective. At this level Foucault’s (1973; 1979) work on knowledge and power which informs the preferred framework is used to explore relationships amongst stakeholders. This way the framework is better able to illuminate both the technical and moral concerns affecting PDev and offer insights on the process of participation as an element of an empowering and social change process for the disadvantaged. Most importantly, the framework aims to build community, and to broaden the power bases for disadvantaged groups through non-violent processes, which should be the focus for every development initiative that involves the interaction of the state, donors, civil society and local communities. The next chapter describes the research design, methodology and methods.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY**

#### **Introduction**

The purpose of this chapter is to delineate and justify the epistemological perspectives and methodology used to generate answers to the thesis' research questions. It first describes the broad subjective view assumed in the research. Next the research design is discussed. Here, the criteria used in selecting the BEIP, participants and sites are then stated together with an acknowledgement of the researcher's role. Then, statements of ethical considerations, methods and procedures for data collection, organization, analysis, presentation and discussion are made. It concludes by summarising the strengths and weaknesses of the research design and methodology.

#### **Research Design: Interpretivism and Constructivism**

This thesis is not based on the positivists' view that there is a single, objective reality that we can observe, know and measure. Instead, it assumes that the world is a function of personal interactions and perceptions, which are subject to interpretation, rather than precise measurement (Merriam, 1988). On this view, the researcher used interpretivism and constructivism perspectives because of their own ideological intersections and compatibility with critical theory, which is used to address the research problem and purpose. The specific features of the research design deriving from this broad subjective world of knowledge conform to qualitative, case study and grounded theory approaches. The thesis will now consider its qualitative approach.

#### **Qualitative Approach**

Qualitative research is fundamentally interpretive (Creswell, 2003). Wolcott (1994) argues that qualitative researchers make interpretations of the data by: developing descriptions of events and processes, analyzing data for themes and categories, drawing conclusions about personal and theoretical meanings, stating the lessons learned and

offering questions for further research. Ideally, researchers filter information through personal lenses that are situated in specific socio-political and historical moments (Creswell, 2003). Such personal interpretations, according to Creswell, enable qualitative researchers to view knowledge as personal and unique. This imposes on researchers a moral involvement with their subjects in sharing their frame of reference, in order to best understand and interpret the world.

Despite such personal interpretivism, qualitative researchers seek to understand the social world from the standpoint of the individuals and groups who are part of the ongoing phenomenon, action, process or event being investigated. The goal of research is to rely as much as possible on the participants' views of the situation being studied. Qualitative research is, therefore, exploratory, inductive, and emphasizes processes rather than ends (Creswell, 2003, 2005; Mason, 2002). According to Crotty (1998) interpretivism combines with constructivism in seeking to promote socially constructed knowledge claims. Here, individuals seek to understand the world in which they live and work. They develop subjective meanings (or perspectives according to Creswell (2005)) of their experiences. These meanings are directed towards certain objects and things. They are varied, multiple and lead the researcher to look for a complexity of views, rather than narrowing meanings into few ideas and categories. Often subjective meanings are negotiated socially and historically — they are formed through interaction with others and through historical and cultural norms that operate in individuals' lives.

On these views, the researcher did not begin with a theory or pattern of meanings as in positivism. Rather, through extensive literature reviews on PDev theory and practice, the researcher identified knowledge gaps, by situating the thesis' problem in broader policy practice, academic and theoretical debates. In line with the thesis' aim of understanding PDev processes and outcomes in aid projects that involve state partnerships with donors, civil society and local communities, the process of research was largely inductive. Nonetheless, deductive faculties were also engaged in interpreting and constructing

meanings (Creswell, 2003; Crotty, 1998), according to how participants had experienced PDev in the BEIP. Here, the researcher sought to interpret data and construct meanings of PDev based on the experiences and perceptions of parents, teachers, technocrats and members of SMCs/PTAs/BOGs who had participated in the BEIP. The researcher's decision to use a qualitative approach was thus influenced by the nature of the problem explored in this thesis.

As earlier stated, the researcher attempted to understand the empowerment and social change value of PDev to disadvantaged people from participants' experiences and perceptions. This need to understand the efficacy of people-centred and PDev approaches in policy planning, implementation, monitoring, evaluation and sustenance mechanisms and processes as enacted in the BEIP, meant that policies (or structural reforms) and their implementing mechanisms exist in an obstinate relationship.

To understand these relationships, the researcher assumed that participants' engagement in the BEIP was likely to be influenced by contextual factors. While it is the norm for research in social sciences to link analyses of specific cases with broader contexts, the process of literature review revealed that, part of the knowledge gap that the thesis is addressing prevailed because research in PDev projects ignored broader contexts. This impressed on the writer the need to link analysis of PDev in the BEIP with broader development policies and other cultural, social, economic and political reforms. To achieve this aim, the research design integrated a case study approach as detailed in the following section.

### **Case Study Approach**

A case study is a "specific instance...designed to illuminate a more general principle" ...(Nisbet & Watt, 1984, p. 72). It is the study of 'an instance in action [which] is of a bounded system [such as] a community...a unique example of real people in real situations (Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 2004, p. 181). It is "...not a methodological

choice but a choice of what is to be studied...” (Stake, 2000, p. 435, cited in Patton, 2002, p. 447). The case is bounded by time and activity. Hence, researchers collect detailed information using a variety of data collection procedures over a sustained period of time (Stake, 1995). Cohen, et al. (2004) argues that one of the strengths of a case study is the ability to establish cause and effect. It enables the researcher to observe activities and subjects in real contexts based on the view that the context of the subject(s) of study is a powerful determinant of both causes and effects.

This recognition of the ‘whole’ being more than the sum of its parts (Nisbet & Watt, 1984) is important to this thesis particularly, with regard to explicating relationships of the BEIP with its structural, practical, and theoretical contexts. It is also critical in analyzing the extent to which the management structure, participation and partnerships within the BEIP contributed to democratic practice, inclusive social networks, empowerment, transformation and sustainable development to disadvantaged people. Creswell (2003) emphasizes the need to establish the “boundaries...and qualifications of the research” (p. 147). The case study approach helped in bounding the research by establishing the ‘unique’ (extent and type of data sites and sources) and ‘broader’ contexts for investigating PDev processes and outcomes. As earlier stated, this research investigated one case namely, BEIP and its relationships with the broader structural, practical and theoretical contexts in which it was implemented. The case study approach thus made the research context sensitive. Following Merriam (1988) it enabled the researcher to investigate the research problem from a holistic perspective.

The BEIP is typical in this research because it involved partnerships between an international agency (OPEC), GOK, disadvantaged communities and civil society. Its focus on participation, empowerment, sustainability and collaborative management and governance made it the ideal case from which to evaluate the ‘fit’ between theory, policy and practice of PDev and its relationships to PDem. Furthermore, the situation of the BEIP within a public sector social service delivery system (ministry of education) made it fit



well in the trajectory between ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ perspectives of PDev. This gave the thesis an added advantage with which to illuminate clear and balanced understanding of mainstream PDev and its pitfalls from the perspectives of technocrats, donors, civil society and the disadvantaged people themselves.

The approach enabled the thesis to evaluate the practical challenges of mainstream PDev as experienced and perceived by these groups, rather than simply reporting data in abstract theories or principles. This is more so when discussing the management structures, partnerships, participation, the relationships generated by these features and their impact on emancipation and sustainable development. Here, the BEIP is the unit of analysis, not the organization within which it was implemented. Nonetheless, sensitivity to structural, social, economic and political reforms which gave BEIP legitimacy to affect democracy, empowerment and social change to disadvantaged people through participation was maintained. This allowed the thesis space to explain the socio-embeddedness of PDev in projects with the policies and other structural reforms these mechanisms service. The aim was to gain in-depth understanding of how PDev processes, outcomes and relationships affected the actual empowerment and social change and the extent to which the disadvantaged people by themselves were able to sustain the changes affected through the BEIP in the long-term once donor and government support is withdrawn. This focus helped the researcher to vividly describe the BEIP and its events, without negating causes and effects of contextual factors on its processes and outcomes. It also helped to illuminate the experiences and perceptions of individuals (teachers, technocrats, parents) and groups (SMCs/PTAs/BOGs) about PDev approaches, processes, principles, interests and power and control relationships within the BEIP events. Apart from the context, purpose and nature of the research problem the thesis investigated, the researcher’s experiences also influenced the choice of a case study approach and selection of the BEIP as follows.

### ***Researcher's Role***

Yin (1989; 1994) argues that identification and selection of cases can be subject to a considerable degree of researcher interest. This is particularly so when the subjects or cases are ones to which the researcher or researched has obligations, responsibilities and attachments. Creswell (2003; 2005) also stresses the need for qualitative case study researchers within educational environments to acknowledge their interests and positioning in the research. Upon graduating with a Bachelor of Education, in 1991, the researcher worked as a high school teacher in an ASAL designated school until 1998. This school had been built through the earlier said harambee process and also received grants in aid and bursaries from the government to support education of bright children from poor households. As the Head of Department of Humanities, the researcher began to observe and develop an interest in issues of accountability, agency and participation. Given the actual conditions of these communities a central concern regarded how effective and sustainable community-based service delivery systems and participatory approaches to development were.

From 1999 to October 2004, the researcher assumed various management roles at the education sector national-central office. Such roles included actioning school audit and accounting reports, advising on parliamentary queries relating to educational policy and coordinating programmes relating to the selection of primary school graduates for enrolment in public secondary schools. The researcher also undertook planning, monitoring and evaluation roles in aid development projects. Most of these projects were funded by the government in partnership with specific donors: World Bank, African Development Bank, UNESCO, UNICEF, DFID and OPEC. The researcher observed that a number of government-donor supported programmes had stalled and those that were concluded in marginalized areas, communities faced challenges of maintaining them. Initial experience gained from engagement in these programmes motivated the researcher to undertake research in programme design and evaluation, as part of Master of Education

qualification (2002). The research process integrated participatory and empowerment research techniques.

This new knowledge rejuvenated the researcher's earlier concerns on the efficacy of community-based service delivery systems for marginalized communities. It also increased the researcher's interest and roles in aid programmes. With funding from the Canadian International Development Agency in 2004 the researcher participated in a Strategic Information Management Programme. The researcher's project proposed an integrated computer-based programme for selection and placement of primary graduates into public secondary schools. The education sector has since implemented the selection programme. Participation in the strategic information symposium further exposed the researcher to policy and implementation processes.

Prior to this, in 2002, the researcher had participated as a member in planning for the implementation of BEIP. Participation in the design, redesign, implementation and evaluation processes of the project activities intensified the researcher's concerns about agency. The researcher also took part in the initial capacity building and community mobilization processes of the project. This earlier experience enabled the researcher to negotiate, interact and gain in-depth understanding from participants about decision-making, state, donor, community responsibilities and power sharing processes. It also allowed space for the researcher to approach the study holistically.

### ***Mediating Researcher's Biases***

Although prior and post research internal debates were ongoing, it should be noted that the decision to investigate this case was neither conceived at the time when the researcher held project or ministerial responsibilities within the education sector, nor was the research proposal delineating BEIP as the case for investigation developed at this time. At the time the PhD study began (2005), the researcher had already assumed human resource development tasks with the Directorate of Personnel Management. Nonetheless,

the researcher's earlier experience with the BEIP may have brought certain biases to the thesis. Although every effort was made to ground data in participants' experiences and perspectives as individuals and groups, these biases may have shaped the way the researcher viewed and interpreted the data. To reduce such biases multiple methods were integrated and utilized in the research phases (research proposal, fieldwork, data analysis, interpretation and documentation).

Here, the researcher assumed that citizenry participation in aid development projects in sectors of social and human development is a complex subject. As said earlier, this influenced the researcher to be cautious and sensitive towards the contexts and participants. The chapter will provide a detailed discussion of the strategies used to address researcher biases when discussing the specific data generation methods and procedures. Meanwhile it is essential to understand the criteria used to select the BEIP.

### ***Selecting the BEIP***

Document analysis, literature reviews undertaken during preparation of the research plan, and the nature of the thesis problem being investigated, informed the criteria adopted in selecting the BEIP, data sources and sites. As pointed out earlier, the topic of research began as an observation, where human development policy had embraced participation to affect sustainable development, empowerment and social change. The literature review also revealed practical and theoretical gaps in mainstream PDev with regard to processes that focus on enabling marginalized communities to take control of their futures. The convergence of these sensibilities, as Creswell (2005) suggests, provided a workable plan for the researcher to carry out purposive sampling of a case and research participants from whom to best learn and answer the research questions outlined in chapter one.

Through the institutional framework of the education sector, the researcher was able to access policy documents and information about the programmes that each policy targeted. Document analysis of the policies on structural adjustment programmes, PRSP,

ERS and Kenya Vision 2030 provided the national development policy direction. These national policies had been integrated in key education sector strategic plans: Sessional Paper No 1 of 2005, which documented current and previous policy emphases, Report of the Education Sector Review (2003), Report of the National Conference on Education and Training (2003) and the Kenya Education Sector Support Programme, which detailed the areas of focus of the 23 programmes that the sector was implementing in primary and secondary schools through a SWAP process. Here, the BEIP fits in the broad programme on improving access to basic education through expanding the physical infrastructure in primary and secondary schools. The researcher delineated the BEIP and the said policies according to how these focused on affecting empowerment and social change to disadvantaged people through participation. To be chosen, BEIP satisfied conditions for this research in five main ways:

1) Its aim of affecting sustainable educational development among disadvantaged communities in pockets of poverty, ASALs and urban slums, fitted well with the thesis' aim of valorising disadvantaged people's perspectives in aid development theory and practice— the project was funded by the state in partnership with the OPEC and local communities.

2) Its focus on *participation* and *mobilizing communities* to support educational development not only coincided with the researcher's earlier concerns about the efficacy of community-based service delivery systems, but also provided a convergence for evaluating how social networks were being redefined in aid programmes through state partnerships with donors and local communities.

3) Its context of implementation in public primary and secondary schools, and target population in rural and urban slums, provided the research with a framework to access a wider variety of participants and perspectives upon which to triangulate data across gender, regions, class, culture, categories and methods.

4) As stated earlier, the project assumed a unique relationship with the overall development policy focus on affecting poverty, sustainable development, democracy, empowerment and social change to disadvantaged people through participation.

5) GOK (2003a) outlines the geographical criteria used by the ministry of education to select schools that benefited from the project. Schools were selected from the three main regional categories of high, medium and low agricultural potential.

### ***Selecting Data Sites and Sources***

This subsection details the criteria used to select data sites and sources and their contexts. The institutional, policy and project frameworks made selection of willing schools and participants through purposive sampling techniques feasible. In this case participants in the research satisfied the criteria of having participated in any of the phases and processes of BEIP because the research depended mainly on participants' experiences and perceptions. To learn from these experiences, the researcher was integrally involved in the state of research processes in an endeavour to experience the participants' life worlds of participation, grasp the emerging meanings and themes and to reveal the richness of these in documenting the data (Creswell, 2003, 2005).

The location of the BEIP within public sector, and its relationships with policy, enabled the researcher to gain insight and discover and interpret stakeholders' experiences, perceptions and meanings about participation along a historical perspective. It was assumed that peoples' lived experiences and perceptions are essentially informed by culture, not as a static but as an evolving practice. Without necessarily equating cultural dynamism with participation, it was assumed that policy and cultural changes were likely to affect participants' experiences and perceptions of participation.

The participants were selected from technocrats (from the ministry of education national, district, divisional and zonal offices<sup>22</sup>), parents, teachers, SMCs/BOGs/PTA members at public primary and secondary schools in city slums, pockets of poverty in areas of high agricultural potential and ASALs. All participants were selected from among individuals and groups that had participated in the BEIP processes and the related policies. This aspect was intended to enable them to draw upon their experiences. Information relating to multilateral and bilateral agencies is largely based on document analysis and the perceptions and experiences of the said groups and individuals.

Since the BEIP targeted schools in the said marginal areas, purposively sampled primary and secondary schools in Nairobi, Central, Nyanza, Western, North-Eastern, Rift Valley, Eastern and Coast Provinces contributed data to the research. The use of purposive sampling techniques further facilitated identification of the specific participants either as individuals or groups from districts and schools within these Provinces. Contrary to the conventional norm of educational policy that ascribes marginality to ASALs and mainly pastoral communities (on account of environmental conditions) in this thesis, marginality and disadvantage have a broader meaning.

It implies exclusion from rights, structures and the means for improving personal and societal wellbeing. This means exclusion from meaningful participation in development as a result of a person's relationship with the socio-economic and political structures that govern one's life (Freire, 1972, 1975; Friedmann, 1992; Ife, 1995, 2002). This broader meaning impressed on the researcher the need to first make ethical considerations with a view to emphasizing structural marginality and disadvantage, confidentiality and anonymity of participants as detailed in the next section.

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<sup>22</sup> Means tiers of educational administration. They represent a hierarchy in authority where the national office holds the highest authority in decision-making and where the zone is the lowest (grass-root) level of administration representing such authority.

## **Ethical Considerations**

Creswell (2003) emphasizes the importance of ethical considerations. Ethical considerations are typically faculty requirements. Albeit, the thesis was concerned that qualitative case studies have been found to be subjective and obtrusive to participants. Techniques for data collection and interaction with participants were needed to mediate against these negative effects. As detailed later, the researcher used interviews and participant observation techniques in data collection. These obliged the researcher to respect the rights, needs, values and desires of participants so as not to invade their lives and embarrass them when sensitive information is revealed during the research process. These were mediated through the following safeguards:

1) To ensure that the researcher respected participants and did not put them at risk, the research proposal was reviewed and approved by the Faculty of Education Research and Human Ethics Committee. In addition, a research information form was filed with the committee and authority granted (Appendices 8 and 9).

2) The researcher verbally and in writing sought permission to carry out the investigation from the Ministry of Education national-central office. Authority to carry out the reach and clearance permit (Appendices 10 and 11) were granted. While on the field, clearance was also sought with 'gatekeepers' at district education offices, primary and secondary schools principals. In each case, the research objectives, including how data would be used were articulated to ensure clear understanding by the participants.

3) Written consent of willingness to participate in the research was sought from individual participants, even where these were engaged as groups. Individuals were not coerced into participation. Only those willing to participate and who had consented by signing a pre-determined consent form (Appendices 6-7) were involved in the research. Each participant signed an independent consent form to participate as individuals or in a group after they read, understood and all their questions answered to their satisfaction.



4) The participant(s) rights, wishes and interests were considered when choices were made regarding the data. For example, participants who wished to receive feedback relating to transcribed data of the conversations they had contributed and had indicated their intent in writing, were accorded such opportunity, before data were analyzed.

5) The researcher tape-recorded all interview sessions, so that the emerging data was well stored, revisited and carefully transcribed to add validity to the study. Hence the researcher was accorded approval by each individual and groups of participants (in the Focus groups) with regard to audio-recording their responses. Participant(s) were informed of all data collection devices and activities. Some participants did not consent to audio-taping. In these cases the researcher adjusted the data collection procedure to suit participants' needs. In most cases, the researcher made notes and continually paraphrased participants' responses to clarify, confirm and to get further detail.

6) The researcher assured participants anonymity and confidentiality. A coding system that preserved the privacy of the participants was developed, where participants' names and their individual ideas were not associated with them. Although the research was not anonymous with regard to the ministry of education, the case and the policies discussed in the thesis, anonymity and confidentiality was essential while referring to specific research sites in terms of districts and schools to which participants belonged.

To enable the researcher to provide feedback to participants, verbatim transcriptions, written interpretations and reports were made available to the participants who wished to gain access to such information. The final decision regarding anonymity rested with the participant(s). The need to maintain these ethical procedures led the researcher to employ grounded theory techniques to allow for researcher flexibility when dealing with data sites and sources and progressive interaction with the data during collection, organisation, analysis and documentation.

## **Grounded Theory**

This section describes the aspects of grounded theory adopted in this research. Creswell (2003; 2005) describes grounded theory as a systematic, qualitative procedure used to generate a process theory that explains, at broad conceptual level, events, activities, actions, and interactions that occur over time. Grounded theory researchers proceed with systematic procedures of collecting data, identifying categories (themes), connecting these categories, and forming a theory that explains the process. Creswell (2005) further identifies three grounded theory approaches:

1) systematic procedure which was developed by Strauss and Corbin (1998). This emphasizes the use of data analysis steps of open coding, axial and selective coding. As such, the researcher proceeds with predetermined categories. The aim of research is to describe such categories and to generate a diagram to explain category interrelationships. A central criticism of this approach is that, it assumes a positivist view by forcing data into predetermined categories and codes (Glaser, 1992). While acknowledging the value of systematic procedures, this research did not assume predetermined categories. Instead, it used the emerging design developed by Glaser and Strauss (1967).

2) The emerging design according to Glaser (1992) stresses the importance of letting a theory (themes and meanings) emerge naturally from data. The goal of research in this case is to explain the basic social processes. It emphasizes constant comparative coding of procedures of comparing incident to incident, incident to category and category to category, not simply describing categories. Here the researcher builds a theory of meanings and discusses the relationships amongst categories without reference to a diagram. The researcher assumed grounded theory techniques of the emerging design to purposively select data sources and sites and to code, analyze and present data. The actual methods and procedures of this continuous process of data generation and analysis will be considered later.

A key component of this emerging design which facilitated the researchers' selection and interaction with data sources and sites is theoretical sampling. According to Creswell, this procedure entails constant comparative and continual interrogation of data arising from different research participants and methods. It enabled the researcher to continually and purposely select participants from whom new and more data in the service of the research purpose was likely to be got. It also allowed the thesis to be grounded in the data and for such data to be categorised according to emerging themes and meanings on which these were coded and analyzed (Gleser & Strauss, 1967).

3) The constructivist grounded theory approach, according to Charmaz (1990; 2000), focuses on meanings ascribed by participants in the study other than on gathering single truths (facts) and describing acts. The researcher used this approach to validate the research and to gain in-depth understanding of participants' experiences and perceptions about PDev. It helped the researcher in making decisions about the varied perspectives of the participants and organizing these into initial themes and categories. Besides emergent themes and meanings, the constructivist design assumes that, participants' views, feelings and assumptions are representations of broader values, belief and ideological systems. Such understanding helped the researcher, throughout the research process, to question the data, and to gauge their feasibility in addressing the central aim of the thesis. Data probing facilitated further probing and a more explanatory and discursive atmosphere within and across participants and methods.

The emerging and constructivist approaches enabled the research to reach out to the data sites and sources at the times of convenience to the participants and in their natural settings (Creswell, 2005). These also made it possible for the researcher to adapt participants' (local) themes and meanings into Ife's framework of analysis (see chapters four to seven) rather than using one completely borrowed "off-the-shelf" (Creswell, 2005, p. 396). Glaser and Straus (1967) assert that such a 'theory' will "fit the situation being researched and will work when put into use" (p. 3, cited in Creswell, 2005, p. 396). It

“actually works in practice, is sensitive to individuals in a setting, and may represent all of the complexities...found in the process” (Creswell, 2005, p. 396). As detailed later in the chapter, grounded theory approach enabled the research to proceed step-by-step by offering a systematic procedure for collecting and analyzing data.

Through purposive and theoretical sampling techniques, chunks of data were analyzed one set after another in an iterative manner (Creswell, 2005). These enabled the researcher to obtain direction and maintain focus from one set of analysis to the next set (Charmaz, 2000). It enabled the researcher to build emerging data categories and themes naturally and systematically. This entailed critical examinations of the relationships within and amongst incidents, categories and themes. Overall, grounded theory enabled the thesis to valorise perspectives of the selected groups and individuals about PDev practice and policies by grounding the thesis on the data. Qualitative methods and procedures that allowed the researcher to remain closely connected to participants and intimate to the data during collection, organization, analysis and documentation will now be considered in the next section.

### **Methods, Tools and Procedures of Data Collection**

The thesis used four methods of data collection: document analysis, one-on-one interviews, focus group discussions and participant observation. These methods were chosen because they are sensitive and allow the active participation of participants. As is the case with qualitative research, these methods allowed the researcher flexibility to refine questions as the researcher learned what to ask and who should be asked during the research process. This process also enabled the development of broad interpretations of the emerging data (Creswell, 2003). Through an inductive-interpretive approach, the researcher interrogated participants’ views and recorded the meanings they had ‘constructed’ (Charmaz, 2000) about participation in the BEIP. A core aim was to understand how such meanings had shaped their agency.

Generally, one-on-one or group interview procedure entailed broad and in-depth questioning. This allowed participants to reflect on their past and present experiences and perceptions, and to project on their likelihood to sustain the changes impacted through the BEIP. 20 primary schools took part in this study. Out of the 20 primary schools, four, two in city slums and two in rural ASALs were observed. 10 secondary schools took part in the study with SMCs/PTAs/BOGs members also contributing to interviews and focus-group discussions. A total of 141 participants contributed to the study on one-on-one and focused group interviews.

Qualitative research acknowledges that there is always a wealth of information in documents. Document analysis and literature review were integral parts of data collection, analysis and alignment of the framework of analysis. The qualitative, case study and grounded theory principles earlier discussed governed how the researcher interacted with data, sites and participants by adding rigour and objectivity into the thesis. These also negated the overly subjective elements of case studies.

### **Document Analysis**

The need for the thesis to link data from the case with its broader contexts necessitated the use of document analysis. Secondary data helped to align the research problem with conventional knowledge, where an adapted framework of analysis arose. Document analysis validated the research. It also complemented empirical data. Policy documents have been outlined under the 'selection criteria' section. Other documents include: Donors, strategic plans for international development, BEIP proposal, project appraisal, aid memoir, implementation manual, training modules, seminars and conference papers, reports, briefs and minutes, report of the APRM (2006) on Kenya and report of the conference on constitutional reform to fight corruption by Transparency International (2002, 2007).

These documents were reviewed with an interpretive approach. Key words notably, participation, empowerment, community, democracy, governance were central guides in document analysis. The researcher interrogated documents in search for meanings, themes, events, actors and their relationships to see how these highlighted PDev as essential to empowerment and social change. Sentences, paragraphs, words and the tone in which these were written, were interpreted in line with the thesis' problem and purpose. In some instances, the specific research tools used on research participants were also used on documents to engage the researcher in a conversation with the documents. Some useful questions are: what is the document saying about participation? What challenges of participation are identifiable? Overall, documents provided rich data on the background context of the BEIP in terms of policy, PDev theory and practice. This also satisfied the need to triangulate data sources.

### **One-on-One Interview**

According to Creswell (2005) one-on-one interview is a data collection process in which the researcher asks questions and records answers from one participant. The researcher conducted one-on-one interviews with educational policy-makers, planners, policy and programme implementers, standards and quality assurance staff, and administrators at senior and medium management levels, principles of primary and secondary schools, teachers, parents and members of SMC/PTAs/BOGs who had participated in the case activities. A total of 60 one-on-one interviews were conducted from 18<sup>th</sup> August 2005 to 20<sup>th</sup> February 2006 (Appendix 1).

Out of these, 30 participants included SMCs/PTAs/BOGs members, parents, and teachers who were interviewed on a one-on-one basis. The other 30 were ministry of education technocrats at central and field offices. These were senior policy-maker, planners and senior and middle level educational managers. Sampling and follow-up procedures have been outlined under the selection criteria of the BEIP, data sites and

sources and ethical considerations above. The process of recruitment ensured that interviewees comprised men and women, old and young from rural and urban schools' environments. As shown in the selection criteria, the researcher ensured that willing participants were interviewed from across the target individuals and groups.

An interview protocol consisting of separate unstructured open-ended questions were administered to participants in their offices and homes. Flexibility was built into the interview process to enable the researcher to seek further clarification of issues from the participants depending on the progress of the interviews and the indicators of desired data that participants cited. Data were recorded by a dictaphone. Where desired the researcher combined note-taking with voice recording. This ensured the researcher recorded and revisited cues where in-depth inquiry was required from a participant or pointed to another participant or site. Where these cues could not be accommodated within the particular interview session, the researcher arranged for a follow-up session either through face-to-face, telephone or email. The use of telephone and email was only accessible to participants in cities. Nonetheless, because of the cost implications, most participants preferred face-to-face follow-ups.

Where verbatim transcription was not possible before the next set of interviews was conducted, the researcher listened to the recorded voices, drew out the main themes emerging from such data, wrote them down and linked these to the voice file. The use of N-Vivo programme aided this process by keeping chunks of typed diary notes and memos linked to the voice files. N-Vivo also helped in continual and constant organization of data into emerging themes and meanings as demanded by the grounded theory procedure. Continual reflections were prompted by observations made at the research site, or a statement or cue made by the research participant or general hunches of the researcher. Memos marked 'reflection' and a diary explaining these reflections were also made. Notes and cues were also recorded alongside memos to indicate an observation from the current participant or where further detail was required during an interview or from another

participant. Memos formed a rich set of data that were analyzed, including the sites, the events observed, or statements that triggered the reflection. This is to say memos helped to connect the researchers' immediate interpretation of data with the actual hunches, event, interview or observations.

As other qualitative researchers have found, interview schedules did not always run according to plan. Sometimes interviews were delayed or postponed. This was particularly the case with technocrats, planners and educationists owing to their busy schedules. In each case, new appointments were sought until a participant was finally interviewed. Participants demonstrated commitment by participating in the research and ensuring uninterrupted interview sessions where possible. However, research in natural settings poses the challenge of in-session interruptions with phone-calls to attend to urgent matters and noise (for example hooting vehicles) from the neighbourhoods.

Although such cases were limited, noise interfered with the quality of voice collected, while interruptions resulted in either postponement of the interview or premature conclusion. Nevertheless, a debriefing of the conversation was arranged to confirm issues of the previous session and to conclude the interview at some other time of convenience to the participant. All interviews held lasted more than the anticipated two hours, with some taking up to three hours held at three to four separate times. Once data were transcribed participants who wished to get feedback about the researchers' interpretation of their contribution for further comments could do this through telephone and email. Indeed one of the focus groups was specifically organised to meet this need as detailed in the next section.

### **Focus Group Interviews**

A focus group is a carefully planned discussion, designed to obtain perceptions of group members on a defined area of interest (Langford & McDonagh, 2003). It is used to collect shared and individual understandings from several individuals or collectively as



groups (Creswell, 2005). The researcher planned for nine, but only eight separate focus group interviews were held. A total of 81 participants took part in the focus groups. Focus group interviews comprised eight-13 members with one being attended by six members. Details of the focus groups are as follows:

- 10 members of school management committees and parents teachers associations, drawn from different primary schools in Nyanza Province. It entailed two sessions of one and half hours each held on different days.
- 13 members of schools board of governors and project implementation staff from Coast Province. It was a once-off session of three hours with a 15 minute tea break.
- Eight members from North Eastern and Western Provinces. It consisted of three sessions each of one hour spread over three days at the participants' convenience. Participants converged at a common centre to attend the interviews.
- 10 participants drawn from members of district project coordinating units in eastern and central Provinces.
- Two separate focus groups, one comprising of 11 members of school committees and the other 12 secondary schools' board members from Rift Valley Province.
- One of six participants drawn from the project planning team at the central office.
- The final group of 11 participants was a mix of teachers, parents, members of CSOs and local government. This was a unique group of participants who wished to get feedback on verbatim transcriptions where their views featured. It enabled the researcher to debrief and validate transcriptions.

There was a total of 19 hours of focus group interviews spread over a period of six months. Each focus group member satisfied the criteria of having participated in the BEIP. Groups comprised men and women from rural and urban environments. The focus group interviews adopted the type of discussion process suggested by Patton (1987; 1990). Themes were recorded and discussed as they emerged in the group in a round-robin manner (Appendix 2). First, participants were asked to respond as individuals by recording

answers against preset short questions. The next step entailed discussion of each question by allowing each participant to contribute in turn until all raised their views. For interviews that entailed second and third sessions a method of data generation comprising of round-robin and nominal group techniques was adopted. Hence the focus group discussions progressively evolved through a process of generation of individual participant ideas (round-robin). Participants built on these initial views through in-depth discussion.

Themes for discussion during the second session arose from the first session and themes for the third session emerged from the second session. This process contributed participatory elements in the research design and also offered an opportunity for the participants to carry out a meta-evaluation of their previous inputs by reflecting on the themes that emerged so as to strengthen them through yet another in-depth discussion. A round-robin procedure sufficed for focus groups that had one continuous session of three hour. The moderator paraphrased a participant's idea to (dis)confirm themes before initiating an in-depth discussion. Paraphrasing helped participants to reflect on individual and group views, on which they constructively elaborated.

At the beginning of each focus group, the researcher explained verbally the objective of the discussion and allowed respondents time to ask for clarifications. The researcher moderated and facilitated the focus group discussions. Although the researcher took notes where possible, a willing research assistant for each session was selected from among the participants. The researcher crosschecked notes for consistency with audio-tapes and each participant's recorded responses.

Flexibility was built in the discussion so that each participant's views were heard and respected by the other participants. The moderator probed sub-questions to allow for in-depth discussions to unravel details on the subject and to enable participants to build on the responses and ideas of others. This increased the quantity and quality of the information gained. Participants were allowed 15 minutes break (not included in the total interview time), during which snacks and beverages were served.

All focus group discussions were audio-taped with participants' permission and were later transcribed. The researcher examined photos with information relevant to the research that the groups had, and wrote memos regarding inferences made. Participation was voluntary. No payments were made to participants, except reimbursement of transport expenses. With participants' approval, group photos were taken at the end of the discussions although none have been used in the thesis. The researcher thanked the participants at the end of each session and encouraged them to seek clarification of the research findings. Such feedback was provided during the eighth focus group discussion. Where focus groups were held, participant observations were also made regarding the construction component of the BEIP.

### **Participant Observation**

Participant observation is the process of gathering open-ended, firsthand information by participating and observing activities in a research site (Creswell, 2005). According to Creswell, it is different from other forms of observation because the researcher assumes a 'participant observer' role and reveals intentions to participants. It is a powerful method of collecting first-hand information about behaviour from the perspectives of participants. Like other researchers have found out (Creswell, 2005), observations were limited to the sites and situations that were accessible. There were also initial difficulties in developing rapport with individuals. These were however overcome through overtly declaring the research agenda and seeking approval of gate keepers at the education national-central and field offices, clearing with school principles, listening keenly, careful attention to visual details and limiting observation only to those activities that were permitted.

The researcher was able to manage the initial awkwardness of being an 'outsider' without initial personal support in a setting (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995), by invoking the duo status of the researcher as both an 'outsider' and 'insider'. The researcher was an

outsider by virtue of carrying out an independent, academic research that was situated in an international university and not having career or professional attachments with the education sector, schools, individual and activities and the case at the time of the research. The researcher also held a certain degree of insider role due to the earlier described relationships with the research contexts and the case. These participant observer roles enabled the researcher to readily identify with participants as a way of understanding the activities and events from their own viewpoints.

While participating in activities, the researcher completed a predetermined unstructured observation protocol (Appendices 4-6). In addition, an audio-tape was used to record discussions and any other voices. These were transcribed with an interpretive lens of what was being heard and observed. Where taking field-notes and tape-recording was not possible during the observation, the researcher completed the observation log as soon as possible after the activity. This means, the researcher changed roles on a continuum of observer to participant observer. This flexibility enabled the researcher to change roles as the situation and participants demanded.

Since one of the BEIP activities entailed expansion of physical facilities, the researcher observed construction sites in schools and participated in school management and board meetings. Participant observation yielded rich data on roles and interactions of school committees and boards in the case activities and physical setting of the research site(s). Other activities observed were schools' open-speech days (when teachers, parents, local administration, school sponsors (religious organizations), education officials, students/pupils) met to review school progress and programmes, capacity building workshops/seminars for district implementing staff, PTAs/BOGS/ SMCs, and class-parents days (when parent representatives of syndicates, teachers, committee member and pupils review their academic progress and map out strategies for correction and advancement). Observational data revealed relations that came into play when participants engaged in activities that practically linked to the case.

The researcher observed participants as they made reflections about their participation in programme activities, watched them act-out forms of participation as well as illuminate factors that encouraged and/or discouraged their participation in speeches, songs, poems and drama. Observed schools were situated in rural and urban environments. Through participant observation, the researcher obtained firsthand accounts of power and control relationships and the interest and motives of the different actors. Observed meetings revealed strategies used in decision-making and responsibility-resources sharing processes. Speech-prize-open days relayed valuable data through poems, dances, music, comedies, speeches and physical context of the activity. As detailed in later chapters, question and statements provided rich connections of the case with its policy, environmental and cultural contexts.

Key words and cues were also followed to record initial hunches as field notes on the behaviour and activities of individuals with the aid of the unstructured observation protocol including: descriptive notes on portraits of the participants, reconstruction of dialogue, description of the physical setting, accounts of particular events or activities from reflective notes (the researcher's personal thoughts, feelings, problems, ideas, hunches, impressions and prejudices) and recorded demographic information about the time, place and date of the field setting where the observation took place. Recorded voices were transcribed and analyzed together with the field notes and data from other methods. Overall, four participant observations were made: Two lasted eight hours each, another four and the last three and half hours. A total of 557 participants were observed at different sites at different times during the fieldwork.

### **Data Organization, Analysis and Interpretation**

Data analysis and interpretation procedures were governed by the qualitative case study design. The case study approach was initially used to produce thick-descriptions of data that illustrate details of the case activities, processes, outcomes and their relationships

with the policy contexts these serviced. Data were streamed into incidences, themes, categories through a natural continuous process of moving back and forth between data generation, organization and analysis as demanded by the emerging and constructivist grounded theory processes (Charmaz, 2000; Glaser, 1992).

To do this, the researcher adopted a procedure of asking questions of data as recommended by Glaser (1992): What is the data a study of? What category or what property of what category does this incident indicate? What is actually happening in the data? What is the basic social psychological process or social structural process in the action scene? (p. 51). This process continued until data saturation of each category was reached. This iterative process of data collection and analysis helped to clarify case descriptions, themes, meanings and categories. To refine the themes and categories, some participants were interviewed more than twice, while focus groups were held in successive sessions with themes for discussion arising from previous sessions.

This process of data generation and analysis meant that data were transcribed and organized progressively. Recorded interviews, field notes, memos and observational data were typed into text files and saved into N-Vivo programme. N-Vivo tools were used to search, sort, code, organize and categorize data into broad themes. As said earlier, themes corresponded firstly to the purpose, research questions and then Ife's framework of analysis. Once data were organized categorically, the researcher reviewed these repeatedly and revised codes continuously (Tesch, 1990).

The researcher assumed the process of data analysis and interpretation recommended by Creswell (2003). It entails reading through all the data (transcriptions) one by one, jotting ideas as they come into mind to obtain a general sense of the information and reflecting on its underlying meaning, then recording general thoughts on the margins. This task was first completed for several participants. The researcher then made a list of all topics into columns that could be displayed as major topics, unique topics

and leftovers. Topics are coded in line with broad themes in the framework of analysis: empowerment, democracy, poverty, interests, approaches etc.

According to Rossman and Rallis (1998) this process of organization and interpretation entails breaking data into “chunks” (p. 71). That is taking text data and segmenting sentences (or paragraphs) into categories and labelling these with a term, based on the actual language of the participant (quoting in-vivo). The aim of quoting in-vivo such as, “...expanding democratic spaces of participation...” was to align data with codes that yielded themes addressing a general theoretical perspective by assembling data material belonging to each category in one place and performing a preliminary analysis (Creswell, 2003; Mason, 2002).

The main technique of verification entailed data and method triangulation. As said earlier, said multiple methods of data collection were used in ways that conformed to qualitative research, case study, grounded theory and participatory techniques. Some degree of member-checking was performed with participants in individual and focused group interviews, especially those who wished to review their own contributions after themes were transcribed. Initial analyses were presented in seminars and conferences. Critiques were clarified with further cross-examination and data analyses.

An ongoing internal verification of data was inbuilt into the interview process so that participants cross-checked and clarified data through in-depth questioning, probing and paraphrasing responses. Willing participants maintained contact (email and telephone) with the researcher throughout the fieldwork, during which pertinent issues were clarified. Audio-taping and integration of N-vivo ensured that data could be cross-examined when need arose. Presentation of discrepant information that ran counter to the themes reduced certain subjectivity, while presenting issues closer to the way they were. Researcher biases have also been clarified.

## Conclusion

Qualitative research that uses a case study approach has been criticized for encouraging researcher bias, which tends to skew data in certain ways (Mason, 2002). The procedures of ethical considerations, multiple methods, grounded theory and acknowledgement of researchers' roles helped to mitigate such biases. These elements also mediated against the negative effects of subjective interpretivism-constructivism while providing readers space to appraise the quality of the research output. While case studies have been accused of inhibiting generalisability of findings, the focus for this study is not to generalize the findings to all PDev projects in Kenya and/or elsewhere as is the case in quantitative research where the research sample is normally representative of the population. Rather, the thesis focus is to unravel the conceptual underpinnings of PDev and governance and the various approaches that might possibly be useful for affecting empowerment and social change for the disadvantaged by pulling out themes about participatory processes that emerged from stakeholders' experiences and perceptions. Specifically, findings are compared with Ife's (2002) empowerment model, which is informed by structuralist and poststructuralist perspectives of power and disadvantages of class, gender, ethnicity and environmental marginality along which generalisations are made. Moreover, generalisations are made based on how relationships and approaches enable the disadvantaged to gain control of their own development and overcome structural disadvantage and social injustices. In the discussion of findings, data are also compared with previous studies in developing countries to explain similarities and differences.

Nonetheless, the way the thesis generalises the research findings could be subject to other interpretations. Given the complexity of participation as a spatial and situated concept, the researcher tried as objectively as was possible to remain sensitive to research participants' views as well as keeping the research design flexible and open to accommodate emerging themes that the research did not initially anticipate. This way, contextualized perspectives of PDev emerged least with the broader-global perspectives



espoused in the broader policies the BEIP drew upon. This allowed the thesis space to enhance understanding of policy, theory and practice of mainstream PDev in a holistic and balanced way. Overall, the research design and methods allowed the thesis to contribute to wider debates about what constitutes transformative and empowering PDev processes, which could be furthered by later research involving larger samples and different variables. The next chapter describes the BEIP objectives and management structures.

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **THE MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES OF THE BEIP**

#### **Introduction**

This chapter explores the management and governance structures of the BEIP and how it relates to Ife's view of CDev and PDem. It helps address the central questions posed by this thesis by exploring how the structures of management and governance established the policy and practical context through which the intervention was enacted. The purpose of the thesis is to draw upon the perceptions of those directly involved to explore how the BEIP impacted PDem. It argues that the structure chosen by the GOK and the principles that underpinned this choice had a defining impact upon the way the targeted schools (or communities) experienced the intervention. It also sets the scene for subsequent chapters by describing the context in which these selected communities experienced partnerships, participation, empowerment and sustainability.

Building upon the comments made in the introduction to this thesis, section one provides further details and analysis of the nature and aims of the intervention. The next sections draw upon documents and the testimony gathered as part of this study from technocrats, members of SMCs/BOGs/PTAs and individual parents to describe the management structure and its contexts, the principles that underpinned it (partnerships, participation, empowerment and sustainability) and assess the impact that these features were perceived to have on PDev and PDem. These features are identified here to set the scene for understanding subsequent chapters, where focus is upon the nature of the change achieved by the intervention. In conclusion a recap of main points is made.

It is important to understand how the management and governance structure established the context and policies to support the project objectives, partnerships, participation, empowerment and sustainability of the changes these features impacted on the people. As stated in chapter two (Ife, 2002), policy and planning, education and consciousness raising, and social and political action are essential components of an

empowering and transformative development process. As part of this process, change agents must enact structures and create institutions to facilitate these mechanisms. They must also balance between local and global processes to help overcome the possible deleterious effects of localism and the imposition of dominant narratives on disadvantaged people. The quest for participation, cooperation and partnerships in development interventions such as the BEIP, partly, is to ensure that structures and processes of governance and management are inclusive. Management structures must neither be alienating to disadvantaged people nor to change agents who represent their interests. Indeed, the need for participation and collaboration, primarily, is to increase the power and control of disadvantaged people over the social, economic and political institutions which govern their lives (or upon which their livelihoods depend).

Besides integrating democratic spaces of participation and collaboration, development interventions must also empower the hitherto excluded to have an impact on institutions such as the education system. Ultimately, such interests should make education more accessible, responsive and accountable to all people, not just the powerful. According to Ife, CDev workers<sup>23</sup> must act as facilitators of development of disadvantaged people in ways that respect ecological and social justice. They must ensure integrity of the development process by establishing structures that conform to the expectations of the outcomes. To help understand the structure of the intervention and its principles, a consideration is first made of the nature and objectives of BEIP.

### **Nature and Objectives of BEIP**

An expected, longer-term, outcome of BEIP (as stated in the official literature) was to promote balanced development (GOK, 2003b; 2005a). This was taken to mean

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<sup>23</sup> This refers to practitioners of mainstream PDev (policy-makers, planners, educationists, teachers, civil society, community/political leaders). According to Ife (2002), CDev must engage the participation of state, political activists for advocacy or civil society and community members themselves who are the owners of development. This is to say the community is the locale for development, not the nation-state.

“...enhance[d] access and improve[d]...quality of basic education with a view of ensuring the achievement of Universal Primary Education by 2005 and Education for all by 2015” (GOK, 2003b, p. 1). It is important to note that this policy outcome may not have occurred as a result of the project alone. Nonetheless, it underscores the interrelatedness of broader policies that supported the BEIP and the structures developed to implement it. The education sector strategy in which the BEIP is part of the infrastructural programme, states that “the broad objective is to give every Kenyan the right to quality education and training no matter [their] socio-economic status” (GOK, 2005a, p. iii). A driving factor in this aim is the view that education contributes to sustainable development by addressing knowledge and information gaps.

While “education is a fundamental right [and] an important [input] to sustainable development, peace and sustainability...” (GOK, 2001a, p. 74), it is not enough in itself. Sustainable development requires the government to enhance the wellbeing of disadvantaged people by attending to the challenges of poverty:

“the government and other partners recognize that the challenges for sustainable development in Kenya are the eradication of poverty and the achievement of sustained broad based economic growth...poverty eradication is viewed not only as a political necessity and a moral obligation but also as an economic imperative for the country’s development and raising people’s standard of living” (GOK, 2001a, p. 73).

Testimonies in this research indicate an acceptance that balancing between education and other social, economic and political factors that affect people’s wellbeing was more likely to increase benefits of transformation to disadvantaged people:

“Education is considered as one of those achievements which will translate in change. But also you must realised that education alone may not [effect change] if the other co-operant factors, or ‘development will’ is not moving in other [social, economic and political] areas...It does not benefit so much to have so many people who have gone to school and yet they are not given the chance to participate in production of goods [access to economic activity] and services [basic and human rights] or paying taxes [through wages or purchasing goods/services]” (Parsley).

This idea of promoting balanced development by creating an enabling environment to promote human rights is reflected in the holistic approach technocrats adopted in the BEIP to improve structures and rights of disadvantaged people:


“particularly in ASALs, urban slums and pockets of poverty...The infrastructure programme when developed and fully implemented in a holistic way... has the potential to contribute towards the achievement of other goals...this will ensure environmental sustainability...proper water supplies and sanitation...gender sensitivity, health [and] hygiene” (GOK, 2005a, p. 3).

This view that a holistic approach was more likely to increase impact and contribute to achievement of other goals, led technocrats to integrate structural and rights perspectives into the BEIP objectives and methods. Figure 2 provides a critical analysis of the interplay amongst structures, rights, methods, outcomes and the process of (holistic and balanced) development that the BEIP was expected to effect.

### **Structures, Rights, Means, Outcomes and Process**

Figure 2 provides a basis for understanding the intra-interrelationships of the BEIP with its broader political, social, economic and environmental contexts in later chapters; the structures, approaches and principles used to support participation, partnerships, empowerment, social change and sustainability; and the actual outcomes as experienced by those involved. It helps explain how PDev and PDem fitted with the BEIP objectives and later the management structures through which they were enacted.

The cyclical arrows emphasize the holistic approach and the need to balance between means and outcomes and structures and rights to achieve empowerment and sustainable change. Such balance is manifest in the way technocrats engraved perspectives of structures, rights, methods and outcomes into the BEIP objectives.



**Figure 2: The BEIP Structural and Right-Based Perspective of Development**

As reflected in the proposal (GOK, 2002) and implementation manual (GOK, 2003b), a holistic approach in the BEIP meant using methods that attend to both the structural and rights deficits among the selected disadvantaged school communities:

“The GOK/OPEC education project will add great value to this programme<sup>24</sup> by increasing access, equity and effect quality improvement in basic education through enhancing the built environment of schools and conditions of teaching and learning. At secondary schools level, the focus will be on science education” (p. ii).

The project implementation manual (GOK, 2003b) shows that the structural approach entailed enhancing the infrastructural and teaching and learning environments of 280 primary and 70 secondary schools. Through the BEIP, technocrats aimed to build “1400 classrooms nationwide by 2007” (GOK, 2005a, p. 2) in primary schools. It also aimed to affect the teaching and learning of “science education through provision of

<sup>24</sup> Free Primary Education (Kenya’s equivalent for Universal Primary Education).

science equipment”, repairing/building laboratories (GOK, 2003b, p. 1) and enhancing the teaching skills of teachers in physics, chemistry and biology subjects (Docs 3a-d) in secondary schools. Another objective targeted the “area...of Special Education, which refers to education and training programmes for children with disabilities. Here, facilities and resource provision [was to] be addressed [through] renovat[ing] and well-equipp[ing] Education Resource Centres” (GOK, 2003b, p. ii). The extent to which this objective was achieved is discussed in chapters six and seven.

The structures-to-rights process, as illustrated by the double-pointed arrow in figure 2, represents this approach (which is structural in nature as it treated rights as outcomes). As expressed in the figure, the BEIP technocrats claimed to create structures through which to enhance the rights of marginalised groups. The technocrats believed that classrooms, boreholes/tanks, toilets and laboratories provided an enabling environment for accessing basic (education, water, health/sanitation, wellbeing) and democratic (participation) rights. This context, where structures form the basis for accessing rights, is closely linked to the rights-based approach (GOK, 2003b), where an increase in access to rights, it was claimed, would ultimately enhance good governance by enacting structures that promote access to physical facilities, more rights and which increase government and community responsibility towards educational development.

This sensibility, as Botchway (2001) and Ife (2002) emphasize, shows that rights and the facilities (or contexts) which enhance these are inseparable. To speak of classrooms, water tanks and toilets in a structural perspective, is to speak of the rights to education, water and health/hygiene in a rights perspective. As Ife contends, this relationship requires balancing between structures and rights and between methods and outcomes so as to maintain integrity of the development processes that emerge. This point is further illuminated in figure 2 by the means-to-outcomes double-pointed arrow.

As reflected in the broad literature on PDev (Oakley & Marsden, 1991), it denotes a process of development where the structures and rights were both methods and expected

outcomes. This complexity where means become outcomes, and vice versa, imply a democratic and empowering process of development, according to Ife (2002), that is neither linear nor value-free. It entailed decision-making processes which had a normative imperative on the decision-makers and upon the lives of the disadvantaged communities whose rights and structures the BEIP affected.

Such decision-making processes are illustrated in figure 2 by the broken diagonal arrows and the V-shapes these arrows form at their point of intersection and the revolving arrows. The revolving arrows spin around to underpin technocrats' belief in holism and balanced development. Through the BEIP, technocrats sought to increase the rights to education and ultimately to spread benefits of environmental and social justice to the selected disadvantaged individuals and groups. A strength of this approach is that it conforms to Ife's (2002) contention that the causes and effects of disadvantage extend to the farthest end of a system and so do the decisions, plans and actions of technocrats. In this regard, technocrat decisions must be informed by the principles of holism and equilibrium. Despite claims to *holism* (systemic approach), the practices revealed in the data that is presented in later chapters show significant disconnects with the stated policies and challenges in maintaining a balance between structures, rights, means and outcomes. A core element of this systemic approach arose from technocrats' view of the BEIP not as an end in itself but as a means of attending to education, poverty, environmental sustainability, water, culture, gender and health.

This view that the BEIP provided the context for targeting structures or rights that can be a basis for contesting other rights derives its strength from Ife's (2002) description of participation as a democratic right (PDem). Technocrats believed that participation is a key democratic right through which disadvantaged communities access education, health, economic activity and freedom of association, and thus a core determinant of their emancipation. On the basis of this belief, technocrats first engraved participation into the



BEIP objectives and then created structures to enable school communities to collaborate and participate in implementation processes.

Figure 2 encapsulates these views by representing participation as a means, outcome and a right in the BEIP process of development. Technocrats perceived participation as a means because they believed that participation (contribution of physical and human capitals) by school communities would strengthen the impact of the BEIP by spreading benefits widely (chapter six). Participation is also an end and a right in that the BEIP “support[ed]...community participation in the provision of [primary] schools and classrooms, [furniture, pupils’ textbooks and teachers’ guides] to [enhance] pupils’ [academic] performance. [Such participation would ultimately impact students] health and wellbeing, including support for children with special needs, through providing water and sanitation facilities” (GOK, 2002, pp. 5, 6).

Technocrats also aimed to facilitate outcomes of rights and/or obligations on the part of students, parents and the government since participation in:

“the project [was also seen] to strengthen the management and governance of schools through capacity building and community mobilization” (GOK, 2003b, p. ii).

Participation in this context of management and governance was expected “to enhance ownership of [decisions, outcomes] and community participation” in the BEIP and future development interventions (GOK, 2003b, p. 2). As evidenced in documents, technocrats believed that collaboration and “participation in the development of education policies and strategies enhances the ownership of the national programmes. This will help us avoid past mistakes” (GOK, 2003b, p. 99). Apparently, these past mistakes entailed implementing aid interventions by the government, donors and NGOs without due regard for *sustainability*, *collaboration* and *(active) participation*:

“One of the major drawbacks of donor/partner-funded projects has been [lack] of sustainability. Among contributing factors to lack of sustainability is failure by some agencies and NGOs to incorporate local communities as active participants in such initiatives. This has created the

problem of dependence and lack of community ownership of projects” (GOK, 2001a, p. 89).

Technocrats’ testimonies also emphasized that sustainability was a major concern and the main reason why the GOK felt the need to implement the BEIP through partnerships and participation. The view according empirical data (chapters five and six) is that community participation and partnerships with technocrats and donors would strengthen governance, enhance ownership, empowerment, transformation and sustainability of the changes the BEIP affected on disadvantaged people. Based on this view, technocrats established participation and collaboration as objectives of the BEIP. They also felt obliged to support these objectives with structures that required disadvantaged communities to actively participate and collaborate with technocrats and the donor in implementing the BEIP.

These structures of participation and collaboration also established the methods and contexts for empowerment. Through participation and collaboration, technocrats believed that disadvantaged communities would be empowered to sustain the changes affected through the BEIP and hold educational institutions accountable for delivery of quality services. The strength of this vision is in the belief that participation increases agency and empowers disadvantaged people (Ife, 2002; Williams, 2004). In this case participation is both a democratic and empowering process and a means through which to increase accountability and responsibility of the government and communities.

This is evident in the way technocrats enacted structures (as elaborated in chapter six) to support community sensitization and “mobilization, advocacy, capacity building and training of members of [project coordination units], school [management] committees...boards [of governors] and parents-teachers associations” (GOK, 2002, p. 5-6). Through these structures and processes, technocrats aimed to empower communities to take greater roles in governance and to increase their participation in the live of society. By increasing participation, in the words of a technocrat, the BEIP was seen to affect social, economic, political and environmental marginalities:

“One of the key areas of focus...was to redress injustices of the past...to increase the participation in education of... marginalized groups particularly in city slums, pockets of poverty and ASALs” (Denise).

Technocrats in their testimonies also observed that by building classrooms, the BEIP promoted the right of education. Education, in the long-term helped to address other structural injustices (environmental, political, social and economic) that inhibited disadvantaged communities from fulfilling their educational rights and obligations. These injustices are also reflected in the way technocrats established selection criteria to ensure the BEIP impacted directly on class, poverty, culture and gender. The next section examines the criteria used to select disadvantaged communities, the process of selection and its linkage to the objectives and management structure.

### **Selecting Disadvantaged Communities**

As highlighted in chapter three, the criteria by which technocrats selected disadvantaged communities underscores key principles that are important to understanding the relationships of the BEIP objectives to the management structures, the policies technocrats created to enact these and the actual outcomes as detailed in later chapters. These principles are evident in the way technocrats established criteria to select disadvantaged communities where the BEIP would directly impact on poverty, active partnerships, participation, gender, culture, ownership and knowledge of rights. The chapter now looks more closely at these criteria.

#### **Criteria**

According to the project implementation manual (GOK, 2003b) technocrats selected schools from areas of high levels of poverty, but which are also highly populated. Interview data shows that the focus on poverty was meant to ensure that the selected schools were in dire need of infrastructural facilities (classrooms, water, sanitation and laboratories) so as to impact increase in enrolments, access to education, especially by girls, and promote better achievements in education. Lack of these physical facilities and

access to basic rights were thus indicators of poverty. As noted in the data educationists believed that schools lacked these physical facilities because the communities<sup>25</sup> meant to provide them were poor. Thus, by building physical facilities, the BEIP promoted the right of education and also affected other structural disadvantages caused by poverty in the selected schools and neighbourhoods.

The need to build the said physical facilities and to enable communities to maintain these facilities helps to explain the close relationship between the criteria established to facilitate participation, ownership and sustainability. To ensure ownership and sustainability, technocrats selected schools to support through the BEIP on condition that such schools were initiated through the action of communities. This criterion means that the BEIP targeted schools that had been built by communities, community based organisations (CBOs), self-help groups mainly, through the harambee processes referred to in the introduction to this thesis. These communities were also supposed to demonstrate active participation in the development of these schools prior to selection. Furthermore, “the schools must have potential for expansion to cater for a larger population, must be located within a cluster of schools with a view to spreading the benefits [and affect] gender participation. Community awareness of its needs” was also part of these criteria (GOK, 2003b, pp. 15,16). These criteria attest that technocrats appreciated the idea of change from below and that communities had *significant claims of ownership* to the schools even before the BEIP was implemented.

Nonetheless, the findings on the practices that the BEIP generated as detailed later to a great degree represent ‘disconnects’ between these objectives and Ife’s (2002) view of ownership and change from below. Empirical data show that in addition to the need to affect poverty, active participation and ownership, the BEIP was also designed to increase

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<sup>25</sup> Official documents (GOK, 2001a; 2003b; 2005b) acknowledge that through the harambee policy adopted by the GOK through sessional paper No. 10 of 1965 provision of educational facilities has largely remained in the hands of communities/parents.

participation of girls in education within communities whose cultures favoured boys as an educationist confirmed:

“There are areas where you want to implement the project but the users do not positively advocate for it because of their cultural aspect. There are areas where education is not taken to be a major thing [for]...girls. That is one of our key focus areas...Girls should come to school” (Antoinette).

Technocrats’ believed that poverty, as a cause and effect of economic change and lack of education, contributes to regional inequalities and accentuates disadvantages such as those based on gender and culture. This belief led technocrats to establish a *process* that would ensure *equitable* distribution of the BEIP benefits by selecting schools from among all ethnic communities and also from the poorest areas. This selection process is provided in the next sub-section as it established a disempowering beneficiary-to-benefactor relationship between the GOK/OPEC and the disadvantaged people as detailed when discussing partnerships and participation. It also sets the scene for understanding the limits and potentials of PDev methods that espouse microeconomic notions of ‘*equitable distribution of resources*’ to empower and socially transform disadvantaged people as detailed in later chapters.

## **Process**

The selection process was enacted in phases. As evident in documents and empirical data, technocrats based the selection criteria on the poverty indices of the national census of 1999 (GOK, 2003b). They first ranked districts into categories of high, medium and low income (agricultural) potentials. In each category, they selected schools from the poorest of the poor districts. These criteria have direct implications to the way the disadvantaged communities experienced the BEIP. The need to situate the BEIP in densely populated areas so as to better spread benefits of education, water and health is out of step with the need to affect poverty in marginalized ASALs. Here, communities are not only sparsely populated but are also nomadic pastoralists.

As detailed in later chapters, the idea of spreading benefits by using general selection criteria and guidelines *negated differences* (regional, socio-economic, class, cultural and gender) that are critical to the effective understanding of structural disadvantages and risked accentuating *social exclusion* rather than addressing it. As Sifuna (2005a; 2005b) suggests, these criteria risk accentuating inequalities because they are premised on distributing resources equitably where the more agriculturally potential and the already endowed areas benefit more than the less agriculturally potential areas. SMCs/PTAs/BOGs testimonies perceived the idea of spreading benefits equitably as contributing to dependence on the more agriculturally endowed areas while at a macro level it was seen to entrench perpetual dependence on external aid.

A contributing factor is that though the poverty indices effectively identified the poorest districts, these criteria could not adequately ensure that only the poorest schools were selected. As confirmed in this selection process, the poverty indices established poverty levels at the national and district scales but, not at the school level. This finding resonates with Pieterse (2002) in his assertion that aid development accentuates micro and macro level inequalities through its emphasis on change at a national scale. It also conforms to (Escobar, 1996) suggestions that since developmental methods of moving people up and down statistical charts have failed to adequately address poverty, alternatives which are not self-destructive, mechanistic and which treat people as people should be adopted. This is evident in the official policy on participation and collaboration (GOK, 2002; 2005a) and in the way technocrats who enacted and implemented the BEIP selection criteria either relied on secondary data or collaborated with their counterparts in the respective districts for information on the actual conditions of the schools. Official documents attest to this point by stating that:

“Due to the urgency for intervention, the ministry will not be able to carry out a national survey, but will instead use secondary data in selecting the schools to be assisted. This data will be obtained from DEOs [District Education Officers] in target districts who will be required to form district

selection committees for the purpose of selecting beneficiary schools (GOK, 2003b, p. 15).

This attempt to select schools without the active participation of communities as shown in this excerpt, established a beneficiary-to-benefactor relationship between these and the GOK/OPEC. In the selection criteria, communities are defined as poor. As we shall see in chapters five and six by describing communities as poor, technocrats represented disadvantaged communities as passive recipients of aid, decisions and policies, despite the requirement on them to participate and collaborate in enacting and implementing the BEIP. The relationships of partnerships and participation that emerged accentuated power and market shifts to the donor and risked further disempowering these communalities. This relationship as reflected in empirical data gathered from technocrats is also evident in the way district committees selected the schools as facilitated by the selection criteria where an educationist stated:

“We started by...identifying the schools we are giving [funds]...the district office identified the schools in consultation with the leaders of the local communities...The leaders had to be consulted to avoid this situation where somebody might be saying that this project was taken to the wrong place. This is not right...The leaders are the opinion of the [community] and were fully involved in the identification of the schools. Then after the schools were identified, we did go down to talk to the school management committees to bring them on board and to [let them] know what it is that was expected of them...parents were also brought on board” (Emmanuel).

According to technocrats, the selection criteria, the process of selection and collaboration with these district-based committees were seen to infuse fairness and equitable distribution of resources, particularly by attending to marginalities caused by environmental and geographical factors, poverty, gender and culture. As emphasized in the findings of this thesis (see chapters five, six and seven), bureaucracy, poverty, culture, gender and other environmental, economic and political factors contribute to inequalities and inhibit meaningful participation of the hitherto excluded, even when spaces for participation are provided. These together with the finding on dependence show that participatory approaches are not only disempowering but can potentially be used to

enhance social exclusion. Questions can thus be raised about the validity and viability of the broad PDev view (Arnstein, 1971; Ife, 2002) that the more powerful or economically endowed can cede/spread power to the less powerful.


While technocrats assumed structural and rights-based approaches to affect structural inequalities, their attempt to use secondary data (or representatives) to determine the type of intervention, its objectives, and to make decisions about who to involve in what activities and how, had a defining impact on the way the selected disadvantaged groups and individuals experienced the BEIP. When determining the objectives and selection criteria, technocrats did not consult the communities whose development the BEIP affected. This means that the communities neither initiated the BEIP nor participated in enacting the policies and decisions that they were meant to implement. As we shall see in chapter six, this separation of processes of planning and policy-making from implementation and monitoring and evaluation activities contributed to social exclusion and reduced benefits of ownership to the disadvantaged.

Such separation and exclusion arose partly from technocrats' top-down mindset and as evident in the following sequence of events. Technocrats first determined objectives, negotiated a loan with OPEC, established the criteria of selection and a management structure, consulted with political/local leaders in identifying the actual schools, informed the SMCs/PTAs/BOGs and finally the broader community of parents and school neighbourhoods. This idea of informing school communities of predetermined decisions so as to gain ownership and support emanated from the hierarchical management structures adopted to enact and implement the BEIP. The next section shows how the management structures, though meant to affect PDev and PDem through processes of decentralisation of decisions and functions, risked legitimating bureaucracy and its undemocratic practices while contributing to 'new centralism'.



## Management and Governance Structures

This section explores the management and governance structures of the BEIP to highlight their underpinning principles and how these features established the policy and practical context of the intervention. According to the implementation manual (GOK, 2003b, pp. 3-9) the GOK formed a national taskforce and committees (see figure 3) akin to the bureaucratic framework of the education sector to enact and implement the BEIP. As is the case in bureaucracies, the BEIP management committees stretch downwards (or outwards) from the national (or central) office of the ministry of education through the district tiers of educational administration to the school (or grassroots).



*Figure 3: Organization Chart of the BEIP (GOK, 2003b, p. 3)*

Orientations such as top-down (and by implication bottom-up) and ‘center-periphery’ to use Peet and Hartwick (1999) are critical to our understanding of technocrats and donor perspectives of mainstream PDev. These orientations resonate with bureaucracies where, as Ife (2002) contends, the aim is to concentrate power to the centre.

They have also obtained ‘capitalist’ notions in discourses of cooperation, partnerships, participation and empowerment, where a key aim is to disperse centralised power away from the centre to the grassroots. This expanded notion of bureaucracy is very important to our understanding of mainstream PDev management within the BEIP. Official documents (GOK, 2001a) indicate that development management through national taskforces and committees is not unique to the BEIP. Again, district education boards, school-based committees, boards and parents-teachers associations are typical. The ministry of education uses these to involve teachers, parents, students and broader communities in the implementation of policies and in planning and management of development programmes in schools.

As a policy requirement of all development interventions (GOK, 2005a; 2005b), technocrats decided to use these pre-existing structures to avoid duplication of services, functions and resources. Nonetheless, empirical data in this research show that technocrats tailored formation and functions of the management structures to suit the BEIP objectives, context and nature of the intervention as they perceived them. A key aim in this customization was to affect bureaucracy by generating democratic relationships through participation and collaboration (GOK, 2003b). Testimonies with technocrats support that technologies of participation and partnerships were also meant to support the decentralisation of power to grassroots and overcome the bureaucratic and undemocratic tendencies of the education system to which BEIP structures belonged:

“...when they said the money be taken to the schools through many channels, such as...the money would come from the donor through the Central Bank to the ministry, to district and to [school]. We sat back and said no. Let’s cut [down] on bureaucracy and have this money channelled directly to the school” (Antoinette).

This understanding of bureaucracy beyond the conventional organisational structure of the ministry of education to include the OPEC implicates four types of power that emerged in the BEIP: bureaucratic power which conformed to the organisational framework of the education system, technical expertise, corporate (or aid) power which emerged through the processes of participation and partnerships and the power(lessness) of poverty, which provide the basis for the former three. These four powers are critical to our understanding of PDev discourses of inclusion. Though meant to support the BEIP objectives of participation, partnerships and empowerment, the way technocrats formed the management structures, established a fertile ground for the emergence of these powers and the way they were experienced by those involved.

Technocrats' testimonies reveal that the organization of the management structures drew upon the belief that, by virtue of their positions and authority, senior bureaucrats were capable of effecting feasible relationships of management, collaboration and participation. An educationist confirmed this view by saying:

“To start with, we involved the key individuals and set up a structure...To ensure that the relationships are workable we got a representative from the very high cadre of individuals at the (re)design level. In every organization that we intended to use in OPEC, we started by having a national team...in [which] we involved the heads of various departments. Once you start by involving the heads and make them meet and interact...the next structure that we set was that of their *juniors*. So if the *seniors* have already accepted to interact with each other as stakeholders, their relationships are okay, then the juniors will follow, and this is what will trickle down to the lowest level...That is at schools...you still have the same relationships because it [the structure] is having support from the top level management” (Antoinette).

This belief that topmost bureaucrats affect the most workable relationships and the subsequent establishment of power binaries of ‘seniors’ and ‘juniors’ resonates with the development perspective that is to date dominating in bureaucracies. According to Ife (2002), this perspective holds that the most senior technocrats are most able to enact effective decisions and policies because they are the most knowledgeable and experienced. Arising from this view, the management structure could be seen to reinforce, not to

challenge bureaucracy and its undemocratic practices. The legitimation of bureaucracy is evident in the organization of the management structures. As shown in figure three, these management structures emphasized vertical relationships in theory and practice by placing the taskforce (political elites and senior technocrats) at the apex and SMCs/BOGs/PTAs at the base (GOK, 2003b, pp. 3-11).

As the data show, in practice, this means authority in the BEIP resided with these political and professional elites. In tandem with the need to affect empowerment (see chapter seven) and decentralization, the assumption is that these political elites are capable (and willing) to cede such authority to those lower down the hierarchy. For this reason, the organization of the management structures indicate flow of authority from these political elites downwards through the cadres of Education Secretary, directors of education and their assistants in the national and district tiers to the school.

This view that power resided with senior bureaucrats is also evident in the way the management structures defined horizontal relationships. Except SMCs/BOGs/PTAs, the taskforce and the national-district-based committees extend outwards away from the vertical line manifested in the centralised structure of the education sector. These national-district-based structures established the context and nature of the intervention as detailed in later sections through participation and partnerships. This does not mean SMCs/BOGs/PTAs were not meant to facilitate participation and collaboration. Instead it is to emphasise that technocrats' belief that power resided with the topmost bureaucrats was partly responsible for the emergence of decentralised centralism.

This way the management structure could also be seen to legitimate bureaucracy through the way technocrats defined who to participate and collaborate with and the roles these assigned to the selected groups and individuals. Starting with the national taskforce, the next subsection explores the formation and specific functions of these management structures. It argues that by retaining the decision-making authority with the topmost bureaucrats, technocrats created the context for new forms of centralism.

## National Taskforce

The national taskforce is the topmost management structure in the BEIP. According to documentary evidence (GOK, 2003b, pp. 3-11), members are drawn from the ministry of education and other sectors whose core functions relate to the project objectives. These include permanent secretaries of the ministries of education (chairmen), health, finance, planning, public works and housing (political elites). Other members from the ministry of education include the chief economist and chief finance officer, principle procurement officer, principle accounts controller, senior deputy director (planning and policy-formulation) and the project coordinator.

The composition of the national taskforce epitomised the earlier said view that the most senior bureaucrats are most experienced, knowledgeable and better able to effect workable networks of change for the selected disadvantaged people. Besides accentuating bureaucracy, the composition shows that the taskforce is the highest authority in decision-making because its members represented such authority in their respective areas of specialization. As part of this authority, the taskforce virtually made the most important decisions relating to policy, resources, planning and implementation of the BEIP. It approved work plans, budgets, disbursement of funds, monitored progress and advised on policy changes in the course of implementation.

This attempt to vest decision-making authority with the taskforce had a defining impact on the way the disadvantaged communities experienced the BEIP. It means that the management structure facilitated devolution of responsibilities (functions and services) from the taskforce to the structures lower down the hierarchy through partnerships and participation. As argued later in this chapter, such decentralization of responsibilities without authority to make decisions created *new centralism* by retaining control with the taskforce and excluding disadvantaged communities and their representatives from enacting the said decisions. How the new centralism was promulgated is described under

decentralization. First attention turns to the steering committee to which the taskforce delegated such decision-making authority.

### **Steering Committee**

The steering committee mainly consists of education professionals. These are the directors of education (including the director of quality assurance and standards) and senior deputy directors. Other members include representatives from ministry of education SAGAs<sup>26</sup> and bilateral organizations<sup>27</sup>. The steering committee guided in planning and advised on policy and cross-cutting development issues. It also coordinated training (or capacity-building) of members of the SMCs/BOGs/PTAs, the project planning team and project implementation units. Moreover, it advised on the selection of schools, and the establishment of reporting and community mobilization systems.

The steering committee is the organ through which multilateral donors collaborated with educationists and planners in enacting the BEIP. As detailed in chapter five, the steering committee negotiated the loan with OPEC. To meet donor interests in markets and technocrats' interests in aid, such negotiations established policies and conditions which negated contextual differences and excluded the disadvantaged communities from enacting such policies and decisions. Such conditions not only contributed to emergence of partnerships on competitive rather than cooperative relationships but also supported upward, not downward accountability.

These emerged because the steering committee depended on delegated decision-making authority from the taskforce. To enact its guidance roles, the steering committee mainly delegated functions and services to the project coordination unit. It however approved how the coordination unit enacted such services and functions. That means the steering committee made the final decisions. In practice then, there was a very fine line

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<sup>26</sup> Kenya Education Staff Institute, Kenya Institute for Special Education, Teachers Service Commission and Kenya Institute of Education.

<sup>27</sup> Kenya National Commission for UNESCO, UNESCO regional office.

between the steering committee and the taskforce. Their guidance, negotiation and collaborative roles in the BEIP and in the broader policies (SWAP) were perceived to facilitate power and market shifts away from the disadvantaged people to the donor. A contributing factor arose from the way these organs delegated decisions, functions, defined how the selected communities participated, and how collaboration with other sectors was facilitated through the project planning team.

### **Project Planning Team**


Similar to the national taskforce, members of the planning team represented core departments that the project aimed to impact on. These are SAGAs, policy formulation and projects, planning, quality assurance and standards, primary, secondary and special education. Its roles are not different from the steering committee except that it comprises middle level managers who had no authority to make decisions. Again, members were not permanently attached to the project. Instead, the project implementation unit liaised with the particular departments to request for staff when their services were needed. By drawing members from these departments, technocrats aimed to increase responsiveness of the BEIP to educational needs as construed in the represented departments and impact on partnerships and social networks across departments. As detailed in chapter five, the planning team supported elite-to-elite social networks across departments within the ministry of education through its roles.

The planning team played a significant role in developing the project implementation manual and training modules for SMCs/BOGs/PTAs. It also established the criteria used to identify participating schools. Through the guidance of the taskforce and steering committee, it established the policy that enacted the management structures of the project and the respective memberships. Besides establishing a reporting and evaluation systems, it also monitored and evaluated project activities as delegated by the structures higher up the hierarchy. Where the decision-making roles represented the

national taskforce and steering committee as one, coordination, facilitation and networking roles within the BEIP represented the project planning team as one with the project implementation unit.

### **Project Implementation Unit**

The roles of the project implementation unit were to administrator and coordinate BEIP activities. As shown in figure 4, it consisted of a project coordinator, a deputy project coordinator and three assistant coordinators.



*Figure 4: Management Structure of the PIU (GOK, 2003b, p. 9)*

The PIU also had a procurement, accountant and executive officers who were seconded from their respective departments to perform such duties when need arose. The functions of the assistant project coordinators were closely tied with the BEIP three main outcome areas: increasing access to primary and special education, secondary education and enhancing good governance in educational systems at the school, district and national tiers of development management. As part of the PIU coordination role, the project



coordinator was also a member of the national taskforce, steering committee and convenor of the planning team. The coordination role of the PIU is critical to our understanding of the potentials and pitfalls of PDev management through committees.

In practice the coordination unit convened all meetings involving implementation of the BEIP. Arguably then, and in bureaucratic terms, the PIU could be considered as the most important structure which ought to possess decision-making authority, not the taskforce and the steering committees. While in theory these topmost committees possessed decision-making authority, in practice, they only ‘approved’ plans and decisions as enacted by the PIU. It is no surprise the attempt to retain decision-making authority with the taskforce cemented bureaucratic power and limited effectiveness of the coordination role of the PIU where a technocrat said:

“Sometimes you make a schedule...for training school communities or monitoring. We may sit as PIU and plan and say we are going in March...by the time these schedules go through our bosses and come back to us, there will be another month gone...because they [schedules] have to pass through many offices. Then these [bosses] also have to know the kind of money there is for that activity... Sometimes we [were] planning for activities [without] involve[ing] the finance people. So when we tell them we have this programme and we need financial approval, they look at it like...well, is it in our budget? Was it planned for? Do we have this kind of money? ...sometimes I find that there has been some delays. [Yet], we must move as per schedule. We have been given three years and we have to complete the project. If we lose a month or two, it is going to affect the completion period” (Carla).

The failure to decentralize decision-making authority meant that the coordination functions of the PIU were subject to bureaucratic red-tape akin to the education system. Indeed, the establishment and roles of the PIU conform to Ife’s (2002) contention that centralised coordination of information is essential. However, the attempt to retain central *control* with the taskforce and steering committee based on the view that these organs were better able to make feasible decision and promote participatory and collaborative relationships is a contradiction of some sort. According to Ife networks are better managed, not at national but rather at local government and/or grassroots levels by the people themselves. A key role of the PIU was to coordinate horizontal collaboration across

educational departments and sectors of public works, housing, water and public health. It also facilitated downward delegation of functions to these departments and sectors through the formation of district implementation committees (regional office) and schools, the locale at which collaborating sectors offered technical expertise. It is no wonder the practices of partnerships and participation as detailed later in the thesis, limited cooperation while heightening competition. This partly arose from the way technocrats formed and assigned roles to the district implementation units.

### **District Implementation Committees**

District implementation committees derive their mandate from the legal framework of District Education Boards. Since their establishment in the 1950s, district education boards have over the years increased their role in overseeing educational development within districts. While the project used the services of district boards, technocrats established parallel committees to oversee BEIP implementation in the districts. Committee members included the District Education Officer (DEO) (Chairman), District Inspector of Schools (Secretary) and the most senior officials in areas of procurement, social development, public works, health, water engineering and school accounts. These advised, monitored and evaluated BEIP progress in the schools (GOK, 2003b). Technocrats' testimonies in this research also support these roles:

“We [PIU]...first formed the district technical teams. These involved the public works officer, the water engineer [and] coordinator of the project. The idea was that these people are actually acting as mediators. The DEO has a coordination role. So these are people who are given money to visit, like if you [SMC/BOG/PTA] are going to sink a borehole or build a water tank, you ask the coordinator, the water engineer and public works person to visit the area. In addition, they also take the health person. These are the people who kind of supervise the project in our [National-based structures] behalf. You know the parents are there [at school] on a daily basis...but [district committees] are people who come once a week or once in two weeks. So they actually come to see how is the work progressing? And they are able to come back to the headquarters if there is a hitch...If the parents are experiencing problems or are lacking technical know-how, they are the ones who advised them, ‘this is the way you need to move.’ So they have been very useful. I remember a case where a public works officer was coming from the Province because they could not get one from

the district. They wanted ....advice about how to go about it...we advised [them to] get a works officer from the Province” (Carla).

In addition to coordinating BEIP progress within their districts, district implementation committees also played a liaison role between SMCs/BOGs/PTAs and the PIU. These also provided technical expertise to the SMCs/PTAs/BOGs. Collaboration between the district and grassroots structures was meant to enhance the cooperation and creation of new social networks of change for the disadvantaged communities. As such, the GOK ensured that representation drew upon the sectors whose core functions related to the objectives of the BEIP. As detailed in chapter five and six the legitimacy of a management structure premised on technical expertise can be questioned on account that it limited cooperation, full participation and devalued knowledge of the disadvantaged communities whose development the BEIP affected.

### **Boards of Governors**

BOGs are established through the Education Act to assist in the management of secondary schools and primary and diploma teachers’ colleges (GOK, 2001a, p. 65). Members are appointed by the minister for education. Membership is changed every two years. Key stakeholders that must be represented in the boards include parents-teachers associations and school sponsor(s). Sponsors are typically religious or community-based organizations (GOK, 2005b). Board members are normally drawn from the local communities which build the schools, members of parliament, business people and old-boys’ and girls’ associations. Initially, schools drew board members from close proximity. However, as secondary schools became multicultural, management also became complex. This has come to mean that BOG members reside in rural and urban areas where these earn a living. This rural and urban dichotomy has cost implications to the BEIP. As detailed in chapter seven, it is also an essential element through which to understand how the BEIP affected knowledge of disadvantaged communities and inequalities of class, culture, gender and environment.

Meanwhile the GOK did not establish parallel boards in the target schools. It enacted a policy that required serving board members (chairman, headteacher (secretary), treasurer and chairman of PTA) to automatically assume management roles in the BEIP. To further tailor the BOG to the objectives of the BEIP, the GOK also prescribed additional members who were not necessarily board members. These are three science teachers, area chief/councillor and community/opinion leader. Such customization together with the legitimation of the BOG by the minister as detailed in chapter five encouraged upward, not downward accountability. Their management roles entailed identifying needs, implementing construction plans, managing project finances and contracts, monitoring progress, reporting and accounting for expenditure and sensitizing the communities (GOK, 2003b). The attempt by technocrats to strengthen upward accountability through these roles cut against the BEIP aim of enhancing downward answerability of the BOGs and PTAs/SMCs to the parents/communities.

### **Parents-Teachers Associations**

PTAs are the second arm in management of secondary schools. Like the boards, parents-teachers associations are not unique to the project. Documents describe PTAs in terms of “community representative organ with no ties to the ministry of education head office” (GOK, 2001a, p. 65). PTAs were initially established in the 1970s through a presidential proclamation. Their establishment is based on the view that secondary schools need to have a body representing the voice of parents and teachers outside the ministry of education and the BOGs. Again, parents and teachers interact with students and the community more closely than technocrats and board members. Indeed, parents and the community are the real owners of the schools. According to the harambee policy (GOK, 1965), initially, the role of PTAs was to raise funds for the construction of harambee (secondary) schools. However, because they lacked a legal basis, PTAs could not manage the funds they raised. Instead the BOGs assumed this role. This created a conflict of

interest, which led PTAs to demand to be represented in the BOGs so as to be able to monitor expenditure of their funds.

These demands have led the GOK to ratify the institution and role of PTAs in school management and planning through the Sessional Paper No. 1 of 2005 (GOK, 2005b). This policy has reinforced the participation of PTAs in BOGs, albeit through representatives. PTAs representatives provide checks and balances on the way BOGs implement school development plans and manage financial resources on behalf of parents. To avoid conflict of interests, in the BEIP technocrats used the BOGs in secondary school. To ensure parents-teachers' interests were valorised in the BEIP, the GOK prescribed representational positions for the sponsor, PTA chairman and science teachers in BOGs as a technocrat confirmed:

“We...have a PTA chairman [who is] representing the whole PTA. These people we keep telling them ‘go back among your people. Sell the idea about what is happening. It is not the project of OPEC...it is a project of the school. Let them [community] know so that they can own it...the BOGs [who are appointed by the minister], we go outside that body and take members of the PTA who are now the parents. So it is like all of them have been brought together. You have harmonized their efforts. BOGs are for management and PTAs are representatives of the parents. [PTAs] keep going back to their communities. When they have...parents and sports days they tell their friends the new developments in their schools” (Carla).

This distinction that PTAs are elected by the communities they represent, while BOGs are appointed by the minister has direct implications to the way the GOK defined the composition and functions of the management structures to satisfy the BEIP objectives. The point is that ideally PTAs were intended to represent the interests of wider communities of parents and school neighbourhoods. In practice, they were considered to be more legitimate compared to BOGs not least because communities/parents elect them but because the act of electing enhances legitimacy and responsibility of representatives. That is to say PTAs provided parents with a forum to exercise ‘voice’ and ‘choice’ through RDem and PDem as shown in the formation/functions of SMCs.

## School Management Committees

According to documents (GOK, 2005b), SMCs are established to oversee management of primary schools. Unlike BOGs, they are relatively free to run their institutions with little reference to the national education office. More often than not, they work with the Teachers Service Commission and the District Education office on matters of deployment of teachers and school development respectively. The BEIP operated within an existing legal framework of the SMCs (GOK, 2005b). As in the case of BOGs and PTAs, not all members assumed management roles in the project.

According to the terms of reference (GOK, 2003b), the BEIP targeted offices of the chairman, treasurer, headteacher, senior teacher, Area Education Officer and area chief/councillor/village elder. Their roles show in the data where a technocrat said:

“We have found SMCs very useful in financial management...these make sure that the money is used properly. They collaborate with the headteacher to see how the money is being used, what materials are being bought. In addition they also supervise. They come around to see how the structure [building] is coming up...OPEC is a project which is involved in construction of classrooms, sanitation and water facilities. So we have found these parents very useful in coming to supervise, making sure that what has been bought is being used properly and what they agreed in meetings is what is being implemented” (Carla).

These roles are similar to those of the BOGs. Unlike BOGs, SMC members are parents whose children are currently enrolled in their respective schools. Parents typically elect SMCs from a group of guardian-parents who oversee the interests of students belonging to the same class (year of study). A technocrat attested to the process of electing SMCs and the way it legitimates representational roles by saying:

“These are really representatives of the community...in the SMC...what we have done is... in every primary school...every class has representative parents. These end up forming the school committee. So if you are a parent representative of say standard one children, the chances that he is representing the wider group is very high because he was elected by the parents of that class and he is duty bound to report back to them on new development in his class or school as a whole. I found that very useful because you are telling a representative of that class...so these parents came together to elect their representative, so he is truly their representative...” (Carla).

The belief that the act of electing enhances legitimacy and responsibility of representatives is critical to our understanding of how the management structures facilitated democracy and its impact on partnerships, participation and empowerment.

### **Democracy**

As noted in empirical data, the way technocrats established the management structures and defined roles of representatives attest that the national-based, district-based and grassroots structures (SMCs/BOGs/PTAs) were meant to facilitate democratic processes, increase benefits of ownership, harmonisation of functions and services, and raise awareness of rights through advocacy, participation and partnerships. The project implementation manual (GOK, 2003b) shows that technocrats created committees at all tiers of administration to enable disadvantaged communities increase their role in management and governance. They also enacted policies to facilitate participation and collaboration of technocrats, OPEC and SMCS/BOGs/PTAs.

Ultimately these features would promote “transparency, decentralization, teamwork and performance-based management and accountability” (GOK, 2005a, p. xii). This way the management structures should be seen to establish the context through which to promote PDem. A critical component of PDem which the management structures aimed to facilitate is decentralisation. The next section demonstrates that despite attempts to decentralise functions and services the promotion of participation and collaboration through representatives led to ‘new centralism’.

### **Decentralisation**

This section explores the meanings and impact of decentralisation on PDem and how the management structure established the policy context for the PDev processes explored in later chapters. It builds on the view presented earlier that retaining decision-making with the taskforce contributed to *new centralism*. It argues that decentralising functions and services through a management structure in which disadvantaged people

participated and collaborated through representatives cut against the aim of enacting the BEIP through the active participation of the selected disadvantaged communities.

The way the management structures established the context and policy on decentralisation reduced benefits of PDem and had a defining impact on the way disadvantaged people experienced participation and partnerships. Decentralization was premised on the view that “decision-making is highly centralized at the ministry of education headquarters. [In relation to]...institutional management [decentralization meant] devolving decision-making and resources management to lower level... structures with the ministry of education [central office] maintaining general oversight and overall superintendence. [It also meant] allowing broad-based participation in the provision of education with all stakeholders taking responsibility for planning and implementation” (GOK, 2003b, pp. 5,6,9). As indicated in these meanings, decentralization aimed to satisfy PDem view that decision-making and functions should not be done at a more centralized level than is necessary (Ife, 2002).

Based on this view, the government established the said management structures to support devolution of functions, resources and services from the central office downwards through the district implementation committees and SMCs/BOGs/PTAs to disadvantaged communities. Along with these, the GOK established structures to support broad-based participation and partnerships. Here, decentralization involved sharing management, financial and implementation responsibilities amongst the government, OPEC and communities. The way financial responsibilities and resources were shared and the practices of partnerships and participation the management structures generated are considered in detail in chapters five and six.

Meanwhile, the need to retain control at the central office led to devolution of functions and obligations to collaborating technical experts, communities, and SMCs/BOGs/PTAs without authority to make decisions. This separation of decisions from functions and obligations (or planning and decision-making from implementation



processes) contributed to ‘new centralism’. New centralism also emerged because disadvantaged communities were meant to participate and collaborate in management of the BEIP and educational governance through representatives. Although these sensibilities resonate with RDem (Ife, 2002), practice shows that participation and collaboration through ‘invited’ rather than democratically ‘elected’ representatives delegitimises the management structure and contributes to decentralised centralism.

### ***RDem***

Management in the BEIP attest that RDem is the norm, not the option in mainstream PDev. RDem explains the contradictions of ‘elected’ and ‘invited’ representatives and the conspicuous invisible place of the donor and communities in the organization of the management structures. As shown in figure 3, technocrats aimed to affect hierarchical and horizontal relationships through participation and collaboration at the national, district and school tiers of educational management and governance. A key strength of these representational formations comes from intentions to enable disadvantaged communities to create social, political and economic networks of change. Ultimately, these networks were expected to enable disadvantaged people to overcome the social exclusionary effects of economic change, bureaucracy, poverty, illiteracy, gender and culture as stated before. Thus, the GOK aimed to reconstruct the place of communities to be able to control their own development by providing them with spaces to collaborate and participate in enacting and implementing the BEIP.

The reconstruction of the place of communities in development cannot be overemphasized considering that technocrats assumed the earlier stated structural and rights-based perspectives, and the principles of holism and balanced development where participation and partnerships are core components. A critical examination of how the management structures were meant to provide disadvantaged people with opportunities to reconstruct their own futures shows that technocrats either equated communities with committees or construed management as something communities access through

representatives. Paradoxically representation in management concealed the place of disadvantaged people whose lives the BEIP was meant to improve.

By so doing, technocrats relegated in management the role of active participation by these people. To concur with Brown (2004) such management where people participate through representatives could be more exclusionary than other forms of management. Disadvantaged people and SMCs/BOGs/PTAs were excluded from enacting the most important policies and decisions through which the BEIP evolved. Thus, participation in management through representatives is decentralised centralism.

### ***Participation as a form of Decentralised Centralism***

This section argues that the use of management structures that facilitated participation through representatives negated active participation and benefits of ownership to communities and SMCs/BOGs/PTAs. The GOK chose to enact management of the BEIP through representatives as opposed to more democratic forms of participation partly because of the vastness and contextual complexity of the BEIP. Such complexity is manifest in environmental, socio-cultural<sup>28</sup>, economic, institutional and stakeholders' diversity. When asked to comment on participation, an educationist attested to stakeholders and institutional diversity in the following ways:

“...the degree of being a stakeholder varies from one group to another. In the case of a school, the immediate stakeholders are the parents, teachers, the pupils, sponsor and the government...There is...SMC in primary schools and BOGs for secondary schools. These are representatives of the above people...when these are represented their views are the ones used to implement the project...the wider community is represented...We cannot have 1000 parents coming to make a decision in a school of 1000 kids. The SMC, represent them and they are the ones who selected the SMC and they have faith...that it is going to implement whatever they want...The belief we have is that in democracy, when you choose somebody, what he does, he does it for you. He/she should have consulted...before they say what they say” (Wamsha).

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<sup>28</sup> BEIP covered the 43 main cultures in Kenya since it was implemented in the 70 districts (or eight Provinces).

This finding resonates with Ife's (2002) argument that RDem is preferable in large organizations because even in small organizations not all members can actively participate. That notwithstanding, representatives must be democratically legitimated by the communities they represent, not by some other authority because democracy entails giving people choices and freedoms. Technocrats assumed that legitimation in the BEIP involved conferment of power onto SMCs/BOGs/PTAs to act on behalf of the communities these represented either through election or consultation processes. As said before, SMCs/BOGs/PTAs are normally taken to represent the interests of parents and communities because these elect them. The problem is that parents did not choose the representatives who took up management roles in the BEIP.

Instead, technocrats tailored representation in the taskforce, national-district-based committees and SMCs/BOGs/PTAs to suit the BEIP objectives as detailed later, through processes of 'inclusion by invitation'. Such customisation and harmonisation by prescribing representatives, though well intentioned, paradoxically reduced legitimacy of the management structure, benefits of ownership and downward accountability (see chapter five) to the disadvantaged people. Legitimacy of the management structures to act and speak on behalf of disadvantaged people can be questioned because the representatives were neither democratically elected, nor were their roles authenticated through the active participation of disadvantaged communities.

The issue on legitimacy of representatives arose in the data in response to the question *how did you experience representation in the BEIP?* An educationist stated:

"I think...representation...has become kind of traditional, that what they say or what is passed at that [national] level is [taken to be] the views of everyone else. In practice that is not so. [we appoint the representatives]...But this representative should not become an authority unto himself/herself. This is a person who is going to represent the views of [communities] ...After representing the views he/she should come back and give feedback to the community because that is what lacks in most cases or consult with the wider community" (Emmanuel).

Such practice as detailed in later chapters attest (Ife, 2002) that much of pluralists' and elitists' approaches to PDev ultimately succumbs to neoliberalism and are more likely

to legitimate the status quo rather than challenge dehumanising and colonising practices that are currently dominating aid development interventions. It also confirms that RDem entails transference of power and authority from citizenry to representatives. Contrary to PDem, representation increases individual power, not collective power to make decisions. As noted representatives failed to consult the communities who elected them and tended to speak their own ideas. They also did not give feedback to communities. These practices underscore the view that democratic processes of legitimation define the authority to whom representatives answer.

Representation is a form of new centralism because the practices of participation and partnerships encouraged upward accountability while negating government responsibility to the people (see chapter five) partly because the management structures facilitated such practices. These findings attest that where communities elect their own representatives through democratic processes their responsibility to ensure that representatives answer to them is increased because they hold the power to delegitimize representatives who do not fulfil their obligations. While the role of participation is to increase such power (Ife, 2002), the GOK attempt to decentralize decisions, services and functions through representatives, negated active participation of communities and their power to enforce the responsibility of representatives to them. Paradoxically, empirical data show that representation was meant to facilitate benefits of consensus-building in decisions.

### ***Consensus-building***

According to an educationist, technocrats chose to enact the BEIP through representatives because, in their view it is much easier to attain consensus-building in decision-making in this way rather than using more direct forms of participation:

“My experience is that consensus becomes difficult when participants are many. If you are to call a school of 700 children you may have 500-600 parents. If you are to call these 600 parents to come and decide whether to build a toilet or to build a class or administration block, it will be more

difficulty to reach consensus. And at the end of the day, you may not agree on anything because the views are as varied as the numbers. But when you reduce the people by representation at least you are now drawing towards consensus” (Wamsha).

Consensus-building is an important element of deliberative democracy and cooperative decision-making (Ife, 2002) that technocrats aimed to achieve through the policies of needs assessment (see chapter six). Nonetheless, as detailed in chapters five and six this idea of reducing the number of participants and their multiple views through representation negated the aim of enabling the BEIP and its partnerships through the active participation of communities (or their representatives). Technocrats were not unaware of the deleterious effects of representation. Despite awareness that participation is a democratic right, and that more direct forms of participation increased benefits of consensus-building, technocrats chose to use representatives to save time:

“I think representation is about democracy. Even in the political arena, when you elect a member of parliament, he’s supposed...to represent your interest...but what he does in parliament is a different story...the same can be argued in these other areas...but the idea of representation is noble in the sense that we cannot all take part in certain things [management]...a lot is wrong with representation. The bigger the consultation the better normally, but again, we are constrained by time, and all those things. How we can get out of that is an issue. When I am elected as a representative I stand for corporate benefits but what we see many times are individual benefits. The whole issue of representation is digressed because I am there on my own now, not on behalf on the people” (Duncan).

This finding concurs with critics (Cook & Kothari, 2001) who argue that in the name of consensus-building decisions in mainstream PDev are rushed to satisfy donor demands and personal interests (see chapter six). The next section shows that the reduction of the democratic right of participation (PDem) into representational roles which increased individual, not collective power, diminished benefits of ownership.

### ***Ownership***

The promotion of participation and partnerships through representatives cut against ownership and decisions, participation and freedoms of SMCs/BOGs/PTAs and

disadvantaged communities. SMCs/BOGs/PTAs testimonies show that representation limited rights, freedoms and benefits of ownership in the following ways:

“...as a stakeholder...my [headteacher] view is that, even if we were represented, it is like our participation was minimal because after the representation, there were particular guidelines that were laid out as per how the project is to be implemented...Even if we would like to voice our views, these guidelines, sort of limit us. We get limited because we are told this is what you should do in the implementation of this particular project” (Benjamin).

Ownership entails control of decisions, resources and processes by owners of development (or disadvantaged communities) (Ife, 2002). This was not the case in the BEIP. Representation is not only a form of new centralism but as detailed in later chapters, a mechanism of domination and exclusion. Empirical data on awareness-creation and capacity-building attest that, functions on construction of classrooms and laboratories were meant to be devolved to SMCs/BOGs/PTAs along with authority to vary technocrats’ decisions to suit geographical and other contextual factors. However, technocrats enacted the BEIP without active participation of disadvantaged communities. The structures and decisions technocrats made also impacted practices of participation and partnerships in ways that cancelled contextual and environmental differences. For example, the ceiling costs that defined the total amount of aid each school community was entitled to, limited freedoms and alternative choices of SMCs/BOGs/PTAs and the advisory roles of engineers who offered technical expertise on constructions:

“The public works officers were supposed to guide us in working out the bill of quantities. Again, they were restricted to the ceiling costs and the amounts allocated for that project. So even if they would work out the BQ and recommend this is it, they could not move out of that ceiling...ideally all projects wherever they are located they were put on the same cost index. So there is little that we can do about it. We were guided and fixed within that bracket” (Hamish).

These guidelines were perceived to impact ‘universalising’ effects where they negated contextual differences. As such representation is a form of new centralism because it excluded SMC/BOGs/PTAs and the communities from enacting the BEIP and devalued local potentials/knowledge (chapters five and six) and left inequalities of gender, class,

poverty and culture unaltered (chapter seven). Despite the need to affect bureaucracy and its undemocratic practices, participation and partnerships through representation turned out to be a mechanism for reinforcing the status quo through practices of domination or coercion. The way technocrats dictated resources and methods of participation is recorded where an educationist indirectly admitted:

“There is a lot of participation of the community...After we come up with what we want to do and that one is determined by the donor and the government. Then the means and ways of implementing what is to be done is actually done by the stakeholders...For example...when OPEC and the government decided to construct five schools in every district. From there the government had no more say. It only dictated the budget: that the budget is 2.1 million for every school...from there we trained the headteachers, the sponsors and accountants so that they can know how to handle the project. From there the ministry has been relying on the same stakeholders to implement the project. I think we are doing well. All were involved no body can say this project belongs to the government or to OPEC. Apart from the money only, the other bits come from the stakeholders [parents/communities]. There are a few things like the plan, the sketch, the specifications which have to be controlled by the government...but you see stakeholders cannot provide that. But when it comes to the real work, it is the community” (Wamsha).

This subtle language of ‘stakeholders’ and ‘all were involved’ when only representatives participated show that representation is a form of new centralism because as is the case with neoliberalism (Ife, 2002) it concealed power differences (chapter six) and legitimated opposition. The legitimating role of representation was recorded where an educationist observed that SMCs tended to lose their critical advantage once they began to enact their management roles:

“It is funny because the SMC has been selected by the same parents but to some extent sometimes they feel as if they are part of the school administration, they are not representing them [parents]. I don’t know how that one develops but my experience is that at some point you hear some parents accusing the same SMC for rallying together with the school administration, which should not be the case...[the wider community now hold representatives] with suspicion as if they are not representing their views” (Wamsha).

This idea of representatives ‘rallying together’ with ideologies which they hitherto ought to challenge underscores two competing principles of representation: cooperation and competition. According to Ife (2002) governments and change agents should facilitate

democracy by enacting policies and methods that support cooperation, not the competitive ethic that is to date dominating development. As confirmed here many technocrats viewed the institutions of SMC and school administration as two competing, not cooperating entities. This reading of SMCs/BOGs/PTAs and the communities they represented meant that representation was expected to diffuse competition by reducing the number of participants who undertook management roles.

Ultimately, this was seen to generate cooperation and consensus-building in decision-making by reducing multiple views that would arise were they to use direct forms of participation. It is no wonder then, SMCs/BOGs/PTAs lost their critical advantage and began to support the practices which they hitherto ought to have challenged. As a result, parents became suspicious of SMC/BOG/PTAs intentions and thereby passive participants in decision-making. As confirmed in what an educationist termed a 3-mans-show, participation through representatives evolved into new centralism:

“[during] the implementation...The SMC, in the schools I have visited... has become a three mans show. It is drifting from the whole committee...to...few people: the headteacher [secretary], the chairman of the school [committee, who is also] the chairman of the tendering committee...[and the treasurer]...The other members of the committee)...claim to be aware and to be involved but in the real sense the real involvement in very minimal...[the wider community involvement] is [also] minimal [in making decisions]...in terms of implementation, supervision and any other issue to do with what is being implemented” (Wamsha).

It is no surprise that parents perceived SMCs/BOGs/PTAs to be lacking in their collective synergy to speak in their behalf. New centralism also arose from the principles and approaches used to support development cooperation and partnerships. As detailed in chapter five, aid assistance, technical expertise and representation led to the emergence of elite-to-elite networks in which the disadvantaged people were excluded. That means ‘inclusion by invitation’ through which technocrats recruited representatives was also responsible for emergence of new forms of centralism.



### ***Inclusion by Invitation***

As detailed in chapter five, technical expertise, representation and aid assistance underpinned the decision of technocrats about who to include in the BEIP partnerships. These components represent ‘inclusion by invitation’, not PDem. Inclusion by invitation means that only those who offered aid assistance, technical expertise and were assigned representational roles in the management structure were directly involved. The practices of participation, cooperation and partnerships that arose reinforced bureaucracy and its undemocratic practices where a technocrat said:

“Sometimes it [bureaucracy] can hinder in the sense that if you are to discuss something, it is not like they [taskforce, steering committee, donor] have all the time to sit with you [PIU] and discuss. May be they are out on a meeting... [or] there are certain things they want to be explained or harmonized. By the time that information reaches you so that you can go back, may be another week is gone” (Carla).

As shown in later chapters, bureaucracy is a significant inhibitor to cooperation, participation and empowerment. When asked to reflect on an ideal structure that would help reduce such delays and red-tapes, technocrats and SMCs/BOGs/PTAs expressed the desire for shorter bureaucracy with fewer management structures at the national office. Their testimonies concurred with policy documents (GOK, 2005a; 2005b) in suggesting decentralization of decisions to implementation units that dealt directly with the disadvantaged communities. Paradoxically, though acknowledging the deleterious effects of bureaucracy, some technocrats did not see the need to decentralize decision-making power further down beyond the project coordinator to the districts or the school-based structures. A key problem arose from technocrats’ view of bureaucracy as only important in development management inasmuch as it hindered cooperation and delayed project activities, not in limiting rights (self-determination) and freedoms (association) which were core concerns for SMCs/BOGs/PTAs and some district implementation units. Their suggestions were still forms of centralism. A parent/BOG member illuminated this riddle on new centralism when she said:

“When you talk about the GOK, I think participation is far from anything...people in the line ministries...don’t seem to understand participation. They are operating in a structure that is so *top-down*, that the new concept cannot be conceptualized. All of them are getting directives from above. To go and sit with the community and tell them to participate to come up with anything, it is completely abstract ideas based on their context...While many people in the mainstream government and NGO world will basically say participation in good, the practice of participation is quite far from...reality. NGO world have a better understanding of it but for their own selfish reasons, and for the fact that very few want to share *power*, where it means let us all with the *beneficiaries* have same knowledge in everything, share the knowledge/the information concerning the project so that they can make informed decisions, they don’t want that...but then the government...is even further because even the awareness and the context does not embrace participation” (Sundukia).

These findings confirm dependency criticisms that government-donor-led [participatory] development slips into neoliberalism since it cannot shed off its modernist past (Manzo, 1991). The bureaucratic context in which the BEIP was enacted either blinded technocrats to understanding how a management structure premised on the relationships of seniors and juniors inhibited their own effective understanding of participation and reinforced domination and exclusion through politics of ‘inclusion by invitation’. Again, their proclivities towards RDem reinforced top-down mindsets which limited the benefits of PDem. As detailed in later chapters, representation, technical expertise and aid assistance as established in the management structures obscured benefits empowerment and social change to disadvantaged people.

### **Conclusion**

This chapter has argued that the management structure through which the BEIP was enacted had a defining impact on the way the people involved experienced and perceived PDev and PDem. Key strengths of the BEIP structures emerged through the used of holistic, balanced, structural and rights-based perspectives. The integration of participation and partnerships into objectives with a view to increasing democratic practices and reducing the exclusionary effects of bureaucracy, poverty, culture and gender maintained, focus on empowering disadvantaged people to control their own futures.

However, the use of a management structure in which disadvantaged people participated and collaborated through representatives reduced the benefits of PDem and led to the emergence of new centralism. Questions can thus be raised about the extent to which partnerships and participation enhanced empowerment, sustainability and social change to the disadvantaged people. The next chapter examines the extent to which the BEIP enhanced the formation of partnerships on 'equal bases' and their impact on accountability.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION, PARTNERSHIPS AND ACCOUNTABILITY

#### Introduction

As established in the previous chapter, the GOK created representative committees at the national, district and school levels to increase the role of disadvantaged people in educational governance and management through participation and collaboration. The view is that collaboration and participation provide spaces for disadvantaged people to form durable socio-economic and political networks through which to overcome the structural and rights deficits earmarked for change in the BEIP. This chapter critically examines the extent to which the policies, approaches and principles used to facilitate collaboration enhanced development cooperation, partnerships and accountability. In exploring these questions, it draws upon policy documents and empirical data to offer a critique of the efficacy of the BEIP to create opportunities for disadvantaged communities to influence the structures that govern their lives. The chapter argues that partnerships premised on the need to maximize aid benefits through representation and technical expertise encourage *power* and *market* shifts away from disadvantaged communities to the donor.

The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section one looks at the policies, aims, approaches and principles used to create partnerships in the BEIP. The central argument is that partnerships drew upon market principles of redistributing costs among stakeholders to maximize benefits of aid to the poor. Besides negating benefits of equal partnerships, these principles contributed to the emergence of aid and technical expertise as potential powers of either domination or exclusion. Section two interrogates processes of collaboration in planning, implementation and monitoring and evaluation activities to establish the nature and impact of the emergent partnerships and social networks on cooperation and accountability. Here, it is argued that the partnerships generated through representation, aid assistance and technical expertise reproduced elite-to-elite networks, enhanced

competition, not cooperation, and facilitated upward, not downward accountability. Finally, it summarises key points.

### **Principles of Development Cooperation and Partnerships**

The central argument in this section is that the principles used to promote development cooperation and partnerships drew upon a microeconomic view premised on the need to maximize benefits of aid so as to spread surplus (savings) to cater for deficits in other areas (as is the case in market principles of maximizing profits through competition and redistributing surplus through a trickle down effect). The way technocrats promoted development cooperation and established partnerships through the sector wide approaches to planning (SWAP) policy (GOK, 2005a; 2005b) to bring interests of donors and technocrats into closer alignment with interests of disadvantaged people, testify to this point.

Documents (GOK, 2002, 2003b) indicate that the BEIP was implemented through a government partnership involving the ministry of education, OPEC and the selected school communities. As said before, partnerships were meant to increase democratic practice and reduce bureaucratic red-tape and the risks of middle men utilising the funds generated through the BEIP partnerships. The organization of the management structure depicted OPEC as an entity external to the education system. Nonetheless, the expanded notion of bureaucracy beyond organisational and national territorial boundaries to include international development cooperation underpins the aid delivery system through which the BEIP was enacted. It sets OPEC as a core stakeholder in the BEIP partnership together with GOK (technocrats, technical experts) and SMCs/BOGs/PTAs. The selected disadvantaged communities were believed to access aid assistance through *representation* by these actors (GOK, 2003b; 2005a).

The current impetus on partnerships in the education sector comes from the policy on SWAP (GOK, 2005a; 2005b). A SWAP is “a process of engaging all stakeholders in

order to attain national ownership, alignment of objectives, harmonization of procedures and approaches and a coherent financing arrangement. [It] involves broad stakeholders' consultations in designing a coherent and rationalized sector programme at micro, meso and macro levels [school, district, national] and the establishment of strong coordination mechanisms among donors and between donors and the government" (p. iii). SWAP requires stakeholders to consolidate resources into one 'basket' to enable the GOK to better perform its coordination and facilitation roles.

Therefore, SWAP underpinned the aims, meanings and processes for creating and promoting partnerships, cooperation and networking with other projects (or organisations) that shared objectives with the BEIP. Empirical data shows that the SWAP idea of pooling resources into one basket also resonated with indigenous and harambee practices of partnerships and participation. While the data recorded variations according to communities and cultural practices, as a component of development cooperation, from the perspectives of technocrats and SMCs/BOGs/PTAs, pooling resources meant contributing human and physical capitals, in kind and material to assist families and communities address the earlier stated structural and rights challenges.

Culturally, this notion of partnerships varied according to the communities but mainly echoed PDev practices of CBOs, women's groups and other self-help groups (Chambers, 2005). Interview data attested that while the idea of SWAP echoed harambee and indigenous principles of participation and partnerships, integrating such ideals in policies expanded the practice from family/village/community to national and international spheres. The KESSP was enacted through SWAP and all its 23 programmes, including the infrastructural programme ought to integrate such processes.

The infrastructural programme is a conglomeration of projects which the GOK is implementing in partnership<sup>29</sup> with multilateral and bilateral donors, private sector, media

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<sup>29</sup>The infrastructure support for North Eastern Province primary schools funded by GOK/USAID; Arid lands Resource Management Project funded by GOK/World Bank;

and civil society (community, NGOs and religious organizations). As one of these projects, the BEIP is central to the KESSP partnerships. Although at the time the SWAP policy came into force, implementation was already underway, documentary and empirical evidence support the view that technocrats encouraged *collaboration* and *networking* between the BEIP and these broader partnerships.

The BEIP cooperative approaches also drew upon the economic development policy of PRSP and ERS. These sensibilities aimed to balance global and local perspectives of cooperation and partnerships. They conformed to Klees' (2001, citing Buchert, 1999; Harold & Associates, 1995; Jones, 2000) view that a genuine SWAP must "...be sector wide; based on a clear and coherent policy framework; local stakeholders are supposed to be fully in charge; all main donors must agree to it; implementation must be developed jointly; and it should depend on local capacity, not technical assistance" (p. 112). It can thus be asked to what extent the practice of development cooperation and partnerships in *planning* the BEIP satisfied these criteria.

Contrary to the cultural practices of participation and partnerships that were people-centered, the whole idea of 'pooling resources into one basket' in SWAP redefined these features in ways the led technocrats to focus more on aid assistance rather than local capacities. Pooling resources was taken to mean harmonized functions and services through creating strategies of collaboration and participation. It also meant reduced duplication (or equitable distribution) of resources and services as shown in the way technocrats enacted structures to support partnerships, participation and networking with like-minded sectors of the ministries of public works, health, housing and water. The view is that partnerships and participation creates new socio-economic and political networks of cooperation. This satisfied the broad PDev view that governments should create 'political spaces' for the hitherto excluded to participate and collaborate (Cornwall, 2004). It also conformed to Ife's (2002) view that as an essential component of empowerment and social

change, cooperation enables disadvantaged people to influence structures that govern their lives.

An examination of the process of collaboration, revealed that the steering committee and PIU, held progressive discussions with SAGAs of the ministry of education and UNESCO (GOK, 2002). These initial discussions developed the project proposal to mobilize resources to meet the structural and rights deficits of disadvantaged school communities identified before. By developing the proposal through which they fundraised to support the BEIP, technocrats also determined the needs and ways in which communities needed to collaborate and participate. Although this practice appeared to satisfy SWAP criteria that ‘local stakeholders must be *fully* in control’, it contradicted principles of change from below (see chapter six).

It excluded disadvantaged people and SMCs/BOGs/PTAs from enacting such plans and decisions. Such exclusion is also evident in the next genre of negotiations that involved ministries of education and finance (national taskforce) and OPEC. Evidence from the project loan agreement and proposal (GOK, 2002, p. 6) show that these negotiations established the BEIP partnerships and nature of intervention by defining the collaborative processes, roles of the donor, technocrats and SMCs/BOGs/PTAs. To clarify this point, a technocrat was quoted saying:

“We [technocrats] have given them [OPEC] our proposal. They have accepted and are willing to fund the construction of those facilities [classrooms, water tanks, toilets] to the tune of 2 million per school...the donor[s]’ role is...giving the financial [assistance] and...the conditions on how that money should be used. So we discuss together and see if those conditions are applicable. So their role really is to hear from us and we also listen to them. They say this is the amount of money. We say the best way we can...administer this money is...They may also have their own suggestions. For example, when we started OPEC, they were wondering whether we should have a district tendering or school community tendering process. We discussed together and came to an agreement that tendering should be done at the school level. So their role is to give financial aid and also advice...we share ideas about how the money should be administered” (Carla).



The chapter will return to these conditionalities later. Given failures of previous aid projects to achieve *sustainability*, it was established that the BEIP would be implemented through the active participation and collaboration of the donor, school communities and technocrats. Here, development cooperation and partnership meant sharing management and financial responsibilities across the key stakeholders (GOK, 2003b, pp. 3-11). When asked to reflect on the nature of cooperation in the negotiations which enacted the decisions to enact the BEIP through partnerships a headteacher said:

“I [headteacher] think in the first stage, they [technocrats]...initiated the idea of bringing stakeholders together to get engaged...they prepared project documents...the plan the project was to take according to the *test* not only of the ministry [education] but also of the donor [including] signing the agreement with the donor” (Benjamin).

This privileging of personal and organisational interests in aid and markets question the viability of the broad PDev assumption that technocrats, donors and civil societies *represent interests* of disadvantaged people (Ife, 2002). The use of technocrats, political elites and technical experts to promote creation of partnerships confirm criticisms that government-donor-led development equates the nation-state with the political subject (Manzo, 1991). Although the disadvantaged did not take part in these negotiations, technocrats assumed that their interests and those of political elites, donors and technical experts were *synonymous and represented* those of disadvantaged people. Yet, as a component of deliberative democracy, the aim of cooperation and collaboration is to decentralize services and decisions from the central office to the grassroots through active participation. Although as caretakers of citizens needs and services (Ife, 2002) technocrats could be seen to act in the interests of disadvantaged people, their attempt to negotiate the BEIP and to determine ways of participation and partnerships meant that the interests of disadvantaged communities and SMCs/BOGs/PTAs were not adequately addressed. This practice negated creation of partnerships on an equal basis and led to the emergence of aid as a form of power.

## **Aid as Power**

This section offers critique to the BEIP partnerships. It explores the themes of ‘partnerships as sharing responsibilities’ and ‘partnerships (and participation) as conditionality’. The central argument is that technocrats view of ‘partnerships as sharing responsibilities’ or redistributing costs of education to the donors and communities privileged aid assistance over local potentials. Such a view risked accentuating power and market shifts away from disadvantaged communities to the donor as the processes of sharing responsibilities testify.

### ***Sharing Responsibilities***

The idea in this sub-section is that the GOK aimed to strengthen aid partnerships to reduce expenditure on the part of the government and citizenry. This is supported in the roles assigned to the donor, government and the disadvantaged communities. According to the project proposal (GOK, 2002) the total cost of the BEIP was US \$ 15 million. This cost was shared between OPEC (Fund) \$ US 13.7 million (90%) and the Republic of Kenya (borrower) US \$ 1.3 million (10%). According to the agreement, the OPEC Fund was advanced as a loan at an interest rate of 1% per annum on the principle amount of the loan withdrawn and outstanding from time to time.

It could not be clearly established from documents and empirical data the estimated or actual costs communities incurred. Albeit, there is consensus that communities contributed physical and human capital to increase efficiency and cost-effectiveness.

Describing parents’ roles in the BEIP partnership, an educationist said:

“The parents participate mainly in terms of provision of labour, local materials used for construction, supply water for construction and bring food as part of the labour so that they can cut costs. The costs that go under these could be utilized by the community [to meet other school needs]...even in the area of supervision...they supervise the project, offer security so that no one tampers with it, among other areas depending on the project tenure” (Mapya).

Such contribution is supported through the policy on participation where the selected school communities were considered to be poor (lacked monetary capital). For this reason, communities needed not contribute monies towards the project. All that was required of these communities to complete their part of the partnership was to participate (contribute physical and human capitals) to sustain the project. These views were recorded where a technocrat commented SMCs/BOGs/PTAs by saying:

“I am impressed by the way they [SMCs/BOGS/PTAs] really appreciate their role. They are not even telling parents to bring any money. They [parents] are actually being told there is money coming. The only thing we [technocrats] are asking from them is sustainability of the project... many parents have been very positive” (Carla).

The assumption is that cooperation between the GOK, donor and communities facilitates the creation of partnerships on an equal basis through which to address the poverty and financial challenges of these disadvantaged communities (GOK, 2005a) in sustainable ways. The durability of this partnership arranged can nonetheless be questioned. Indeed the decision by technocrats to ask communities to participate, but not in terms of money, redefined poverty as lack of money. This means that aid partnerships are meant to alleviate poverty by reducing costs on the part of the government and the citizenry. The paradox is that partnerships anchored on the need to maximize aid benefits could be seen to negate government responsibilities while loading the same on communities through participation (see chapter six). This point is recorded in official documents in the view that “education is expensive and the government needs to strengthen partnerships and collaboration with other partners to lessen its burden [and]...to help reduce the public financing burden” (GOK, 2003b, pp. 47, 83). Community participation was also meant to cut down on costs and spread benefits of the surplus to other areas of need as an educationist asserted:

“I would like to look at the OPEC project in two levels. The secondary level where they were constructing and equipping laboratories... there will be a positive input in academics because in that particular school, we would expect improvement in performance in sciences. That is first. Two [is] the resources allocation. The schools that benefited from [project] resources, they will now allocate the resources they would have used in

the construction of a laboratory to the improvement of other areas. This one [aid] now will ease the burden of the parents because they...are the ones who would have shouldered the burden of constructing and equipping that laboratory...Secondly, as we have captured in the secondary section, [in primary schools] the burden that would have been born by the parents has somehow been relieved in a way that they can now shift to other areas” (Emmanuel).

The problem with partnerships where the aim is to maximize aid benefits through market principles of redistribution is that it contradicts principles of PDem. Such partnerships accentuate the vulnerability of disadvantaged communities and encourage power and market shifts to the donor where the educationist said:

“The donor decides the financial package and who to administer it...My experience of partnerships in the OPEC project is that ‘he who pays the piper calls the tune’. Well, this is expected to fade away since we have started SWAPs in KESSP, where emphasis is on programmes...not projects. SWAP is allowing stakeholders to participate as equal partners. The challenge...is that some donors do not want to pool resources together...They don’t want to relinquish their faces... they want to be heard...they do not want to loose their voice or power” (Emmanuel).

This finding attests to power and control relationships within the BEIP partnerships. While the SWAP policy was claimed to encourage partnerships on an equal basis, the negotiation processes that established the BEIP enacted conditions that negated formation of partnerships on an equal basis. The next subsection examines the negotiation process to highlight the conditions the donor and GOK enacted.

### ***Conditionalities***

This subsection argues that negotiations by the GOK and OPEC established *conditionalities* (or structures) that negated equal partnerships while increasing power and market shifts to the already powerful. As said before, the GOK in collaboration with the donor established cost ceilings (the amount of aid assistance) for each school. They also agreed to the formation of school-based tendering committees and established procedures of contracting and procuring goods and services/labour through competitive bidding that these committees would use. The data with an educationist further attest to the processes of

negotiation, nature of intervention, contexts, conditions, policies and processes of collaboration in the following ways:

“One thing I admit with OPEC is that it [loan] was negotiable. They allowed negotiation and renegotiation...I realise there is no decision which OPEC came forth with, which was not giving an opportunity for understanding. We sat quite a number of times to review the Aid Memoir. Through it, I realised that some of the things which were in the agreement were revisited to make them workable. For instance, there was this time they [OPEC] wanted to send the money and they wanted that money to come in lump sum. We said no. We want a revolving fund. That is, money sent to the Central Bank we use. When it is over, then they replenish what we have used. Those were renegotiations...I also remember they had wished that when it comes to reporting back or giving feedback to the donor [accountability], they had said we make a report for the whole country once. We said no. It has to be in phases. Another better example is when it came to contractors. They had wanted us to get one contractor for all the schools in the country. We sat down and said no. We cannot afford to risk with one contractor. Let each school manage their own contractor. All those things were renegotiated. Despite all these, I think OPEC was quite good because they allowed room for renegotiation” (Antoinette).

Core strength of these negotiations came from the technocrats’ belief that management of resources is best done at grassroots. Through these negotiations, technocrats established policies and guidelines with a view to affecting decentralization of services and functions from the national office to the grassroots. As said before, such decentralisation occurred through participation and collaboration through representatives. These features were meant to facilitate the creation of social networks and enhance government accountability and SMCs/BOGs/PTAs responsibility to the broader disadvantaged communities/parents. For these reasons, technocrats-donor established an accountability and quarterly reporting system that necessitated implementation of the BEIP in phases, disbursement of funds in instalments to match the revolving fund system and other terms of reference as outlined in the Aid Memoir, loan agreement and contracting-procurement-tendering through competitive bidding.

As detailed under accountability, the government could be seen to encourage development managerialism rather than governance (Ife, 2002). Meanwhile the practice of negotiation negated the formation of partnerships on an equal basis where an educationist

reflecting on such negotiations observed that contrary to many donors who are typically inflexible, OPEC was flexible because the fund was a loan, not a grant:

“There are some donors<sup>30</sup> I know but let me not mention their names. I think why they do not want (re)negotiations is because they have some vested interests...So this is why they may want to be so rigid on what they said on the word go. But if one is out to help, they should help and help indeed. The rigidity is out of self-centred gain. Yea...once you [technocrat, donor] negotiate and go, you [SMCs/BOGs/PTAs] who is implementing is the one who knows how best the programme might work. So the donor need not dictate the project implementation because he is not the one on the ground. Another reason why I thought OPEC was flexible is because this is a loan and not a grant. There are those who are giving grants and they have to dictate and you [borrower] because you are a consumer and helpless, you just go by their terms. You can't change, because it is a grant after all...I believe in every project if it has to bear fruits there should be understanding” (Antoinette).

Aid is power because it gives donors leverage to engrave conditions that skew decisions towards their intentions. These conditions also accentuate vulnerability both in theory and practice because disadvantage (or need to be positive) limits alternative choices of the government and disadvantaged people. Again, donors impose conditions even where opportunities for negotiations are created because they find it hard to change their ways of thinking and doing things as a councillor confirmed:

“We have met NGOs and many international organizations which come and partner with the government for specific projects. When these people come, they have a specific line of operation. You cannot deviate...it is like if you ask World Bank to change their way of doing things. You cannot...They will make sure that you are put in their way of doing things and think the way they think...I think in OPEC, every beginning can be the beginning of our design. We [can]not talk of planning or negotiations as our initial design level...we talk at the level when money is available and we need to be called to participate as our beginning” (Mapatano).

The inability of donors to change their ways of thinking and doing things and the inability of governments to effectively influence the decisions and intentions of donors has taught SMCs/BOGs/PTAs and disadvantaged communities to accept conditionalities and exclusion from planning and aid negotiations as the norm. This confirms Brown's (2004) view that most communities construe donor and government institutions as distant from their realities. It also concurs with social democrats' (Ife, 2002) view that though

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<sup>30</sup> Refers to the development partners in KESSP and the infrastructure programme cited before.

governments could be seen as villains when they fail to effectively implement social policies, in partnerships aimed at maximizing benefits of aid, these are just as powerless as the communities they seek to empower.

As detailed later the inability of donors to change mindsets led to competition and withdrawal of the BEIP from Coast Province. While such competition attests to aid-donor power, the idea of an active donor that imposes conditions onto a passive and unwilling government does not arise. This is because the reason for entering into partnerships is to counter such socializations through cooperative, not competitive relationships of problem-solving (Ife, 2002). Thus, donor conditionalities provide no strong case to exonerate the government from taking responsibility for entering into aid partnerships. On its part the GOK established structures which SMCs/BOGs/PTA described as conditions (or blueprints) as reflected in the words of a teacher:

“There were guidelines or blue prints as well as the relationships...we [SMCs/BOGs/PTAs] could not go beyond those blueprints...” (Hamish).

SMCs/BOGs/PTAs viewed the structures that the GOK established to enact partnerships, participation and accountability as conditions because they prescribed these features in ways that limited full participation and freedom of choice (see chapter six). For this reason, SMCs/BOGs/PTAs stated that donors and technocrats impose conditionalities to protect their own interests in markets and aid. Although claimed to enhance good governance, conditionalities thrive on mistrust where a councillor said:

“...it is like the donor or whoever is giving aid, number one does not trust the person he is giving...He is ready to give but...that donor money...is also given some conditions...In this OPEC, what we are seeing is that, we shall give you five hundred thousand first. Clear that...before that...we cannot give you another [amount]... account for that...[then] we give you another one, forgetting that there is timing here where the contractor is waiting [to be paid]. So one week being wasted, that is going to be paid for and there is no work going on. It is like the donor and whoever is giving is doubting the person he is giving. Whoever is giving does not tell us I am giving you this much, this is what I had...planned for you. You are just given, it is like somebody's own property and [he] lives the life for you” (Mapatano).

The GOK and OPEC decisions to implement the BEIP in three phases and to disburse funds in instalments could be seen to reduce the confidence of disadvantaged people about government and donor commitment to enact structures that affect sustainable changes. The view that conditionalities breed mistrust and encroach into disadvantaged people's lives confirms Brown's (2004) contention that partnerships based on aid concessions diminish government legitimacy and distort authentic political relationships. This point will be developed later. Conditionalities potentially reduced confidence in government since they represented donor and technocrats' knowledge as the unquestionable norm even where they further marginalized disadvantaged people.

An aid condition believed by technocrats and SMCs/BOGs/PTAs to draw upon mistrust and which implicates government structures in breeding mistrust relates to technical assistance. That is to say, where donors impose conditionalities in the form of aid assistance to protect their interests in markets, governments facilitate this process by enacting partnerships on the basis of technical expertise. The next section explores how technical assistance (expertise) informed the formation of partnerships.

### **Technical Expertise as Power**

This section builds on aid as power by looking into the motivations of donors to enter into aid partnerships with governments through the concept of technical assistance. It also considers technocrats interests in 'technical expertise'. The central argument is that GOK attempted to facilitate the formation of partnerships on the basis of technical assistance (expertise), which did not adequately address interests of disadvantaged communities. Technical expertise is premised on the view that disadvantaged people do not understand what is in their best interest. Even where disadvantaged people understand their needs, they lack resources, technical knowledge and skills. These resources, knowledge and skills gaps, it is claimed, must be closed by experts. The enactment of partnerships through aid assistance and technical expertise led to the emergence of



technical expertise as power (resources and knowledge). Technical assistance as power was recorded where an educationist said:

“...there is this assumption that developing countries need technical assistance. So they [donors] come and say we want to help you, what can we help you with. Once you say yes to the project, half of the project money goes with their salaries. It is a way of creating jobs for their people. At the end of the day only a ¼ of say the 15 million the donor contributed is used on project implementation. You don't feel the impact...but they will write that they assisted with 15 million, when only 2 million reached [the community].” Other donors want to maintain off-shore accounts. It is them to decide which and who to contract, select consultants, decide how much to pay...so they end up saying we gave you 15 million yet only 8 million reached you. The rest was used elsewhere because of donor interest to create jobs, decide and control the process. So now it becomes a problem with these donors” (Bushie).

This confirms power and market relationships in aid partnerships (Kapoor, 2005) where disadvantage (or need) constitutes the ‘power(lessness)’ upon which technical assistance thrives. Technical assistance is a form of power because neither is the partnership ‘mutual’ nor do the negotiations offer ‘freehand’ to the government. Technical assistance negates equal partnerships because it is imposed as conditions. For example purchasing vehicles that are incompatible with local terrains and which “may not end up improving the general wellbeing of these so called people to be assisted” (Bushie). These ways of facilitating power and market shifts to the donor contradict the view that technical assistance facilitates empowerment from ‘haves’ to ‘have nots’ (Arnstein, 1971; Ife, 2002). The validity of partnerships premised on market principles of redistributing resources from donors and knowledge from technical experts can be questioned. The problem with partnerships premised on redistributive power, is that technical assistance allows donors and technocrats to offer solutions according to their own perspectives and interests. Such solutions are not contextually feasible and devalue local resources and knowledge. At the micro level these practices led communities to mistrust SMCs/BOGs/PTAs because to entrench their interests, headteachers typically compromise the less educated members as an educationist said:

“I want to state that sometimes the suspicion [of communities] is true. Those people sometimes are compromised...If you go to the rural areas, you find that some parents who are in the SMCs are actually illiterate and are actually the grandfathers of the children in that given school. The real parents are not there. Grandfathers are not the ones who give the money. They may have very little information on construction. So they may actually be the only people [available] in the whole community. So it is very easy for the headteacher to compromise, if he wants to comprise them...most of them are actually compromised. To reduce such suspicion, let us have SMCs that consist of literate people. I think Kenya now we are in a stage where we can say any person who is not literate should not be in any given committees” (Wamsha).

Technocrats believed that SMCs/BOGs/PTAs lacked the literacy levels necessary for leveraging criticism to headteachers. Technocrats also considered that some SMCs/BOGs/PTAs comprised of aged people who were incapable of providing the technical expertise needed for constructions and for effective management of the BEIP. Again, since the BEIP used pre-existing structures at the grassroots, members who undertook management roles were neither the ones experiencing the needs nor those who raised the resources used to build the physical facilities. SMCs/BOGs/PTAs were thus considered devoid of the capacity to effectively manage the BEIP and enforce accountability of headteachers to the GOK-donor and responsibility to parents.

The paradox is that the structures created to address these deficits facilitated elite-to-elite networks since they drew upon technical expertise. For example, the GOK prescribed that members of the SMCs/BOGs/PTAs must at least have literacy levels of primary or secondary education to assume management roles as an educationist said:

“We did not ask for uniform level [of literacy] because it depends on the regions, but mainly in the SMCs we expect someone who can read and write, because if we put the levels of education we will block those who are from marginalized areas and yet they are not learned as such. But our preference in secondary education is that we get someone who has higher education” (Antoinette).

Technocrats fixed literacy levels for members of SMCs/PTAs/BOGs so that it would be easier to communicate with these in the coordination of the BEIP processes. As alluded to under decentralization, technocrats viewed SMCs/BOGs/PTAs as ‘gate-keepers’ (Eade, 2003) through whom to access disadvantaged communities. Despite some

technocrats' concern about the need to avoid exclusionary structures, the policy on minimum literacy levels for SMCs/BOGs/PTAs excluded the less educated folk from management roles. As detailed in chapter seven, the GOK risked reinforcing class inequalities through formation of elite-to-elite networks and to use partnerships premised on technical expertise and representation to reinforce the status quo.

While the idea of educating SMCs/BOGs/PTAs about their roles to enable them to enact decisions, implement the BEIP effectively and promote ownership and sustainability are core strengths, the assumption that these representational formations should only be accessed by the educated contradicted the BEIP aim of increasing the role of disadvantaged people in governance. The next section shows that representation, technical expertise and aid assistance promoted managerialism (or corporatism) rather than governance and encouraged competition and upward accountability.

### **Managerialism and Corporatism**

The central argument is that the use of aid assistance, technical experts and representatives encouraged development managerialism (or corporatism), rather than governance, contributed to the emergence of partnerships through competitive rather than cooperative relationships and promoted upward rather than downward accountability. Interviews with technocrats acknowledged that collaboration and participation in management of educational development in schools is a right (even for the illiterates). The GOK also intended to use the BEIP management structures to enhance performance-based management, ownership of policies and decisions, accountability, responsibility/obligations on the part of parents and knowledge of rights. Literate SMCs/BOGs/PTAs were thus needed to communicate effectively and advocate for the BEIP at the grassroots. That means partnerships were meant to emerge through capacity-building forums where SMCs/BOGs/PTAs, members of the PIU and district

implementation committees were trained, and through the general processes of participation in the planning, implementation and monitoring and evaluation.

While these are important features of PDem and strengths of the BEIP, the practice of development cooperation and partnerships created elite-to-elite networks in which the disadvantaged people were excluded. This reproduction of social class through aid assistance, technical expertise and representation, as detailed in chapters six and seven limited participation and freedoms of SMCs/BOGs/PTAs and disadvantaged people and accentuated inequalities based on culture, gender, age, poverty/class, ethnicity and other environmental, economic and political factors. These outcomes attest that instead of enhancing governance, representation, aid assistance and technical expertise encouraged corporatism (or managerialism) through competitive rather than cooperative relationships (Ife, 2002) and the formation of elite-to-elite networks.

### **Cooperation**

A core aim of the BEIP was to promote cooperation between the GOK, donors and the disadvantaged communities. This subsection argues that the practices of sharing responsibilities and the harmonization of activities through representatives, aid and technical assistants, contributed to the emergence of elite-to-elite networks and partnerships through competitive rather than cooperative relationships. Cooperative relationships were meant to emerge between technocrats, SMCs/BOGs/PTAs, disadvantaged people and technical experts from ministries of water, public works and health through the processes of planning, implementation and monitoring, and evaluation. For example, when planning how to implement the BEIP, technocrats collaborated with SMCs/BOGs/PTAs about the needs of schools. Data attest that such collaboration privileged technical expertise and excluded ideas of SMCs/BOGs/PTAs in the final plans that these grassroots structures were meant to implement:

“...I [teacher] remember I was in the first meeting. We were able to come up with some suggestions. Do we need a new laboratory or do we renovate

the old one? Based on our agreement...the plan was drawn. To some extent we were involved but the *technical expertise* was to be done by the ministry of works” (Hamish).

“Incorporation of ideas and suggestions of science teachers in the planning of the project was not done. Plans were just brought in and we were told build according to this plan. So we had no alternative but to follow what they had decided” (Benjamin).

The failure to incorporate local interests confirms that mainstream PDev continues to perpetuate partnerships of domination (Ife, 2002) and elite-to-elite networks based on aid assistance, technical expertise and representation in which the disadvantaged whose development the BEIP was meant to improve were excluded.

### ***Elite-to-elite Networks***

Aid assistance, technical expertise and representation limited full participation, choices and freedoms of SMCs/BOGs/PTAs and the disadvantaged people themselves through policies and conditionalities that OPEC and technocrats established to guide implementation of the BEIP. Such powers that infringe on other people’s rights either through exclusion or domination according to Ife (2002) should not be sought in development cooperation. The data accounts for domination in different ways. The way technocrats facilitated formation of partnerships through representatives and the criteria used to select schools as said before, created beneficiary-to-benefactor relationships between the GOK/OPEC and the disadvantaged people. This relationship represented disadvantaged people as passive recipients of aid. It is not a surprise that the use of aid assistance and technical experts excluded the disadvantaged people from policy-making and decisions that enacted the BEIP because they were considered poor and illiterate:

“When OPEC came, every school which was identified had a certain figure to be spent at that school...everything had been done, so the community could not be involved at that [design] level...” (Hamish)

“...here we were only given money...If people were involved right at the beginning...we could have specified what is practicable or what is not” (Mapatano).

A driving force towards development cooperation comes from the view that partnerships create ‘political spaces’ for disadvantaged people to influence policies and decisions that affect their lives with concomitant benefits of ownership. In addition to bureaucratic power as said before, the partnerships generated through representation, aid assistance and technical expertise impacted on relationships of domination and limited the efficacy of the BEIP where focus group data attested:

“My experience [with] ministry of public works...is that we have incurred difficulties in implementation of this project, because they [technocrats] say we have experts. If you do not do this, then we will withdraw the project” (Mapatano).

Relationships of domination cut against the BEIP aim of promoting partnerships by harmonizing interests, services and activities through cooperative relationships:

“It is good for other people to know what you are doing...discuss with you and may be harmonize certain activities [and] ideas. If you moved alone, ‘I am the coordinator, I [go to] the PS [permanent secretary], I am given an okay and may be within the same period we would have moved together...to [do] monitoring...with another group that is going to monitor other projects in the field...in a way it [partnership] is cutting down the costs. Instead of using three teams to monitor, you just use one team and may be give them slightly more days. They do the same job in the same area” (Carla).

The attempt to promote cooperation through joint monitoring and evaluation of the BEIP satisfied the earlier said SWAP criteria on ‘joint implementation’ by all stakeholders. Nonetheless the emergent partnerships and social networks reproduced elite-to-elite networks. Although it might be argued that the disadvantaged people were represented through SMCs/BOGs/PTAs in these monitoring activities, as detailed in chapter six, many of the forums through which social networks were meant to occur such as needs assessment and consensus-capacity-building excluded the disadvantaged people themselves because they did not satisfy the criteria on literacy levels.

The efficacy of such ideas as harmonizing activities, sharing responsibilities through representatives and the use of participation to increase efficiency and the cost-effectiveness of aid can be questioned on the grounds that in the BEIP they blamed disadvantaged people for their own conditions while accentuating structural disadvantages.

The formation of elite-to-elite networks conforms to pluralists and elitists (Chambers, 1997) by seeking to integrate disadvantaged people into a system in which they cannot favourably compete through elite representative who are better able to compete in a system of unequal power (Ife, 2002). The point is that in promoting partnerships, technocrats were well aware of inequalities in the BEIP. However the use of elite representatives to speak and act on behalf of the disadvantage people limited the formation of cooperative and dialogical relationships with them.

Contrary to principles of deliberative democracy, which is an essential component of PDem (Ife, 2002), these features inhibited the benefits of cooperation. As detailed in chapter six, although low levels of awareness and relationships with the structures that govern disadvantaged communities' lives inhibited participation, the use of technical expertise, aid assistance and representation devalued disadvantaged people's potential knowledge and excluded them from the partnerships that emerged. Instead of creating opportunities for technocrats and civil society to cooperate with disadvantaged people with a view to enabling them to unlearn the apolitical socialisations that have taught them to devalue their own potential and to accept exclusion from planning and policy-making as the norm, representation, aid and technical expertise led to conflict of interests and competition in the BEIP partnerships.

### ***Competition***

Interview data recorded conflicts of interest, competition and duplication of resources/services in the partnerships that emerged through planning, implementation and the joint monitoring and evaluation activities where an educationist said:

“There are times when we have duplication of activities. You find that everybody is targeting educational programmes...Early Childhood Development, girl-child education, government and aid-sponsored programmes...you [also] find that one NGO is doing the same [thing] as another...there is...overlapping in the activities. But to ensure that there is no conflict we advice them to work in different areas...There are a number of times when they do a similar activity...[that brings] conflict of interest...in the sense that...One has decided to do one thing which is

similar, and you are doing that one thing in the same community. That duplication is there. Conflict of interest in the sense that...many times there is a bit of friction... because every one wants to serve and want to be seen serving the community. Everybody wants to remain in the community to ensure that when their evaluators or monitors come they are given a good report...so those things are there” (Dorobo).

A contributing factor to the conflicts of interest and competition arose from the use of representatives and the formation of partnerships on the basis of aid assistance and technical expertise. These features heightened individual rather than collective power and led donors, technocrats and NGOs to take advantage of the conditions of disadvantaged people to justify their own interests in aid:

“These stakeholders [donors, technical experts) come and assess our needs...they want to ensure that they narrow the gap...they help us at least...rise to certain levels with the rest of the [developed parts of the] country...the idea is to ensure that we have risen from that low level where we are, that unprivileged place...because of the geographical position of those communities. They are very far [from] these parts that are considered developed and having all the opportunities. So we very much appreciate these stakeholders and the idea is to ensure that we come up...other motives [are]...most of these stakeholders [government and NGO] are people who get donation from outside. Of course their existence...depends on the activities that they generate within certain areas. So as much as they want to help us and that seems to be the objective, they also want to ensure that they exist and of course get money using now the communities’...poverty level [condition]. So that proves to be an excuse of all of them...for earning money from donors” (Dorobo).

Contrary to the BEIP aim of enhancing development cooperation, the need to legitimate aid activities and personal interests among communities in Coast, North Eastern and Western Provinces impacted on the formation of partnerships on competitive as opposed to cooperative relationships. The experiences of competition and conflict of interest were slightly different. In western Province some schools participated in a pilot study (see chapter ix) in which technocrats tested efficacy of the tools and methods that facilitated needs assessment and consensus-building amongst SMCs/BOGs/PTAs.

Interview data show that the BEIP was not implemented in some of the schools that took part in the pilot because the selection processes involved politicians whose interests mediated against cooperation and the needs of these schools. As noted, the multiparty political context threatened cooperation because some of the members from opposition



parties could not readily identify with policies and decisions of the ruling party. Another conflict of interest arose because political elites:

“...felt they needed to influence our [technocrats] decisions on where to implement the project. So after we took our stand and we insisted on the areas and the criteria that we gave and stuck to it, they realized that since this is a benefit to their constituency, they had no choice but to support it. So we have got a lot of support even though the project is mainstreamed within the government, whether the politician is on opposition or even the government in power...” (Antoinette).

The attempt by technocrats to privilege objectives of the BEIP (which supposedly were taken to represent interests of the disadvantaged people) over interests of politicians, conforms to Chambers (2005) view that PDev requires principled leaders and change agents who ensure that disadvantaged community needs are not militated against where political elites or donors uncritically wield unnecessary pressure to have their interest considered in aid programmes. It is also quite informative about the role of politics in aid programmes that promote participation and partnerships between donors, politicians, civil societies, technocrats and disadvantaged communities.

A key finding is that contexts of plural politics are potential hindrances to cooperation and that personal interest in politics can precipitate competition within aid development project and the partnerships that emerge. The BEIP case shows that mainstream PDev partnerships continue to suffer antagonism by political elites. Questions can thus be asked about the efficacy of PDev assumptions that political elites, donors and technocrat represent the interests of disadvantaged communities and that they are able and willing to cede power when need (Arnstein, 1971; Ife, 2002).

Political elites in the BEIP were invited to render ‘political will’ and to play advocacy roles to increase the acceptance and impact of the BEIP on the disadvantaged people within their political constituencies. As detailed in chapter six despite emerging as potential change agent, political elites espoused to use the BEIP as a campaign tool to entrench their personal and political interests on their constituents. While politicians

appeared to support schools that were within their political constituencies, they also wielded influence on the choice of schools where the BEIP was implemented:

“When we identified these schools and the same are presented to the politician... you know these are engaged in development of their area, you may find a politician dismissing a school or just striking a school [from the list] not because he is informed of its needs, but because he feels that, that area is not fully his/her supporter. So there are some vested interests” (Emmanuel).

The problem is that collaboration with political elites did not necessarily ensure that the schools that were most needy by virtue of the set criteria (or others) benefited from the BEIP. For example, in Western Province, some of the school(s) which were dropped, in the testimonies of SMCs/BOGs/PTAs and also district implementation committees, were considered more disadvantaged than those that were finally supported. As detailed in chapter six, this failure to implement the BEIP where tools were piloted meant that technocrats were experimenting with unproven strategies on these communities.

In North Eastern and Coast Provinces, competition and conflict of interest arose partly, because of macro-level relations that enacted the partnerships of the infrastructural programme within which the BEIP belonged. The way technocrats facilitated collaboration and networks with the other projects identified before in the KESSP partnerships, contributed to a conflict of interests and competition amongst USAID, World Bank, OPEC/GOK. Despite SWAP claims to cooperation and equal partnerships, the conflict of interest and competition to implement projects amongst ASALs led to the withdrawal of the BEIP from all primary schools in Coast Province.

The problem is that communities had already undertaken needs-assessment and mobilized themselves to support the BEIP. Such withdrawal reflected negatively on donor and government commitment towards enacting development cooperation and partnerships in ways that increased control of development by the disadvantaged people. The SWAP policy change which led to the withdrawal of the BEIP meant that donors could implement projects where they chose as long as these projects fitted with the priorities identified in the

KESSP. This means the BEIP aim of harmonising interests of the GOK, donor and the disadvantaged people was not achieved. Some donors were wary about how the GOK would spend the funds. Others argued that to change their ways of accounting, reporting and procurement to suit the BEIP requirement, they had to be authorised by their funding states.

It is not also clear to what extent the ministry of education was able to steer development decisions in the BEIP through the SWAP processes. Indeed technocrats determined priorities in the KESSP and, as shown in chapter six, the needs of schools in the BEIP. Nonetheless in encouraging technocrat to steer development the SWAP policy practice contradicted the BEIP aim of enabling disadvantaged people control their own futures. Again, allowing donors to implement projects as they wished concurs with Chambers'(2005) view that SWAP programmes could be more permeable than individual projects. Although the policy on SWAP emphasized programmes, aid power impacted on the conflict of interests and competition through the individual projects that made up KESSP. As result of privileging interests of the World Bank, the BEIP was withdrawn from all the primary schools in the Coast Province where a district committee member said:

“We have had that project for sometimes...Parents have realised it is important to support education [of] their boys and girls. They are ready to educate them, but where are the facilities? We hear the project is taken to other schools because the World Bank will bring another one here. We have not seen it. That is why we have been saying these people [technocrats and donors] like creating false hopes...in the people [communities]” (Chakalisa).

Such privileging of donor interests confirms Klee's (2001) view that partnerships based on SWAP policies give donors overriding power over governments. Considering that at the time the SWAP policy came into force the BEIP was already underway, some technocrats' testimonies indicated that the GOK/OPEC agreement was not expected to be affected by the requirement of KESSP for donors to pool resource. BEIP was thus expected to be implemented as a stand-alone project.

However, cooperation with other partners in KESS was embraced because “when a project operates independently, it does not anchor well...” [But cooperation floundered because some partners “were not involved at the start. Maybe...they want[ed] to wait and see whether it is going to succeed. They want[ed] to observe and...join at a later date” (Antoinette). This ‘wait and see’ attitude was also described as “big brother syndrome” and “shifting goal posts” (Duncan). The point is that donors’ decisions to either partner with others in the KESSP or enact independent projects largely depended on what the World Bank appeared to support. Despite optimism that the SWAP policy was more likely to impact benefits of equal partnerships and affect sustainable development through its projects, the BEIP experience show otherwise.

The decision by technocrats to discontinue the BEIP when communities had already mobilized themselves to support it is a disturbance of local processes of development (Ife, 2002). It also meant that aid development and its partnerships are unsustainable (see chapter seven). On this view the validity of partnerships that contribute to competition, rather than cooperative relations can be questioned from technical and moral grounds. The potential and limitations of aid assistance, technical expertise and representation to generate social networks through cooperation became apparent in the language of ‘partnerships’, ‘development partners’ and ‘stakeholders’. Mainstream PDev can potentially use these terms to promote competition and conceal power and control relationships as a parent said:

“The term *stakeholder* is more of a textbook thing, rather than the reality. When we come to the practice, it is completely different...To talk about stakeholder that levels the power relations. Each stakeholder has to believe that has a part to play. The other one is a *partner*. The other one is equally important. Starting right from the donors, we don’t see that relationship of *partnership*. They will come and decide this is what we are giving and we are giving you for this. I mean, you can’t call that partnership when one party is completely... making decisions on what is happening...and that whole thing flows in the whole chain. Basically, when you talk about stakeholders, I think it is more of a catchword in development. In practice, to a large extent there is nothing. We could have very few isolated cases where to some extent there is that stakeholder relationship. But from most of the [aid] projects in my experience, there is nothing like stakeholder.

You [community] are simply seen as beneficiaries and you receive the little you can receive. Not only the issue of receiving [fund], even the information, everything...I mean you are not taken as if you are in the same level right from the donor to intermediaries, implementing agencies to all that. Can you imagine the DEO seeing himself as a stakeholder with a parent? Not until he unlearns, because even the way the DEO will approach the community/parent is so paternalistic. Is just you are [up] there and I [parent] am [down] there, and they just take their positions. The moment there are such kinds of relationships, the issue of stakeholder becomes quite weak” (Sundukia).

This subtle character of the discourse on partnerships to conceal power relations confirms Ife’s (2002) view that pluralists’ and elitists’ discourses encourage cooperation but also cancel opposition to legitimate the status quo. In the BEIP, the emphasis on achieving efficiency and the cost-effectiveness of aid through technical expertise and the politics of representation encouraged managerialism and domination rather than governance (Ife, 2002) where cooperation aims to increase people power. Such managerialism and domination is evident in the way partnerships in the BEIP encouraged upward rather than downward accountability.

### **Accountability**

This section argues that the policies enacted to support partnerships and participation and the practices they impacted on encouraged upward accountability to the donor and technocrats rather than downward accountability to the people. This occurred because the principles underpinning these policies drew upon market principles of maximizing the benefits of aid through competition rather than cooperation. Such competition reduced the benefits of control by the GOK and the SMCs/BOGs/PTAs through what Ife (2002) terms covert and overt privatization of services and decisions.

A core aim of participation and partnerships in the BEIP was to enhance transparency, performance-based management and accountability (GOK, 2005a, p. xii). The data described accountability in the following ways:

“Accountability is broad....but we [technocrats] have understood it in the straight way of efficient management of resources...In a nutshell spending resources for the purpose intended ...and in an open manner (Parsley).

This attempt to tie accountability with management is premised on the belief that participation of school communities through representation at the national, district and school levels increases the benefits of accountability and openness. As established in the management structures, the disadvantaged people could only participate through representatives. To achieve accountability and transparency, representatives in the SMCs/BOGs/PTAs were expected to be impartial, of high integrity and ought to encourage competitive bidding in contracting and procurement of service and goods:

“Representatives are supposed to be people who are impartial...I mean having no vested interests. I would not like to have a situation where the owner of a hardware shop is the school chairman, so that most of the goods will be bought from his shop without competitive bidding. Too, we would like to have people who have integrity...I mean people who have high reputation in the community based on their character and conduct” (Emanuel).

These attributes encourage the view that aid power, technical expertise power and representation are not enough to enforce accountability. These can encourage competition but flounder on increasing openness and accountability. Accountability requires attitudes that aim to increase collective, not individual benefits. These points are set out in the data where a technocrat described malpractices that backgrounded the GOK decision to enact structures to enforce accountability and transparency as follows:

“First and foremost, attitude must be touched. In Kenya and other African countries there has been...hostility that came as a result of colonialism...that ‘Mali ya Uma’ [public property] attitude. If you recall, during the building of the railway, some communities were stealing some parts of the rail. You know because they considered it as not theirs as a community but of the foreigners...therefore because the foreigner is fixing it in their country, why can’t they take it away from the foreigner? The foreigner also...contributed by taking the African land. [This] was a way of telling people that they [foreigners] can also not be transparent...even when [the] country gained its self-rule, there was still that ‘mali ya uma’ business. People felt that they needed to take it [public resources] away. Also the government failure to harmonize or spread its benefits to everybody... people had this kind of attitude that since the government has been unfair to them, they also can be unfair to it. [Government failure to] enforce a harmonious...spread of wealth ...equitabl[y]...either in terms of regions or salaries...That one has been a driving force for people to want to sabotage and benefit themselves. What I’m trying to say is this...This [Mali ya uma attitude] is embedded in people’s ways of live. Most people who are not accountable or transparent they do not do it

because they are poor. They do it because they want to do it. They feel like...they are paying back in kind [punishing]" (Parsley).

Technocrats saw accountability as involving politics, power, resources and responsibilities in which people chose to adhere to certain set standards. On the view that *poverty* is synonymous neither with irresponsibility nor evidence of unaccountability, the validity of technical expertise, aid power and representation to enforce accountability and responsibility can be questioned. The need to affect transparency and accountability was informed by entrenched malpractices of the government, technocrats, donors and communities in previous aid interventions. The view that resources advanced by the donor through the government are for stealing (or sabotage) explains why technocrats adopted participatory and collaborative approaches to manage the BEIP. As said earlier, the BEIP was funded through an OPEC loan. The worth of partnerships and participation was to enable communities to own the BEIP and sustain it after the 3-5 years' project cycle concludes. Again, the need to affect attitudes of the donor, technocrats and the communities necessitated the GOK to enact policies to support cooperative, not competitive practices in enacting their roles as set out in the management structures. Collaboration was thus a means of harmonizing activities of these actors with a view to increasing efficiency in management and cost-effectiveness.

For these reasons, the earlier said negotiations between the GOK and donor enacted the policy on joint monitoring and evaluation to affect collaboration and also increase openness and accountability. Another policy allowed schools to operate Bank accounts through which the BEIP funds were directly credited. This policy also allowed for devolution of financial management roles to SMCs/BOGs/PTAs. The guidelines on these financial management roles required SMCs/BOGs/PTAs to establish tendering committees whose functions entailed contracting, tendering and procuring services and goods through competitive bidding. Technocrats also established that the BEIP would be implemented in three phases spread out within a period of three years.

Indeed the ‘revolving fund’ policy was meant to ensure that funds were released by the OPEC Fund to the GOK and then to the schools when needed. As alluded to before, technocrats considered the process of disbursement to be bureaucratically long as it stretched downwards from the supra (donor) through the Central Bank, ministries of finance, national and district committees to the schools at the grassroots level. To cut down on the risks of middle level institutions and commissions/interests charged on the loan once disbursed, technocrats established the revolving fund. In practice this meant that the funds could only be released to the school in phases (instalments).

In this regard technocrats fixed the ceiling costs of the BEIP in every school at 2.1 million Kenya Shillings (\$ US 26,923). Despite claims of accountability, these policies were perceived to entrench corruption and as detailed in chapter six are attempts to control disadvantaged people’s processes of development. The ways the accounting and reporting systems these policies established and the partnerships they generated encouraged upward, not downward accountability to the people attest to these claims.

### *Upward Accountability*

The accountability and reporting systems required SMCs/BOGs/PTAs to complete progress and expenditure reports on a quarterly basis. These reports were sent to the project implementation unit through the district implementation committees. Upward accountability is represented in this process where school communities report to technocrats, who in turn report to the donor. As noted in the data, the ministry of education was keen to see the success of the BEIP. It sent technocrats and technical experts to evaluate and monitor the BEIP as this increased prospects of continuity and commitment by disadvantaged communities. Accountability procedures required SMCs/BOGs/PTAs to post summaries of expenditure on public notices, maintain balance sheets and send quarterly reports to the PIU. When asked to reflect on their experiences of donor accountability, these SMCS/BOGs/PTAs attested:



“I think there is always demand of accountability on the side of borrower. But on the side of the donor these things are not really open. Sometimes we...wonder. Are they accountable also themselves? Because they will always make sure that our books are okay...But we are not...aware of what is happening on their side” (Hamish).

The SMCs/BOGs/PTAs testimonies showed that there is always demand for upward as opposed to downward accountability, because some donors are not accountable. Donor unaccountability meant imposing conditions for technical assistants to be employed in the programmes they fund, spending project money visiting foreign countries and living in expensive hotels. Technocrats were also said to be unaccountable in similar ways. For this reason a political councillor said:

“We were not accountable. Some donors are not accountable. They [donors] say you can only get this money if you employ the executive director coming from country X and you will pay this and this and discuss this and that...[They earn a quarter of that money back to their country. This is [un]accountability...and then you [citizen] pay both the capital, [interest] and the financial aid” (Mapatano).

This view that both donors and technocrats are not accountable underscores the limitations of upward accountability. The problem is that donors and technocrats do not see the need to account to aid recipients because in the words of a headteacher:

“First and foremost the donation is given because you are not self-sustaining. That is why you need that assistance. It does not mean that when you will be given that assistance...you will be able to [fully] support yourselves in other areas of need...Even in the same area you have been assisted. But you have not been able to be independent in your undertaking, at present and in the future. Now the way you take care of the resources that have been extended to you, will be able to determine what other assistance might be presented to you. Therefore, that should be the principle focus, that when you take care of what you have been given, how you use it, in a transparent manner and at the end of it, you can be able to draw a balance sheet and say income is equal to expenditure and anybody can see, you expect to score the highest mark possible and get confident that the hand [donor] will be able to come back again and possibly assist you. If you take care of something small you will also be entrusted with a bigger responsibility. That is the way I see it. And it [accountability] should be seen...from all dimensions...donors, politicians, peers, mates and those who are below should be able to see...what has been achieved through this kind of funding/assistance” (Reuben).

SMCs/BOGs/PTAs have come to believe that they need to create confidence with donors through reports and balance sheets so as to attract further aid. They are also aware

that aid enhances the vulnerability of disadvantaged people because it does not offer permanent solutions for the present and in the future. It is thus fitting to argue that upward accountability legitimates the status quo; encourages power and market shifts to the already powerful; and, partnerships within an aid delivery system are unsustainable because they facilitate dependency on donors. While upward accountability to the sources of funds is critical (Craig & Porter, 1997, 2003), it can be questioned to the extent that it retains control with the already powerful, entrenches dependency and as detailed in chapter seven accentuates inequalities and structural disadvantages. This way, partnerships that encourage accounting through balance sheets (reports to the donor and displays in public notices) can be seen to redefine openness in ways that negate donor-to-government responsibility (or downward accountability) to the people.

### ***Downward Accountability***

Downward accountability entails the fulfilment of government responsibility to its people. It draws upon the democratic rights of self-determination (participation), association (collaboration) and citizenship (Gaventa & Valderrama, 2001). It requires democratically elected governments to be open and answerable to the citizenry. Downward accountability derives legitimacy from the view that citizens form the government by themselves, for themselves and have a responsibility to sustain it through taxes. The government uses such taxes to deliver services and pay aid loans such as the BEIP fund. Thus, donors ought to be accountable by acting in ways that do not disenfranchise the aid recipients (Chambers, 2005; Ife, 2002). On these accountabilities a technocrat said:

“In the communities...we have trained SMCs, who we want to ensure they run the affairs of the learning institutions. We are channelling funds through them. But training alone...only enhances their management [and] accounting ability. But as for transparency, this is something that requires some kind of a national motto...I can put it like this...some discipline...This discipline [can be] enforced by [government]...I think transparency and accountability requires something...like a country motto, which people get used to and they also know it is illegal [to go against]...As a starter...it [motto] must come from the government and then the communities own it. There has to be somebody to start it...if it is

the communities starting, there will be no uniformity in the country. It has to appear like it is coming from a central place...This is what we are...doing” (Parsley).

It is important for the GOK to enforce responsibility and openness. However the idea of encouraging accountability and transparency from above or outwards from the centre so as to attain uniformity contradicts principles of PDem. The idea of participation and collaboration as shown in chapter six is to celebrate diversity not to negate differences through manageristic structures that encourage corporatism.

Corporatism in this case means excluding the very disadvantaged people from decisions and policies while vesting the same on the donor and market rather than the elected government. Such overt and covert privatisation of decisions and services on the assumption that the corporate or market will distribute the surplus from the few to the many, represents the idea of change from above. In the context of downward accountability, it assumes that governments and aid agencies are self-reflective, self-correcting and self-responsive. The role of partnerships and participation is to ‘discipline’ citizenry through representation and technical expertise.

For example, the GOK was said to treat demands for accountability from citizenry as riots and a threat to the status quo. Such practices meant that the GOK is unaccountable. The use of terms such as ‘beneficiaries’ also enabled donors and technocrats to limit participation and partnerships to activities where they will not need to share information about how they spent project funds and decisions about sharing resources. While such terms enable donors and governments to legitimate the status quo while remaining unaccountable, they also disempower disadvantaged people. Without critical information and access to resources and decisions, disadvantaged people and their representatives neither had the basis nor the power to claim accountability.

The paradox is that such practices negated government responsibility, encouraged covert and overt privatization of decisions, services and resources, and vested such power in the market and the donor. The idea of privatization derives from the view that the

principles underpinning accountability and the processes of enforcing it did not obtain legitimacy from democratic practices of participation and cooperation. Rather the practices accruing from participation and partnerships depended on microeconomic policies of redistribution and the terms and conditions set out in the loan agreement, aid memoir, services and building-labour and performance-based contracts. Due to a lack of space to explore these agreements and contracts independently only general comments are made.

As noted policies of maximizing benefits of aid through tendering and contracting on the basis of competitive bidding as detailed in chapter six led to commodification of participation, devaluing of local knowledge/potentials, entrenched personal and organisational interests in aid and increased control of development, services and decision by the donor and market. The aid agreements, performance-based contracts and those based on competition though meant to enforce accountability negated government responsibility where an educationist said:

“Performance contract...is one way of trying to achieve that accountability. Assuming that all things are put in force...we should have benchmarks against which to gauge our performance...the government has put in place these performance contracts with an aim of improving services to the people. This means that when officers do not perform their duties and tasks in time, the citizen has a right to complain and then I [officer] will be held responsible” (Mapya).

The essence of performance-based contracts is that they enable policy-makers and civil servants to achieve set targets of delivering services to the citizenry. Again, it is claimed that citizens can hold the government accountable. The problem is that these contracts do not commit duty-bearers. They commit functions and positions. Performance-based contracts can thus be seen to negate government responsibility because they neither increase answerability to the people nor provide a legal mechanism to hear citizenry voices and complaints as claimed here. To the question who hears the voices and complaints of the citizenry, the same educationist avowed:

“That is now the problem...the government is...amorphous...The government...is amorphous, but the performance contract will enable my supervisors such as the PS; the accounting officer for the ministry will

hold me accountable. Before he accounts [to the Executive] he will find out who has messed me” (Mapya).

As discussed in chapter four, the bureaucratic structure within which the BEIP was implemented meant that the permanent secretary who is an appointee of the President and the ‘authorised accounting officer’ signed performance-based contracts on behalf of the ministry of education. The permanent secretary does not sign this contract as an individual but on behalf of “the whole body” (Mapya). The question is where officers do not achieve set targets, who has failed? Is it the permanent secretary or the ‘amorphous government’? The answer is as follows:

“You [PS] are signing that [contract] given the responsibilities and duties that are charged by your office [function]. You need to ensure that what you are signing for is being accomplished. Otherwise why are you signing? Like if I am supervising three people and I have been given a deadline, it is upon me to make sure that I have the [resources, tools]. [Not] making necessary channels to do my work, then I am failing...The point is, it is not the person. We are talking about the office. Offices are charged with certain responsibilities which are supposed to be implementing government projects and programmes” (Mapya).

The GOK could thus be seen to encourage development managerialism (as opposed to governance) and corporatism (as opposed to cooperation) through practices of partnerships and participation. According to Ife (2002) development managerialism and corporatism denote attempts by development practitioners to encourage the government to emulate corporate ways of thinking and doing business (or ‘third way’).. Due to the failure of the first way (government) and second way (private sector) systems to alleviate poverty, the government is encouraged to embrace third way practices to increase efficiency and cost-effectiveness of its investments towards human development. Partnerships and privatisation are main features of third way practices.

In the BEIP this idea of vesting responsibility in offices overtly privatized services and decisions because duty-bearers, not offices implement projects. Covertly, it also privatized services and decisions by vesting these in the donor and market. For these reasons, aid development partnerships negate government responsibility because

democratically elected governments must seek to retain and increase power to the people, not the corporate and market.

These ways of privatisation mean that where duties are not performed or where the decisions enacted through these contracts impact negatively on communities it becomes possible for the government to pass the buck because the agreements neither committed technocrats and donors to answer to the people nor are they accessible to the collectivity of citizenry as would be demanded by the principle of PDem (Ife, 2002). Again, public servants are transferred from time to time as the call of duty dictates.

In cases of transfer the notes accruing from processes of 'handing over and taking over', though meant to enhance accountability, become potential tools for negation of responsibility. Another problem is that the policies on partnerships and participation meant to increase accountability were perceived to derive and entrench donor and personal interests. Though meant to enforce accountability, policies that required the BEIP to be implemented in three phases and those which encouraged disbursement of funds in instalments were responsible for "many uncompleted projects which had been donor funded" because once a new government comes to power, donors withdraw funding on claims of poor governance when their "contact" person is not re-elected (Amani). This idea of establishing policies (project phases/instalments) to satisfy donor and personal interests not only privatises decisions and resources but also marginalises and institutionalises poverty as a parent/BOG member asserted:

"In a country where development is linked to personalities other than clear policies, then automatically that means that everybody who has been excluded from education cannot climb up to the top, cannot influence policies, and the moment you cannot influence policies, that means exclusion and once you are excluded then poverty is with you. And it is not only with you for days, it can even be institutionalised. This is because if you are poor and you cannot take your child to school, you bring up another poor person [and the chain continues]. With time you realize, regions, communities, families are completely excluded" (Sundukia).

How the BEIP was perceived to enhance inequalities and marginalities will be discussed in chapter seven. As noted, donors make personal contacts (or agreements)

which translate into aid project. Through the discourse of enforcing good governance and accountability, political elites enter into aid partnerships because they aim to strengthen their political influence at the macro and meso levels. The validity of enforcing accountability through political elites, though meant to infuse political will, can be questioned on the view that their behaviours redefined partnerships in ways that negated government responsibility. An educationist argued that when political elites and civic leaders turn aid projects into campaign tools:

“...the project ceases being seen as a responsibility that the government is playing but now the MP wants to capitalise on the project for his own gains. In fact that one might affect participation because there are some people who may feel that hii ni [this is a] project ya mjumbe [of the MP] so we won't [participate]...” (Emmanuel).

The social networks generated through community mobilisation, advocacy and participation as detailed in chapter six attest that schools and aid projects are arenas for political interests (personal and collective). The redefinition of the BEIP into a campaign tool represents a process of individualising, as opposed to generalising benefits to the community. This privileging of personal over collective needs arose from the formation of partnerships through principles of competition and representation. By engaging politicians in the BEIP partnerships, the GOK satisfied the ADev view that political will and empowerment cannot be achieved outside of government systems (Friedmann, 1992; Ife, 2002). Nonetheless, the behaviours of political elites to confirm Brown's (2004) view distorted authentic political relationships by using the BEIP to legitimate and entrench their personal and political interests onto the disadvantaged people they represent. In this view the practices of partnerships and participation also led communities to perceive political elites as 'donors'. Such redefinitions led political elites to make false promises to justify their statuses as 'political leaders', 'aid assistants', 'equal partners' and 'representatives of the disadvantaged people in the BEIP.

By using politicians to exert their political influence on the disadvantaged people to participate in the BEIP, technocrats risked negating government responsibility and the

rights and obligations of the communities. This way the GOK risked entrenching dependency on external aid where most SMCs/BOGs/PTAs contended that by funding the BEIP wholly, OPEC was saving communities from domination by political elites. Paradoxically, arguing that communities should not be asked to contribute monies is to support power and market shifts to the donor, and agree to bureaucratic power and dependency. On these views headteachers argued that:

“...the conditions which are laid [out] are really limiting us to implement the project. When money comes...you are told that you have been allocated 2 million to build a laboratory. The community is looking forward to see that project completed...now we have been given half a million, only months have gone, it is only papers. Every time papers and then you cannot move. I think the guidelines, the bureaucracy which is there is really too strict. It slows down the implementation of the project...The government procurement procedures should be restructured” (Reuben).

“There is also the colonial status of the country...You find today you procure... materials at a particular cost. In a few days or weeks...you find that the prices shoot up. Now you have to reschedule everything because the supplier will come down running to you telling you, mwalimu [teacher] we cannot supply you with these, because we can't do it at this price. That also hinders our participation” (Benjamin).

The linkage between colonialism, bureaucracy and markets confirms that due to internationalization of capitalism, commodity prices and decisions are made at levels that are beyond the proximity of governments (Ife, 2002). The validity of partnerships aimed at increasing accountability through contracting, competitive bidding and performance-based contracts can thus be questioned on technical grounds. Headteachers resorted to goodwill and personal negotiation skills to establish networks with suppliers of markets and goods not GOK circulars. To the extent that headteachers depended more on cooperation, not competition, the GOK commitment to enact structures and partnerships that increase control to the disadvantaged people can also be questioned on moral grounds. The structures on accountability encouraged the view that donors and governments ought to be self-reflective and self-regulatory (Chambers, 1997). Yet, the practices of partnerships



taught parents that neither the donor nor the government can be held accountable to the people. For this reason:

“What I can say in terms of...these international donors and their partnerships with the government is that, they are subjecting us to corruption. That is the best thing I can say....you cannot give me a project of 2.1 million and give me five hundred thousand and let me hung there for two to three years, as if nothing is happening there. I will be forced to pick from here and there so that the project can go on. So they are subjecting us to corruption” (Mapatano).

For example, the education sector was perceived to lack “the capacity... attitudes... the will to change things, to want to focus on change as opposed to structures. The moment that is wanting then we cannot talk about accountability” (Sundukia). This distinction between structural and change reforms as detailed in later chapters is critical to understanding empowerment, transformation and sustainable development. As critics of modernisation (Isbister, 1991) have argued the structural approach used to promote accountability focused on creating partnerships to solve the poverty and rights challenges of disadvantaged people cemented into neoliberalism. By focusing on structural rather than change-oriented reforms, the ministry of education was perceived to lack in vision and responsiveness to the needs of disadvantaged people. To be responsible the education sector needed to enact structures that balanced between structural and transformational reforms. Nonetheless, the attempt to provide structures and opportunities for development cooperation and GOK partnerships with donors, civil society and disadvantaged people represents possibilities for change.

## **Conclusion**

This chapter has shown that core strengths of the BEIP arose from the attempt to promote development of partnerships and cooperation and the enactment of structures to enforce accountability and transparency. These features represent the GOK willingness to generate increased power for disadvantaged people to control their futures. However, the attempt to create partnerships that aimed to maximize aid benefits increased power and market shifts to the already powerful. This way the GOK relegated its responsibility to

disadvantaged people by enacting structures and partnerships that increased dependency on aid. Indeed the GOK attempt to connect disadvantaged people with institutions that govern their lives points to possibilities for change. Nonetheless, the use of technical expertise, aid assistance and representation negated equal partnerships, encouraged competition rather than cooperation and upward rather than downward accountability. Such practices cemented into neoliberalism. That means an empowering and transformative PDev must promote participatory practices, government partnerships with civil societies and local communities and discourses of rights and citizenship to enable disadvantaged people to claim accountability based on their human and civic rights. The next chapter examines the extent to which participation satisfied principles of change from below.

## CHAPTER SIX

### THE PROCESS AND OUTCOMES OF PARTICIPATION

#### Introduction

Chapter five has shown that an emphasis on structural rather than transformative reforms meant that the BEIP partnerships cemented into neoliberalism and accentuated the vulnerability of disadvantaged people. This chapter builds on this view by exploring how SMCs/BOGs/PTAs participated in the BEIP and the impact of that participation. It critically examines the structures and approaches that technocrats used to facilitate participation in the planning, implementation and monitoring and evaluation processes to ascertain the extent to which the practice satisfied principles of change from below. The chapter argues that although the BEIP provided structures and opportunities to increase participation, the structural approach technocrats adopted obscured empowerment and social change benefits of the *participatory process* to disadvantaged communities. The three sections covered are planning, implementation and monitoring and evaluation. In each section, focus is upon objectives, methods, meanings and outcomes and the opportunities-challenges these features posed to the actualization of participation by the disadvantaged people whose lives the BEIP was meant to improve.

As noted in previous chapters, development practice and analysis should assume a broad systemic perspective (holism) in understanding particular problems or processes (Ife, 2002). The idea of holism was found in the way technocrats assumed structural and rights-based approaches to enact and implement the BEIP through active participation of SMCs/BOGs/PTAs and communities. These structural and rights-based approaches were designed to promote participation as a process, not just as a separate means and ends. This concurs with Ife's view that the process and outcomes of development are inseparable because means and ends are morally connected. To protect the integrity of the process means should be treated as outcomes. Likewise the means and ends of participation are inseparable. Means can become ends and ends can become means especially because

participation is both a democratic right and a critical learning process (Burkey, 1993; Chambers, 1997). These relationships require change agents to act in ways that do not disenfranchise the disadvantaged people.

Building on the means, ends and process principles set out in chapter four, the data presented here show that despite policy claims to holism, in practice technocrats separated means and ends of participation. Separation meant that technocrats prescribed participation as a technical panacea to the rights and structural challenges school communities experienced. This emphasis on structural outcomes as opposed to rights (where the process of participation constitute the right of self-determination) compromised the integrity of the participatory process. The next section shows how that separation reinforced top-down approaches while limiting SMCs/BOGs/PTAs and disadvantaged people's participation in key decision-making processes.

### **Project Planning**

This section explores how SMCs/BOGs/PTAs participated in project planning, statement of needs and consciousness-raising processes. It argues that the attempt by technocrats to enact the BEIP and determine structures and processes of participation contradicted principles of change from below and excluded school communities from enacting rights of participation and decision-making. As the broad literature on PDev suggests (Cornwall, 2004; Ife, 2002), participation in planning is aimed to make policies and development sensitive to community needs (GOK, 2003b; 2005a). According to documents (GOK, 2002), the GOK enacted structures to support participation in planning. Planning entailed analysing needs, capabilities, resources and activities of redress, including ways to mobilize extra resources to cover deficits. Imperatively then, the extent to which school communities participated in project planning activities indicates their level of control of decisions, resources and knowledge that underpinned development processes

within the BEIP. One of the planning activities entailed stating objectives and results areas of the BEIP.

### **Processes of Stating Objectives**

Given the focus on empowerment and social change, it could reasonably be expected that school communities would have played a key role in establishing the objectives and approaches adopted in the BEIP. However, documents (GOK, 2002) suggest that technocrats in collaboration with UNESCO determined the objectives and the respective approaches. Further, evidence suggests that, at the time of determining objectives (and approaches), the project proposal (development plan) was primarily a fundraising tool. Thus, because of the need to meet the requirements of donors, technocrats established objectives which they perceived would increase access to education while enabling school communities actualise their right of participation. On this view an educationist stated:

“Donors come...at the national level. Negotiations, conclusions and signing [of the agreement] is done here. So these things start rolling once signatories have been attended and terms have been agreed upon. So...we tell stakeholders down there (school), that you are stakeholders, you are parents, you are expected to do this and that. We are not asking them, what are your ideas? Can we incorporate your ideas in this particular project called OPEC? You are already telling them that this is your responsibility...do number one, two and three” (Bushie).

This planner-centred approach (Michener, 1998) to participation contradicts principles of change from below. Change from below necessitates that communities initiate development either by themselves or with the facilitation of change agents (Ife, 2002). The use of words such as ‘telling’ and ‘down’ by technocrats in reference to school communities respectively denote undemocratic and top-down mindsets. These mindsets are confirmed in the data with an educationist who pointed out that participation in project planning occurred through representatives when she said:

“the planning level...is at a point where there was involvement of key government...ministry SAGAs...we had involvement of KIE [Kenya Institute of Education and] different departments in the ministry of

education...so that...the donor would come into an agreement with something that has been again accepted by the stakeholders of the headquarter levels before we went down to the consumer... What I experienced first in the design...of the programme itself, it was a brain storming [exercise] with different SAGAs...so that we would know how to trickle down the whole project, down to the consumer (Antoinette).

This confirms that technocrats are involved in processes of policy translation and their decisions are not value free (Ife, 2002). According to the PDev (Chambers, 1997) management literature, the aim of participation in planning, partly, is to bring decisions closer to the subjects of development and to enable these actively participate. The statement of project objectives and approaches by technocrats meant that neither the SMC/BOGs/PTAs nor disadvantaged communities actively participated in identifying the BEIP. According to an educationist these individuals and groups were excluded in project planning because the project "...is still within the management structure of the central office. It has not rolled to the district, divisions, zones...and it is...the way government programmes and projects are run" (Bushie).

This idea that project planning is not a responsibility of grassroots structures denied school communities their democratic right of agency and self-determination. Relating to their meanings of participation SMCs/BOGs/PTAs testified that:

"...participation is...being involved in the identification of the project and in this case in OPEC it is not the case because they [technocrats, donor] already know what they want to do...actually the areas have been undertaken...we should [also] be involved in...evaluation of the project, in the initial planning, even sustenance... awareness creation on how to implement the project" (Geoffrey).

A key decision of project planning committed school communities in their absence to implement the project with a participatory approach, as stipulated in the poverty reduction strategy (GOK, 2002). This failure by technocrats to involve school communities in these initial decisions meant that the project and its participatory processes were imposed from above. The next section offers further insight into the nature of participation in project planning by arguing that although technocrats created structures and

opportunities for SMCs/BOGs/PTAs to (re)define the needs addressed in the BEIP, their participation was tokenistic-coerced or passive-instrumental.

### **Statement of Needs**

Although there was an understanding of empowerment, the way technocrats facilitated communities to (re)define the structural needs and rights BEIP addressed in their schools led to the emergence of participation as coercion. In tandem with the need to increase ‘power over statement of needs’ (Ife, 2002), the GOK enacted the structure on needs assessment to enable communities to play a key role in determining their felt structural needs and rights. Thus, needs assessment was an opportunity for disadvantaged people and SMCs/BOGs/PTAs to participate as an educationist said:

“...like the needs assessment...it is an opportunity for the school community to participate...that is one because we sought their opinion. Another one is the commitment that finally the project will be given to the community so that the community can gain from it” (Antoinette).

Official documents (GOK, 2003a, 2003b) show that the policy on needs assessment aimed to affect participation and collaboration through a series of activities. Firstly, the policy allowed technocrats to develop needs assessment tools and to test their efficacy with sample schools before these could be applied to the actual needs assessment processes in all schools. The “pilot testing in five schools” (GOK, 2003a, p. 11) aimed to establish the efficacy of the questionnaires technocrats used to assess schools’ needs before these tools were applied on the rest of the 350 schools that took part in the BEIP. The pilot study was also meant to address ambiguities in the questionnaires and harmonize areas of need identified therein with the felt needs of the schools’ communities. Though understandable from an elitist viewpoint, SMCs/BOGs/ PTAs described participation as ‘extractionist’ because they felt cheated out of their rights, knowledge, time and resources by participating in the pilot study where a parent said:

“...so we are seeing that we are being used as experiential animals...the project...is a question [of] experimenting it with us. Whether is successful or a failure, it will be implemented in other areas, not where it is piloted.

So it is exploitive in nature. Though the exploitation is silent, it looks exploitive” (Oromosa).

As alluded to before, the failure to implement the BEIP in some of the schools where the pilot study was done and the withdrawal from primary schools in Coast Province led SMCs/BOGs/PTAs to believe that technocrats were experimenting untested strategies on the disadvantaged people without addressing the root cause of their poverty (see chapter seven). A key problem with the questionnaires used is that they could neither with ease determine the quality of participation nor the levels of poverty (Shivji, 1999, 2003) and micro, meso and macro inequalities (Pieterse, 2002).

The potential and limits of these questionnaires can better be understood by exploring the other two activities: statement of needs and consensus-building. These features ran simultaneously in practice but for ease of reference the data is presented separately. The needs assessment processes ideally, aimed to enable communities to determine their felt needs and build consensus in decisions. It also aimed:

“to assess the degree of [communities interest in the project]; develop interest and seek possible participation in the processes; to discover and understand alternative ways of defining goals and objective of the project; to bring to light information about the programme/people; to begin identifying existing projects, assessing experience and determine institutional resources available so a to determine what can be drawn upon and what needs to be added from external source” (GOK, 2003a, pp. 12-13).

This need to secure community commitment and support for the BEIP necessitated the planning team and project implementation unit to enact a series of methods and processes that culminated with communities stating needs and also attaining consensus-building on the decisions that emerged. In practice though, needs assessment became a process of verifying (or harmonizing) the needs communities identified with the objectives and areas of need technocrats predetermined in the questionnaires. The identification of needs began with the determination of the project objectives and the selection of schools. As stated in chapter four, rather than drawing information directly from communities



technocrats initially used secondary information to select disadvantaged communities and demarcate their needs (GOK, 2003b).

District implementation committees and political elites facilitated the selection processes. The problem with using secondary data (or third parties) to establish 'needs' as revealed here is that the right of participation is treated as an information gathering process. Such practice is reductionist. On the view that participation is both a democratic right and a learning process (Burkey, 1993; Chambers, 1997; Ife, 2002), the use of secondary and third parties to demarcate areas of needs and expected outcomes could be seen to deny disadvantaged communities the opportunity to enact these rights.

Reductionist practice is also evident in the process of determining the tools of analysis. The data show that communities played no role in determining the tools technocrats used to assess their needs. After developing the project proposal and implementation plan, technocrats developed two sets of questionnaires and defined the kind of information needed and the procedures of administration. The questionnaires addressed the earlier stated rights and structural needs of primary and secondary schools and non-formal education centres. The first questionnaire prescribed the participation of headteachers. Headteachers participated by providing general information about the school: geographic location and socio-economic setting, school enrolment capacity, information on special needs students, gender, school progress in achievement, physical facilities, teaching and learning resources in primary and number of teachers for science subjects available in the respective secondary schools. As a headteacher stated, participation was nothing more than "completing the questionnaire" (Kagendo). The second set of questionnaires contained four sections each corresponding to a project objective: school management and governance, physical facilities and other teaching and learning resources, wellbeing, healthcare and sanitation and participation and community mobilization.

Each section contained 12–15 questions. The specific questions also varied according to whether the school was primary, secondary or a non-formal education centre and sponsor. Technocrats held three-day meetings with SMCs/BOGs/PTAs to determine needs based on these questionnaires. A statement of needs was an iterative process of identifying needs by completing the questionnaires, prioritizing, evaluating resources, costs and mapping actions on the basis of (un)available human, social, economic and political capital. Participants were educationists, planners, members of SMCs/BOGs/PTAs, area education officers or inspectors of schools and village leaders.

According to technocrats' testimonies, the questionnaires were comprehensive. They covered most information necessary for technical planning and resource allocation. According to Ife (2002) such expertise is necessary for information gathering and data analysis. Although SMCs/BOGs/PTAs (re)defined needs with the facilitation of technocrats, the quality and impact of their participation remains an empirical question.

To be sure the question is not whether disadvantaged people participated. Rather, it is the quality of their participation. Empirical data used to answer this question reveals disconnects between the policies used to promote participation and the practices which ensued. A training module, which technocrats used to build the financial and management capacities of participating school communities, describes the needs assessment as a process of “gathering important information that sets the tone and direction of the project [through] consulting with [communities] for whom the project is intended by policy makers...to take ownership and responsibility for sustaining the OPEC project overtime” (GOK, 2003a, p. 12). The document also distinguishes between compensatory and constructive needs assessment approaches. A compensatory approach identifies problems and focuses on “removing the deficit, instead of assisting the community to find permanent solutions.”

A constructive approach aims to empower the community to find ways to a lasting solution...to come out of the problem through “identifying the divergent views and the deviants so as to involve them not to sabotage the programme” (GOK, 2003a, pp. 14-15).

It also privileges primary over secondary data, which may give inaccurate information due to regional disparities, data manipulation and policy interpretations. Despite documentary preference for constructive processes, the data on the process of participation in the needs assessment meetings indicates otherwise. While acknowledging the value of inferred knowledge, the paradox is that, by using questionnaires, technocrats appeared to reduce communities into objects— passive recipients of predetermined development plans, needs and decisions. The use of questionnaires denied disadvantaged people the rights of choice, agency and decision-making and as detailed later privileged technical (or devalued local) knowledge.

According to Ife (2002) communities must determine their own needs and analysis tools to avoid imposition of needs and methods determined elsewhere. On this view, the data confirm that SMCs/BOGs/PTAs participation in planning processes was only a reaction to predetermined needs and decisions, as opposed to initiating needs and evolving their own methods and solutions. To be precise participation in the needs-assessment was coerced as a parent/BOG member asserted:

“You cannot tell people to participate when you have already drawn the playing field [project, questionnaire, needs, and decisions] and then you tell them come and play in the field I have already put. You are not sure whether some would have wanted to play outside. But you already tell them you guys come I want you to play here...And now you are equal partners, start participating. That coerced kind of participation, not many people ...really want to participate. People mainly want to participate in issues they have made decisions about...themselves” (Sundukia).

There is ample evidence in technocrats’ accounts that participation in the needs assessment assumed consultation, telling or informing. Such participation is overly nominal (Cornwall, 2000) and tokenistic (Arnstein, 1971; Ife, 2002). It can thus be questioned to what extent the process of needs assessment increased disadvantaged communities’ control and power over the determination of needs, ideas and life chances. The idea of participation through representation meant that disadvantaged people themselves did not participate in the needs assessment meetings. The needs assessment

structures and the practices these generated thus exclude disadvantaged people from enacting their right of participation and obscured benefits of learning (empowerment and social change) which they would have had.

Indeed the attempt to use generalised tools to determine needs of school communities constrained the alternative choices of school communities which found that the needs which were not identified in the questionnaires, however important, could not be addressed in the BEIP. It also negated consideration of contextual differences and the unique features that existed in the target schools. Thus, the needs assessment tools were seen to 'universalise' needs of the disadvantaged people and to relegate the significance of difference and diversity in aid development.

Again, most SMC members with low levels of literacy least understood the second set of questionnaires and the method of analysis. As detailed later under the consensus-building section, it is for this reason that teachers played a significant role in completing the questionnaires on behalf of the disadvantaged communities and interpreting these to SMCs/BOGs/PTAs. Although technocrats described participation as a right and argued that school communities 'fully participated', their attempt to determine needs and dictate resources meant that development is conferred downwards by the state/donor something done for communities not something communities originate. As noted in chapter four *dictating* budgets when needs assessment ought to facilitate communities originate their own plans meant that participation in development remained "a discourse of the powerful about the powerless" and a dictatorship of needs and resources (Ife, 2002, p. 67).

Such dictatorship limited control of the participatory process by disadvantaged communities. Such a practice is disempowering and is skewed towards dependency because it focused on using aid to address educational and poverty challenges. The practice of participation in needs assessment and consensus-building limited agency by retaining the decision-making authority with technocrats and excluding disadvantaged people from enacting these rights where a parent said:

“Of course...participation to them [technocrats, donor] means identifying needs...A project is supposed [to] help people identify their needs and go further than that. But now if participation is used to make people identify needs, really it is so limiting, because if I identify my needs and you take them, whatever solution you give is according to you, whatever resources you attach is also according to you. That is very much limited...When we are talking about stakeholders’ participation, we are talking about power sharing...all we know is that power is very sticky...power determines resource sharing...very few people [donor, technocrats] are really in the bottom of their heart committed to share power ...and...resources...mainly the participation is limited to processes that enable the communities to identify their needs and plan...but participation involves control [of] resources and money....when you want to make a decision to buy this and that they don’t want their beneficiaries to know that...So their participation is still very much naked” (Sundukia).

This way, technocrats risked using the coopting language of representation, questionnaires, ‘stakeholders’, ‘full participation’, ‘beneficiaries’ and ‘needs’ to silence dissenting voices and legitimate the status quo where an educationist said:

“In fact these things [projects] are rolled down, already with specifics, done, defining the role of each stakeholder. So you end up being told, here is a programme and this is what is expected out of you...So you are trying to align yourself to fit within the system of what you are being told to do” (Bushie).

Such depoliticization of the right of participation arose because of the need to achieve consensus-building through questionnaires and representatives.

### **Consensus-Building**

The need to secure SMCs/BOGs/PTAs and community commitment toward the BEIP through the needs assessment processes derived from the view that participation enhances ownership of decisions through processes of consensus-building. The structures, methods and processes of needs assessment were thus designed to generate consensus-building, make the BEIP sensitive to the needs of the disadvantaged communities, and increase their participation in decision-making. These are important spaces which the GOK instituted, in line with Cornwall (2004), to ensure active participation of communities in planning. However, the way technocrats integrated processes of consensus-building in the

questionnaires and needs assessment processes fell short of realisation of the integrity of the participatory process.

The process of consensus-building proceeded as follows. First, three teachers separately completed the second set of questionnaires. Each teacher identified seven-to-eight priorities per section according to how they felt such areas needed attention. Next, with facilitation of educationists, these teachers converged to discuss their prioritized needs and agreed on the top four-to-five priorities per section. They then completed a fresh questionnaire to indicate the outcome of their collaborative discussions. On the second day, with the facilitation of either a deputy or senior teacher, these teachers converged with SMCs/BOGs/PTAs. On average the meetings were attended by 10–13 members, excluding the facilitators. Technocrats facilitative roles ranged on a continuum from complete observer to participant observer.

In addition to completing the earlier said demographic questionnaire, headteachers participated as observers. A key aim of these meetings was to adopt the needs previously agreed upon by the teachers and build consensus with the rest of SMCs/BOGs/PTAs members. Upon lengthy deliberations SMCs/BOGs/PTAs ranked their preferred four options per section, on a continuum of 1–4 in order of priority. Further debate on these tallies enabled SMCs/BOGs/PTAs to select one core need per section through a majority vote. On the third day, participants drew contextualized action plans and tentative budgets for these four priority needs. Technocrats then used the information generated from these discussions to enact the final decisions on needs.

The extent to which this process of consensus-building increased control of SMCs/BOGs/PTAs and disadvantaged communities over decisions and the plans that flowed from their participation is an open question. The data indicate that needs analysis and consensus-building are key determinants of ownership and sustainability. Thus, the efficacy of the BEIP to impact on these features depended upon how SMCs/BOGs/PTAs participated in these meetings where an educationist stated:

“Needs assessment was one of the exercises that was very key...We were trying to assess the priority needs of each school so that we will be sure of what they want us to do... If it has to be participation, it is not about the ministry dictating what they want to do in the schools. It was about the schools being involved in *deciding* their priority areas of needs. My experience...was that there was a lot of acceptance of the project by the SMCs, teachers, DEOs. Why was there so much acceptance? It is because at one point we are giving back the project to them and no longer calling it the ministry of education headquarters project, but calling it the schools’ project. We referred to it as ‘your project’. Though we were the designers, though the money was being facilitated through the headquarters, we returned the whole project to them for the purpose of participation and ownership...[Thus] the needs-assessment was an eye opener to enable the consumer accept the project and move it (Antoinette).

Contrary to Ife’s (2002) view of change from below, this practice of decision-making and consensus-building through representatives suggest that ownership can be conferred from above. Paradoxically, this means that the decision on participation was imposed on the disadvantaged people in an attempt to secure support, ownership and sustainability of the BEIP. Notwithstanding the significance of ownership and sustainability, it is one thing for communities to participate in implementing predetermined decisions and plans. It is another to claim ownership, make commitment and practically be able to sustain the project. The fact that ownership entails the control of decisions, resources and processes (Ife, 2002) means that participation and ownership reside with people. This is understandable considering the type of schools the project supported and the structural and rights approaches that technocrats assumed.

As alluded to earlier, most schools had been built by communities through harambee processes. Again, the selection conditions demanded that participating schools must be “initiated and managed by the community [which must demonstrate] awareness of its needs” (GOK, 2003b, p. 16). Participation by these communities was thus a matter of principle. Since communities neither initiated the project, nor made critical decisions, whose development were they to participate in and own? As said before, this is not just a question of ownership and accountability. It is also one of agency and efficacy of participation to affect sustainable changes. Despite claims to ownership, the idea of

deciding for disadvantaged communities and giving them aid resources to own as detailed in chapter seven can be questioned on the view that aid development is unsustainable. Again, participation through representatives excluded the very disadvantaged people and increased control by the donor and technocrats.

The data with technocrats demonstrate awareness that participation is a process through which school communities exercised their democratic right. However, those who participated in consensus-meetings are not the real decision-makers. Consensus-building meetings are public arenas in which the disadvantaged participated, but the real decisions remained made in private forums that were inaccessible to these people. Statements of needs and consensus-building through SMCs/BOGs/PTAs and technocrats meant that these meetings were only attended by representatives. The use of questionnaires also meant that SMCs/BOGs/PTAs build consensus on predetermined decisions and demarcated areas of needs as a member of a district committee stated:

“If you want to attend a meeting and you want to get involved in that discussion, I think that is participation. The meeting has its objective and purpose. If it is a planning...or consultative meeting...most of our people [communities] are not even consulted in the projects they see around...they are never consulted. Projects just come and then they are asked, be involved and own the project. This is what people usually come and tell [us]...most of the time we feel that most of these projects are being forced down the throats of our people, because in the initial stage, the initiation process, they are not consulted on the projects. So somebody comes with a project and tells you...you don't have facilities, he will give you good facilities” [Nashika).

Such participation where disadvantaged people build consensus by ‘reacting’ to predetermined needs and decisions (Ife, 2002) or participate not to generate ideas, but to consent to ready-made decisions risked legitimating the status quo. According to Ife (2002) different types of participation (including representation) should be encouraged because not all people can actively participate. Albeit, as said before the use of representatives to reduce multiple viewpoints meant that the disadvantaged people were excluded from decisions. Ultimately, either due to a lack of time or in the name of consensus-building such decisions were rushed to satisfy donor and technocrats interests. The reference of



'statement of needs' as 'assessment' or 'verification' suggest that technocrats used needs-assessment less to build consensus but more to justify predetermined decisions and actions as a technocrat avowed:

“...for the first time we [technocrats] did not want to be told that we are writing a document from Jogoo house, for Jogoo house [by] the people [communities]...that's why we involved all stakeholders...the process was participatory” (Duncan).

Although meant to ensure commitment and participation of SMCs/BOGs/PTAs and disadvantaged parents, such commitment was lacking, partly because “this was a project that was just coming in...The level of participation of the parents...was just to be told this has happened... [Although]...involved [represented] in that meeting... there is no statement of agreement that you will contribute, that brings in the hitch...” (Emmanuel). This confirms Ife's (2002) view that stating needs is like 'writing a will'. It entails decisions, commitments and responsibilities. Relegation of commitment and benefits of ownership also arose from the technocrats' view that school communities needed to participate but not contribute monies because they were poor. Paradoxically, by assuming that they were funding the BEIP wholly through aid, technocrats devalued local knowledge and potential. It is thus not perchance that disadvantaged people hardly participated in decisions and SMCs/BOGs/PTAs found it difficult to mobilise additional resources from parents as a district educationist stated:

“It is only SMC members who come to sit and deliberate on issues pertaining to the project. Otherwise, community participation as such...because the donation is fully funded...there is no way the community will come and say we are participating by providing funds here...At the moment no” (Chamkwezi).

Considering that participation has normative and technical values (Ife, 2002), the practice of participation in planning processes suggest that technocrats enacted and implemented participation as a technical panacea to the structural and rights challenges the disadvantage people faced. The next section argues that the structural approach to participation redefined consciousness-raising and community-resources mobilisation as

‘sites’ for (de)valuing local potentials despite awareness that these features were critical empowerment and transformative opportunities for disadvantaged people

### **Implementation**

The purpose of this section is to examine how participation occurred in the implementation of consciousness-raising and the mobilization of communities and resources to support the BEIP. Although participation has increased awareness of rights, the attempt by technocrats to prescribe participation as a technical panacea to the structural and rights challenges of the disadvantaged people enabled the GOK to shirk its responsibility while loading the same on disadvantaged people. Official documents (GOK, 2003b), indicate that the GOK assigned SMCs/BOGs/PTAs and disadvantaged people roles to play in implementing the BEIP. The need to mobilize communities and conscientise them about their participation in the BEIP drew upon the view that:

“the government does not build schools or laboratories...many parents and communities are not actively involved in management of schools due to lack of proper training in how schools are managed...most learning institutions...lack supportive learning environments. Classroom conditions are poor. Furniture and equipment are inadequate or unsuitable. Water and sanitation facilities are unhealthy or non-existent...many parents and communities are not sensitized enough on such issues and what role they should play in supporting education of their children” (GOK, 2002, p. 27-28).

To address these structural and rights deficits and enhance good governance and community responsibility towards educational development the GOK negotiated a loan with OPEC, sensitized communities and coordinated disbursement of funds. The subsequent sub-sections detail that by focusing on aid and technical expertise the GOK risked shirking its responsibilities and devaluing local potentials through consciousness-raising and community-resources mobilizations.

### **Consciousness-raising**

The methods selected by technocrats to affect consciousness-raising were advocacy and capacity-building (GOK, 2002, 2003b). These features aimed to ‘sensitize’

disadvantaged people and SMCs/BOGs/PTAs on the need to participate and sustain the BEIP where an educationist reiterated:

“I want to group stakeholders’ right away from the ministry, all the way to the parents on the ground: teachers...the beneficiaries and...the students. The involvement mainly has been, at the ministry level we organized for *sensitization* of the beneficiaries on the ground and mobilize[d] them on the need to support the project; So that they know the amount of money that is supposed to go to them, for what purpose...how are they going to be ready to utilize these funds and also organize for sustainability...at the end of it...Being a GOK/OPEC [partnership] there is need for sustainability of the project” (Mapya).

The focus on capacity building is a key strength of the BEIP. It concurs with Ife’s (2002) view that any development intervention focused on empowerment must integrate educational mechanisms to raise the consciousness of disadvantaged people and enable them to participate meaningfully. Technocrats conceptualised consciousness-raising as a process through which to provide information to disadvantaged people and SMC/BOGs/PTAs. The idea was to enable them to make informed choices about their participation in the BEIP. Nonetheless, consciousness-raising is more than just making a decision about whether or not to participate and how to spend aid resources. It is much more about the kind of participation and the extent to which the process increased the ability of disadvantaged people to initiate social and political action on the structural and rights deficits they were facing. The way disadvantaged people participated in consciousness-raising processes is thus a critical measure of their level of awareness of rights and ability to enact these rights.

As set out in the BEIP structure, political elites were meant to enact advocacy. Technocrats believed that political elites were better able to enact advocacy and affect consciousness-raising and participation of disadvantaged people because:

“These are people who are representing a wider range of population. That implies that the person ought to be an accessible person. You can access to them any time for information purposes. These are the kind of people who are respected within the society. So...they can command some authority. We are talking about people who have some influence so that when you call for public participation, these people will be able to collect everyone in the community. We are talking about people like the political councillors, the MPs, the chiefs. These are people who are very influential.

People who are commanding authority, people who are respected, people who have character such that when it comes to your interest of using them to reach to the community, because you are not known by everyone in the community, it is very easy to go through them...These are also people who can communicate clearly, may be with basic literacy level and who can communicate well because this is about passing information and if it is distorted, it messes the whole project” (Antoinette).

In tandem with ADev (Friedmann, 1992; Ife, 2002) participation of political elites in advocacy was meant to guarantee ‘political will’ by linking disadvantaged people with the political structures that governed their lives. For this reason, when ‘inviting’ politicians to participate, technocrats chose those they considered actively involved in the development of their constituents. The expectation was that the invited politicians would not ‘politicize’ the BEIP for personal gains. Contrary to the technocrats’ view that politicians ought to be impartial and apolitical, their practice of advocacy and participation indicate that schools and aid projects are arenas for political interests (personal and collective). SMCs/BOGs/PTAs testimonies reiterated that:

“This [interest] could be political...politician in a given community when donor money like OPEC has come during his term, they expect next time to say this project has come during my time. So can you elect me?” (Nashika).

Despite technocrats awareness and concern to avoid practices that enhance personal as opposed to the collective good, the use of the BEIP as a campaign tool reinforced personal interests and redefined politicians as ‘donors’ not political agents. Such distortion of authentic political relations arose partly from the use of power-brokers to exert pressure on disadvantaged people to participate and enable technocrats secure access and acceptance by these people. Such practices compromised the integrity of the participatory process and depoliticized the political because rights (participation, access to information) by their very nature are political. Acts of depoliticization showed in the way technocrats invited politicians to participate and advocate for the BEIP and in processes of participation and collaboration.

As noted earlier, politicians used their authority to exert pressure on technocrats' decisions about the schools in the BEIP. To the extent that attempts to connect the 'personal and the political' (Ife, 2002) enhanced domination by politicians, it can be questioned to what extent advocacy after Freire (1973) 'conscientised' disadvantaged people about the structural disadvantages that inhibited their knowledge of rights and participation. Focus group data through a headteacher revealed that:

“Participation in this project has made our politician [active]...particularly at school Y, this project has sort of brought some blessing politically. I am sure, after the political arena learnt that we had received some assistance from the OPEC people, now blessings started flowing to the school. They also started allocating us money for something else such as renovating dormitories” (Benjamin).

While some politicians participated by visiting the project sites, spending their own resources to expand physical facilities in schools, others “...since we started this project at our school, we have talked to the area councillor and she has never turned up even one day” (Maisha). As detailed in chapter seven structural disadvantages based on culture, gender and age mitigated against the participation of some female leaders. The data is replete with views that some political leaders did not engage in the BEIP because they were busy in urban centres, while the project sites were in rural areas. This is to say regional disparities constrained the ability of political leaders to fulfil their advocacy and participatory responsibilities. Another factor that prevented some political and civic leaders from fulfilling these obligations in the words of a chief is:

“Sometimes when we want to participate...we are not able...we are not informed about such things...Sometimes those donors are not passing through our offices so by the time they come to the schools we are not aware. If we do not communicate with the headmasters...we find it difficult...to participate in the project” (Rosalind).

When enacting the structures on advocacy technocrats believed that civic and political leaders were better able to use their political influence to affect the participation and consciousness of communities within schools' neighbourhoods. To the extent that some political and civic leaders claimed a lack of information when the data show that they

took part in selecting the schools within their jurisdiction testify to how responsibility is negated in aid PDev. It adds to the ineffectiveness of advocacy through political elites.

As such politicians and power-brokers cannot be considered as direct channels for enacting consciousness-raising and participation of disadvantaged people. As detailed in chapter seven, their behaviours risked entrenching structural disadvantages either through exclusion or domination as a result of cultural and gender perspectives. Despite these shortcomings politicians should be encouraged to participate because by so doing they interacted with their constituents in developing schools. The experience gained from such interaction equipped disadvantaged people to better demand responsibility from these political representatives when they privilege their personal interests over the collective good. However, the ability of disadvantaged people to initiate social and political action against entrenched structural disadvantage remained a distant dream because participation in the BEIP taught them that:

“Politicians should be there and should be encouraged to participate because they know more where these donors are and where funds come from than myself in the location” (Hamish).

This idea of establishing networks with politicians with a view to connecting disadvantaged communities with donors misses the point where consciousness-raising according to Ife (2002) ought to enable these people to understand how structural disadvantages are perpetuated in society. The assumption according to Ife (2002) is that because of oppressive structures and discourses, disadvantaged people have come to accept oppression as inevitable. They are unconscious of oppression. The role of change agents is to raise the consciousness of disadvantaged people about the discourses and structures which inhibit them from exploring disadvantage and oppression effectively. As confirmed here, technocrats, SMCs/BOGs/PTAs and the politicians along with the disadvantaged people require conscientisation.

According to participant observations<sup>31</sup>, technocrats used the needs assessment meetings to advocate for the BEIP. Advocacy in this case assumed telling or informing SMCs/BOGs/PTAs about the project objectives to enable them to make decisions about how they wished to participate. Technocrats also directed SMCs/BOGs/PTAs to carry out further advocacy as a means of mobilizing broader communities and their resources to support the BEIP. Such sensitization and mobilization aimed to enlist the participation of disadvantaged communities to increase efficiency and cost-effectiveness. On their part SMCs/BOGs/PTAs used parents and open and prize giving days to publicise the BEIP to the neighbouring communities. An educationist recorded these processes by saying:

“You know there was this aspect of community sensitization and mobilization. One must strategise on how he want to achieve targets...for a project like this to succeed... We started by identifying the said schools and means. We [district committees] gave a list of...schools [to project coordination unit]. It is out of those schools that the evaluation team went down there [schools] to analyse needs...those were necessary strategies and steps. After the schools were identified they had to convene meetings now with the stakeholders to mobilize, to create that awareness, training those people who will be handling the finances and those who will be supervising...when it comes to those strategies, there is nothing we... want to change to enhance participation...these are very necessary and very crucial” (Emmanuel).

Despite knowledge of the important role communities played in their own development and the need to sustain the BEIP, consciousness-raising was done in a top-down and coercive manner. The way technocrats carried out advocacy represented disadvantaged people as passive recipients of aid resources, information and plans designed elsewhere, not as initiators of development. Such practice is also evident in the way technocrats implemented capacity-building and training seminars for members of SMCs/BOGs/PTAs and district implementation committees. According to documents (GOK, 2003a) technocrats used lectures with integrated questions-answer sessions and

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<sup>31</sup> At the time of data collection for this research, capacity-building was being undertaken for schools in phases two and three of the BEIP. Some workshops provided professional knowledge about methodologies of teaching science education, especially for secondary schools teachers. These professional-based training sessions were not observed. The data presented here excludes these.

group discussions to sensitize and capacity-build these groups. The knowledge was tailored to specific project objective in the areas of community mobilization, needs assessment, project management, school administration, financial management (budgeting, reporting, record keeping), accountability, procurement of stores and services and development planning and integrity. It also emphasized the need for physical facilities to meet housing, health standards and remain sensitive to the needs of the physically challenged. A training module was covered within five days.

These details are important because the success of consciousness-raising depended not just on the means but also the content and process of communication. These features indicate the degree of power and control by SMCs/BOGs/PTAs. Technocrats observed that information was disseminated through “established communication channels” (Antoinette) of the education sector and the BEIP management structures as shown in chapter four.

Participation in the BEIP enhanced awareness of rights where a technocrat confirmed:

“When you hear some of these BOGs/PTAs...they are firing. People are not to be dictated to any more...initially we used to think elites are authorities of the village. He comes and dictates to the BOGs...these things are changing because people have become enlightened...they have grown out of this thing called ‘nimewajua wale wamesoma’ [I have connections with elites]...they [communities] may not be educated but they are aware of some of their rights as citizens of this country. And that is a way forward for education...it is just about time change is coming...when you go to these district committee meetings, you will see it coming. People are talking more than they used to. Responsibilities have been pushed to the lowest level and that is opening their eyes. Aha! This is what we have been missing” (Duncan).

This concurs with Williams’ (2004) view that a key determinant of emancipation is knowledge of human and political rights, and particularly the right of agency for the disadvantaged people. Participation also contributed to processes of learning in tandem and increased awareness of needs where the technocrat added:

“Participation has been to me an eye opener. It has build my capacity because in the processes of building others, I also learned from them...we in the ivory towers ...think we know it all...wait until you go to talk to these locals and they tell you, No! Our needs are not what you are telling us. Our needs are...if you give us water, roads, electricity we will be fine. You go to a school thinking that you know their needs or what is best, only to realize you knew very little. To some of them classes may not be



the issue...If you built a toilet for them even if you build a storey house for them, you are wasting time...It has been a learning process for me. We are talking about learning in tandem” (Duncan).

Capacity-building forums also provided space for SMCs/BOGs/PTAs to establish dialogical and collaborative relationships across class boundaries and share experiences of participation with technical experts from ministries of health and public works. These ministries were also claimed to have increased their role in education. These outcomes confirm Ife’s (2002) view that participatory processes enable marginalized people to create new social networks and share experiences of oppression. According to participant observations, attendance in capacity-building was 100 percent. Paradoxically, the extent to which these means of consciousness-raising and the networks created affected dehumanizing structures and discourses that leave disadvantaged people powerless cannot be clearly ascertained. As said before, it meant that representation contributed to elite-to-elite networks in capacity-building forums.

Albeit, when the approaches technocrats used and these outcomes are juxtaposed with Brohman’s (1996) concerns about who participates, how participation occurs and where, it becomes apparent that the BEIP consciousness-raising programme least challenged dominant discourses and structural disadvantages. The reproduction of social class through elite-to-elite networks risked entrenching domination because the very disadvantaged people who are most affected by structural disadvantages were excluded from capacity-building forums. SMCs/BOGs/PTAs described awareness-raising as a once-off activity in which technocrats were the mediums of knowledge rather than a process where disadvantaged people participate as creators of knowledge:

“The people [technocrats] who are used to introduce the project to the community, most of the times...do not understand the community...Somebody will be sent to sensitize you and he tells you he has two hours to spent tonight, and needs so and so. At the end of the day, the people who will be coming there are the people who are available then...but not those who matter in decision-making in that community. And when they are confronted with questions, they end up giving the communities false expectations, they make false promises. Because the first question they are asked is what are you coming to do? What do you

have for us? So that they be accepted they will sweet-talk to the people. And then from there they will not be seen again. The ministry of education is notorious for sending different persons for the same project. Today you sent this, tomorrow another and the next day another person” (Jasmine).

The hurriedness with which technocrats conducted consciousness-raising in the perspectives of SMCs/BOGs/PTAs showed that “there is inadequate communication” and that they were interested in justifying their personal interests in aid because once they had “gotten their allowances... they don’t consider the sustainability of that particular project” (Jasmine). A technocrat concurred with this view by saying that:

“We have had cases...where the money has...been spent in paying hotel bills for the same people day in and out to talk about project aims. In my view, benefits may not trickle down, or where we spent development partners’ money [aid] to conduct community sensitization. The same people [trainers]...have recently been given a nickname, ‘professional work-shoppers’. These are people who are in every workshop, if it is in agriculture, education, health and it all ends there” (Parsley).

Such practices concur with Mulenga’s (1999) view that PDev contributes to manageristic systems that are too costly but which have little impact on the poor. Indeed, SMCs/BOGs/PTAs challenged technocrats methods of capacity-building by demanding to be paid stipends just like the technocrat and to be given notes to take home rather than spend time in lectures to be taught what they could read by themselves. Though underpinning a learning outcome on the part of technocrats and SMCs/BOGs/PTAs, such practices attest that consciousness-raising forums turned into ‘sites’ in which technocrats top-down mindsets exerted bureaucratic pressure on the SMCs/PTAs/BOGs and disadvantaged people to participate. Yet, such domination appeared to enhance neither consciousness-raising nor participation. Although all members attended needs-assessment where they were sensitized about their roles in decision-making and made a commitment to support the BEIP, their participation and that of neighbouring communities diminished during implementation.

As said before only the three members of SMCs/BOGs/PTAs who attended capacity-building forums remained actively involved in decision-making. On this view an educationist remarked: “we [trained] them so that they could go back and sensitize the

whole SMC/BOG/PTA so that at the end of the day each one of them is an expert, but not to go and be the only two or three people who are in charge of what is happening” (Wamsha). Paradoxically, this need to create experts testify to ‘new professionalism’ (Chambers, 1994c). Such reproduction of social class through processes of consciousness-raising meant that even where opportunities for participation are created, politics of representation, aid assistance and other structural disadvantages inhibit participation and the effective understanding of structural disadvantages by technocrats and disadvantaged people. These features imposed a technical approach to consciousness-raising which led technocrats to privilege their own knowledge over local knowledge and potential.

Technocrats rushed consciousness-raising because their focus on outcomes of physical facilities aimed to save teaching and learning time:

“...we had said we were not going to talk first...we are going to the ground, build the classrooms and when we are about to be through, we shall start talking. I have considered that one as very practical because before we have done anything else, children are already in the classes benefiting. Although of course there was some minimum talk [initially]. We had to assemble the leaders and tell them what we want to do in the location (grassroots tier of local government)” (Parsley).

It is logical to build classrooms to ensure students do not lose learning time. These are important outcomes, given the BEIP aim of increasing access to education by establishing an enabling environment for teaching and learning. However, this technical mindset, compromised the integrity of the participatory process by privileging the outcomes of rights on the part of students over the democratic right of participation of their parents. This failure to balance between rights and obligations suggests that if parents are unaware of the structures and discourses which inhibit them from fulfilling their own rights and obligations to their children, it is unlikely the outcomes of awareness-raising would affect inequalities of gender, culture, age and poverty (chapter seven). The next section deliberates that this technical approach led to commodification of participation and the devaluing of local potential despite awareness that community-resources mobilisation processes are critical to empowerment and transformation.

## Community-Resources Mobilisation

This subsection argues that while communities participate when they know their actions will make a difference, the technical approach used to implement the BEIP devalued local potential. Together with structural disadvantages experienced by the poor, the technical approach also inhibited meaningful participation. The data reported the technical approach where some technocrats described participation as “expanding democratic spaces of empowerment” by enacting structures for disadvantaged people to participate (Duncan). It is also where most educationists described participation as:

“...contribution or input by those affected by the project...supporting the project [by] providing material resources such as sand, bricks, ballast, skilled, unskilled labour...[and] non-material support such as time, sharing ideas (Bushie).

Likewise, SMCs/BOGs/PTAs saw “participation...[as] financial assistance from the government...donor and other well-wishers...parents working manually, like bringing water, building materials, giving guidance, monitoring and evaluation” (Jasmine). A key aim of the BEIP was to build/rehabilitate classrooms and laboratories and provide sanitation and water facilities. To achieve these aims the GOK secured a loan from the OPEC. It also enacted structures to enable SMCs/BOGs/PTAs to mobilise disadvantaged communities and their resources to increase impact of the loan:

“At the school level, we came to an agreement with the SMC...since they will be the ones on the ground implementing the project, they would have to give bits of resources, but not in monetary terms. So they were to provide things like labour... Education administrators [were] to ensure that there is good coordination between the headquarters and the district level together with the committees who were involved in the implementation...There were so defined roles for each individual and I felt they [SMCs/BOGs/PTAs] were accepting their roles since we did not dictate the roles to them. We requested them to give us what to do. So when they said they were...going to provide water for free, we felt that was participation enough. Others said they will collect sand... free labour... out of all that I felt the resources were very well shared in terms of the role for each individual. So it was not about just taking to them money because money is not the final end. It had to go deeper to the consumer getting involved in how to utilize the fund to make sure that they maximize the results of what was coming from the financial resource given to them” (Antoinette).

These redefinitions of participation on a continuum from aid (technical) assistance to voluntary contribution emphasized a technical approach, which focused on providing solutions to the structural and rights deficiencies of the disadvantaged people. This emphasis on outcomes by maximizing benefits of aid valorised the agency of disadvantaged communities not as a right but as a method of enabling communities to save and redistribute surplus as in microeconomics and markets. Relieving disadvantaged peoples' burden of building schools conforms to beneficiary types of participation (Cornwall, 2003) where "the OPEC project has not come to incorporate our money to it...the benefit comes as a supplement to our resources and abilities" (Reuben). Where parents participated by providing labour, materials and supervision of constructions they reduced costs and could spread benefits to other areas.

While citizenry participation to cater for deficits in development plans is essential, this microeconomic view of participation meant that under the guise of participation the GOK can potentially reduce its expenditure on education, while loading the same on communities. On this view a parent/BOG member said:

"One way of seeing participation is contribution of labour, it means they will save in terms of money. If more people can participate and give their labour, they will reduce the cost and it will be better for them in terms of resources...participation to them means identifying needs. That makes their work easier too" (Sundukia).

These meanings attest to *commodification*<sup>32</sup> of participation. As research (Craig & Porter, 2003) has shown commodification of participation represents a convergence of government, donors and citizenry politics within PRSP and SWAP policies from which the BEIP derived its legitimacy for people-centred, participatory and partnerships approaches. Arguably, it resonates with the way 'third-way' governments (Strathdee, 2005) in UK and

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<sup>32</sup> Used to refer but not limited to the actions (e.g. employment/sell of ideas/knowledge/skills, labour, services) and processes (decision-making, contracting, and competitive bidding) through which participation is weighed and translated into waged economic and human capital within the BEIP.

New Zealand are responding to the social exclusionary effects<sup>33</sup> of economic growth through commodification of social capital.

Contrary to the technocrats' view of voluntary participation by providing 'free' labour, ideas and materials, commodification suggests that the BEIP provided opportunities for disadvantaged communities to gain employment and market their knowledge, skills and resources where an educationist said:

“When the contractor employs those local fundis (constructors) they also benefit economically [through utilization of local labour force...skilled or unskilled... and] the materials used in the local area...” (Benjamin).

Although disadvantaged communities believed that they had a critical role to play in education and development, to be motivated to participate in the BEIP and other aid projects, it was essential for local resources, skills and knowledge to be valued. These sensibilities concur with Ife's (2002) contention that in addition to a broad education to enable disadvantaged people to effectively participate, ownership and sustainability are more likely where local potential is used. The GOK satisfied this view by establishing structures that enable SMCs/BOGs/PTAs to procure goods and services from the communities within which the BEIP was implemented. Valuing local resources was essential because “ownership...depends on how you have involved the locals” (Antoinette). Valuing local potential enhanced self-esteem upon successful implementation of the project, and “...encourage[d] further development” (Benjamin).

Paradoxically, commodification of participation in the BEIP meant that where the aim is to cut costs, or maximize savings of aid, disadvantaged communities were triple payers. First, they build the schools on their own land. Second, they employed teachers

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<sup>33</sup> For example, those relating to erosion of familial social networks upon which primordial societies depended on for employment and other means of economic activity. To reverse such effects third-way governments have evolved an interest in social capital and have taken an active role to remake social networks through policies such as those governing welfare system and tertiary organisation (competency-based assessments and PBRF). The aim is to create communities of knowledge and to optimize benefits of social networks in employment processes of recruitment, placement, contracting and marketing (e.g. labour and research).

where the government has not deployed these to the schools (GOK, 2003b). Third, the BEIP was funded through a loan, not a grant. Here, participation is two-fold: direct tax and in capital and kind through the project partnership. Besides aiding the government to triple-shirk its responsibilities, participation could also be seen to blame (or discipline) communities for their conditions where an educationist said:

“I [community, parent] am the beneficiary...it is not for the foreigner [donor] who is giving me money, not even for the...ministry of education. So every Kenyan should participate in these projects...In essence you realize that at the end of it all we will end up paying this loan all of us...not the government. The government will pay the loan as a facilitator...but me the local person, I am being charged the tax which is being used to pay back the loan. In other words, whether I want to participate or I'm not participating, at the end of it all, I will still pay back that loan through the little tax that I pay as I buy something in the shop. What I am saying is that you cannot exonerate participation...you cannot separate people from participating, because whether you want to participate willingly or not at some point you will” (Antoinette).

Given the earlier said donor and technocrats' interest in aid and markets, the viability of these ways of disciplining (or reinforcing responsibility) can be questioned. The BEIP was believed to have contributed outcomes in the building of water tanks, classrooms and toilets. These physical facilities were believed to enhance access to the rights of education, water and health, and increase enrolments and gender parity by encouraging participation of the girl-child. The BEIP also enhanced an enabling environment for parents and teachers to fulfil their rights and obligations. Considering the aim of enhancing teaching and learning conditions of the target schools, these are critical strengths of the BEIP outcomes.

However, the focus on outcomes meant that participation is an obligation on the part of parents. By privileging obligations over rights, technocrats lost focus on balanced development, where the fulfilment of the rights of students is dependent on the ability of parents to exercise their rights and obligations and the fulfilment of government responsibilities to all. A headteacher in a focus group emphasized this socio-embeddedness

of the rights and obligations of parents, students and the GOK, and the inseparability of rights and obligations of each (Ife, 2002) by saying:

“The factors that have encouraged me to participate...I look at the end result of the project and the benefit [it] will give first to the student and the community at large. Even the country...If we are putting up laboratories and we want Kenya to be industrialized in the year 2020...we [must] bring up young men and women who will at least contribute something to the nation of Kenya” (Benjamin).

Arising from this awareness of the interrelatedness of rights and obligations, technocrats enacted structures to increase the participation of girls in education and women in the management of the BEIP. As detailed in chapter seven, despite government efforts to increase gender parity in education and the number of women in school management, representation combined with cultural practices that encouraged decision-making through male representatives denied women ‘spaces’ in management.

This technical approach to participation risked entrenching inequalities by obscuring the rights and learning outcomes of the participatory process. As noted, despite the need to reduce cultural paternalism and increase gender parity, the technical approach used meant that culture and gender were only important inasmuch as they limited participation not sustainable development. Arguably, the technocrats’ emphasis on obligations (technicalities) over the moral (participation as a democratic right) dimension of development is a denial of the right to self-determination and a negation of both government and community responsibilities. Yet, the GOK has a responsibility to enforce rights and obligations. The citizenry also have a responsibility to the government to fulfil their obligations (e.g. paying tax) and promote rights:

“If this project is in my community, I think I have a right to know what is happening in my community as far as the donor is concerned. So it is a right to know what is happening. Then I am obliged to...go to know [seek information] because you cannot know if you sit at home...A right sometimes has to be fought for. So you go to fight for your right or to see what is happening. You are obliged to your right and you are obliged to promote it” (Reuben).

This awareness of the right of participation and other rights concurs with Ife’s (2002) argument that rights and obligations are synonymous. To speak of obligations is to



speak of rights. Again participation is a democratic process in which disadvantaged people struggle to fulfil their obligations and rights (Freire, 1972). It also shows that disadvantaged people are willing to participate in development according to Ife (2002) when they know their actions will make a difference where a science teacher said:

“The...community need actually is like a drive to make us participate more and surpass the challenges which we are undergoing. At the end of the day even if it takes more than ten years, the community need will still be there” (Reuben).

This understanding of needs/challenges as motivators shows that poverty and other disadvantages are not necessarily as synonymous with powerlessness as the general PDev literature suggests. Parents willingly participated because the BEIP helped to “enhance community development” (Rosalind) and people’s wellbeing. These findings confirm that disadvantaged communities are not completely unconscious their futures contrary to the technocrats view that these people do not understand what is in their best interest. Such a view risked devaluing local potential because disadvantaged people are not primarily to blame for their conditions. As detailed in chapter seven, technocrats’ perceptions and approaches to poverty, gender and culture limited development of the disadvantaged people. Despite awareness that the use of local potential was better able to enhance empowerment and sustainable development, the need to maximize benefits of aid led technocrats to set ceiling costs of the BEIP based on aid assistance, not local potential. This devalued local potential and limited participation and alternative choices of SMCs/BOGs/PTAs and disadvantaged people:

“There is the standard construction which anybody else in the community is building. The public works have their own standards...the way they do it is...to make sure that whatever they build is used as per that standard of theirs. I think, if we were given the freedom as stakeholders to do that...because we are building schools and structures everywhere and they are permanent...saying it has to be like this and that...until everything pitches on such standards....it is actually curtailing the involvement of the locals” (Mapatano).

Rather than increase efficiency and cost-effectiveness, technical expertise increased costs and accentuated vulnerability where a headteacher said:

“These public works people...are really making things very complicated. They will always coat you exactly with the amount [aid] you have. There is not any allowance. Something which you cannot even comment on...This is where our participation is limited...because this is conditional (Hamish).

Technocrats’ testimonies also contended that technical expertise devalued local knowledge by not allowing SMCs/BOGs/PTAs to use certain types of stone and building materials within their proximities which could have reduce costs. These testimonies confirm poststructuralists’ (Spivak, 1985) criticism that the needs of disadvantaged people continue to be observed and solved from the vantage point of external perspectives. Considering the worth of cooperative ways of problem-solving (Ife, 2002) and the need to avoid the dangers of localism (Mohan & Stokke, 2000) that accompany participatory processes, technical expertise has a technical value.

However, the need to satisfy personal interests in aid and donor conditions for markets led technical experts to devalue local potential. Indeed technical experts made many trips to the project sites in large groups, used car hire rather than public transport, asked to be remunerated at higher rates than was agreeable with the GOK regulations and preferred to be contracted. Such ‘deals’ enable them to generate more monies than the reimbursements GOK offered. Participation (or collaboration) in the BEIP was thus seen to encourage ‘project money attitude’ which emerged because:

“...in the past [aid] projects were rated differently...different donors give a higher payment to those who are involved. But in this particular one...it is the ministry of education which is going to pay back as a loan. Since we took it as a loan, we want all the money to benefit the child...almost 100%. Operation money...is being catered for by the ministry...in terms of going to train [or] monitor. So we will not really risk to take the money and pay people who are already on salary...that is what we have told them...they are willing...now they understand it is a government project...they are facilitated in terms of lunch by the government. They do not expect anything higher. [After all] we are not asking them to go there on daily basis” (Carla).

The emergence of a project money attitude just like the earlier described ‘mali ya uma’ attitude as confirmed above derive from the need to increase individual not collective goods. Arguably, it is an immanent component of commodification of participation where

a core principle is to amass power to a few individuals from whom to redistribute to the many (Arnstein, 1971). These ways of devaluing local potential without providing permanent solutions to root causes of poverty meant that participation in aid programmes maintains the balance in the status quo. Building on this view, the next section argues that although joint monitoring and evaluation are essential components of PDev and core strengths of the BEIP the way these features were enacted risked increasing control of the pace and process of development by technocrats and donors while entrenching corruption and dependency on aid.

### **Monitoring and Evaluation**

Monitoring and evaluation were critical components meant to enhance transparency and accountability in the BEIP. Core strength of the BEIP was in the enactment of policies to support monitoring and evaluation activities. Nonetheless the practices of participation arising from such monitoring and evaluation activities reinforced upward accountability. For this reason, joint monitoring and evaluation were seen as attempt by technocrats-donor to control the 'process and pace'(Ife, 2002) of development of the disadvantaged people. The BEIP implementation manual state that monitoring is:

“...a regular, systematic and constant assessment of the progress achieved in the implementation of an activity...project. It seeks to establish the extent to which inputs, work schedules...targeted outputs and outcomes are proceeding according to the plans so that timely interventions measures are taken to correct deficiencies detected...evaluation...involves the process of measuring the performance of an activity...project to determine relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and impact according to set standards, targets and objectives” (GOK, 2003b, p. 59).

To achieve these aims, the GOK had sent technocrats and technical experts to the project sites to monitor and evaluate progress. Such activities increased the efficacy of the BEIP to meet its targets. As noted earlier, the implementation of the BEIP in three phases, the revolving fund system of disbursing funds in instalments and the monitoring and evaluation policies were meant to increase accountability. Monitoring and evaluation ensured SMCs/BOGs/PTAs enacted their roles according to these policies, the guidelines

on procurement and remained focused on the BEIP objectives. These objectives were partly achieved where a technocrat said monitoring and evaluation had increased accountability and satisfaction levels of SMCs/BOGs/PTAs:

“...in fact that money is best accounted for at the district or school level than if it were in Jogoo (central office). The other day we were doing some of the reports on monitoring and the audit queries are now less than when everything was centrally controlled...that tells you the level of satisfaction...it is never 100%. There are always problems here and there...but they [SMC/BOGs/PTAs] are appreciating what is really happening to them and the sector” (Duncan).

Technocrats also argued that participation in monitoring had increased the responsibility and motivation levels of parents. Parents were now inviting technocrats to assess how they had managed the BEIP funds and good management was evident in the buildings constructed. Although the policy on monitoring and evaluation gave:

“the ministry of public works...mandate to inspect the project, as they would at any other time... they will not come to the site unless they are instructed to do so....By whom? That one now remains [an issue]...Is it the client who tells them to come or should they be able to judge within the progress of the project that this time round I need to be on site to see what is happening” (Benjamin).

Such ambiguity on monitoring and evaluation was perceived to perpetuate a projects money attitude on the part of technical experts who demanded to be paid by SMCs/BOGs/PTAs to visit the project site. A conflict of interest also arose because the school communities were excluded from the forums where these decisions and policies were enacted. While SMCs/BOGs/PTAs understood that they need not fund monitoring and evaluation activities, by financing operational costs relating to monitoring and evaluation activities enacted by technocrats and engineers, the GOK devalued the monitoring and supervisory activities of SMC/BOGs/PTAs. Again, the schools incurred running costs through printing and purchase of material for structural designs. As a result of such ambivalence a district committee member asserted:

“...these are some of the strings attached. You cannot be given this money like that. There has to be somebody to benefit. Employment is provided for their...people and those people are expatriates, they are the ones who get more in payment. You know people like [grassroots representatives] are told...you are project vocal points. And then you are...told you

people...are government employees...you are not supposed to benefit...You *are donated* by your government towards this project to assist...Yet, this person has been donated by his government but them a lot of money, us, nothing...one time I was told that you are sacrificing for your community. You don't need to be paid. So those are some of the strings attached. The donor has to pay watu wake [his people]...and then the local person who is supposed to be the implementer of the project at the district or the community level you are supposed to give sacrificial services” (Jasmine).

Despite these shortcomings, SMCs/BOGs/PTAs often asked technical experts to inspect the progress of the BEIP. While this indicates responsibility and satisfaction with the way SMCS/BOGs/PTAs performed their tasks, it pointed to ulterior motives where technical experts failed to fulfil their obligation of designing and drawing bills of quantities even after SMCs/BOGs/PTAs invited them. Again when the technical experts finally visited the school, they would disapprove some of the decisions and activities undertaken in their absence. While acknowledging the worth of frequent monitoring from technical experts, from a social justice perspective the attempt by technocrats to enact structures that increased control by technical experts contravened the BEIP aim of enabling SMCs/BOGs/PTAs and the disadvantaged people to enact these rights. The testimonies on delay of the BEIP activities mean that SMCs/BOGs/ PTAs were neither in control of the pace of development nor the processes and decisions they implemented through monitoring and evaluation.

### ***Pace and Process of Development***

Contrary to the principle of change from below, the practices of monitoring and evaluation according to the data with a parent/BOG member, failed to satisfy the principles of organic development by attempting to rush the development process:

“The participatory methodology is like the process itself. Because you are building on people’s responsibilities and... it is not like this idea of timing it, after two to three months I’ll finish. It is a way of life... Once you have these values [belief in people potentials and accountability] you make it a way of life that goes beyond the process...What is left with the people continues to be with them, whether a project is phased out...the people will continue to embrace those values. Unless people have those values, no matter how many PRAs/PLAs people do, it will just be like any other

extractive method. If the people and facilitators have those values, then we can be assured of change and of course the whole issue of attitude” (Sundukia).

The idea of building on people’s responsibilities confirm (Burkey, 1993; Chambers, 1997; Ife, 2002) that participation is part of a development learning process whose knowledge gaps, methods and pace are determined by the communities. The attempt to implement the BEIP in phases and to disburse funds in instalments to test progress could be seen to negate control of the pace and processes of development by disadvantaged people while legitimating donor and technocrats’ interests through monitoring and evaluation activities. The data is replete with accounts that the behaviours of technocrats and technical experts contributed to delays in the implementation of the BEIP. Thus monitoring and evaluation processes emerged as yet another ‘manageristic system’ (Mulenga, 1999) whose validity could be questioned.

Technical experts and technocrats were limited by their location in urban centres to be at the project sites when communities needed them. As detailed in chapter seven, by not breaking these regional barriers participation in monitoring and evaluation processes risked reinforcing regional-to-environmental and class inequalities. As noted, by questioning why technical experts spent tax-payers’ money to hire cars, and their failure to enact their roles when they were receiving salaries, highlights a significant convergence of aid programmes with state-led development. It underscores the point that disadvantaged people can hold technocrats (the government) responsible to them on the basis of their citizenship. However, it can be questioned to what extent participation in monitoring and evaluation enhanced such rights to disadvantaged people. Some technocrats argued that some disadvantaged communities from North Eastern and Coast Provinces failed to participate in educational projects because they believed it is the responsibility of their elected governments to provide for those rights. Cautioning against blaming disadvantaged people where they do not participate as expected, a parent/BOG member said:

“...the whole idea of participation is based on premises of freedom and democracy....human beings know what is good for them. They know at what times not wanting to engage, they have good reasons why they don't want to participate. I think the key question we should ask them is what are the factors for not engaging or what factors that are promoting them to engage. I think that is the key area we should explore, but making the decision to engage or not to engage I see as exercising their own democratic right and it should be respected” (Sundukia).

Indeed structural disadvantages inhibited the right of participation and control of the pace and process of development in the BEIP. The policies on monitoring and evaluation, project phases and disbursement of funds according to SMCs/BOGs/PTAs reduced their motivation to participate and limited their ability to plan ahead. They also subjected SMCs/BOGs/PTAs to corruption, where technical experts questioned the use of local materials while contending with aid assistance. Contrary to Ife's (2002) view on peace and non-violence the practices show that addressing the challenges of disadvantaged people through participation in aid projects breeds mistrust, inhibits foresight, accentuates inequalities and entrenches dependency.

Thus the challenge for the GOK to embrace PDev practices in ways that empowered disadvantaged people to control their own futures still remained:

“Are... [technocrats] willing to embrace the ideal of participatory methodologies? Even if you force people to embrace participatory methodologies and they just embrace it for the sake...they say this is how we arrived at this...it will be meaningless...Anybody who is practicing PDev and does not believe in the people themselves and their potentials, no matter how much you use those methodologies it is useless. Anybody who uses participatory methodologies and does not believe in transparency and accountability...even if a process goes through it is useless. A participatory methodology that does not believe in people's knowledge, that means the people have knowledge and can shape whatever you are doing...believe that people can do it themselves; have mutual respect... If you start seeing yourself as ...superior and they are inferior, that distorts the whole issue of participatory methodologies” (Sundukia).

### **Conclusion**

This chapter has explored how participation occurred in planning, implementation and monitoring and evaluation in processes of the BEIP. It has shown that the official view included strong claims about increasing participation and the power of disadvantaged

people to be able to control their own development. There was also a strong desire to allow the disadvantaged to drive the goals and direction of the BEIP through needs assessment, consciousness-raising and community-to-resources mobilisation strategies. Although these aims and methods were enshrined in the official documents, in general, the practices of participation fell short of enabling disadvantaged people to achieve self-determination. The main strengths of the BEIP were that participation enhanced the teaching and learning conditions of the target schools. Participation also increased awareness of rights to the disadvantaged people.

However, the promotion of participation through representatives, technical experts and the need to maximize the benefits of aid imposed a technical top-down approach to participation. This undermined the integrity of the participatory process and principles of change from below. Consciousness-raising represented disadvantaged people as passive recipients of resources and knowledge, not creators. Commodification of participation accentuated power and market shifts to the already powerful. Considering these outcomes, it cannot be overemphasized that structural disadvantages based on bureaucracy poverty, culture and gender remained significant inhibitors to the actualisation of participation rights. The next chapter explores these structural disadvantages under the themes on empowerment, sustainability and change.



## CHAPTER SEVEN

### EMPOWERMENT, SUSTAINABILITY AND SOCIAL CHANGE

#### Introduction

The previous chapters have highlighted the fact that the technical approach to participation, partnerships and management reinforced bureaucratic power, excluded disadvantaged people from key decisions and planning processes, and accentuated power and market shifts to the donor. This chapter explores the extent to which the BEIP management structures, partnerships and participation impacted on empowerment, sustainability and social change. The central argument is that although the BEIP opened spaces for participation and collaboration, the enactment and implementation of these features within an aid delivery system and through representatives and technical experts limited benefits of empowerment, sustainable development and social change.

The first section considers the meanings of *empowerment* and impact on inequalities of class, culture, gender, age and poverty. The second section on *sustainability* examines the extent to which the BEIP challenged inequalities caused by broader environmental, socio-economic and political factors. The third section reflects on the perceived outcomes of empowerment and sustainability, further interrogates data to envision possibilities for *social change* and makes a concluding statement.

It is essential to understand the extent to which the BEIP structure delivered its promise of development and emancipation to disadvantaged people. It is also essential to understand the extent to which the practices of partnerships and participation challenged dehumanizing structures and discourses of development which had to date remained dominant. According to Ife (2002) the three pillars of an empowering development approach are policy and planning, social and political action, and education and consciousness-raising. The structural and rights-based approach of the BEIP as outlined in chapter four engraved these ideals through the management structures, partnerships and participation. The aim of these features was to connect the political and the personal and

empower the disadvantaged people to be able to hold the political, social and economic structures that govern their lives more accountable.

Ultimately, such empowerment and government responsibility would enhance sustainable development and transformation. The next section on empowerment shows that disadvantaged people's information gaps and low levels of awareness inhibited their meaningful participation. Albeit, rather than challenge discourses and practices of domination, technocrats' perspectives and approaches to empowerment obscured effective understanding of structural disadvantages by themselves and the disadvantaged, and risked reinforcing inequalities of culture, gender, age and poverty.

### **Empowerment**

This section critically examines meanings and impacts of empowerment. The focus is upon the objectives, approaches and the extent to which the resulting practices increased benefits of empowerment to disadvantaged people. Empirical data indicated that the aim of partnership and participation was to empower disadvantaged people to control their own development and hold government structures accountable. Empowerment was a motivating factor for participation as a headteacher confirmed:

“We are participating because of empowerment: political, social and economic. Here, there are so many things we are fighting. Key on the agenda is the removal of ignorance. Upon ignorance, there is contribution to poverty, disease and...inability to exploit even the resources around, including the immediate environment. One cannot actively do that unless he/she passes through an institution of learning, where one is endowed with knowledge...If the school does not have enough facilities that... will contribute to lack of knowledge, lack of information, lack of expertise in many areas...That tends to contribute to poverty. So when you have that institution [school] in place and students who are members of the local community, sent by the parents, they are bound to do very well within an enabling environment” (Reuben).

The data with technocrats and SMCs/BOGs/PTAs supported the belief that by building institutions of learning, the BEIP enhanced enabling environments for the disadvantaged people to access the right of education. Ultimately, education would empower disadvantaged people to overcome the deleterious effects of ignorance, poverty

and environment and exploit their potential to enhance individual and collective wellbeing. While education was considered an important component of sustainable development, empowerment entailed transformative strategies in which the government and communities played their roles. A science teacher showed a desire for long-term rather than short-term solutions such as those realised in the BEIP by saying:

“We want to uplift educational standards...This [BEIP] is a benefit of education and that is why we are struggling all the more to put up institutions so that they can be accessible to the young. If the young do not have good facilities like this, they cannot change their way of thinking...I am not looking at this project endowed with [aid] resources. I am looking at that child, today and tomorrow and what the influence he/ she is going to make in that given environment, if she/he has accessed education and obtained good/acceptable standards...coming back to continue CDev...that is impact in that given community and that is where I work” (Hamish).

The point that CDev is the ultimate goal for education concurs with Ife's (2002) view that the vision for empowerment is to increase the power of disadvantaged people over the political, social and economic institutions that govern their lives. The idea of education impacting on CDev meant that an enabling environment for empowerment would enhance the rights of access to education, health and economic activity (land, employment). Again, balancing education and other components of development is critical to the achievement of sustainable livelihoods. As such empowerment also entailed social development as a teacher reiterated “socially...it becomes easier to handle people who are well informed, well educated than when you are dealing with a lot of guys who are illiterate” (Reuben). These meanings of empowerment confirm the view (Ife, 2002) that communities are always engaged in their own development and that the role of government and change agents is to enhance enabling conditions for such development. The extent to which the BEIP empowered the disadvantaged people is provided in the subsequent sections of the chapter. The next section shows that despite integrating an educational programme to reduce cultural inhibitors to empowerment, representation cemented with cultural practices to exclude the very disadvantaged people who are most affected by cultural inequalities.

## Culture

Generally, the data defined culture as people's way of life. As said before, the BEIP aimed to impact on cultural practices that inhibited the educational rights of the girl-child and participation of disadvantaged communities in educational development. Culture is a significant inhibitor of participation, empowerment and development:

“I would talk from the point of view of local communities because these are the ones who were really affected by socio-economic and cultural factors. Cultural factors... affect[ed] the project. They hindered it. There are some [communities] who do not believe in providing manual labour. They believe someone else must do it. That is a cultural factor that came out very clearly. There are some areas where we have nomadism. You even send the project but the user is not there. Culture is a limiting factor because the beliefs of the people influence...implementation of the project... There are people who do not find a priority in that project...even after you do a lot of sensitization...Especially nomads who keep moving to other areas. They don't see why you are constructing a permanent building in their environment since they will move after sometime due to their lifestyle...There is also the aspect of attitude...of people looking at 'past projects have failed...what makes you think this one will succeed? It...took time...to convince them. That is a hindrance because [when] some ...are saying 'this is our project', others are saying 'let us wait and see' (Antoinette).

Disadvantaged people's low levels of awareness led them not to participate as anticipated. That notwithstanding, the technical approach technocrats used to enact and implement consciousness-raising, advocacy, capacity-building and community-to-resources mobilization to affect cultural practices, limited empowerment and social change benefits to disadvantaged people. Cultural beliefs relating to manual labour, time and resources cut against the technocrats' expectations that disadvantaged people would contribute human and physical capital towards the BEIP. From a cultural perspective, the education system through the BEIP threatened socio-economic and cultural institutions upon which the livelihoods of disadvantaged people in ASALs depended upon. On this view, a district committee member said:

“When this project was started, one of the strategies was to do community mobilization. I particularly did that. First of all the district sensitization was done by technocrats. Then I did divisional and zonal/village sensitization. Now, one pertinent cultural question that came up was that...“You as a turkana girl, have you been paid for dowry? Our

observation is, when girls go to school, dowry is not paid for them...That has impacts and far reaching consequences both for my family and the community...In my community if you have been paid for dowry, a woman is considered...a proper woman...The dowry...benefits members of the clan...If I have not been paid for dowry, it is like...You make them lose the opportunity...You make them lose an economic base. Then, I am not recognized in that community. It is like going to school because of that [BEIP] initiative, you have been detached from your community/clan. So there are two types of people created here. A Turkana girl who is foreign in quotes has gone to school and then the Turkana girl which has remained in the traditional lifestyle...The thing is, these people felt and...still feel us who have gone to school are not proper role models. They even say...‘when our children...go to school, they settle in towns and leave us without care...You just hear they are married by other people they have never seen. We are not being told. So why should we take these children to school...It is like the family institution, the clan, the traditional community is threatened’ (Jasmine).

The view that disadvantaged communities perceived the BEIP and the general education system as a threat to the socio-economic institutions that held families and communities together without offering acceptable alternatives contravenes the social development aim of increasing, not depleting, the social, political and economic capitals upon which people’s livelihoods depend (Putnam, 1993). Data recorded appreciation for the value of education and the GOK aim of enhancing access to the right of education. Albeit, the approaches technocrats used to achieve these aims were perceived to further marginalize rather than emancipate the disadvantaged people:

“I want to give an example of GOK/OPEC project...the people who are in the planning and who have been sensitized are...SMCs and...project coordinator[s] ...There is also a district team that was sensitized and trained...The thing is, this SMC is only a representation, a small portion of the community or that particular village where the school is built...The extent that these SMCs...may not be people who are popular who can convince the community to give their contribution or give labour that kind of thing...that is a limitation...A weakness is the little representation...In the four [primary] and one secondary school they are assisting in the district, there is one...which has lagged behind. Some schools have reached windowsill others have roofed. That school [it’s now they are beginning]...making bricks...You wonder...it is like this community was not sensitized” (Jasmine).

Despite integrating a consciousness-raising programme, the enactment and implementation of the BEIP through representatives [SMCs/BOGs/PTAs] and technical experts meant that disadvantaged people themselves did not participate. Again, although

SMCs/BOGs/PTAs attended, they were not seen as creators but rather as recipients of development (aid assistance) and knowledge of technical experts. Such practices, inhibited empowerment and social change benefits that disadvantaged people could have had from these educational processes had they actively participated.

The content offered in capacity-building seminars was tailored towards project management and how to mobilize communities to participate as a way of maximizing the benefits of aid rather than creating awareness about how cultural disadvantage limited access to rights of education and participation. However important, this education fell short of a broad education system that according to Ife (2002) should address issues of how cultural and other structural disadvantages inhibit the ability of disadvantaged communities to claim the spaces created for them to participate. As SMCs/BOGs/PTAs suggested, such broad education was better able to address cultural practices that deny women rights to own property, which promote forced marriages and FGM for girls, and which make parents deny girls access to education.

Despite these shortcomings the BEIP like other education interventions by donors and civil society were creating awareness and impacting on cultural change:

The 'doctors' of FGM are being told that even in child[ren's]-act it is written that if you do such kind of practices and something bad happens to the child, you can be imprisoned. So culture is being affected by religion and know-how of the people. As people grow close to religion, they know which culture to take as indicated in the books that they are referring to...Bible, Quran, and Children's Act or rights conventions. I have in mind the World Vision, Moyale Branch that is creating more awareness on cultures that are not suitable (Shirikiano).

This redefinition of cultures through education, religion, human rights conventions and children's acts underlines an important convergence of aid development through government partnerships with civil society, donors and local communities. According to Ife (2002), any development intervention underpinned by an empowerment system must value local cultures inasmuch as these adhere to conventional rights. Change agents must thus connect the personal (spiritual) and the political with a view to empowering the disadvantaged to overcome the deleterious effects of localism (Mohan & Stokke, 2000)

and the imposition of dominant narratives where human rights are stated in ‘universal’ rather than contextual terms (Ife, 2002).

In the BEIP technocrats’ approaches either devalued local cultures or privileged the individual rights of children over the collective rights of communities. For this reason, SMCs/BOGs/PTAs argued that civil societies are better able to enable disadvantaged communities to originate strategies to address their felt needs without interfering with cultural systems:

“...in my district, NGOs, development partners [government and multilateral donors], have formed a system whereby they go down to the community and form CBO systems. Through these CBO systems they are able to address issues of development without necessarily interfering with the cultural systems of the community. In the CBO system...people are given a challenge to come up with their own programmes. Culture and religion are distinctly different. Some communities may use culturally based programmes, others use religion. It is easy for someone to change me religiously and I may not change culturally...So CBOs have assumed that system of religion...that is what I have observed” (Shakombo).

These convergences between religion and culture, and government, donors and civil society are critical to our understanding of how the BEIP partnerships affected the local cultures of the disadvantaged people. In an attempt to strengthen partnerships, the GOK established a management system where the donor, technocrats, political elites and civil society (SMCs/BOGs/PTAs) were allocated roles to play in the BEIP. A core requirement was that SMCs/BOGs/PTAs must have a sponsor. In most cases this was a religious organization. The data points to an awareness that since culture is dynamic, a partnership between the government, civil society and the disadvantaged people themselves was better able to address the developmental and rights challenges the BEIP addressed. The problem with partnerships based on religion and culture is that, people may embrace new religions or cultures without necessarily changing the practices which inhibit access and promotion of rights. The efficacy of aid projects enacted through government partnerships with donors and CBOs/NGOs to impact on cultures that inhibit access to rights can thus be questioned. These organizations are taken to represent the interests of

disadvantaged people. Yet, representation in the BEIP led to exclusion of the disadvantaged people who are most affected by cultural inequalities.

For this reason, participation through representatives cannot be considered to directly impact on cultural challenges faced by disadvantaged people because:

“...in my area we see culture and religion as synonymous. The dictates of religion are more powerful than cultural dictates. We have reached a stage where we are not able to identify the difference between religion and culture...from the works of the GOK and development partners...the issue of CBOs is created within us, but it has not yet matured...They [CBOs] have been formed but they are not operational...these organizations are desperate in accessing funds. They are not better than the communities they are trying to assist. They have no donor and they have not been formed with the consultation of the community in total [or by]...its [representatives]. Now it is not addressing the problems of the community. What is to be done is the issue...my community in particular, what they need is awareness” (Pakomosa).

The approaches technocrats used to address the deleterious effects of disadvantaged communities’ cultures were a significant hindrance to emancipation and effective understanding of structural disadvantages. The failure by technocrats to legitimate management structures either through consultation or election processes meant that disadvantaged people did not consider the representatives used to enact and implement the BEIP as authentic channels for addressing their cultural challenges. This has cultural implications. Despite the BEIP having a strong focus on rights, the creation of awareness through representatives and technical experts who did not identify with local cultures and religions led SMCs/BOGs/PTAs to label these facilitators ‘professional work-shoppers’. These labels question the efficacy of the methods used to raise awareness to impact on dehumanising cultures. Where local facilitators were used, for example, among the Gusii in Nyanza Province, they were not considered role models because either they had done FGM on their girls or were seen to be motivated by personal interests on aid and markets. For this reason a parent asserted:

“...we [community] have not come to the reality of who we are...we do not have women who are ready to represent the government fully from their heart, ready to change the system of FGM. So these are the people who have made the system to continue for so long...[when] they go to the workshop and ask other women to stop, they are asked ‘have you done it



to your children?' If yes, who do you expect to change? You should have served as a role model so we could see the goodness in it... the NGO is better because they [use] people who have not been mutilated ...these are better role models. But if they (GOK) continue to use women who...have been mutilated and have mutilated their girls...who are interested in money...it is not easy for the community to change their attitude because they know who you are...that is the problem" (Omambia).

This view that change agents both in mainstream government and civil society were motivated by their own interests in markets and aid, rather than cultural needs, confirms Spivak's (1985) contention that disadvantaged people's development continues to be observed from external viewpoints. Technocrats' inability to observe and understand cultural needs from the vantage point of the disadvantaged people led them to prescribe solutions based on their own perspectives and aid potentials. Such development practices that aim to maximize on benefits of aid can neither emancipate disadvantaged people from dehumanizing cultures nor are they sustainable. As detailed under sustainability, the BEIP risked perpetuating dependency on external aid which in essence is a negation of government responsibilities towards promoting the cultural and collective rights of access to economic activities by these disadvantaged communities.

SMCs/BOGs/PTAs in rural and urban slums also indicated that cultural practices relating to wife inheritance continued because of lack of role models. Indeed an aim of the BEIP was to increase the participation of girls in education and to create awareness of such cultures through participation. Participant observations drawing on a poem dubbed 'I speak for the common man from [urban] slums' revealed that cultural practices of wife-inheritance and poor housing in urban and rural slums contributed to an increase in the prevalence of HIV/AIDS and an increase in the deaths of both women and men. As presented in that eventful speech-prize giving day, when a BOG and school administration reviewed the progress of the BEIP and other development projects in their school, the voices of students, parents and communities encapsulated in this poem suggested that the consequences of wife-inheritance threatened the family and economic institutions of these disadvantaged communities.

However, women and girls, especially the less educated, were at greater risk than the men. The evidence further shows that strong cooperation between husbands and wives and partnerships between the government, civil society and disadvantaged people themselves were more likely to reduce these dehumanizing cultural practices. That notwithstanding, these voices also questioned the role of the government in enabling the ‘common man’ to address his own poverty and developmental challenges through active participation as promulgated in the PRSP. For PDev to effectively transform dehumanizing cultures, the data emphasized the need for active participation rather than participation through representatives.

Although technocrats and SMCs/BOGs/PTAs were aware that participation and education are both rights and obligations, the promotion of participation and partnerships through representatives meant that consciousness-raising forums enhanced awareness of SMCs/BOGs/PTAs, not the broader communities who were most affected by cultural inequalities. This made it difficult for the disadvantaged people to effectively understand how cultural disadvantages inhibited rights. The BEIP impact on parents’ understanding of their own rights and obligations and those of their children was minimal where a district committee member said:

“To us [educationists] it is an obligation to ensure that each and every child has received basic knowledge...education. If you go back to the community, in some communities, it is not the right of the child in education. They do not understand the right. So *they need more sensitization* to be told that education is the right of a child. The other day...a father just came and stood in front of a class...removed the girl out of the classroom and went with his girl. And told the teacher that this is my biological daughter and you have no right over the girl...up to now our community does not understand that education is the right of the child. So we need still sensitization to the community as far as education is concerned” (Jasmine).

Contrary to the conventional view that disadvantaged communities in the ASALs are culturally conservative and resistant to change (Sifuna, 2005b), the data confirm that pastoralist-nomads embraced changes which were perceived beneficial to their collective and individual wellbeing. As noted the problem is that most of the changes are dictated by

natural calamities and make disadvantaged people lose community and their own identity. When forced to move about or settle among other communities, disadvantaged people are labelled and exposed to insecurity and rape. Changes that are imposed either through policies or natural calamities are undesirable because they inhibit freedom of choice as a district committee member stated:

“...this change is dictatorial. This change is being dictated by circumstances. Whether it is circumstances that are created by man or natural circumstances that have come up...it is not their choice. In fact people are longing...we have seen a few people who go back to their traditional lifestyles. There are people who have been working with the government. After retiring, they tell you...this lifestyle you talk about is cosmetic life. The real and comfortable life is that one which they used to live. This is the situation” (Oromosa).

A core aim of the BEIP was to build classrooms and laboratories and provide water and sanitation facilities. As shown in chapter six, these are indeed important outcomes. However, some communities in coast Province could not use toilets constructed by foreigners because that was culturally inappropriate. They would rather do it themselves. Establishing permanent classrooms also risked forcing people to change from nomadism to more settled lifestyles. Such practice problematised people's lifestyles and imposed undesirable changes where a district committee member said:

“I believe we should address issues and create awareness. In my community the issue of water is their problem and you find everybody taking about it. Indeed they tell you, you are talking about education, you are putting so many efforts you are building so many classrooms, yet the lifestyle is that which is highly mobile. They have a nomadic lifestyle, but the facilities you put in place are static. You expect somebody who has gone 50 km away to access that facility. What we are saying is, we should have a system that takes services to the people but not the people to the services. This is what is happening. We want the people to come to the services, but the services should be taken to the people. This is the way I see it” (Oromosa).

Technocrats testimonies concurred with documents (GOK, 2005a; 2005b) that the government was implementing mobile schools in nomadic communities and night teaching-to-learning sessions in ASALs in an attempt to take services closer to these people. Nonetheless, the data is replete with testimonies that a broader system of education

and consciousness-raising than was provided through the BEIP was needed to emancipate the disadvantage from cultural inequalities. A broad civic and citizenship education that focused on enhancing awareness of human and political rights was envisaged to be better able to affect cultural paternalism. The next section on gender shows that without such education, the efficacy of PDev to affect cultures which treat women, children and youth as inferior and not able to influence CDev, was limited.

## **Gender**

This section argues that representation (or technical expertise) risked cementing cultural practices that exclude women from decision-making and leadership roles even where affirmative action policies are put in place. The idea of representation enabled men to either deny women opportunities to join SMCs/BOGs/PTAs or where the spaces were provided, women tended to support the cultural practices they ought to challenge for fear of being labelled ‘radicals’ by the men (or communities).

According to Ife (2002) affirmative action policies are essential to increase access to services and participation of disadvantaged groups such as women, aged, youth, children, physically-to-mentally challenged and the poor. The training module which technocrats used for capacity-building (GOK, 2003a) and the project implementation manual (GOK, 2003b) stated that all treasurers who assumed management roles in the BEIP must be women. This structure conforms to a policy requirement where of SMCs/BOGs/PTAs membership positions are reserved for women (GOK, 2005a; 2005b). This affirmative action policy aimed to facilitate participation of women in management of the BEIP and also affect gender inequalities in the SMCs/BOGs/PTAs which were considered to be dominated by men.

When asked to relate their experiences of gender a headteacher said that the domination of SMCs/BOGs/PTAs by men discouraged women from participating:

“Gender goes hand in hand with attitude...For example, if we are to look at the number of women to come and participate in implementation of the

OPEC project, if those women look at the composition of the committee that deliberates on the implementation of that project, they find that they are all men. There are some women chauvinists who might feel that they [men] have put us aside as women, so why should we go and [participate] when they never even considered us when they were selecting the members” (Hamish).

Inequitable representation in the SMCs/BOGs/PTAs also inhibited participation of women. Disparities arose from cultural beliefs that women are less intelligent than men, which according to a teacher “can only be overcome in due course, when women are involved in participating in issues of decision-making and with them contributing to ideas. If someone is giving out an idea, you go for the idea regardless of whether one is male or female” (Rodham). The perspectives of gender by technocrats, SMCs/BOGs /PTAs and the disadvantaged people themselves limited participation of women. Women were not able to take up their managerial responsibilities because in most disadvantaged communities, there were few literate women to take up such roles.

It follows then that, by enacting the BEIP through representatives who had to satisfy minimum academic achievement levels, technocrats risked reinforcing inequalities of gender. The data recorded significant relationships amongst culture, low literacy levels and the participation of women where a science teacher said:

“Can we correlate that [women representation] with the level of illiteracy in a given community? Illiteracy that goes with tradition and culture...If you talk of community involvement in the OPEC project, there comes in that aspect of culture. This should be done by this particular sex. This is work for women and this is work for men. So community involvement there becomes a problem” (Chweya).

This correlation between gender and sexism and culture and low levels of awareness made SMCs/BOGs/PTAs concerned about how the language they used represented women and disadvantages where a teacher said, “...may be we may not call it illiteracy. We can call it limited literacy” (Ruben). The concern for discourse, sexism and disadvantage arose from the view that certain beliefs, traditions and cultures skewed participation towards a particular gender. Where communities believed that a type of work

was meant for men, then when called to participate, it was more likely that men participated in the ways that were considered culturally appropriate to them.

Where tasks were culturally associated with women, it was more likely that when called to participate, only women took up such tasks. For example, SMCs/BOGs/ PTAs were supposed to appoint women to be treasurers of the BEIP funds and incorporate them in the procurement/tendering committees. A key aim was to increase the role of women in decision-making. These opportunities notwithstanding, most women in ASALs did not take up these managerial roles as anticipated. This failure to participate led some men to argue that women “do not take their work seriously...” (Hamish). In response, a woman participant in the focus group asked:

“Is it women who are not serious or is it men who do not give women the chances for them to participate? If women were given the chances, we would have more women in this activity<sup>34</sup> (Rosalind).

Participant observations showed that the meeting was attended by one female. It was also observed that some male participants were somewhat ‘violent’ and uneasy when Rosalind spoke as shown in the response “If I give you and you do not even come to the tendering committee, how do I even give you more chances? We are wasting time” (Hamish). As noted, house chores may have limited women from taking up management roles. Nonetheless there is consensus in the data that men denied women such opportunities because culturally, decision-making is not women’s responsibility.

Further evidence showed that men were not unaware of the deleterious effects of cultures that vested decision-making authority on men as an educationist said:

“In the communities and that is according to the customs, roles are very specific and are given to both genders right from childhood to adulthood and even old age. As much as...there is no conflict between the roles of the two genders....the most unfortunate thing is that there is no fairness...the roles given to women are much more compared to those of [their male] counterparts...the men are the ones who run how/what each gender does...the men have good time in the sense that they do very little compared to the ladies. But *the ladies seem to accept because they do not take part in decision-making...* [which] is completely the role of men” (Dororomo).

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<sup>34</sup> The focus group meeting.

These testimonies acknowledged that the BEIP provided opportunities for women to participate in educational management. It recorded optimism that participation in SMCs/BOGs/PTAs even after the BEIP was completed would progressively enhance benefits of empowerment and social change for both men and women. However, the view advanced by some men that women accepted to be denied leadership and decision-making roles suggest that the men resisted policy changes that offered women such opportunities where the district committee member reiterated:

“Despite that rigidity of men not wanting to have complete change, things are moving for the better. But still we have along way to go because children preference for boys is still there...Even the mother prefers the boy...In terms of [leadership] roles, education, inheritance of property, the boy child is given upper hand. So we have a long way to go to ensure that there is a level ground” (Dororomo).

Due to such entrenched cultural paternalism women have become ‘unconscious’ (Ife, 2002) of cultural and gender inequalities and have come to accept a denial of rights to own property, leadership and decision-making authority as the norm. For this reason, women also preferred men for leadership positions. This behaviour led men to contend that women are ‘enemies’ to themselves. However, such blaming was negated by the view that even men preferred male leaders and hardly suggested women for civil elections. While women appeared to have accepted an ‘under-class’ position in communities, the data is clear that entrenched paternalism and cultural practices that exclude women from decision-making in preference to men have led women to devalue their own potential and ‘humanity’. The paradox is that the men gave women opportunities to participate in SMCs/BOGs/PTAs activities on the claim that women had the time and courage to work for the community. This is a compliment and an opportunity for women to participate. However, it also confirmed (Chambers, 2005) that the already overburdened women participated more than the men.

The data pointed to gender parity amongst agriculturalists and agro-pastoralists but disparity amongst pastoralists and nomadic communities in the way women and men

participated in SMCs/BOGs/PTAs. According to an educationist in agriculturalist communities men were less domineering than in the pastoralist-nomadic communities. Where more women participated, “men actually have a right...But in pastoralist communities where women’s contribution is not fully developed...it is men who mainly make the decisions...[Women] attend the meetings...go to school to work...fetch that water...but the men who attend the meeting and...make decisions, they hardly go to do those types of work” (Emmanuel). Thus, cultural practices of decision-making by men reinforced by the technocrats’ decision to retain decision-making authority with the national taskforce combined to exclude women from decisions and management of the BEIP.

This attempt by technocrats to prescribe gender representation and retain decisions to satisfy dominant structural and cultural practices risked entrenching gender inequalities. Just like the practices of partnerships and participation most cultures that the BEIP sought to affect, encouraged representation of women in decision-making by men. Men promoted dominance giving “women...conditions” (Dororomo) much like the conditionalities entailed in the BEIP partnerships. While affirmative action policies are important to facilitate the participation of women and a strength of the BEIP, the requirement on literacy levels made it possible for SMCs/BOGs/PTAs (which were dominated by men) to invoke cultural beliefs and the low literacy levels to preclude women from participating in management. The requirement of literacy levels negated the benefits of empowerment and social change in communities that preferred to educate boys over girls because women either did not have equitable literacy levels with men or the minimum levels of education prescribed. Such conditions together with the rigidity of men limited empowerment benefits and risked cementing cultural and gender inequalities.

This is because cultural paternalism has socialized men to restrict the chores of women to what a BOG member termed ‘housewives’. Because housewives were perceived to be less educated and informed, some men blamed women for suffering from an



‘inferiority complex’ when they failed to take up management positions in SMCs/BOGs/PTAs where a BOG member said:

“The behaviour of men has contributed to this aspect of inferiority complex...by not giving them superiority...men not giving women opportunities to decide...For example we have a female chief here. When we were registering, I got a bit mixed up when jotting her name, before I realized I was making a mistake. You see, we expect a chief to be a man, not a woman (Chweya).

Participant observations showed that both the men and woman nodded to approve the view that men denied women opportunities. The data acknowledged that most successful families benefited from women’s leadership and that most educated women were successful when given leadership positions. However, the belief that women are less knowledgeable, the weaker sex and thereby needed to be represented, led men to deny women leadership positions to retain control despite affirmative action policies. As such the contribution of women to decision making remained low because men chose “not listen” to women’s ideas in SMCs meetings (Hamish). As noted in the data, women felt more insecure in their communities than men, even little boys.

This encourages the view that a key determinant to the empowerment of women is to address the cultural barriers which lead them to be treated as lesser beings and which as a consequence make them feel insecure. The data showed gender relationships which are also far more complex, but for a thesis of this size, it is necessary to make only general comments. Increasing access to education and improving sanitation in schools was believed to increase the security and comfort of women and girls. However, to reduce gender inequalities both in schools and educational development, men need to unlearn the cultural beliefs and practices that make them devalue education for girls and not listen to women’s ideas. One belief to unlearn is the patriarchal attitude that women should aggressively *fight and compete* with men as equals. Next is the tendency to invoke culture to deny women/girls decision-making and education rights. Third is the interpretation of gender ‘purely’ in either masculine or feminine terms.

The convergence of these cultural perspectives with pluralist and elitist ideologies in the BEIP meant that where women are unable to compete favourably either male ‘shields’ or elite representatives were needed to put through women’s issues. The paradox is that these perspectives led men to perceive the empowerment of women as a threat to their own superiority. The use of words such as ‘superiority’, ‘aggressive’, ‘let them fight and prove that they can deliver’, in the data meant that some men perceived attempts to address inequalities of gender in terms of increasing domination by women. While acknowledging the role broad education played in reducing gender inequalities and enabling women to progressively increase their role in leadership, as is the case with pluralist and elitist ideals (Ife, 2002), men still expected women to compete with them for leadership and educational opportunities as equals.

This convergence of representation and competition with cultural and gender perspectives meant that men can easily justify uncooperative actions against women while blaming it on culture or biological differences. Where women were expected to compete, rather than affect cooperation and gender inequalities, affirmative actions were more likely to reinforce the status quo. Marijuana and alcohol taking by the men was perceived to negate their responsibility and precipitate violence against women, children and girls. Violence manifested more dramatically in communities that encouraged decision-making by men, especially among the Maasai and Gusii. Most schools among the Gusii of Nyanza were also believed to be dilapidated because despite women being more entrepreneurial male domination inhibited their effective participation in SMCs/BOGs/PTAs. The way the BEIP was promulgated appeared to cement, not to challenge such violent-behaviours and gender inequalities. Representation and competition meant that gender participation was about integrating the few elite women who were able to compete favourably in a system that was dominated by men. These features excluded the majority of less literate women and isolated the men who were unable to compete favourably.

The competitive behaviours that emerged from the practices of participation and partnerships were a good recipe for violent as opposed to peaceful and non-violent ways of problem-solving which Ife (2002) recommends. As noted the consciousness-raising programmes empowered women with skills and attitudes needed to effectively participate in SMCs/BOGs/PTAs. However, to the extent that the men continued to make decisions in private arenas, the quality of their participation remains an empirical question. The data is clear that women representatives presented in SMCs/BOGs/PTAs meetings the decisions and ideas which their husband consented to. At face value, this could be justified on grounds of cooperation. Nevertheless, these practices were unlikely to challenge male domination and gender imbalance because:

“...culture, tradition, that kind of background...seems to be following them [women]. Even those who are educated, even when they are put in positions that they should influence, they still seem to go back to [culture] instead of letting go, because by taking that position, men are happy with them. They see them like real women while those who go against, or those who really assert themselves and bring out the issues that affect women and or be a real voice, they are seen as radicals. Many women don't seem to like to be seen as radicals because that tends to exclude them. Somehow the voice of women is not as it should be. If you look at the programme of education, women are worse affected. Yet their voice is not as much [laudable] as the problem. There is need for a lot of affirmative action, a lot of unlearning for both men and women” (Sundukia).

The chapter will return to the point on unlearning under social change. These practices attest that both men and women are unconscious of the factors which limit them from effectively understanding gender inequalities and exploring possibilities for social and political action. Where such understanding is demonstrated through the creation of affirmative action policies, perceptions about representation, technical expertise and bureaucracy obscured benefits of empowerment and inhibited gender parity. Contrary to Ife's (2002) view that affirmative action policies should challenge dominant perspectives by assuming cooperative as opposed to competitive methods of problem-solving, competition and gender imbalance were not just outcomes of the BEIP but were entrenched in the education and media systems. Cultural paternalism and domination were inbreeding in families, schools and national-macro development levels. The use of

representation and competition within the BEIP was perceived to entrench the cultural and historical practices of domination and exclusion that are inherent within the broader education and political systems and among SMCs/BOGs/ PTAs. To affect such gender imbalance and cultural inequalities, required a broad education system than was provided in the BEIP. Where women were said to suffer from ‘cultural syndrome’, cooperation, not competition is better able to empower them and increase their roles in decision-making. The next section builds on this point by arguing that where decision-making is premised on perspectives of experience and ‘universal’ wisdom as promulgated in the BEIP, representation risked reinforcing cultural practices of exclusion and denial of rights on the basis of age.

### **Age**

According to Ife (2002) age is a significant defining factor of structural disadvantages, participation and empowerment. The way the BEIP was promulgated did not indicate a standard way to define age. The data defined age in terms of the number of years a person has lived. It also categorised age into groups of adults, youth and children. Thus, there is a very fine line between these age brackets owing to the socio-embeddedness of rights and responsibilities. Age significantly affected the relationships of partnerships and participation. These relationships drew upon the way the bill of rights (constitution), local cultures, and professional milieu defined age.

The one which derived from the constitution considered a child to be below 18 years of age. Above age 18, people were either seen as youth or adults with citizenship rights. An important point to note is that children do not have direct access to citizenship rights, but have access to rights through their parents. The cultural defining factor of age varied according to communities. Most communities grouped members into age-sets (or sex-sets) comprising of children, youth (those who have undergone rites of initiation and are ready to marry) young adults (newly recruited to adulthood through marriage) middle

age adults (in transition/being prepared for leadership roles in communities) and adults (from among whom political, social and economic and religious leaders were selected). The work related factors defined relationships (e.g. student-teacher, employer-employee, government-citizen and parent-child).

These perspectives are critical to our understanding of how technocrats promulgated participation and partnerships and the way the BEIP impacted on structural disadvantages arising from age. When SMCs/BOGs/PTAs were asked to relate their experiences about how age influenced participation and partnerships in the BEIP a teacher in the Coast Province responded by saying:

“I think when you are old you should be left out because even when we come to meetings like this, they are slow” (Chamkwezi).

The view is that ‘old’ people process tasks and information slowly and were unable to participate actively in the management of the BEIP because of low attention and memory spans. Old people were also perceived to be physically too weak to provide manual labour in the construction sites as prescribed by technocrats. To the extent that these disadvantages were potential reasons to deny old people their right of participation, then the BEIP risked accentuating inequalities caused by age.

SMCs/BOGs/PTAs were aware of the dangers of blaming old people for their condition and excluding them from participating where a teacher in reference to the relationship between age and experience said “Amekula chumvi nyingi tumsikize” [a Kiswahili proverb meaning, what old people say/do should be adhered to because they have loads of experience] (Kasim). Apparently, this idea of equating age with experience (or wisdom) is not just an element of local cultures.

It also influenced the formation of the BEIP management structures. As said before, technocrats believed that the most senior technocrats were most experienced and better able to enact and implement feasible relationships and policies to empower disadvantaged

people. This equation of age with wisdom and experience with power led to a conflict of interests and inhibited development where a headteacher said:

“That is why we have found in some communities they [old people] will water down what has been spoken by us, young men...‘what will this young man tell us?’ I think age has also something to contribute towards participation in educational projects... That is what has hindered a lot of development. Elderly people think that they are everything...When we young people say we want to do this, they say, what do you know you young people? We have been here for ages and we know what you need [experience]. Until sasa [now] we say we [young people] have to go by force...I remember an experience we had in our primary school... [Participants] are going to bear me witness. There are some elderly people who did not want to come out of the SMC. They wanted to remain there and do things the way they did last year and ten years ago...So we said no and now we changed. The youth came in and good luck the youth took over the leadership of the school. At least in one year things in the school are changing...There should be a [better] way of dealing with these old generation to have changes” (Hamish).

To the extent that age and experience inhibited change, we need to question what knowledge claims are better able to enhance agency and in the next section, sustainable livelihoods of disadvantaged people. The point that aged people devalued the knowledge of young people and denied them leadership positions based on claims that they are inexperienced has critical implications to the way technocrats enacted the management structure of the BEIP and the impacts it was perceived to have on the disadvantaged people. Experience was the main reason why the national taskforce retained authority to make decisions. The formation of the taskforce drew upon the view that members were most experienced in their areas of specialisation.

This attempt to use age and experience to legitimate the status quo limited the participation and decision-making rights of SMCs/BOGs/PTAs and the disadvantaged people. While experience is an important element of development management, the assumptions that the most senior bureaucrats made the most effective decisions and policies and, that the time for the youth to lead and participate in development is in the distant future, contradicted the BEIP aim of enacting partnerships and participation across age, cultures, social, economic and political spheres of society.

Although partly responsible for legitimating bureaucracy, age and experience were not hindrances to participation and partnerships in themselves. The use of age and experience to deny youth leadership roles and retain control without necessarily satisfying empowerment and social change interests of the disadvantaged people and the ones considered 'young' was the problem. The data underscored this unwillingness by those with power and in leadership positions at the school, district and national levels to leave office and train others for management succession as a key hindrance to the meaningful participation of middle level managers, students/children and the disadvantaged people themselves. Contrary to Ife's (2002) views on peace and non-violence, this inability to cede power and lack of cooperation by the aged leaders contributed to competition. It also led the young to resort to non-peaceful strikes, eviction and demonstrations to claim what they perceived as a denial of their rights of participation and decision-making. The data indicated awareness by technocrats and SMCs/BOGs/PTAs of the deleterious effects of these features and the desire for cooperation and a peaceful means of problem-solving where a headteacher suggested:

"I want to say that the ratio should be...aged people should be less. We should have a few. We should not leave them [out] completely...[let old people play an] advisory role...some of us [are] old but we are young in that we would like our children to live good livelihoods...Old people should come aboard but...They should not assume that they are capable to do everything" (Reuben).

This view that the youth cannot claim their rights of participation and leadership positions by excluding the old concurs with Gandhi's (1964) challenge that change agents should become the change they wish to see in the world. It also conforms to Ife's (2002) contention that neither can unjust means be used to achieve justice nor can wrong means be used for right ends. Implicitly then the understanding of age and experience in terms of the 'vision' leaders hold for the wellbeing of the present and future generations is a strong basis for forging cooperation across different age groups and for cultivating effective understanding of the deleterious effects of age.

Technocrats and political elites were believed to be the ‘vision-bearers’ within the BEIP. It is for this reason that technocrats created representational roles for them in the management structures. The paradox is that where SMCs/BOGs/PTAs and the disadvantaged communities appeared to question the logic used to enact participation and partnerships, technocrats treated these behaviours either as animosity or resistance. The data testified that ownership, sustainability, and empowerment depended on how vision-bearers promoted participation. Where communities are sensitized and involved in the project at the design and planning levels and, where continual cooperation and dialogue prevailed, communities rarely resisted.

Despite intentions to promote ownership and empowerment, the attempt to retain decision-making authority with technocrats and to use their knowledge as the unquestionable norm negated benefits of ownership. Again, the use of political elites to enact advocacy, influence the participation of disadvantaged people and infuse political will in the BEIP processes appeared to reify age and experience even where these groups were seen to significantly lack in vision and promulgate their own interests rather than those of the disadvantaged people where the educationist avowed:

“Multiparty government environment is a hindrance. Others are not visionary...They lack the vision. They are not supportive to that [project]...” (Antoinette).

Where age and experience served the interests of the status quo, the BEIP risked cementing inequalities of culture, class, bureaucracy and as detailed under sustainability, denial of rights due to political marginalisation. SMCs/BOGs/PTAs argued that age and experience made those who are already in leadership positions think that they have a monopoly of knowledge. Yet “the young have knowledge. [The aged] should not keep on talking of what they did thirty years ago...life has changed, everything has changed. [They should give the youth a chance]...to headship positions” (Mapatano). That is to say, age and experience are not reason enough to cling to power and leadership positions. The issue



of age is highly contested because both culturally and bureaucratically, age is seen as a sign of wisdom, not just experience.

To assume that young people should hold leadership positions as heads of schools and departments with or without experience is to challenge the very wisdom that underwrites certain cultural, departmental and organizational knowledge claims in the education sector and in all government and private institutions. To the extent that age and experience reinforced bureaucracy, class and cultural inequalities, then the principles of competition that underwrite the education system and the policies on promotion to leadership positions require rethinking. By reifying experience and age technocrats negated the BEIP aim of increasing access to the rights of participation and decision-making on the part of disadvantaged people and of students. When SMCs/BOGs/PTAs were asked how students participated a headteacher said:

“To say the truth...our students have not been involved. We are putting up a laboratory. They see a construction going up. That is why at the end of the day, they go writing [tagging] and they burn it...they don't call it their own development. In every writing they...always damn instructions...We put up a primary school next to secondary school Y...[We] spent 4 million shilling worth of blocks. We never called the children to tell them, the donor came and brought the money we put up a beautiful block for you. They are sitting there learning, but it is not theirs. So when their time comes to want to tell us something, they will burn it” (Benjamin).

Like the adults, students resorted to violent and non-peaceful methods of problem-solving when denied rights and opportunities to contribute to their own development. Age and experience thus accentuated domination and denial of rights of agency. As shown in chapter five, a contributing factor to violent and non-cooperative ways of problem-solving was the inability of SMCs/BOGs/PTAs, technocrats and donors to act in transparent and accountable ways. The use of age and experience as determinants of success endorsed the view that development is something done for people, not something people originate. Such practice is dictatorship of development (Ife, 2002) and tyranny of participation (Chambers, 2005; Cook & Kothari, 2001).

It is dictatorship because it treated SMCs/BOGs/PTA, disadvantaged people and students as recipients of development designed elsewhere. Such practice arose from the inability of the donor and technocrats to treat these people as equal stakeholders. This practice led a parent/BOG member to caution:

“Although in most areas these people have been taken like recipients. I think it is a major challenge. I think that is somewhere we are failing because, like when you look at secondary schools, really we are dealing with mature people. And even in primary school, I don’t think there is anybody who is so young and small that he has no opinion of what is happening to his/her own life. If the pupils/students were also given room to influence what happens to them, I think they can also influence in some way...the advisory services given by the ministry [or] government” (Sundukia).

Considering that the BEIP was in its phase one at the time of this research, SMCs/BOGs/PTAs emphasized the need to actively involve students in the manual activities generated through the construction plans and in decision-making. Failure to involve students decreased benefits of ownership and negated their own responsibility where they engaged in destroying school property at times causing death. These violent and irresponsible practices increased educational costs to the parents who had to rebuild the schools. By enacting the BEIP through an aid delivery system the government risked shirking its own responsibilities through participation and increasing costs and taxes to the already overtaxed and overburdened members of society.

The failure to engage students negated their own responsibility, threatened sustainable development and risked perpetuating dependency on external aid. Imperatively, to increase upward accountability to the sources of the BEIP funds and downward responsibility to the recipients required the involvement of the disadvantaged people and the students in enacting and implementing the BEIP. Engaging students and communities in enacting not just implementing the BEIP would increase their responsibility. However, this demanded an attitudinal change on the part of technocrats, political elites and school administrators. Key elements of the change process included downward responsibility to the students and communities, collaboration, consensus-

building in decision-making processes and an educational (or consciousness-raising) process that allowed for learning in tandem.

Nonetheless, as promulgated in the BEIP, much of this discourse was one of domination. To enable development for students, even when they are told or involved about the sources of funds and how their parents are involved is not enough. Although the BEIP had integrated spaces for students to participate, cultural perspectives of age and experience negated the benefits of collaboration, consensus-building and learning in tandem because students were excluded from most of the implementation and decision-making processes. Such exclusion arose from the view that children have no rights and that their parents and SMCs/BOGs/PTAs know what is in their best interest. It is conventional practice in African contexts to deny students their rights to contribute towards their own development through views such as “...they are still children” (Sundukia). Yet, this negated benefits of empowerment and social change to them.

While acknowledging the worth of government and SMCs/BOGs/PTAs responsibility towards children, the way the constitution promulgated rights of children limited participation of students in development because these were considered children whose voices should be heard through their parents until they attained 18 years of age. Viewed through cultural norms which encourage collective responsibility toward children, in the target schools, voices of children were to be heard through teachers. Nonetheless, to treat students as recipients of development because they have no citizenship right is to negate their own responsibility and that of the duty-bearers (government and parents/communities). Again, the social and political embeddedness of rights as stated in the constitution, their implications to government and parents responsibilities (as duty-bearers and promoters of children rights) the cultural perspective of children and the complexity of participation limited effective understanding of how age and experience reinforced inequalities where a teacher said:

“If we want these young people to be an integral part in our society, and to involve them actively in participation, then we should be able to move together so that they are able to see our strength and that is the intention. But also let them see also our weaknesses...I mean it is an internalised process that a child is going to ask you what they are not sure of or whatever you have done or said. And you will not turn to him and say that is not your responsibility. Why are you asking? When were you born? Whose is older? Yet we are talking of ideas” (Shirikiano).

Devaluing the rights and ideas of the youth, children and young adults was well entrenched in society. A key finding is that excluding students from decisions that impacted on their lives denied them opportunities to develop critical life skills such as truthfulness, openness, dialogue, assertiveness, teamwork and cooperative ways of problem-solving. Lack of these skills led them to resort to violence and non-peaceful acts of problem solving. To affect social changes required ‘unlearning’ of the dehumanizing practices that treated students, SMCs/BOGs/PTAs and the disadvantaged people as recipients rather than creators of development. The unlearning process demands reorientation of mindsets and realisation of political and human rights. The social and political embeddedness of these rights imputes a responsibility on the government and leaders to account for their actions to the citizenry by enforcing individual and collective rights (including rights of access to economic activity and source of income). Otherwise the denial of ‘spaces’ to influence development on the grounds of age and experience created a dependent society where children relied on their parents for solutions and communities and government on donors for aid and strategies. These risked entrenching perpetual dependency and inequalities of poverty.

## **Poverty**

The way technocrats promulgated the structural and rights-based approaches suggests a systemic approach to the question of poverty which according to Ife (2002) should apply at the level of policy, practice and analysis. The structural and rights-based approaches and principles of holism and balanced development as stated in previous chapters meant that poverty is both a cause and an effect of the challenges addressed in the

BEIP and that the actions of those involved spread to the furthest end of the system. As a *cause*, the PRSP describes poverty as the “inadequacy of income... deprivation of basic needs and rights,... lack of access to productive assets [land, employment and] social infrastructure and markets” as a result of natural disasters and an inequitable distribution of wealth, goods and services (GOK, 2002, p. 6).

The PRSP further states that poverty adversely affects participation in social, economic and political processes, denies people life choices and makes them vulnerable. People are poor when they are unable to meaningfully exploit their economic, social and political capitals to enhance their individual and collective wellbeing. As said before, arising from this understanding of poverty as a deprivation of rights, the BEIP aimed to increase access to the rights of education on the part of children and participation of communities in education and development.

An achievement of the BEIP is that it created enabling environments through which to reduce poverty and achieve sustainable human development. Towards this outcome technocrats chose to implement the BEIP in areas that were perceived to have high levels of poverty. It was believed that poverty had led these disadvantaged communities to be unable to meaningfully participate and benefit from educational development compared to other communities. The value these communities attached to education and development led them to readily accept the BEIP and the idea of people-centred and participatory approaches. They understood their needs and how the project was likely to impact their livelihoods. However, as an *effect*, poverty significantly limited the agency of disadvantaged people even after they were provided with structures and opportunities to participate where an educationist stated:

“There are some areas that are really hit by poverty, such that however much you expect the community to participate, it is hard hit. Some of them are not able to... come to help in manual labour. They have no strength. They have no food. Others have nothing to offer...they have no sand to give. In some areas the project may take up at a slower phase. In other areas which are endowed economically, I realized that the project tended to blossom quite fast...there are variations” (Antoinette).

Albeit there were marked differences in the way poverty affected the participation of agriculturalists, agro-pastoralists and pastoralist communities. The socio-economic setups either promoted or inhibited participation. Generally, poverty motivated most communities to participate but structural disadvantages inhibited such participation. The finding that poverty either motivated some communities to participate while discouraging others questions the validity of the technical approach used to enact participation. The technical approach ‘universalised’ or ‘generalised’ participatory approaches and discouraged participation of some disadvantaged individuals and groups. As noted the differences in socio-economic and environmental set-ups emphasise the need for contextualised development approaches.

When policies and approaches are contextualised benefits of ownership and cost-effectiveness are more likely to be increased. This is because despite disadvantaged people’s willingness to participate, natural and environmental conditions limited their participation and variedly increased the costs of the BEIP. Contrary to the view that participation increased efficiency and cost-effectiveness, environmental factors limited alternative choices of the disadvantaged people and those of technocrats:

“...in areas where they have environmental challenges, we had no choice. The work that has been done is not as much as in other areas...We have those discrepancies...in hardship areas, they have spent more in getting material compared to those who get materials from close proximities ”  
(Carla).

Considering the BEIP focus on empowerment, it would reasonably be expected that in implementing participation, technocrats paid attention to these socio-economic and environmental conditions. Despite awareness that these communities lacked access to sources of income and were unable to meaningfully exploit their environments, technocrats proscribed that all disadvantaged communities must participate both in human and physical capital to enhance ownership of the BEIP. This was coated in the language of ‘voluntary participation’. Arguable, it offered the disadvantaged people ‘freedom’ to participate based on their material abilities. Such a prescription of participation as a technical panacea to

poverty negated the contextual differences. It risked accentuating poverty and regional inequalities where a technocrat said:

“Some regions are rich. The parents are willing to contribute. They are putting great effort. Some communities are very poor. They cannot contribute anything. Even if they came to work it is like they should be given some food...because they spent all the time looking for food. So when we...engage them in...school activity, [they ask]. At the end of the day can we get some food to take home for our children? In these hardship areas, it is a real challenge to tell them to put one or two hours into school activity...They spent a lot of time trying to secure food for the children” (Carla).

The quality of the ‘choices’ offered through voluntary participation can thus be questioned. Choosing not to participate in the BEIP to earn an income to feed the children is an act of responsibility and empowerment on the part of disadvantaged communities. It concurs with Ife’s (2002) contention that people participate when they know their actions will make a difference. However, to assume that the richer communities were more willing and better able to participate than the poorer communities is to blame the less endowed communities for their own conditions.

It is also to limit understanding about how the structural approaches technocrats used limited effective understanding of inequalities caused by poverty and accentuated class differences. As said before, the technical approach redefined poverty as a lack of money. Such redefinition also meant that disadvantaged people were rich in human capital and could afford time to attend to the BEIP activities and processes. However, “most of us do not have that time because we want to go out and earn some income to feed our families” (Jamal). The BEIP risked accentuating regional and class inequalities without necessarily addressing the root causes of poverty where a councillor said:

“Concerning this issue of poverty, this issue of voluntary work sometimes is very complicated because those people we want to come for the meetings, they have families and they are not paid. So they have to run for their own survival. That is why they have limited time to be at the site...poverty is a key hindrance” (Mapatano).

These outcomes spell out the contradictions of participation and the use of local resources, materials, knowledge and skills to spread benefits to these communities. The use

of local potentials was taken to mean selling goods and services. Important as this is, the paradox is that the processes of commodification ensured that only technocrats, technical experts, builders and contractors were paid. In enacting the BEIP, technocrats assumed that parents and SMCs/BOGs/PTAs should provide ‘voluntary’ or ‘free’ labour, ideas and time to increase cost-effectiveness, ownership and responsibility. These perspectives of poverty, allowed for impositions of conditions of participation that poor communities were unable to satisfy where a teacher said:

“In relation to the issue of poverty, there are some donors who have a condition, 10% contribution from the community. This is where the problem is with OPEC. The contribution in terms of participation cannot be raised. If they come to dig trenches and they go home with nothing, the following day they do not come” (Reuben).

This idea of remunerating technocrats and technical experts partly inhibited participation. The failure to involve the disadvantaged people in designing the BEIP, led disadvantaged people to believe that technocrats used their poverty conditions to justify their own interests in aid and donor interests in markets. For this reason disadvantaged people also asked to be ‘paid’ a token to be motivated to participate. While the communities’ attempt to ask for payment could be justified on moral grounds, as said before these ways of addressing poverty are tokenistic and were perceived to entrench corruption. The data described corruption in terms of the failure by the government, donors, SMCs/BOGs/PTAs and other change agents to accomplish obligations as claimed in the BEIP or to enact policies to justify technocrats and donor interests in aid and markets. As noted in the data, although the BEIP was justified on grounds of poverty, ASALs communities believed that they are not poor. Rather, technocrats and donors ‘perceived’ them as poor to market goods and services from the more endowed areas where a district committee member avowed:

“I believe our people are not poor...The people we are talking about in quotes the ASALs. They are poor because of the perception. They are only perceived to be poor and because everybody is saying that they are poor, they have accepted that status. Why am I saying this? The resources we have in most of these areas are untapped. Our local resources are untapped



100 times. They are merely underutilized. Why do I say this? These projects come with million of shillings. I wish to take the OPEC project in Mandera...much of the shillings [go] back to Nairobi because of the cement and the sand, mostly the cement, not the sand. There is that locally available building material in our local communities” (Dororomo).

This finding that the BEIP facilitated the exploitation of disadvantaged people is out of step with Ife’s (2002) view that development interventions should increase the power of disadvantaged people over personal and life chances, power over economic activity, and power of reproduction. Thus, to provide solutions to poverty through an aid delivery system is to disempower disadvantaged people and entrench dependency:

“Disempowerment [is] when you loose your sense of dignity, capacity...what I am seeing in schools, if they [government, donors] continue supporting them like this without sense of responsibility, when they withdraw, some of the stakeholders and especially the parents... will have lost their sense of responsibility. The dignity to be responsible parents...they look at themselves like other people and somebody should come and help. That is the worst benefit of the OPEC project. The moment you get disempowered, you don’t feel like you can do anything for yourselves. You no longer feel in control and you cannot even have a vision of the kind of change. I think that is the greatest loss an individual/community can get” (Sundukia).

To the extent that the BEIP left structural poverty/class inequalities unaltered, encouraged dependency and negated responsibilities aid development is unsustainable.

### **Sustainability**

This section builds on the view that aid development is unsustainable. It explores the extent to which the BEIP challenged inequalities caused by environmental, economic and political factors. It argues that the GOK attempt to reduce the challenges of poverty, health/hygiene and education through an aid project, though well intentioned, fell well short of realising sustainable development because structural disadvantages and broader economic, environmental and political factors limited the benefits of empowerment and social change to the disadvantaged people.

Documents (GOK, 2002, 2003b) attest that the BEIP aimed to impact sustainable development through increasing participation and partnerships. As said before, participation in needs assessment was meant to empower and enable SMCs/BOGs/PTAs to

commit on their behalf and on behalf of the broader community of parents towards sustaining the BEIP. As part of this commitment SMCs/BOGs/PTAs were expected to initiate income generating activities such as:

“...open[ing] up these institution(s) to the community such that when... learning is not going on within the school...any one can hire the school facilities and use them for their own personal benefits. For instance, if you hire...the school compound... buildings for a wedding ceremony or family gathering... then you pay...those funds are meant to sustain the project but on condition that [the users] will not affect the future use of that facility. So there are others who will not give anything, they may not even be directly involved in the implementation but they can become users and indirectly participate in sustaining the project through what they shall give to the school when they hire” (Antoinette).

Other income generating activities reported in the data were planting trees, vegetables/farm-crops and dairy farming. Fundraising through CBOs/NGOs, government grants and private entrepreneurs were also identified. Thus, sustainability was construed in terms of maintaining the physical facilities built through the BEIP. Participation and partnerships were thus *methods* of sustainability. The data attest that participation increased the awareness of SMCs/BOGs/PTAs and parents and enabled disadvantaged communities to sustain the BEIP as an educationist stated:

“People have learned to sustain projects with the resources they are generating from those projects...Depending on how capacity-building has been done to the various stakeholders, sustainability can be achieved...If the component of capacity-building has not been well articulated in the entire process of the project. Nothing much will be achieved. People will continue waiting for donors to assist them” (Bushie).

Again, as a result of the consciousness-raising processes “communities have learned to ask for returns for what they give e.g. land they expect what is constructed there to benefit them” (Bushie). Despite enhancing awareness of the BEIP to the broader communities, the data is pessimistic about the extent to which advocacy, capacity-building and participation empowered the disadvantaged people to actually sustain the BEIP and initiate similar development projects in future.

Despite awareness that sustainability required balancing the technical and moral components of development, the focus on structural reforms rather than transformative

reforms meant that the disadvantaged people did not have the technical and resource abilities required to sustain the BEIP. This imbalanced implementation has been shown earlier in the use of questionnaires and pilot testing techniques, phased implementation, and the withdrawal of the BEIP from some schools to accommodate donor interests. Such practices posed major challenges to sustainability. For example, the withdrawal of the BEIP from primary schools in Coast Province to confirm the view that policies ought not be viewed as separate from the mechanisms which implement them (Wallis & Dollery, 2001), meant that aid development is unsustainable.

The withdrawal led SMCs/BOGs/PTAs to believe that projects that are implemented in phases or where funds are disbursed in instalments are unsustainable since such policies draw upon the interests of donors/technocrats or political elites. Where political elites are not re-elected to power, donor-states withdraw funding based on claims of poor governance or unpopular policies where a political councillor stated:

“...we are just being used by westerners...these [donors] think that we are corrupt, we cannot use money, and they think we have all the time to do what they want. If you go to Europe now, they have every minute planned for something. They do not waste time. For us they give us [instalments of] five hundred thousand. They think we are going to stay with that five hundred thousand for one year before they give us another stage. *So they just spoil us more.* Instead of giving us the whole sum of money we tender, we get the material and buy [services] and finish up. A project for three years takes five to seven years, only for 2.1 million Kenya shillings [or \$ US 26,923]. They just give little by little, what is that?” (Mapatano).

The BEIP funds were directly credited into the school accounts for SMCs/BOGs/PTAs to access directly. This may have reduced risks of financial handling by technocrats and delays arising from bureaucracy. Nonetheless, enactment of the BEIP through an aid delivery system overtly and covertly transferred resources and decision-making power from the government either to the donors or the market rather than vesting such authority with the communities. These practices limited capacities to of these communities to sustain the BEIP, gave donors power to ‘shift goal posts’ as they desired and risked delegitimising the government because disadvantaged people lost confidence in

the GOK commitment towards addressing their human developmental challenges in emancipatory and sustainable ways:

“...in this project they propose this, they propose that and then their follow up is not proper. Why? People come to stop because the assistance has stopped. There is no monitoring, there is no follow up. They sponsored no particular people visiting [communities], living with them, knowing their problems. Just to pump money in a particular district and then you say you have assisted people is not enough. People need to go and live with the people and see the situation and observe how the programme itself has been taken by the people on the ground...When, they [donors] just sent money, this money can disappear in between before it reaches the destination...I think a project like OPEC need close supervision, monitoring, guidance on how they want this programme to go and then the sustainability of the programme should have been well set out. When such things are left out, the programme dies naturally when donors withdraw” (Nashika).

The data with SMCs/BOGs/PTAs show that the changes impacted through the BEIP were ‘tokenistic’ and risked creating social classes of ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ or accentuating inequalities where a parent/PTA member confirmed:

“...you sacrifice at long run when the donor...of the project has gone away, your hand is tied...there is no an inch you can move...you don’t have the fund and your people have not been adequately sensitized on how to sustain this particular project. This person employed by the government will just carry on the project supervision because he has the money at hand. But immediately the donor goes then you [community] have no where to go. There is nothing which has been left for this project to run for some time while the sustainability itself has to be organized. So you are left hanging...and then the project dies slowed. Halafu [and then]...these projects are like drops of water in a desert. Like they will always say this project is piloted in two divisions in a certain district. Like in my case these children had nothing completely. It is a boarding school, the dormitory or classrooms may be there but they are empty...the communities are poor...whom do you sell the water to...they cannot afford... You incapacitate people distributing these. Now all the schools are needy...whom do you give and whom do you leave? And when you give about ten furniture in each school...and then you go...you know these [facilities] are floating because they will only be used by few and the rest of children...You even create inequalities...you now wonder is it better to have some sleeping on the beds others on the floor or some sitting on the desks and others on the floor” (Ruaikei).

These concerns meant that the BEIP was unsustainable and the furniture, classrooms, water and sanitation facilities it provided could not meet the needs of the school populations and the neighbouring communities who greatly lacked access to these

rights. This way the BEIP stifled local innovation and motivation to participate while entrenching dependency where a headteacher said:

“It is good that the OPEC project is entirely giving the whole lot of money for the whole project to take off and be completed. Otherwise, if there could be a certain contribution of a certain percentage from the community, then it could be stored somewhere [savings] because of the political environment/ atmosphere. If there is a certain percentage for the community to contribute towards that project, then of course the community could go the politician to ask for assistance. This is where now the community will be deceived. That either I will bring four lorries of sand which will delay or I will contribute four thousand blocks which will delay or the donors give the whole amount of money. So there is no need for the community to contribute. We have come across all those [scenarios]...Sometimes if the community is supposed to pay...some...donation, politically these problems come in. There is an element of some thing being given free now, so the community member should not be [asked to contribute]” (Hamish).

A contributing factor to the inability of the BEIP to affect inequalities and sustainability came from structural disadvantages arising from environmental, economic, educational and political factors as shown in the following subsection.

### **Environmental, Socio-economic and Political Factors**

Sustainability from the perspective of technocrats and SMCs/BOGs/PTAs is a significant element of emancipation. However, technocrats focus on the maintenance of the physical facilities enacted through the BEIP meant that sustainability drew upon the ability of the disadvantaged people to create markets and make profits from the income generating activities they were able to establish. On the contrary environmental, socio-economic and political factors and technocrats’ perspectives of poverty limited the ability of disadvantaged communities to realise the benefits of sustainable livelihoods.

The way technocrats promulgated the BEIP and the use of local potential fell well short of satisfying the poverty and developmental needs of disadvantaged communities. Firstly, the approach excluded disadvantaged people from processes which identified and mobilised resources to address their poverty and educational challenges organically. Secondly, the socio-economic institutions and infrastructural systems needed to enable

meaningful participation were lacking. The use of representatives as said before led to the creation of elite-to-elite networks. Rather than providing permanent solutions, these approaches accentuated class inequalities and further marginalized the disadvantaged where a parent/BOG member contended:

“I think it is a deliberate way to marginalize others...The whole issue of participation is very closely linked to poverty. The moment this person is denied an opportunity to education, right from primary...talk that as exclusion. This is because the issue of information being power, knowledge being power...you can't get yourself a job. You can't argue out your case clearly in the community and you cannot get feasibility...It goes up to the national level. You will always [be] excluded as an individual and community and of course poverty becomes a reality” (Sundukia).

Far from increasing power over institutions of health and education (Ife, 2002) and thus their ability to sustain the BEIP, the education sector was perceived to marginalize and entrench poverty through policies which encouraged admission to universities on the basis of available beds. The criteria used to select primary graduates for admission into secondary schools also satisfied the interest of the elites and the rich. These practices and policies made the disadvantaged to believe that poverty is ‘created’ through denial of rights of access to education, economic-activity, health and security and discourses of representation and aid where a district committee member said:

“Look we have been given a name tag. This name, ‘the ASAL’ and then there is ‘hardship area’. All these are labels that we are not...as an individual I am not comfortable with these labels. Because it is segregating us, it is dividing us. It is separating us from the rest of Kenyans. Why should this be used if they are assisting us as they claim? I think there is this saying which says that instead of giving somebody fish for lunch, it is better to teach him how to fish. Yes, the area is hardship, but we should use that hardship for positively developing our people. That condition [dry weather] is not available with everybody. There is nobody who gets 24 hours or 12 months... sunshine like us...most of these developed countries...do not have 24 months sunshine...They do not have 12 months working period of the year. Half of the year they are covered with snow, they cannot produce as much sun as we are producing. So we have this time, and we have this environment at our disposal which is untapped...[Yet] when there is disease, it is ASAL people, when there is war it is ASAL people, when there is drought, it is ASAL people, when there is floods it is ASAL people...Insecurity, ASAL people, why? I don't think we have more insecurity than...Nairobians. In these projects, our people should be involved in resources identification and

mobilization...for their development...they must be involved in mobilization of their own resources. That is the only time they can own up these projects and the project can be sustained...most of these development projects run by the ministry like GOK/OPEC lack networking and effective coordination... that is the way I feel. That is what hinders development” (Dororomo).

The GOK failure to develop enabling environments for ASALs to meaningfully exploit their socio-economic and environmental capital limited benefits of sustainability. SMCs/BOGs/PTAs testimonies questioned the logic used to describe these communities as poor and their environments as ‘ASALs’, ‘hardship’ and ‘insecurity zones’. Such ‘labels’ meant that the government justified aid through educational and other economic development policies and used these to further marginalize pastoralists where the district committee member added:

“Education policies are surely biased...The policies in this country generally are just biased to us the pastoralists. Why? Since late 1979 there was no allowing of marketing of livestock and livestock products. While we have Pyrethrum...Coffee Board of Kenya, Kenya Tea Board...We don’t have livestock production and marketing board in this country. And we are boosting economy...we provide more that 68% of the beef... livestock products to the country. Why should we be seen as a liability...poor, when we are [supplying] all livestock products to this country. So, we are deliberately neglected in these development strategies” (Dororomo).

Where educational and developmental structural disadvantages inhibited access to education, participation and sustainability, the BEIP risked entrenching class, poverty, ethnic and regional inequalities. School communities were expected to provide security to the schools where the BEIP was implemented as a way of cutting the costs of employing security guards. As part of this role, parents were supposed to build access roads, fence the schools and keep vigilance. SMCs/BOGs/PTAs were nonetheless pessimistic about how the disadvantaged communities were meant to sustain these roles in the long-term, largely because of the high crime rate in urban slums and hardship areas. They questioned the efficacy of the BEIP to increase security to communities that were not even entitled to such rights in the words:

“From the time of colonial [rule]...we are said to be...violent/harsh. The climate is harsh and the communities are harsh...That is why people in

hardship areas are taken to be very violent people...That is why we...had section 2A that is putting us under emergency from colonial time...People who are under emergency have no right to do anything either education or anything. It was only the other day that the section was removed. But if you go down now to Mandera, Isiolo, somebody's right is violated and nobody will even think of correcting that. This is the way we have been thinking...and we still think that is still there. We have inherited from all that time. The other thing is ignorance and inadequate education...It is...normally said, if you go to a local man in Mandera, Isiolo or Moyale, he will ask you, do you come from Kenya? That means they are not even Kenyans. They don't even associate themselves with Kenyans. It is not ignorance...They believe that those people from down Kenya are Kenyans. The ASALs are neither Kenyans, nomads nor Somalis. They don't even know who they are. They are hanging wherever they are" (Nashika).

To ask the disadvantaged communities to provide security to schools when their own security rights were not structurally guaranteed risked shirking government responsibility towards promoting such rights while limiting sustainability of the BEIP. As a result of 'perceived' insecurity, schools in the ASALs were neither maintained nor supervised. SMCs/BOGs/PTAs feared that despite enacting structures and processes to monitor and evaluate the schools built with the BEIP fund, generally ASALs schools were hardly supervised nor monitored as frequently as schools in other areas. These schools lacked facilities and performed poorly in national examinations.

Monitoring and evaluation in the BEIP was also ineffective. Technocrats could not get through to the schools because of harsh weather and rough roads. Such 'neglect' taught elites from disadvantaged communities to devalue their own schools and choose education in other parts of the country. The paradox is that disadvantaged people continued to miss out in education. They cannot afford education in either public or private schools within their communities or elsewhere. Data showed that mushrooming of private schools among ASALs was teaching the disadvantaged people that private schooling was better than public schooling. Yet, the ministry of education neither ensured the quality of education private schools provided through supervision nor facilitated parents to receive value for money through the curriculum. Whether enrolled in public or private schools, most children from disadvantaged households dropped out often losing learning time. Some



attended up to four schools. Again, the education system encouraged white collar rather than blue collar jobs upon which the livelihood of disadvantaged communities depended.

The failure to integrate the socio-economic needs of ASALs communities in educational policies meant that when their children completed schooling they could neither secure employment nor herd livestock since they missed out in such life skills. This is different to children from agricultural communities who could resort to farming when they missed out on waged employment. This way the education system detached disadvantaged children from their socio-economic lifestyles and destroyed traditional socio-economic systems without providing alternative sources of income. Thus, a parent contended:

“I think the curriculum is creating the gap? Why is the curriculum not serving our culture? Why is the curriculum not meeting our needs and yet it is meeting the needs of other Kenyans? Because of lack of job opportunities, our children are not going back to herding. Now what do they do? They are involved in drugs and drug abuse...And then the discipline deteriorates. They try even to influence students who are admitted [in schools]. So lack of job opportunity brings a lot of other problems to us... [including] HIV/AIDS...” (Darren).

These findings concur with Sifuna’s (2005b) contention that the education system better served the interests of the communities that lived in the areas of high and medium agricultural potential than pastoralists-nomads living in the ASALs. Economically this means that pastoralist communities must wait for the agricultural communities to farm and market their goods to them. This way of redistributing goods, services and markets makes pastoralists depend on the agriculturally endowed parts of the country. The way the government promulgated economic development and integrated these policies within the education system, better served agricultural rather than pastoralist communities through the provision of water, roads, electricity and social amenities. This inequitable distribution of economic assets, infrastructure (including educational institutions) and the poor integration of disadvantaged peoples’ needs in the education system arose from unclear policies and wrong priorities based on the personal interests of political elites, donors and technocrats rather than community needs where the parents/BOGs member confirmed:

“Look at the way the [government] has shared the tarmac roads, I don’t think there was any merit apart from who is who. In a country where development is linked to personalities other than clear policies, then automatically that means that everybody who has been excluded from education cannot climb up to the top, cannot influence policies, and the moment you cannot influence policies, that means exclusion and once you are excluded then poverty is with you. And it is not only with you for days, it can even be institutionalised. This is because if you are poor and you cannot take your child to school, you bring up another poor person...With time you realize, regions, communities, families are completely excluded” (Sundukia).

SMCs/BOGs/PTAs argued that the education system encouraged competition in examinations. Such competition meant that the education system served the socio-economic and employment needs neither of ASALs nor of other communities, even after achieving good grades of C+ and above. These ways of maintaining a balance in the status quo denied ASALs access to the right of economic activity and employment while forcing youth who have attained academic achievements to continue to ‘depend’ on their parents for their livelihood. Thus, the education system through the BEIP risked entrenching ethnic, regional and class inequalities at the micro, meso and macro levels of development without addressing the root causes of poverty.

To the extent that the education system encouraged competition without necessarily addressing poverty, education and employment needs of disadvantaged people, it is right to state that more cooperative rather than competitive ways of problem-solving are more likely to increase the benefits of empowerment and transformation to the hitherto excluded. Thus, as Ife (2002) contends, PDev interventions must challenge the competitive ethic that informs most education systems with a view to increasing the power of disadvantaged people to control their own future. Decrying the education system a teacher suggested:

“Education should enable one to use the skills and the knowledge he has attained to exploit the environment [to] develop himself and sustain his parents, not to come back to depend on them...there has to be a mechanism by the government or the civil society, whoever is concerned with development of humanity in the republic. That mechanism must aim at improving the life skills of that individual. If you are trained to become a teacher or farmer you must have that speciality inbuilt in you to ensure that you...improve your participation. What is lacking is that proper mechanism... The goal of education is to develop one to live a happy and

quality live in society... I mean [being] able to provide for his family adequately” (Nashika).

These perspectives were neither meant to devalue education nor the benefits of aid projects. Instead, it is to emphasize the need for the GOK to address the economic, socio-political and environmental factors which inhibit disadvantaged people from controlling their own development. It is also to stress a focus on contextualised PDev strategies based on environmental and socio-cultural knowledge and the need for transformation as the next section shows.

### **Social Change**

This section critically reflects on the BEIP empowerment and sustainability benefits to envision possibilities for social change. The central argument is that the emancipation and sustainable development of the disadvantaged people is more likely to emerge with interventions that promote participatory practices, which embrace strong government partnerships with civil society and local communities (including the active participation of women and youth). A strong focus must be on promoting access to the rights of citizenship, access to economic activity, education, health, security and general agency in the development of society. To empower disadvantaged people to claim their rights and to hold the government and donors accountable to them, a more radical approach to mainstream PDev than was realised in the BEIP is needed.

As noted in the data technocrats integrated capacity-building seminars to train SMCs/BOGs/PTAs on how to manage the BEIP. The lesser impact realised on the disadvantaged people led an educationist to suggest broad civic and formal education systems with a focus on human and citizenship or political rights. This educational programme demanded responsible government/education systems that were willing to:

“...educate [people] on a broad scale to know their rights, what their limitations are to their rights...We are taking management to grassroots. Have we capacity-built these people enough to be able to observe and act? The government has a key stake in making people know their rights. It has to empower people to know their rights and act in a transparent way. I

repeat is there government will because we have been thriving on ignorance of the people. We have trampled on people's rights because they don't know their rights. Do we have the will to tell them what to do when wrong things happen? (Bushie).

Besides integrating educational programmes in development interventions, mainstreaming these forms of education in school curricular with all educational institutions, civil societies and media playing an active role is critical. An educational programme that sensitized and politically empowered disadvantaged communities to feel a part of the Kenyan community was seen to increase government, community and civil society obligations towards human development. Ultimately, the increased sense of responsibilities enhanced participation in development interventions and enabled disadvantaged people to hold accountable systems that govern their lives.

It cannot be overemphasised that emancipation and sustainable development require radical mindsets and unlearning processes (Chambers, 1997; Ife, 2002) on the part of disadvantaged people, technocrats and donors. Parents need to unlearn much of the cultural practice that makes them deny children access to educational rights and participation in development. Disadvantaged people need to unlearn much of the cultural practice and apolitical socialization which has led them to devalue their own potential and depend on external aid. Technocrats must unlearn the belief that disadvantaged people do not know what is in their best interests– unlearn the idea of providing solutions to poverty and rights challenges from their own perspective. Political elites must unlearn the desire to amass power. They should learn to cede political power by being answerable to the people. On these unlearning processes, an educationist said:

“The political will should be there. And even us government officers. We have been having some mindsets. There is a particular way people are used to doing things...the civil service culture. Are we willing to turn around and do things in a better way to *change from being bosses to servants*; to guide the people, because if we are bossy, empowering these people, because we do not want them to challenge our authorities, then we are not going to go very far. First of all we must be facilitators of this change and...empowerment. Are we willing to change the attitude? Has the government itself prepared us so that we change attitudes as we

become change agents of the people down there, to turn around and reengineer the process?” (Bushie).

According to a parent/BOGs member, donors:

“...need to unlearn [their linear thinking and understand] that we have unique needs as a country, as Kenyans. They cannot treat Kenya like any other country. So any time they give donations...they should not say this country is behaving like this [other] country. I think that comparative approach to countries ...makes it difficult for donors to address the real unique needs of a society. They need to unlearn this issue of generalising needs. They need to humble themselves come and sit with the people and identify the real need ....that are facing the people” (Sundukia).

As noted in the data, the GOK and donors must reorient their thinking about representation, technical expertise and aid assistance as these increased domination and social exclusion. Emancipation, sustainable development and social change are unlikely with weak government institutions. The data showed that while the ministry of education policies were well intentioned, the proclivities towards top-down methods and the bureaucratic context within which they operated limited an effective understanding of structural disadvantages on their part. Like the disadvantaged people, the ministry of education needed to be strengthened or empowered to learn to be responsive to the needs of the people, not to work with ‘reactionary’ structures.

To increase validity and efficacy of such structures, there was need to integrate immersion programmes within disadvantaged communities before, during and after PDev programmes. Ultimately such immersion processes enhanced learning and empowerment benefits to the disadvantaged and change agents themselves. Most suggestions for social change encouraged the view of a ‘poor government’ and a ‘willing to empower donor’. While government cooperation with donors is desirable, to the extent that the forms of participation and partnerships appeared to delegitimise the government and disempower disadvantaged communities, aid PDev requires rethinking. The data recorded the need for a strong, able and responsible government that prioritized citizenry wellbeing over markets. A responsible government will not only enact structures but will also enforce and promote the rights of its disadvantaged communities.

To empower the disadvantaged the GOK must take services closer to the people. As the main exit out of poverty, disease and ignorance, education must be tailored towards human development and disadvantaged people's rights. As part of this responsibility the GOK will have to develop the social, political and economic capitals upon which the disadvantaged people's lives draw. Here, anti-growth policies (Ife, 2002) that focus on developing disadvantaged people's subsistence economies are more likely to enhance empowerment and sustainable changes. Such contextualised human development means that the GOK must rethink its capitalist oriented strategies.

Rethinking is essential where PDev practice in the BEIP led to commodification of rights and promoted power and market shifts to the donor. Given the scarcity of resources, the GOK must strengthen its partnerships with civil society and local communities. It must enact structures and promote participation on the basis of rights and citizenship agendas, not maximizing benefits of aid through microeconomic principles of redistribution. Furthermore, it must address the poor infrastructures and policies that negatively discriminate against disadvantaged people.

### **Conclusion**

This chapter has shown that bureaucracy, environmental, cultural and socio-economic factors inhibited the long-term engagement of disadvantaged communities with the BEIP. Their poverty, lack of information, time, materials and low awareness levels suggest that unless these structural disadvantages are addressed emancipation and sustainable development are unlikely. To the extent that the BEIP left existing inequalities and social exclusion unaltered, or appeared to accentuate these, a complete overhaul of the infrastructural conditions of the schools and neighbourhoods and a rethinking of the competitive principles of education and PDev are desirable. The next chapter concludes the thesis by summarising the main findings and exploring the implication to PDev policy, theory and practice and the possibilities for future research.

## **CHAPTER EIGHT**

### **CONCLUSION, IMPLICATIONS TO PDEV POLICY, THEORY & PRACTICE**

#### **Introduction**

This chapter restates the central aim of the thesis, the methodology used to answer the research questions and summarises the main findings. It also considers how the research findings implicate contemporary debates on mainstream PDev, Ife's (2002) model for CDev and modernisation, dependency, ADev and postdevelopment theories. The central argument of the thesis is that although participation and collaboration in the BEIP have enhanced the teaching and learning environments of the target schools and increased awareness of rights to the disadvantaged people, accountability has remained top-down. These top-down approaches have contributed to social exclusion and further marginalisation of disadvantaged people. For these reasons, the thesis argues that emancipation and sustainable development are more likely to emerge through interventions that increase participatory practices, that entail government partnerships with civil society and local communities, which promote structures and discourses of citizenship and rights, and where the grassroots is the locale for change.

#### **Central Aim of the Thesis**

The purpose of this research was to critically examine the efficacy of mainstream aid programmes that embrace people-centred, participatory approaches and government partnerships with donors, civil society and local communities to affect benefits of empowerment and social change to disadvantaged people. It also aimed to utilise structural and poststructural perspectives to critically assess the 'fit' between policy, practice and theory of PDev and its relationships with PDev, use the knowledge obtained from the perspectives of those directly involved in the BEIP to appraise Ife's (2002) approach to CDev, and illuminate theoretical debates that are ongoing in development. It answered four questions.

The first question looked into the way the BEIP objectives and management structure established the context and policy for participation, partnership, empowerment and sustainable (or balanced and holistic) development. It also considered the selection criteria used to ensure the BEIP impacted on disadvantages of poverty, gender and culture. The question also looked into the principles guiding the formation and functions of the management structures and their impact on PDem.

The second question assessed the approaches, principles and impact of the BEIP partnerships. It aimed to ascertain whether there is a 'level ground' on which the government, donor, civil societies and disadvantaged people participated as equal partners, the extent to which social networks emerged across social class and their durability and impact on cooperation and accountability.

The third question examined the extent to which the process and outcomes of participation within the BEIP adhered to principles of change from below. It interrogated levels of involvement by the different actors in the processes of planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. Special reference was made to aims, meanings, methods and principles of decision-making, consciousness-raising, community-resource mobilisation and the use of local potential. Any opportunities and challenges offered for the participation of disadvantaged people were also highlighted.

The fourth question critically examined the extent to which the management structure, partnerships and participation challenged dominant discourses and structural disadvantages based on bureaucracy, culture, gender, age, poverty and broader socio-economic, environmental and political factors. The themes of holistic development were here once again reflected upon to gauge the potentials for the BEIP to affect empowerment, sustainable development and social change to disadvantaged people.



## Summary of Main Findings

As Ife (2002) suggests, this research has shown that PDev is more likely to address the structural and rights challenges of disadvantaged people when a holistic approach to development is used. While policies may have a strong focus on holistic and balanced development there existed significant ‘disconnects’ between the stated policies and the practices generated through the BEIP. This disconnect confirms the fact that despite awareness of the need for balance between structural and rights (or technical and moral) components and an understanding of development as a process, technocrats are usually engaged in processes of translation and, the consequences of their policies and decisions may not be intentional (Williams, 2004). It also attests that translating policies into practices of balanced mainstream PDev is neither value-free (Ife, 2002) nor is it without structural challenges to the technocrats and disadvantaged people.

As shown in this research, mainstream PDev continues to appropriate bureaucratically organised management structures underpinned by the view that the top-most bureaucrats are most able to make feasible decisions and policies and promote relationships based on partnerships and participation. Arising from this view, PDev is implemented through ‘invited’ representatives who are neither democratically elected nor are their management roles legitimated through processes of consultation or other forms of democracy. For this reason, representation is a significant inhibitor to PDev because it legitimated bureaucracy and its undemocratic practices.

PDev within bureaucratic contexts can thus appropriate discourses of representation, participation, partnerships and empowerment to exclude the very disadvantaged people from decision-making and policies that affect their lives. Despite decentralisation of functions and services to lower tiers of the management structure, the retention of decision-making authority with the central office led to the emergence of participation and collaboration through representatives as a form of new centralism. That is to say where participation is promoted through invited rather than democratically elected

representatives PDev denies disadvantaged people the rights of participation, excludes them from decisions and results into elite-to-elite networks.

This reproduction of social class confirms that rather than strengthen PDem, PDev management within an aid delivery system through representatives (Brown, 2004) and technical experts, is indeed a form of social exclusion. Besides negating contextual differences, the practice of PDev denied the disadvantaged people freedom of choice and opportunities to participate fully in the identification, implementation and monitoring and evaluation processes of the BEIP as PDev protagonists (Burkey, 1993; Chambers, 1997) advocate. Despite having sensibilities of PDem the practices of participation, partnership, consciousness-raising, consensus-building show that PDev largely remains a discourse of the powerful about the powerless (Ife, 2002). It can potentially legitimate dissenting voices through such terms as stakeholders and development partners and promote new professionalism (Chambers, 1997).

A central finding is that to impact empowerment and transformation, the process and outcomes of PDev must be treated not as separate but rather as a process whose means and outcomes are intractably entwined (Ife, 2002). Separation makes change agents to privilege technical over moral elements of PDev by focusing on structures, participation, partnerships, empowerment and sustainability as methods and/or outcomes rather than processes in which the disadvantaged people are active, not passive participants. Such privileging comes from technocrats and donors' top-down mindsets and the use of representatives, aid assistance and technical experts.

These features together with 'dichotomic thinking' (Pieterse, 2002) blind change agents to effectively understand how the bureaucratic contexts, their own perceptions and approaches enhance social exclusion, inhibit participation and the creation of partnerships and social networks on an equal basis. This research has shown that empowerment, transformation and sustainable development are more likely to emerge with interventions that promote participatory practice, that embrace government partnerships with civil

societies and local communities and which promote structures and discourses of rights and citizenship. Nonetheless, a major challenge for PDev remains overcoming donor interests in markets and technocrats' interests in aid.

Despite PDev claims to redistribute economic and technical knowledge from the already endowed and powerful (Arnstein, 1971), such interests are critical inhibitors to the use of local knowledge, skills, potential and the realisation of organic development (Ife, 2002). The attempt to promote PDev in the BEIP fell well short of realising change from below and the integrity of the participatory processes. Despite intentions to implement PDev as a process, the structural approach adopted led to commodification of participation. Such commodification risked accentuating power and market shifts away from the disadvantaged to the donor and enabling the GOK to shirk its own responsibilities and those of its disadvantaged people.

Where cooperation and partnerships are premised on the need to relieve the government burden by maximizing benefits of aid through microeconomic principles of redistribution PDev risked supplanting structural disadvantages (Botchway, 2001) critical to emancipation and encouraging dependency on external aid (Burkey, 1993). As Klees (2001) contends, far from ensuring partnerships on equal basis, PDev in the BEIP strengthened donor monolithic power and exposed the vulnerability of the GOK and its disadvantaged people. The imposition of donor power occurs because donors find it hard to change their ways of thinking and doing things. For this reason, PDev partnerships continue to privilege donor interests through conditions established through negotiations that are sealed through aid memoirs, agreements and contracts that are neither accessible to disadvantaged people nor their representatives.

Although technocrats negotiated with OPEC, such negotiations established conditions and policies which limited the choices of the SMCs/BOGs/PTAs, collaborating technical experts from other sectors and disadvantaged people. Contrary to literature that denies the role of Third World governments (Rahnema, 1992) in PDev, such negotiations

recognise that role and are indicative of opportunities for change– the donor and the government are willing participants despite absence of ‘equal partnerships’ in practice. As Chambers (2005) states, governments may appear to be in control of aid development projects when some other power, for example a donor, makes the most critical decisions. This research has shown negotiations are potential mechanisms to rubberstamp donor interests in markets and government interests in aid.

Such interests contributed to the emergence of partnerships on the basis of competitive rather than cooperative relationships. To the extent that such competition led to the imposition of decisions confirms that more cooperative approaches are better able to address structural disadvantages (Ife, 2002). The problem with such partnerships is that macro/meso/micro-level power relationships are left unchallenged. That means PDev partnerships are not just empty spaces. Rather, partnerships are spaces filled with ‘political, economic and social powers’. Appropriation of these powers through PDev encouraged upward rather than downward accountability to the people. To concur with Gregory (2007), this research has shown that there is a very fine line between accountability and responsibility. Contrary to conventional notions which only loosely use accountability to denote reporting to donors (or sources of funds), responsibility entails processes of integrity, transparency and answerability to the people. Mainstream PDev will have to engender downward responsibility to the people.

Contrary to the view that partnerships in PDev contributes to the establishment of durable relationships and social networks through which disadvantaged people can overcome their poverty challenges like Buch-Hansen (2002) argued, this research shows that aid partnerships are neither durable nor sustainable. Instead PDev partnerships within an aid delivery system accentuate social exclusion, inequalities (Pieterse, 2002), and entrench dependency (Burkey, 1993).

Indeed, PDev requires government partnerships with civil society, citizenry and disadvantaged people themselves and structures that promote participatory practice, that

promote active citizenship and rights agendas (Hickey, 2002; Ife, 2002). However, dependence on aid curtails local innovations and foresight and risks entrenching corruption rather than addressing it. Technocrats' tendency to enlist local participation to increase efficiency and cost-effectiveness of aid redefined participation in apolitical terms (contribution and sharing). This necessitates PDev researchers and practitioners to (re)politicise participation (Williams, 2004) with a view to enabling disadvantaged people to initiate social and political action (Ife, 2002) on their own disadvantages.

The practice of participation in the BEIP confirms that for most of the time mainstream PDev continues to be enacted in a top-down manner (Ndengwa, 1996). Where disadvantaged people and their representatives participate, the most important decisions are made by technocrats in collaboration with the donor. This failure to involve disadvantaged people in decision-making processes attests to the fact that participation in PDev practice is largely either tokenistic (Arnstein, 1971) or coerced (Chambers, 2002). Again, these forms of participation are nominal and instrumental (White, 1996). This privileging of functional over transformational modes of participation emerged through the methods of planning and decision-making.

To confirm Brohman's (1996) concerns, many of PDev decision-making practices turned out to be forums in which disadvantaged people did not participate. Methods of planning inhibited the full participation of disadvantaged people and their representatives and curtailed their freedom of choice. Similarly, the methods used in advocacy, consciousness-raising and capacity-building treated SMCs/BOGs/PTAs and disadvantaged people as passive recipients of knowledge channelled through lecture-seminars by technocrats and technical experts.

Indeed these forums were seen to increase awareness of SMCs/BOGs/PTAs and contributed to processes of learning in tandem. However, awareness of rights to disadvantaged people was minimal because they were largely excluded from these educational forums. These practices confirm that planners and policy-makers lack

theoretical knowledge on participation and contextual understanding of the people whose development they plan for (Chambers, 1974; 1983). For these reasons, change agents alike with disadvantaged people require more empowerment through processes of learning in tandem, immersion, broad political and civic education programmes to affect social and political action, than is currently promulgated in mainstream PDev.

As research has established (Cornwall, 2003) PDev through processes of community-resources mobilisation in the BEIP succumbed to *neoliberalism* without necessarily addressing the root causes of poverty because of structural disadvantages based on class, culture, gender, age, environmental, socio-economic and political factors. Unless these structural inhibitors are replaced with enabling environments, technical changes at an individual or organisational level will achieve only limited results. Despite a willingness to participate, these factors inhibited disadvantaged people's meaningful participation and obscured empowerment and transformation. Community-resource mobilisation presents an opportunity for the GOK, CBOs and disadvantaged people to jointly address structural and rights deficits. The BEIP contributed to the development of physical facilities in the target schools. This is no mean contribution towards enhanced access to the rights of participation and education.

As Ife (2002) contends, participation in the BEIP also provided disadvantaged people with an opportunity to share experiences of disadvantage and visions of how to combat their inhibiting factors. However, unless disadvantaged people are enabled to undertake social and political actions on their own disadvantages, PDev will continue to be a discourse of the powerful about the powerless. Government-led PDev must develop an enabling environment to promote the 'rule of development by the people (Ife, 2002). It must avoid manageristic systems (Mulenga, 1999) that are too costly, which bring few benefits to the disadvantaged people and which rather than build communities (Ife, 2002), accentuate social exclusion and domination.

As shown in this research, aid assistance meant that PDev encourages the observance and construction of disadvantaged people's development from the vantage point of outsiders (Spivak, 1985). When observed from the vantage point of technocrats disadvantaged people's lifestyles and cultures are idealised and targeted as problems for projects to respond to without unpacking such cultures or seeing them as products of internalised power relationships (Williams, 2004). For example, technocrats' perceptions about poverty 'deprived' disadvantaged people their humanity while the equation of experience with wisdom cemented with cultural practices to deny women, youth/students and children rights and leaderships positions. These practices precipitate cultural-ethnic animosity, conflicts of interests and violence. For these reasons, PDev will have to appropriate the more cooperative, not competitive; peaceful and non-violent ways of problem-solving; and value culture as a system of knowledge-power from which efforts towards emancipation and sustainable development can benefit.

While PDev continued to appropriate affirmative actions to overcome the deleterious effect of gender, culture, age and poverty, the pluralist and elitist view that the hitherto excluded must compete with others as equals negated the meaningful participation of disadvantaged people. Competition in the BEIP in tandem with Pieterse (2002) was perceived to accentuate micro-meso-macro level inequalities and allowed technocrats-donors to experiment with unproven policies (Visvanathan, 1988) on them.

Such practices must be replaced with more radical structural and poststructural perspectives that find a balance between experiential-cultural and universal knowledge, civic-citizenship<sup>35</sup> and human rights agendas to avoid the deleterious effects of ethnicity and culture and the imposition of global practices. An core finding on rights is that PDev tends to emphasize individual over collective rights of ethnic formations. To overcome the individualising effects that result from this liberal approach, PDev, focus should not be to celebrate culture and citizenship indiscriminately.

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<sup>35</sup> As promulgated in Kenya, the concept of citizenship assumes unitary meanings that negate cultural diversity or treat tribes and cultures as negative terms within democracy (Murunga & Nasong'o, 2007)

It must identify the salient features that support individual and collective rights and sustainable livelihoods in balanced ways that do not exclude disadvantaged people. The need for a broader educational programme than was realised in the BEIP is a critical element for increasing awareness and political and social action. PDev interventions should thus aim to provide such education through multi-sectoral approaches (including formal schooling, informal education programmes focusing on health, water, education, agriculture, environment and wildlife sectors). This means that media organisations and civil societies have critical roles to play in such education.

These ‘alternatives’ (Escobar, 1996) are more likely to enable PDev practitioners to shift the focus towards communities and villages (Friedmann, 1992) where organic development is more likely to emerge. Another key finding is that integrating immersion programmes for technocrats to live among the disadvantaged communities (ethnic tribes), learn their ways of thinking and doing development (Burkey, 1993) before and when implementing projects would make policies and decisions more feasible. Lack of such immersion programmes in the BEIP meant the disadvantaged communities considered technocrats’ decisions less sensitive to their realities. To increase PDev impact on the understanding of culture, tribal and territorial boundaries which manifest the realities of these people must count in PDev practice.

To enable disadvantaged people to initiate social and political action, change agents must rethink their ways of doing development and adopt a 360° reorientation—they must change together with the disadvantaged people. Change agents will have to unlearn much of their bureaucratic, capitalistic, technocratic and elitist socialisations which make them treat disadvantaged people as ‘inferiors’ and unable to know what is in their best interest. Disadvantaged people will have to unlearn much of their apolitical and cultural socialisations that make them devalue their own potential and humanity. If PDev is ever to achieve emancipation and sustainable development, human development must retain a central place in policy and planning, education and consciousness-raising and social and



political action (Ife, 2002). For these reasons a more *radical* approach to mainstream PDev, which originates with disadvantaged people (Friedmann, 1992; Ife, 2002; Pretty, 1995) is both essential and desirable.

In this case the efficacy of PDev and its approaches will not be measured by the number of physical facilities and amount of money aid agencies have contributed. Rather it is in terms of how its efforts break ties of dependency (Burkey, 1993) and contribute sustainable livelihoods to the generality of the populace, which can never be attained unless disadvantaged communities (women, youth, children) are engaged in development. A core finding is that an imbalanced implementation of PDev through structural rather than change focused reforms limits benefits of ownership, empowerment and sustainability in aid interventions. Implications of these findings to modernisation, dependency, ADev and postdevelopment theories will now be given.

### **Implication to Development Theories**

A central implication of this thesis' findings to modernisation theory resonates with the dual societies (Frank, 1969), neoliberalism and technocratic planning and managerialism that pervade donor-to-government-led development (Willis, 2005) (such as those identified with World Bank, OPEC). Like Frank's dual society this research has revealed that capitalist and subsistence economies co-exist in the theory and practice of mainstream PDev among disadvantaged people. Contrary to Frank's view that the capitalist economy totally integrates peripheries and makes the subsistence sector play a secondary role, in practice this is not the case.

While in theory the capitalist economy masquerades as the dominant socio-economic order, in practice the majority of the disadvantaged people continue to primarily depend on subsistence economies for their livelihoods. As shown in this research economic growth structures have neither solved the poverty and educational challenges of the disadvantaged people nor totally erased the significance of their traditional institutions to

their wellbeing. Indeed the attempt to address the poverty and educational challenges of disadvantaged people through representatives, aid assistance and technical expertise cemented into neoliberalism, contributed to social exclusion and enhanced dependency on elites and donors.

These findings conform to structural dependency (or postcolonial) (Bhabha, 1994; Cardoso & Faletto, 1979; Spivak, 1985), ADev (Burkey, 1993; Chambers, 1997; Friedmann, 1992; Martinussen, 1997) and postdevelopment (Escobar, 1996; Sachs, 1992) ideals. As is the case with structuralists, this research revealed that the GOK has a significant role to play in planning and human development. However, the proclivity towards capitalist, market, technocratic and bureaucratic ideals, as Manzo (1991) argues, led the donor and technocrats to equate the nation-state with the political subject of development [disadvantaged people]. For example, from the perspectives of school communities, technocrats formed partnerships and determined who would participate according to the interests of the ministry of education and the donor. Such an equation of technocrats' interests with those of disadvantaged people concealed contextual differences and histories of the disadvantaged people. It blinded technocrats from effectively understanding how their nationalist proclivities redefined culture within tribal and national confines and reproduced culture beyond these territorial boundaries (Bhabha, 1995b; Spivak, 1985). Structural disadvantages (culture, gender, poverty, age, bureaucracy, economic, environmental, political) are given a secondary role in PDev.

These features mattered inasmuch as they either limited or enhanced participation in aid development (the BEIP). And yet, in enacting structures of the BEIP, technocrats and the donor did not consider how their own practices inhibited the disadvantaged people from enacting their own development. This way, the practices of partnerships and participation through representation, aid assistance and technical expertise either negated contextual differences or contributed to 'universalising' effects to maintain balance and legitimate the status quo. The emergence of new centralism, new professionalism, and

competitive rather than cooperative relationships, violent rather than peaceful and non-violent means of problem-solving, despite the use of alternatives of consensus-building and participatory approaches attest that the GOK need to rethink and reorient its vision of mainstream PDev for disadvantaged people.

A central theme of reorientation comes from the belief that donors, technocrats and civil societies represent and are able to transform themselves to speak and act on behalf of the disadvantaged people. In the BEIP, this notion meant that these elites and elite groups can impose their capitalist, bureaucratic, market, elitist, technocratic-managerialist ideals on SMCs/BOGs/PTAs and disadvantaged people. For example, the definition of poverty in purely macro-economic terms as the lack of economic capital, and the 'reduction' of inequality and diversity issues into a discourse of 'fairness' indeed led technocrats to privilege aid assistance over potentials of the disadvantaged people whose lives the BEIP sought to improve. To the extent that these ideals led disadvantaged people to devalue their own humanity, knowledge bases and potentials is sufficient ground to argue that to promote human development in a more balanced way, mainstream PDev must seek to develop the subsistence economies on which the livelihoods of the disadvantaged masses depend. Here, the focus is not on creation of profits and markets but rather the emphasis is on enabling the disadvantaged people to access economic activity (provide waged or unwaged labour) which is their right.

While the findings show that ADev (Brohman, 1996; Burkey, 1993; Friedmann, 1992; Ife, 2002) ideals have the potential to facilitate this new vision, the tendency towards structuralism and the subsequent consequences of neoliberalism, technical expertise and managerialism, mean that the new vision must appropriate and balance between structural and poststructural perspectives to achieve human development. Here, PDev must not uncritically integrate non-contextual strategies for economic growth or capitalist economies that are self-destructive and which integrate development of disadvantaged people to legitimate the status quo. Rather, the new vision must focus on 'alternatives to

development' (Escobar, 1996). Such alternatives may include affirmative action and anti-growth policies based on cooperative, not competitive approaches and peace and non-violence (Ife, 2002).

Other alternatives include developing the informal and subsistence<sup>36</sup> economies of disadvantaged people, which according to Kipnetich (2001) together support about 94% of disadvantaged people. Considering the scarcity of resources and high-levels of poverty, it is unlikely that the GOK will step up to this challenge alone. Thus, a reorientation of PDev vision is imminent to ensure collective and individual rights matter more than economic progress. The vision on alternatives mean that development is not just about reducing poverty through technocratic and micro-economic policies that reduce disadvantaged people to passive recipients of aid, development strategies and decisions designed off-shore. Rather disadvantaged people must be initiators and creators of knowledge and prime movers of their own development. The challenge for PDev is to enable disadvantaged people to unlearn the cultural and apolitical socialisations which make them to devalue their own potentials and knowledge bases.

This transformational process as clearly shown in this research will have to focus on the grassroots as the locale for change. This does not suggest strategies for 'delinking' from government-led development (Frank, 1969) since the government has a responsibility

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<sup>36</sup> The post-independent government adopted a capitalist approach to economic development. Nonetheless, the capitalist and non-capitalist regimes have co-existed with competing, but reinforcing characteristics. Despite capitalist-economies masquerading as the dominant social order in development rhetoric, in practice, subsistence economies are. Kipnetich (2001) explains that the mainstay of Kenyan economy is agriculture. Agriculture employs 70% of the workforce but contributes only of the GDP. There are varied interpretations to this low turnover. One assumes that rural life is dependent on subsistence farming and on income from urban dwellers, who constitute 25% of the population. This means that there is a high dependency ratio. 47% of Kenya's GDP is concentrated in Nairobi, which makes Kenya to have the second worst income disparity in the World after Brazil. In terms of population, the structure of economy in 2001 was: 6% formal, 21% informal and 73% subsistence. It is currently estimated that there is only 1.95 million wage earners with only few benefiting from commercial agriculture. While subsistence economies are blamed for the high dependency, the capitalist school of thought does not say much about the structural factors shown in this research that inhibit development of subsistence economies.

towards its people. Although state-led development contributes to eurocentricism, neoliberalism and technocratic planning, delinking from government-led development 'isolates' disadvantaged people from effective engagement with the political, social and economic structures that govern their lives with consequences of ethnocentricism. To empower the disadvantaged people to be better able to manage their relationship with such structures, it is desirable to entrench the values of participation, cooperation and partnerships into the social change processes. These features will not only strengthen governance, responsibility and accountability but are also critical steps towards realising people-led development as the ultimate goal for mainstream PDev. This means that the new mainstream PDev vision must engender a coalition that privileges people-led development where donors and technocrats must unlearn treating the nation-state as the subject of development.

The challenge in actualising this vision is that current PDev theory assumes that these change agents are capable of transforming themselves through self-reflective methods (Chambers, 1997). Contrary to this view, this research shows that technocrats can (un)consciously enact malign policies through which the government can perpetuate social exclusion, corruption and the abuse of rights. Even where structures for participation and inclusion have been provided, the failure by disadvantaged people to meaningfully participate because of lack of enabling environments and the enforcement of rights means that these features must become central components of mainstream PDev. This is not to downplay the role of the government.

Instead it is to emphasise the important role of governments in policy, planning and human development. Despite the said inadequacies of technocratic policy and planning as was promulgated in the BEIP, this research has shown that technocrats through their views on learning in tandem and argument that the policies they enact lead them to trample on the rights and ignorance of the disadvantaged people have clear indications that there are possibilities for change. These reflective acts by technocrats testify that structures that

create opportunities for disadvantaged people to participate in enacting development programmes-projects that affect them are better able to increase downward responsibility. Participation is likely to doubly enhance democratic practices where disadvantaged people can claim legitimacy for agency based on citizenship and rights agendas. For these reasons, this research has argued that the empowerment of disadvantaged people will largely depend on government partnerships with civil society and local communities (plus youth, women, children and special needs people) and structures whose sensibilities for agency link them to citizenship and rights agendas.

### **Suggestions for Future Research**

This research has shown that grassroots management structures based on representation, technical expertise and aid assistance are no panacea to the emancipation and sustainable development of the disadvantaged people. The contradiction revealed in this research and which remains a challenge is the distinction between PDev and PDem. PDev aims to ensure that the totality of the citizenry, where disadvantaged people are members optimise their participation in economic, social and economic development. This aim supports claims of PDem (Ife, 2002), where all participate directly. While these sensibilities appeared compatible, the former applied to economic development through democratic practices, the latter referred to governance.

In the latter, the consensus is that not all can participate directly in governance (or management). As set out in the pluralist and elitist approaches adopted in the BEIP, this understanding led technocrats to the belief that those who are economically endowed and powerful can 'cede' power by sharing benefits of their economic, political and technocratic knowledge with disadvantaged people. This notion of sharing 'power' (Arnstein, 1971; Ife, 2002) is the root cause of turbulence between management and governance and participation either as democracy, development or both.

The implications of this research's findings on ownership support the view that disadvantaged people are always engaged in their own development in their own ways (Ife, 2002); that power resides with people and cannot be conferred either from the centre outwards, from the state above downwards to the disadvantaged people, from the public to the private sector or from the private to the public sector. These constructions distort the meaning of rights and services. Rights and services are neither accessed on the basis of whether they are public or private but because they are basic needs to humanity. As shown here, all the government, donors and civil society can do is either enhance people's power or deplete it through such constructions. The deleterious effects accruing from these assumptions in practice affirm that mainstream PDev currently lacks clear theoretical frameworks that can support the emancipation of disadvantaged people without further marginalising them. There is therefore a need to develop a theoretical framework that is seen to dismantle these binaries and reinstate a concept of development that values humanity for the essence of being.

This suggests that future research would do well to tease out how PDev based on participation, citizenship and rights perspectives is likely to redefine or dispose of social exclusion, class-based networks and micro-to-macro level inequalities. A key focus for such research would be to consider how age, gender, rights for women, children and youth are defined within particular projects and the relationships of these revelations to the ways these components draw upon constitutional and cultural rights.

As shown in this research, students, youth and women's entitlements are neither spelt out clearly in legal documents nor are such statements sufficient to guarantee a reinforcement of rights in practice, even where participatory and collaborative practices are used. For this reason, future research would do well to investigate the convergence between competition and cooperation and their contribution and effects on mainstream PDev. A critical area of focus should be on the components that enable technocrats to shift away from top-down, technocratic and bureaucratic approaches in favour of the more

cooperative, democratic and bottom-up strategies. A starting point for this investigation would begin by examining how CBOs forge partnerships with broader civil societies (e.g. NGOs) and government to optimise the vision of community-based services, rather than national-based services.

Such research is likely to better illuminate the interplay between global and local perspectives of PDev by overcoming some of the weaknesses of this research. For example, this research was necessarily broad. Depth and breadth were thus compromised when presenting the findings of the themes which emerged. Of particular interest are the themes on empowerment, social change and sustainable development. While this research has demonstrated that these are essential components of mainstream PDev, it has also revealed that little is known by technocrats about how their own nationalist, bureaucratic, technocratic, capitalist and bureaucratic proclivities accentuate inequalities and social exclusion. A focus on the convergence between local and global perspectives of partnerships, democracy, participation, empowerment and transformation is likely to further unravel the potentials and limitations of PDev.

This research has revealed that participation in development particularly by youth in secondary and tertiary institutions of learning and even those who have attained these achievements has remained significantly low. While unemployment is a significant contributing factor, research that focuses on how structural disadvantages affect the participation of youth from disadvantaged communities both in education and development promises interesting findings on the convergence of citizenship, rights and democracy. A key question in this research could investigate the extent to which national education curricular enhance the notion and practice of 'active citizenship' (Hickey, 2002) within and outside institutions of learning.

While this research aimed to valorise perspectives of disadvantaged people, the scope of the BEIP and the complexities of the problems investigated reduced actual interaction with the very disadvantaged people whose lives the intervention was meant to



improve. Indeed most of the parents, teachers, head teachers and members of SMCs/BOGs/PTAs who participated in this research largely identified with the communities within which the schools were located. Their sensibilities also reflected ideals of the disadvantaged communities. Nonetheless, mainstream PDev policy, theory and practice are likely to benefit from future research where the disadvantaged people themselves are targeted as active participants. Such research would benefit more where empowerment and participatory methods of research are appropriated. The researcher's role is to facilitate these communities to originate their own research tools, procedures of data collection and analysis with a view to reducing the deleterious effects of 'extractionist' methods and to highlight the potentials and pitfalls of PDev and participatory research itself. As a start trials could be made with Robert Chambers PRA (Chambers, 1994b, 1994c) as a way of enabling the disadvantaged whose levels of communication is limited by language and low literacy participate actively in research.

Overall, the role of future research is to investigate those salient features and alternatives to development which increase the benefits of wellbeing not just to those who are already endowed and powerful but also to the hitherto excluded and powerless. It is also to unravel those elements of PDev which increase government accountability to the people and community rights and responsibilities through active citizenship without which neither democracy nor sustainable development can be actualised.

### **Concluding Note**

The argument in this thesis is that mainstream PDev has not sufficiently addressed the deleterious effects of structural disadvantages caused by culture, gender, ethnicity/racism and poverty. Mainstream PDev policy, practice and theory attempts to address the structural and rights challenges of disadvantaged people continue to flounder to attain emancipation and sustainable development because technocrats, civil society organizations and bilateral and multilateral organizations have relegated the importance of

inequalities caused by eliticism, bureaucracy, culture, gender, poverty (or class) ethnicity and capitalist economies in colonial inheritor national governments. For this reason, mainstream PDev has continued to heighten power and market shifts to the already powerful, while limiting access to the right of participation, access to economic activity, education, health and water to disadvantaged people.

Ife's deliberative democracy which is an essential component of PDem was largely lacking in the operations of technocrats, particularly where they dealt directly with disadvantaged people. In these cases the binaries of 'uppers' and 'lowers' and 'benefactors' and 'beneficiaries' became the more apparent. These binaries resonate with Pieterse (2001) dichotomic thinking and are symptomatic of the problems of the assumption that the economically endowed and powerful are better able to empower the disadvantaged by spreading benefits of their economic surplus and knowledge to the disadvantaged people (Arnstein, 1971; Ife, 2002).

Contrary to this view, this research has demonstrated that these power brokers will go to great lengths to ensure a power balance through technologies of participation and partnerships in which affirmative actions fail to work because the disadvantaged must compete as equal partners. In this case Ife's principles of cooperation, peace and non-violence find less resonance while consensus-building and consciousness-raising and education succumb to the social exclusionary effects of technical expertise and development managerialism because change agents according to Murunga (2005) face a knowledge challenge "of thinking and acting...with people..." In the BEIP this challenge arose because technocrats failed to make the critical leap Shivji (1999) recommended to Africa in the words "we have to sit back and think and think with the people, and think for ourselves, for as Wamba-dia-Wamba says: 'people think', and not only think, but also act" (cited in Murunga, 2005, p. 10).

The principles of representation, technical expertise and the condition of the disadvantaged people themselves all contributed to a disconnection between the policies

and practices. Pluralist and elitist approaches that informed participation in the BEIP shared concerns for emancipation and social transformation of the disadvantaged people. However, the idea of facilitating participation, partnerships and empowerment through representatives and technical experts faltered because the disadvantaged people could not favourably compete and the representatives were not democratically elected. The reproduction of social inequalities and new centralism means that mainstream PDev co-opts discourses of participation, empowerment and transformation to legitimate opposition while promoting its neoliberal agenda (Cornwall & Brock, 2004).

Since political empowerment cannot be achieved outside of government systems (Brohman, 1996; Friedmann, 1992; Ife, 2002) lest attempts to isolate the disadvantaged people result into ethnic, racial or religious enclaves (Pieterse, 2001), following Ife (2002), this thesis has suggested that balancing between structural and poststructural approaches and between the technical and moral components of development is more likely to achieve positive changes towards emancipation and social transformation.

Effort should be made to forge theoretical and practical cooperation and cooperation between structures and rights-based approaches with a focus on placing decision-making power, responsibilities and services closer to or with the family/communities. Rather than promulgate national unity by demonizing diversity, the focus should be on optimizing local potential and celebrating cultural diversity where it enhances wellbeing. Where culture limits wellbeing and access to collective and individual rights, more contextualised strategies of redress should be sought with a view to having the communities that experience the deleterious effect evolve their own plans so as to enable them to benefit from processes of learning in tandem.

This means democratic, cooperative and peaceful, rather than non-democratic, competitive and violent ways of problem-solving are better able to emancipate and achieve sustainable development (Ife, 2002). Affirmative action policies will go a long way towards realising this aim where the focus is to increase control of the disadvantaged

people over the social, economic and political structures that govern their lives. To enable disadvantaged people to originate and control their own futures, the government must forge strong partnerships with the civil society and the disadvantaged people. Finally, unless the participation, educational, infrastructural, unemployment, poverty and security issues that inhibit disadvantaged people from optimizing their social, economic and political capitals are addressed, emancipation and sustainable development are unlikely. Where the thesis has enhanced understanding of how mainstream PDev policy, practice and theory limit and enhance empowerment and social transformation to disadvantaged people, then it has achieved its purpose.

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## APPENDICES

### Appendix 1: One-on-One Interview Probe Questionnaire

#### Objectives

1. What were your expectations of the GOK/OPEC project?
2. In what ways were your expectations met or not met?
3. What unexpected aspects or gains did you have from the project?
4. What are the conditions or factors that made it possible for those gains?
5. How might you maximize such benefits in future development projects?

#### Management Structure

6. In your opinion would say the BEIP achieved or did not achieve its aims?
7. What was the BEIP expected to do in the participating schools and communities?
8. How were decisions made in the BEIP?
9. How were responsibilities and resources shared?
10. How were the BEIP management structures formed?
11. Generally, how would you describe the stakeholders' meetings, for example of the:
  - i. National Taskforce?
  - ii. Project Steering Committee meetings?
  - iii. Project Planning Committee?
  - iv. Project Coordination Unit?
  - v. District Implementation committee?
  - vi. Boards of Governors/School Management Community/Parents-Teachers Associations?
12. How did women participate in these meetings?
13. What factors would you say encouraged effective meetings?
14. What factor can you say discouraged effective meetings?
15. How would you describe stakeholders' relationships with each other in any other project activities?

## **Participation**

16. How did you experience participation in the BEIP (GOK/OPEC Fund)?
17. In what other ways were you involved in the project?
18. How would you describe the participation of other people who were involved in the (re)design, implementation, monitoring and maintenance)?
19. How did you benefit from your participation and that of others?
20. What aspects of participation would you say are essential to success of the project?
21. What factors would you say helped you to actively participate in this project?
22. How would you have improved your participation?
23. What factors limited your active participation?
24. How did you overcome [deal with] your limiting factors?
25. Suppose you faced those challenges in future. How would you deal with them to ensure your continued participation?

## **Partnerships**

26. What kinds of partnerships prevailed in the BEIP?
27. What were the responsibilities of the different stakeholders?
28. How would you like to see future participatory projects organized?
29. What motives should underlie those projects?
30. What relations would you like to see in those projects?
31. What strategies would you like put in place to realize those relations?
32. What roles should the GOK and other stakeholders play?
33. What other changes would be desirable in these projects?



## Appendix 2: Focus Group Questionnaire for SMCs/BOGs/PTAs

### Round Robin Questions

1. Participation in the GOK/OPEC Means \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
  
2. In the project phases outlined below, I participated in the following ways:
  - i. Design \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
  - ii. Redesign \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
  - iii. Implementation \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
  - iv. Monitoring \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
  - v. Maintenance \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
  - vi. Other tasks/activities that I *did* are \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
  
3. I would have wished to be involved/do the following task although I did not:
  - i. Design \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
  - ii. Redesign \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
  - iii. Implementation \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
  - iv. Monitoring \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
  - v. Maintenance \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
  - vi. Other tasks/activities that I *did not* do are \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
  
4. The following factors enabled me to participate actively in the project activities  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

5. But the following factors limited/hindered/discouraged/worked against my participation\_\_\_\_\_

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6. I overcame my limiting factors in the following ways\_\_\_\_\_

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7. In my view the following roles that I did are essential to the project\_\_\_\_\_

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because\_\_\_\_\_

but the following ones are not essential \_\_\_\_\_

8. \_\_\_\_\_

because\_\_\_\_\_

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9. The outlined groups of stakeholders performed the following roles:

i. Officers from Ministry of Education, Science and Technology\_\_\_\_\_

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ii. The Donor\_\_\_\_\_

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iii. District Implementation Committees \_\_\_\_\_

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iv. SMCs/BOGs\_\_\_\_\_

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v. Parents\_\_\_\_\_

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vi. Teachers\_\_\_\_\_

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- vii. Men \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_
- viii. Women \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_
- ix. Other people \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

10. How were decisions in the SMC/BOG meetings made? For example:  
 According to \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_ or based on \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

11. How were responsibilities/tasks and resources shared? Responsibilities/tasks and resources were shared in the following ways \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

12. In my view SMC meetings were well run because \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 But I would also say they were not well run because \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

13. The following factors encouraged us to work as a team \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_ but the following factors discouraged us from working as a team \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_ Participation in the project was essential to me in the following ways \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_ and to the project in the following ways \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

14. By participating I expected to benefit by \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_ which, I did not get but I also benefited by \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ which, I  
did not expect. I would like to see the following strategies put in place in future  
participatory projects \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ to enable me participate in the  
following ways \_\_\_\_\_

15. Briefly describe the decision-making process you would like to see in future project. I  
would like to see decisions made in the following way(s) \_\_\_\_\_

16. In my view the following relations should exist in future projects \_\_\_\_\_

17. I would expect the following benefits for me \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ and the  
project \_\_\_\_\_

### Appendix 3: Moderator's Guide for Focus Group Discussion Template

Date [            ]  Day [            ]	Moderator's Name: Josephine Mwanzia		Total Time: <b>3 Hours</b> <b>0 Minutes</b> Duration: 9.00 -12.00	
	Participants: SMC/BOG/PTA/DIU (Circle as appropriate)			
Topic	Focus Group Session _____		Duration [Minutes]	Start at
	Description	Aids		
Introduction			10	9.00
Warm-up discussion			5	9.10
Objectives			10	9.15
Management Structures			30	9.25
Participation			30	9.55
<b>Break</b>	<b>Break</b>	<b>Break</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>10.25</b>
Partnerships			30	10.35
Empowerment			20	11.05
Sustainability			30	11.25
Transformation			5	11.55

**Appendix 4: SMC/BOG/PTA\* Meeting Observation Sheet**

**Time:** \_\_\_\_\_ **Duration** \_\_\_\_\_ **Date:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Place [School]:** \_\_\_\_\_

<p align="center"><b>Descriptive Notes</b></p> <p>[Portraits of participants, a reconstruction of a dialogue, a description of the physical setting, accounts of particular events or activities]</p>	<p align="center"><b>Reflective Notes</b></p> <p>[Researcher’s personal thoughts such as speculation, feelings, problems, ideas, hunches, impressions and prejudices]</p>
<p>*Circle as appropriate</p>	

### Appendix 5: Other Observations at the Research Site

Observational Field notes for _____ (activity, behaviour, etc) Setting: _____ Observer: Josephine Mwanzia Role of observer: Observer of _____ Time: _____, Date: _____ Length of Observation: _____ [Hours; Minutes]		
Time	Description	Reflective Notes (insights, hunches, themes)



**School of Education**  
**Te P tāhitanga o te M tauranga**

**Appendix 6: Consent Form for One-on-One Interviewees**

**Title of the Project:**

[I have been given an explanation and I have understood the objectives of this research project]

[I have had an opportunity to ask questions and have them answered to my satisfaction]

[I understand that I may withdraw myself (or any information I have provided) from this project when I have the need to do so before the data is analyzed, without having to give reasons and without penalty and that my views or the data will not be included in the final report if I withdraw]

[I understand that any information I provide will be kept confidential to the researcher, the supervisors and the person who transcribes the interview audiotapes and group discussions]

[I understand that photographs bearing my image if used in the report will be blotted out to conceal association of identity with me]

[I understand that the published results in academic and professional journals will not use my name]

[I understand that no opinions will be attributed to me in any way that will identify me]

[I understand that the tape-recorded interviews will be electronically wiped five years after project is concluded unless I indicate that I would like to have them returned to me, and that the verbatim transcribed data will be securely stored and destroyed five year after the project]

[I understand that I will have an opportunity to check the transcripts of the interview or participant observation notes and that I will be invited for a meta-evaluation meeting with the researcher as an individual/group (delete as appropriate) before publication (Please check the box against this statement (like this✓) if you wish to get feedback]

[I agree to take part in this research]

**Signed:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Name(s) of Participant:** \_\_\_\_\_

**(Please print clearly) Date:** \_\_\_\_\_





**School of Education**  
**Te P tāhitanga o te M tauranga**

**Appendix 7: Consent Form for Focus Group Interviewees**

**Title of the Project:**

[I have been given an explanation and I have understood the objectives of this research project]

[I have had an opportunity to ask questions and I have had them answered to my satisfaction]

[I understand that photographs illustrating my participation in focus group discussions will be kept confidential to the researcher and that the image will be blotted out to conceal association of identity with me]

[I understand that the published results in academic and professional journals will not bear my real picture but blotted images and or illustrations in the form of drawings]

[I understand that the pictures will be kept in soft and hard copies and that they will be destroyed five years after project is concluded unless I indicate that I would like to have them returned to me]

[I understand that I will have an opportunity to check the photographs and that I will be invited for a meta-evaluation meeting with the researcher as an individual/group (delete as appropriate) to audit the photographs before publication (Please check the box against this statement (like this✓) if you wish to get feedback]

[I agree to be photographed/I consent that the researcher can take images of the research site]

**Signed:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Name(s) of Participant:** \_\_\_\_\_

**(Please print clearly) Date:** \_\_\_\_\_

Appendix 8: Research Proposal Letter of Approval



School of Education Studies  
Te Kura Akoranga Matauranga

28 July 2005

Josephine Mwanzia  
4/43 Cooper Street  
Karori  
Wellington

Dear Josephine

**PROPOSAL 05/43(PH)R**

Thank you for your research proposal. This is a fascinating proposal for a very worthwhile and appropriate PhD study of Kenyan development projects which I am pleased to approve, with a recommendation that you consider the comments, which are enclosed, together with a copy of your proposal.

Congratulations and best wishes.

Yours sincerely *All the best for your research Josephine!*



Dr Lise Claiborne  
Research Committee

Cc Rob Strathdee

## Appendix 9: Ethics Letter of Approval



School of Education Studies  
Te Kura Akoranga Matauranga

30 August 2005

Josephine Mwanzia  
4/43 Cooper Street  
Karori  
Wellington

Dear Josephine

**RE: Your ethics application AARP/SOES/2005/18, 1 August 2005**

I am pleased to advise you that your ethics application, 2005/18, with its subsequent amendments, has been approved.

Best wishes for the completion of your research.

Yours Sincerely



Dr Lex McDonald  
Convenor, School of Education Studies Human Ethics Committee

Cc Rob Strathdee

10/25  
20/25  
25/25  
25/25  
25/25

## Appendix 10: Letter Authorizing Research

### MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY

Telegrams: EDUCATION", Nairobi

Fax No.  
Telephone: 318581  
When replying please quote



JOGOO HOUSE  
HARAMBEE AVENUE  
P. O. Box 30040  
NAIROBI  
KENYA

**MOEST 13/001/35C 452/2**

**31<sup>st</sup> August, 2005**

**Josphine Syokau Mwanzia  
4/43 Cooper Street  
University of Victoria Wellington  
United Kingdom**

Dear Madam

#### **RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION**

Please refer to your application for authority to conduct research on "Stakeholders participation in donor assisted development projects in Kenya: basic Education Improvement Project (BEIP), Government of Kenya and The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) Fund".

I am pleased to inform you that you have been authorized to conduct research in all districts in Kenya for a period ending 20<sup>th</sup> February, 2006.

You are advised to report to The Government Officers of the Government Departments you will visit before embarking on your research project.

Upon completion of your research you are expected to submit two copies of your research findings to this office.

Yours faithfully

**B.O. ADEWA  
FOR: PERMANENT SECRETARY**



Appendix 11: Research Clearance Permit

PAGE 2

PAGE 3

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT:

Prof./Dr./Mr./Mrs./Miss JOSEPHINE SYOKAU  
MWANZIA

of (Address) 4/43 COOPER STREET  
KARORI WELLINGTON NEW ZEALAND

has been permitted to conduct research in \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ Location,  
ALL District,  
ALL Province,

on the topic STAKEHOLDERS PARTICIPATION  
IN DONOR ASSISTED DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS  
IN KENYA: BASIC EDUCATION IMPROVEMENT  
PROJECT (BEIP)

for a period ending 20TH FEBRUARY, 20 06

Research Permit No. MOEST 13/001/35C 452

Date of issue 31 - 08 - 2005

Fee received SHS 1000



*[Handwritten Signature]*  
B.O. ADEWA

Applicant's  
Signature

FOR

Permanent Secretary  
Ministry of Education  
Science and Technology

CONDITIONS

1. You must report to the District Commissioner and the District Education Officer of the area before embarking on your research. Failure to do that may lead to the cancellation of your permit.
2. Government Officers will not be interviewed without prior appointment.
3. No questionnaire will be used unless it has been approved.
4. Excavation, filming and collection of biological specimens are subject to further permission from the relevant Government Ministries.
5. You are required to submit at least two (2)/four(4) bound copies of your final report for Kenyans and non-Kenyans respectively.
6. The Government of Kenya reserves the right to modify the conditions of this permit including its cancellation without notice.



REPUBLIC OF KENYA

RESEARCH CLEARANCE  
PERMIT